quassi juditial process
DESCRIPTION
quassi Juditial ProcessTRANSCRIPT
Bombay
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDEAPPELLATE SIDEAPPELLATE SIDE
WRIT PETITION NO. 4101 OF 2007WRIT PETITION NO. 4101 OF 2007WRIT PETITION NO. 4101 OF 2007
Smt.Savitri Chandrakesh Pal. ... Petitioner.
V/s.
1. State of Maharashtra,
2. The Controller of Rationing,
3. The Hon’ble Cabinet Minister, Food and Civil Supply & Consumer Protection, Mantralaya,
4. Jaiambe Grahak Sahakari Sanstha. ... Respondents.
Ms.Poonam P. Bhosale for the petitioner.
V.A.Gangal, special counsel with S.K. Chinchlikar, AGP and Ashok G. Gade for respondent Nos.1 and 3.
Uday Warunjikar with P.A.Pol for respondent No.4.
CORAM: V.C.DAGA, J.CORAM: V.C.DAGA, J.CORAM: V.C.DAGA, J.
DATED: 24th March 2009.DATED: 24th March 2009.DATED: 24th March 2009.
JUDGMENT (PART - II) :JUDGMENT (PART - II) :JUDGMENT (PART - II) : ------------------------
. Rule, returnable forthwith.
2. Mr.Gangal, special counsel appearing along
with learned A.G.P. for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and
Mr.Warunjikar with Mr.Pol for respondent No.4 waived
service.
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3. Heard finally by consent of parties.
4. Perused petition, affidavits and counter
affidavits.
5. This petition is directed against the order
dated 24th November, 2006 passed by the Hon’ble
Minister for Food and Civil Supply and Consumer
Protection, Mantralaya, Mumbai, the respondent No.3
whereby and whereunder the revision petition filed by
the petitioner challenging the order of the Controller
of Rationing, the respondent No.2 dated 17th December,
2004 was dismissed.
Factural Matrix :Factural Matrix :Factural Matrix : ---------------------------------------------
6. The factual matrix reveal that the Controller
of Rationing, Churchgate, Mumbai, the respondent No.2
herein had issued an advertisement in the local
newspapers dated 8th November, 2002 notifying
intention to make allotment of rationing shop under
Item No.207/02 for the area Pimpri Pada, Malad (East)
Mumbai. The last date for submission of the
application by the applicants desirous of having
allotment of the ration shop was 31st January, 2003.
7. In response to the aforesaid advertisement, in
all 22 applications were received by respondent No.2
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including applications of the petitioner and
respondent No.4 respectively.
8. The respondent No.2 has passed an order dated
22nd November, 2003, whereby and whereunder the ration
shop was allotted to respondent No.4 treating the said
respondent falling under the Category/ Priority No.6.
9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated
22nd November, 2003, the petitioner, claiming to be an
educated unemployed woman falling under Category/
Priority No.2, filed revision application before the
Hon’ble Minister for Food and Civil Supplies and
Consumer Protection, Government of Maharashtra, the
respondent No.3 herein; to challenge the aforesaid
order dated 22nd November, 2003 passed by respondent
No.2. The respondent No.3 vide his order dated 2nd
June, 2004 rejected revision application of the
petitioner and thereunder confirmed the order of the
respondent No.2.
10. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the
respondent No.3 confirming the order of respondent
No.2 allotting ration shop to the respondent No.4,
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petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.5891/2004 in
this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. This Court, after hearing the
parties, vide its order dated 25th August, 2004, was
pleased to quash and set aside the order of the
respondent Nos.3 dated 2nd June, 2004 and remanded the
matter with certain directions to the respondent No.2
for consideration afresh.
11. The respondent No.2 vide his order dated 17th
December, 2004 claimed to have made enquiry through
the regional office. Based on the report of the
regional office, he found that the authorised ration
shops bearing Nos.42-G/159 and 42-G/264 were being run
in two separate Galas and not in one. With the
result, the allotment of the ration shop in favour of
respondent No.4 was allowed to be continued.
12. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the
respondent No.2 again revision application was filed
by the present petitioner before the respondent No.3.
The hearing on merits was completed on 19th August,
2005. However, the order appears to have been passed
on 24th November, 2006, practically, after a period of
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14 months whereby and whereunder the revision
application filed by the petitioner came to be
rejected. With the result, allotment of ration shop
in favour of respondent No.4 was confirmed. The
petitioner states that the copy of the said order was
supplied to her on 5th April, 2007 i.e. after a
period of 5 months, that too, after repeated
approaches made to the office of the respondent No.3
13. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order,
present petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India on various amongst other grounds
raised in the petition.
Shocking Fact brought on Record :Shocking Fact brought on Record :Shocking Fact brought on Record : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner, during
the course of hearing, brought to the notice of this
Court two orders of the revisional authority, the
respondent No.3, one allowing revision and another
rejecting the revision filed by the petitioner. These
orders were taken on record.
15. Having seen aforesaid shocking material
brought on record, this Court naturally felt the
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necessity to investigate the same. Consequently,
notice was issued to the Chief Secretary, State of
Maharashtra vide order dated 13th August, 2003
directing him to make enquiry in the matter. Pursuant
to this direction, respondent No.3; the Chief
Secretary; Shri A.A.Godbole, Section Officer; and
Shri S.Y.Kursange, Deputy Secretary of the department
have filed their respective affidavits. All these
affidavits read together revealed a very sorry state
of affairs with regard to the mode of decision making
process adopted in the Mantralaya.
16. It came on record through the above affidavits
that when the matter was heard by respondent No.3,
Shri S.Y.Kursange, Deputy Secretary was present and
received instruction from respondent No.3 for
preparing draft of the order. He, in turn, directed
Shri A.A.Godbole, Desk Officer to prepare draft order.
Accordingly, Mr.Godbole prepared draft order dictating
it to one Shri Suryakant Gole, Clerk allowing revision
filed by the petitioner. It has further come on
record that Shri S.Y.Kursange, Deputy Secretary again
instructed Shri Godbole to prepare a revised draft
rejecting revision application. This business of
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preparing one draft allowing revision application and
another rejecting revision application revealed that
none of these orders were dictated by respondent No.3,
the Hon’ble Minister himself, who had heard revision
application filed by the petitioner. Both draft
orders were prepared by Shri A.A.Godbole, Desk
Officer, who was not present at the time of hearing.
He was completely unaware of the rival contentions
canvassed by the parties. The respondent No.3, the
Hon’ble Minister has filed an affidavit dated 2nd
September, 2008, the relevant part of which reads as
under:
"..... After hearing the parties in the Revision Petition, I did not dictate order neither it is possible for me to dictate each and every order considering the voluminous work of my ministry. The practice followed by my department after hearing the Revision Application, I asked my departmental officers to go through the merits of the case and submit a note accordingly for approval......"
(Emphasis supplied)
The Hon’ble Minister has further stated in para-4 of
the affidavit that:
".....Accordingly, my department had prepare the first draft for my approval which is at
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‘Exhibit-h’ to this Writ Petition. However, the said draft was not brought before me for my approval. The Deputy Secretary and his subordinate officers discussed the matter with me with reference to the Application of the Respondent No.4 dated the 5th September, 2006. During the course, of discussion, I directed them to check up whether the proposed shop was an unauthorised structure or otherwise. Hence, it was found necessary to verify the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation’s tax receipt of the proposed shop."
"I state and submit that the Respondent No.4 has submitted the Assessment Certificate of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation of the extended area of 200 sq.fts. In view of this subsequent evidence, my department changed the first draft and the second draft was submitted for my approval. Since the second draft was prepared with all the relevant records and it was well supported by merits and I approved the same....."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. This Court, having seen the mode and manner of
decision making process and the procedure adopted for
deciding the appeals and revision applications, this
Court was compelled to pass the order dated 4th
September 2008 directing the State Government to place
on record the procedure, normally, followed and
adopted by all the departments of the State Government
of Maharashtra while hearing and deciding appeals
and/or revisions.
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18. After the aforesaid order dated 4th September,
2008, Shri V.A.Gangal, Special Counsel appeared for
the State and informed this Court that a committee has
been constituted by the State Government consisting of
the Chief Secretary, Law and Judiciary with the
officers of General Administration Department with
Shri V.A.Gangal, Advocate and Special Counsel for the
State of Maharashtra, to streamline the procedure of
hearing and deciding appeals and/or revisions by the
officers of the State of Maharashtra including the
Ministers of the respective departments.
19. Having noted the anxiety of the State
Government to streamline the procedure through the
committee constituted by the Government, this Court
felt that Mr.Anand Grover, who was appointed as Amicus
Curie to assist this Court, should also be included in
the said committee. Accordingly, Mr.Grover was
included in the committee. The committee was granted
time to submit their report. The said committee
submitted its report. It was accepted by this Court
by a separate order wherein guidelines are framed and
the procedure is laid down prescribing the mode and
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manner of hearing the revisions and/or appeals by the
State Government and functionaries of the State so as
to streamline the decision making process. Since a
separate judgment is being passed in that behalf, I do
not propose to dwell on this issue any further. Now,
let me deal with the petition in hand based on rival
submissions.
Preliminary Objections :Preliminary Objections :Preliminary Objections : ------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Now, turning to the facts of the case at hand.
When the hearing of this petition commenced on merits,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 raised a
preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the
Single Judge to entertain and hear this petition
contending that the petition against the impugned
order of the respondent No.3 would lie before the
Division Bench since neither the Maharashtra
Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 1975
nor the Maharashtra Foodgrains Rationing (Second)
Order, 1966 which has been passed under section 3 of
the Essential Commodities Act, 1965 is listed in any
of the 43 clauses under Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the
Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1966, as such,
this petition does not lie before the Single Judge.
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It should, therefore be placed before the Division
Bench for hearing.
21. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, countered the above submission relying
upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
in Principal, Micky School v. State of MaharashtraPrincipal, Micky School v. State of MaharashtraPrincipal, Micky School v. State of Maharashtra,
2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 1153, and urged that the preliminary
objection is devoid of any substance. She further
pointed out that the subject judgment is followed by
the Division Bench of this Court in Ajabrao v.Ajabrao v.Ajabrao v.
Principal, Kala Vanijya Mahavidyalaya,Principal, Kala Vanijya Mahavidyalaya,Principal, Kala Vanijya Mahavidyalaya, 2008 (6)
Mh.L.J. 436 and M.S.Co-op.Bank Ltd. v. State ofM.S.Co-op.Bank Ltd. v. State ofM.S.Co-op.Bank Ltd. v. State of
MaharashtraMaharashtraMaharashtra, 2008 (6) Mh.L.J. 463.
22. Mr.Gangal, learned special counsel appearing
for the State of Maharashtra did not agree with the
submission made by learned counsel for respondent
No.4. In his submission the Single Judge alone has a
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present
petition.
Decision on Preliminary Objection :Decision on Preliminary Objection :Decision on Preliminary Objection : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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23. Having heard both views, the preliminary
objection raised by respondent No.4 needs to be
overruled in view of the judgment of the Division
Bench in the case of Principal, Micky SchoolPrincipal, Micky SchoolPrincipal, Micky School (supra),
paras-10 and 11 of which read as under:
"10. Then comes Rule 18 of Chapter XVII which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 1, 4 and 17 of this Chapter i.e. Chapter XVII applications under article 226 or 227 or under articles 226 & 227 may be disposed of by the learned Single Judge of this Court and proceeds to enumerate the categories of orders or enactments which are to be dealt with by the learned Single Judge. It will thus be seen that provisions of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII is a provision made in relation to rules in Chapter XVII and therefore are rules which as contemplated by rules 1 and 2 of Chapter I provide for hearing by a learned Single Bench. As we have noticed above that rules 1 and 2 both of Chapter I provide for exception in cases where it is otherwise provided for by these rules. Language of Rules 17 and 18 in the circumstances is required to be noted. Rule 18 of Chapter XVII says notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 1, 4 and 17 of this Chapter i.e. Chapter XVII the following applications mentioned in the said rule are to be heard by the learned Single Judge. It means rule 18 is a provision which is a case where it is otherwise provided by these rules that the matters can be heard by the learned Single Judge. Clauses 1 to 43 of this rule 18 provide various categories of orders passed by under various enactments which are required to be dealt with by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Sub-clause 3 however is omnibus clause which reads thus:
"The decrees or the orders passed by
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any Sub-ordinate Court (or by any quasi judicial Authority) in any suit or proceedings (including suits and proceedings under any Special or Local Laws), but excluding those arising out of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court."
. According to these provisions therefore any decree or order passed by any subordinate Court or quasi judicial Tribunal in any suit or proceedings including suit or proceedings in any suit or legal law are to be dealt with by a Single Judge. It will thus be clear from the conjoined reading of all the relevant provisions that according to Rule 18 of Chapter XVII all petitions mentioned in that rule in sub- clauses 1, 2 and 4 to 43 are to be dealt with by a Single Judge and this will not present any difficulty in classification. The problem as has been raised in the present case arises on interpretation of Chapter XVII Rule 18 clause 3 quoted above. We have explained how this rule 18 operates.
11. In our opinion, the position in regard to hearing of writ petitions under Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 is clear. All writ petitions under articles 226 and/or 227 or under article 226 or under article 227 are to be heard by learned Single Judge of this Court. Exceptions having been provided by clause 2-B of Chapter I and ratio laid down by Supreme Court in relation to articles 323 A and B. Therefore writ petitions covered by clause 2- B, writ petitions arising out of orders made by Administrative Tribunals established under 1985 Act and orders passed by such Special Tribunals as are created under the Constitution and all other matters are required to be herd by the learned Single Bench. The order impugned in the present petition is passed under the provisions of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 which is a special law enacted for protection of persons mentioned therein. It
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is therefore a special enactment or law and the order made thereunder is squarely covered by the provisions of clause 3 of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII being the order made by an authority under Special Act. The Registry is therefore directed to place the matter before the appropriate bench. Interim order already granted to continue.
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In the above view of the matter, the
preliminary objection raised by respondent No.4.
challenging jurisdiction of the Single Judge stands
overruled.
Rival Submissions on merits :Rival Submissions on merits :Rival Submissions on merits : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
while challenging the impugned order urged that it is
in breach of the principles of natural justice.
Firstly, she submits that the impugned order is bad
because it was passed after lapse of 14 months from
the date of hearing, which ultimately, resulted in two
orders running counter to each other. According to
her, order ought to have been passed within a period
of 8 to 10 weeks as per the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of Anil Rai v. State ofAnil Rai v. State ofAnil Rai v. State of
BiharBiharBihar, 2001 7 SCC 318 : AIR 2001 SC 3173 followed by
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this Court in the case of Devang Rasiklal Vora v.Devang Rasiklal Vora v.Devang Rasiklal Vora v.
Union Bank of IndiaUnion Bank of IndiaUnion Bank of India, 2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 208.
26. She further submits that the impugned order is
also liable to be quashed and set aside since two
orders have come on record, one allowing the revision
and another rejecting the revision. She urged that
this Court should read between the line and try to
find the reasons for two orders running counter to
each other. According to her, at any rate, impugned
order needs to be quashed and set aside as no judicial
mind can approve such mode and manner of the decision
making process adopted by the respondent No.3. She
further submits that the matter was heard by one
person whereas the order was passed by another as such
the impugned order is clearly in breach of principles
of natural justice and liable to be set aside on this
count alone.
27. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that para-5 of the affidavit dated 2nd
September, 2008 filed by the Hon’ble Minister, the
respondent No.3 makes it unequivocally clear that
after the case was closed for final order, fresh
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information was sought by him from the Brihan Mumbai
Municipal Corporation, that too, without notice to the
petitioner. The information received was adverse to
the interest of the petitioner and that information
was used against the petitioner to dismiss the
revision application. She, thus, submits that the
impugned order is clearly in breach of principles of
natural justice as such unsustainable in law.
28. Mr.Warunjikar, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.4, in reply, urged that the impugned
order is without jurisdiction as such it cannot stand
to the scrutiny of law. He submits that the revision
application itself was not maintainable before the
State Government against the order of the respondent
No.2 dated 17th December, 2004 since it was passed
pursuant to the order of this Court dated 25th August,
2004 in Writ Petition No.5891/2004. He, thus, submits
that, if the order passed by respondent No.3 in
revisional jurisdiction is held to be bad for want of
jurisdiction, then the order passed by respondent No.2
dated 17th December, 2004 would alone hold the field.
He, thus, submits that the impugned order passed by
the respondent No.3 be quashed and set aside declaring
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the order passed by respondent No.2 dated 17th
December, 2004 as legal and valid holding the field
and the allotment of ration shop in favour of the
respondent No.4 under this order be treated as valid
since there is no challenge to the said order in this
petition.
29. Mr.Gangal, learned special counsel appearing
for the State and learned counsel for the petitioner,
in rejoinder, jointly urged that the revision was very
much maintainable before the State Government. Both
of them submit that the impugned order for the various
strange reasons surfaced on record be set aside and
the matter be remitted back for reconsideration to the
revisional authority.
Consideration :Consideration :Consideration : ---------------------------------------
30. Having heard learned counsel for the parties,
the submission made by learned counsel for respondent
No.4 that the revision application was not
maintainable before respondent No.3 cannot be accepted
in view of Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Writ Petition No.2305/1998 dated 18th December, 2005
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(Smt.Anita Deoraj Naidu v. The State of Maharashtra &Smt.Anita Deoraj Naidu v. The State of Maharashtra &Smt.Anita Deoraj Naidu v. The State of Maharashtra &
ors.ors.ors.) (unreported); wherein this Court was pleased to
hold that revision filed under clause 24 of the
Maharashtra Schedule Commodities (Regulation of
Distribution) Order 1975 is very much maintainable
before the State Government against the order passed
by the Commissioner. By virtue of this judgment,
judgment of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
Nos.1485/2002 and 1913/2002 holding that revision
under section 24 of the Maharashtra Schedule
Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order 1975
was not maintainable before the State Government was
set aside. The same consideration hold good even to
the revision filed before the respondent No.3 said to
be under clause 30 of the Maharashtra Foodgrains
Rationing (Second) Order 1966, which has been, in
turn, passed under section 3 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1965.
31. The learned counsel for the petitioner is
justified in making grievance that the adverse
material collected by respondent No.3 extracted in
para- 27 (supra) in the form of assessment certificate
of the Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation was used
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against the petitioner without disclosing it to the
petitioner. Needless to mention that in view of the
Apex Court judgment in the case of Union of India v.Union of India v.Union of India v.
Mohammed Ramzan Khan,Mohammed Ramzan Khan,Mohammed Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471, in any quasi
judicial proceeding non-supply of adverse material to
the affected person but supply thereof to the
authority taking decision against him on that basis
constitutes violation of rules of natural justice. In
other words, the material supplied or shown to the
decision making authority without disclosing it to the
person against whom it is to be used clearly
constitutes breach of principles of natural justice
which is very much applicable to the quasi-judicial
proceedings. On this count alone the impugned order
is liable to be quashed and set aside holding it to be
bad and illegal being in breach of principles of
natural justice.
32. The sole contention raised by respondent No.4
on merits that the order of respondent No.2 dated 17th
December, 2004 would hold field in the event the order
of the revisional authority, namely, that of
respondent No.3 is set aside holding it to be without
jurisdiction is also misplaced. On the touchstone of
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the doctrine of merger, which is very much applicable
to the revision petitions in view of the Apex Court
judgment in the case of Kunhayammed v. State ofKunhayammed v. State ofKunhayammed v. State of
KeralaKeralaKerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587 the submission has no merit.
In the said judgment, the Apex Court has ruled as
under:
"43. ..... ..... .....
. To sub up our conclusions are:-
. (i) Where an appeal or revision is proved against an order passed by a Court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the sub-ordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law."
33. In my considered view, the revision petition
filed before the State was very much maintainable.
The same was rightly entertained. On its decision on
merits, the order of the lower authority, namely, that
of respondent No.2 merged in the revisional order.
Since the revisional authority has set aside the order
of the respondent No.2, it merged into the order of
the revisional authority. Thus, the submission made
in this behalf by Mr.Warunjikar that the order of the
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respondent No.2 would hold the field in the event
revisional order is set aside also needs to be
rejected being without any substance.
34. Having said so, let me now turn to the
question relating to the grant of relief which the
petitioner is claiming in the petition.
35. The factual matrix surfaced on record show
that the applications for allotment of ration shop
were invited in the month of November, 2002. Almost
more than six years have been consumed by this
litigation. The agreement relating to the shop
premises of the petitioner, which was shown to be
available for running ration shop, was for a duration
of seven years commencing from 5th December, 2001.
The said period has expired on 4th December, 2008. As
on date, agreement is not in existence. It has
expired. There is no material on record to show
renewal thereof. In the circumstances, there is no
material on record to suggest that the shop premises
of the petitioner is still available for opening and
running ration shop. Assuming to be in possession of
the petitioner, core question would be in what
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capacity she is in possession. Once the agreement has
expired, possession of the subject shop cannot be said
to be legal and valid. One cannot presume renewal of
the agreement in absence of positive evidence. No
material in this behalf is available on record. Thus,
it cannot be concluded that the shop premises is still
legally available with the petitioner for running the
ration shop, if allotted.
36. So far as respondent No.4 is concerned, no
document or evidence is on record to indicate as to in
what capacity the said Society came in possession of
the subject shop premises. The material on record
only suggests an agreement dated 4th May, 2002. One
does not know the nature and/or life of the said
agreement. One does not know whether it is agreement
of lease or rent or licence or agreement to purchase
the property with possession. No documentary evidence
in this behalf is available on record. One does not
know whether or not the said agreement is still alive
and holding the field. One cannot imagine that the
subject shop premises would remain unused or under
lock and key for such a period of more than six and
half years as such claim of the respondent No.4 by
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passage of time has lost its significance.
37. On the aforesaid backdrop, this Court has to
consider the effect of long gap of 6 1/2 years
consumed by the present litigation. This Court has to
consider as to whether any useful purpose would be
served by remanding the matter back to the authorities
below for consideration afresh.
38. Having noticed the factual matrix, having
indicated the nature of material available on record
including absence of positive material to decide rival
claims on merits, I am of the considered view that no
useful purpose would be served by remanding the matter
back for consideration afresh to the authorities
below.
39. The State Government has laid down the
guidelines prescribing eligibility criteria for
allotting ration shops. As a part of Government’s
policy of the distribution of its largesse Government
have prescribed the eligibility criteria. The persons
answering the eligibility criteria according to the
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priority fixed can only be considered for allotting
ration shop. Persons dehors the guidelines have no
independent right to have business or avocation in the
form of running ration shop. The distribution of
largesse of the State is for the common good and to
subserve the common good of as many persons as
possible. Economic and social justice as envisaged in
the Preamble of the Constitution, is sought to be
achieved and there is a reasonable nexus between the
object and the prescription of the eligibility
criteria as prescribed in the guidelines.
40. During the intervening period of 6 1/2 years,
the other citizens of the subject ration area must
have acquired or built shop premises. They would also
be entitled to have right to apply and get their claim
considered in accordance with law.
41. In the above premises, for the reasons stated,
I decline to remand the matter back for consideration
afresh by the authorities under the Act. On the
contrary, I direct respondent No.1 to issue fresh
advertisement inviting fresh applications for
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h Court
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consideration afresh on their own merits in accordance
with law.
42. In the result, impugned order dated 24th
November, 2006 passed by the respondent No.3 is
quashed and set aside. As a consequence thereof, the
order dated 17th December, 2004 passed by respondent
No.2 would not survive. Respondent No.1 to comply
with the direction given herein immediately after the
expiry of Code of Conduct which is prevailing as on
date. It is made clear that the petitioner and
respondent No.4 shall also be entitled to compete with
others but only after making proper applications in
response to the fresh advertisement inviting
applications. None of the orders passed in the
present proceedings either in favour or against the
parties to the petition shall come in their way.
43. Rule is made absolute in terms of this order
with costs quantified in the sum of Rs.30,000/- to be
paid by the State Government to the petitioner which
the respondent No.3 shall reimburse to the State from
his own funds being responsible for giving birth to
the shocking fact emerged on record. The Secretary,
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h Court
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Food and Civil Supply and Consumer Protection,
Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai to report compliance
of this order within four weeks from today.
(V.C.DAGA, J.)(V.C.DAGA, J.)(V.C.DAGA, J.)
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