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Three Scenes of Sovereignty and Power

© Etel SolingenUniversity of California Irvine

Paper presented at the conference in honor of Stephen D. Krasner(Princeton, October 1-2, 2010). For inclusion in Back to Basics: RethinkingPower in the Contemporary World, edited by Martha Finnemore and Judith

Goldstein

The concepts of sovereignty and power provide a leitmotif in Krasner’scontributions to international relations. The incisive and original insights of sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy” have helped illuminate importantdilemmas in world politics.1 Power influences the repertoire of responses todilemmas of sovereignty. 2 In turn, how states manage dilemmas of sovereignty also hold important implications for power. I explore the

reciprocal relationship between sovereignty compromises and power by

1Note: Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at a conferenceorganized by Judith Goldstein and Martha Finnemore (Stanford University)and at the 2010 APSA meeting. I would like to acknowledge the editors,discussants John Meyer and Ron Hassner, and conference and panelparticipants for helpful comments. The discussion of China’s sovereigntydilemmas benefited from personal interviews in Shanghai (September 2009,December 2009) and Beijing (September 2009 and July 2010).

Krasner (2009:180) defines interdependence sovereignty as “the ability of

public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people,pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.” This sovereigntycategory is exclusively concerned with control and not authority, withcapacity to regulate trans-border flows and their domestic impact, a capacityarguably diminished under globalization. Elsewhere Krasner (2009:15)subsumes “interdependence sovereignty” under “domestic sovereignty,” orthe ability of political authorities to control a state’s authority structure andlegitimacy within and across its borders effectively. Westphalian/Vatteliansovereignty accepts states as juridically independent, autonomous, notsubject to external authority (2009:15), a concept that negates the right of states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Westphalian

sovereignty is “the exclusion of external actors from authority structureswithin a given territory” (2009:179).2 Krasner (1976) defines power as a resource or attribute, more specificallyas economic capabilities (size, per capita income, shares of world trade andinvestment flows). Krasner’s (1999) book on sovereignty commonly refers to“power asymmetries” as a relational concept--getting others to do somethingthey would otherwise not do--or the ability to determine outcomes, to coerceand control.

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zooming in and out of three different scenes of contemporary internationalrelations: the ascent of China as a great power, variations in regionalism,and the evolving non-proliferation regime. These three realms areparticularly suitable for a volume addressing Krasner’s contributions: theyoffer fruitful arenas for investigating two master variables in his work; they

are crucial themes in the contemporary study and praxis of internationalrelations, in line with Krasner’s own interest in both theory and policy; andthey address various levels of analysis--domestic structures, rulers, states,entire regions, and international regimes--relevant to his own contributions.3

Scene 1 focuses on a single state, China’s shifting sovereignty compromisesin tandem with its ascent to power. Scene 2 turns to the regional level toilluminate divergent sovereignty compromises in the Middle East and EastAsia, with attendant consequences for aggregate regional power. Scene 3explores how both vastly compromised sovereignty and power asymmetrieshave influenced the evolution of the international non-proliferation regime.

Dilemmas stemming from sovereignty as an organizing principle of

international relations can lead states to compromises that are sometimesinherently contradictory or hard to reconcile; in Krasner’s terms, hypocritical.Organized hypocrisy is characteristic of the international environmentbecause of asymmetries in state power and because rulers must beresponsive to domestic norms that are not always fully compatible withinternational ones (1999:3, 2009:211). The analytical point of departure inthis chapter centers on incentives of ruling coalitions to assert orcompromise different forms of sovereignty. Those incentives andcorresponding compromises stem from ruling coalitions’ favored models of political survival no less than from international power considerations.4 Inturn, different sovereignty compromises can enhance or diminish

international power as well as the domestic power of ruling coalitions. It isnot merely that different states vary in their relative power at time t , when agiven hypocritical behavior might be observed (this might be labeled spatialor horizontal power differentials among states). It is also the case that states’power can vary dramatically from t to t+1 (leading to temporal orlongitudinal power differentials for the same state), influencing leaders’incentives to alter sovereignty compromises. As the three scenes below

3 Regions per se may not have been central to Krasner’s work but thepolitical economy of industrializing regions and their relationship to theindustrialized core has been and remains one of his core themes (Krasner

1985). Middle Eastern oil economies were also a special focus in Krasner(1978).4 Internationalizing models rely on growth and economic performance viaintegration into the global economy whereas inward-looking models rely onautonomous “self-sufficiency” (Solingen 1998). The two ideal-types alsodiffer in the extent to which states replace or enhance markets. Therelationship between states and markets, and economic openness versusclosure, have been central to Krasner’s work.

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suggest, sovereignty compromises both reflect and transform the power of leaders, states, regions, and global order. “Transform” does not implyuniform effects. The reciprocal relationship between sovereignty and poweris complex.

Scene 1: The ascent of ChinaAs with other rising hegemons, China’s ascent to power wasaccompanied by shifting dilemmas regarding interdependence andWestphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Mao’s autarchic model of politicalsurvival--congruent with high Westphalian and interdependencesovereignty--condemned China to lower levels of international power at timet (1950s-1960s) than it might have otherwise accrued.5 Subsequent effortsto integrate China in the global political economy--the road to WTOmembership--introduced greater strain into that coherence.6 China’sinternationalizing ruling coalition--departing from Mao’s model of politicalsurvival--was now becoming bound by global rules and felt compelled to

“reconceptualize” sovereignty to reconcile it with domestic expectations.“Self-reliance” and “autonomy”--Westphalian sovereignty’s core (Krasner2009:183)--could no longer provide a coherent motto for an economyincreasingly dependent on external (including Japanese) markets, capital,investment, technology, and expertise. In an effort to reconcile this dilutionof sovereignty with the concept’s continued domestic appeal, Deng Xiaopingand his successors unleashed the (synergistic) dual promise of individualwealth ( xianfuqilai) and national power. In Premier Wen Jiabao’s words,“development is the last word; it is not only the basis for resolving allinternal problems but is also the basis for boosting our diplomatic power. Thebasis of competition between states lies in power” (Medeiros 2009:15).

Those compromises indeed made China more powerful at t+1 (2000s)but also increased tensions between praxis and continued rhetorical supportfor sovereignty norms. Without challenging their legitimacy, China’sinternationalizing leaders violated those norms in a much deeper way. Yet, interms of Krasner’s modalities of sovereignty compromises, these wereconcessions by invitation—conventions, contracts, international economic

5 Mao’s autarchic model--reacting to “100 years of shame and humiliation”by the West and Japan--denounced external coercion and infringements onsovereignty (Medeiros 2009). The model was less congruent when it came toother countries’ sovereignty, endorsing revolutions throughout the

developing world. Another inconvenient incongruence were secret protocols(1950) giving the Soviet Union extraterritorial economic privileges in China(Johnston 2008:206).6 Sovereignty compromises, in China as elsewhere, evolved over time,sometimes cyclically. Organized hypocrisy was typical of imperial China,where behavior inconsistent with Confucian norms was reinterpreted fordomestic audiences (Krasner 2009:222). Late 20th century compromises,though of a different kind, were nothing new for China.

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institutions--rather than coercion. Conveniently, compromising sovereigntyto capitalist international institutions also raised the costs of futuredefections by domestic opponents of internationalization and privateenterprise (Johnston 2008:209). Sovereignty compromises, in other words,strengthened the leadership domestically as well.

Those compromises were not circumscribed to the economic arena.China’s aversion to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as hypocritical, unfair,and discriminatory (Gill 2010:5) was congruent with Mao’s energetic defenseof self-reliance and autonomy. Preventing other states from following China’sown development of nuclear weapons would have entailed extremehypocrisy for a regime self-identified with disenfranchised developing statesseeking to redress discriminatory practices. Thus, Mao’s China recognizedthe sovereign right of states to acquire nuclear weapons and its own right toshare nuclear technology even with potential proliferators. The road to WTOmembership, however, subordinated sovereignty claims to internationalexpectations of behavior compatible with an internationalizing model.

Whereas Mao’s model considered the Biological Weapons Convention “afraud of sham disarmament” in the early 1970s, China acceded to thisconvention by 1984 (Kent 2007). In 1985 it unilaterally accepted IAEAsafeguards on part of its civilian nuclear program and conditioned its nuclearexports on recipients’ acceptance of IAEA safeguards. By the early 1990s itbegan complying with obligations to report nuclear exports to the IAEA andaccepting CWC and IAEA verification, including on-site inspections.Progressive compliance was not linear. Yet securing economic aid from Japan, restoring international legitimacy after Tiananmen Square, demandsfrom the scientific community, among others, led China to sign the NPT in1992. While China had once shared sensitive nuclear technology with

Pakistan, in 1998 it joined other UNSC permanent members in condemningPakistan’s (and India’s) nuclear tests.7 In 2004 China joined the NuclearSuppliers Group--which some developing countries consider an internationalcartel--and supported UNSC Resolution 1540 strengthening domestic exportcontrols.

China’s ascent to power, steered by its leaders’ internationalizingmodel, imposed new responsibilities and compromises but did not requiresacrificing sovereignty all around. Indeed China’s assertion of sovereigntyover its own nuclear arsenal arguably grew stronger as it rose in power. Testing nuclear weapons at t (1964) was congruent with Mao’s strongassertions of sovereignty; and “minimal deterrence”--forged under the

economic hardships of autarchy--did the job. At t+1, however, far greatermaterial resources (power as attribute?) led China to uphold its sovereignright to upgrade nuclear capabilities and deflect demands for transparency innuclear and conventional modernization, arguing that weaker powers mustkeep stronger powers guessing (Gill 2010). Nuclear Zero proposals could

7 A more recent agreement with Pakistan followed other states’ bending of nuclear export rules on behalf of India.

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limit nuclear sovereignty and raise the political costs of modernizing nucleararsenals, particularly for a global power asserting its “peaceful rise.”

China thus became more deeply implicated in differential adherence tosovereignty principles across issue-areas. The sovereign right to nuclearweapons (self-defense) and the sovereign right to economic self-reliance

were more in synch at t, under Mao. The sovereign right to upgrade nucleararsenals at t+1 appears less compatible with charm offensives within andbeyond the region, and with budding leadership positions in regional andinternational forums, from the G-20 to the BRICs. Nor do sovereigntycompromises vis-à-vis international economic institutions carry over to thoseadvancing democracy and human rights. Tensions in sovereigntycompromises are evident across and within issue-areas. The sovereign rightof others to develop nuclear weapons was endorsed at t but disparaged att+1.

Even the means to dampen horizontal proliferation evolved in tandemwith China’s ascent to power. While continuing to extol sovereignty

rhetorically, China’s policies regarding sanctions on proliferating statesreveal mounting fissures. Sanctions were once deemed serious violations of non-interference under Mao’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,”reacting to “hegemonistic” Soviet and Western dictates to China (ICG2009:13). Yet China began endorsing UNSC resolutions sanctioning NorthKorea and Iran since 2006, not once but seven times. Even if they were lessbiting than others might have preferred, they nonetheless signaledrelaxation of sovereignty norms. Growing tension between rhetoric andaction emanate, here as well, from dilemmas internationalizing leaders facefrom within and without. Oil and natural resources are crucial to breakneckeconomic growth and, hence, to Chinese leaders’ own political survival.

Upholding Iran’s sovereignty over the full nuclear fuel cycle--includingenrichment--helps trade and investment in Iran’s oil and gas but also createstensions with Saudi Arabia, China’s top oil supplier, Arab Gulf partners, theUS and Europe. Nor can China benefit from Iran’s threatened destabilizationof strategic maritime lanes that provide it with crucial inputs for continuedgrowth.8

China’s support for limited sanctions on North Korea following its 2006first nuclear test also depart from previous practice even if compliance hasbeen selective, reluctant, and intermittent, reflecting another multifacetedchallenge. A destabilizing (sovereign) nuclear North Korea is not China’spreferred outcome, but neither is it the least preferred. North Korea’s

collapse; an assertive unified and sovereign Korean peninsula; or an evenmore intrusive US presence in Northeast Asia are all worse than the status-quo.9 Thus, policies vis-à-vis North Korea--a crucial test of China’s adherenceto sovereignty--reveal inconsistencies. In 2003 officials described China’s

8 As expressed by Ambassador Wang Guangya after endorsing UNSCsanctions against Iran in 2006 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/tpxw/morefotos/2006/t284890.htm#>.

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positions as consistently opposing sanctions and coercion.10 However,following North Korea’s first nuclear test, China approved UNSC resolution1718 invoking Chapter VII (though barring the use of force under Article 41),while opposing cargo inspections. After North Korea’s 2009 second nucleartest, China endorsed UNSC resolution 1874 calling to “inspect and destroy all

banned cargo,” financial sanctions, asset freezes, targeted travel bans (arare concession), and blocking trade in nuclear and missile components.China’s representative called this a “balanced reaction of the SecurityCouncil” while urging respect for North Korea’s “sovereignty, territorialintegrity and legitimate security concerns.” Only after it returned to the NPT,Chinese officials now argued, would North Korea enjoy the right to peacefuluse of nuclear energy. Meanwhile China would “implement the resolutionearnestly.”11 Increased instability in North Korea related to Kim dynasticsuccession led China to water down UN sanctions following the sinking of theSouth Korean warship Cheonang.

These linguistic and behavioral contortions reveal new compromises

aimed at aligning rhetoric of sovereignty with endorsement of sanctions, atleast de jure. China’s leaders viewed this shift as reflecting responsibilities of an emerging global power (ICG 2009:13). Furthermore, while opposingforceful “regime change,” they sought to persuade Kim Jong-Il to transformNorth Korea’s authority structures and basis of legitimacy through China-style reforms and international economic openness. This was by any othername another departure from Westphalian sovereignty, one that mightconveniently redress reputational losses incurred by China’s leaders everytime North Korea reneges on promises to denuclearize through China-sponsored Six-Party Talks. Reputational costs--international and domestic--led an influential group of Chinese experts to strongly endorse sanctions,

countering constituencies adamantly guarding North Korea’s “sovereign”right to nuclear weapons (ICG 2009:5). These competing demands explainChina’s tortuous efforts to square the sovereignty circle; its tentativeapplication--and lax implementation--of sanctions; its stated agreement withthe Proliferation Security Initiative’s mission, even as it refuses to join it; andits contested interpretation of UNSC resolutions as compatible with enhancedtrade, investments and aid to North Korea and Iran (Shen 2009).

In Krasner’s (2009:211) familiar formulation, the logic of consequences--maximizing leaders’ political survival--has thus far gainedground over the logic of appropriateness (non-intervention) in both theIranian and North Korean theaters. Even mild interventionist steps reveal

that political expediency trumps normative consistency as China urges Iran

9 Solingen (EAI, 2010). China perceives the influx of North Korean refugeesinto Yanbian as fueling Korean irredentism.10 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t29000.htm>.11 < http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>; NTI, Globalsecurity Newswire, “U.S. Says North Korean Blast "Probably" Nuclear,” June16, 2009

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to provide unimpeded access to IAEA inspectors, ratify the AdditionalProtocol, and suspend enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water-relatedactivities; and urges North Korea to reform its economy and abandon nuclearweapons while publicly acknowledging that “the dual track [carrot-and-stick]strategy is the right one.”12 On sanctions, as with sovereignty norms more

generally, China’s rise has compelled compromises intended to signal itsnew reputation as a “responsible major power” (fuzeren de daguo).13

Reputational considerations may derive from norms, instrumentalities orboth, and as Keohane (2009:10) argues, it can be difficult to identify which isendogenous to the other (“observational equivalence).” Leaders may bepaying lip service to norms they don’t necessarily believe in, using them asrationalization for ulterior preferences, but they may also be acting inresponse to role expectations--at home and abroad--of an emergingsuperpower.

In sum, China’s ascent to power provides a window into evolving shiftsin magnitude and forms of compromised Westphalian sovereignty. It

illuminates evolving “solutions” to tensions induced by sovereignty normsacross the domestic-international divide, across issue-areas, across different norms in the same issue-area, within the same norm over time, acrosssuccessive ruling coalitions, and across domestic constituencies. Sovereigntynorms conflicted with other norms and interests contemporaneously(spatially) and over time (longitudinally), as the power transition from t tot+1 confronted Chinese leaders with new norms, expectations, and interests. These continue to exert pressures for new sovereignty compromises. Whilenavigating through dilemmas of a fledging superpower, rhetorical allegianceto sovereignty remains deeply engrained among some domesticconstituencies. As Krasner (2009:213) argued, leaders may heed to

constituents’ normative concerns for the (consequential) purpose of stayingin power. This explains Chinese leaders’ uncompromising response to Japanover the maritime incident in September 2010 and their line-in-the sandwhen it comes to protecting every bit of domestic sovereignty fromcentrifugal tendencies (Taiwan, Tibet , Xinjiang) and external intrusion intofundamental domestic authority structures (democracy and human rights).14

12 Chinese Foreign Minister Hopes Iran, IAEA 'Step Up' Consultation, AFPDecember 5, 2007, World News Connection).13 On Chinese leaders’ concern with China’s reputation as underlying its shifttoward CTBT endorsement, see Johnston (2008:113). Both expected material

benefits (access to trade, aid, technology, and investment) and symbolicreasons drive China’s concern with reputation according to Medeiros(2009:17).14 Krasner (2001:28) suggests that Chinese and Tibetans might be better off if Tibet regains some of the autonomy it had as a tributary state under China’sempire, yet domestic resistance pivoted on sovereignty norms hasprevented that outcome. On the connection between “losing Taiwan” and“losing power,” see Johnston (2008:210).

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Of all dilemmas of sovereignty posed by China’s rise, perceived threats todomestic sovereignty are second to none in the leadership’s struggle forpolitical survival.

Scene 2: Sovereignty Constructs: Within and Cross-RegionalVariation

Variations in sovereignty compromises can also be observed at theregional level, with attendant consequences for aggregate regional power.International legal sovereignty was challenged both in East Asia and theMiddle East circa the mid-20th century (t). Exception for Taiwan, legalrecognition of states became the norm in East Asia by t+1 but remainedmore challenged in the Middle East, particularly vis-à-vis Israel but also inthe inter-Arab and Arab-Iranian arenas. Domestic and interdependencesovereignty also endured comparable challenges in both regions at t butremained more challenged at t+1 in the Middle East. Cross-regional variationcan also be detected with respect to Westphalian sovereignty compromisesincurred through participation in the global political economy, and those

incurred through participation in regional institutional frameworks. In Europethe two kinds--global and regional-evolved if not in complete synchrony atleast in the same general direction: toward progressive acceptance of greater external intrusion on domestic authority structures. East Asia revealsgrowing acquiescence with sovereignty losses vis-à-vis global institutionsover time, accrued in connection with outward-oriented economic models. These were largely voluntary losses, or in Krasner’s terms, “by invitation.” Yet East Asian states were both far more reluctant to bear sovereignty lossesto regional institutions, and far more sensitive to neighboring intervention ineach others’ domestic affairs, keeping such intrusions at relatively low levels.Middle East states, conversely, exhibited far lower tolerance for sovereignty

losses stemming both from participation in the global political economy andin regional institutions. Uninvited intervention in neighbors’ domestic affairs,however, was rampant.

The contrast between the two regions is particularly intriguing becausethey shared many common initial conditions as industrializing regions at t :colonialism, state-building challenges, economic crises, stagnation, collapse,low per-capita GNPs, heavy-handed authoritarianism, widespread poverty,human rights violations, vast gender inequities, high illiteracy andunemployment, ethnic clashes and civil wars, low intra and extra-regionaleconomic interdependence, weak or non-existing regional institutions, andlong coastal lines suitable for trade. Its much higher share of land dominated

by temperate climate would have predicted higher growth potential for theMiddle East. Elbadawi (2005:319) suggests that the subsequent divergentevolution of the two regions confirms that economic growth requiresdeliberate and strategic intervention by states. Endowments not alwaysmaterialize in greater power, as Finnemore and Goldstein suggest. Bothregions also shared norms emphasizing family, literacy and community.Some imputed East Asia’s rapid development to those norms but why theywould lack comparable effects in the Middle East remains unclear. Both

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regions also exhibited high intra-regional diversity although East Asiaseemed more internally diverse in language, ethnicity, religion, levels of development and regime type (democratic or authoritarian). Much of theMiddle East shared Arabic language and culture, entrenchedauthoritarianism, and an overwhelmingly Islamic character despite ethnic,

tribal, and communal diversity. Yet, counterintuitively, East Asia’s higherintra-regional diversity did not preclude much higher levels of regionalcooperation and restraint in cross-border interventions over time than in aless diverse Middle East.

How can the puzzle of differential sovereignty compromises at theregional and global levels be explained? And what were the implications of those compromises for aggregate regional power? In line with the argumentdeveloped above for China, East Asian internationalizing leaders madesignificant sovereignty concessions as they deepened ties to the globalpolitical economy. The typical model of political survival--incepted by Japanand emulated by “tigers” and “cubs” even before China--hinged on economic

performance and growth fueled by export-led manufacturing and promotionof private enterprise. This pioneering model, adopted while much of theindustrializing world remained steeped in dependency models (Krasner1981), required sovereignty compromises to facilitate access to internationalcapital, technology, markets, and investments. It thus enabled greaterintrusion such as conditionality arrangements by international institutions,foreign powers (including erstwhile colonial power Japan), and private banksand corporations. By contrast, the reigning Middle East model followingEgypt’s 1952 revolution and its equivalents elsewhere hinged on inward-looking self-sufficiency, nationalism, and state and military entrepreneurship,buttressed by oil rents where available. This model required--from the

standpoint of domestic political survival--minimal sovereignty losses vis-a-visinternational institutions, foreign powers, and private corporations (highWestphalian autonomy).

Different domestic ruling coalitions linking state and private actorsunderwrote models in each region.15 Politically stronger beneficiaries of relative closure, import-substitution, militarization, and natural resourcemonopolies--mostly within the state itself--could veto alternative models inthe Middle East for decades. Furthermore, sovereignty losses to extra-regional actors (state or private) were particularly sensitive because rulingcoalitions relied heavily on anti-colonial rhetoric and pan-Arab norms of autonomy as sources of legitimacy.16 Neither model characterized all cases

15 On permissive and catalytic conditions explaining the origins of thesemodels, see Solingen (2007b and 2009a).16 Anti-colonialism cannot easily explain differential approaches to the globaleconomy because both regions were subjected to colonial domination,occupation, and exploitation. China’s yoke under colonial powers, Japan’scolonial violence in its region and its own occupation by the US, andVietnam’s repeated victimization are only some instances of colonial

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in its region but each captures Weberian ideal-types. Most East Asian statesevolved into market-friendly developmental states emphasizing performancein international markets as yardsticks for success (Stiglitz 1996; Haggard2004; McIntyre and Naughton 2005). The contrast with the typical MiddleEast predatory state is clear, over and beyond differences in natural resource

endowments and authoritarian forms (praetorian versus monarchic).17

Hightariffs and non-tariff barriers, import-substitution, extensive state andmilitary entrepreneurship, and weakened private sector transcended thosedifferences.18

Both regional models became self-reinforcing via path-dependentmechanisms that strengthened beneficiaries in each case. Path-dependencyimplies lasting legacies that reproduce political forces invested in extantinstitutional arrangements and “increasing returns” whereby actors reinforcethe model’s logic, alternatives are dismissed, and institutions magnifyexisting patterns of power distribution (Krasner 1999:61-2; Thelen 1999;Pierson 2000). Chatelus (1987:111) emphasizes overwhelming incentives by

Middle East dominant groups to retain rents and disincentives to shift toproductive activities. Beblawi and Luciani (1987:16) describe the “perceptionof a lack of any politically accepted alternative. Although rejection of export-led growth may not have been unusual for the 1960s, Middle East states alsoresisted subsequent opportunities: the 1970s oil windfalls featuringprominently in Krasner’s work, the 1980s crises, the global transformationsof the 1990s and consequent dramatic expansion of capital flows (Owen andPamuk 1998; Henry and Springborg 2001:44-5; Halliday 2005:264,295). Theshare of FDI to all developing countries captured by Middle East statesdeclined from 11.6 (1990) to 2.1 (mid-1990s) and 1 percent (2001)(Hakimian 2001:89; AHDR 2002:87). Recent reforms might reverse this trend

but trade liberalization has not yet transformed deep seated anti-exportbiases with some exceptions (Galal and Hoekman 2003; Hoekman andSekkat 2009).

Different sovereignty compromises are also evident in intra-regionalrelations. State sovereignty became far more problematic in the Middle Eastunder the pincer movement of inward-looking, self-sufficiency political-economy models and transnational pan-Arab allegiances. Both influencedregional institutional arrangements and the high incidence of interventions ineach other’s domestic affairs. Middle East leaders launched import-substitution to achieve rapid industrialization via robust entrepreneurialstates, decreased reliance on international markets, and redistribution. Yet

oppression in East Asia.17 Developmental states usher in industrial transformation; predatory statesundercut it even in the narrow sense of capital accumulation (Evans 1995).On MENA’s common features and the strong case for treating the region as aunit, see Abed and Davoodi (2003).18 Hakimian (2001); AHD Reports (2002-2009); Galal and Hoekman (2003);Elbadawi (2005); Noland and Pack (2005).

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this model unintentionally depleted states’ resources and ossified thepolitical machinery--often the military--that controlled them. As chief beneficiaries of import-substitution and state entrepreneurship, military-industrial complexes perpetuated their rents under the aura of militaryprowess, nationalist myths, and pan-Arab symbols (Bill and Springborg 2000;

Dawisha 2003). Drained and entropic states could not deliver resources toconstituencies previously mobilized through revolutionary nationalist fervor. Thus external conflict, nationalist rhetoric and intervention in neighboringstates became effective substitutes for deflecting coups and enhancingdomestic legitimacy. As Halliday (2005:291), following Tilly, contends“Middle Eastern states are in essence…based on the use and threat of force,” prone to deploy violence at home and abroad (Dodge 2002:177).19

Inward-looking Middle East models had an inherent tendency towardcompetitive-outbidding among “truer” versions of the ideal-type. Reinforcedby pan-Arab rhetoric, they fuelled mutual assaults on sovereignty.20

Individual Arab states were not the highest locus of political identification

and legitimacy; colonialism was blamed not for incorrect border demarcationbut for conceiving of borders at all (Gause 1992). Pan-Arab (qawmiyyah) andpan-Islamic norms weakened the legitimacy of sovereign statehood(watanyyiah), stimulating mutual challenges to sovereignty, subversion of neighbouring rulers, cross-border militarized conflicts, political unificationschemes, and violent campaigns for ideological “homogenization” acrossstates.21 Such challenges became rarer in East Asia as internationalizingmodels took hold. Noble (1991:75) notes that “Arab governments reliedprimarily on unconventional coercive techniques…strong attacks on theleadership of other states, propaganda campaigns to mobilize opposition,and intense subversive pressures, including cross-frontier alliances with

dissatisfied individuals and groups” to destabilize and overthrow opposinggovernments. Sovereignty was little else but “organized hypocrisy” in aregional environment where competing claims--kawmiya/ watanyia--couldhardly co-exist easily together.

Nasser’s junta benefited from external confrontations, divertingattention from severe domestic economic crisis by attacking Yemen andtargeting oil-rich monarchies (Halliday 2005); challenging Arab leaders toendorse an Arab Collective Security Pact and unified army; threatening tosuspend relations with “duplicitous” Arab states favoring the Baghdad Pact;

19 The same mechanisms--delegitimized mukhabarat (secret police)

authoritarian states with mammoth military-industrial complexes--afflictedboth inter-Arab and Arab–Israeli relations even prior to the Six Day War (Kerr1971).20 Solingen (2009b). Pan-Arab rhetoric camouflaged ethnic minority control byAlawi (Syria), Sudairi (Saudi Arabia), Hashemite (Jordan), and Tikriti (Iraq)tribes, to deflect internal opposition.21 Halliday (2005: 35) considered those norms epiphenomenal, invokedprimarily for “political calculation.”

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proposing counter-pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia; and intervening inothers’ domestic affairs by mobilizing protests, forcing replacement of primeministers and confining Jordan’s King Hussein. Nasser’s regional designsresembled Hirschman’s (1945) imperial commercial strategies, using trade toinduce maximum dependence by neighbors, turning them into raw materials

suppliers, diverting Egypt’s trade to weaker partners for whom trade utilitywas higher, and de-industrializing weaker competitors for export markets.22

His proposed United Arab Republic with Syria (and later Iraq) entailed noseepage of sovereignty toward a supranational authority. Rather, it forcedSyria to import industrial goods exclusively from Egypt, paralyzing Syrian-Lebanese trade and restricting Lebanese exports to Egypt. Syrianagricultural and commercial interests and even the military resisted it,leading to Syria’s secession (Hasou 1985; Macdonald 1965). Lebanon’s opentrading entrepôt model based on extensive extra-regional trade, commercialand banking interests was particularly threatened by protectionism, stateentrepreneurship, import-substitution and highly militarized economies.

Though Nasser’s record may be better known it was far from an anomaly.Hafiz el-Asad intervened in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon; Saddam Hussein,Muammar Qhadafi, and others in various other countries. This patternattenuated over time but never disappeared; Lebanese Premier Rafiq Hariri(a Saudi protégé) was putatively assassinated by Syrian agents.

Though aligned with pan-Arab rhetoric, most interventionscontradicted the 1945 Arab League’s Charter. Article 8 proscribed intrusionin domestic arrangements, committing members to respect other’s forms of government, a truly Westphalian-compliant document.23 Article 5 prohibitedthe use of force to settle disputes, allowing the Council to consider onlydisputes unrelated to “independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity.”

The Charter foreclosed even the mildest forms of intervention in crucialcategories of conflict. In reality, however, public behavior favoring wataniya--consistent with the Charter--was bad form and bad politics. Pan-Arabkawmiyah was an important source of domestic and trans-regionallegitimacy; leaders could neither live with it nor without it, forcing them toembrace the rhetoric while circumventing high sovereignty costs in practice. The League’s design was not an unintended outcome but an accuratereflection of converging preferences for an institution that would not achieveunity. These push-pull pressures for unity led to extreme rhetoric but limitedachievements; centrifugal regional relations; and baroque compromisesover--assaults on--sovereignty. Failing to tame competitive outbidding, the

League unintendedly provided a stage for that competition. Summits were

22 Hitler’s Germany was the textbook imperial strategy. Arab nationalistsconsidered European fascism “a virile politico-economic system superior toother Western models” (Macdonald 1965).23 The League denied Iraq’s Governing Council the right to represent Iraq(2003) for lacking “sovereign” legitimacy, a particularly poignant justificationgiven the League’s autocratic membership.

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not designed to enhance information and transparency about truesovereignty preferences but instead revealed the depth of rivalries andmutual attacks on domestic legitimacy. Al-Jazeera became another arena formutual subversion with far greater reach than League meetings. A sharedidentity did not necessarily help Arab states overcome collective action

problems; it may have even exacerbated them (Barnett and Solingen 2007).Fears of sovereignty loss also explain the prevalence of war (Dodgeand Higgott 2002:24–25). Weak acceptance of sovereign non-interferenceand of borders themselves fuelled inter-Arab, Arab–Israeli, and Arab-Iranianconflicts. Israel, Turkey and Iran were drawn into a regional system withtenuous deference to sovereignty norms (Halliday 2005). Krasner (2009:xiii)argues that ”most rationalist approaches would predict that if rules wereviolated they would change. Most sociological approaches would predict thatif rules and norms were violated they would wither away. But the rules of sovereignty persisted even though they were violated.” The Middle Eastexperience is emblematic of this apparent paradox. Violations of sovereignty

persist to this day. Syria hosts terrorists reportedly implicated in attacks inBaghdad, resisting extradition and leading to ambassadorial recalls by Syriaand Iraq, and to Iraqi warnings of retaliation in kind. Their bilateral diplomaticties--symbols of mutual recognition of legal sovereignty--had barely beenresumed in 2006 after 24 years of interruption. Saudi Arabia’s air forceattacked Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen in retaliation for violation of Saudi sovereignty. And so on.

Sovereignty norms took hold in East Asia only during the late twentiethcentury (Chan 1999:200) although others find them rooted in much earlierperiods for China (Hui 2005). Embraced with a vengeance at the regionallevel, these norms led to strong reluctance to cede sovereignty to regional

institutions. ASEAN, APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Treaty on Amityand Cooperation, and other regional arrangements are all sovereignty-preserving, emphasizing non-interference in others’ internal affairs andrespect for territorial integrity (Solingen 2008). This features enabled Chinato transcend erstwhile reluctance and endorse sovereignty-upholdingregionalism enthusiastically (Johnston 2008). In contrast to the Middle East,violent and subversive efforts to undermine other states’ authority structuresdeclined dramatically in East Asia in recent decades.

This pattern cannot be separated from East Asian leaders’ acceptanceof Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty losses at the global level tofacilitate economic growth and enhance their own political survival. These

models required macroeconomic and regional stability and predictability,conditions propitious for attracting foreign investment, capital, technology,and expertise. Common “resilience,” a widely affirmed concept particularly inSoutheast Asia, was instrumental for export-led growth. Incentives to signalcooperation to neighbors and foreign investors alike dampenedinterventionist impulses in others’ domestic affairs. Collective rhetoricalsupport for sovereignty was aligned with a praxis of restraint on territorial,maritime, transboundary and other conflicts. This moderation is especially

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notable given many unresolved competing claims over sovereignty in theKorean peninsula, Taiwan Straits, Spratly Islands, Senkaku/Diaoyutai, Takeshima/Dokdo, and among various Southeast Asian dyads, and givenincomplete domestic sovereignty over territories in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and others (Ganesan 2010). A further contrast with the Middle East

is East Asia’s near universality in diplomatic relations, extending mutualrecognition of legal sovereignty even to adversarial states such as NorthKorea.24 In terms of Krasner’s (2009:198) modalities of sovereigntycompromises, challenges to sovereignty in intra-regional relations were morefrequently of the coercive non-Pareto type in the Middle East than in EastAsia.

In sum, the two regions shared many features at t (1940s-1950s),when their respective inward-looking models underpinned similar patterns of regional conflict and sovereignty violations. Their eventual evolution intocompeting models of political survival led them in dramatically differentdirections and contrasting approaches to sovereignty at t+1 (1960s onward).

A preference for regional stability, restraint, and compliance with sovereigntyand non-intervention helped sustain nearly three decades of peace incontinental Southeast Asia; over four decades in maritime Southeast Asia,and over five decades in Northeast Asia. Higher receptivity to sovereignty losses vis-à-vis the global political economy, and low receptivity tosovereignty violations among East Asian states, jointly contributed to adramatic rise in collective regional power. At t+2, roughly five decadesremoved from t , East Asia is now ground zero of the 21st century globaleconomy, the center of economic and financial power, a region nimble andresilient despite the 1997 Asian and 2008 global crises. Conversely, lower receptivity to sovereignty losses vis-à-vis the global economy, and higher

receptivity to sovereignty violations at the regional level, jointly relegatedmuch of the Middle East to significantly lower rankings in industrial prowessand resilience.

Whereas East Asian economies are increasingly vital to each other andto the world (EAR 2008), the same cannot be said about the Middle East.East Asian economies export over 50 percent of their total exports to eachother; Middle East economies only about 14 percent.25 East Asian economiescollectively account for nearly 25 percent of world exports in goods andservices; Middle Eastern ones for less than 5 percent. East Asia contributesnearly 30 percent of the world’s manufacturing exports; the Middle East less

24 Taiwan is the exception whereas inexistent or interrupted diplomatic tieshave been far more frequent in the Middle East (Syria/Lebanon, Iraq/Syria,Egypt/Iran, Morocco/Iran, Mauritania/Morocco, Libya/Egypt, Egypt/Sudan,Arab states/Israel, etc.). Egypt recalled its ambassador to Algeria followingmutual attacks on soccer fans during a playoff game for the 2010 World Cup.25 Averages for 2000-2008 (See Solingen 2009b for further sources, includingfor GCC countries discussed below). Intra-Arab trade accounted for 7-10percent of their total since the 1950s (AHDR 2002:126).

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than 2 percent. East Asia accounts for nearly 18 percent of globalcommercial service exports; the Middle East less than 4 percent. East Asiacontributes over 41 percent of the world’s high technology exports; theMiddle East less than ½ percent. Whereas both regions attracted comparableshares of FDI inflows in the early 1980s--about 10 percent of the world’s

total--East Asia averaged 10-20 percent since 1985 (25 percent in the mid-1990s) and the Middle East 1-2 percent (5 percent in 2003-2004). East Asiaaccounted for at least 10 percent of total world FDI outflows (1981-1997); 15percent for all but one year; 20 percent in four of those years; and 12percent average during the 2000s. The Middle East accounted for 1-2percent of world FDI outflows (1980s), virtually nil (1990-2003), and about 2percent (2003-2007). Middle East information and technology links areamong the weakest in the world, in contrast with East Asia (Abed andDavoodi 2003). Among the top 10 ranking states in foreign exchangereserves (2009), East Asian states controlled about $4 trillion to the MiddleEast $400 billion. The G-20 includes five East Asian countries (China,

Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Australia,) and two Middle East ones(Saudi Arabia and Turkey). OECD members include four East Asian but onlytwo Middle East states (Turkey and Israel).

The one exception in these indicators relates to fuel exports, where theMiddle East contributes about 22 percent of the world’s total, to Asia’s 13percent. Oil and gas reserves have rescued the Middle East from even lowereconomic power rankings but have also kept it ever more vulnerable toglobal trends, precisely the kind of vulnerability (sovereignty threats?) thatMiddle East models sought to avoid for many decades. The region wouldrank much lower without the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, anintriguing partial and relatively recent departure from the standard Middle

East model.26

Despite their heavy oil and gas export dependence, efforts tointernationalize the economy have deepened, moving GCC states closer toEast Asian models. Their combined nominal GDP represented over ½ that of all Middle East countries (2003) and they accounted for over 1/2 of all FDIinflows into the 22 Arab countries since 2004. Three of the top six sovereignwealth funds are GCC-owned. All GCC states are WTO members but only 12of 22 Arab states. GCC states are busily negotiating FTAs with major andmiddle powers.

GCC reliance on external powers for security--a crucial compromiseover sovereignty--also resembles East Asia’s extra-regional alliances,reflecting an even more extreme case of contracting out security. Such

contracts, though rhetorically affirming GCC sovereignty, violate Westphaliansovereignty in practice by subjecting domestic military institutions andpersonnel to external authority (Krasner 2009:2002). A relatively morerelaxed approach to sovereignty vis-à-vis external powers contrasts withdeep reluctance to incur sovereignty losses at the intra-GCC level,

26 The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE,accounting for only 1.4 of world GDP (2005).

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particularly given perceived Saudi hegemonic ambitions.27 This pattern tooresembles East Asian compromises, informal institutions, and wariness of regional arrangements that exclude the US while China rises. Though bothEast Asia and the GCC remain averse to sovereignty losses to regionalinstitutions they have made important steps in financial coordination. GCC

progress on labor mobility, unified passport controls, joint investments,diversification, and unification of standards have not removed concerns withsovereignty, impeding a full customs and monetary union and a proposedcommon currency. Latent intra-GCC territorial sovereignty disputes havebeen significantly restrained, as in East Asia, an important condition forattracting FDI.

As a federation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)--a GCC member--seems an anomaly for Middle East sovereignty compromises.28 The Emiratesregretted British-imposed independence in 1971, another unusual pattern forthe broader Middle East. Theirs was a peculiar transition from colonial non-sovereignty to federal UAE sovereignty. Though doubting it would ever

function as an effective unit, the British hoped that UAE recognition as aunified international entity would help protect it from external interventionby Iran, Egypt or Saudi Arabia (Legrenzi 2008). Today’s UAE seems far moreconsolidated than various other Middle East states, transcending, albeit in alimited sense, the penchant for individual sovereignty (watanyia) so strictlyguarded in this region. A Central Bank replaced old currencies with acommon dirham and helped establish a thriving banking system. Emiratesmanage their own sovereign wealth funds independently but conduct aunified foreign policy, largely run by Abu Dhabi, with some sovereigntyleakage where individual sheikhdoms’ agendas diverge, as on Iran.

Scene 3: Sovereignty, Power and Hypocrisy in the Global Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR)

If states seek power, why would most renounce their sovereign right tonuclear weapons? The NPR operates in the thorniest domain of nationalsecurity, where the emergence and functioning of international institutionsshould be most difficult.29 One could easily conceive of the nuclear realm as

27 Sovereignty was traditionally exercised over peoples and not over territoryin the Arabian peninsula (Legrenzi 2008:195). As oil concessions becameimportant, so did territorially-based disputes.28 The emirates are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras

al-Khaimah and Fujairah.29 Revisiting his 1982 definition of international regimes, Krasner (2009:12)argues that theoretically neutral definitions of regimes are impossible. In aconstructivist world regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectationsconverge in a given issue-area.” For realism regimes entail rules and normsreflecting the interests of most powerful states. For neoliberalinstitutionalism regimes are principles, rules, norms that mitigate market

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Dhabi_(emirate)

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the last bastion of sovereignty, where states would be expected to reject allrestraints, limits, or prohibitions imposed by external authority structures. Yet the heart of the NPR, the NPT, won ratification by 189 states and is themost widely subscribed international treaty even though it is arguably themost constraining security regime of all insofar as it proscribes what some

regard as the ultimate guarantee of security, the “absolute weapon.”Despite its severe deficiencies, it would be difficult to argue that theNPR is neither institutionalized nor important. If one can conclude withoutdoubt that all states joined voluntarily rather than through coercion orimposition, the NPR arguably does not violate legal sovereignty (Krasner2009:15). Expert views vary regarding such assessment. There might bebroader agreement on the NPR as an international authority structure thatviolates Westphalian sovereignty, subverting member states’ control overnuclear activities within their territory, severely reducing their autonomy,and compromising their de jure and de facto authority to develop nuclearweapons; dictating specific authority structures that must regulate domestic

nuclear matters;30

and endowing external authorities (IAEA) with expandingrights to inspect and secure compliance. The NPR also overrides states’authority to regulate cross-border flows of nuclear materials, equipment andweapons; states’ must subordinate their regulations to the NPR and cannotassist, encourage, or induce NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons. UNSC 1540takes the erosion of sovereignty a step further, compelling UN members toadopt national legislation to prevent proliferation of materials, weapons anddelivery systems.31

This story of dramatic acquiescence with sovereignty loss is largelycorrect for most of the 184 (189 - 5) NNWS states that have genuinelyabdicated their right to develop nuclear weapons. It is less relevant to three

other groups. First, five states are recognized as de jure nuclear weaponsstates (NWS) under the NPT (the US, USSR/Russia, China, UK, and France),conforming to Krasner’s recognition of relative power as an important source

failures. The NPR can be understood through these different lenses focusingon norms, power, and institutions respectively but all three have distinctlimitations (Solingen 2007a).30 For instance, prohibiting links between civilian and military programs innon-nuclear-weapons (NNWS) states, institutionally “sanitizing” the nuclearfuel cycle.31 States must develop and maintain: appropriate physical protection

measures; border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter,prevent and combat illicit trafficking; establish, develop, review and maintainappropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls overexport, transit, trans-shipment, re-export, financing, and transporting thatmight contribute to proliferation; establish end-user controls and enforceappropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export controllaws and regulations<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm>.

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of violations of sovereign equality norms. Second, some states signed theNPT but had no qualms violating it, including Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syriaand Iran (the latter two found in violation of reporting commitments to theIAEA). Organized hypocrisy is a particularly apt term for these cases insofaras their rhetorical commitments to nonproliferation norms were flouted in

practice, sometimes with (unintended) assistance from the IAEA. Third, India,Pakistan, and Israel abstained from signing the NPT and proceeded todevelop nuclear weapons, the former two testing them and the latter neithertesting nor acknowledging weapons. By not signing the NPT these threeexhibited greater consistency than the previous group, neither compromisingsovereignty nor technically violating the NPT.

The NPR’s recognition of a two-tier system of NWS and non-NWSrecalls Krasner’s dominant “modalities of deviation” from sovereign equality,whether the regime operated through coercive, imposed or contractualpower asymmetries, and whether or not it yielded Pareto-improving results. The contractual account builds on the NPT bargain that stipulated the right of

NNWS to obtain civilian nuclear technology in exchange for renouncingsovereign rights to nuclear weapons. This is a story of Pareto optimality.Betts (2000:69), however, concluded that “if the NPT...preventedproliferation, one should be able to name at least one specific country thatwould have sought nuclear weapons or tested them, but refrained fromdoing so, or was stopped, because of [this] treaty. None comes to mind.”Furthermore, it is possible that the very conditions leading states to sign andratify the NPT, although not always directly observable (or measurable), canalso explain subsequent compliance better than would the NPT itself (i.e.,selection bias can overstate the effect of treaty commitments). But it is alsoplausible that the NPR as a cluster of institutions has, in Krasner’s (2009:xiii)

formulation, moved “states closer to their most preferred outcomes.” The coercive account dwells on superpower efforts, particularly by the

US and USSR/Russia but also others, to deny nuclear capabilities to non-NWS, with the 2003 war in Iraq providing the most forceful instance of coercion to ensure denial. This is a story of the strongest powers imposingtheir own favored solution along the Pareto frontier. Coercion by powerfulstates, however, did not preclude North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel (orChina itself for that matter) from acquiring nuclear weapons or Iran fromreaching threshold nuclear status. As Waltz (2003:38) argued, “in the pasthalf-century, no country has been able to prevent other countries from goingnuclear if they were determined to do so.” Krasner’s discussion of

“modalities of deviation” from sovereignty does not include a persuasionaccount, but his recurrent attention to the logic of appropriateness drawsattention to the possibility that some 180 states were persuaded to foregonuclear weapons because the latter arguably enjoyed low moral standing, atleast among some states. The idea of a universal anti-nuclear acquisitionnorm, however, clashes with a reality of competing norms endowing nuclearweapons with redemptive anti-colonial, ethnic, religious or civic-nationalistfeatures. There is no systematic empirical evidence one way or another for

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all 180 cases that could help adjudicate unequivocally among competingacccounts credited with this feat of sovereignty trimming by the NPR(Solingen 2007). The extent to which this feat can be traced to internationalpower asymmetries alone or primarily--or to norms alone or primarily--remains subject to contestation. Indeed political-economy models are as apt

in elucidating patterns of nuclear weapons abstention/acquisition since theNPT’s inception.Whatever its main source, the NPR has raised the reputational costs of

pursuing nuclear weapons for NNWS. There is a common perception thatgranting NWS status to the Five has had the effect of freezing theinternational power hierarchy in existence in the 1960s, when the NPT wasnegotiated. States that did not limit their nuclear sovereignty presumablygained or preserved power whereas states that renounced the sovereignright to develop nuclear weapons somehow detracted from their potentialpower. A simplistic “power as resource” perspective may perhaps suit thisline of thinking. However, a relational perspective that looks at international

power as the ability to affect outcomes might find possession of nuclearweapons a more questionable source of power. Nuclear weapons did little forthe US and the USSR in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Nuclear weaponsprograms may have arguably brought Pakistan and North Korea closer tofailed state destiny than to regional hegemony by, among other things,breaking their economic back. As Finnemore and Goldstein suggest, sometraditional trappings of power may be poor predictors of outcomes, andnuclear weapons may be particularly so in the 21st century, givenasymmetrical warfare and elusive terrorist networks. At the other end, it’sunclear that states that abdicated sovereign rights to nuclear weapons infact became less powerful. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Brazil and

others have enhanced their power quite dramatically throughinternationalizing models, avoiding material, reputational, and highopportunity costs of nuclear weapons and delivery systems (and no, they arenot cheap as an old conventional wisdom affirms). China’s real ascent topower--as ability to affect international outcomes--can similarly be traced toits internationalizing model much more so than to the power “resource” itacquired in 1964.

Recent pressures by NNWS have resulted in declaratory commitmentsby NWS that they would strive to achieve a nuclear-weapons free world. Those pressures emanated chiefly from article VI of the NPT urging NWS toachieve nuclear disarmament, a concession extracted from NWS at the time

of NPT negotiations. Whether or not NWS considered article VI a seriouscommitment or a symbolic gesture to engineer the perception of a Pareto-optimal treaty is a subject of intense debate. Yet Article VI’s commitment topursue nuclear disarmament negotiations “in good faith” entailed a self-binding of nuclear sovereignty by the most powerful actors. For much of thetreaty’s lifespan Article VI remained in the background of the NPR, as power-based perspectives of international relations would have expected. That theless powerful (NNWS) states would succeed in curtailing the sovereign right

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of more powerful NWS to retain nuclear weapons might turn theories of international power on their head. This outcome seems unlikely any timesoon (if ever) but NWS have already been pressed into verbal and writtencommitments that can hardly be explained by notions of relative power. Though initially favoring the most powerful states that created it, the NPR

could well end up canceling those states’ prerogatives. The road to thatelusive outcome is likely to be plagued by resistance from domesticaudiences in NWS (including newcomers) as well as structural difficultiesinherent in “getting to zero” in a multilateral nuclear world. And even if suchdifficulties were to be surmounted, hypocrisy could well remain a feature of aNuclear Zero world: latent differential power capabilities (nuclear, industrial)among unequal sovereign states might continue to foil stable Pareto-optimalnuclear-free outcomes.

ConclusionsOur brief excursion into three scenes of contemporary international

relations confirms that Krasner’s four sovereignty forms do not necessarilyco-vary, and that the sovereignty bundle is a continuously evolvingconstruct. China’s reduced sphere of interdependence and Westphaliansovereignty in the wake of its internationalization has been accompanied bya rise in recognition of its international legal sovereignty (buttressed by UNmembership) and perhaps a strengthening of its domestic sovereignty.Indeed, Westphalian sovereignty losses to international economic marketsand institutions may have arguably strengthened China’s ability to withstandexternal intervention in authority structures relevant to democracy andhuman rights. Some of the same sovereignty tradeoffs can be observed withrespect to East Asia as a region: greater acceptance of interdependence

sovereignty losses and heightened levels of domestic sovereignty. Taiwanwas able to endure minimal legal sovereignty--the very prospect of statedeath--through extensive compromises in interdependence and Westphaliansovereignty. By contrast, greater resistance to interdependence andWestphalian sovereignty losses by most Middle East states did not entailstrengthened domestic sovereignty, or effective state control over activitieswithin their borders (Yemen is only an extreme example but similar tribal,ethnic, and political challenges afflict other states, from Morocco to Iran andPakistan). Some of the states most resistant to interdependence sovereigntylosses have also been keenest on retaining sovereign rights to developnuclear weapons. Ironically, the high opportunity costs of both these efforts

brought diminished domestic sovereignty, from Pakistan to Iraq, Syria andLibya (and perhaps Iran and even North Korea).

The three scenes also illuminate the reciprocal and complexrelationship between sovereignty compromises and power. Suchcompromises, stemming from both domestic incentives and internationalpower considerations, in turn have the potential for altering the power of leaders, states, regions, and global order. But it is not necessarily the casethat demands for greater interdependence and Westphalia sovereignty lead

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to greater power capabilities, at home or abroad. On the one hand strongdemands for undiluted sovereignty by China’s Maoist leadership may haveenhanced Westphalian autonomy from external and internal forces but alsostifled China’s ascent in global resources and influence, and weakened Mao’spower. Similarly, rigid interdependence and Westphalia sovereignty claims

by Middle East rulers sapped their own power resources at home andshackled their ability to enhance the region’s international power, a patternthat GCC leaders superseded only recently. Finally, resistance to sovereigntycompromises embedded in NPT membership (including Additional Protocols)did not entail heightened power capabilities for North Korea, pre-2004 Libya,Iraq, Iran, Cuba or Pakistan (and Brazil’s acceptance of NPT commitmentspreceded--did not preclude-- its dramatic ascent to power).

On the other hand, compromises that curtailed interdependence andWestphalian sovereignty have been instrumental in enhancing the power of China’s internationalizing rulers domestically and overseas. Even as Chinabecame more bound by international conventions and external markets (for

natural resources and technology, among others), its power to affectoutcomes also rose within and beyond governance structures such as the G-20 and the UNSC. Similarly, self-imposed limitations of interdependence andWestphalian sovereignty by East Asian states helped propel their region tohigher levels of international power (as both resource and ability to influenceoutcomes). The renunciation of nuclear weapons by Japan, Germany, SouthKorea and others did not necessarily diminish their power; indeed it is quitepossible that nuclear abstention helped consolidate it (though thecounterfactual that nuclear weapons might have made them even morepowerful cannot be completely ruled out).

Our conclusions thus far suggest that maximizing

sovereignty/autonomy does not necessarily entail maximizing power, andreductions in sovereignty don’t automatically lead to reductions in power.But does greater power inevitably lead to greater demand for sovereignty? The answer to that question is highly contingent on, first, the nature of theinternational system at a particularly world-time. Our brief zoom into scene 1suggests that greater power in contemporary international relations canparadoxically require greater receptivity to sovereignty compromises andreduced autonomy. Whereas China might have preferred a freer hand andmuch lower profile on the sanctions debate vis-à-vis North Korea and Iran, itsown evolving interests and international expectations leave it less room forautonomous behavior. Whether greater power leads to greater demands for

sovereignty is also contingent on competing domestic models of politicalsurvival, the relative strength of which is partially affected by internationalstructure.

In sum, as Finnemore and Goldstein suggest, power does not translatetidily into political outcomes. Neither does sovereignty. Nor do power andsovereignty map unto each other in self-evident ways. Any research agendaon these relationships is indebted to Krasner’s efforts to problematize powerand sovereignty as central concepts of international relations.

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