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RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY2 (C) VALUEWALK 2015

The concept of Russias foreign policy is determined by its pretensions of being a superpower that influ-ences the fate of the world. In the first half of the 90s, the difficult and volatile economic and political situation in the country forced its leadership to lim-it its foreign policy to influencing the former Soviet Union states. Russia wanted the Western powers to give it special rights over the former Soviet Union states, including the right of holding its peacekeep-ing military operations on their territories in order to protect the Russian-speaking population. With-out entering into an open conflict, the Group of Sev-en countries refused to support Russias proposals on dividing the spheres of influence.

In the 90s, Russia was constantly interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. There is a great number of documented examples illustrating Russias policy in relation to its brothers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1992, the relations between Russia and Ukraine escalated in connection with the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet and the question of the status of Crimea. Up until the summer of 1994, Russia basically waged a cold war against Ukraine. Relations between the two countries somewhat improved after the election of Ukrainian PresidentLeonid Kuchma. However, even in 1997, Russia did not abandon its claims against

Ukraine. The stubborn unwillingness of the Russian side to demarcate (make clarifications on the map) the border with Ukraine is a telling indication of that. With the stabilization of the political situa-tion, Russia resumed the struggle for leadership in world affairs. Since the end of 1993, its position on major international issues has been increasingly at odds with the position of the US and NATO. From 1994 to 1996, Russia was the only major power that supported the Great Serbian policy in the Bal-kans.

Russiasimperial ambitions raised concerns in Cen-tral and South-Eastern Europe. The Baltic states saw a warranty against interferences in their in-ternal affairs in joining NATO. Between 1995 and the first half of 1997, Russian leaders unsuccess-fully tried to prevent the expansion of NATO in the East by threatening the West with the beginning of a new large-scale cold war. Finally, in May 1997, Russia signed an agreement with NATO, in which it agreed with the joining of new members andwas granted the right to participate in NATOs deci-sion-making. NATO, in turn, pledged not to deploy its nuclear weapons in the East.

In general, Russias foreign policy shows that when there are less internal problems, it tends to in-crease the threat to its neighboring countries se-curity.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 3(C) VALUEWALK 2015

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation declared itself the successor state of the Soviet Union, and thus inherited a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. American experts active-ly participated in the development of Russias eco-nomic reforms in order to help it make the transition from a planned to a market economy. During the transition period, the US has provided humanitarian aid to Russia (operation Provide Hope). Relations between Russia and the US improved, but not for long.

During the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Russia in January 1999, she and Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed the commitment of the U.S. and Russia to build bilateral relations based on equality, respect and consider-ation of each others interests. It was emphasized that the importance of constructive cooperation be-tween Russia and the U.S. was a stabilizing factor in international affairs. The two leaders spoke in favor of further progressive development of multifaceted relations between the two countries at all levels and noted that any differences in approaching certain issues must not obscure the fundamental strategic goals of both Moscow and Washington. Albright con-firmed the willingness of the U.S. administration to support reforms in Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic, so-cial and political crisis in Russia, and the dramatic fall

of its inter national influence and military-po-litical poten tial led to the fact that the U.S. became the only world leader. Many politi-cal experts believe that this period showed the weakness of Russia, and as a result, its nu-merous concessions and failures of diplomacy.

These failures include: the uranium deal in 1993, the Budapest Memorandum declared in 1994, which did not prevent the expansion of NATO, and, in particular, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. Russias weakness was also revealed in terminating military alliances and reducing its activity in East-ern Europe and other regions and in a number of trade agreements.

Russia expected that with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO would also be dissolved soon-er or later. However, the credibility of the popular statement that Gorbachev was given solid guaran-tees of NATOs non-expansion, which were later violated, are extremely doubtful. Gorbachev even expressed the intention of the Soviet Union to join NATO in order to undermine it from within. Fur-thermore, in December 1991, Yeltsin told U.S. Sec-retary of State James Baker that he hoped for the future merger of the armed forces of the CIS and NATO. However, in 1999, NATO accepted the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, and in 2004, Esto-nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria.

2.1 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION


This fact and the U.S. operation with its allies against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq caused confusion in Russia about building relations with the United States. On the one hand, after the ter-rorist attack that took place on September 11, 2001 in the United States, Russia joined the anti-terror-ist coalition led by the United States; on the oth-er hand, on June 13, 2002, the United States de-nounced the 1972 ABM Treaty, justifying it with the need to have protection against pariah states.

As noted by journalist Peter Baker, at the beginning of his first presidential term, George W. Bush was inclined to work with Vladimir Putin. Bush believed that there was no real threat coming from Russia to the United States. In 2001, an expert on Russia, Mi-chael McFaul, advised Bush to lure Russia into a pro-

American camp, and Bush agreed, arguing that someday

we all will have to deal with the Chinese.

In 2003, Russia, France and Germany actually led the camp of countries opposed to theU.S. ac-tions against Iraq. At the end of 2004,the relations between Russia and the U.S.experienced an un-precedented cold snap related to the events in Ukraine (the Orange Revolution).

According to political expert Edward Lausanne, Putin started out with a very pro-Western policy. Lausanne added that at first, Putin even hinted at the possibility of joining NATO as well as abandon-ing Russias military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. Af-ter September 11, he suggested that the U.S. and Russia should have closer military and political co-operation as well aswork on the development of an anti-terrorist alliance. However, almost all of his initiatives were rejected. This was followed by the Munich Speech and other harsh statements.

Image source: Newsweek


2.2 RESUMPTION OF CONFRONTATIONThe main problematic issues between Moscow and Washington include Russias help to Irans nuclear program, energy security, the situation in Georgia, Ukraine, and Palestine, and the U.S. deployment of its missile defense systems in Europe. Many Rus-sians believe that under the pretext of democracy, the United States has been funding several Russian non-governmental organizations and political par-ties, and in fact, wants to bring a crisis similar to the Ukrainian oneinto Russia. On May 4, 2006, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney gave a speech in Vilni-us, which now many call the VilniusSpeech, similar to Winston Churchills Fulton Speech. According to Cheney, the U.S. was not satisfied with Russias use of its mineral resources as a foreign policy weapon of pressure as well as violation of human rights and the destructive actions of Russia in the international arena. Russias refusal to cease its cooperation with

Iran, Syria, North Korea, Belarus and other countries raised concerns in the U.S. and led to a permanent Russian-American conflict in the UN Security Council.

At the beginning of 2007, the conflict between the United States and Russia raged with even greater intensity due to U.S. intentions of deploying the el-ements of its missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. According to the U.S. adminis-tration, this action was aimed at protecting Europe from North Korean and Iranian missiles. The Rus-sian leadership categorically rejected this explana-tion. On February 8, 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that the United States should be prepared for a possible armed conflict with Rus-sia. In turn, at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin sharply criticized U.S. foreign policy.


Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Gener-al Solovtsov also said that if the elements of the U.S. missile defense system were deployed in Eastern Europe, Russia would denounce the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the suspension by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and related international agree-ments. Analysts believe that this decision was the first step of the Russian leadership toward a radical change in the military-political situation in Europe.

In an accompanying certificate of the document, it was stated that the decision had been made due to the ex-traordinary circumstances, affecting the security of the Russian Federation. These, in particular, include:

1. The exceeding of the CFE Treaty limitations by Eastern European states joining NATO as a result of the alliances expansion;

2. NATO countries failure to comply with the politi-cal commitment adopted in 1999, which accelerat-ed the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty;

3. The refusal of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithua-nia and Estonia, which had joined NATO,to partici-pate in the CFE Treaty and, as a result, the appear-ance of weapons on the north-western border with Russia, which were free from the restrictions on the placement of conventional weapons, including weapons of other countries;

4. The planned deployment of U.S. military bases in Bulgaria and Romania.

Image source: uci.edu


2.3 US INTELLIGENCE PREDICTS WORSENING OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The Director of National Intelligence(the unit that brings together allU.S. intelligence agen-cies, including the CIA),retired Admiral Michael McConnell, speaking at a hearing in the U.S. Senate with a report on threats to U.S. nation-al security, said the tightening of Russian leader-ships policies would inevitably lead to an increased antagonism between Moscow and Washington.

The report stated that, according toU.S. intelligence, Russia had gotten back to its struggling towards de

mocracy. This was evident in the increasing control over society and political parties to the point that the next leader of the country would be merely ap-pointed. According to the report, Putin was facing massive pressure from the countrys law enforce-ment officials, who accused the U.S. of humilia-tion that had befallen Russia in Washingtons at-tempt to slow down Moscows development. The source of such pressure from law enforcement of-ficials was the extremely high prices of energy re-sources.


According to McConnell, the current state of the Russian economy and politics strengthened Rus-sias confidence in its abilities, and as a result in-creased defense spending and continues to pursue foreign policy goals that are not always consistent with the goals pursued by the Western countries. He believed that such a course would be implement-edthrough the 2008 presidential election in Russia and would be accompanied by the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in its domestic politics.

That allowed Michael McConnell to conclude about the future intensification of rivalry and antago-nism between the U.S. and Russia, especially on the territory of the former Soviet Union states, as well as the weakening of cooperation in such ar-eas as the fight against terrorism, non-prolifer

ation of weapons of mass destruction, energy and the development of democracy in the Middle East.

McConnells criticism coincided with other simi-lar statements of senior U.S. political and military leaders. Speaking at the same hearing in the U.S. Senate, the director of the U.S. Defense Intelli-gence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Meyplz, reported about Russias efforts to use outer space for military purposes.

Gates, speaking before the Senate Appropriations Committee, reiterated that one of the reasons why the United States should develop its armed forces lies in Russias and Chinas modernization of their armies.

Image source: New Republic


2.4 RUSSIA AND GEORGIAThere was a new round of confrontation between Russia and the United States beginning with the in-vasion of Georgian troops in South Ossetia in August 2008. Russian troops cleared the territory of the un-recognized republic from the Georgian army and for several days kept bombing military facilities on the Georgian territory, including Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. After that, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had always been part of Georgia, as independent states. The existence of the NATO-Russia Council was then questioned.

Francis Fukuyama, one of the worlds most renowned futurologists, noted that there is a possibility of a renewal of the Cold War, which meanswe would be dealing with a Russia that could not be trusted and that at any moment could resort to military force. The difference is only in the fact that, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is more integrated into the global economy, and that is why its more vulnera

ble. This fact imposes certain constraints on Rus-sias actions which did not exist during the Cold War.

In July 2009, at the briefing dedicated to the policy of the outgoing administration of George W. Bush, his National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, speaking about U.S.-Russian relations formulated by the results of the past few years, said: On Rus-sia, President Bush has worked to shift Americas relationship from the rivalries of the Cold War to partnering with Russia in areas where we share common interests -- while managing our differenc-es in a frank, consistent, and transparent way.

Among the achievements, Hadley highlighted U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of WMD in the resolution of Iranian and North Korean issues, and maintaining negotiations to achieve peace in the Middle East.


There had been a preparation for the vis-it of U.S. President Barack Obama to Russia in 2012, but his meeting with Putin was canceled.

In 2013, the examples of differences between Russia and the U.S.included the situation in Syria and North Korea, missile defense, the condition of non-profit or-ganizations in Russia, the Magnitsky Act and the aw of Dima Yakovlev. On the night of May 13, 2013, the Federal Security Service arrested CIA agent Ryan Fo-gle, who served as the third secretary of the political department of the U.S. Embassy in Russia, during his recruitment of one of Russias secret service agents.

Russias granting of asylum to Edward Snowden was viewed as an open hostile action by a num

ber of Americans. The special statement of the White House on Obamas cancelled visit to Mos-cow in September 2013 noted the absence of any progress during the past 12 months in such issues as missile defense and arms con-trol, trade and economic relations, issues of global security, human rights and civil society.

In early March of 2014, with a sharp deterioration of the relations between the two countries in con-nection with the so-called Crimean crisis, Secretary of State John Kerry said during a televised inter-view that the reset thing was in the past. We entered another phase of relations with Russia. It was noted that relations between the U.S. and Rus-sia had been at their worst since 1991.

Image source: The Telegraph


3.1 SOME ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER MARCH OF 2012.

On September 3, 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladi-mir Putin published his own article in the newspaper Izvestia, dedicated to the creation of the Common Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakh-stan. This is the first program article of Putin as prime minister and as a future president concerning foreign affairs. It became a subject of the discussion about the prospects of forming a new foreign policy of the Kremlin as a result of Putins return to the presidency.

Putins decision to run for president triggered a wave of discussions on the possible revision of Russian foreign policy priorities. The article in Izvestia was hailed as evidence of that. It was interesting for peo-ple to do a review of Russias foreign policy imple-mented during Dmitry Medvedevs presidency and to evaluate possible changes to Russias main direc-tions in connection with the future election of Putin.

Over the years of his presidency,Medvedev proved to be quite active in matters of foreign policy. The main and most productive direction was the new relation-ship with the U.S., the so-called reset, the main success of which was the signing of the START Treaty.

The achievements of Medvedev also include the re-duction of emotional negativity between the two countries and his attempts to build new institutions of interaction: the first negotiations on military-tech-nical cooperation, the establishing of a bilateral pres-idential commission, and the existence of cooper-ation in modernization (Skolkovo office in Silicon Valley). In addition, Russia was a close partner of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan and gave the green

light for the beginning of the NATO operation in Libya. On Iran, one of the most sore subjects for the U.S., Moscow went to meet Washington halfway by freezing the delivery of S-300 mis-siles, supporting UN sanctions and noticeably dis-tancing itself from the regime of Ahmadinejad.

This entire set of foreign relations was far from a con-sensus for the Russian elite. Putin negatively react-ed to Russias position on Libya in the UN Security Council (the discussion between Putin and Medve-dev on this issue became one of the most striking ev-idences of the differences between the two leaders) and advocated for a more cautious approach on Iran. It must also be pointed out that in the summer of 2009,Putin spoke out against Russias early accession to the WTO. The prime minister also almost never commented or promoted Medvedevs European se-curity project, not paying much attention to the es-tablishment of an international financial center and did not take over the functions of negotiating with other countries of the partnership formodernization.

All that had grounds to say that the nature of Russias foreign policy would change after the election of Pu-tins presidency. It is important to highlight a few key points. It could be assumed that in public relations, the topic of post-Soviet integration would be active-ly promoted, while the issues of relations with the West would merely becomea background. The lim-ited capacity of the reset became clear after the signing of an agreement on strategic offensive arms.


Considering that the Western direction has always been more difficult for Putinand that resources for influence were far greater in the post-Soviet space, it was not surprising that the goal was to focus on in-tegration projects in the CIS countries. The Customs Union had become one of the priorities of Putin, whose government was actively engaged in its implemen-tation. In addition, the prime minister took a much

tougher stance on Ukraine. As an example, Medvedev tolerated the joint venture between UkrainesNaftogaz and Russias Gazprom, while Putin openly lobbied the absorption of the Rus-sian gas monopoly from Ukrainian companies.

However, during the presidency of Medvedev, Russia began a sharp contradiction with Belarus, which had

Image source: Der Spiegel

It was not possible to come up with any new sub-stantive agenda topics for cooperation, nor to find common ground on missile defense, which had been particularly irritating Moscow. Moreover, the position of both Russian leaders here are rel-atively close. In July 2012, Kommersant newspa-per, citing its own sources, wrote that according

to Medvedev, the talks on missile defense had reached a deadend. Thus, the prospect of an impending new conflict between Rus-sia and the U.S. and the return of Putin to be-ing the president of Russia, showed much greater possibility for yet another cold peace.


experienced an oil war in late 2010. Medvedev was always much distant when speaking about the CIS. Ingeneral, his policy toward the post-Soviet space was low-key, if not to mention, of course,such key events in Medvedevs foreign policy such as the war in Geor-gia in August 2008 and the consequent recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Putin, preparing to return to the presidency, was betting on the Eurasian integration project. He stood up for the CIS, calling it a source of new in-tegration organizations such as the EEA, the CSTO, and the Union of Russia and Belarus. The Russian Prime Minister would present the project of the Eurasian Union, which was the starting point for the EEA birth, as the beginning of building a new pole of global power, which would be based on the integration mechanisms of the European Union.

It took Europe 40 years to go from the European Coal and Steel Community to a fully developed Eu-ropean Union. The formation of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space is much more dy-namic, as it considers the experience of the EU and other regional organizations, Putin said in the article.

However, Putins project looks more populist today: the creation of supranational bodies, and particularly a single emission center for a single currency, seems impossible at this moment, while the contradictions between potential participants in such a union seems too deep. Moreover, unlike the EU, Russias claims on non-formal domination, which would be inevitably-formalized, deter many post-Soviet countries, and the project is seen as Moscows attempt to expand its influence beyond its borders.

The situation with Ukraine is even more difficult. In 2012, the Ukrainian issue became one of the most acute in Russias foreign policy and was concentrated on Moscows attempts to force Kyiv to make a choice

between the EU and Russia, drawing Ukraine into the Customs Union.Putins article showed that such attempts would become more active.

The important point is the fact that during the election campaign in Ukraine in 2010, Putin sym-pathized with YuliaTymoshenko, while Medvedev more effectively interacted with former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (these candidates were completely opposite to each other). Putin as-sured that the choice between the EU and the Eur-asian Union was false, and in fact, the integration into the Eurasian Union would allow its members to quickly integrate into the EU.

I think this is a false fork. Were not going to build a wall and counter anyone. Eurasian Union will be based on universal principles of integration as an integral part of the Great Europe united by the val-ues of freedom, democracy and market laws, Pu-tin wrote. The potential conflict with Ukraine could only grow amid the above-mentioned difficulties.

For Asian regimes, Putin offered a guarantee of po-litical stability andmilitary intervention in case of revolutions from the botto mup. CSTO unitswould play the main role in such a case. However, not many believed in the capacity of the CSTO, particularly after its inaction against the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Putin said he expected Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to connect to the integration into the Eurasian Union.

However, the sources of Kommersant in the For-eign Ministry of Kazakhstan explained that Astana had not been eager to see Kyrgyzstan among the Customs Union, and hence, the Eurasian Union. Kazakhstan had already spent a lot of money for the resettlement of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, but after the entry of Bishkek into the Customs Union, the borders of the union would have to be revised,


and it was unlikely that anyone would compensate the costs incurred by Astana.

During Putins regime, the competition and oppo-sition between Western and Eastern countries has once again been aggravated, despite the fact that before he was elected, Putin had been avoiding the anti-Western rhetoric. However, it has been known that his surroundings and the entire conservative elite as well as security forces tend to be more an-ti-Western. Against this background, it became ev-ident that the first vice-speaker of the Federation Council, Alexander Torshin, as he himself admit

ted, after reading Putins article, decided to initiate the creation of the Eurasian Court of Human Rights. He was one of the authors of the bill on the right to check the Russian Constitutional Courts decision about the Strasbourg court for compliance with the Russian Basic Law.

Putins article in Izvestia was primarily addressed to the internal audience, which was nostalgic for the days of the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, the article was seen as a striking confirma-tion of concerns about possible changes in foreign policy in connection with the change of president in March 2012.


3.2 LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN-U.S. RELATIONS

The topic about the Ukrainian-Russian conflict dominated the discussions of international affairs at the Faculty of International Relations during the XXIV seminar at St. Petersburg State University

Russia comes closer to China because of despair

The official theme of the seminar was 70 years after the war: lessons of the past and future of the Russian-American relations. The discussions tone was given by the topics of the roundtables: U.S.-Russian relations: conflict and the possibili-ty of a compromise, Regional aspects of the Rus-sian-American rivalry and Russia and the Unit-ed States in the modern world order. However, it doesnt matter what aspect of international pol-icy was discussed; all Russian and U.S. as well as Chinese experts, who joined them later, put the events in Ukraine into the center of the discussion.

Associate Professor of American Studies of the Fac-ulty of International Relations of St. Petersburg State University Ivan Tsvetkov, who holds a Ph.D. in histori-cal sciences, said that the relations between the U.S. and Russia had never been warm and had been char-acterized by predictability before Kyivs Euromaidan. It was a systemic attitude, he said in a conversation with a correspondent for Voice of America. That was, at the very least, Russian partial recognition of the U.S. world leadership. We criticized them, pointed at the facts that we did not like, but agreed that there was a system of rules that comes from Washington and determines international relations.

Now, judging by Putins statements, in particu lar in the film Crimea: The Way Back Home, Russia has decided to end the system of international relations and does not take anyones opinion into account: not from Washington, nor London or any other ma-jor capital of the West. This statement, by the way, is not reflected on our expert community, but still it is a very important statement, said Ivan Tsvetkov.

At the same time, according to experts, Russia is now in solitude. It is not that such an approach is not supported by the Americans, but even the qua-si-allies of Russia like China, India and Brazil are also not willing to exit the current system of internation-al relations, which is led by the U.S. And it turns out that after the events in Ukraine, Russia is not chal-lenging the U.S., but rather the established system. However, the Russias appeal to other countries to escape from this system has not been responded by anyone, because, unfortunately, Russia has nothing to offer in return, except for the claims that it is a great power and is able to act as a leader, said Ivan Tsvetkov, Associate Professor of American Studies.

Commenting on the so-called Eastern turn of Rus-sian foreign policy, the expert notes that the bias towards Southeastern Asia, and in particular China, is not a manifestation of a deliberate strategy of the Russian leadership, but rather a forced step. This is happening because of despair. As of today, China is the only full-fledged counterweight to the United States. And if we quarrel with the United States, we will inevitably fall into the arms of China and begin living by their rules, he said to Voice of America.


The best way is to promote the expansion of NATO

Aprofessor at Cornell College in Mount Vernon, Iowa, Robert Givens, was present among other U.S. participants. He said that among his students, there are a lot of descendants of Russian immigrants, but he can recognize them only by their names. They are well adapted, and position themselves as Ameri-can citizens of Russian origin, Professor Givens said.

In general, according to the American ex-pert, due to the Ukrainian crisis, there has been a significant increase in the interest of the U.S.scientific community toward Russia.

This is not surprising because in order to under-stand the roots of any inter-state conflict, it is nec-essary to know the history, cultural characteristics of both sides, to get acquainted with the docu-ments, and it is very desirable to do it in the origi-nal language. Therefore, I cannot tell whether the current interest to Russia is friendly, or vice versa, negative. Rather, it is a research, Professor of Cor-nell College said.

As to Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs, ac-cording to Givens, For the United States, this con-flict plays the most important role in its internal political debates. Especially with the presidential

Image source: CNN


election campaign around the corner. Of course, our administration has always stressed how important the Ukrainian issue is. But I think that, after all, for Russia, these events are far more important than for us, he said.

He added that, according to his observations, the Rus-sian government is currently not seeking to increase its zones of influence in the neighboring country.

Because the larger the part of Ukraine controlled by the Russian Federation, the more the rest of the country aspires to join the West, first and foremost - NATO. Russia has repeatedly stated that it is against the NATO expansion, but there is no better way to contribute to this process than to conquer new ar-eas of Ukraine, Givens stated. He concludes that the current situation is in the best of interests to the Kremlin.

Allied relations will cease to exist

On the opening day of the XXIV Russian-American seminar, the results of the survey by the Levada Cen-ter were published. According to sociologists, 59% of respondents believe that Russia has a reason to fear the United States, while over the past eight years, the proportion of those who look at the U.S. with fear has risen from 47%.

The Russians interviewed by the Levada Center con-sider that the main threat from Washington is the possibility of preventing the development of their country. Such respondents have accumulated to 48%.

Forty percent of the respondents believe that the U.S. wants to establish control over the Russian econ-omy, 36% believe it wantsto impose its foreign ideas and values, and 31% see the possibility of a military invasion of the U.S.Army with the occupation of the country following.

A correspondent for Voice of America asked the deputy director of the Institute of the U.S. and Can-ada Studies, Valery Garbuzov, to comment on this survey.

I think that the current mood in Russian society is reflected truly, Garbuzov said. And this is due to the events of the past year in Ukraine, Russias policy towards Ukraine, the rhetoric of the Russian authorities as well as all the media, and above all Russias television. This rhetoric contains a negative assessment of the Western position, and especially the United States position. It is very clear that it is reflected in the Russian mass consciousness that is not capable to critically process the information offered to them, Garbuzov pointed out.

The expert added that, to his knowledge, a similar survey on the attitude to Russia was conducted in the United States, in which it turned out that al-most the same number of Americans negatively viewed Russia, its foreign policy and Vladimir Putin. So we can talk about the mirrored data of sociolo-gy in our country and in the United States, he said.

And he adds that now everything will depend on how the Minsk Agreement is adhered to in eastern Ukraine and on the progress of the upcoming elec-tion campaign in the United States. I think that some progress will take place as the U.S. Congress is surprisingly unanimous when it comes to Ukraines matters. And the unanimity between Democrats and Republicans is a very rare thing in recent years, ValeryGarbuzov said and added, Now, in the U.S., a lot depends not only on the president, but also on Congress, and both are anti-Russian.

According to the expert, at the end of his second term, President Barack Obama may demonstrate a gesture of goodwill against Russia to go down in his-tory as the leader of peace. But there is a big doubt


whether this trend will be picked up by the new master of the White House, Valery Garbuzov emphasizes.

And he concludes that, in his opinion, the period of friendly relations between Russia and the Unit-ed States, similar to those that existed during the Second World War, will not happen again. How-ever, that will not interfere with their cooperation on issues in which the positions of Moscow and Washington are the same, or more or less close.

In almost every speech during the seminar, there was hope that the next seminar will bring more positive conclusions than this one. However, we cannot be sure if this will happen, and if the XXV Russian-American seminar will be held at St. Pe-tersburg State University, all this will depend on the resolution of the crisis in eastern Ukraine.


3.3 PUTIN, THE U.S. AND UKRAINE: PUTIN HINTED THAT IF THE U.S. SUPPLIES MORE WEAPONS TO UKRAINE, THE WAR WOULD ESCALATE

Putin hinted that if the United States supplies weap-ons to Ukraine, the offensive of the Russian troops and the pro-Russian rebels would be inevitable.He stated this at a press conference in Budapest:

According to our information, the US has already supplied weapons to the territory of Ukraine. I am deeply convinced that whoever and whatev-er weapons will supply, the number of victims, of course, may be increased, but the result will be the same as today.

Image source: mil.gov.ua


U.S.-Russia Diplomacy: Ukraine is important, but not more important than Iran

The assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State, Victoria Nuland, said to dig deeper for the full implementation of all aspects of the Minsk Agree-ment and urged Ukraine, Russia and international mediators to resolve the eastern Ukrainian conflict.

Nuland said in Moscow that the U.S. could support the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. And it looks like the other participants in the process dont have anything against it. The United States did not participate in the negotiations in Minsk in September 2014 and February 2015 in the Nor-man format (Germany - France - Ukraine - Russia).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, antici-pating his talks with Nuland, shared his vision on the role of the United States.He said that the fo-cus should be on how Washington is influencing Kyiv to not allow disruption in power scenari-os and seeks to start a political process through direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk.

Nulands visit to Moscow and the recent meet-ing betweenU.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vladimir Putin as well as the Foreign Min-ister Sergei Lavrovwas viewed by observers as the resumption of the dialogue between the United States and Russia, which stopped af-ter the Ukrainian crisis and has led to the most dramatic aggravation of the relations between Moscow and Washington since the Cold War.

The day before her visit to Russia, it had be-come known about the capture by Ukrainian armed forces of the two Russians, who are be-lieved by the authorities of Ukraine to be the Russian military men. We welcome the Ukraine governments public statements that they are being well taken care of and that the Interna-tional Committee of the Red Cross... will be al-lowed access to them, Nuland said in Moscow.

Nuland also said that there was no intention in Kyiv to resume hostilities in eastern Ukraine

4.1 TODAY

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