SAFE WINGS

This issue…

9 Korean Air Lines Flight KE007

9 MILITARY INTERCEPTION & SIGNALLING

* For Internal Circulation Only

Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air Issue 42, NOVEMBER 2015

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EDITORIAL A civil aircraft is most likely to be intercepted by a Military aircraft if it has lost communication with ATC or strays into airspace without appropriate diplomatic or other clearance and without contact with the appropriate controlling authority. In this Edition of the Magazine we have featured an article on MILITARY INTERCEPTION & SIGNALLING along with an accident to Korean Air Lines Flight KE007 involving Military Interception.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The posting of stories, reports and documents in this magazine does not in any way, imply or necessarily express or suggest that all the information is correct. It is based on details gathered from various sources and is for information purpose only. The Flight Safety Department is making this material available in its efforts to advance the understanding of safety. It is in no way responsible for any errors, omissions or deletions in the reports.

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KoreanAirLinesFlightKE007wasascheduledflightfromNewYorkCitytoSeoulviaAnchorage.OnSeptember1,1983,theairlinerwasshotdownbyanInterceptoraircraftoftheSovietUnion,aSukhoiSu-15,nearMoneronIslandwest ofSakhalinin theSea of Japan. All 269 passengers and crew aboard were killed, includingLarryMcDonald, a Representative fromGeorgiain theUnited StatesHouseof Representatives. The aircraftwas enroute fromAnchorage, AlaskatoSeoulwhen it flew through Sovietprohibited airspacearound the time of aU.S.reconnaissancemission.

TheSovietUnion initiallydeniedknowledgeof the incident,but lateradmitted theshootdown,claiming thattheaircraftwasonaspymission.

ThePolitburoof theCommunistPartyof the SovietUnionsaid itwasadeliberateprovocationby theUnitedState.totesttheSovietUnion'smilitarypreparedness,oreventoprovokeawar.TheWhiteHouseaccusedtheSovietUnionofobstructingsearchandrescueoperations.TheSovietArmedForcessuppressedevidencesoughtby theInternational Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) investigation, such as theflight data recorders,whichwerereleasedeightyearslaterafterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion.

HISTORYOFFLIGHT

Theaircraft flyingasKoreanAir Lines Flight007wasa commercialBoeing747-230Bdeliveredon January28,1972,withtheserialnumberCN20559/186andregistrationHL7442(formerlyD-ABYHoperatedbyCondor).TheaircraftdepartedGate15ofJohnF.Kennedy InternationalAirport,NewYorkCityon30August1983,boundforGimpo InternationalAirportinGangseoDistrict, Seoul, 35minutesbehind its scheduleddeparture timeof23:50EDT(03:50UTC,August31).Theflightwascarrying246passengersand23crewmembers.AfterrefuelingatAnchorage International AirportinAnchorage, Alaska, the aircraft, piloted on this leg of the journey byCaptain Chun Byung-in, First officer Son Dong-hui and Flight Engineer Kim Eui-dong.departed for Seoul at04:00AlaskaTimeZone(13:00UTC)on31August1983.

Theaircrewhadanunusuallyhighratioofcrewtopassengers,assixdeadheadingcrewwereonboard.Twelvepassengersoccupiedtheupperdeckfirstclass,whileinbusinessalmostallof24seatsweretaken;ineconomyclass, approximately 80 seats did not contain passengers. Therewere 22 children under the age of 12 yearsaboard.OnehundredandthirtypassengersplannedtoconnecttootherdestinationssuchasTokyo,HongKong,andTaipei.

KoreanAirLinesFlightKE007

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Flight deviation from assigned route

AftertakingofffromAnchorage,theflightwasinstructedbyairtrafficcontrol(ATC)toturntoaheadingof220degrees.Approximately90 seconds later,ATCdirected the flight to "proceeddirectBethelwhenable".UponarrivingoverBethel,Alaska,flight007enteredthenorthernmostoffive50-mile(80km)wideairways,knownastheNOPAC(NorthPacific)routes,thatbridgetheAlaskanandJapanesecoasts.KAL007'sparticularairway,R-20(Romeo20),passesjust17.5miles(28.2km)fromwhatwasthenSovietairspaceoffthecoastoftheKamchatkaPeninsula.

Atabout10minutesaftertake-off,KAL007,flyingonaheadingof245degrees,begantodeviatetotheright(north)ofitsassignedroutetoBethel,andcontinuedtoflyonthisconstantheadingforthenextfiveandahalfhours.

International Civil AviationOrganization(ICAO)simulationand analysis of the flight data recorder determinedthatthisdeviationwasprobablycausedbytheaircraft'sautopilotsystemoperatinginHEADINGmode,afterthepoint that it should have been switched to the INS mode.According to the ICAO, the autopilot was notoperatingintheINSmodeeitherbecausethecrewdidnotswitchtheautopilottotheINSmode(shortlyafterCairn Mountain), or they did select the INS mode, but the computer did not transition from INERTIALNAVIGATIONARMED to INSmode because theaircrafthadalreadydeviated off trackby more than the7.5 nautical miles(13.9km) tolerancepermitted by theinertial navigationcomputer.Whatever thereason, theautopilot remainedin the HEADINGmode, and theproblem was notdetected by thecrew.

At28minutesaftertakeoff, civilianradar atKenaiPeninsulaon theeastern shoreofCook Inletandwith radar

AsimplifiedCIAmapshowingdivergenceofplannedandactualflightpaths

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coverage175miles (282km)westofAnchorage, trackedKAL0075.6miles (9.0km)northofwhere it shouldhavebeen.

WhenKAL007didnotreachBethelat50minutesaftertakeoff,amilitaryradaratKingSalmon,Alaska,trackedKAL007at12.6nauticalmiles (23.3km)northofwhere itshouldhavebeen.There isnoevidenceto indicatethatcivilairtrafficcontrollersormilitaryradarpersonnelatElmendorfAirForceBase(whowereinapositiontoreceive theKing Salmon radar output)were awareof KAL007's deviation in real-time, and therefore able towarn theaircraft. Ithadexceeded itsexpectedmaximumdeviationsix fold,2nauticalmiles (3.7km)oferrorbeingthemaximumexpecteddriftfromcourseiftheinertialnavigationsystemwasactivated.

Theinabilitytoestablishdirectradiocommunicationstobeabletotransmittheirpositiondirectlydidnotalertthe pilots of KAL007 of their ever-increasing divergenceand was not considered unusual by air trafficcontrollers.Halfway between Bethel and waypoint NABIE, KAL007 passed through the southern portion oftheNorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommandbufferzone.ThiszoneisnorthofRomeo20andoff-limitstocivilianaircraft.

Sometimeafter leavingAmericanterritorialwaters,KALFlight007crossedtheInternationalDateLine,wherethelocaldateshiftedfromAugust31,1983toSeptember1,1983.

KAL007continueditsjourney,everincreasingitsdeviation—60nauticalmiles(110km)offcourseatwaypointNABIE,100nauticalmiles(190km)offcourseatwaypointNUKKS,and160nauticalmiles(300km)offcourseatwaypointNEEVA—untilitreachedtheKamchatkaPeninsula.

SHOOTDOWN At 15:51 UTC, according to Soviet sources,KAL007entered therestricted airspaceof the KamchatkaPeninsula. The buffer zone extended 200 kilometres(120mi) from Kamchatka's coast and is known asaflight information region(FIR). The 100-kilometre(62mi) radius of the buffer zone nearest to Sovietterritoryhadtheadditionaldesignationofprohibitedairspace.WhenKAL007wasabout130kilometres(81mi)fromtheKamchatkacoast,oneMiG-23andthreeSu-15FlagonfighterswerescrambledtointercepttheBoeing747.

UnitsoftheSovietAirDefenceForcesthathadbeentrackingtheSouthKoreanaircraftformorethananhourwhileitenteredandleftSovietairspacenowclassifiedtheaircraftasamilitarytargetwhenitreenteredtheirairspace over Sakhalin.After the protractedground-controlled interception, the three Su-15 fighters (fromnearbyDolinsk-Sokolairbase)andtheMiG-23(fromSmirnykhAirBase)managedtomakevisualcontactwiththeBoeing.Thepilotof the leadSu-15 fighter firedwarning shots,but recalled later in1991, "I fired fourbursts,morethan200rounds.Forallthegooditdid.Afterall,Iwasloadedwitharmorpiercingshells,notincendiaryshells.It'sdoubtfulwhetheranyonecouldseethem."

At thispoint, KAL007 contactedTokyoAreaControlCenter, requesting clearance to ascend to ahigherflightlevelforreasonsoffueleconomy;therequestwasgranted,sotheBoeingstartedtoclimb,graduallyslowingasitexchangedspeedforaltitude.ThedecreaseinspeedcausedthepursuingfightertoovershoottheBoeing,anactionthatwasinterpretedbytheSovietpilotasanevasivemaneuver.TheordertoshootKAL007downwasgivenas itwasaboutto leaveSovietairspaceforthesecondtime.Ataround18:26UTC,underpressurefromGeneralKornukov,andgroundcontrollerswhowerenot to let theaircraftescape into internationalairspace,

ASovietSukhoiSu-15Flagoninterceptor

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theleadfighterwasabletomovebackintoapositionwhereitcouldfiretwoK-8(NATOreportingname:AA-3"Anab")air-to-airmissilesattheplane.

Post-attack flight At the timeof the attack, the planehadbeen cruising at an altitudeof about 35,000 feet (11,000m). Tapesrecovered from the airliner's cockpit voice recorderindicate that the crewwere unaware that theywere offcourse and violating Soviet airspace.Immediately after missile detonation, theairliner began a 113-second arc upwardbecause of a damaged crossover cablebetween the left inboardand rightoutboardelevators.

At 18:26:46UTC,at the apex of the arc ataltitude 38,250 feet (11,660m),either thepilotwasabletoturnofftheautopilotortheautopilot tripped and the plane began todescend to 35,000 feet (11,000m). From18:27:01 until 18:27:09, the flight crewreports to Tokyo Radio informing thatKAL007 to "descend to 10,000" [feet]. At18:27:20,ICAOgraphingofDigitalFlightDataRecorder tapes show that after a descentphaseanda10second"nose-up",KAL007 isnow leveled out at pre-missile detonationaltitude of 35,000ft (11,000m), forward acceleration is now back to pre-missile detonation rate of zeroacceleration,andairspeedhasreturnedtopre-detonationvelocity.

Yaw(oscillations),begunatthetimeofmissiledetonation,continuedecreasinglyuntiltheendoftheminute44secondportionofthetape.TheBoeingdidnotbreakup,explodeorplummetimmediatelyaftertheattack; itcontinueditsgradualdescentforfourminutes,thenleveledoffat16,424feet(18:30–18:31UTC),ratherthancontinuedescendingto10,000aspreviouslyreportedtoTokyoRadio,continuingatthisaltitudeforalmostfivemoreminutes(18:35UTC).

Thelastcockpitvoicerecorderentryoccurredat18:27:46whileinthisphaseofthedescent.At18:28UTC,theaircraft was reported turning to the north.ICAO analysis concluded that the flight crew "retained limitedcontrol" of the aircraft.Finally, the aircraft began to descend in spirals overMoneron Islandbefore comingdown 2.6miles (4.2km), killing all 269 on board.The aircraftwas last seen visually byOsipovich, "somehowdescending slowly" overMoneron Island. The aircraft disappeared off long rangemilitary radar atWakkanai,Japanataheightof1,000feet(300m).

AJapanesefishermanaboardthe58thChidoriMarulaterreportedtotheJapaneseMaritimeSafetyAgency(thisreportwascitedbyICAOanalysis)thathehadheardaplaneatlowaltitude,buthadnotseenit.Thenheheard"aloudsoundfollowedbyabrightflashoflightonthehorizon,thenanotherdullsoundandalessintenseflashoflightonthehorizon"andsmelledaviationfuel.

K-8missle(thetypefiredatKAL007)mountedonthewingofaSukhoiSu-15

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SEARCHANDRESCUE

AsaresultofColdWartensions,thesearchandrescueoperationsoftheSovietUnionwerenotco-ordinatedwith thoseof theUnitedStates, SouthKorea,and Japan.Consequentlyno informationwas shared,andeachside endeavored to harass or obtain evidence to implicate the other.The flight data recorderswere the keypiecesofevidencesoughtbybothfactions,withtheUnitedStatesinsistingthatanindependentobserverfromtheICAObepresentononeofitssearchvesselsintheeventthattheywerefound.Internationalboundariesarenotwelldefinedontheopensea,leadingtonumerousconfrontationsbetweenthelargenumberofopposingnavalshipsthatwereassembledinthearea.

SOVIETSEARCHANDRESCUEMISSIONTOMONERONISLAND

The Soviets did not acknowledge shooting down the aircraft until September 6, 1983.Eight days after theshootdown,MarshaloftheSovietUnionandChiefofGeneralStaffNikolaiOgarkovdeniedknowledgeofwhereKAL007hadgonedown,"Wecouldnotgivethepreciseansweraboutthespotwhereit[KAL007]fellbecauseweourselvesdidnotknowthespotinthefirstplace."

Nine years later, the Russian Federation handed overtranscripts of Soviet military communications thatshowed that at least two documented search andrescue(SAR)missionswereorderedwithinahalfhourof theattacktothe lastSovietverified locationof thedescending jumbo jet, overMoneron Island: The firstsearchwas ordered fromSmirnykh Air Basein centralSakhalin at 18:47 UTC, 9 minutes after KAL007 haddisappeared from Soviet radar screens, and broughtrescue helicopters from Khomutovo Air base, thecivilianandmilitaryairportatYuzhno-SakhalinskCityinsouthernSakhalin,andKGBboatstothearea.

Thesecondsearchwasordered8minuteslaterbytheDeputyCommanderoftheFarEasternMilitaryDistrict,Gen.Strogov,andinvolvedciviliantrawlersthatwereintheareaaroundMoneron."Theborderguards.WhatshipsdowenowhavenearMoneron Island, if theyarecivilians,send[them]thereimmediately."Moneronisjust4.5miles(7.2km)longand3.5miles(5.6km)wide,located24miles(39km)duewestofSakhalinIslandat46°15ʹN141°14ʹE;itistheonlylandmassinthewholeTatarStraits.

SEARCHFORKAL007ININTERNATIONALWATERS

Immediately after the shootdown, South Korea, owner of the aircraft and therefore prime considerant forjurisdiction,designatedtheUnitedStatesandJapanassearchandsalvageagents,therebymakingit illegalfortheSovietUniontosalvagetheaircraft,providingitwasfoundoutsideSovietterritorialwaters.Ifitdidso,theUnitedStateswouldnowbelegallyentitledtouseforceagainsttheSoviets,ifnecessary,topreventretrievalofanypartoftheplane.

Onthesamedayastheshootdown,RearAdmiralWilliamA.Cockell,Commander,TaskForce71,andaskeletonstaff, taken by helicopter from Japan, embarked inUSSBadger(stationed off Vladivostok at time of theflight)on September 9 for further transfer to the destroyerUSSElliotto assume duties as Officer in Tactical

ThesubmersibleDeepDroneisdeployedfromthefleettug,USNSNarragansett(T-ATF167).

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Command (OTC) of the Search and Rescue (SAR) effort. Surface search began immediately and on intoSeptember13.U.S.underwateroperationsbeganonSeptember14.OnSeptember10,1983,withno furtherhopeoffindingsurvivors,TaskForce71'smissionwasreclassifiedfroma"SearchandRescue"(SAR)operationtoa"SearchandSalvage"(SAS).

The vessels used in the search, forthe Soviet side aswell as the Alliedside (U.S.,SouthKorea, Japan)wereboth civilian trawlers, especiallyequipped for both the SAR and SASoperations, and various types ofwarships and support ships. TheSoviet side also employed bothcivilian and military divers. TheSoviet search, beginning on the dayof the shootdown and continuinguntil November 6, was confined tothe 60-square-mile (160km2) "highprobability" area in internationalwaters, and within Soviet territorialwaters to the north of MoneronIsland. The area within Sovietterritorial waters was off-limits totheU.S.,SouthKorean,andJapaneseboats.FromSeptember3to29,fourshipsfromSouthKoreahadjoinedinthesearch.

AtahearingoftheICAOonSeptember15,1983,J.LynnHelms,theheadoftheFederalAviationAdministration,stated:"The U.S.S.R. has refused to permit search and rescue units from other countries to enter SovietterritorialwaterstosearchfortheremainsofKAL007.Moreover, theSovietUnionhasblockedaccesstothelikely crash siteandhas refused to cooperatewithother interestedparties, toensureprompt recoveryofalltechnicalequipment,wreckageandothermaterial."

AFTERMATH

The FAA temporarily closedAirwayR-20, the air corridor that KoreanAir Flight 007wasmeant to follow, onSeptember2.Airlinesfiercelyresistedtheclosureofthispopularroute,theshortestoffivecorridorsbetweenAlaska and the Far East. It was therefore reopened on October 2 after safety and navigational aids werechecked.

NATOhaddecided,undertheimpetusoftheReaganadministration,todeployPershingIIandcruisemissilesinWestGermany.Thisdeploymentwouldhaveplacedmissilesjust6–10minutesstrikingdistancefromMoscow.Supportforthedeploymentwaswaveringanditlookeddoubtfulthatitwouldbecarriedout.WhentheSovietUnionshotdownFlight007,theU.S.wasabletogalvanizeenoughsupportathomeandabroadtoenablethedeploymenttogoahead.

TheSovietKashinclassdestroyerOdarennyyshadowsshipsofTaskForce71,7th

FleetastheyconductsearchoperationsforKoreanAirlinesFlight007.

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Theunprecedenteddisclosureofthe communications interceptedby the United States and Japanrevealed a considerable amountof information abouttheirintelligencesystems andcapabilities.National SecurityAgencydirectorLincoln D.Faurercommented: "...as aresult of the Korean Air Linesaffair, you have already heardmore about my business in thepast two weeks than I woulddesire... For the most part thishas not been a matter ofunwelcome leaks. It is the resultof a conscious, responsibledecisiontoaddressanotherwiseunbelievablehorror."Changes that theSovietssubsequentlymadeto theircodesand frequencies reducedtheeffectivenessofthismonitoringby60%.

TheU.S.KAL007Victims'Association,under the leadershipofHansEphraimson-Abt, successfullylobbiedU.S.Congressand the airline industry to accept an agreement that would ensure that future victims of airlineincidents would be compensated quickly and fairly by increasing compensation and lowering theburden ofproofofairlinermisconduct.This legislationhashadfarreachingeffectsforthevictimsofsubsequentaircraftdisasters.

TheU.S.decided toutilizemilitaryradarstoextendair trafficcontrol radarcoverage from200 to1,200miles(320 to1,930km)out fromAnchorage.TheFAAalsoestablishedasecondary radarsystem(ATCBI-5)onSaintPaul Island. In1986, theUnitedStates, Japanand theSovietUnionsetupa jointair trafficcontrol systemtomonitoraircraftovertheNorthPacific,therebygivingtheSovietUnionformalresponsibilitytomonitorcivilianairtraffic,andsettingupdirectcommunicationlinksbetweenthecontrollersofthethreecountries.

PresidentRonaldReaganannouncedonSeptember16,1983,thattheGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)wouldbemadeavailable forcivilianuse, freeofcharge,oncecompleted inorder toavert similarnavigationalerrors infuture.Furthermore,theinterfaceoftheautopilotusedonlargeairlinerswasmodifiedtomakeitmoreobviouswhetheritisoperatinginHEADINGmodeorINSmode.

InaMarch15,2001 interview,ValeryKamensky, thenCommanderof theSoviet FarEastMilitaryDistrictAirDefenseForceanddirectsuperiortoGen.Kornukov,opinedthatsuchashootdownofacivilianpassengerplanecouldnothappenagain inviewof thechangingpoliticalconditionsandalliances. In this interview,Kamenskystated,“Itisstillamysterywhathappenedtothebodiesofthecrewandpassengersontheplane.Accordingtoone theory, right after the rocket’s detonation, the nose and tail section of the jumbo fell off and themidfuselagebecameasortofwindtunnelsothepeopleweresweptthroughitandscatteredoverthesurfaceoftheocean.Yet in thiscase, someof thebodieswere tohavebeen foundduring thesearchoperations in thearea. The question of what actually happened to the people has not been given a distinct answer.”

"TheTowerofPrayer",amonumenttoKAL007atCapeSōya,Japan

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DESCRIPTION

Military aircraft are often tasked to intercept unknown aircraft, aircraft which are not incommunicationwiththeappropriateATCagency,andaircraftwhicharenotrespondingtoattemptedATC contact or have departed from their current clearance. The probable close approach byinterceptingaircraftmaytriggeraTCASRA;however,ifthecircumstancesareappreciatedwhenanRAoccurs,thenormalresponseisinadvisablefortworeasons:

Theinterceptingaircraftmaybeexpectedtoapproachveryclosetotheinterceptedaircraftinordertoascertain itsstatus:anunexpectedabruptmanoeuvremayresult incollisionwhichwouldhavebeenavoidediflevelflighthadbeenmaintained;

Anabruptmanoeuvrebytheinterceptedaircraftmaybemisinterpretedbytheinterceptingaircraftassuspiciousorevenhostile.

Since theeventsof11September2001,military interceptionofaircraftwhicharenot responding tocommunications with ATC has become more likely. Furthermore, because of the potential securityissues, such interceptsarepotentiallyhazardousand it is important thatcrewsknowwhat toexpectwheninterceptedandareawareofthesignalsusedbymilitaryaircraftandhowtorespond.

INTERCEPTIONANDACAS

If the interceptingaircraft is/areequippedwithanaltitudeencodingtransponderwhich is left activeduring the approach to the target, then the first indication the intercepted aircraftwill have of the

MILITARYINTERCEPTION&SIGNALLING

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interception may be on the TCAS display. If an approach is obsrved, especially from behind, it issuggested that a response to any consquentTCASRAmay be inappropriate. See the example givenatACAS Bulletin 9. Once visual contact with intercepting aircraft is available, usually as they arrivealongsidefrombehind,theinterceptedaircraftshouldsettheTCAStoTA.

THEINTERCEPTION

DayVMC

If there are two intercepting aircraft, thesecond will usually adopt a surveillancepositionwhiletheleadaircraftmovesinclosertopositivelyidentifytheaircraftandthestatusofitsflightcrew.Separationshouldnotbelessthan the minimum necessary to identifyaircraftandflightcrewstatus.

If the interceptors are not equipped withaltitude encoding transponders or haveswitchedthemoff,thenthefirstawarenessofinterception may come from passengers viathecabincrew.

Theinterceptoraircraftcanbeexpectedtobecareful not to alarm the crewandpassengersand will manoeuvre slowly and deliberately.The lead aircraft of two can be expected toadopt aposition slightly ahead,higher and totheleftoftheinterceptedaircraft.

NightandIMC

InIMCoratnight,theinterceptingaircraftcanbeexpectedtoestablishthemselvesinaradartrailcomfortablybehindtheinterceptedaircraftandwillmaintainasafeverticalseparation.

ActionsonInterception

The flight crew of an intercepted aircraft should follow the instructions given by the interceptor,interpretingandrespondingtothevisualsignals(seetheparagraphonInterceptionsignalsbelow).

TheflightcrewshouldnotifytheappropriateATCunitandattempttoestablishradiocommunicationwiththeinterceptoron243.0MHzor121.5MHz,givingtheidentityandpositionoftheaircraftandthenatureoftheflight.TheflightcrewshouldthenSquawkemergency(7700)unlessotherwiseinstructed.If the intercepted aircraft receives intructions from any source which conflict with the instructionsgiven by the intercepting aircraft, they should seek clarification but continue to comply with theinstructionsgivenbytheinterceptingaircraft.

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MILITARYAIRCRAFTPERFORMANCE

Theinterceptedaircraftcrewcanexpecttoseedifferentdragdevicesdeployedbytheinterceptorasitstabilisesitsspeedandposition.TurbopropsshouldanticipatetheneedtomaintainanIASabove200ktssoasnottocausethefighteranydifficultyinmaintainingformation.

INTERCEPTIONSIGNALS

Ref:ICAOAnnex2,AppendixA,2.1and2.2

Signalsinitiatedbyinterceptingaircraftandresponsesbyinterceptedaircraft

Series INTERCEPTINGAircraftSignals MeaningINTERCEPTED AircraftResponds

Meaning

1

DAY-Rocking wings from a positionslightly above and ahead of, andnormally to the left of, theintercepted aircraft and, afteracknowledgement,aslowlevelturn,normally to the left, on to thedesiredheading.

NIGHT-Same and, in addition,flashing navigational lights atirregularintervals.

NOTE1-Meteorologicalconditionsorterrainmay require the interceptingaircrafttotakeupapositionslightlyaboveandaheadof,andtotherightof, the intercepted aircraft and tomake the subsequent turn to theright.

NOTE 2-If the intercepted aircraft isnot able to keep pace with theintercepting aircraft, the latter isexpectedtoflyaseriesofrace-trackpatterns and to rock its wings eachtime it passes the interceptedaircraft.

You havebeenintercepted.Followme.

AEROPLANES:

DAY-Rocking wings andfollowing. NIGHT-Sameand,inaddition,flashingnavigational lights atirregularintervals.

HELICOPTERS: DAY orNIGHT-Rocking aircraft,flashing navigationallights at irregularintervalsandfollowing.

Understood,willcomply.

2 DAYorNIGHT-Anabruptbreak-away Youmay AEROPLANES: Understood,will

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maneuver from the interceptedaircraft consistingofa climbing turnof 90 degrees or more withoutcrossing the line of flight of theinterceptedaircraft.

proceed. DAY or NIGHT-Rockingwings.

HELICOPTERS: DAY orNIGHT-Rockingaircraft.

comply.

3

DAY-Circling aerodrome, loweringlanding gear and overflying runwayin direction of landing or, if theintercepted aircraft is a helicopter,overflying the helicopter landingarea.

NIGHT-Same and, in addition,showingsteadylandinglights.

Land at thisaerodrome.

AEROPLANES:

DAY-Lowering landinggear, following theintercepting aircraftand, if after overflyingthe runway landing isconsidered safe,proceedingtoland.

NIGHT-Same and, inaddition, showingsteady landing lights (ifcarried).

HELICOPTERS: DAY orNIGHT-Following theinterceptingaircraftandproceeding to land,showing a steadylandinglight(ifcarried).

Understood,willcomply.

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HAZARDS

LossofSeparation.Militaryaircraftclimbingatahighratethroughorclosetocontrolledairspaceneedto be deconflictedwith other traffic tomaintain system safety. This requires effective coordinationbetweencivilandmilitaryATC.

Signalsinitiatedbyinterceptedaircraftandresponsesbyinterceptingaircraft

Series INTERCEPTEDAircraftSignals MeaningINTERCEPTING AircraftResponds

Meaning

4

DAYorNIGHT-Raisinglandinggear(if fitted) and flashing landinglightswhilepassingoverrunwayinuseorhelicopter landingareaataheight exceeding 300m (1,000 ft)but not exceeding 600m (2,000 ft)(in the case of a helicopter, at aheightexceeding50m (170 ft)butnotexceeding100m(330ft)abovethe aerodrome level, andcontinuing to circle runway in useor helicopter landing area. Ifunabletoflashlandinglights,flashanyotherlightsavailable.

Aerodromeyou havedesignatedisinadequate.

DAYorNIGHT-Ifitisdesiredthattheinterceptedaircraftfollow the interceptingaircraft to an alternateaerodrome, theintercepting aircraft raisesits landing gear (if fitted)andusestheSeries1signalsprescribed for interceptingaircraft.

Ifitisdecidedtoreleasetheintercepted aircraft, theintercepting aircraft usesthe Series 2 signalsprescribed for interceptingaircraft.

Understood,followme.

Understood,you mayproceed.

5

DAY or NIGHT-Regular switchingonandoffofallavailablelightsbutin suchamanneras tobedistinctfromflashinglights.

Cannotcomply.

DAY or NIGHT-Use Series 2signals prescribed forinterceptingaircraft.

Understood.

6DAYorNIGHT-Irregular flashingofallavailablelights.

Indistress.DAY or NIGHT-Use Series 2signals prescribed forinterceptingaircraft.

Understood.

NovemberEdition42S A F E W I N G S

14|P a g e

F l i g h t S a f e t y M a g a z i n e o f A i r I n d i a , A i r I n d i a E x p r e s s a n d A l l i a n c e A i r

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