DRAFT

SHEFFIELD FLOODS 2007

JOINT REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC RESOURCES AND PERFORMANCE AND CULTURE, ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABILITY

SCRUTINY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT BOARDS

June 2008

Sheffield Floods 2007 – Joint Report of the Strategic Resources and Performance and Culture, Economy and Sustainability Scrutiny

and Policy Development Boards

CONTENTS

Page Nos.

1. Joint Chairs’ Foreword 2

2. Executive Summary 3-6

3. Introduction 7-8

4. Responsibilities 9-10

5. Summary of Events 11-12

6. Immediate Impact 13-14

7. Initial Responses 15-19

8. Recovery 20-27

9 Cost and Resources 28

10. Initial Lessons learned 29-32

11. Issues Raised by Members of the Public 33-35

12. Issues Raised by Members of the Council 36-42

13. Key Lessons Learned 43-44

14. Conclusions 45-48

15. Draft Recommendations 49-52

Appendix - Attendees at the meetings 53-54

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1. JOINT CHAIRS’ FOREWORD

The 2007 Sheffield Floods affected everyone in our City in some way. Tragically lives were lost and the lives of others were disrupted. Sheffield's homes, businesses, schools, and transport network felt the effects of the unprecedented weather that put Sheffield in the national spotlight.

The Council and local emergency services responded to this incident and this paper demonstrates that this Council has taken a lead in assessing what worked well, what could have gone better and how we can learn any lessons going into the future.

The wide-ranging scrutiny exercise gathered evidence from local people and all the organisations involved in dealing with the major incident. As a result local members were able to hear a full and frank account of events and make recommendations that are contained within this report.

On behalf of this Council we would like to thank all those who contributed towards putting together this important piece of work. As the planet faces up to the prospect of more extreme weather conditions as a result of Climate Change, it’s important that the Council and its partners are up to the challenge. This piece of work and its recommendations put us in a stronger position to deal with any future event on the same scale.

Councillor Mike DavisChair of the Strategic Resources and

Performance Scrutiny and Policy Development Board

Councillor Martin BrelsfordChair of the Culture, Economy and Sustainability Scrutiny and Policy

Development Board

3

SECTION 2 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For many people flooding can be a fact of life and there are areas of the City that have suffered from localised flooding previously. However, the unprecedented events that occurred in the City in June 2007 affected residents, businesses, schools, roads and public transport on a scale not seen before and the effects will be remembered for a long time. Unfortunately there were two fatalities as a result of the floods.

It is clear from the evidence presented that there was a fantastic response from all those involved in dealing with this major incident.

Nearly a year later the effects of the floods are still being felt. For example, a number of residents have still not returned to their properties. Also one of the City’s major roads (A61 Penistone Road) has just reopened and another (A6102 Middlewood Road) still remains closed due to the complexity of the reconstruction works required to reopen it.

This report looks at the events that led to the flooding in the City, the response and key lessons learned.

The following draft recommendations are put forward for consideration by the joint Scrutiny meeting for submission to the Cabinet:-

GeneralR1 Those who contributed to the Scrutiny investigation and the members of the

public that took time to attend the meetings are thanked.

R2 The Council, Environment Agency and Yorkshire Water are thanked for responding to a number of local concerns raised during the scrutiny meetings, including Falding Street, the River Loxley at Hillsborough and the River Sheaf at Millhouses.

R3 That the Government be requested to make Yorkshire Water and Trent Water (in common with other Water Authorities) statutory consultees for planning applications.

R4 All owners of dams and lakes are alerted of the possibility of flooding and the need of regular safety inspections.

R5 The City Council and the Environment Agency to provide advice for businesses and residents living or moving to addresses within the floodplain on how to plan for a flood and deal with any flooding.

Environment AgencyR6 The Environment Agency to clarify exactly where its responsibility ends and

that of riparian owners starts (both on a map of rivers and a written statement).

R7 The Environment Agency’s guide for people that own land or property alongside a river or other watercourse (entitled ‘Living on the Edge’) be made

4available to all riparian owners. The guide should also include contact numbers for advice and a details of assistance that is available for owners who cannot either financially or physically upkeep their responsibilities. Purchasers of properties with riparian responsibilities should be provided with a copy of the booklet (possibly in conjunction with Estate Agents).

R8 In the light of increasing frequency and length of heavy rainfall, the capacity of waterways be inspected and where necessary increased.

R9 The Environment Agency’s Capital Investment Strategy for the Don Catchment that is being developed with Yorkshire Water and the City Council is reported to a future meeting of the relevant Scrutiny and Policy Development Board.

R10 Businesses and the public be encouraged to sign up to the Environment Agency’s automated flood warning service and the service is made available to all Elected Members.

R11 Consideration is given to developing a warning system for flash flooding.

R12 Develop an education programme, in partnership with Yorkshire Water and the City Council, to enable the public and businesses to understand and respond to weather warnings.

Yorkshire WaterR13 Check that all water drains and sewage works are adequate to cater for

increased frequency and prolonged periods of heavy rainfall.

R14 When assessing the effect planning applications would have on land drainage, a holistic approach is taken that takes into account of the cumulative affect on an area.

R15 When the dams are nearing capacity, Yorkshire Water inform all emergency planning partners of the situation at the earliest possible moment.

R16 Consideration is given to increasing the capacity of the dams at least by removing silt.

Sheffield City CouncilR17 All surface water drains to have a regular clearance programme (not just

identified hot spots) and ensure that there is adequate capacity for the increasing frequency and length of heavy rainfall.

R18 Arrange for regular checks of all areas where the Council is a riparian owner for maintenance of banks, free flowing of the water course and that the depth of the water courses are adequate to cater for most eventualities, deepening or widening where necessary.

R19 Development Control Officers and Planning and Highways Area Boards take due cognisance of reports from Yorkshire Water.

R20 The Head of Development Services be requested, either through the

5Sheffield Development Framework or Supplementary Planning Guidance, to prepare a policy to ensure that in future developments all hard surfaces are permeable so reducing immediate run off during heavy rainfall.

R21 Review the size and nature of the Council’s Emergency Planning Control Centre.

R22 Risk registers to be updated to take account of the flooding experience.

R23 The location of Gold and Silver commands (controls) should be reassessed.

R24 Consideration is given to providing additional resources, such as sandbags etc, at strategic locations across the City.

R25 Establish a Members' hotline for use during a major emergency to provide them with direct advice and information.

R26 Members be encouraged to attend Emergency Planning Seminars.

R27 The recruitment of more accredited workers that can be used in an emergency both within the Council and in conjunction with the voluntary, community and faith sectors be supported.

R28 The fragmentation of the Utility industry is a major issue and the City Council needs to consider how it can play a role in helping achieve better co-ordination.

R29 The Culture, Economy and Sustainability Scrutiny and Policy Development Board to review annually (a) Surface Water Management Plans and other linked plans, such as Local Development Frameworks and Community Risk Registers, to ensure that flood risk is adequately considered and to ensure greater transparency and progress in the management of that risk and (b) emergency plans and business continuity plans of essential service providers.

R30 The outcome of the review with schools in February 2008 in relation to the successes and improvements that could be made following the flood event in June 2007 is reported to the Children and Young People Scrutiny Board.

R31 The Carer Support Emergency Plan being established be welcomed.

R32 The proposed emergency response Good Neighbour Scheme be welcomed.

AllR33 Improve public awareness of the likelihood of flooding and the need for

contingency plans and the dangers of immersion in flood water.

R34 Improve public knowledge of how to behave in the event of flooding and the necessity of obeying police warnings to ensure public safety.

R35 Improve communications systems within each organisation and with the general public so that when emergency alerts are first issued everyone is

6aware.

R36 The Importance of attending training and exercises for all levels of command and control structures should be highlighted and encouraged.

R37 Need for identification of trigger points for activation and initiation of plans and command structures.

R38 In relation to flood warnings, there is a need for greater co-operation between agencies e.g. Yorkshire Water, Environment Agency and the City Council.

R39 Greater clarity is required on the responsibility for dam and reservoir plans.

R40 Establish a multi-agency project to track progress and investigate the fragmentation of watercourse management through the City.

South Yorkshire Passenger Transport ExecutiveR41 Discussions are held with bus companies on whether there should be less

cross-city bus services and more that start from the City Centre.

Utility companiesR42 The need for improved engagement from utility companies in local level

planning on critical infrastructure.

R43 Representation be made to the utility companies to ensure that appropriate senior staff are available to attend Silver and Gold Commands.

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SECTION 3 – INTRODUCTION

3.1 In response to the unprecedented events in the City in June 2007, the Strategic Resources and Performance and Culture, Economy and Sustainability Scrutiny and Policy Development Boards agreed to undertake an investigation into the floods. This sought to draw on evidence from the City Council, Yorkshire Water, the Environment Agency, South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue, South Yorkshire Police, Councillors and members of the public.

3.2 The following terms of reference were agreed for the scrutiny investigation:-

Session 1 – 21st January 2008

To establish what happened, the reasons for the flooding, the extent of the flooding and the short-term impact.

To understand the responsibilities of various organisations in the management and discharge of water and the extent to which these are understood and acted upon.

To assess the effectiveness of the initial response by the Council and partner organisations and identifying areas for learning.

To identify any further areas for investigation arising from the session.

Session 2 – 25th January, 2008

To understand and examine the recovery planning and its execution, for example in relation to highways infrastructure.

To consider the Council’s and partner organisations’ evaluation of lessons learned.

To understand the resource implications arising from the flood and the resultant damage and impact.

To consider the range of actions proposed, including those to minimise flood risk.

To identify further areas for investigation arising from the session.

3.3 It was agreed that there would be a further joint meeting to agree the draft report and recommendations for consideration by the Cabinet and relevant agencies.

3.4 During the two joint meetings, the following information was presented to the Boards:-

A report of the Council’s Chief Executive providing a summary of events, the immediate impact of events resulting from the flooding,

8responsibilities for flood risk management, the initial response by the Council and partner organisations, community care and support, residential impact and response and provision of a Humanitarian Assistance Centre.

A presentation from the Environment Agency outlining information relating to the effects of heavy rainfall in June, 2007 on the rivers and all the watercourses in the local catchment areas, including the Upper Don, the Lower Don and the Rother catchments and the roles and responsibilities of the Environment Agency, local authorities, water companies and riparian owners in relation to watercourses.

A presentation from South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue in relation to the their role, lessons learned and actions taken.

A presentation and supporting information from Yorkshire Water analysing the rainfall in June, 2007, outlining emergency and contingency planning and methods of maintaining a clean water supply, flooding, recovery and their statutory responsibilities.

A report from the Council’s Chief Executive concerning recovery arrangements, residents, customer services activity, care and support, costs and resources, environmental health and the emergency response.

Information from Yorkshire Water and the Environment Agency on their recovery arrangements and lessons learned.

The appendix to the report gives details of the attendees at both meetings.

3.5 All Members of the City Council were also invited to attend both meetings and ask questions. A press release was issued publicising both meetings and members of the public attended, some from the flood affected areas. They were given the opportunity to ask questions of officers.

3.6 The following external reviews had been produced in relation to the floods but were not considered by the Joint Meetings:-

Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods – An Independent Review by Sir Michael Pitt.

The Environment Agency’s Review of 2007 Summer Floods.

Report from Professor Richard Astley, University of Sheffield that provided an expert review of the Environment Agency’s report, especially the case study that focused on Sheffield.

The South Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum Final Report on the Flooding of summer 2007.

3.7 In addition comments were sought from a number of the utility companies including CE Electric UK Ltd, the National Grid Gas and Open Reach.

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SECTION 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 It is worth understanding the responsibilities of some of the organisations involved.

4.2 City Council Emergency response and recovery. Powers to carry out works on “ordinary watercourses”. Planning permission for development. Maintaining highway drainage network and local watercourses not

classed as main rivers.

4.3 Environment Agency Powers to carry out works on “main rivers”, such as the Rivers Rother

and Don. Issue flood warnings. Flood risk advice. Issuing consents for works on “main river”. During emergencies, provide advice to emergency services and local

authorities. Enforcement of riparian responsibilities.

4.4 Yorkshire Water

4.4.1 Section 94 of the Water Industry Act 1991 states that it shall be the duty of every sewerage undertaker to provide, improve and extend such a system of public sewers (whether inside its area or elsewhere) and so to cleanse and maintain those sewers as to ensure that that area is and continues to be effectually drained.

4.4.2 Sewers are elsewhere defined as drains serving premises, not open land. Water companies are not therefore liable for surface water and rainfall management.

4.4.3 Water companies are not statutory consultees for new planning applications. They are obliged to offer all new developments the right to connect into the public sewerage system under Section 104 of the Water Industry Act.

4.5 Riparian Owners

4.5.1 There is mention in this report of riparian owners and they are defined as someone or an organisation that owns land adjacent to a watercourse and were presumed to own land up to the centre of a watercourse unless it was known to be owned by someone else.

4.5.2 They have a responsibility to pass on the flow of water without obstruction; to accept flood flows, even if this was caused by inadequate capacity downstream; maintain the bed and banks of the watercourse; to clear debris even if it did not originate from their land; not to cause an obstruction to prevent the passage of fish; to keep the bed and banks of the watercourse clear of any matter that could cause an obstruction if it was to be washed

10away; to keep structures that they owned clear of debris (for example culverts, screens, weirs and bridges); and to control any invasive alien species such as Japanese knotweed. There was no duty on a riparian owner to improve the drainage capacity of a watercourse.

4.5.3 Riparian owners have a right to protect their property from flooding and such protection would probably require consent from the Environment Agency. Such consent would not normally be provided if works increased the flood risk for others, interfered with any work of the Environment Agency which they might wish to undertake in the future or adversely affected the environment or the Environment Agency’s flood defences.

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SECTION 5 - SUMMARY OF EVENTS

5.1 The Yorkshire area suffered the wettest June in 2007 since 1882. Sheffield experienced two spells of exceptionally heavy rainfall. On the 13/14th June 118mm of rain was recorded. This resulted in some localised flooding and the evacuation of a number of properties that were dealt with effectively within the normal emergency plans and procedures.

5.2 The ground had been saturated by the rains of early June and the reservoirs and rivers were full. Although this was not unusual for rivers, it was at that time of year, unusual for reservoirs to be full. On Sunday 24th June, the Meteorological (Met) Office and the Environment Agency started issuing warnings relating to a threat of heavy rain and possible flooding in Sheffield. The rainfall on 24/25th June came on top of an already saturated water table. Met Office records show that between 2200 hours on 24th June and 2200 Monday 25th June, 88mm of rain fell in the Sheffield catchment.

5.3 At around 8.00 a.m. on Monday 25th June, the Council’s Street Force service reported no unusual flooding incidents. The first flooding began to occur and be notified to Sheffield’s Emergency Planning Team during the Monday morning and the Emergency Control Centre was activated.

5.4 During the afternoon of Monday 25th June, the River Don overtopped in central Sheffield and flooding, on a scale not seen since the 1864 Dale Dyke Dam breached, affected the area from Kelham Island downstream to Meadowhall and Blackburn Meadows. Other watercourses were also much higher than normal. Tragically, at this time two people lost their lives. A major factory fire was triggered in the Meadowhall area by flood waters impinging on a hot furnace and an electricity sub-station in north Sheffield was flooded, resulting in widespread loss of power supplies and the imposition of rota power cuts, to facilitate reconnection.

5.5 The major distinguishing feature of the flooding that affected Sheffield was the sheer volume, force and speed of water coming down the fluvial river

12system in a very short period of time.

5.6 Late on the evening of 25th June, Ulley Dam, owned by Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, was in danger of collapse with a consequent threat to critical infrastructure, including electricity power supplies and sewerage works. This threat to the Brinsworth substation had dire predicted consequences over the imminent loss of most of Sheffield’s power supply for a number of weeks. A major pumping operation was put in place to reduce the water level, and precautionary evacuations and road closures, including part of the M1 motorway, were carried out. The pumping operations involved the largest ever deployment of the South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue’s High Volume Pumps and due to outstanding efforts of the responding agencies, the Dam held.

5.7 In Sheffield some 1,275 domestic properties and approximately 1,000 businesses were flooded. For the first time since it opened, Meadowhall was closed other than for Christmas/Easter. The M1 motorway was shut for three days.

5.8 A County-wide command structure consisting of a Police-led Gold Command, district Silver Commands, Incident Commands and individual organisations' command support groups was set up on 25th June 2007. A Multi Agency Silver Command was established in the Council’s Emergency Control Centre in the Town Hall. Category 2 Responders (e.g. utility companies, highways authorities, transport providers) were represented at command groups as designated under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Meadowhall Road

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SECTION 6 - IMMEDIATE IMPACT

6.1 The effect of the flooding on the City of Sheffield was devastating with the City divided in half by floodwater, along a corridor some 23km in length, effectively isolating half of the City from access to the main accident and emergency centre and effectively trapping large numbers of people at the hospital.

6.2 Numerous roads, retaining walls, bridges, items of street furniture and sections of public rights of way were badly damaged. The damage, estimated to cost £9.9 million to repair, caused 28 roads to be closed requiring extensive traffic management measures. Some roads were made inaccessible, in particular along the Upper and Lower Don transport corridor due to large accumulations of debris [1,590 tonnes] deposited by the flood water. Gully pots, culverts and other drainage systems were blocked due to debris washed down by the flood water and a large volume of debris and vegetation collected under bridges over rivers. 16 traffic signal controllers were put out of action because of flood water damage to electronic equipment and a further 20 suffered impact damage. The Urban Traffic Control room at the Council’s offices at Carbrook had to be evacuated due to rising flood water at 7.30 p.m. on 25th June and some flood damage occurred to this installation.

6.3 RAF Sea King helicopters were used for rooftop rescues with other people being rescued by boat and in some cases by a tractor.

6.4 A large number of people were left stranded and unable to get home; others were evacuated from flooded homes. A number of reception centres were established and these included pre-determined and ad hoc centres to accommodate and feed over 1400 people. Power cuts affected the north of the City with 48,000 homes without power.

6.5 1275 properties were affected across the City. 40 properties at Chapeltown were affected on two occasions by flooding which occurred 10 days apart. Of the 1275 properties, around 400 were severely affected. In hilly locations small numbers of properties were affected by the flooding of culverts. The Hillsborough area of the City experienced the most severe impact. Around 250 owner-occupiers and 150 Council tenants were flooded when the River Don broke its banks. This coincided with households losing power for up to 7 to 10 hours. Along the valleys of the Don, Rother, Sheaf and Porter, small numbers of households were also affected.

6.6 The City’s railway station was closed, trams terminated and passengers were left stranded, needing accommodation that was provided by the City Council. Assistance was also provided the following day with onward travel arrangements.

6.7 The M1 was closed between Junctions 31 and 34 due to fears that Ulley Dam would burst with the potential for 2 million cubic metres of water cascading across the motorway and damaging the Brinsworth substation with dire predictions of the imminent loss of most of Sheffield’s power supply

14for a considerable period of time. A gas main carrying gas supply for the East Midlands was also at risk if the dam breached.

6.8 6 Sewage Treatment Works, 1 Sludge Treatment facility and 33 Sewage Pumping Stations were affected in the Sheffield area.

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SECTION 7 - INITIAL RESPONSES

7.1 This section sets out how the Council and the main agencies responded to the floods.

Environment Agency7.2 The Environment Agency was responsible for issuing flood warnings for

flooding from rivers and the sea. The ability to issue warnings was dependent upon the ability to detect a flood in advance from weather forecasts, forecast of flow in the river system and measurement of river levels and having sufficient time to allow recipients to react to warnings. However, at the time of reporting, systems were not advanced enough to be able to issue specific warnings for sewer flooding. Warnings were disseminated via automated voice and/or text messages, public address loudhailer, indirectly through local radio and the Environment Agency’s website.

South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue7.3 Major concerns for South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue were the widespread

and multiple types of localised flooding, generating heavy demand for the service to “pump out”; evacuations and rescues in difficult conditions (both swift water or still water); deployment difficulties due to the flooding; a major incident at Firth Rixson; a major pumping operation at the Dam at the Ulley Reservoir; and the long term response to widespread flooding in Doncaster.

7.4 The key events on 25th June 2007 were the activation of the Command Operations Room at 4.50 p.m. and at 6.25 p.m., a Gold Command log was started by the Chief Fire Officer, personally. The service took responsibility for all rescue boats used in South Yorkshire. At 10.45 p.m. problems at the Ulley Reservoir were first recorded as being notified to South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue. Overnight, High Volume Pumps were mobilised for use at the reservoir. Immediately below the dam was a main road, the A618, along which run both electricity and gas mains. By 10.00 a.m. on 26th June, 18 High Volume Pumps were committed to Ulley. At the same time the Fire and Rescue Service was receiving calls relating to house fires, road accidents and industrial incidents.

7.5 South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue participated in four district Silver Commands and a Silver Command at Ulley Reservoir. This represented the largest ever deployment in the United Kingdom of High Volume Pumps, totalling 31. Water Rescue Units were deployed from across the United Kingdom, including a Royal National Lifeboat Institute inshore rescue craft from Dorset.

7.6 South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue had 32 fire engines available, 12 of which are based in Sheffield. There were four reserve vehicles at the training centre. Also available were one High Volume Pump and one Water Rescue Units with a boat. The Service had approximately 800 uniformed officers and covering all appliances, command positions and liaison jobs would use all available personnel rapidly. The Service maintained statutory cover for the whole County and for non-flooding risks including fires, chemical leaks, road

16accidents, transport incidents and other threats. A particular problem with flooding is that it is not feasible to pump floodwater away if rivers are full as there is then nowhere to pump water to.

Yorkshire Water7.7 Incident Management Teams were established by Yorkshire Water and a

Regional Operational Control Centre at Bradford to deal with the clean and waste water elements of the business. Liaison with the Gold Command at Sheffield was managed through those teams. The establishment of such teams gave their emergency command teams a clear single point of contact with the Company and with colleagues empowered to make decisions and also enable a regional approach to ensure that resources were focused in the right place and at the right time.

7.8 In reference to the incident at the Ulley Dam, Yorkshire Water did reserve pumping capacity in emergency situations although it was difficult to source additional capacity until that situation was resolved. Yorkshire Water viewed the efforts to shore up the Ulley Dam as a regional priority as it threatened major industrial and utility infrastructure in the valley. Colleagues with reservoir safety expertise were released to support Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council in managing the incident. The events also prompted the company to undertake a programme of visits to reservoirs under their ownership to ensure the integrity of those structures and adopting a precautionary approach, which saw colleagues walking the perimeter of reservoirs to carry out individual inspections for those reservoirs considered to be most at risk.

7.9 The impact of the flood water on water treatment works was also monitored, so as to ensure the works themselves were not inundated with water and so that the system was kept under positive pressure to ensure the quality of water.

7.10 The loss of power from the National Grid supply led to a drop in electricity capacity in Sheffield. This impacted upon Yorkshire Water who moved treatment works to on-site generation. Yorkshire Electricity Distribution Limited advised Yorkshire Water not to draw power from the National Grid, thereby releasing capacity for other users in the region. The treatment works using on site generation included Loxley, Ingbirchworth, Rivelin, Langsett and Ewden. Yorkshire Electricity Distribution Limited provided a list of potential rota cuts to power that enabled Yorkshire Water to assess assets and prioritise the impact of powers cuts on water supply.

7.11 The City Council advised that a trunk main, serving approximately 150,000 customers was exposed where water from the River Don had caused a landslide, exposing the main and making it vulnerable. Yorkshire Water therefore developed an engineering solution to shore up the bank and protect it, which also protected other utility services and this was put in place within two days.

7.12 Throughout the flooding Yorkshire Water did not experience any water quality incidents and ensured that the supply was maintained. In particular, the use of a water grid meant that, for the vast majority of customers,

17alternative water supply could be made available should their usual supply be lost.

7.13 The flooding in Sheffield affected the waste water treatment works in the Sheffield catchment to varying degrees. For example, at Blackburn Meadows the treatment works site was totally flooded and under four to five metres of water with staff stranded at the site overnight. In addition, sewage pumping stations in the Sheffield catchment were also damaged to varying degrees.

7.14 During periods of high rainfall, Yorkshire Water pumped screened but untreated flows directly into the river undertaken through a consents regime agreed with the Environment Agency. Once the water in the river subsided treated flows were pumped into the river again.

7.15 Contractors (Drainsaid) worked to help clear homes affected by flooding from the sewers.

City Council7.16 The City Council has a very clear plan for responding to emergency

situations and this was successfully activated. This is supported by training through a series of scenario-based exercises, which operates at all levels of command. The clear task and issues that needed to be faced were to minimise the impact of the flooding, to deal with the immediate consequence of the crisis and to manage the recovery of the City back to a state of normality.

7.17 On the afternoon of 25th June 2007, South Yorkshire Police declared a major incident and convened a Gold Command. The City Council had already been operating at a Silver Command level throughout the morning of 25th June 2007. The City Council attended the Gold Command within 40 minutes of it being declared with an officer who had been trained in Gold Command scenarios. The Council’s response was co-ordinated from the Emergency Control Centre in the Town Hall and the Council’s Silver Command was represented at Multi Agency Silver Command level.

7.18 A key part of the initial response was to keep the highway network fit for purpose as far as practically possible, focusing on safety and critical access for emergency services involved in the incident. 35 of the roads closed during the incident, including Sheffield Parkway that closed due to Ulley Reservoir, were reopened within 48 hours. 8 major road failures, 2 collapsed bridges and 6 minor slippages were made safe and clean up work commenced immediately on the morning of 26 June 2007 to remove debris from highway surfaces and clean blocked drainage systems.

7.19 The action that the Council took was:

Full participation in all multi-agency structures. Mobilisation of full emergency plan including action managers from

across all Directorates. Strategic and tactical deployment of resources City-wide to prevent

harm to public, to mitigate damage to property and to care for those in

18need.

Liaison with Government. Set-up a network of reception centres. Liaison with other local authorities on mutual aid basis. Direct communications with press and public and staff. Keeping Elected Members informed via intranet. Activation of Assistance Centres in accordance with the plan. Liaison with partner organisations.

7.20 Recognising that the resilience of the Council to continue to deal with this incident and the need to manage the transition from immediate response to recovery, the following action was taken:

Key personnel were rested during the night of 25th/26th June 2007 so that they could take over on 26th June 2007.

A handover and appraisal meeting was held at 6.00a.m. on 26th June 2007 chaired by the Chief Executive.

Structures to manage the recovery phase were put in place to operate in parallel with the incident management structure. A Silver Recovery Group, chaired by the Director of Development Services, was established at 6.00 a.m. on 26th June. It should be noted that the Gold Command incident structure remained in place until 1st July 2007 making it, at the time, the longest-running Gold Command exercise in the UK.

Recovery objectives were set and continuously reviewed.

Rotas, welfare and support arrangements were put in place to sustain the recovery effort.

Key partner agencies (e.g. Sheffield Homes) were brought into the recovery structures and partner resources were secured (e.g. Kier and Veolia).

7.21 The City Council anticipated that the immediate aftermath of the flood would be severe and disruptive and, with South Yorkshire Police, it requested that people should stay away from the City. This reduced pressure on the City and its infrastructure on 26th June 2007 giving "space" to address immediate recovery priorities. The impact of the Council's actions were:

Near-fully operational City infrastructure and Council facilities within 48 hours of flooding commencing.

Reduced impact of electricity loss to City through joint-working with utilities.

Early release (up to £2m) of Government support for businesses, minimising impact on economy.

19 Demonstrable Government support arising from clear communications

and liaison.

7.22 The provision of a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) is a new responsibility placed on Local Authorities. The planning for this responsibility was still in the early stages when the floods occurred. The HAC was set up within 24 hours of the event using the existing infrastructure within Customer Services. It was situated within Howden House and delivered by the First Point team.

7.23 Through the Council’s scheme for Major Peacetime Emergencies, the Community Care has the responsibility for planning, preparing and overseeing the provision of immediate care and support to people in the event of a major emergency. This is undertaken by the Major Incident Response Group (MIRG), which also has membership from the Council’s Children and Young People Directorate, Sheffield Primary Care Trust and faith groups.

7.24 A register of 300 accredited workers is maintained to deploy support teams at reception centres, hospitals and other locations around the clock for the first 72 hours after an incident. WRVS are also key partners who provide support as well as drinks and refreshments.

7.25 MIRG established 4 reception centres to accommodate around 1,400 people overnight who were either stranded in the City or who had been evacuated from their homes. The centres were at the Town Hall, Hallam University (Owen Building), Sheffield Hallam Arena and Tapton Secondary School. By midday the next day, all the centres were returned to their normal use.

7.26 In addition to these ‘formal’ reception centres, there were scores of stories of neighbours, families, friends and strangers, employers and employees spontaneously assisting people who were caught up in the floods.

South Yorkshire Police7.27 The flood event of June 2007 presented a testing and challenging time for

South Yorkshire Police and their resources were stretched. There had been a very positive response from Police Officers, Police Community Support Officers and from Special Constables. In relation to Police powers to prevent people from putting themselves at risk, for example by driving into flood waters or playing on weirs, the Police could only attempt to dissuade people from putting themselves at risk, as they had no powers in this regard.

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SECTION 8 - RECOVERY

City Council8.1 On the evening of the 25th June when the scale and extent of the flood event

had become clear, the Gold Command agreed that, in addition to the Silver Tactical Response Group, a City Council Silver Recovery Group be established. The Council’s Executive Management Team requested that the Director of Development Services chair this Group initially. The Group met between 25th June and 2nd July to commence the recovery plan. It comprised the Director of Development Services, Director of Street Force, Director of Housing, representatives from Environment and Regulatory Services, the Emergency Planning Team and the Head of Customer Services. The Group was supported by a range of officers from the respective Directorates.

8.2 The Group was located in the Town Hall in offices adjacent to the Silver Command Response Group chaired by South Yorkshire Police. This enabled close liaison between the team responsible for dealing with ongoing response issues and the team responsible for planning and implementing the recovery of the City. The City Council officers on the Silver Recovery Group were augmented by representatives from the Environment Agency, Yorkshire Water, the Public Utilities and the Emergency Planning Team.

8.3 It is worth noting that the Pitt Review: “Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods Interim Report” has highlighted that those authorities, such as Sheffield, that set up a separate Recovery Group were able to respond better to the emergency than those that left these activities with the Gold and Silver Tactical Commands dealing with response.

8.4 The first main task of the Group on the morning of Tuesday, 26th June, was to establish the extent of the damage to the City’s infrastructure, homes and business. This was done by Council officers being dispatched to flood affected areas to assess the actions needed to address the following:

Safety of the public. Damage to highways infrastructure and traffic disruption. Debris and blockages of the rivers and drainage systems. Damage to residential properties. Damage to business properties. Damage to critical infrastructure such as power facilities, water

facilities, and sewage disposal facilities. Any impact or threat to public health. Provision of waste disposal facilities, especially for contaminated

material. Provision of information and advice.

8.5 Following this initial recovery phase a South Yorkshire Multi Agency Recovery Working Group was established. The Council’s Chief Executive chaired the initial meeting of this Group on Monday 2nd July. The group met to agree recovery arrangements at a sub regional and district level. It was

21agreed that local authorities should be proactive with communities and manage expectations, especially the timescales for recovery.

8.6 The full Council Recovery Working Group chaired by the Chief Executive was held on Wednesday 4th July 2007 with lead officers identified for relevant work streams generated by the group. The main focus of the group was:

Restoration of the City’s infrastructure. Co-ordination of the immediate and ongoing safety of affected areas. Support for the clean up and decontamination of buildings and the

environment. The safe, orderly and speedy return home of evacuated people. Removal and disposal of contaminated waste. Environmental monitoring and sampling. Support for businesses. Medium term welfare needs of those affected. Provision of information and advice. Restoration of public confidence.

8.7 Various areas were identified as requiring action, some to be taken jointly with partners to deal with recovery in the first few hours and days after 25 June 2007 including: -

Impact on the community. Communication with highway users. Restoration of Urban Traffic Control Cameras and Management

system. Temporary traffic management measures in liaison with South

Yorkshire Police and the Highway Agency. Supplying emergency sand bags to individuals and businesses. Making safe infrastructure damage. Clearing of debris from the highway including mud, abandoned

vehicles, other debris and remaining flood water. Clearing of vegetation and other debris from rivers in locations where

City Council is responsible as riparian owner and/or highway authority. Clearing high-risk vegetation from rivers generally between bridges

was the responsibility of riparian owners but was carried out by the Council in the interests of public safety. The Environment Agency has legal powers to undertake this work if it considers it to be a flood risk

Clearing blocked gullies, grillages, culverts and beany blocks. Initial inspection of highways bridges and other infrastructure to

assess the extent of the damage and begin to formulate recovery plans.

Setting up the Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC). Impact on businesses. Funding and donations. Visiting flooded houses, food and other businesses and identifying

significant chemical losses from industry. Liaison and support to utilities, especially electricity suppliers,

Yorkshire Water and Gas, to protect services and restore electricity supplies to 48,000 properties in North Sheffield.

22

8.8 The Council and its partners took a number of actions in the 2 weeks after 25th June 2007 including:-

Initial inspection of highways bridges and other infrastructure to assess the extent of the damage and begin to formulate recovery plans. Liaison took place with the Statutory Undertakers who took action to make their services safe including diversions where necessary.

Communication with highway users about the current state of the network using local radio, television, newspapers and signage.

Temporary traffic management measures – 41 roads were closed following the floods. However, all but 6 were re-opened within 48 hours. Temporary repairs to traffic signals and Urban Traffic Control system. The M1 and Sheffield Parkway was closed for 48 hours because of the possibility of the Ulley Reservoir dam collapsing.

Over 13,000 emergency sand bags were supplied to individuals and businesses and 25 cellars were pumped out at Hillsborough.

Infrastructure damage was made safe, including 8 major road failures and 6 minor slippages. A potentially dangerous pipe bridge was removed downstream from Livesey Street.

26km of highway were cleared of mud, abandoned vehicles, other debris and remaining flood water. In total, 1600 tonnes of debris was removed.

Vegetation and other debris were cleared from rivers in locations where the City Council was responsible as riparian owner and/or highway authority.

Potentially high-risk vegetation was cleared from rivers, generally between bridges, by the Environment Agency and other riparian owners. It was also carried out by the Council in the interests of public safety.

4,000 gullies were cleared together with numerous grillages and culverts, which had become blocked by debris deposited by the floodwater.

Altogether, 245 Street Force personnel were involved together with 38 operatives from 8 sub contractors.

An assessment of the impact on the construction of the Northern Inner Ring Road that had been badly affected by flooding in the Nursery Street/Wicker Areas.

8.9 Having made the highway network safe, an infrastructure damage recovery plan was implemented to restore the highway network to its pre June 25th

23status i.e. fit for purpose and business as usual. Since the floods, local residents and road users have been kept informed with progress through letter drops, media articles, public meetings, signage and information boards on site, newsletter and website updates. Diversion routes, which it is acknowledged are not ideal in certain cases, were introduced and where possible works have been carried out to improve the situation.

8.10 The storms and flood caused considerable damage to over 50 buildings (including libraries, museum, crematoria and chapels, domestic dwellings, offices and community facilities). The Council worked closely with Kier Sheffield LLP (its building maintenance contractor) to undertake urgent action to deal immediately with issues such as flooded cellars, water ingress through roofs, doors and windows, water damage to electric installations, collapsed ceilings, and flooded boiler and plant rooms.

8.11 Considerable damage was caused to land and infrastructure within parks, woodlands and cemeteries across the City but particularly along the valleys of the City’s rivers and streams. Paths, tracks and driveways were damaged or destroyed; culverts and drains were damaged and blocked with debris thus causing flooding on adjacent roads and land; bridges in parks and woods were damaged or destroyed; children’s playgrounds in four parks were destroyed; river retaining walls and river banks were destroyed or damaged; parks, sports pitches, cemeteries and allotments were flooded with contaminated waters.

8.12 The most serious impact on service delivery was the flooding of part of the core office accommodation at Carbrook including the Urban Traffic Control Centre, Street Force operational depot facilities on Penistone Road and Kelham Island Museum. Additionally, the retaining and flood defence walls around the River Don and adjacent historic goit around Kelham Island Museum were completely destroyed. Many historic and valuable artefacts and exhibits were destroyed or damaged by the flood.

8.13 The emphasis in the response phase was to ensure safety of staff and public and ensure the delivery of services could continue. Action taken included:

Kier Sheffield LLP was commissioned to undertake a range of urgent work to ensure buildings were safe to continue operating. Three buildings required complete replacement of heating plant and one required renewal of electrical installation and mains supply.

Council engineers were commissioned to survey damage to infrastructure and produce prioritised recommendations and estimates for repairs. Critical remedial work, including clearing of debris from rivers, unblocking culverts, making safe bridges and other health and safety work was implemented immediately and resources were made available.

At the Carbrook Offices, temporary accommodation was found for services and staff displaced and a programme of immediate cleaning up, sanitising and disposal of contaminated equipment, furniture and fittings undertaken. Once approval to spend was obtained, a full

24programme of refurbishment of the affected parts of the offices was commenced and this was completed in January 2008.

Temporary facilities (offices, showers and toilets) were installed at Penistone Road Depot to allow the facility to operate.

The Sheffield Industrial Museums Trust, working with Zurich Insurance and their emergency salvage agents, have completely stripped out and sanitised the Museum prior to developing plans for full refurbishment.

To prevent any recurrence of flooding of Kelham Island Museum and surrounding area during the winter of 2007 and throughout 2008, pending permanent reinstatement of retaining and flood defence walls, a temporary wall comprising sand-filled geotextile membrane has been installed around the perimeter of the island.

Reinstatement of four children’s playgrounds.

8.14 Considerable work is still required to achieve full recovery. None of the flood damage caused (with the exception of the internal damage to Kelham Island Museum) will be met from Insurance.

Residents8.15 Visits were made to approximately 2,000 Council residential properties

between 30th June and 1st July 2007 to ascertain the impact of the flooding on residential properties and to identify vulnerable people requiring support. It could not have been predicted where people would have been affected by the flood events and there were isolated locations where residents were affected, for example by blocked culverts.

8.16 The general advice provided to residents was that in the first instance they should look to their own insurance company to put right any damage or losses as a result of flood damage to their home or possessions. However, the Council recognised that immediate support was required and made available a scheme to residents regardless of tenure in areas affected by the floods that were under or uninsured. The immediate assistance included:-

Pumping out / sweeping out of water.

Removal of slurry from cellars or under floors.

General chemical clean.

Electrical testing and emergency electrical repairs.

Removal of flood damaged items from the home.

Support for older/ vulnerable people to rearrange furniture and make their home habitable.

The collection of flood damaged items through additional refuse collection or skips in isolated areas.

Separate collection of other items such as Fridges/ Freezers and TVs

25 Arranging support for vulnerable people.

8.17 Approximately 60 tons of debris had been cleared in the first 10 days after 25th June and Kier made 275 properties fit for habitation. Significant levels of support were made available to individuals in the first three to four weeks following the floods.

8.18 The South Yorkshire Community Foundation administered the South Yorkshire Disaster Relief Fund on behalf of the Council and it was the single mechanism used to deal with requests for immediate financial assistance from residents. Initially the take up of requests for financial assistance was slower than anticipated, despite being actively marketed through the media and a newsletter to flood affected residents. Feedback indicated that this reluctance was due to the amount of financial information the application form requested. The process was streamlined and with encouragement and support the number of applications rose to 566.

8.19 Council Tax inspectors carried out visits and exemptions were granted to residents where properties suffered structural damage and /or were otherwise uninhabitable.

8.20 79 volunteers from across the Council also made follow up visits to all properties affected by the floods. The aim of the visits was to make contact with the public, to identify any needs that exist and to encourage people to apply for £100 grant from the South Yorkshire Relief Fund. They were also intended to identify anyone who would qualify for the ‘Christmas/Holiday Season’ payment of £30 and encourage applications for this. The information gathered from the visits has been used to populate a database that is being utilised to plan and record actions.

8.21 Six months after the floods there were still over 100 people still not living in their own homes and the main reason for the delay in their return was the time taken to dry out properties.

Customer Services Activity8.22 In the first two weeks after the flooding event, some 20,000 telephone calls

had been received in relation to the flooding. A dedicated Flood Co-ordinator was put into post to support residents affected by the flooding. The Council acknowledged the work of the South Yorkshire Community Foundation that had effectively dealt with requests for financial assistance from residents.

Care and Support8.23 Meetings had been held with colleagues from Carlisle with regard to the

Council’s approach for providing care and support. A multi-agency care and support group was established including representatives of Community Care, the Children and Young People’s Directorate of the Council, the Care Trust and Primary Care Trust, Educational Psychologist and community organisations to establish a clear and quick pathway to specialist help for people if they required such support. The Council considered that it was now in a better position to identify vulnerable people, especially in such emergency circumstances as the events in June 2007. A carer support emergency plan was also being established.

26

Businesses8.24 The Chamber of Commerce, Creative Sheffield and Yorkshire Forward were

involved in the process of assessing the impact on businesses and support required. A business help line was established and well utilised and appreciated, especially by small businesses. A small number of businesses initially made claims for business rate rebate and further information was sent out to encourage applications. Yorkshire Forward provided financial assistance and the Investor Development Manager from Creative Sheffield represented businesses at the Recovery Working Group.

Public Health8.25 Sheffield Primary Care Trust and the Health Protection Agency had

responsibility for health monitoring following the floods. The Council’s Environment and Regulatory Services visited and provided advice at leisure facilities especially swimming pools and food outlets. Trading Standards Officers provided advice on avoiding rogue traders in repair and renovation work. The Council’s waste partner Veolia provided a vehicle and loaders to collect flood-damaged materials from domestic premises for free. All businesses in Sheffield within the flood-affected area where there was a higher risk of chemical loss, were contacted to risk assess the likelihood of significant contamination.

Yorkshire Water8.26 A primary concern for Yorkshire Water was the recovery of sewage

treatment works and a reinstatement team was established to oversee the long-term recovery of its assets. In relation to the works at Blackburn Meadows, there was a scheme to replace damaged process plant and equipment and, where necessary, equipment will be protected from future floods.

8.27 Reservoirs were operated under the 1975 Reservoir Safety Act and were inspected weekly, including the level of water at the embankment of the reservoir. Annually, an independent engineer inspected the integrity of the reservoir and this was supplemented by a 10 yearly inspection with regard to longer term maintenance. The Underbank Reservoir was inspected on 16th May 2007 (this was its 10 year inspection) and minor requirements from that inspection had been completed.

8.28 Yorkshire Water’s emergency response involved:-

Contracting partners, AMBS, Framework suppliers and their teams delivering an exceptional response.

Sewerage service impacts kept to minimal with no reported impact on river qualities.

Close liaison with Environment Agency. Repairs undertaken and some permanent reinstatement completed

immediately to maintain compliant operations. To date £10m spent on emergency response and work completed A Team dedicated to emergency and reinstatement programme. A Team responsible for appointment of contractors for recovery and

reinstatement for all assets, liaison with insurers and Network de-

27silting programme.

8.29 Progress included:

Site asset assessment completed on all flood affected assets. Technical designs and solutions completed and progressed into

delivery schemes. Desilting programme removed 437 tonnes of silt and grit from 34km of

sewers. Sewage Treatment Works have been compliant with consent

conditions with no detrimental impact on receiving watercourses. Programme of inspections ongoing for condition assessment to

ensure operation and health and safety. Work on permanent reinstatement of assets across Sheffield. Electrical panels for a number of sites on order and awaiting delivery

for installation. Majority of sites to be completed by mid 2008. There was a significant programme of works taking place through

2008 at the Blackburn Meadows sewage treatment works at an estimated cost of £12m.

Continuing involvement and liaison with the Environment Agency.

Environment Agency8.30 The Environment Agency worked to clear debris from watercourses and was

also working on the production of a capital investment strategy for the Don Catchment with both Yorkshire Water and the City Council.

Thank You Event8.31 To recognise the work of people from all organisations involved in the

response to the flooding a reception was held at Sheffield Town Hall. The Lord Mayor, in the presence of the Chief Executive and Leader of the Council, presented certificates.

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SECTION 9 - COSTS AND RESOURCES

9.1 The overall cost of the damage to the City’s infrastructure, was estimated at some £22.5 m. These costs have been primarily incurred as a result of damage to the City and the Council’s infrastructure in the form of damage to public highways, public rights of way, drainage systems, premises and assets, parks etc. There was also significant damage to homes, managed on behalf of the Council by Sheffield Homes.

9.2 Of this overall cost it is estimated that £3.4m is covered by various insurance policies. The Council was also able to claim from the Bellwin fund to pay for the immediate cost of response. It is worth noting that this only covered expenditure in the first 6 months on a very closely defined list of activities. The overall eligible costs were estimated at £1.5m, however Bellwin required the Council to spend 0.2% of its revenue budget on these matters before making the claim; therefore the net value of the claim is £166,000.

9.3 The balance of revenue costs, which is estimated at £2.7m, needs to be found from the Council’s own resources.

9.4 Capital resources were also needed, which will be obtained from Department for Transport emergency capital funding, the claim being £9.9m, which will be paid net of the £840,000 Local Transport plan excess. The Council’s corporate resource pool will be used to fund such costs as Public Rights of Way, property and assets that were not covered by insurance in 2007/08 and 2008/09. £3m has been identified for this purpose and will be spread across 2007/08 and 2008/09.

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SECTION 10 - INITIAL LESSONS LEARNED

City Council10.1 An analysis has been undertaken to assess the risk of further flooding. In

particular an intensive programme of removal of debris, falling trees etc. from highways, drains and rivers to reduce the risk of further floods was commissioned from Street Force following consultation with the Environment Agency and utilities. Proposals have also been included in the 2008/09 budget process to improve resilience of City Council drainage systems.

10.2 Although the floods were perhaps the largest and most widespread destructive event to affect Sheffield and South Yorkshire since the Second World War, there were many positive aspects of the response which include:

Although large numbers of people had to be evacuated from both homes and business premises, these were all dealt with within the Council’s own resources.

It was estimated that around 1,400 people were stranded overnight in the City Centre by the termination of trains at the railway station and the stopping of bus services. These people were accommodated and fed by the City Council and provided with transport to their destinations within 24 hours of the initial flooding. Many have since praised the Council's organisation that enabled this.

Joint working within the Council and with private and public partners went very well. A County-wide multi-agency command structure was quickly established and managed the rapidly unfolding events. This structure remained in place for some time and enabled a co-ordinated response to the threat of further disruption from expected further heavy rain on the weekend of 30 June/1 July (which fortunately did not occur). It also enabled a smooth transition to the management of the recovery operation.

People went the extra mile with no ‘jobsworth’ attitudes.

The Council’s emergency plan, emergency response and business continuity planning were tested in many different ways and the success of the overall response proved the value of the ongoing hard work and commitment to emergency planning in Sheffield.

The early transition to the recovery phase to repair damage to infrastructure was recognised as good practice.

Press coverage and customer feedback has been largely positive.

The plans and preparatory work for the establishment of HACs proved very effective. They were set up both in Howden House and in affected communities and were regarded as useful and provided a focal point for information and assistance.

30 While management structures and resources came under intense

pressure, a particular success was the early realisation of the scale of the emergency and setting up of staff rotas during the Monday 25th June 2007 to enable the instigation of a relief shift later on the Monday evening.

Exercises play an important role in the training and preparation for officers at all levels in dealing with major emergencies and the participation by a number of Council officers on the multi agency flood exercise ‘Exercise Loxley’ in December 2006, and the Gold level exercise, ‘Exercise Thermos’ in March 2007 reinforce the benefits gained.

The Corporate Contact Centre quickly established helplines for both residents and businesses, which were widely used.

10.3 A debrief of the recovery process took place in February 2008.

10.4 The Environment Agency and the City Council have held joint meetings to discuss the lessons learned from the floods and agree how the organisations will work together, involving local water companies and partner agencies. The establishment of a multi-agency project to track progress and investigate the fragmentation of watercourse management through the City has been suggested. The Area Report and revised Flood Maps were due to be available in March 2008 from the Environment Agency.

10.5 Despite a list of 300 accredited workers to deploy support teams at reception centres, hospitals and other locations around the clock for the first 72 hours after an incident, many were not able to respond due to disruption caused by the number of roads flooded or damaged. The Council has a rolling programme to recruit more staff within the Council and is working with the voluntary, community & faith sectors to increase numbers and also to progress an emergency response ‘good neighbour scheme’.

10.6 Whilst feedback from users of the Reception Centre was overwhelmingly positive, there were isolated incidents of theft and unsettling behaviour. Depending on the nature of the emergency, the police cannot guarantee to have a permanent presence in a reception centre. The Council is looking at deploying City Centre Ambassadors and Community Wardens for additional reassurance in any future emergencies.

10.7 The Council has information on vulnerable families and affected households but there will be many others who become vulnerable as a result of an emergency and who are not readily known to the Council. The Government has issued guidance on data sharing (for example between health, social care and utilities) and the Council is awaiting specific guidance on approaches to identifying vulnerable people. A Council group is looking at the lessons from the floods and power cuts. It has produced a draft protocol for sharing information, and has agreed the definitions for vulnerable people that, it is anticipated, will be acceptable under the Government guidance.

10.8 The Interim Pitt Report recommends a review of all potential reception

31centres, to establish which buildings have their own generators or whether a generator could be brought in to power the buildings. The Council will be carrying out the same audit of residential care homes with a view to have homes in strategic locations that will be able to operate on their own power and also be in a position to support other care homes, or become a reception centre for those needing 24 hour care.

Environment Agency10.9 The report published by the Environment Agency concerning the flooding in

2007 suggested a strategic overview involving various agencies and acknowledging that the critical infrastructure in the country needed to be “climate change proofed”. It was suggested that there needed to be an increase in the national spending on flood risk management from the £650m spent annually. Improvements were also recommended in relation to flood warning systems, particularly those to deal with flash floods or those caused by surface water.

10.10 The Agency worked to help ensure that information it provided to partners, emergency services and the public provoked action. Improvements were also recommended in relation to the response to incidents of flooding, particularly in relation to personnel servicing Gold and Silver Command structures.

10.11 The recommendations of the interim review by Sir Michael Pitt echoed some of the recommendations of the Environment Agency.

10.12 The Environment Agency is working on the production of a capital investment strategy to improve flood resilience across the Don Catchment with both Yorkshire Water and the City Council. This will take up to two years to complete.

10.13 A particular task for the Agency was to improve the take up of its flood warning service as only 800 to 1,000 people in Sheffield were using the service. Consideration was being given to providing the service for all those living in flood risk areas and requesting that people opt out of the service, although there were data protection implications of such a solution.

10.14 The Environment Agency had maintained clear advice in relation to development on flood plains and also worked with individual businesses to increase their resilience to flooding.

Yorkshire Water10.15 It had become apparent that there was some confusion amongst customers

and other stakeholders as to roles and responsibilities of various agencies with regard to river flooding, drainage and sewage networks.

10.16 There was also lack of clarity about the role of water companies in the planning process for new developments. Water companies are not statutory consultees for new planning applications although, if consulted by a developer or local authority, Yorkshire Water can request conditions, which the approving authority might attach to the planning permission when granted. The company had no duty to monitor whether the

32recommendations they had made had been implemented. In addition, Yorkshire Water was obliged to offer all new developments the right to connect into public sewage systems under Section 104 of the Water Industry Act. It was considered that such regulations might need to be reviewed as a result of the flooding in summer 2007.

South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue10.17 Action taken by South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue included consultations with

other Fire and Rescue Services across the country; national enhancement of and improved co-ordination of water rescue resources; a review of flooding risk assessments; review and revision of flooding contingency plans; further exercises, including one on 24th October, 2007 and 30th January, 2008; liaison with the Environment Agency and the Meteorological Office; the enhancement of Gold control facilities and the establishment of a new South Yorkshire Multi-Agency Gold Command at Handsworth; increased water rescue capability in South Yorkshire; the training of additional personnel on high volume pumps; and improved arrangements to enable support staff call-out. One important remaining issue for the service was to persuade people not to put themselves at risk unnecessarily when events, such as the flooding, occur.

Utility Companies10.18 Although they were not present at the meetings, the main utility companies

were asked for a view on their experiences of the impact of the floods and lessons learned. Responses were received from National Grid Gas and Open Reach (BT).

10.19 The main concern of National Grid Gas at the time of the flood was the integrity of Ulley Dam. There is a major offtake in close proximity to the dam. Contingency plans had been put in place to isolate the offtake but it was felt that communications from the dam to Gold Command and then to their incident room was very slow which lost them time in making decisions. Their staff on site at the dam did relay some information to the incident room but this was treated with caution until they received official communication from Gold Command.

10.20 Although not directly affecting Sheffield, the comments from Open Reach were around the decisions not to set up a Gold Command in South Yorkshire with representation from all the utilities. They were aware that something similar was organised in Catcliffe but nothing covering the Doncaster areas. From a telecoms point of view they could have given better service and response had this been organised.

Insurance Industry10.21 Residents reported very mixed responses and experiences from the

insurance industry. In circumstances where different arrangements had been made for contents and property insurance, co-ordination was generally poor. The Council had expressed to the insurance industry that an important learning point was being to provide better-written information to claimants. Although the majority of homeowners were insured, a worrying number of tenants were not insured for the loss of contents, although the Council provides a scheme through Norwich Union.

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SECTION 11- ISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

11.1 The Chairs of the two Scrutiny Boards were keen for the involvement of the public in the scrutiny investigation. A press release was issued and approximately 25 people attended both meetings. They were given to the opportunity to ask questions of officers from the Council and agencies. The majority of those attending were from areas affected by the floods in June 2007 and also the flooding that occurred the day before the first scrutiny meeting.

11.2 Residents of Cowley Court, Cowley Lane, Chapeltown expressed concern at the maintenance of drainage and that housing development taking place elsewhere in Chapeltown may have contributed to the drainage difficulties associated with the flooding.

11.3 The Environment Agency referred to discussions on Blackburn Brook, Chapeltown that had been held with a consultant engineer and with the City Council on the possible provision of storage to manage water flow. In addition, the entire catchment of the River Don was being considered by the Environment Agency as part of a wider study and when the result of this study was known, the options available to reduce flood risk and associated flooding could be considered further.

11.4 The Environment Agency stated that in relation to debris and trees in the main river watercourses, large trees were being cleared and particularly at Hillsborough, debris had been washed into the river and it was acknowledged that there was a significant amount of clearing still to be done. A particular difficulty was access to the river due to the built up nature of the area.

11.5 In relation to the Ulley Reservoir, repairs had taken place (of a temporary nature) after the events of flooding in June 2007. Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council owned the reservoir, although the Environment Agency was responsible to ensure that the local authority undertook the required works to their satisfaction. In the short term, the condition of the reservoir was considered to be satisfactory.

11.6 The Council’s Director of Street Force stated that the City Council was responsible for highway drains and local watercourses on Council land. Street Force carried out routine emptying of gullies at least once a year and other gullies were cleaned with greater frequency every two or three months. Known “hotspots” were examined more closely following receipt of flood warnings to ensure that they were running freely. At any one time it was considered that 93% of gullies were running freely. The Council took the issue of gully clearance very seriously, although, if flash floods were to occur, surface water drainage systems might be overwhelmed locally.

11.7 On the issue of the management of dams and, in particular how excessive loads of water within dams were prevented in winter periods, Yorkshire Water explained that reservoirs in the group along the Little Don fed into the

34Underbank Reservoir and provided compensation flow for industry along the river. Whilst the dams and reservoirs provided some flood attenuation, their primary function was water supply and the provision of a compensation flow for the industry in the valley. In June 2007 the reservoirs were 75% full which was slightly lower than the average for that time of year. Yorkshire Water would continue to work with other agencies, such as the Environment Agency, in relation to flood attenuation if supply arrangements (for water) were seen as a possible solution. The Environment Agency had a regulatory responsibility to ensure that dams and reservoir owners properly maintained their assets. With regard to the role of reservoirs and dams in flood attenuation, there were interim arrangements with Yorkshire Water to use the reservoirs for storage, although it was acknowledged that the significance of this was limited. This would be one option considered as part of the Agency’s Don Catchment Investment Strategy.

11.8 In relation to concerns relating to Cowley Lane and Falding Street and a request that water be directed so as to reduce the risk of flooding, the Director of Street Force suggested that the agencies including Yorkshire Water, the Environment Agency and the City Council meet on site to address the concerns, particularly in relation to the responsibilities of the various agencies and possible improvements which could be made. Such a meeting should include officers from Parks and Countryside.

11.9 There was a request that work should be done to improve the flow of water through Chapeltown. The Environment Agency confirmed that the Blackburn Brook, which flows through Chapeltown, was considered a “main river” and this definition informed agencies of their powers to undertake works relating to the watercourse. There were discussions being held with consultants concerning the possible provision of storage to manage water flow.

11.10 It was suggested that the storm drain had been opened at Underbank Reservoir allowing water to be carried downstream. Yorkshire Water stated that on 25th and 26th June 2007 water passed through as overflow but the sluice gates were not opened.

11.11 On the impact of housing development and how the Council’s Planning Service would examine further planning applications with particular reference to flooding and surface run-off from increasingly impermeable surfaces (for example when people paved over their gardens), the Director of Development Services stated that advice was always taken from the Environment Agency before planning decisions were taken. However, any new development could potentially add to drainage issues, although 90% of development in Sheffield occurred on previously developed “brownfield” land. It was the intention that the run-off of water from surfaces on such developments should be minimised and work was undertaken with the Environment Agency and Yorkshire Water as to the design of drainage systems. There was a dilemma, as people wished to have new homes, so flood risk needed to be balanced with other needs. There was no control, under the present legislation, of building on garden spaces for the development of patios, for example.

11.12 An issue was raised on how riparian owners were expected to clear areas of

35the river. The Environment Agency had powers to undertake works on major rivers and if a riparian owner reported a problem in a watercourse or any member of the public reported such a problem as a possible flood risk, the Environment Agency would undertake to investigate this matter to assess whether it might increase flood risk.

36

SECTION 12 - ISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

12.1 In addition to Members of the two Scrutiny Boards, all City Councillors were invited to the meetings and 13 attended. Officers from the Council and the agencies responded to the questions and issues raised.

Resources12.2 The Board heard from the Director of Street Force that, in relation to the

provision of local resources, such as sandbags, it was the intention that resources be placed outside at a location in the north of the City. Work would be undertaken with local Elected Members to determine the exact location. It was noted that Yorkshire Water also owned some resources.

12.3 On 25th June 2007 there had been a great number of requests for sandbags and the Emergency Planning Team had been a single point of access for such assistance. Sandbags were not always the best solution, for example at the Neepsend Power Station, a request had been made for 8,000 sandbags (with only 10,000 sandbags available in the City) and, following an assessment, it had been decided that a trench would be more effective to prevent further flooding.

Dams/Reservoirs12.4 Emergency plans were in place, which tested and modelled what might

happen if a dam were to be breached. Yorkshire Water also carried out a statutory inspection of reservoirs every six months and this was undertaken twice daily in the immediate time following the flood event in June 2007. No damage was recorded on the reservoirs that were the responsibility of Yorkshire Water and were designed to withstand a 1 in 1,000 year event.

12.5 With regard to the routine maintenance of Yorkshire Water’s reservoirs, if silting had occurred and channels in the reservoir were blocked then de-silting was undertaken through a programme of maintenance. Such maintenance was identified in the annual and 10 year reviews of reservoirs. Reference was made to research being undertaken to ascertain whether dredging of reservoirs would increase capacity and water supply and if a contribution had been made to flood attenuation.

12.6 In relation to the infrastructure of dams and reservoirs, a change in legislation had been proposed whereby each owner of a reservoir would be required to assess its resilience to extreme conditions and have contingency in place. This set of proposals was being consulted upon. The reservoirs under the ownership of Yorkshire Water or other Water Authorities, which were greater than 25,000 cubic metres in volume, were subject to the Reservoir Safety Act.

12.7 Reservoirs under the ownership of Yorkshire Water were not built primarily to provide flood attenuation but were for the supply of water and for extraction of the water for industrial purposes downstream. Climate change was being considered as part of Yorkshire Water's future plans.

37River/Watercourses/Drainage

12.8 A local Member made reference to a meeting of the North Area Panel that had taken place on 16th January 2008 at which local residents of Falding Street and Cowley Lane had expressed concern at rising water levels due to recent heavy rain. Concern was expressed that debris in the river (for example at Oughtibridge) was causing blockages and it was important that the Environment Agency stated when this debris would be cleared. Removal of debris from watercourses was a continuing task for the Environment Agency. A crane and machinery was required together with possible road closures for the removal of certain large items of debris and there was sometimes difficulty in accessing some sections of the watercourse.

12.9 Concern was expressed that the River Loxley contained debris and trees. The Environment Agency referred to difficulty in accessing the River to remove some of the debris that would require the use of a crane to remove material and a road closure to enable the siting of a crane. The Agency would enquire in relation to the Bradfield Road/Hillsborough Corner section of the river and to the deposits of debris at that location.

12.10 The Environment Agency stated that in relation to the River Sheaf at Millhouses it was suspected that debris would not be removed at that location, as there were few houses or businesses in the park area. Removal of such debris was prioritised.

12.11 In relation to the inspection of watercourses, the Council inspected high risk areas with the Environment Agency and the Council had cleared a significant volume of debris to fulfil its responsibility as riparian owner but also other nearby debris at the same time, where it was in the public interest.

12.12 The Environment Agency reiterated that wholesale dredging was not considered effective as potentially little material was removed which would reduce the risk of a watercourse flooding and in addition structures along the watercourse might prevent dredging. When in flood, rivers carried debris and scoured the watercourse rather than depositing material.

12.13 The Environment Agency was working with the City Council regarding a timetable of debris clearance. The Agency undertook to examine the concerns raised in relation to the section of the river adjacent to Riverside Exchange and Lady’s Bridge. It was confirmed that Street Force did remove debris from that location in the week after the flooding of 25th June.

12.14 It was acknowledged that there was an issue in relation to the public’s knowledge of which authorities were responsible for the management of the discharge of water and one of the recommendations of the Pitt Review pointed to a more integrated approach to water and drainage management.

12.15 In relation to the known surface water drainage hot spots, these were prioritised against a criteria included in the Street Maintenance Policy Standards and Strategy Statement and was a matter of public knowledge. In some cases, grillages to culverts require inspection and clearance is necessary in response to flood warnings, in addition to routine clearance. In other cases, there was perhaps not enough hydraulic capacity and larger

38pipes may be needed to cope with the volumes of water discharging through the sewage and surface water drainage systems.

12.16 Reference was made to the possible development of a surface water management plan, which was very likely to be one of the outcomes from the Pitt Review.

12.17 Yorkshire Water confirmed that routine maintenance was undertaken and sewers were monitored and cleared of restrictions. Additional monitoring was undertaken following the flood event in June 2007 and technology was employed to monitor water levels in sewers.

Communications12.18 A number of Elected Members did not feel included in the sharing of

information during June and July 2007 and expressed concern that there were not mechanisms in place to keep local Members informed. It was noted that the emergency planning process attempted, wherever possible, to keep people informed and the intranet was used by the City Council to this end. Elected Members were encouraged to attend emergency planning seminars. The Council’s communication plan was being reviewed in the light of the floods and within the review the role and place of Councillors within communications system was to be specifically considered.

12.19 It was acknowledged that, early on in the incident, the authorities were unaware as to which highways were becoming blocked and in the City Centre, in some cases, the Ambassadors were sent to identify people who were stranded. Information was also forthcoming from others in the City Centre including taxi drivers. At one point the Urban Traffic Control Centre at Carbrook and cameras were out of operation because of the floods and there was reliance on the Police helicopter for information. The control equipment was moved to the top floor to improve resilience.

Climate Change12.20 It was suggested that Natural England be involved in the development of a

biodiversity plan, together with agencies such as Yorkshire Water and the Environment Agency, to mitigate the effects of climate change and flood risk in the future. It was noted that, in the long term, work would be undertaken with the Environment Agency and the University of Sheffield was undertaking research with regard to reducing future flood risk. When planning applications were received, such aspects as a sustainable water system were considered.

Riparian Owners12.21 It was acknowledged that it was a challenge to inform people of their riparian

responsibilities and reference was made to an Environment Agency guide for people that owned land or property alongside a river or other watercourse entitled “Living On The Edge” (also available on their website www.environment-agency.gov.uk).

12.22 Riparian owners were approached by negotiation and suggestion and it was difficult to enforce requirements for riparian owners to undertake work such as the clearing of debris. Such tasks were also resource intensive for the

39Environment Agency. It was confirmed that the riparian responsibilities were those of the freeholder, unless duties were transferred as part of a lease.

Flood warnings12.23 In relation to flood warnings, the Environment Agency operated a campaign

to increase people’s awareness and letters had been sent to people who might be affected by flooding to raise awareness of the flood warning service, although the take-up of this service was poor despite the fact that it was free of charge. A trial had been undertaken whereby households were visited personally to encourage them to sign up to the flood warning scheme but this was recognised to be resource intensive as the Environment Agency did not have sufficient resources at present to undertake a similar approach and consideration would need to be given to other methods of promoting the service. Elected Members could receive the Environment Agency’s flood warning service.

12.24 It was confirmed that the Emergency Planning Team distributed flood warnings as soon as they were received from the Environment Agency. The Environment Agency provided specific timings for the flood warnings given in relation to the events in June 2007. In terms of the lead-in times for flooding events, in Stocksbridge it was between one and two hours for which a warning could be given. In the Lower Don Valley this was perhaps eight to nine hours as a maximum. In order to prepare temporary flood defences days of lead in time were required. On Sunday 24th June 2007, although the Met Office had given early warning of a severe weather system over Yorkshire, the exact location of the weather was not identified. Local authorities were informed of the early warning. The Director of Development Services stated that the severe warning of flooding was issued by the Environment Agency after the flood had actually started.

12.25 The Environment Agency did take account of previous rainfall and the Met Office radar was able to predict weather events. Warnings could be taken from river levels up stream which would affect areas downstream and the aim of the Environment Agency was to give at least two hours warning of a flood event, although this presented a significant challenge with rapid lead in times in some river catchments.

12.26 The Environment Agency stated that advice and literature was available regarding the flood-line and action people should take for example in producing their own flood plan. Wherever a property was located in the floodplain, people would be best advised to ensure that they had a plan in place in case of flooding.

12.27 Consideration was being given to the type of information that could be given to people that would stay useful and relevant once the initial memories of the flood events had faded and this was a task which still needed to be developed. It was critical that a timely warning of flooding be obtained so that appropriate resources and personnel could be mobilised.

Resilience12.28 Discussions had been held with firms such as Forgemasters in relation to

what action they might take to improve their resilience to flooding in the

40future, although, given the intensity of rainfall and resultant flooding, it was likely that businesses in some areas would have been adversely affected, whatever level of maintenance, floods defences or gully cleaning.

12.29 Resilience planning was undertaken for a 1 in 100 year flood event. The events at the level of 25th June, 2007 would overtop flood defences, unless a significant amount of investment to improve in defences was made. There were questions to be asked to the level of resilience, which could be planned in relation to future flood events.

Transport12.30 Bus operators did withdraw services rapidly on 25th June and discussions

had been held with the Passenger Transport Executive in relation to the provision of public transport. It had been possible, due to the rapid withdrawal of services, to enable bus services to be up and running the very next day. Supertram services continued to run to all locations with the exception of Meadowhall.

12.31 The Passenger Transport Executive was represented on the Recovery Group, although bus operators were not. It was considered that bus services were vulnerable as they ran across the City (not terminating in the City Centre) and this meant that they were susceptible to difficulties associated with flood, snow and ice.

Water Treatment Supply12.32 Concern was expressed at the pumping of untreated sewage into the river

system. Yorkshire Water stated that power was lost to the treatment works at Blackburn Meadows and therefore effluent could not be treated, temporarily. The sewage released from the plant was diluted to the extent that it was not considered to be a risk to health. Environmental and Regulatory Services stated that health protection officers had advised people to treat all flood water as contaminated and affirmed the statement by Yorkshire Water that the sewage released into the watercourse was so significantly diluted that it presented a low risk to health.

12.33 Yorkshire Water had invested in a grid system for the supply of water and was able to supplement Pennine sources by using those from the Ouse and the Derwent. It was confirmed that some treatment works had the capacity to operate independently of electricity from the National Grid. Significant contingency planning and learning had occurred as a result of the flooding, particularly the loss of power from the Brinsworth switching system. Planning was undertaken with other agencies such as Yorkshire Electricity Distribution Limited.

Electricity12.34 With regard to improving the resilience of infrastructures such as the sub-

station at Neepsend, when power was lost, the Council worked closely with the Yorkshire Electricity Distribution Limited to lay cables to supply power to the north of the City. It was considered that switching gear could be moved to a higher level; so as to avoid becoming submerged and this might quicken the speed of recovery of such infrastructure.

4112.35 The Director of Street Force referred to difficulty in communicating with the

electricity company, particularly when information was required (such as whether cabling over the steel gantry bridge at Livesey Street was live) before action was taken. There was also difficulty in obtaining decisions or the views of a senior person (from the electricity companies) by Gold and Silver Command, although it was acknowledged that the electricity companies themselves were under considerable strain.

Development 12.36 All new development was subject to environmental assessment and, since

the introduction of Planning Policy Guidance 25, no consents for planning were given against the advice of the Environment Agency. There was now a stronger test against which levels of resilience were built into the planning requirements for developments. The Sheffield Development Framework was being revised as far as the flood risk assessment was concerned and this would be carried out in time for the Planning Inspector’s consideration of the Framework.

12.37 Issues relating to the drainage in new developments had been raised as part of the Pitt Review.

Children and Young People12.38 Significant difficulties had been experienced in ensuring that vulnerable

children were able to get home. A range of reception centres had been identified but access to some parts of the City was problematic.

12.39 Concerns were expressed about alerting parents that children were being asked to go home from school and provision for looked after children. It was felt that a clear message needed to be given to schools that when they closed, consideration needed to be given to communications with parents and safeguarding children. It was recognised that some young people were returning to an empty house when parents were at work or potentially could not get home due to the disruption on the City’s transport systems.

12.40 A full review was due to take place with schools in February 2008 in relation to the successes and improvements that could be made following the flood event in June 2007.

Vulnerable People12.41 The Council was now aware of the location of most vulnerable people and

action had been undertaken to prepare and respond to situations in partnership with health services so that both vulnerable people and their carers were aware of what they might do to prepare in an emergency.

Insurance12.42 In relation to insurance for residents, the Council and Sheffield Homes had a

partnership arrangement with Norwich Union for affordable insurance with no restrictions in terms of postcodes. The Council was aware that a significant number of tenants did not take advantage of this arrangement and some people in the City had fears as to the cost of insurance and their ability to afford cover. Work was being undertaken in relation to financial inclusion with Housing Associations in the City and both loans and insurance were

42incorporated into this piece of work. It was also considered that purchasing insurance through the internet and “shopping around” should be viewed with caution, as customers did not necessarily gain the most appropriate insurance package or best service.

Command Structures12.43 Gold Command was established, by the Chief Constable, at 2.41 p.m. on

25th June 2007. The issue of when “gold” was called was part of a review by the South Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum.

12.44 There were concerns at the flooding of Atlas Court, which was the main Police Communications Centre. Whilst flooding did occur in the area around the building, the building itself did not flood. Atlas Court continued to operate, although access for officers to and from the building was extremely difficult. There were contingency plans in place if a similar event were to recur.

Emergency Plan12.45 One learning point from the events of June 2007 might be that, although

there was a generic emergency plan for the City, a more specific one might be needed in relation to the recurrence of a flood event.

Businesses12.46 Creative Sheffield had undertaken a significant amount of work in relation to

businesses and the City Council was aware that ongoing support was required both for business recovery and planning for the future. The City Council was also involved with Yorkshire Forward and the local Chamber of Commerce was also involved in supporting businesses and the Chamber had held seminars. At some particular sites at risk of flooding, businesses would be expected to improve their own flood defences and were obtaining advice from the Environment Agency. It was hoped that the resilience of businesses in the Lower Don Valley to flood risk could be improved.

12.47 Businesses were able to purchase their own sandbags. It was found that few businesses had a procedure for dealing with flood events in contrast to most businesses that had a fire plan. Particular support was given to small food businesses to advise them on health and safety implications. The City Council established a free telephone number to support businesses in the City.

101 Single Non-Emergency Number12.48 The 101 single non-emergency number was used together with the Council’s

general enquiry number during the emergency. Work was being undertaken to secure funding for the single non-emergency number in the longer term. Importantly, in relation to calls to the 101 number, the mapping of calls received helped to identify which areas in the City had been most affected by the floods.

43

SECTION 13 - KEY LESSONS LEARNED

13.1 The evidence from the City Council highlighted a number of key lessons:-

The City Council's Emergency Plan proved effective in the deployment of resources, the compliance with structured action and the capability of key individuals.

The fragmentation of the Utility industry is a major issue, and the City Council needs to consider how it can play a role in helping achieve better co-ordination.

The future development of the City, and the mitigation measures required, needs to be re-appraised, although more recent flood mitigation measures did work.

The size and nature of the Council's Emergency Control Centre needs reviewing.

Risk registers should be updated in the light of the flooding experience.

The location of Gold and Silver controls should be re-assessed.

Importance of attending training and exercises for all levels of command and control should be highlighted and encouraged.

Consideration of providing extra resources at strategic locations

13.2 In relation to flood warnings a number of issues were identified: -

Warnings need to be more easily understood.

Businesses and the public should be encouraged to sign up to the Environment Agency automated verbal warnings on telephones

The lack of a warning system for rainfall flash flooding.

Need for identification of trigger points for activation and initiation of plans and command structures.

Programme of education for the public and businesses on weather warnings.

More co-operation between agencies e.g. Yorkshire Water, Environment Agency and the City Council.

Locally based telemetry to provide better-focussed information.

13.3 In respect of critical infrastructure the following issues were identified:-

44 Need for improved engagement from utility companies in local level

planning.

Critical infrastructure should have appropriate defences.

Critical links between different service providers should be assessed.

More clarity needed on responsibility for dam and reservoir plans.

13.4 Members raised the following issues:-

The provision of upstream storage to alleviate flood waters entering Blackburn Brook.

The lack of dredging of the river contributed to the increased risk of flooding both at Blackburn Brook and on other locations.

The monitoring of the environmental condition and level of saturation on the Moors surrounding the Sheffield catchment to enable early warning.

Advice for residents moving to addresses within the floodplain.

Although 90% of development in the City was occurring on Brownfield land, this development had been of greater density than previously and, in addition, there were gardens on Brownfield sites, which could potentially be replaced by hard surfaces.

More detailed information was required for riparian owners.

Efforts to increase the permeability of hard surfaces for vehicle standing needed to be considered.

Consideration should be given as to how people would be prevented from putting themselves at risk in flood situations.

Consideration should be given to climate change issues.

The need for more partnership working and measures to increase the resilience of infrastructure to flooding.

The need for further flood alleviation and resilience for the Lower Don Valley.

How valuable the 101 service had been during the floods and communicating this to South Yorkshire Police.

45

SECTION 14 - CONCLUSIONS

14.1 The unprecedented events that occurred in June 2007 had a major effect on the City. Over a 1000 domestic properties were flooded and residents had to be evacuated from their homes. Major roads were closed and schools were shut. Approximately 1,000 businesses were flooded and the railway station had to close and this meant people were stranded in the City. A major concern had been whether Ulley Dam would be breached and the threat this would have had on critical infrastructure, including power supplies to the City and sewerage works. Unfortunately two people lost their lives as a result of the floods.

14.2 The rainfall on 24/25th June came on top of an already saturated water table. The major distinguishing feature of the flooding that affected Sheffield was the sheer volume, force and speed of water coming down the fluvial river system in a very short period of time. Any surface water flooding was secondary to the overtopping of the river system.

14.3 It is clear from the evidence presented that there was a fantastic response from all those involved in dealing with this major emergency. The work to ensure that Ulley Dam held was crucial. The efforts to get the City up and running as soon as possible were commendable and down to the multi-agency working that took place. The Council and its partners worked hard to support residents affected by the flooding. Considerable damage was caused to over 50 Council buildings and the Council worked closely with Kier (its building maintenance contractor) to undertake urgent action to deal with these issues.

14.4 The South Yorkshire Disaster Relief Fund provided immediate financial assistance for residents and was well publicised. However, initially there was low take-up of the scheme due to the amount of financial information required. The process was streamlined and over 500 applications were received.

14.5 Given the problems experienced at the Ulley Dam there was a need for assurances about the safety and integrity of the dams and reservoirs in the City. Yorkshire Water inspected its reservoirs weekly and an independent engineer inspected the integrity of the reservoir annually and this was supplemented by a ten yearly inspection with regard to longer-term maintenance.

14.6 A business helpline was established that was well used, especially by small businesses.

14.7 Providing support to vulnerable people is especially important in emergency situations. A multi-agency Care and Support Group was established to provide a clear and quick pathway to specialist help for people if they required such support. The Council considered that it was now in a better position to identify vulnerable people, especially in emergency circumstances. A Council group is looking at the lessons from the floods and power cuts and produced a draft protocol for sharing information and agreed

46the definitions for vulnerable people.

14.8 There was a significant cost to the City’s infrastructure of £22.6m. These costs were met from insurance policies, the Bellwin fund, Department of Transport emergency capital funding and £2.8m from the Council’s own resources.

14.9 A County-wide command structure was quickly established with Gold and Silver Commands and Gold Command remained in place until 1st July 2007. A City Council Silver Recovery Group (that also included representatives from the Environment Agency, Yorkshire Water, and the Public Utilities) met between the 25th June and 2nd July 2007 to commence the recovery plan. The Interim Pitt Review highlighted that those authorities, such as Sheffield, that set up a separate Recovery Group were able to respond better to the emergency than those that left these activities with the Gold and Silver Tactical Commands. There were concerns about the location of Gold and Silver controls.

14.10 It is important that all the agencies involved learn from what happened. The Environment Agency and the City Council have held joint meetings to discuss the lessons learned from the floods and agree how the organisations will work together, involving local water companies and partner agencies. The establishment of a multi-agency project to track progress and investigate the fragmentation of watercourse management through the City has been suggested.

14.11 Providing people with advance information is important. The Environment Agency operated a campaign to increase people’s awareness and letters had been sent to people who might be affected by flooding to raise awareness of the flood warning service, although the take-up of this service was poor, despite the fact that it was free of charge. There had also been a trial of home visits to encourage people to sign up to the flood warning scheme but the Environment Agency recognised this was too resource intensive. There was a need to consider other methods of promoting the service to businesses and the public.

14.12 It is crucial that as much notice as possible is given of any possible flooding. Although the Met Office had given early warning of a severe weather system over Yorkshire, the exact location of the weather was not identified. The aim of the Environment Agency is to give at least two hours warning of a flood event, although this presented a significant challenge with rapid lead in times in some river catchments.

14.13 There were concerns that Elected Members were not kept fully informed around the time of the floods. They were not signed up to the Environment Agency’s flood warning service and had to rely on the Council’s Intranet and news media for information. A better mechanism is needed for keeping Members informed and it was noted that this was being considered as part of a review of the Council’s Communications Plan.

14.14 People living in a floodplain need to be aware of the potential risks if there was a flood. The Environment Agency provided advice and literature

47available regarding the floodline and action people should take for example in producing their own flood plan. Wherever a property was located in the floodplain, people would be best advised to ensure that they had a plan in place in case of flooding.

14.15 The responsibilities of riparian owners were discussed and could have warranted a full day session alone. It was acknowledged that it was a challenge to inform people of their riparian responsibilities but considered that more information should be made available. The Environment Agency had produced a guide for people that owned land or property alongside a river or other watercourse.

14.16 There was considerable damage to the City’s infrastructure and improving its resilience to future flooding needs to be built in. Consideration needs to be given by Yorkshire Water and the electricity companies to the resilience of key sites, such as the sub-station at Neepsend.

14.17 There was some confusion amongst the public and stakeholders as to the roles and responsibilities of various agencies with regard to river flooding, drainage and sewage networks. It was acknowledged that there was an issue in relation to the public’s knowledge of which authorities were responsible for the management of the discharge of water and one of the recommendations of the Pitt Review pointed to a more integrated approach to water and drainage management.

14.18 The safety of children and young people during such an emergency is paramount. The outcome of the review that took place in February 2008 in relation to affect of the floods on schools should be reported to a Scrutiny Board.

14.19 Risk registers should be updated to take account of the experiences of the floods. For example, an number of communication systems were affected and the Urban Traffic control Centre had to be relocated.

14.20 The Director of Street Force referred to difficulty in communicating with the electricity company, particularly when information was required before action was taken. There was also difficulty in obtaining decisions or the views of a senior person from the electricity companies by Gold and Silver Command, although it was acknowledged that the electricity companies themselves were under considerable strain.

14.21 The value of the 101 Emergency number was highlighted and following the request from the Joint Scrutiny meeting on 25th January 2008, a letter was sent to the South Yorkshire Police Authority underlining its value and requesting that it be retained. It is noted that a proposal was subsequently approved for the service to be retained in 2008/09.

14.22 Although the meetings did not specifically consider a number of the external reviews on the floods (such as those undertaken by Sir Michael Pitt, the Environment Agency and the South Yorkshire Resilience Forum) there has been mention of a number of the recommendations in this report. Two of the interim conclusions of the Pitt Review relate to scrutiny and suggest that

48local authority scrutiny committees should review Surface Water Management Plans and other linked plans, such as Local Development Frameworks and Community Risk Registers, to ensure that flood risk is adequately considered and to ensure greater transparency and progress in the management of that risk. Also emergency plans and business continuity plans of essential service providers should be reviewed annually.

14.23 Nearly a year later the effects of the floods are still being felt, for example, a number of residents have still not returned to their properties. Also one the City’s major roads (A61 Penistone Road) only reopened in April 2008 and another (A6102 Middlewood Road) will not be reopened until December 2008 due to the complexity of the reconstruction works.

49

SECTION 15 - DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS

GeneralR1 Those who contributed to the Scrutiny investigation and the members of the

public that took time to attend the meetings are thanked.

R2 The Council, Environment Agency and Yorkshire Water are thanked for responding to a number of local concerns raised during the scrutiny meetings, including Falding Street, the River Loxley at Hillsborough and the River Sheaf at Millhouses.

R3 That the Government be requested to make Yorkshire Water and Trent Water (in common with other Water Authorities) statutory consultees for planning applications.

R4 All owners of dams and lakes are alerted of the possibility of flooding and the need of regular safety inspections.

R5 The City Council and the Environment Agency to provide advice for businesses and residents living or moving to addresses within the floodplain on how to plan for a flood and deal with any flooding.

Environment AgencyR6 The Environment Agency to clarify exactly where its responsibility ends and

that of riparian owners starts (both on a map of rivers and a written statement).

R7 The Environment Agency’s guide for people that own land or property alongside a river or other watercourse (entitled ‘Living on the Edge’) be made available to all riparian owners. The guide should also include contact numbers for advice and a details of assistance that is available for owners who cannot either financially or physically upkeep their responsibilities. Purchasers of properties with riparian responsibilities should be provided with a copy of the booklet (possibly in conjunction with Estate Agents).

R8 In the light of increasing frequency and length of heavy rainfall, the capacity of waterways be inspected and where necessary increased.

R9 The Environment Agency’s Capital Investment Strategy for the Don Catchment that is being developed with Yorkshire Water and the City Council is reported to a future meeting of the relevant Scrutiny and Policy Development Board.

R10 Businesses and the public be encouraged to sign up to the Environment Agency’s automated flood warning service and the service is made available to all Elected Members.

R11 Consideration is given to developing a warning system for flash flooding.

R12 Develop an education programme, in partnership with Yorkshire Water and the City Council, to enable the public and businesses to understand and

50respond to weather warnings.

Yorkshire WaterR13 Check that all water drains and sewage works are adequate to cater for

increased frequency and prolonged periods of heavy rainfall.

R14 When assessing the effect planning applications would have on land drainage, a holistic approach is taken that takes into account of the cumulative affect on an area.

R15 When the dams are nearing capacity, Yorkshire Water inform all emergency planning partners of the situation at the earliest possible moment.

R16 Consideration is given to increasing the capacity of the dams at least by removing silt.

Sheffield City CouncilR17 All surface water drains to have a regular clearance programme (not just

identified hot spots) and ensure that there is adequate capacity for the increasing frequency and length of heavy rainfall.

R18 Arrange for regular checks of all areas where the Council is a riparian owner for maintenance of banks, free flowing of the water course and that the depth of the water courses are adequate to cater for most eventualities, deepening or widening where necessary.

R19 Development Control Officers and Planning and Highways Area Boards take due cognisance of reports from Yorkshire Water.

R20 The Head of Development Services be requested, either through the Sheffield Development Framework or Supplementary Planning Guidance, to prepare a policy to ensure that in future developments all hard surfaces are permeable so reducing immediate run off during heavy rainfall.

R21 Review the size and nature of the Council’s Emergency Planning Control Centre.

R22 Risk registers to be updated to take account of the flooding experience.

R23 The location of Gold and Silver commands (controls) should be reassessed.

R24 Consideration is given to providing additional resources, such as sandbags etc, at strategic locations across the City.

R25 Establish a Members' hotline for use during a major emergency to provide them with direct advice and information.

R26 Members be encouraged to attend Emergency Planning Seminars.

R27 The recruitment of more accredited workers that can be used in an emergency both within the Council and in conjunction with the voluntary, community and faith sectors be supported.

51

R28 The fragmentation of the Utility industry is a major issue and the City Council needs to consider how it can play a role in helping achieve better co-ordination.

R29 The Culture, Economy and Sustainability Scrutiny and Policy Development Board to review annually (a) Surface Water Management Plans and other linked plans, such as Local Development Frameworks and Community Risk Registers, to ensure that flood risk is adequately considered and to ensure greater transparency and progress in the management of that risk and (b) emergency plans and business continuity plans of essential service providers.

R30 The outcome of the review with schools in February 2008 in relation to the successes and improvements that could be made following the flood event in June 2007 is reported to the Children and Young People Scrutiny Board.

R31 The Carer Support Emergency Plan being established be welcomed.

R32 The proposed emergency response Good Neighbour Scheme be welcomed.

AllR33 Improve public awareness of the likelihood of flooding and the need for

contingency plans and the dangers of immersion in flood water.

R34 Improve public knowledge of how to behave in the event of flooding and the necessity of obeying police warnings to ensure public safety.

R35 Improve communications systems within each organisation and with the general public so that when emergency alerts are first issued everyone is aware.

R36 The Importance of attending training and exercises for all levels of command and control structures should be highlighted and encouraged.

R37 Need for identification of trigger points for activation and initiation of plans and command structures.

R38 In relation to flood warnings, there is a need for greater co-operation between agencies e.g. Yorkshire Water, Environment Agency and the City Council.

R39 Greater clarity is required on the responsibility for dam and reservoir plans.

R40 Establish a multi-agency project to track progress and investigate the fragmentation of watercourse management through the City.

South Yorkshire Passenger Transport ExecutiveR41 Discussions are held with bus companies on whether there should be less

cross-city bus services and more that start from the City Centre.

Utility companiesR42 The need for improved engagement from utility companies in local level

52planning on critical infrastructure.

R43 Representation be made to the utility companies to ensure that appropriate senior staff are available to attend Silver and Gold Commands.

53Appendix

21st January

Environment AgencyPeter Holmes - Flood Risk ManagerJohn Housham - Environment Manager

South Yorkshire Fire and RescueJohn Harthman - Divisional Emergency Planning OfficerMartin Oldknow - Group ManagerTony Clay – Area Manager

Yorkshire WaterJeremy Housley – Head of waste Collection and Treatment SouthDave Stephenson – Distribution and Customer Services Alliance ManagerMichelle Lewis – Public Affairs Manager

City CouncilSir Robert Kerslake - Former Chief ExecutiveDavid Curtis - Director of Development ServicesJohn Charlton - Director of Street ForceJulie Bullen, - Head of Customer ServicesKarl Tupling - Director of HousingPhillip Horton - Care4YouSheila Slingsby – Senior Emergency Planning Officer

Board Members - Councillors Anne Smith (Chair), Steve Ayris, David Baker, Penny Baker, Marjorie Barker, John Campbell, Jean Cromar, Mike Davis, Roger Davison, Julie Dore Sylvia Dunkley, Jackie Drayton, Denise Fox, Ibrar Hussain, Martin Lawton, Bob McCann, Mike Peat, Peter Price, Mike Pye, Andrew Sangar, Ray Satur and Janice Sidebottom.

Other Councillors Patricia Fox, Trevor Bagshaw, Bernard Little, Alan Hooper, Janet Bragg, Martin Davis, Diane Leek, Kathleen Chadwick, Garry Weatherall and Alison Brelsford.

Public QuestionsMrs Berry, Mrs Ibbotson, Mr Connell, Mr. Madeley and Mr Steer.

25th January

Environment AgencyPeter Holmes - Flood Risk ManagerJohn Housham - Environment Manager

South Yorkshire PoliceInspector Rachel Barber

Yorkshire WaterJeremy Housley – Head of Waste Collection and Treatment South

54Neil Dewis – Manager Asset StrategyMichelle Lewis – Public Affairs Manager

City CouncilSir Robert Kerslake - Former Chief ExecutiveDavid Curtis - Director of Development ServicesJohn Charlton - Director of Street ForceJulie Bullen, - Head of Customer ServicesLinda Lawson - Customer ServicesKarl Tupling - Director of HousingEddie Sherwood – Head of Care4YouEugene Walker – Deputy Director of Corporate ResourcesRichard Jones - Corporate ResourcesMick Ogle – Emergency Planning TeamLiz Bashforth – Assistant Chief Executive, Legal and GovernanceIan Ashmore – Head of Environmental Regulation

Board Members - Councillors Anne Smith (Chair), Steve Ayris, David Baker, Penny Baker, Marjorie Barker, John Campbell, Martin Brelsford, Jean Cromar, Mike Davis, Roger Davison, Julie Dore, Sylvia Dunkley, Jackie Drayton, Denise Fox, Ibrar Hussain, Martin Lawton, Bob McCann, Mike Peat, Peter Price, Mike Pye, Andrew Sangar, Ray Satur and Janice Sidebottom.

Other Members - Councillors Martin Davis, Janet Bragg, Trevor Bagshaw and Alan Hooper.

Public questionsMr. Rockett, Mrs Rason and Mrs Ibbotson.