sattler - conceptions of ethos in ancient greece

8/11/2019 Sattler - Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Greece

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CONCEPTIONS OF

ETHOS

IN ANCIENT RHETOR IC*

WILLIAM M. SATTLER

University of Oklahoma

I. INTRODUCTION

QTUDENTS of rhetorical theory and

^criticism are not in full agreement

m me deno tation of ethical

proof

(or

ethos)

as a technical rhetorical term,

although it is in almost general use

among rhetorical scholars. The current

tendency is to assume that this very an-

cient concept is commonly understood

and to imply a single and standard mean-

ing among ancient classical writers.

That this term was much used by the

ancients is obvious to all, but that it

was of complex and somewhat fluid, or

at least changing, denotation is not al-

ways realized.

Ethos

is derived from the Greek word

for custom, habit, or usage. The cus-

toms of any class or society are obviously

given a stamp of approval, and

ethos,

in

its earliest signification, may be said to

refer to the usages, habits, and traditions

of one social group as distinguished

from another. In this connection we

note a close similarity in meaning be-

tween

ethos

and folkways, namely, ac-

cepted and approved

practice. Many

folkways, however, are elevated to the

position of

mores;

that is, they concern

conduct deemed so vital to the group

that to violate the group practice is con-

sidered to be destructive to the social

welfare. As such,

mores

are welfare

*This paper is an abstract of the early sections

principles, and they are therefore in-

vested with moral approval.

The Latin

mores

and the Greek

ethos

are similar in meaning, but the two

terms are not synonymous. T he

mores

as standards indicative of morally ap-

proved conduct, are included in the

ethos

or group character. On the other

hand, certain traits of character within

the scope of

ethos

cannot be called

mores.

The traits or qualities which

make up

ethos

are of course approved

and respected by the society in question,

but such traits do not necessarily have

the status of welfare principles. T ha t

is to say,

ethos

refers to qualities other

than those considered to have moral

import.

In this derived sense, we find that

ethos

is more inclusive than habit; and simi-

larly, it has a more comprehensive mean-

ing than

mores.

In short,

ethos

may be

defined as tota lity of characteristic

traits,

rather than in terms of mere cus-

tom or morally approved habits.

1

While

this is true, one must nevertheless under-

stand that the idea of custom is often, al-

though not necessarily, either clear or

implicit in the rhetorical application of

the doctrine of

ethos.

Rhetorical theory applies the princi-

ple of

ethos

in two basically different

forms. One interpretation of ethos is

that the speaker exhibits qualities of a

personal natureintrinsic goodness and


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SPEECH

MONOGR PHS

the arguments given in a speech. For

purposes of differentiation, we may label

this type of ethos (the character and

personality of the speaker) subjective

ethos. A second meaning, and one

which is sometimes confused with the

ethos of the speaker, is the portrayal of

the character traits of others by means

of description or possibly impersonation

(objective ethos) ?

II Ethos

IN

PRE-ARISTOTELIAN

RHETORIC

While Aristotle was the first to give

ethos a definitive formulation,. oblique

references to the persuasion exerted by

the speaker as an individual appear in

the very earliest rhetorical manuals.

The writings of Corax and Tisias, for

example, imply the doctrine of ethos in

the principle of probability. In a

mere positive sense, however, we note

that ethical persuasion is indicated in

the proem at which point the speaker

is advised to gain the listener's good

will.

3

We may look with considerable in-

terest ,upon the Rhetorica ad Alexan-

drum,

because this treatise, although

written approximately the same time as

Aristotle's Rhetoric and reflecting influ-

ences other th^n pre-Aristotelian, is our

most complete extant specimen of rhe-

torical theory as it was taught by the

Greek sophists before Aristotle.

4

T he

unknown author of the ad Alexandrum

states that the speaker is admired when

he adapts his arguments to his listeners,

2

See Immisch , Ot to , Ue ber T heo phras t s

Charak te re , Philologus, LV II (1898), 210.

3

Croise t , Alfred , and Croiset , Maur ice, An

and when he is able to present evidenc

on his own autho rity. T he treatise

most explicit with respect to recomme

dations designed to win the good will o

the audience in the proem. In this r

gard, it appears fair to say that for th

early writers on rhetoric the ethos

the speaker operates as a persuasive fa

tor very largely in and through the i

troduction of the speech.

5

As a final o

servation it is appropriate to state th

while the persuasive effect of goo

character is recognized in the ad Ale

andrum, an appearance of honesty

the usual recommendation given.

At least two conclusions relevant t

ethos as a rhetorical factor may b

drawn from Plato's dialogues: (1) In th

Gorgiasand elsewhere, his b itter attac

on the hypocrisy and deception of so

phistic rhetoric and its anti-social cha

acter constitutes in itself an argumen

for a rhetoric which will recognize th

persuasive force of the moral man; an

(2) in thePhaedrus,he sketches the ou

lines of a rhetoric which presages th

mature conception of ethos found

Aristotle. The truly eloquent man

seen as one who krws the truth and

able to take into account the differen

natures of those who are to hear him

It is not one's fellow servants that on

should care to please, if one has sens

save incidentally, but one's good an

noble masters. . . . Yet your ends also

as the argument sets forth, will be be

attained in this way, if they are what

man desires.

6

Specifically, the ou tline for the nobl

rhe tor ic which Plato desires incorpo

56


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CONCEPTIONS

OF

ETHOS

IN

ANCIENT RHETORIC

57

ing respects: (1) The speaker should

possess good character;

7

(2) the speaker

should be intelligent' and informed;

8

(3) the speaker should adapt his argu-

ments to the audience;

9

(4) the speaker

should consider the good will of the

audience.

10

While the term ethos is not

directly used, the conceptual equivalent

is present in many of its more important

aspects.

Plato closes the Phaedrus with a

good word for Isocrates. While Isocrates

left no rhetorical manual which is now.

extant, in his writings, especiallyAgainst

the Sophists and the Antidosis, we can

see his conception of the orator-states-

man, the man of character and practical

wisdom, skilled in speech. . . . the

power to speak well is taken as the surest

index of a sound understanding, and

discourse which is true and lawful and

just is the outward image of a good and

faithful soul.

11

And further, the

stronger a man's desire to persuade his

hearers, the more zealously will he strive

to be honourable.

12

The Isocratean conception of the ora-

tor-statesman approximates much of

what Cicero and Quintilian describe in

their analyses of the idea l orator.

Cicero, for example, echoes the design

of Isocrates when he decries the separa-

tion of philosophy and eloquence; to

eloquence is un ited all knowledge and

science in all things whether they ap-

pertain to morality, to the duties of life,

to virtue, or to civil government.

18

7

Laws, 601,Phaedrus, 270, and Gorgias, 500.

Citations from th e

Phaedrus

and

Gorgias

are

based upon Lane Cooper's

Plato

(London, 1938).

All

other references

are

from

th e

five

volume,

third edition of Plato's Dialogues by B. Jowett

III.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF

Ethos

There are several essential differences

between the treatment given to ethical

proof by earlier writers and that set forth

by Aristotle: (1) Pre-Aristotelian rhet-

oric does not give a systematic and de-

tailed account of the doctrine, in fact,

the tripartite plan of proofs is distinctly

Aristotelian; (2) earlier rhetoric, ac-

cording to the testimony of both Plato

and Aristotle, gives primary attention to

the parts of the speech as the frame-

work

1

of rhetorica l p rinciples, and there-

fore, with the possible exception of Isoc-

rates, ethos is considered largely as a

function of the proem; (3) sophistic

rhetoric either tacitly or openly explains

ethos as a technique by which one may

persuade audiences to accept proposals

which are morally indefensible.

Aristotle takes considerable care to

show that although the proofs of rhet-

oric attain the level of

belief,

they

differ from those of scientific demonstra-

tion. H e points out that contingent

conclusions stem from the logical

proofs of rhetoric; on the other hand,

the logic of certainty, scientific demon-

stration, is a matter developed in the

Priorand Posterior Analyticsas a system

for dem onstrating necessary conclu-

sions.

Matters admitting of certainty

being thus clearly delimited in the Rhet-

oric, Aristotle sets forth his tripart ite

plan of artistic proofs peculiar to persua-

sion in the realm of practical affairs.

Since rhe toric is a logic of probabili-

ties,

Aristotle includes, aside from logi-

cal proofs applicable to the contingent,

proofs which he labels ethosand pathos.


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SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

enced

by

non-moral attributes

of

perso-

nality evidenced

by the

speaker

and by

appeals to the emotions.

14

The inclusive diagrammatic represen-

tation

of

ethos which follows

may be

considered

as a

synthesis

of the

Aristo-

telian doctrine.

ly,

in the

case

of

objective ethos,

th

traits of represented persons may b

portrayedby thespeaker.

A.

Intelligence, Character,

and

Goo

Will:

The

speaker

who

possesses

th

three personal qualities here listed wil

says Aristotle,

be

worthy

of belief;

tha

ETHOS

INTELLIGENCE CHARACTER

Virtues

1. Liberality

2. Justice

3.

Courage

4. Temperance

5. Magnanimity

6. Magnificence

7. Prudence

8. Gentleness

9. Wisdom

Manifested in Choice Through

1

Invention, Arrang emen t, Style, De livery

Such ChoicesAre

GOOD 'WILL

Friendship

1. Genuine interest in the

welfare of listeners.

2.

Also

an

inclusive terra

for all respected qualities

discerned in the speaker.

1.

Dictatedbywhatthespeak- 2.Tem pered byadaptation to

* .

In conformity with traitsof

er believes to be:

Viewed as Constant factors:

(1). Expediency

(2). Justice

(3). Honor

the audience.

(1). Ages

(2). Forms of Government

(3). Fortune

(4). Wealth

(5). Power

depicted characters.

(i). Age

(2). Sex

(3). Nationality

(4). Moral Character

(5).

Education

(6). Pursuits

Refers toobjective ethos (theportrayalofcharacter), especially applicablein the narration

of the speech.

Following

the

diagram,

we may see

that

intelligence, character, and good will

are manifested

by the

choices

the

speaker makes;

and

further, these

choicesaremade with respect tomatters

involved

in

invention, arrangement,

style,

and

delivery.

The

choices

are

conditioned

by the

particular

end

in view in the case of deliberative,

is

to say, he

will have

the

confidence

o

his hearers.

Among

the

nine virtues named

b

Aristotle

in the

Rhetoric,

two of

them

wisdom and prudence, are intellectu

virtues. Prudence corresponds

to th

practical wisdom

of the

Ethics,

an

refers

to

that sagacity which enables

man to fit means to an end. As suc

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CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS IN ANCIENT RHETORIC

59

and, according to Aristotle, will be an

untrustworthy adviser; thus, those

thought to be prudent and sagacious

are more likely to be believed.

Like the intellectual virtue, pru-

dence, the moral virtues in the

Rhet-

oric are also considered in relation to

the advantages listeners conceive they

may derive from a speaker who pos-

sesses good character. These virtues are

nevertheless considered in two respects:

first, as in the Ethics, as the choices of

the good man, as the nob le, which

is desirable in and of

itself;

and sec-

ondly, in the popular conception, as

qualities which tend to confer benefits

upon others. The rhetorical interpre-

tation of moral virtue is derived main-

ly from the latter, for the speaker

seeks to win confidence by a personal

character from which listeners may ex-

pect all manner of benefits on all

occasions.

15

Good will or friendship is defined as

wishing for a person those things

which you consider to. be goodwish-

ing them for his sake, not for your

ownand tending so far as you can to

effect them.

16

In this sense good will

is closely allied with Aristotelian moral

virtuesthe speaker effects goods for

his listeners.

A second aspect of good will has to

do with characteristics discerned in the

speaker which are basically non-moral

qualities. In fact, if this were no t the

case, Aristotle would have no reason to

include a third major category in his

analysis of ethos. Among the traits hav-

ing little relationship to moral virtue

way, (d) one who praises our good

qualities, (e) one who sees the good in

us,

and (f) one who takes us seriously

These qualities suggest that good will is

imputed to the speaker in the degree

that he appears to possess any traits of

character which the particular audience

esteems. As such, Aristotle appears to

be saying that the power of 'custom and

tradition is strong; and that the speaker

who conforms to the ethos of the class

who likes what we likewill be highly

regarded.

B.

The Doctrine of Choice:A pivotal

point in the Aristotelian conception of

ethos concerns the choices evidenced by

the speaker in his speech; here again,

Aristotle includes a principle developed

in the Ethics wherein the agent merits

praise for good choices

voluntarily

se-

lected.

17

Since the speaker is free to

choose or avoid and since the subjects

with which he deals reflect moral pur-

pose,

the judgments given in a speech

may be said to have moral import. Th is

idea pervades the Poetics as well; just

as the orator selects arguments which

reveal his character, so a character in a

drama, through the way he argues

(dianoia),

shows his ethos.

ls

Certain traits mentioned by Aristotle

under the heading of good will may not,

strictly speaking, be considered to have

moral significance, although it is true

that the popular audience sometimes

appraises them on such a basis. Personal

factors such as appearance, dress, and

physical traits are largely beyond the

scope of ratio na l, voluntary choice. In

such matters we find that one's choices

are in part dictated by the class or group


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CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS IN ANCIENT RHETORIC 6 1

ethos of the speaker. For exam ple, in

th e

Rhetoric

III . 17 we are told th at

the speaker should qu

v

ote remarks which

will reflect unfavorably upon him and

he will thereby gain in prestige. In

III;

7 Aristotle deals with appropriate-

ness of style in depicting character, in-

dicating that dramatic characterization

must conform to the age, sex, national

character, education, and pursuits of the

represented person. In this regard, Jebb

argues that such portrayal of character

has no thing to do with 'ethical proof

proper ;

23

Cope on the other hand, con-

cludes that accuracy in depicting char-

acter gives to the speech an air of tru th-

fulness and fidelity.

24

Both of these po-

sitions are tenable, especially if we in-

terpret ethos narrowly as does Jebb to

mean choices of an ethical nature; but

yet, the relationship to the speaker's

ethos is nevertheless present as Aristotle

explicitly states in this chapter. Finally,

in II I. 16, Aristotle under the heading

of narration definitely shows that sub-

jective ethos is heightened through the

relation of facts dealing with the char-

acter of others. In short, whenever

Aristotle deals with the portrayal of the

character of others in a speech, he in-

dicates the relationship of such ethos

to the ethos of the speaker.

IV .

Ethos IN ROMAN RHETORIC

A. Ethos as a Function of the Ex-

ordium: While the basic Aristotelian

conception of ethos appears in Cicero's

later works and in the Institutio Ora-

toria of Q uin tilian , the earliest extant

Latin works conceive of good will

(ethos)

only with respect to the opening

sider certain types of causesupon which

the forensic speaker must speak. De-

pending upon the cause, for example,

honorable or discreditable, four topics

are given to make

ethos

operative in the

exordium, namely, the character of the

speaker, adversary, audience, and case.

25

In these works we have a rhetorical plan

devoted to an interpretation of ethos

which has much in common with the

pre-Aristotelian doctrine of the proem,

and which shows the influence of the

formal, scholastic rhetoric of Herma-

goras in which he presents his new sys-

tem of the status and makes ethos op-

erative only in the exordium.

26

B. Ethos and the Ideal Orator: T h e

tripartite Aristotelian system of proofs

is reintroduced in the De Oratore, Ora-

tor, and Institutio Oratoria; and with

the exception of sections dealing with

forensic speaking, materials are no long-

er organized under the conventional

headings of parts of the speech. Rather,

we have a design which gives toethosan

influence which pervades the entire

speech and places it on an equal plane

with rhetorical logical proof.

The emphasis which Cicero and Quin-

tilian give to the doctrine of the perfect

orator or ideal pa ttern immediately

suggests a direct relationship to ethical

proof. The training these writers de-

mand for the speaker contributes greatly

to his intellectual and moral qualifica-

tions and certainly will operate asethos

as Aristotle conceived it. Bu t while this

is true, Cicero does not clearly associate

his philosopher-orator with ethical proof

proper. Qu intilian, on the other hand,

explicitly develops ethical proof with


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SPEECH MONOGRAPHS

the perfect orator; he does not, how-

ever, indicate how

ethos

functions be-

cause of the intellectual skills of the

speaker.

The union of philosophy and elo-

quence, which both writers seek,isnever-

theless of considerable significance in

any study of ethical persuasion quite

apart from acompleteandexplicit iden-

tification with

ethos.

When Cicerore-

introduces

the

Isocratean orator-states-

man, he points to Socrates of the Pla-

tonic dialoguesas theoriginator of the

tendency

on the

part

of

schools

of

philos-

ophy to draw a'line of distinctionbe-

tween knowledgeandeloquence. In ef-

fect, Cicero wishestochallenge thismis-

conception:

to think well

and

tospeak

well

are inseparable. They are not, as

Socrates is often pictured assaying,in-

compatible ends.

27

To exemplify his

orator-statesman whopossesses that wis-

dom which comprehends thinking

and

speaking , Cicero names Solon, Pericles,

and Cato the Elder. Similarly, in the

Orator Cicero speaks of the idealora-

tor, andgivesa popularized exposition

of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas to

which

he

refers

as the

model

for

perfec-

tion.

28

As is well known, also, the con-

summate orator

of

Quindlian

is a

good

man skilled inspeaking,

29

a definition

attributed to Cato the Elder, possessing

both intellectual and moral qualifica-

tions.

C.

Ethos Identified as a MildEmo-

tion: Functionally applied by Cicero

and Quintilian, thetripartite proofsare

to conc iliate,toinform,andtomove;the

first,

ethos,

which Quintilian says cannot

of liberality, of piety, of grateful f

ings,

30

healsoisindicating thegen

and more usual,

habitual

emotions, wh

pathos refers to the stronger, viol

emotions.

31

In onepassage Quintilian states t

the only difference between

ethos

a

pathos

isthatofdegree; to illustrate

point, the former is defined as aff

tion, the latter, as love. Some c

icism of this position has been ma

especiallybyRothandVolkmann. Th

indict Quintilian,

and by

implicati

Cicero

as

well,

for

this vague

and

fun

mentally false conception of

ethos.

32

W

must add, however, that a more ba

concept emerges,for in theDeOrato

ethos

comprehends morals, principl

and conduct. Similarly, Quintili

states:

The

ethos

Idesideratein an o

tor is commended to our approval

goodness more than aught else and

not merely calm and mild.

33

In t

final analysis, therefore, neither Cice

nor Quintilian actually makes mildne

the distinguishing characteristicof

eth

although they do emphasize the id

that ethos is usually projected throu

mildness.

A number of reasons may be offe

to showwhyCicero often explains

eth

asamild emotion: (1) In therhetori

theory of Hermagoras good will is t

sole aim of the exordium, and Cice

is influenced by Hermagoras; (2) C

ero's later writingsareinfluenced by t

De Inventione

in which

ethos

is as

ciated with the mild emotions in t

exordium;

(3)

Cicero knows

the

val

of

ethos,

but he is more interested

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CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS IN ANCIENT RHETORIC

ethos

in a thoroughly systematic

34

(4) Cicero is greatly influ-

1

doctrine of the

mean, which is interpreted as the

r control of all emotions; (5) the

an principle of decorum is given

of choice, and decorum is often

ve with Quintilian . Particularly is

cal theory, Rom an decorum , and

When Quintilian tells us that the best

ethos

nd

pathos

is that

ethos

resembles com-

pathos

tragedy, he is reporting

ethos

ap-

further, both types are projected

ethos

in diverse ways, and yet

D.

Ethos and Declamation: In the

declamation,

here considered

ian era,

ethos

is almost wholly limited

to character-portrayal of another per-

onsequence, we find that Apsines and

ermogenes in his

De Inventione Ora-

toria

show a retention of only a few

principles relevant to subjective

ethos.

35

cal sense, fail to give even a hint of this

original doctrine. Aphthonius, follow-

ing the pattern of Hermogenes,

36

gives

a definition which apparently stems

from Quintilian's statements regarding

characterization.

37

Similarly, the

ethos

of the characterized oration is illustrated

by Philostratus in his explanation of the

oratory of the Second Sophistic.

38

V. CONCLUSIONS

(1) T he teachings and writings of

Plato and Isocrates probably had a

greater influence upon Aristotle's theory

of ethical proof than has been generally

recognized. This conclusion is believed

to be tenable despite fundam ental dif-

ferences, general and specific, which are

well known in the case of Plato. T he

significant influence of Isocrates is like-

wise advanced notwithstanding the fact

that Aristotle began instruction in rhet-

oric in competition with the well-estab-

lished school of Isocrates. In add ition

to the principles relevant to

ethos

which

make up , in part, the Platonic noble

rhetoric , Plato's writings are followed,

within limitations, in other respects as

well. These include (a) the qualifica-

tions of the able leader, the good ad-

viser, implicitly or directly expressed in

the dialogues as a whole; (b) the con-

clusions which Plato makes obvious in

the case of the sophistic conception of

justice, the interest of the stronger ;

and (c) the criticism of the

probability

of Corax and Tisias, later amended by

Aristotle in the

Rhetoric.

Although

Plato did not intend, except in the

Phdedrus,

to have these doctrines ap-

63


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SPEECH MONOGR PHS

plied to an art of rhetoric, Aristotle was

not deterred from making use of them.

Isocrates, in many respects like Plato,

also offered both a positive and a nega-

tive guide to a theory of ethical proof.

Constructively, Isocrates offered his

ora-

tor-statesman;

the personal w orth of the

speaker was the starting-point of his

rhetorical instruction. In a negative

sense, Isocrates pointed to the ethical

weaknesses in prevailing theories of

rhetorical instruction.

(2) Aristotle directed the way to an

interpretation of ethical proof which

gives to

ethos

a more far-reaching func-

tion than adaptation to existing atti-

tudes of the audience wherein success in

persuasion is the ultimate c riterion. He

is explicit in giving the threefold bases

of

ethos:

intellectual virtue, moral vir-

tue, and, under the heading of good

will, qualities which are in agreement

with the customs and traditions of the

class. T h e . moral virtues, sometimes

called goods, are the selections which

reflective beings will make when they

are completely free to exercise choice;

especially through this distinction, Aris-

totle changes the ethical tone of rhetori-

cal theory from customary morality to

tha t of reflective m orality. The intel-

lectual factor, prudence, is also asso-

ciated with moral virtue inasmuch as

prudence is the regulator of the reason-

ing which is designed to achieve the

moral virtues with respect to a given

case.

Fundamental to the Aristotelian

conception of

ethos

is the ethical prin-

ciple of voluntary choice: the speaker's

intelligence, character, and qualities

(3) T he use of

ethos

as a mode

proof by Latin writers will be be

understood if one heeds Quintilia

statement that the Latin language d

not offer an exact equivalent for

word

ethos.

Quintilian further sta

and it is likely that he has Cicero

mind in this connection, tha t the m

cautious writers have preferred to g

the sense of the term rather than

translate it into Latin

(Instit. Orat.

2).

While Quintilian uses the Gr

ethos

as a rhetorical concept in' a vari

of different ways;- Cicero m entions a fo

of

ethos

directly on only one occas

(Orator,

37), and even in this case

is speaking of the character of the au

ence to which the speaker should ada

In other words, neither Cicero nor Qu

tilian, with the exceptions indicat

present materials relating to ethi

proof under the label of Aristoteli

ethos.

(4) Cicero's functional applicati

of ethical

proof,

namely, to conciliat

embraces the

character

and

perso

decorumof the speaker, and has much

common with moral virtue and go

will as explained in the

Rhetoric.

T

Ciceronian doctrine, apart from Cicer

failure directly to use the Greek

eth

in more than one sense, is distinguish

from tha t of Aristo tle: (a) Cicero,

the main, makes ethical proof synon

mous with the mild emotions of t

speaker, a lesser degree of pathos; a

although he does not consistently mai

tain this distinction, the emphasis whi

he gives to the idea of mildness results

some passrges in ascribing to

path

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CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS IN NCIENT RHETORIC

only indirectly associated with ethical

proof, (c) The Aristotelian principle of

choice is not set forth 'as the criterion for

appraising character in Cicero's rhetori-

cal works, but does appear in his ethical

treatise, the De Officiis. (d) Cicero

gives considerably less emphasis to ethi-

cal proof as it arises from rhetorical in-

vention, and proportionately more em-

phasis to arrangement, style, and de-

livery, (e) Th e Ciceronian doctrine de-

pends in part upon the previous impres-

sion of the speaker's character, whereas

Aristotle considered ethical persuasion

to be exerted wholly through the actual

speech.

(5) Qu intilian 's conception of ethi-

cal proof embraces all that Cicero ex-

plained, but he is more explicit than

Cicero and adds somewhat more of the

Aristotelian doctrine: (a) Hf directly

defines ethos as characterand courtesy

(decorum, the becoming); and while he

discusses ethos in terms of mild emo-

tions, he openly repudiates the accuracy

of such a definition , (b) He shows

wherein ethos is projected through in-

vention to a greater extent than Cicero,

particularly when he says character is

revealed whenever the orato r speaks of

what ought or ought not to be done

(Instit. Orat., VI. 2); and, in a slightly

different sense, when he mentions the

authority of the speaker (Instit. Orat.,

IV. 2). (c) Likewise, Quintilian identi-

fies ethos with style and delivery both

more directly and in much greater de-

tail than Cicero.

(6) Quin tilian uses the Greek ethos

to explain the rhetorical school exer-

cises which were largely devoted to char-

acterization, and which in turn typify

the rhetoric of the second sophistic. In

this sense objective ethos becomes an'

end in

itself,

wholly divorced from the

character of the speaker, and the earlier

strictly classical concept of rhetorical

ethos is given a new emphasis.

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