Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 22028

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(SCL-42500; PPFB-P3300)

ONA

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$150 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF PERU

FOR AN

EL NINO EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROJECT

JUNE 20, 2001

Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure DepartmentCountry Management Unit - LCC6CLatin America and the Caribbean Region

This documnent has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective )

Currency Unit = Nuevo SolI Nuevo Sol = US$ .286

US 1= 3.5 Nuevos Soles

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance StrategyCEREN Comite Ejecutivo de Reconstrucci6n "El Niio" (Executive Committee for El Nifio

Reconstruction)ENFEN Estudio Nacional del Fen6meno "El Niiio" (National Study of the "El Nifio"

Phenomenon)GDP Gross Domestic ProductDGC Direccion General de Caminos (General Roads Directorate)DHN Direcci6n de Hidrografia y Navegaci6n (General Directorate of Oceanography and

NavigationIDB Inter-American Development BankIGP Instituto Goefisico del Perui (Geophysical Institute of Peru)INADE Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Institute)IMARPE Instituto del Mar del Peru (Peru Institute of the Sea)NOAA U.S. National Oceonographic and Atrnospheric AgencyMEF Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas (Ministry of Economy and Finance)MTC Ministerio de Transporte, Comunicaciones, Vivienda y Construccion (NMinistry of

Transport, Communications,Housing and Construction)PAEFEN Programa de Apoyo a la Emergencia Fenomeno "El Niio " (Support Program for the

"El Nifio" Emergency)PPF Project Preparation FacilitySENAMHI Servicio Nacional de Meteorologia e Hidrologia (National Hydrology and Meteorology

Institute)UCP Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (Project Coordination Unit)

Vice President: David De FerrantiCountry Manager/Director: Isabel M. Guerrero

Sector Manager/Director: Danny LeipzigerTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Arnaud Marie Guinard

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERUEl Nino Emergency Assistance Project

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 1

2. Principal Performance Ratings I

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry I

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 8

6. Sustainability 9

7. Bank and Borrower Performance 9

8. Lessons Learned 11

9. Partner Comments 12

10. Additional Information 12

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 13

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 14

Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 16

Annex 4. Bank Inputs 17Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 18

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performnance 19

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 20

Annex 8. Borrower's Evaluation Report 21

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID: P054667 Project Name: El Nino Emergency AssistanceProject

Team Leader: Arnaud Marie Guinard TL Unit: LCSFUICR Type. Core ICR Report Date: June 20, 2001

1. Project Data

Name: El Nino Emergency Assistance Project LIC/TF Number: SCL42500;PPFB-P3300

CountryIDepartment: PERU Region: Latin America andCaribbean Region

Sector/subsector. TU - Urban Transport

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD. 09/30/1997 Effective: 03/17/1998 12/23/1997Appraisal: 10/22/1997 MTR. 12/02/1999 12/15/1999Approval: 11/20/1997 Closing: 12/31/2000 12/31/2000

Borrower/lImplementing Agency. GOVERNMENT OF PERU/SECTORAL MINISTERS; GOVERNMENT OFPERU/REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: David De Ferranti Shahib Javed BurkiCountry Manager: Isabel M. Guerrero Isabel M. GuerreroSector Manager: Danny Leipziger Krishna Challa (Acting)Team Leader at ICR: Arnaud Marie Guinard Eugene McCarthyICR Primary Author: Amaud Marie Guinard;

Francisco Wulff

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactoiy, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: U

Sustainabilhy: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance. S

QAG (if available) ICRQualitv at Entrv: U

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The original objectives of the project were to:

* help reduce the loss of human life and a deterioration of living standards that might result from thefloods and/or droughts caused by the 1997/98 El Nifio event;

* help reduce the loss of, or damage to, econormic and social infrastructure that might result; and* help increase Peru's capacity to forecast and respond to future El Nifio phenomena.

The objectives were clearly stated. They were important for the country at the time. The previous El Niiioevent in 1982-83 had caused 100 inches of rain over six months in the coastal desert regions of NorthernPeru and severe drought conditions in the Andean highlands. There had been about US$2 billion in directand indirect losses to fisheries, agriculture, transportation, housing and other sectors. About 6 millionpeople had suffered from the effects of the earlier El Nifio event. The objectives of reducing these types oflosses and improving Peru's capacity to deal with future such disasters were clearly important.

Although the disaster mitigation and reconstruction objectives of this project were not specifically part ofthe Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Peru at that time, they were consistent with the CAS'semphasis of sustained growth and poverty alleviation. The southern Altiplano drought prone region andthe northern flood prone region contain many of the country's poorest communities. The northern region isalso an important center for national agricultural production.

The damage inflicted by the 1997-98 El Niiio phenomenon indicated that the objectives had been generallywell targeted. Growth in GDP in Peru fell from 6.9% in 1996 to 0.3% in 1997, due largely to the effects ofEl Nifno. More than 100,000 houses in five departments were damaged. There were large losses ininfrastructure, primarily related to irrigation and transport. There was also extensive damage to educationfacilities and other social infrastructure.

3.2 Revised Objective:

The objectives of the project were not changed during implementation.

3.3 Original Components:

* The prevention and emergency support consisted of the following sub-components:

Flood protection measures in northem coastal Peru, including river dredging, strengthening ofriver defenses, cleaning/construction of storm drainage canals in urban and rural areas, bridgestrengthening, construction of temporary housing, and protection of archeological sites.

Drought mitigation measures in southern Peru's Altiplano, including water managementmeasures such as rehabilitation of wells, pumps, and small irrigation systems, production offorage to mitigate the effects of a drought on livestock and a seed production program toensure the availability of seeds for the next planting season.

In the emergency phase the Bank would provide limited support, largely for the provision ofcertain emergency equipment needed urgently during the flood disaster.

* The reconstruction phase. Given that the full impact of El Nifio would only be ascertained in thefirst months of 1998, it was not possible to define this phase completely at appraisal. It wasexpected to consist of three sub-components:

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Rehabilitation and reconstruction of public infrastructure such as: (a) hospitals, health posts,and schools; (b) roads and bridges; (c) irrigation and drainage systems; (d) water supply andelectricity; and (e) river training.

Resettlement of families in flood prone areas. Permanent relocation of 6,000 families fromareas which are flood prone or where necessary for emergency preparedness.

Labor intensive rural public works. A safety net program for vulnerable groups in the Andeanhighlands that would also strengthen sustainable agriculture in these drought prone areas.

* Institutional Support.

Expertise, training and equipment to assist agencies responsible for predicting, monitoring andmitigating future El Ninlo events.

Preparation of a government strategy for disaster forecasting and management.

Technical assistance to the Office of Investments of the Ministry of Economy and Finance forproject implementation.

The Bank loan (No. 4250-PE) of US$150 million and a separate parallel loan from the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (No. 1058/OC-PE) for US$150 million, were signed in December 1997. The Bankloan became effective in the same month. The government was to make a counterpart contribution ofUS$130 million (of which US$65 million was counterpart funding for the Bank loan), bringing the total forthe Bank supported program to US$215 million and for the entire El Nino program in Peru to US$430million.

The components were structured to meet the objectives. The government had declared a state of emergencyon June 19, 1997 and had begun to plan emergency prevention measures at that time. The preventioncomponent was designed to undertake rehabilitation and maintenance works before the El Niiio eventoccurred in order to minimize damage to people and property, such as cleaning riverbeds, gullies anddrains. Drought mitigation measures would assist small farming in the drought prone highland areas. Itwas recognized that it would be difficult to predict exactly where prevention works would be needed, but inmany cases the investments would be needed anyway to make up for deferred maintenance, even ifadditional storm or drought damage did not occur.

The emergency component was small and limited to providing emergency equipment such as mobile bridgestructures and power plants which was an appropriate provision given the uncertainty of the impact of thedisaster. Immediate rehabilitation activities to restore basic productive capacity were to be financed byIDB.

Components of the reconstruction phase could only be listed generically, reflecting the types of damageexperienced during previous El Ninio events. During implementation it would be necessary to reallocatefunds in accordance with the damage that actually occurred. Most of the loan proceeds, about two-thirds,were allocated for the reconstruction phase.

At appraisal it was recognized that it was necessary to develop adequate institutional capacity to forecastand manage future natural disasters, and technical assistance was provided for this purpose. The overall ElNifio program (PAEFEN) was placed under a high level Committee for Reconstruction (CEREN) made up

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by eight ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister. A Special Commission of the Ministry of Economyand Finance was appointed to provide technical support on economic and financing matters, and a programcoordinating unit (UCP) was established to assist CEREN in coordinating the activities of the implementingagencies and administering loan accounts. A consultant was to be recruited to support UCP. Sub-projectexecution was to be done by specialized technical and administrative agencies of the government, some ofwhich required institutional strengthening.

3.4 Revised Components:

Most of the emergency activities were financed by the Government of Peru and other donors. Thiscomponent was deleted from the Bank loan, and the USS5 million allocated to it were reallocated toconsultant services under the reconstruction phase in an amendment to the loan agreement of December 29,1999.

Drought conditions in the southern Altiplano region were less severe than expected. Funds originallyallocated for reconstruction works in that region were reallocated to the reconstruction of roads and bridgesand irrigation systems in the northem region. It was agreed that IDB would mainly finance major primaryroads and the Bank would finance secondary and tertiary roads. However, at that time there was norecognition that the roads to be financed by the Bank would be more difficult and time consuming toimplement during the short remaining project period, especially given institutional constraints within theDGC. The proposed resettlement of 6,000 families was deleted from the project because a resettlementplan could not be agreed upon with government.

The prevention works were completed between July and November 1997, before the loan agreement wassigned on December 17, 1997. Prevention works undertaken after June 19,1997 were made eligible forretroactive financing to be disbursed after the loan became effective.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

In the face of an imminent disaster of national proportions, the project was prepared and processed quickly(three months from first mission to signing). The project documentation contained an appropriate balanceof detail and flexibility, given the uncertainty of the impacts of the phenomenon. However, the institutionalarrangements did not provide sufficient clarity regarding overall leadership for the program, since the PrimeMinister was appointed a chairman of the CEREN while the UCP was placed under the Minister ofEconomy and Finance. From the outset this led to disagreements and lack of coordination in the definitionand execution of activities. Gradually these issues were resolved as overall responsibility for the projectwas more clearly placed with the MEF.

The project was processed expeditiously and included very beneficial prevention activities and long-terminstitutional development provisions. However, the structure and size of the loan were risky. With a projectimplementation period of only three years, uncertainty about the length and impacts of the phenomenon andtwo-thirds of the disbursements to be made during the reconstruction phase, full disbursement of theUS$150 million loan was very amnbitious. The average disbursement profile in Peru of 5 to 6 years forinfrastructure projects should have raised concem about the feasibility of completing a project of this sizeand content within the allotted time period (and taking into account that works can only be implementedfor eight months per year) . On balance, therefore, quality at entry is rated unsatisfactory.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

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There is lack of historical data to use as points of comparison in evaluating outcome, and it is not feasibleto evaluate a scenario without the project. Therefore it is not possible to provide a quantitativeassessment of achievement of the objectives. However, qualitative information from technical audits, sitevisits, and reports from other agencies suggest that significant progress was made in meeting thedevelopment objectives of the project:

Loss of human life and deterioration of living standards were less than expected and damage to economicand social infrastructure was reduced. In the drought prone southern highlands the effects of El Nifno wereless than expected. The main impacts were in the northem flood prone areas where a large program wasrequired to protect transport and irrigation infrastructure as well as urban centers.

Reconstruction works were needed especially in the northern flood prone areas and project funds werereallocated for this purpose. Most of this effort involved the reconstruction of roads and bridges andrestoring irrigation systems. However, it was not possible to restore all the assets that were targeted withinthe project period, and a large amount of the project amount had to be cancelled (see section 5.4).Nevertheless, all of the studies in preparation for large investments (roads and bridges) were successfullycompleted and remain available for future investment programs.

The project contributed significantly to increasing Peru's capacity to forecast and respond to future El Nifnoevents. The institutional capacity for climate forecasting was increased by improving coordinationbetween four key government agencies and establishing state-of-the-art systems for real time data collectionand atmospheric and oceanographic modeling. Thirty-two experts from four agencies were trained inclimate and temperature forecasting and contacts have been established with intemational weatherforecasting agencies (see section 4.5).

The original project design was both ambitious and risky. While the project contributed significantly toincreasing Peru's capacity to forecast and respond to future El Nino events, it only achieved partialrestoration of assets originally targeted within the project period, and about 55% of the loan amount had tobe cancelled. On balance, therefore, the project outcome is rated unsatisfactory.

4.2 Outputs bv components:

Prevention and Emergency Component

(a) Prevention. The prevention works were completed between July and November 1997, before the loanagreement was signed on December 17, 1997. Prevention works undertaken after June 19, 1997 wereeligible for retroactive financing to be disbursed after the loan became effective. There were 116prevention sub-projects for a total of US$41.2 million for which the Bank contributed US$28.3 million.This component included flood protection measures in the northern and coastal areas (river dredging,strengthening of river defenses, cleaning and construction of storm drainage canals, and bridgestrengthening). Prevention works originally planned for the southem highlands were not carried out. Theprevention works were completed on schedule, and an extemal audit firm certified that they weresatisfactorily completed with competitively priced contracts. Works carried out during the prevention phasebenefited about 550,000 people. An enviromnental audit confirmed that these works had been consistentwith sound environmental practices.

(b) Emergency. Emergency measures were undertaken during the phenomenon, but the government decidedto use mainly its own funds and financing from the IDB for this effort. The US$5 million originally

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allocated for this purpose at appraisal was reallocated for consultant service in a loan amendment agreedupon at the end of 1999.

Reconstruction component.

By the end of August 1998 the first assessment of reconstruction requirements was completed, amountingto about USS I billion, of which 65% was in the transport sector and 12.5% was in agriculture. The Bankrequested the agencies in the concerned sectors to prepare lists of sub-projects for financing, including moredetailed cost estimates and criteria for sub-project selection. These proposals were received for Bankfinancing consisting of about USS 110 million for secondary and tertiary road and bridge reconstruction bythe DGC and US$51 million of irrigation works by INADE. The Bank agreed to these proposals near theend of 1998. However, the Bank recognized that it would be difficult to complete this program within theremaining two years of implementation and recommended that additional consultants be employed toprepare these investments and ensure the technical and economic feasibility, especially for the road andbridge reconstruction sub-component.

(a) Roads and Bridges. The design work by private consultants progressed slowly and many of the roadsections were over designed. The consequent need to revise designs led to a protracted discussion betweenthe UCP and the DGC and delays. By August 1999 a supervision mission noted that it would be difficult tofully complete this component by the closing date. This was further confirmed during a short review inDecember 1999. By April 2000 one bid had come in at 40% over estimate and the Bank noted a moreserious problem. Due to fiscal constraints, counterpart funding for the year 2000 for the El Nifno projecthad to be drastically reduced. The government requested an extension of the closing date, but the Bankindicated this would not be possible because it was an "emergency" project and recommended a partialcancellation of US$81 million. Because of this, the project was rated unsatisfactory for developmentobjectives and implementation progress and highly unsatisfactory for counterpart funds. A cancellation ofUS$81 million was finally agreed upon in September 2000, retroactive to July 2000. Nevertheless, at theend of the project the Bank had financed 13 key bridges out of 37 for which designs had been prepared.Also by the end of the project, technical studies were completed for 9 packages of key secondary andtertiary roads. Bank missions played an important role in insuring the use of appropriate and affordablestandards in the preparation of these designs. Given the technical, institutional and counterpart financingconstraints, this proved to be a more realistic outcome than the targets envisioned at the preparation stage.

(b) Irrigation. Preparation of this component also was delayed, although it progressed more rapidly thanthe road and bridge component. About US$ 35 million in Bank fmancing was allocated for irrigationsub-projects under INADE. The first phase of the works (40%) was contracted in early 1999, but theamount of funding was substantially reduced in 2000 because of counterpart funding limitations. Byproject completion the Bank had nevertheless financed USS19.2 million of these works consisting mainly ofaccess roads and hydrologic infrastructure for irrigation systems in nine major irrigation zones. The worksare important elements of the irrigation system and are of good quality.

(c) Rural Public Works. Because the impact of the phenomenon on drought in the highlands was lesssevere than originally expected, the Government financed these works through ongoing programs andallocated the bulk of the Bank financing to the transport and irrigation sectors.

(d) Resettlement. After the El Nifno event, the government estimated that some 30,000 families would notbe able to return to their homes and would have to be resettled, and the Bank was asked to finance part ofthe resettlement cost. By late 1998 the government had not reached a consensus on resettlement policy andrequested that funds originally intended for this purpose be used for reconstruction works. The Bank

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agreed to this proposal. Only limited resettlement was carried out by the Government with its own funds.

Institutional Development.

(a) Assistance to the Project Coordination Unit. A management consulting firm was recruited early in theproject period to assist with project implementation. As a result, an Operations Manual was prepared, aninventory of damage was undertaken, a satellite office was established in the northem part of the countrywhere most of the reconstruction work took place, and technical, economic and environmental studies werecarried out for all sub-projects financed under the loan. A substantial database of projects has beenestablished that can be used for future reference for defining technical standards and evaluating unit costsfor similar infrastructure projects.

(b) Preparation for Future Disaster Forecasting and Management

By the end of the project substantial progress had been made in developing Peru's capacity to forecast andrespond to future El Nifio events through the establishment of state-of-the-art systems for real time datacollection and modeling of the ocean and the atmosphere (see Section 4.5).

Environmental Im=act

Ex-post environmental assessments were carried out at the end of 1998 for the emergency preventivemeasures implemented from July to December 1997 and showed that environmental impacts had beenminimal. Proposed reconstruction projects were screened for potential impacts and where necessaryEnvironmental Management Plans were submitted prior to beginning any works. UCP followed up onthese with inspections during implementation. In a few cases corrections were made. Irrigation workswere undertaken in close coordination with beneficiaries, and there were no conflicts or complaints frominhabitants or farmers.

Output indicators are given in Annex 1.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

Economic assessment was required for major reconstruction components such as major highways andbridges and major components of irrigation systems. Investments not yielding 12% were given furtherscrutiny and their design was subject to modification. This became especially critical for roads, becauseby mid 1999 preparation studies were showing high unit costs for road rehabilitation and low trafficcounts. At that time it was agreed that standards would have to be reevaluated.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

Financial rates of return were not calculated, given the nature and size of investments financed under theproject.

4.5 Institutional development impact:

As a result of provision of equipment and technical assistance under the project, a network of four scientificagencies (ENFEN), which had previously operated independently, was brought together to develop anintegrated weather and oceanographic forecasting system. These agencies were the Peruvian Institute of theSea (IMARPE), under the Ministry of Fisheries, which is responsible for scientific and technological

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research for sustainable use of oceanic resources; the Geophysical Institute of Peru (IGP), under theMinistry of Education, which is responsible for research and training in geophysics; the Directorate ofOceanography and Navigation (DNH), under the Peruvian Navy, which is responsible for oceanic researchand regulation; and the National Meteorological and Hydrological Service (SENAHMI), under theMinistry of Defense, which is responsible for meteorological and hydrological forecasting and monitoring.These agencies were able to overcome a history of independent action by reaching a consensus on theirrespective roles and responsibilities in forecasting and assessing El Nifio phenomena and operating in acoordinated manner.

At project completion ENFEN had developed an integrated forecasting system which consists of thefollowing key elements: (i) weather observation and data collection; (ii) communications; (iii) datamanagement; (iv) modeling; and (v) human resource development. These sophisticated systems aretechnologically comparable with and coordinated with other international systems such as NOAA in theUnited States and systems in Brazil and the Pacific Rim. Establishing these systems represents a majorachievement, but their maintenance and further development are a substantial challenge. Linking thesesystems with response capacity also remains a challenge for the future.

Technical assistance provided under the project was successful in developing the capacity of UCP tomanage and coordinate the implementation of a complex project and to establish a data base (e.g., worksrequirements, impact assessments, data bases, contractor availablity) which would be available forundertaking future prevention works and providing disaster response.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

It was not possible to predict precisely where and how severely the effects of El Nifo would be felt. In theabsence of the type of prediction capacity that is now being established, there was no alternative to theassumption that the El Niuo phenomenon would be similar to previous experience.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

Starting at the end of 1999, the government was unable to provide adequate counterpart funding for theproject which resulted in delayed implementation and ultimately a much reduced scope of works under theproject than previously planned. This was a contributing factor in the decision to cancel US$81 millionfrom the loan amount on July 17, 2000, late in the project period.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

After the El Nino phenomenon the MTC decided that the road rehabilitation should be used as anopportunity to upgrade the technical characteristics of the roads. In most cases the new designs led tohigher costs that could not be justified economically given project traffic levels. This led to discussions anddelays in the finalization of plans and bidding documents. By the time the studies were revised, it was toolate to initiate bidding because the loan closing date was only six months away.

5.4 Costs and financing:

The original total project cost was established at US$215 million, of which the Bank was to financeUS$150 million. A PPF of USS500,000 had been established at appraisal but was not used. Most of thecomponents and their costs were not defined until after the end of the El Niiio event.

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Because of delays in the reconstruction phase, of the original Bank fmnancing of USS150 million, US$81rnillion were cancelled from the loan amount on July 2000 leaving only USS69. After this cancellation,loan funds remained to finance about US$29 million for prevention works, US$27 million were forreconstruction, mainly irrigation, US$6 million were for institutional strengthening and US$4 million werefor project management. The final total cost of the project was about US$91 million. A furthercancellation of US$2.0 million was made at the time of closing of the loan accounts. Detailed project costsand financing are presented in Annex 2.

Under the parallel IDB financed project there was a USS 150 million loan and a US$65 million counterpartcontribution. As of September 30, 2000, about USS 113 million had been disbursed from the IDB loan andabout USS47 million in counterpart funding. As with the Bank loan, most of the shortfall in investmentwas in the reconstruction phase.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

Many works during the prevention phase such as dredging rivers and protecting bridges were important formitigating the impact of the El Nifio phenomenon, but by their nature they were temporary. Bridge andirrigation works were designed and implemented with the express purpose of improving their durabilityunder El Nifio type stress. Their maintenance will be the responsibility of the permanent public agencieswith moderate capacity for this purpose, INADE (irrigation) and DGC (bridges).

The sustainability of the institutional development achievements for future disaster forecasting will dependon continuing cooperation amnong the agencies under ENFEN, whether budgetary resources continue to beavailable to these agencies, and their ability to develop and retain qualified professionals. The agenciesparticipating in ENFEN, although coming from different ministries and perspectives, have achieved aunprecedented level of cooperation during the project which they are committed to sustain. During theproject each agency was required by the government to make a commitrnent to financing these activities forat least ten years, which they did. These are positive commitments which bode well for sustainability.Nevertheless, future budget allocations will remain susceptible to the economic environment. In spite ofthis reservation, sustainability of this project achievement is considered likely.

UCP is expected to remain in existence until the end of 2001 and is likely to be extended beyond this datewith financing from IDB. While the existence of UCP beyond this period is uncertain, the core expertise ofcompetent professionals created under the project could be mobilized in the future under the Ministry ofFinance for disaster prevention and response.

Overall, sustainability is rated likely.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

Transition to regular operations should be a smooth process. The main implementing agencies, DGC andINADE, are already taking responsibility for operation and maintenance. The four agencies participatingin ENFEN are also taking responsibility for maintaining data collection and forecasting systems.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank

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7.1 Lending:

The Bank responded quickly to this request for emergency assistance. It fielded two preparation missions inquick succession in September and October 1997, before the phenomenon occurred, recognizing theimportance of prevention. Negotiations and Board approval took place in November 1997, and the LoanAgreement was signed in mid November. The inclusion of the institutional development component was animportant element towards developing a long-term perspective. However, the size and structure of the loanposed serious risks (see section 3.5). This should have been highlighted, stipulating that a detailed reviewof the content of the investment program would take place after the full impact of the phenomenon wasknown and indicating that a reassessment of the scale, mix and implementation period of the reconstructionprogram could be required.

In spite of the expeditious project preparation under emergency circumstances, the project was large andrisky. In addition to short-term prevention and rehabilitation works, about two-thirds of the projectconsisted of long-term investments which were unlikely to be implemented within a three year time frame,especially given the time needed to assess and define sub-projects after the phenomenon had occurred. Onbalance, therefore, lending is rated unsatisfactory.

7.2 Stupervision:

There were ten supervision missions from early 1998 to completion, an average of three per year. Mostmissions had at least one engineer, a water resources specialist and a roads specialist. They were, however,usually short in duration because most mission members were also involved in supervising other El Nifioprojects. Once the size of the investment requirements was known (around the end of 1998) and it wasrecognized that design of some road components would have to be modified, missions correctly identifiedthat it would be difficult to complete the project on schedule. A comprehensive mid-term review asoriginally planned for December 1998 would have been appropriate at that time, but it did not occur.However, the borrower was determined to finish the project within its original scope and was reluctant tocontemplate a partial cancellation. Even if a major review had taken place, it is doubtful that asignification reduction in the project scope could have been achieved, given the government's views that theclosing date should be extended. A decision to reduce the scope of the project was not made until late inthe project period when the Bank reiterated its position that it would not extend the loan beyond the closingdate.

Without a determined and successful supervision effort from the Bank (and close monitoring from UCP),the institutional development component for disaster forecasting would not have been achieved. Banksupervision teams brought the agencies participating in ENFEN together and put them in contact andarranged training with specialized international agencies and agencies in neighboring countries. Banksupervision missions also played an important role in assuring appropriate and cost effective designs forroads (see section 4.2).

Although the Bank was not able to convince the borrower to proceed within early cancellation, it played acritical role in institutional development and successfully supervised a large program of rehabilitation andprevention works. On balance,therefore, Bank performance during supervision is rated satisfactory.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

The project was large and necessarily undefined at appraisal which posed serious risks for implementation.There were insufficient safeguards for reassessing the project and its scope after the impact of the disaster

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was known. However, the Bank did respond quickly and flexibly to the emergency. During supervision itcorrectly identified the need to reassess and reduce the project, particularly the roads component. Thegovernment only agreed to this very late in the project period. The Bank successfully supervised well theworks and designs which were undertaken and was particularly successful in supervising the institutionaldevelopment component. Overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

Borrower performance during preparation was satisfactory. Government anticipated the disaster as far inadvance as possible, and it programmed and carried out preventive measures with its own funds. It alsomobilized a large external support effort rapidly, with high level political commitment. It included theinstitutional development component and gave it high-level support.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

In spite of a number of important achievements, government performance during implementation wasmarginally unsatisfactory. There were problems with the clarity of institutional responsibilities at thebeginning of implementation and the availability of counterpart funds that contributed to delays inimplementation. The borrower was responsible for delays in anticipating and reacting to changes in theproject environment and in recognizing the need to reduce the size of the project and the loan.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

There were initial difficulties in setting up the UCP and establishing coordinating arrangements withimplementing agencies. With the help of consultants, UCP became an effective coordinating agency whichhas managed to develop a detailed data bank of sub-projects and establish project assessment andimplementation procedures which, if properly maintained, would be useful to respond before and duringfuture disasters.

The implementing agencies managed to complete successful prevention and emergency phases (the latterfinanced mainly by IDB). During the reconstruction phase and despite a deteriorating economicenvironment, INADE succeeded in implementing many key elements of its investment program within ashort time frame. However, the perfornance of DGC was inadequate; many roads were overdesigned andhad inadequate economic justification. DGC was able to complete only part of the bridge reconstructionprogram, but it undertook all the feasibility studies, including revisions of standards, for roadreconstruction, which are available for future investment programs.

The four institutions participating in ENFEN (IMARPE, IGP, DHN and SENAMHI) overcarne their initialdifferences and managed to plan and complete their respective programs very satisfactorily.

With the exception of DGC, the performance of implementing agencies is satisfactory.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Borrower performance is rated marginally satisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned

* To design projects in anticipation of future disasters such as El Nino, the availability of the following

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types of updated information is crucial:

(i) A database on population in areas affected, tasks and types of professionals needed, typicalworks, unit costs, etc.

(ii) Historic information about occurrences and impacts of similar events.(iii) Detailed design standards, unit costs and implementation requirements for different types of

works, including procurement arrangements, personnel and training requirements.(iv) Capacity of consulting and contracting industry.

* Prevention measures can have a substantial impact on the reduction of social and economic losses.Countries with a history of El Ninio type phenomena should undertake contingency planning andpreventive measures. Many of these types of investments should be incorporated in nomnal sectorinvestment programs during non-emergency periods.

* Reconstruction requires careful assessment and a long-term effort that generally extends beyond thenormal three-year implementation period of Bank-assisted emergency operations. Therefore, priority inthis type of project should be given to prevention, immediate measures to reactivate economic activityand careful assessment of longer-term reconstruction priorities and designs. Special attention shouldbe paid to flexibility of project design and scope, realism of development objectives and methodologyfor the measurement of impact. If major reconstruction investments are included in an emergencyproject, as in the case of this project, there should be an explicit provision at the design stage for areview of project design and scope after the actual damages are assessed. However, it may be morepractical to establish a separate loan for this purpose or to reallocate resources from existing loans.

* When a natural disaster is of national proportions as was the case in Peru, the Bank response shouldnot be limited to the provision of emergency assistance but should also include an update of the CAS inlight of potential changes in the country's overall investment priorities.

More specific lessons include:

* The institutional arrangements now in place for predicting El Nifio phenomena constitute a substantialimprovement and should be maintained.

* A clear agreement on responsibilities for project implementation at inception is more important than thelocation of lead responsibility.

* When parallel financing is used, a clear separation of sub-sector and/or geographic financingresponsibilities could lead to more efficient implementation.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:Please see Annex 8

(b) Cofinanciers:Not available

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):Not Applicable

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10. Additional Information

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators:

| IndicatorlMatrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate

Because of the emergency nature of the project, it was not possible to stipulate outcome/impact indicatorsfrom the outset.Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest EstimatePaved road rehabilitation 10325 kmConstructon of sewers 27Constructon of rural access roads 10kmConstruction of earth drainage dtches 10kmConstruction of lined drainage ditches 27 kmConstruction of flood defense works in rivers 86.79 kmand gulliesConstrucion of pontoon bridtes 2Construction of bridges 15Cleaning of canals and drains 293 kmRehabiitation of wells 3Rehabiliatalionrreplacement of sewers 586Rehabilitatation of sluice gates 7Rehabilitabon of rural access roads 212.55 kmRehabilitation of canals 133.33 kmRehabilitation of lined ditches 0.9 kmRehabilitabon of drains 25825 kmRehabilitation of pumping stabons 4Rehabilitation of bridges 28Agriculture area protected 143.3 ha

End of projectBecause of the emergency nature of the project, it was not possible to stipulate outcome/impact indicatorsfrom the outset. Key outputs achieved by the implementing agencies are listed above.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in USS million equivalent)Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage ofEstimate Estimate Appraisal

Project Cost By Component US$ million US$ millionPrevention & Emergency 41.40 19.3

Regional Works 18.87Agriculture 7.10Roads and Bridges 3.50Irrigation 10.87Emergency Roads 0.84

Reconstruction 158.47 73.7Roads and Bridges 9.67Irrigation 26.33Special Transport Rehabilitation Program (PERT) 1.02

Institutional Strengthening 8.04 7.75 3.7Project Management and Consulting 7.09 5.13 3.3

Total Baseline Cost 215.00 91.08

Total Project Costs 215.00 91.08Total Financing Required 215.00 91.08

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)_ ~~~~~Procurement Method

Expenditure Category ICBCB B Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 20.00 95.00 71.00 0.00 186.00(14.00) (65.00) (50.00) (0.00) (129.00)

2. Goods 0.00 0.00 16.50 0.00 16.50(0.00) (0.00) (13.50) (0.00) (13.50)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 7.50 0.00 7.50(0.00) (0.00) (7.50) (0.00) (7.50)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 20.00 95.00 95.00 0.00 210.00(14.00) (65.00) (71.00) (0.00) (150.00)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (ActuallLatest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

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Procurement MethodExpenditure Category ICB NCB Other' N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 70.30 0.00 0.00 70.30(0.00) (53.44) (0.00) (0.00) (53.44)

2. Goods 5.45 0.41 0.13 0.00 5.99(0.17) (0.22) (0.10) (0.00) (0.49)

3. Services 4.17 10.62 0.00 0.00 14.79(3.54) (9.02) (0.00) (0.00) (12.56)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 9.62 81.33 0.13 0.00 91.08(3.71) (62.68) (0.10) (0.00) (66.49)

h Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.

2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contractedstaff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to(i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local govemment units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)l ~~~~~~~~Percentage of Appraisal

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Pretg of ApriaBank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.

Prevention 28.98 12.42 28.89 12.29 99.7 99.0Emergenev 0.09 0.04 0.62 0.22 688.9 550.0Reconstruction 110.43 48.04 27.29 9.73 24.7 20.3lnstutional Strengn. 5.63 2.41 5.98 1.77 106.2 73.4Project Mgnt & Consult. 4.96 2.13 4.33 0.80 87.3 37.6

Figures include rounding error by implementing agency.

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Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits

Economnic assessment was required for major reconstruction components such as major highways andbridges and major components of irrigation systems. Investmnents not yielding 12% were given furtherscrutiny and their design was subject to modification. This became especially critical for roads, becauseby mid 1999 preparation studies were showing high unit costs for road rehabilitation and low trafficcounts. At that time it was agreed that standards would have to be reevaluated.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Perform ce Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count T Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation9/97 1 Eng

Appraisal/Negotiation10/97 2 Eng, Fin

Supervision5/98 3 Eng, Fin, Irrig. Eng. S S8/98 1 Eng. S S12/98 3 Eng, Fin, Irrig. Eng. S S3/99 1 Eng. S S8/99 2 Eng, Irrig. Eng. S S11/99 2 Eng, Irrig Eng. S S12/99 4 Eng., Irrig. Eng, Rd.Eng, Instit. S U

Spec4/00 3 Eng, Irrig Eng., Rd. Eng. U U7/00 5 Eng, Tport Spec, Urb Spec, U U

Irrig. Eng, Rd. Eng.

ICR3/01 3 Urb. Spec (2), Econ. U U

(b) Staff

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks USS ('000)

Identification/Preparation 7.60 43.30Appraisal/Negotiation 24.68 148.30Supervision 47.12 228.95ICR 5.95 22.53Total 85.35 443.08

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

ZMacro policies O H O SU O M O N * NA

FSector Policies O H OSUOM O N O NAZ Physical O H OSUOM O N C NAF Financial O H C SU O M * N O NAF Institutional Development 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N C NA

*Zl Environmental O H OSUOM * N O NA

SocialO Povertv Reduction 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N * NAL Gender O H OSUOM ON * NA

Other (Please specify) O H O SU O M ON * NACl Private sector development 0 H O SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAN Public sector managementH 0 O SU * M 0 N 0' NALi Other (Pleasespecify) O H OSUOM O N O NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

! Lending OHS OS *U OHUZ Supervision OHS OS O U O HU2 Overall OHS Os O u O HU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating

(Z Preparation OHS OS O U O HU2 Government implementation performance 0 HS O S * U 0 HU2 Implementation agency performance OHS OS 0 U OHUZ Overall O HS*s O u O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

Memorandum and Recommendation of the President, Report No: P-7194-PE, November 11, 1997.Loan Agreement, Loan Number: 4250-PE, December 17, 1997.Project Files.Project Supervision Reports, January 1998 to March 2001.Informes de Ejecuci6n del Programa, UCP, 1998-2001.Financial and Technical Audit Reports, UCP, 1998-2001.Borrador del Informe de Cierre, UCP, Marzo 2001.Cuadros Resumen y Agenda de Trabajo, UCP, Marzo, 2001.Programa de Reconstrucci6n y Rehabilitaci6n de Carreteras y Puentes, DGC, Marzo 2001.Rehabilitaci6n y Reconstrucci6n de Obras Dafiadas por El Fenomeno El Nifio, INADE, Marzo 2001.Informe Final de la Asistencia Tecnica a la UCP, C. Lotti & Associati, Marzo 2001.

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Additional Annex 8.B orrower's Evaluation Report

INFORME DE CIERRE DEL CONVENIO DE PRESTAMO NO 4250-PE

1.ANTECEDENTES

1.1 Problematica del Fenomeno El Nino y Dainos Producidos

A. Fen6meno El Niiio

El Peru esta expuesto desde hace 4,500 aiios a la ocurrencia peri6dica del Fen6menohidrometeorol6gico de "El Nifio", tambien denominado "ENOS" (El Niio Oscilaci6n Sur), el ultimoevento ocurri6 en diciembre de 1997 a abril de 1998 y el anterior en el periodo 1982-83, en amboscasos se produjeron fuertes dafios.

El Nifio se inicia con el calentamiento del mar (Oceano Pacifico), que suministra energia de calor a laatm6sfera y produce la actividad convectiva y turbulencia del aire, ocasionando cambiosclimatol6gicos, que generan lluvias torrenciales que se precipitan en el centro de la Costa occidentalsudamericana, incrementando las descargas de los rios a niveles torrenciales, generando sus desbordese inundaciones sobre las areas pobladas y su infraestructura de servicios (vial, saneamiento, hidraulica,etc.) e infraestructura de producci6n (areas agricolas, industrias, centros mineros, etc.).

B. Dafios Producidos por el Fen6meno El Niiio 1997-98

La producci6n nacional fue fuertemente afectada cayendo el Producto Bruto Interno (PBI) de 6.9% en1997 a 0.3% en 1998. La poblaci6n afectada fue de 548,569 personas, 50.2% varones y 49.9%mujeres. Del total 52.2% manifest6 problemas de salud por enfermedades diarreicas, de la piel yconjuntivitis. Fueron afectadas 107,527 viviendas de las cuales el 30 % fueron destruidas.

El documento "Evaluaci6n de las Viviendas, Poblaci6n e Infraestructura Basica del Estado Afectada porel Fen6meno de El Nino", Julio 1998, INEI, reporta danios en la infraestructura basica por US$1,262millones, el sector mas afectado fue Transportes con USS443 rmillones (carreteras US$297 rnillones,puentes US$68 millones, etc.), seguido de Agricultura USS245.4 rnillones (obras de riego US$71.6millones y areas agricolas dafiadas US$173.8 mnillones).

En Educaci6n los danos fueron por US$209 millones (2870 locales escolares). En proyectoshidriulicos principales US$96 mnillones. En infraestructura de agua y alcantarillado US$65.6 rnillones.En Salud los danios son por USS60.5 millones (560 centros de salud). En otros sectores (Energia yMinas, Justicia, Pesqueria, etc.) los dafios llegan a USS142.5 rnillones.

1.2 Programa de Apoyo a la Emergencia Fen6meno El Niiio (PAEFEN)

Para mitigar los efectos del iltimo Nifio (1997-98), el Gobiemo del Peru desarroll6 el Programa deApoyo a la Emergencia Fen6meno El Nifo (PAEFEN), cuyo objetivo es minimizar las perdidas devidas humanas y los dafios materiales en la infraestructura de servicios y de producci6n.

El Gobiemo en 1997 declar6 en emergencia en 15 departamentos, de los 23 que confornan la divisi6npolitica del Peri. Para el financiarniento del PAEFEN suscribi6 en diciembre de 1997 dos Convenios

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de Prestamo, uno con el BIRF (N° 4250-PE) y otro con el BID (NO 1058/OC-PE), por USS150millones cada uno, complementados con el aporte local de USS'130 millones, siendo el total delfmanciarniento programado US$430 millones.

Para la operaci6n del PAEFEN, se crearon tres organismos: el Comite Ejecutivo de Reconstrucci6n deEl Niho (CEREN), conformado por ocho Ministros de Estado, la Comisi6n Especial integrada porfuncionarios de alto nivel del Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas, ambos, en reuniones mensualesaprobaron, en sus respectivas instancias los proyectos y sus inversiones. El tercer organismo es laUnidad Coordinadora del Programa (UCP).

La UCP de acuerdo a la Secci6n 1.02. "h" del Convenio de Prestamo, tiene a su cargo laadministraci6n e implementacion del PAEFEN a traves de un Equipo de Coordinaci6n, establecido enla Oficina de Inversiones del MEF, asistida por la empresa consultora C. Lotti & Associati en losaspectos tecnicos y ambientales. Los proyectos del PAEFEN se Ilevan a cabo a traves de organismosSub-Ejecutores, que son entes especializados permanentes de los sectores del gobierno, que ejecutanlos programas regulares de estudios y obras.

El PAEFEN se inici6 en enero de 1998 y debe operar hasta el 2001, cuando culmine el financiamientodel BID y tiene cuatro Componentes, tres comprenden la estrategia de actuaci6n frente al evento(Prevenci6n, Emergencia y Reconstrucci6n) y uno es el Fortalecimiento Institucional, con fines demejorar la capacidad de pron6sticos de El Nifio.

La ejecuci6n de todos los Componentes ha comprendido el desarrollo de 1629 proyectos, de los cuales348 corresponden al fmanciamiento del BIRF y 1281 al BID.

2. CONVENIO DE PRESTAMO NO 4250-PE

2.1 Alcances y Desarrollo

El Decreto Supremo N° 167-97-EF autoriza el endeudamiento extemo con el BIRF, el 17/12/97 sesuscribe el Convenio de Prestamo N° 4250-PE por USS 150 millones, cuya fecha de cierre es el31/12/2000 y ha sido extendida hasta el 31/03/2001. para ejecutar algunos gastos pendientes deconsultorias y obras.

Al cierre del prestamo se ha ejecutado US$69 millones, esto debido a que el periodo requerido fuemayor al previsto, para la ejecuci6n de las obras de reconstrucci6n principalmente las carreteras, entreotros. Dada la imposibilidad de extender dicho periodo, el Gobiemo solicit6 al BIRF cancelarparcialmente el monto del prestamo de US$81 millones y fue atendida por el BIRF con fecha de 17 dejulio del 2000.

Los alcances del Convenio de Prestamo son los de brindar apoyo al Gobiemo Peruano, ante laemergencia planteada por la ocurrencia del Fen6meno, en:

* Reducir la perdida de vidas humanas y el deterioro de los estindares de vida.* Prevenir los dafios a la infraestructura social y econ6mica;* Rehabilitar la infraestructura social daiiada por El Nifio; y* Reforzar la capacidad de las instituciones gubemamentales encargadas de pronosticar fenomenos

climatol6gicos.

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2.2 Ejecuci6n Segun Categorias de Desembolsos

Las Categorias de Desembolsos del Convenio (SCHEDULE 1) fueron modificadas en dosoportunidades, la primera solicitud del Gobiemo corresponde al Oficio N° 662-99-EF/75.22,(13/08/1999), atendida por el BIRF en la Carta del 29 de diciembre de 1999, y la segunda al Oficio N°474 -2000 -EF/75.22 (17/07/2000) para la cancelaci6n parcial del Convenio de Prestamo porUSS81.0 millones, atendida por el BIRF con la Carta del 13 de setiembre del 2000.

2.3 Enmiendas y Modificaciones a la Fecha de Cierre de Algunos Proyectos

* El 25 de Agosto del 2000 el Gobiemo solicit6 al BIRF (Oficio N° 997-2000-EF/68.01-FNI&O),una enmienda al Convenio para financiar parcialmente las obras de 37 puentes ubicados fuera delarea de emergencia, establecida en el Convenio. Estos puentes correspondian al fmanciamiento delBIRF del Convenio de Prestamo N° 3717-PE cuya fecha de cierre fue el 30 de junio del 2000 acargo del Prograrna de Reconstrucci6n de Infraestructura Vial (PRT) del Ministerio deTransportes.

- El BIRF en la Carta del 6 de octubre del 2000, concord6 con el Gobiemo en establecer en laSeccion 1.02 (a) del Convenio de Prestamo extender como "areas elegibles" al departamento deAmazonas (provincias de Bagua, Condorcanqui y Bongara) y el departamento de San Martin(provincias de Tocache y Mariscal Caceres), y de esta forma atender el fmanciarniento parcialsolicitado de las obras de puentes.

* El Gobiemo (Oficio N° 1408-2000-EF/68.0FNINO del 29/11/2000), solicit6 al BIRF la NoObjeci6n para ampliar la fecha de cierre del Convenio hasta el 31 de enero del 2001, para laoperacion de la empresa C. Lotti (asesora de la UCP) y la adquisici6n de dos radares porUS$110,429.52 del Componente Reforzarniento Institucional. El BIRF con Carta del 04 dediciembre del 2000 declar6 procedente esta solicitud.

* El Gobiemo (Oficio N° 027-2001-EF/75.22 del 10/01/2001), solicit6 aJ BIRF la No Objeci6n paraautorizar gastos realizados hasta el 31 de marzo del 2001 de los rubros: Direcci6n General deCarninos por US$901,134.2 (cancelaci6n de las obras y supervision de 13 puentes) y del INADEpor US$388,725.4 para cancelaci6n de estudios y obras hidriulicas. El BIRF con Carta del 30 deenero del 2001, como una excepci6n, consider6 procedente la solicitud.

2.4 Ejecucion Fisica y Financiera al Cierre del Convenio de Prestamo

La ejecuci6n por Componentes se describe a continuaci6n.

A. Componente Apoyo a la Prevenci6n y Ia Emergencia.

Fase de Prevenci6n

Comprendio los 116 proyectos ejecutados antes de la ocurrencia del Fen6meno, de julio adiciembre de 1997, y corresponden a descolmataci6n y limpieza de cauces de rios, quebradas,drenes y canales de riego, habilitaci6n de obras de defensa riberefias, etc. La ejecuci6n financierafue de US$40.3 rnillones (US$12.1 millones del gobierno y US$28.2 rnillones del BIRF),desembolsados en enero de 1998, como reconocimiento de gastos. El inventario de los proyectosfue realizado por las empresas HASKONING-LAGESA.

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Los organismos Sub-ejecutores de los 116 proyectos han sido: Consejos Transitorios deAdministraci6n Regional (CTARs) 53 proyectos por US$13.21 millones, Ministerio de Agricultura21 proyectos por US$5.0 millones, Direcci6n General de Caminos del Ministerio de Transportes 17proyectos por US$2.45 millones y el Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo (INADE) 25 proyectos porUS$7.61 millones.

Fase de Emergencia

Se ejecutaron dos proyectos a cargo de la DGC-MTC por US$0.62 millones de endeudamientoextemo. Uno corresponde a la rehabilitaci6n de las carretera Puente Paurcatambo - Oxapampa(45.7 Km.), cuya ejecuci6n se culmin6 en febrero de 1999, restaurando la transitabilidad deimportantes ciudades. La segunda corresponde a la carretera Urcos-Puerto Maldonado (58 Km.),que fue suspendida al 18% de su ejecuci6n, debido a la ocurrencia de fuertes lluvias (enero de1999).

B. Componente de Reconstrucci6n

Este Componente cubre 166 proyectos de reconstrucci6n de infraestructura, ejecutados en el periodo dejulio de 1998 a marzo del 2001. La inversi6n con recursos del BIRF fue de US$27.3 rnillones. La UCPtraspas6 los recursos a los Sub-Ejecutores, quienes realizaron las adquisiciones (bienes, consultorias yobras); los expedientes tecnicos a traves del Concurso Intemacional de Meritos (Listas Cortas) y lasobras a traves de Licitaci6n Publica Internacional. Las obras concluidas han sido entregadas a losorganismos puiblicos encargados de su operaci6n y mantenimiento.

Los 166 proyectos corresponden a: 88 proyectos de estudios y obras hidriulicas a cargo del InstitutoNacional de Desarrollo (INADE), 41 proyectos (estudios y obras viales) ejecutados por el Ministerio deTransportes (DGC) y 37 obras de puentes con financiamiento parcial, ejecutados por el Ministerio deTransportes (PERT-PRT) .

Los 88 proyectos del INADE corresponden a: 32 expedientes tecnicos, 45 obras (39 obras hidraulicas,2 puentes y 4 obras viales); y 11 contratos de consultoria para la elaboraci6n de estudios de impactoambiental y evaluaci6n econ6mica.

Los 41 proyectos viales son: (i) 10 consultorias (expedientes tecnicos) de tramos de carreteras desegundo orden (8 tramos de longitud variable de 38 a 84 km., un estudio de variante de 3.0 Km. yestudio de actualizaci6n de evaluaci6n econ6mica) y (ii) 31 consultorias de expedientes tecnicos depuentes, de los cuales se han construido 13 puentes de longitud variable de 16 a 50 m. A traves delProyecto Especial de Reconstrucci6n de Transportes PERT-PRT se realiz6 el financiamiento parcial de37 puentes, considerados en el Convenio de Prestamo N° 3717-PE cuya fecha de cierre fue el 30 dejunio del 2000.

C. Componente de Fortalecimiento Institucional

En esta fase se ejecutaron 64 proyectos a cargo del Servicio Nacional de Meteorologia e Hidrologia(SENAMH), Instituto del Mar del Peru (IMARPE), Instituto Geofisico del Periu (IGP) y la Direcci6nde Hidrograffa y Navegaci6n de la Marina de Guerra del Peru (DHN), por un monto de US$8.3millones, de los cuales US$5.4 millones corresponden al BIRF y comprenden la adquisici6n yoperaci6n de equipos cientificos modemos, capacitaci6n especializada y asistencia tecnica de expertos

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intemacionales en operaci6n de modelos.

3. ANALISIS DEL IMPACTO DEL PROGRAMA EN RELACION CON LOS OBJETIVOSPLANTEADOS

3.1 Impacto socioecon6mico

Las obras del Programa han tenido la aceptaci6n de la poblaci6n beneficiada y han proporcionado losbeneficios esperados, principalmente en regularizar y garantizar el abastecimiento de agua para losdiferentes usos y regularizar el transito vehicular. No hay reclamos sobre la calidad de las obras niproblemas por daiios en su ejecuci6n.

El nri:mero de beneficiarios en la Fase de Prevenci6n fue de 178,025 habitantes. En la fase deReconstrucci6n se beneficiaron 548,408 habitantes y se contribuy6 con la recuperacion de 52,402hectareas de terrenos de cultivo.

Las obras de construcci6n de los puentes han perrnitido regularizar el transito, beneficiando aimportantes poblaciones. Cabe resaltar que el 75.66% de la cobertura del programa corresponde adistritos considerados como pobres.

3.2 Impacto Ambiental

Los aspectos ambientales han seguido los procedimientos del BIRF y la normatividad nacionalvigente, fueron considerados los aspectos ambientales en los estudios y durante la construcci6n de lasobras.

Para las obras de Prevenci6n, de acuerdo a lo concordado con el BIRF, se realiz6 la Evaluaci6nAmbiental Ex Post y no se encontraron alteraciones ambientales importantes, situaci6n que fueconfiumada por el estudio "Analisis de Impacto Ambiental producidos por la Desviacion artificial delos rios La Leche y Motupe al Desierto de M6rrope".

Las obras de la Fase de Reconstrucci6n no han ocasionado alteraciones ambientales. Las obrashidriulicas se han ejecutado en coordinaci6n con los usuarios del agua, sobre todo con los agricultoresde las areas sembradas, en lo referente a la interrupci6n del abastecimiento de agua para permitir laconstruccion de las obras y el uso parcial de sus predios durante el proceso constructivo.

En la ejecucion de las obras no se han presentado ningun tipo de conflictos con la poblaci6n y con losagricultores y no han ocurrido demandas al Programa por algun dano o perjuicio.

3.3 Aspectos Institucionales

La implicancia ambiental, econ6mica y social que tiene el Fen6meno El Nino sobre el desarrollo delpais, propicio la participaci6n de las instituciones comprometidas en la toma de decisiones, para laplanificacion y disefio de proyectos de inversi6n dentro del contexto del Convenio de Prestamo N°4250-PE, las mismas que dieron una respuesta positiva durante toda la ejecuci6n del programa.

Como aspectos importantes se menciona el mejoramiento de la capacidad de las instituciones paraadministrar y ejecutar recursos provenientes de endeudamiento extemo, lograda mediante la asesoria yasistencia tecnica que brindo la UCP-PAEFEN asi como la uniformizaci6n de las especificaciones

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tecnicas para todos los tipos de obras que ejecut6 INADE.

En el caso de la DGC-MTC se implement6 una oficina tecnica administrativa con el apoyo de laAsesoria Tecnica de la UCP-PAEFEN que ejecut6 eficientemente los proyectos.

4. SOSTENIBILIDAD DEL PROGRAMA

Las obras y equipos del Programa, mantienen su sostenibilidad para su vida fitil, porque estan bajo laadministraci6n de organismos puiblicos perrnanentes. En el caso de equipos debe considerarse sureposici6n, por perder su vigencia debido al avance tecnol6gico.

Las obras de la Fase de Prevenci6n no estan expuestas a su sostenibilidad porque en muchos casosfueron fungibles, operaron durante la ocurrencia del fen6meno y su situaci6n antes y despues del Nifioes similar. Por su naturaleza correspondieron a limpieza y adecuaci6n de los cauces de los rios yquebradas para facilitar el drenaje natural del agua al mar, tambien se habilitaron obras de defensaribereflas para protecci6n de riberas.

Las obras de reconstrucci6n (hidraulicas y viales) pertenecen a entes que ejecutan labores permanentesde mantenimiento, como el INADE y el Ministerio de Transportes.

En el Componente Reforzamiento Institucional, los equipos adquiridos necesitan en el futuro recursospara su mantenimiento y reposici6n. Se debe mantener la integraci6n y coordinacion alcanzada duranteel Programa, por los entes del ENFEN, y la sostenibilidad de sus tareas a realizar, a cargo de losprofesionales capacitados por el Programa, quienes pueden renunciar cuando concluya suscompromisos, entre otras causas por bajos salarios. Se ha coordinado con las entidades integrantes delENFEN para que elaboren e implementen un programa de mantenimiento y sostenibilidad.

5. Evaluaci6n del Objetivo del Programa y su Implementaci6n

5.1 Metas Planteadas/Metas Logradas

En algunos casos las metas ejecutadas fueron diferentes a las establecidas originalmente en el Conveniode Prestamo, debido principalmente a la magnitud y tipos de dafios presentados, las variaciones son:

* Los rubros de reasentamientos involuntarios y de infraestructura social no han sido atendidos conel financiamiento del BIRF;

* El subprograma de mitigaci6n de efectos de la sequia en el altiplano no se ejecut6 porque no sepresentaron las sequias;

* Ha sido necesario incrementar el rubro de Asesorias, debido a la necesidad de estudios como: (i)Estudio de la influencia de la derivacion del rio La Leche en la forrnaci6n de la laguna de la Nifia;(ii) Estudio hidrol6gico de los rios de la vertiente del Pacifico; (iii) Asistencia Tecnica a la ODI y ala DGC del MTC (iv) ejecuci6n de expedientes tecnicos de las obras hidraulicas y viales.

El Programa ejecutado para El Nifio 1997-98, ha permitido reducir los daiios significativamentecomparados con los producidos por el fen6meno 1982-83, a pesar que las descargas de los rios fueranmayores en el primer caso en el orden del 30% para los rios de la costa norte.

5.2 Evaluaci6n Ex-Post de los Objetivos, Enfoque Metodol6gico y Componentes del Programa

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A. Objetivos y Metas.

Los objetivos han sido mantenidos antes y despues del Programa. Los proyectos ejecutadoscorresponden a los sectores considerados previamente, en los Comnponentes Fases de Prevenci6n yReconstrucci6n.

La selecci6n y contrataci6n de las consultorias y obras civiles, han seguido los procedirnientos delBIRF y en forma supletoria las normas peruanas; s6lo se ha presentado un caso de incumplirnientode una empresa contratista.

Las principales limitaciones consideradas del Programa son

* El plazo corto para la ejecuci6n del prestamo, considerando el periodo necesario para lareconstrucci6n de obras viales (Grafico 1) y las tareas del Programa (inventario de dafios;priorizaci6n de proyectos; aplicaci6n de criterios de elegibilidad tecnicos, econ6micos yambientales, preparaci6n de TORs para consultorias; proceso de selecci6n y contrataci6n deconsultores; proceso de licitaci6n y contrataci6n de obras y finalmente el periodo para la ejecuci6nde las obras).

* Limitaciones de los profesionales de algunos Sub-Ejecutores, para aplicar los procedimientos deadquisiciones de los organismos financieros, elaborar temninos de referencia de consultorias ylicitaciones y procesos de calificacion y contrataci6n.

* Reducido nurnero de tecnicos de la UCP-PAEFEN. En 1998, el 95% del tiempo de losespecialistas ocupo el seguimiento de los 764 proyectos de Fase de Emergencia.

- En algunos casos la licitacion de obras por Paquetes o Lotes, llevo a esperar hasta la culminacionde expedientes tecnicos que tenian diferentes periodos de preparaci6n.

B. Enfoque Metodol6gico

Estrategias

Los resultados favorables obtenidos, indican que la estrategia aplicada fue adecuada para afrontarEl Nifno, la cual comprende las Fases de Prevenci6n; Emergencia y Reconstrucci6n. Adicionalmentese ha ejecutado el Componente de Fortalecimiento Institucional para afrontar eventos futuros enmejores condiciones de prediccion.

Manejo del Programa por parte del Prestatario

Al inicio se presentaron algunas descoordinaciones institucionales entre la UCP y la secretariatecnica del CEREN, ocasionando el retraso de la ejecucion de algunas tareas.

El Gobierno ejecut6 el Programa a trav6s de organismos centrales. Algunas tareas como eldiagnostico de los dafios y la priorizaci6n de los proyectos, se pudieron realizar en tiempo menorcon la participaci6n de organismos descentralizados (Municipios).

C. Sub-Ejecutores Sectoriales

S6Mo una obra a cargo del INADE se anul6 por incumplimiento de la empresa contratista.

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En el caso de la DGC-MTC fue necesario su reforzamiento institucional a traves de la asesoriatecnica de la furna C. Lotti & Associatti.

En el caso del ENFEN se superaron las divergencias iniciales entre IMARPE, IGP, DHN YSENAMHI, cumpliendose las metas establecidas en el Programa.

5.3 Principales Factores que Afectaron la Implementacion y los Resultados Alcanzados por laUnidad Ejecutora

Efectividad de la Gerencia de la UCP-PAEFEN:La UCP y la Asistencia Tecnica (C. Lotti) han operado subdimensionada en cantidad deprofesionales, considerando la magnitud de las tareas del Programa y la falta de preparaci6n de losprofesionales de los Sub-Ejecutores.

La empresa de asistencia tecnica a la UCP-PAEFEN inicio sus operaciones seis meses despues dela suscripcion del prestamo. Inicialmente no hubo adecuada coordinaci6n entre la empresa asesora(C. Lotti) y la UCP en la ejecuci6n de las funciones, este impase fue superado despues de tresmeses de iniciada las labores de la consultora.

Monitoreo y Evaluaci6n:La operaci6n del BIRF de Datos en tiempo real, tuvo problemas iniciales en los reportes delavance fisico y financiero de ejecuci6n de los estudios y obras.

Condicionantes cimaticas:El periodo anual disponible para la ejecuci6n de las obras se reduce a ocho meses a causa delperiodo de lluvias, que se presentan en el Peru.

Inestabilidad del Personal de los Sub-ejecutores:Se han presentado carnbios frecuentes del personal clave de los organismos Sub-ejecutores, que hadilatado la continuidad de las labores, produciendo el reinicio de algunos procedimientos yacuerdos.

Restricciones en el Gasto Publico:Las restricciones en el gasto piublico a partir del tercer trimestre de 1999 limitaron la ejecuci6n delas obras y por lo tanto las metas, especialmente carreteras y puentes.

Costos del Programa

Las ofertas de las licitaciones de las obras han sido menores a los costos establecidos en losexpedientes tecnicos, habiendo un ahorro significativo de inversiones. En el caso de obrashidriulicas han sido en promedio 12 % menores, solo un caso fue el 30% mayor al presupuestoreferencial, para una obra ubicada a 4,000 m.s.n.m. En el caso de obras de puentes la reducci6n delos costos es del orden del 20%.

5.4 Resultados (Indicadores Fisicos y Sociales

No se han presentado diferencias notables entre el tamanio de los indicadores programados y ejecutadosy reflejan adecuadamente la magnitud de las obras.

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6. LECCIONES APRENDIDAS

6.1 Preparaci6n del Programa

En la preparaci6n del Programa (afio 1997) no se ha dispuesto de informaci6n adecuada, a pesar de lapresencia de un Fen6meno similar en el periodo 1982-83. Los alcances establecidos en los Convenios dePrestarno han sido en algunos casos de caracter general.

El PAEFEN tiene la Base de Datos con informaci6n detallada, que permitira, ante un evento futuro,establecer una programaci6n adecuada con inforrnaci6n de: tipo de organizaci6n, estimacion de lasinversiones y periodo de ejecuci6n de las obras, procedimientos de adquisiciones, terninos de referenciapara consultorias y licitaciones de obras, criterios de calificaci6n, selecci6n y contrataci6n de empresas,criterios de elegibilidad de las inversiones (tecnicos, econ6micos y ambientales), seguinmiento yevaluaci6n de ejecuci6n de los Componentes y sostenibilidad y liquidacion tecnica y financiera de lasobras.

Se recomienda dos tipos de labores ante un evento futuro. La primera es de caracter permanente contareas de: zonificaci6n territorial de las areas criticas, normas legales que definan el uso del suelo en laszonas criticas, participaci6n de la poblaci6n afectada, preparaci6n de los profesionales en las tareasdescritas anteriormente, disenio del tipo de organizaci6n para la ejecucion del Programa y su manualoperativo, disefio del inventario y criterios de evaluaci6n de las obras daniadas. Criterios tecnicos como:alcances del tipo de obra a ser reconstruida (nivel de servicio, magnitud, disenio geometrico, disenloestructural tipo, magnitud de su costo, condiciones de mantenimiento y operaci6n), analisis de los costosunitarios por tipos de obras, criterios de priorizacion de ejecuci6n de las obras, desarrollo de loscriterios de elegibilidad en los aspectos tecnicos, ambientales y econ6micos, etc.

El segundo tipo de labores corresponde a aquellas a ejecutar ante la certeza de la ocurrencia delFenomeno en las fases de Prevenci6n, Emergencia y Reconstrucci6n.

Hay una leccion muy importante: las labores de Prevenci6n, principalmente la limpieza de los cauces derios y quebradas y su acondicionamiento para grandes descargas favorecen altamente la mitigaci6n delos efectos del Fenomeno.

6.2 Aspectos Contractuales

Los plazos del Programa fueron de 3 anos. En la prictica el Programa se inici6 en agosto de 1998 conla evaluaci6n de daiios, preparaci6n de expedientes tecnicos, selecci6n de contratistas y ejecuci6n de lasobras, el plazo fue insuficiente algunos proyectos demandan un periodo de ejecuci6n mayor a 12meses.

Los recursos asignados a la Fase de Emergencia han sido restringidos, comparados con la demanda.

6.3 Aspectos relacionados con la Ejecuci6n del Programa

* Ha sido acertado establecer una Unidad Ejecutora del Programa, caso contrario hubiera significadoestablecer una Unidad Ejecutora en cada Sector.

* Es necesario la preparaci6n de los profesionales de los Sub-Ejecutores en procedimientos paraadministrar y ejecutar recursos del fmanciamiento extemo.

* La Unidad Ejecutora debe estar implementada en personal de acuerdo a la magnitud de las tareas.

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6.4 Aspectos Financieros

Compromisos del gasto puiblico:Es importante el compromiso del Gobiemo para atender el calendario establecido de fmanciamiento delas obras.

Costos de las ObrasLas obras se deben ejecutar por Paquetes o Lotes por: sus costos se reducen significativamente, lacoordinaci6n es eficiente (se dispone una empresa para varias obras). Los criterios de selecci6n debenconsiderar la solidez econ6mica de la empresa que permita atender los gastos, cuando se presentenalgunas demoras en los pagos.

7. PROPUESTA PARA LA EJECUCION DEL PROGRAMA

a) Fase de Ajuste de la Planificacion de las Acciones.

Se recomienda que despues del inventario de los dafios, se lleve a cabo la adecuaci6n de losalcances del Convenio de Prestamo con la magnitud y tipos de obras necesarias.

b) Fase de Evaluaci6n de los Dafios.

Esta labor debe ser realizada por una entidad con experiencia y capacidad para ejecuci6n de tareasmasivas en forna sirnultanea, con capacidad para movilizarse en condiciones adversas, producto deEl Nifio.

c) Fase de la Reconstrucci6n

En los termninos de referencia de expedientes tecnicos, considerar que el consultor tendra laobligaci6n de proponer modificaciones para mejorar las caracteristicas tecnicas de la obra y surentabilidad econ6mica y social, considerando los aspectos ambientales. Las obras reconstruidasdeben garantizar una vida iutil compatible con su tipo, en algunos casos podra significar unamejora sustancial de la estructura dafiada.

Se debe considerar la posibilidad del empleo de la mano de obra de la poblaci6n afectada en lastareas del Programa, para que dispongan de un ingreso econ6mico, por la paralizaci6n de lasactividades productivas por causas del fen6meno.

Se recomienda mantener un sistema de comunicaci6n con las poblaciones afectadas sobre el avancedel programa y sus areas de intervenci6n.

En el caso de obras reconstruidas deberan estandarizarse los criterios y la metodologia deevaluaci6n econ6mica.

Tratandose de obras preexistentes, en general la evaluaci6n ambiental se centra en los impactostemporales durante la construcci6n y el manejo adecuado de las canteras y botaderos.

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Debe ser permanente las acciones para la predicci6n de un Fen6meno, realizando la evaluaci6ncritica del funcionamiento de predicci6n con vistas a actualizarlo, corregirlo y/o complementarlo,incluyendo los adelantos tecnol6gicos.

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