public disclosure authorized thailand transport sector...
TRANSCRIPT
Report No. 4950-TH
ThailandTransport Sector Review
June 28, 1985
Transportation Division 2Projects DepartmentEast Asia and Pacific Regional Office
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
;;t rc~ - - ;.l . J trt; - - ' '; '~~~~~~~~~~~, - ; - 4i
-. ~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .-- .. . - -. ;
---.: : ..
Document of the World Bank
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World Bank authorization.
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
Pub
lic D
iscl
osur
e A
utho
rized
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit - Thailand Baht (B)
B1 = US$ 0.0435B1 million = US$43,478US$1 = B 27
FISCAL YEAR
October 1 - September 30
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft.)1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi)1 square kilometer (sq km) = 0.39 square miles (sq mi)1 liter (1) = 0.28 US gallons (gal)
= 0.22 British gallons (l mp gal)1 metric ton (n ton) = 1.10 US short ton (sh ton)
- 0.98 British long ton (lg ton)= 1 million grams
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
aadt - Annual average daily vehicle trafficARD - Accelerated Rural Development DepartmentB - BahtBMA - Bangkok Metropolitan AdministrationBMTA - Bangkok Mass Transit Authoritycfs - Container freight stationcif - Cost, insurance and freightDOH - Department of Highwaysdwt - Deadweight tonsETO - Express Transportation OrganizationFY - Fiscal YearLPG - Liquified petroleum gasLRVC - Long run variable costMOC - Ministry of CommunicationsMOI - Ministry of InteriorMSL - Mean Sea LevelNESDB - National Economic and Social Development BoardPAT - Port Authority of ThailandPWD - Public Works DepartmentSRT - State Railway of ThailandTEU - Twenty-foot equivalent unitsTPU - Transport Planning UnitV-km - - Vehicle-kmVOC - Vehicle operating costs
FOR OMCiAL USE ONLY
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Table of Contents
Page No.
SUMMARY
i. Introduction .............................................. 1ii. The State of Transportation Development and the Sector's
Current Investment Program .............. 1................. Iiii. Main Issues and Problems Confronting the Sector ........... 4
I. ROADS SUBSECTOR ............................................. 8
A. National and Provincial Roads .......................... 8National and Provincial Roads System . . 8Traffic and Transport Industry .. 8Department of Highways .. 9Fifth Plan Investments .. 10Investment Needs and Priorities ...................... 10Kain Issues .. 11
B. Rural Roads . . ........................................... 12Rural Roads System .... 12Traffic ....................... 13Administration/Institutions .... 13Study of Rural Roads .... 14Planning and Engineering of Rural Roads . . 16Construction .... 16Maintenance of Rural Roads ......................... 16
This report,prepared by Mr. Lars Nordin (Senior Transport Economist), bringstogether and updates sector analyses by recent appraisal missions and studiesand other sector work carried out over the past few years by Messrs. Robert E.Rafloski, and Albert Weckerle (Senior Transport Economists), Philip Morris(Senior Highway Engineer), Wolfgang P. Hoehenwarter (Financial Analyst), ErnstFrankel (Ports Adviser), Richard Podolske (Urban Planner) and FrankHigginbottom (Consultant/Port Engineer).
This document has a reid difrbution ad my be used by recpients on in the perfomance oftheir official duties. Its ontents may not otherwise be dislosed without Wod Bank authorization.
- ii -
Page No.
II. THE STATE RAILWAY OF THAILAND ............................... 17
A. Organization ................ ..*..0- .6 ...........a...................... 17B. Management, Staff and Training .. 17C. Facilities .. 18D. Traffic and Operations .. 20E. Tariffs and Costs . . 21F. Budget and Accounting .................................. . 23C. Uneconomic Lines and Services .. 23H. Compensation for Losses .. 24I. SRT FY82-86 Investment Plan .. 24J. Financial Performance .......... 25
III. PORTS SUBSECTOR ...... 27
A. The Ports System . ....................................... 27B. Organization ............................................ 27C. Existing Facilities .......................................................... 28D. Traffic and Operations . . . 30E. Development Strategy . . . 33F. Finances ................................................ 34
IV. INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL PORTS .............. ........ .. 34
A. Inland Waterways ........................................ 34B. Coastal Ports .. 37C. Harbour Department .. 39D. Issues .........................................Do.................... 40
V. SHIPPING . . .................................................. 41
A. Fleet Composition . ...................................... 41B. Institutional Issues ........................................................ 42C. Future Prospects ........................................ 43D. Findings and Recommendations . . .......................... 43
VI. URBAN TRANSPORT .... 44
A. Overview .. 44B. Existing Transport Conditions in Bangkok . . 45C. Proposed Investments in Transport Infrastructure ........ 46D. Urban Transport Institutions . . 47E. An Urban Transport Strategy for Bangkok . . 48
- iii-
TABLES
1.1 - Department of Highways Roads by Regions in 19841.2 - Roads Maintained by the Department of Highways, 1963-841.3 - Motor Vehicle Registration1.4 - Registered Motor Vehicles by Area of Registration (1978)1.5 - Vehicle-Kilometers on National, Provincial and Rural Roads1.6 - Department of Highways Five-Year Investment Plan, 1982-861.7 - Rural Road Density by Region2.1 - SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic ('000 tons)2.2 - SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic (million ton-km)2.3 - SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic ('000 passengers)2.4 - SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic (million passenger-km)2.5 - SRT Traffic Unit Costs and Revenues - FY822.6 - Government Compensation for SRT Losses2.7 - Summary of SRT FY82-86 Investment Plan2.8 - SRT Income Statement (Commercial and Noncommercial Operations Combined)3.1 - Import and Export Trade (non-POL) through Bangkok Port System - by
Facilities, 1975-843.2 - Comparative Statement of Container and Break Bulk Cargoes through
Klong Toei Wharf during the Years 1978-90 (January-December)3.3 - Container Traffic at Bangkok (Klong Toei)3.4 - PAT Consolidated Income Accounts: 1976-853.5 - PAT Consolidated Balance Sheets: 1976-854.1 - Inland Waterways Fleet during 1980-824.2 - Harbour Department - Budget Appropriations and Actual Budget
Expenditures, 1978-844.3 - Harbour Department - Revenue Collection, FY79-846.1 - Composition and Growth of Motor Vehicle Fleet Registered in Bangkok6.2 - Estimated Person-Trips by Mode in Primary Travel Direction on Arterial
Streets in Central Bangkok6.3 - Bangkok: Urban Transport Investments, 1980-846.4 - Agencies Involved in Urban Transport within Bangkok
CHARTS
1. Organization of Department of Highways2. Accelerated Rural Development Department: ARD Organization Chart3. Organization Chart of State Railway of Thailand4. Port Authority of Thailand: Organization Chart5. Organization of Harbour Department
MAPS
IBRD 15195R - Second Provincial Roads ProjectIBRD 13621R2 - Sixth Railway Project (Proposed)IBRD 14856R1 - Bangkok and S2ttahip Ports ProjectIBRD 14857R - Inland Waterways and Coastal Ports Project
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
SUMMARY
(i) Introduction
1. The Bank's last Transport Sector survey was completed in 1972 (TheTransport Sector of Thailand, September 25, 1972). An informal update wasprepared in 1975. Since 1975 there have been six transport loans.
2. The Bank has been involved in all transport modes in Thailand exceptc;:il aviation and pipelines, and helped finance 19 transportation projects inall. The total amount of loans approved is $601.6 million. The largest reci-pient of loan funds is the Department of Highways with eight loans for a totalof $396.6 million. Next in order is the State Railway of Thailand (five loansfor $68.7 million), the Port Authority of Thailand (four loans for$67.3 million), the Harbour Department (one for $53 million), and the Ministryof the Interior (one for $16 million for Bangkok traffic improvements).
3. The purpose of this report, which incorporates comments receivedfrom the Royal Thai Government, is to document the present situation in thetransport sector towards the end of Thailand's Fifth Development Plan 1982-86and highlight some issues that merit attention in the preparation for theSixth Development Plan 1987-91. As such, this report is a base document whichis expected to be followed by close cooperation between the Government and theBank with the aim of producing strategy papers for the various modes. Thereport will also be useful for forthcoming public investments reviews.
(ii) The State of Transport Development and the Sector's CurrentInvestment Program
4. Since the mid-1960s, the Thai economy, as a result of a strong show-ing of the agricultural sector, grew at a rapid pace and ganerated a highdemand for transport. To accommodate the growing demand, the Governmentundertook large transport investments (in particular for road infrastructure)and created a policy environment in which, with some exceptions, a competitivetransport industry developed. Today, all Changwats (Provinces) are inter-linked with a good interregional and interprovincial communications network,and transport services have penetrated the majority of previously remote ruralareas. In comparison with other similarly situated countries, the transportsystem is, by and large, good. There are, on the whole, no significantphysical or administrative impediments to meeting current transport demand.
- 2 -
5. The country's transport is multimodal, consisting in order of impor-tance of road, rail, inland water, maritime, air and pipeline transporta-tion. rhe agencies, except for pipelines, are under che Ministry of Communi-cations (MOC). Road transport has become predominant, supported by largeinfrastructure investments. Railway and water transport have also developed,but at a more modest rate due to more limited investment budgets. In freighttransport (excluding urban traffic), roads carried in 1981 about 79% of allton-km, followed by rail with 10X, coastal shipping 6% and inland water-ways 4%. In passenger transport (again excluding urban traffic) for the sameyear, the role of road transport was even more pronounced with about 90% ofthe passengers, against some 10% carried by rail. The share of domesticaviation was negligible. During the 1980s, the transport sector is expectedto continue its growth (in terms of ton-km and passenger-km of service) instep or slightly ahead of CDP growth, with road transport at least consoli-dating, if not strengthening, its relative position. Gas pipelines starteddeliveries in 1982. Due to their possible impact on bulk carriers throughfuel substitution in industry, particuLarLy rail, their operations should beclosely monitored.
TRAFFIC CARRIED BY MODE, 1981
Tons Ton-km Passengers Passenger-km… --------------- …(millions)----------------…--
Road 157.0 22,000.0 2,200.0 88,000.0Rail 6.1 2,732.0 78.8 9,483.0Inland waterways 5.4 1,200.0 - -Coastal shipping 3.0 1,800.0 - -Domestic aviation - 1.0 .8 295.0
Total 171.5 27,733.0 2,279.6 97,778.0
Sources: SRT, DECONS, TPU, KAMPSAX
6. The country's various transport modes have developed soundly andimpressively over the past quarter century, with appropriate balance among themodes to serve different transport functions. As a proportion of total publicinvestment, the share of transport is likely to decline somewhat from pastlevels.
7. Roads constitute the largest stock of transport capital and providemuch the largest share of both passenger and freight transport. The basicframework of national and provincial roads is in place; for many years futureinvestments will be devoted to upgrading, strengthening and maintaining theexisting roads. New construction will be limited to short sections tocomplete missing links. The rural road network is also well developed (overtwice the kilometers of the national and provincial roads combined) butsuffers much more seriously from under-maintenance.
- 3 -
8. The policy and institutional regime guiding road passenger andfreight transport has been generalLy sound, and an efficent, private, highlycompetitive transport industry provides services at reasonable cosc. Thereare some exceptions which need attention, notably the Government-owned ExpressTransportation Organizacion (ETO).
9. The aspect of road transport that requires most attention in thenext few years is urban transport in Bangkok. This subsector will requirelarge investments, a determined effort to reduce pollution, continuing effortsto reduce congestion, and improved cost-recovery for the city's buses.Bangkok's transport system requires almost as much investment (in the currentplan) as all the country's national, provincial, and rural roads combined. Areview of urban transport investments is being undertaken in the BangkokRegional Development Study, to be completed by the Government by end-1985.
10. Only minor extensions of the railway network are likely in the fore-seeable future, and some unprofitable branch lines deserve abandonment. Theeconomics of main-line electrification is under study, and this could lead tomajor investments late in the decade. But the dominant problem of the railwayis weak finances, reflecting insufficient attention to marketing and Govern-ment reluctance to adjust both freight and passenger tariffs despite risingcosts.
11. International and domestic air transport is strategicalLy importantfor government and business travel but plays a very small role in total domes-tic passenger-kms (1X of passengers and 3% of passenger-km). The mainquestions affecting this subsector revolye around the timing and design of anew international airport near Bangkok.l
12. Thailand's rivers provide good opportunities for inland waterwaystransport, which is welL developed but serves fairly narrow corridors (mainlyto transport a few buLk agricultural commodities and construction -rterials toBangkok). Most of the inland ports are private, as are the barges and towboats that serve them. The Government's main roles are planning, channelmaintenance through dredging, and the provision of navigation aids for inlandwaterways and coastal ports. The main problems are weak cost recovery to payfor government services, staff shortages and inadequate staff training.Coastal shipping, also private, handles slightly more freight than the inlandwaterways; 60% of its traffic consists of oil products.
13. Thailand is unusuaL in having only a very small - one may say insig-nificant - merchant marine. Almost all the country's substantial voLume of
1/ The airports and aviation subsector is not discussed elsewhere in thereport.
- 4 -
foreign trade is carried in foreign bottoms. The Government may wish toreview the economic and financial feasibility of leasing ships to carry a partof its trade.
14. The ports subsector is reasonably well developed, well administeredby the Port Authority of Thailand, and fairly well financed from usercharges. Surplus port capacity exists on the East Coast, so that currentproposals for building new ports raise questions about premature and possiblyuneconomic investments.
15. A small pipeline network (almost all of it to move gas) is beingconstructed, stimulated by the important gas finds in the Culf during the pastdecade. This network will, for the next few years anyway, be limited to theindustrial East Coast and metropolitan Bangkok.
16. The Government's Fifth Development Plan 1982-86 (Page 5) includedsome B 105.4 billion Investments in Transport, with heavy expenditures for theroads subsector (B 35.0 billion) followed by Bangkok urban transport (B 30.0billion) and inland waterways and ports (B 19.4 billion). Notable are theallocations for deep-sea port investments representing some B 13.8 billion.Design of a new port at Laem Chabang and the proposed bulk port at Map Ta Pud,near Rayong, is now underway. The rail subsector investment (B 8.8 billion)vas agreed with the Bank during negotiations for the Sixth Railway Project.
(iii) Main Issues and Problems Confronting the Sector
17. The main issues and problems concern transport pricing and invest-ment policy:
(a) Although retail petroleum fuel prices are, on average, 40% higherthan import prices, the retail price of diesel fuel is about 38%less than that of regular gasoline (B 10.80/liter vs B 6.70/liter).The price gap between the two should be reduced to improve theoverall efficiency of the transport sector. Based on 1981 dieselfuel consumption figures, each Baht increase in the tax on dieselfor transport could increase Government revenues by as much asB 2 billion (US$74 million) p.a. This would also provide addedrevenues to the Government, possibly for additional outlays ontransport infrastructure requirements (such as maintenance of ruralroads).
(b) Rail tariffs do not cover costs, and the State Railway of Thailand(SRT) is losing money. SRT's depreciation provision is based onhistorical asset value, as required by law, which understates thecost of operating the railway.
(c) The Government, in its effort to develop the Eastern Seaboard, plansto construct deep water ports at Laem Chabang and Map Ta Pud.
- 5 -
GOVERNMENT FIFTH DEVELOIPMNT PLAN 1982-86INVESTMZETS IN TRANSPORT
An ap-rcent
ofNillion Baht grand total
RoadsNatlonal 7,682Provincial 12,052Rural 15.300
Total 35,034 33.2
Railway (Stat: Railway of Thailand)Locomotives and rolling *tock 4,970Track modernization and rehabiltatlon 1,202Signaling and telecommunications 1,252Wbrkshop improvements 197Capacity increasing track inve.tments 267Noncomm_rcial Invewtmence 903Niscellaneoum 53
Total 8,844 8.4
Inland Waterways and PortsInland waterways improvements 1.163Coastal ports improvemnts 357Thai Maritite Navigation Company 1,600Deep--sea port. Investments
Phuket and Songkhla 2,215Klong Toei and Sattahip 1,034Laem Chabang 2,065Mop Ta Pud 8,497
Subtotal 16.931 16.1
Merchant marine promotion 2.500 2.3
Total 19.431 18.4
Civil AviationAircraft procurement 3 568Expansion of Don Muang airport (Bangkok) 2,820Construction of new International airport
at Nong Ngu Hao (Bangkok) 60Improvement of other airports 2,870Aircraft maintenance center 1,991nther investments 788
Total 12,105 11.5
Bangkok Urban Transport /aRapid transit 20,000Other 10,000
Total 30,000 28.4GRAND TOTAL 105.414 100.0
/a Excluding railway investments covered under Railway.
Source: NESDB and 1OC.
However, two important considerations are: (1) the type of shippingThailand can attract and utilize, which wilL help determine thedraft requirements and hence the amount of dredging required; and(2) the type of port facilities to be built, considering thepossible traffic to be handLed at the ports. A review of the portdevelopment plans by recognized, independent experts would beuseful.
(d) The bulk of the rural road system receives little maintenance.Improving the condition of these roads is essential to enable anysubstantial rural development to occur or for the fledgling agro-processing industries to establish themselves. The estimated costof maintaining the system is about B 1.2 billion p.a. and, based onpast maintenance programs, the benefits would exceed this figure.
(e) Investment planning in the transport sector begins with thepreparation of subsector programs by the implementing agenciesconcerned. The individual programs are then consolidated by theMinistry of Communications and submitted to the National Economicand Social Development Board (NESDB) for review. NESDB's reviewfocuses on new investments, particularly large ones, and on "problemprojects" in the ongoing program. This review process is oftenprolonged due to inadequate program preparation by impLementingagencies. A lack of uniform criteria across subsectors oftenresults in a variety of objectives, sometimes conflicting with eachother, being pursued in the various subsectoral programs. Finally,the consolidated program is presented to the Cabinet for approval,but large projects may also be submitted separately and indepen-dently of the program. The problem project review process islimited in effectiveness by the automatic budget allocation insupport of the entire ongoing program.
(f) Another issue is the management of public enterprises. Publicenterprises with modal responsibilities and those in the urbansector appear to operate under varying sets of criteria with respectto financiaL and tariff policies, investment programming, opera-tional management, and policy coordination.
(g) Bangkok Mass Transit Authority's (BMTA's) financial situation andoperating efficiency are major issues. BMTA has never hadsufficient capitalization nor adequate fare levels to operate as aviable enterprise. The possible privatization of BMTA is animportant issue to be addressed.
18. The actions or recommendations contained in this report can besummarized as follows:
-7-
Roads- strengthen and rehabilitate older paved roads, particularly for
heavy export traffic (paras. 1.02 and 1.13)- adjust taxes on trucks upwards (para. 1.15)- increase diesel fuel taxes (paras. 1.15 & 1.16)- maintain or increase average fuel prices in real terms (para. 1.16)- make ETO commercially and financially viable (para. 1.18)- review intercity bus transport industry (para. 1.19)- introduce adequate maintenance on rural roads (para. 1.22)- separate ARD's road works and social programs (para. 1.29)- introduce quantitative evaluations of rural roads (para. 1.34)- let villagers maintain single village access roads (para. 1.36)
Railways- redesign Makkasan workshop (para. 2.14)- implement tariff adjustments at regular intervaLs (para. 2.25)- refine costing and accounting systems (para. 2.27)- improve timeliness of the Government's transfer payments to SRT
(para. 2.33)- reimburse SRT for losses on social services, etc. (para. 2.42)- strengthen SRT's marketing function (para. 2.44)
Ports- replace old dredgers (para. 3.14)- introduce multi-shift operations (para. 3.26)- discontinue stuffing and unstuffing of containers at Klong Toei
(para. 3.28)- transfer overflow traffic out of Klong Toei (para. 3.31)- review port development plans along the Eastern Seaboard (para.
3.37)
Inland Waterways and Coastal Ports- use push barges to increase capacity (para. 4.08)- enlarge navigation locks at Rama VI dam (para. 4.10)- study ports not yet reviewed and develop dredging program
(para. 4.18)- strengthen administration of dredging works (para. 4.22)- train staff (4.25)
Shipping- replace obsolete tonnage (para. 5.09)- rationalize the shipping industry and provide technical assistance
(paras. 5.11 and 5.14)- expand or lease fleet of dry bulk and containers (paras. 5.13 and
5.16)
Urban Transport- increase bus fares and improve bus system operations
(paras. 6.06, 6.13(iii) and 6.17)- improve the management of traffic flows (paras. 6.13(i) and 6.14)- comprehensively plan and expand the road building program to
complement the existing network (paras. 6.13(ii) and 6.15)- provide (after careful planning) segregated transport infrastructure
which gives priority to public transport (para. 6.13(iv) and 6.18)
-8-
I. ROADS SUBSECTOR
A. NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ROADS
National and Provincial Roads System
1.01 The national and provinciaL roads, both administered by theDepartment of Highways (DOH) under the Ministry of Communications, total about45,000 km (Map IBRD 15195R). Rural roads are administered mainly by agenciesin the Ministry of Interior and are discussed separately in Section B of thischapter. There are about 15,200 km of national roads and 29,900 km of provin-cial roads (Table L.1). The national (or primary) road system connects theprincipal towns and regional centers throughouc the country. The provincial(or secondary) road system connects the provincial centers and other majortowns with the nationaL roads, and it interconnects the rural roads. Further,many provincial roads provide access to rural areas, along with rural (ortertiary) roads. The North has the greatest length of national and provincialroads, with a share of 29%, followed by the Northwest with 28%, the CentralRegion with 25Z and the South with 18%.
1.02 Since the early 1960s, the national road system has grown from9,000 km to 15,200 km in 1984, and the proportion paved has increased fromclose to 50% co virtually 100% (TabLe 1.2). During the same period, theprovincial road Length has grown from 8,000 km to 29,900 km with improved(paved and gravel) roads growing from about 2,000 km to over 19,500 km andunimproved roads from 6,000 km to some 10,000 km. Future investment require-ments are to strengthen and rehabilitate older paved roads, particularly thosecarrying the heavy export traffic, and to upgrade the unimproved provincialroads, because of their rural access function, to paved or gravel standard.
Traffic and Transport Industry
1.03 The country's motor vehicle fleet, including motorcycles, has grownfrom about 740,000 units in 1970 to about 2,600,000 units by early 1983 (Table1.3). Excluding motorcycles, the increase was from about 400,000 units toover 1,200,000 units, with an annual growth of 9.6%. Commercial vehicles -buses, trucks and other utility vehicles - account for about two thirds offour-wheel vehicles, with cars making up the remainder. About 80% of the carsand taxis, 70% of the buses, and almost 30% of the trucks were registered inBangkok in 1978 (Table 1.4).
1.04 Motorized traffic (including motorcycles) on all non-urban roads wasin the order of 24 billion vehicle-km in 1978 (Table 1.5). About 50% of thistraffic was concentrated in the Central Region within a radius of 150 km fromBangkok, highlighting Bangkok's leading role as the center for Government,commerce, industry and transport. About 19% of the vehicle-km were recordedin the Northeast, 18% in the North, and 12% in the South. Of the non-urbantraffic, over 90% is concentrated on the national and provincial roads (about44,000 km) and the remainder on rural roads (about 106,000 km). The nationaland provincial roads, however, show great variations in traffic density.About 15Z of the system, including most of the national roads, account for
-9-
about 55% of traffic, and about 33% of the road length accounts for 75-80% oftraffic. On many of the top-Listed 15% of roads, average daily traffic(excluding motorcycles) equals or exceeds 10,000 vehicles.
1.05 The trucking industry is one of the most important and possibly thelargest industry in Thailand. It employs directly an estimated 500,000people, has a capital asset value of some B 70 billion and annual operatingcosts of about B 29 billion and its turnover in freight revenue is estimatedat some B 45 billion p.a. The total number of freight vehicles operating inthe country is over 230,000 light trucks and 100,000 heavy trucks. By someestimates, over 50% of the heavy trucks are for hire. Most trucking firmshave only one (heavy) truck, managed by the owner-operator. A few firms haveseveral hundred trucks, including the Government-owned Express TransportationOrganization (ETO). While essentially free of economic regulation, periodicand regular pressure is being applied for more regulation. Some of theinitiatives are more or less disguised attempts at protecting competitors fromthe rigors of the free transport market. Other regulatory issues are theoverloading of trucks, regulations on vehicle specifications and road usercharges for trucks. Overloading of trucks is a fairly common occurrence, withimplications for road safety and maintenance. The Highway Police Division inthe Police Department is charged with traffic law enforcement on national andprovincial roads. Since 1981, it has taken over from DOH the management ofthe ten permanent truck weighing stations in the country, and is increasinglycracking down on overloading violations. These and other trucking issues arebeing analyzed under the ongoing Trucking Industry Study (Loan 2035-TH).
Department of Highways
1.06 The Department of Highways (DOH) in the Ministry of Communications(MOC) is responsible for administration, planning, construction and mainte-nance of national and provincial roads. DOH is weLl organized and welloperated, and functions as a modern agency with considerable autonomy. DOHhas an adequate organization to perform its functions. The present organi-zation was set up in the mid-sixties, with some modifications introduced inthe mid-seventies, as a result of a Highway Maintenance Study financed underthe Fifth Highway Project, to give greater emphasis to road maintenance.
1.07 DOH has a competent staff of 16,000-17,000. Local and overseasformal training programs assure high professional standards. Further, thereare programs for on-the-job training, including several DOH construction unitsset up with bilateral funding.
1.08 Most of DOH road construction, about 90%, is undertaken by con-tract. The remainder is by force account by the construction units referredto above. The Thai construction industry has fully matured in the past 15years and, in more recent years, Thai firms have won most of the contractsagainst competition by foreign firms.
1.09 DOH's institutional competence expresses itself also in its interestto improve its maintenance performance. In 1978 the Highway Maintenance Studyreferred to above estimated yearly budgets for routine and periodic
- 10 -
maintenance of national and provinciaL roads and recommended the purchasing ofequipment and the creation of an internal equipment hiring system. Under theSixth Highway Project, technical assistance was provided to DOH for thecreation of the internal hiring system for road maintenance equipment. Alsounder the Provincial Roads Project, DOH is introducing the first stages of apavement management system to ensure that a systematic condition assessment ofthe network is done and that more realistic maintenance and rehabilitationbudgets are prepared. Until recentLy road maintenance budgets covered only70-80% of estimated requirements. However, in 1983 and 1984 the coverageincreased to about 90%.
Fifth Plan Investments
1.10 The current road subsector plan (FY82-86) for national and provin-ciaL roads calls for total investments of about B 23 billion, of which aboutB 9 billion (40%) is earmarked for national roads and about B 14 billion (60%)for provincial roads (Table 1.6). For comparison, the plan for rural roads isin the order of B 15 billion, and the overall transport pLan (exclusive ofBangkok rapid transit and bus transport) is about B 75 billion.
1.11 Because many provincial roads serve as rural access roads, thetrend, established in the previous Plan, toward increased provincial roadsexpenditures, is continued in FY82-86. The relative size of the DOH road planis fully justified, given the dominance of road transport. About 50% of thecurrent plan investments for national roads are aimed at strengthening andrehabilitating existing roads with high traffic volumes. In the case ofprovincial roads, the focus is on bettering about 6,000 km of unimproved roadsto engineered standards.
Investment Needs and Priorities
1.12 Investment needs and priorities for national and provincial roadsduring the eighties were periodically reviewed in recent years, with the mostdetailed review undertaken under the "Screening Study" for these roadsfinanced under the Sixth Highway Project (Loan 1510-TH). In summary, theconclusions are as follows:
(a) except for very specific localized cases, the network of nationaland provincial roads is adequate in extent and area coverage;however, some paved road sections need more capacity, due to trafficgrowth; and a great part of the so-called unimproved provincialroads requires upgrading to engineered standards, including, in manycases, conversion to paved surfaces; and
(b) older paved national roads, particularly those carrying high volumesof heavy truck traffic, increasingly require strengthening andrehabilitation.
1.13 The present Plan for national and provincial roads provides areasonable balance between the above investment categories in FY82-86.However, in the next Plan period road strengthening/rehabilitation shouldbecome more dominant. Virtually all of these investments are economically
- 11 -
well justified and fit into the Covernment's strategy of rural development,support to the agricultural and related sectors, and preservation of existinginfrastructure.
Main Issues
1.14 The main issues in the roads subsactor are the policies directed atthe performance of the road transport industry (defined in the wider sense ofall users of road infrastructure) and its relationship with competing trans-port modes. A discussion of these issues follows.
1.15 Road User Taxation. The 1982 report by TPU/BCEOM, Taxation of RoadUsers, provides a comprehensive discussion of taxation issues, includingrecommendations for future policies. The report notes that in FY75-80,aggregate receipts from road user charges on national and provincial roadswere close to 70% of aLl expenditures, and about 2002 of aggregate marginalinfrastructure costs. As these cost coverages were achieved during a periodof rapid network expansion, which will not be repeated in the coming years, itis likely cost coverage would be even higher in the future. The only majorflaw in the taxation picture is the under-coverage of infrastructure costscaused by heavy trucks (6- and 10-wheelers). An upward adjustment of taxes ontrucks is therefore called for. Measures to increase road user charges onheavy trucks should include the consideration of an increase in diesel fueltaxes (para. 1.16). Each one Baht increase in the diesel tax would amount toabout B 2 billion p.a. in revenues. This would be the least costly andadministratively the easiest tax since it could be collected at therefinery. The amount of taxes required to cover marginal costs for heavytrucks would increase trucking cost 2.5X to 5%. The Ministry ofCommunications is pursuing the course of raising the truck license fee, whichis in their purview, to cover the costs. (The fee would amount to about B11,000 p.a. for each heavy truck.)
1.16 Fuel Efficiency. Fuel efficiency and conservation occupy aprominent place in the FY82-86 Plan. A major Plan objective is to allow nogrowth in oil imports after the end of the Plan period. Since the transportsector is a major consumer of oil products (402), conservation efforts withinthe sector are important. Most of the sector's fuel consumption takes placein the road subsector, suggesting the need for tighter control of fuel con-sumption in road transport. The problem is aggravated by the substantialprice differential between regular gasoline (B 10.80/liter) on the one side,and diesel fuel (B 6.70/liter) and LPG (B 5.39/liter) on the other. Thisprice differential should be reduced. In another 1982 TPU/BCEOM study (Studyof Energy Policies for the Transportation Sector, 1982), the question of fuelconsumption in the road subsector was explored, and MOC is in the process offormulating a program for making road transport more fuel efficient. Amongthe measures likely to be proposed are improved road traffic flows, drivereducation, phasing-out of obsolete vehicles, vehicle speed control, increasesin average vehicle payloads and flattening of traffic peaks (duringcongestion). However, one of the most effective measures with immediateresults would be to keep average fuel prices up in real terms, if notincreasing them in relation to border prices. For essentially non-economicreasons, the Government has refrained from such a fuel pricing policy, withconsequent adverse effects on the balance of payments.
- 12 -
1.17 Road-Rail Competition. For a variety of reasons, not the Leastbeing the size and vocal strength of the State Railway (SRT) workforce, theGovernment is locked into an uncomfortable railway situation. With railtariffs below costs, SRT is incurring increasing annual losses, both on themain line network and on branch lines and Bangkok commuter services. Onvarious occasions in the past, there have been calls for regulatory restric-tion on the road transport industry to protect the raiLway. There is also thecontinuous problem of apportioning Government funds between the two modes onthe basis of inconsistently applied investment criteria. The most andeconomically efficient way of dealing with these issues is to transform SRT'smain line operations into a commercially oriented activity (para. 2.43).
1.18 Economic Regulation. Economic regulation, existing and potential,is often an impediment to the efficiency of road transport. Generally,trucking operates free of economic restrictions, markets are open and servicesand rates are determined under market conditions. However, regulatory inroadshave been made by ETO, which has trucking monopolies for: (i) transport offreight landed at Klong Toey; (ii) a number of Government specified commodi-ties; and (iii) transit traffic to and from Laos (as well as Kampuchea). ETOis a frequently criticized enterprise which, despite generally acknowledgedpoor performance (in cost and services), has succeeded in expanding over theyears. The size of ETO's workforce (over 4,000 staff) has become its protec-tive shield. The only economically efficient method to deal with ETO is torequire that its operations be commercially and financially viable.
1.19 Intercity bus transport is aLso regulated. The Government-ownedTransport Co. has exclusive traffic rights between cities, which it has builtinto a franchise system with participation by the private sector. On the faceof it, the franchise system appears to provide low-cost and low-fare transportof good quality. However, the system also limits the number of buses perroute and, hence, supply does not appear to adequately address passengerdemand as evidenced by illegal services provided on certain routes. A reviewof the intercity bus transport industry's regulatory aspects will be under-taken under the Second Provincial Roads Project.
B. RURAL ROADS
Rural Road System
1.20 Rural roads may be defined as all roads outside of cities andmunicipalities, excluding the approximately 14,000 km of national highways and28,000 km of provincial roads, both under the jurisdiction of the Departmentof Highways (DOH) of the Ministry of Communications. About 70X of rural roadsare gravel topped, the remainder earth. These roads connect villages andrural populations with the provincial and national road systems and with eachother.
1.21 The rural road system is very large, about 106,000 km. Some96,000 km are nominally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior
- 13 -
(MOI) through its various line agencies and its provinces (changwats) andtheir subdivisions. The remaining 10,000 km are special purpose roads, builtby specialized agencies, chiefly the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and theRoyal Forestry Department in the Ministry of Agriculture, and the MobileDevelopment Units of the Ministry of Defense. It is generally agreed thatsuch special purpose roads should continue to be constructed, and maintained,by the specialized agencies concerned since the roads are an integral part oftheir development projects. However, in the later stages of development, withthe growth of new villages or towns, such roads are usually eventually incor-porated into the provincial road system of DOH, or are handed over as ruralroads to the local government units according to their appropriate classifica-tion. The distribution of rural roads is, approximately: Northeast 44%,North 22Z, Central 21Z, and South 13%.
1.22 The rural road system is very extensive with an average density ofabout 1 km per 5 sq km and few new roads are needed (Table 1.7). However, theroads are of low standard, averaging about 4.5 m width, with generally lessthan 30 aadt. In the dry season about two thirds of the roads are usually infair condition, and one-third poor. During the rainy season, however, manyroads become impassable. Improvement of rural roads to engineered standardshas so far been largely limited to some regional development projects, princi-pally in the Northeast. Low cost works have been undertaken on a largeproportion of the rural roads, chiefly under employment generation and villagedevelopment programs. The bulk of the roads receive Little maintenance.Improving the condition of these roads is essential to enable any substantialrural development, such as agro-processing and small industry relocation, toproceed. While a sustained long-term program should be undertaken to recon-struct the roads to higher standards, in accordance with economic prioritiesand the growth of traffic, a significant improvement in the condition of thebulk of the roads can be achieved by introducing adequate maintenance. Forthis a strong institutional framework is needed, which does not exist atpresent.
Traffic
1.23 Virtually all the ruraL roads carry some motorized traffic,generally below 30 aadt. Animal-drawn vehicles do not form a significant partof the traffic. Although the rural road system amounts to about 70% of allnon-urban roads, it carries only about 7% of all road traffic (veh-km),excluding urban traffic. Nevertheless, rural roads perform a vital functionin providing transport for the rural population. The predominant vehiclesusing rural roads, apart from motor-cycles, are farm trucks (a simple four-wheel chassis with an open body and a one or two cylinder engine), farmtractors/trailors, pick-up trucks (often with bodies converted to carry pas-sengers and freight), and jeeps. Other than vehicles for governmentadministration, nearly all the vehicles are privately owned, some by smallfirms, but mostly by owner/operators.
Administration/Institutions
1.24 The institutional framework for dealing with rural roads ispresently unsatisfactory. According to the Announcement of the Revolutionary
- 14 -
Council No. 295 (1972) on roads, rural roads are the responsibility of the 73provinces (changwats) and the Governors of the provinces are responsible forregistering them within the road system. However, in practice this registra-tion process has not been followed and a large proportion of the roads are notformally under the jurisdiction of any agency. Much of the rural road networkdoes not receive maintenance on a regular basis.
1.25 The changwats and their districts (amphors) and subdistricts(tambons) have little or no technical expertise, and few resources for carry-ing out works. The MOI has a number of departments and offices which provideassistance to changwats for various functions. The chief ones for roads andother public works are the Office of Accelerated Rural DeveLopment (ARD) andthe Public Works Department (PWD). However, their functions overlap to aconsiderable extent. In particular, for roads, both give assistance to anumber of changwats, sometimes to the same changwats. ARD is the largerorganization. It has six regional centers and gives direct assistance invarying degrees through its staff stationed in 57 of the 73 changwats. Insome changwats, especialLy in the Northeast, where it started operationsnearly 20 years ago, ARD has considerable staff and often considerable equip-ment, although much of the latter is beyond their useful Life. In someeastern and southern changwats it has only one or two staff and noequipment. However, ARD is gradually increasing the staff and equipmentinputs to these changwats. PWD has operations in 31 changwats, a number ofthem overlapping with ARD activities, but PWD staff is generally on a smallerscale. A number of changwats receive assistance from neither ARD nor PWD.Apart from rural roads, ARD and PWD are concerned with other works functionsin rural areas, chiefly water supply. ARD is also concerned, to a limitedextent, with small irrigation projects. In addition, ARD has a number of"social" activities which overlap with the functions of the CommunityDevelopment Department (CDD) which is also under MOI.
1.26 The Government has financed a number of programs aimed at improvingliving conditions in the rural areas since about the mid-i960s. Largely,these funds have been channeled through the changwats and the tambons, partic-ularly for unemployment relief, for example following a period of drought.Expenditures have fluctuated widely, but in some years have exceededUS$100 million. A large part of these "relief" funds have been used to effectlow-standard improvements over a considerabLe proportion of the rural roads.In addition, the Government, through ARD and, to a lesser extent PWD, hasimproved a limited number of rural roads to higher standards, largely to helpthe poorer areas, especially in the Northeast. Again, expenditures havefluctuated, but in recent years have been of the order of US$15-25 million forARD and US$5-8 million p.a. for PWD.
Study of Rural Roads
1.27 With a view to tackling the rural road problem on a national scale,the Government and the Bank included a Study of Rural Roads in the SixthHighway Project (Loan 1519-TH) of March 1978. This study was carried out by ajoint venture of two foreign and two Thai consulting firms under a steeringcommittee convened and chaired by NESDB and composed of officials from MOC,MOI and other concerned agencies. It was started in September 1980 and
- 15 -
completed in mid-1982. It was in two main parts: (a) Organization andMaintenance Study: aimed at recommendations for changes to be made for insti-tutions concerned with rural roads, and particularly for setting up anadequate road maintenance organization; and (b) Rural Road Development Study:aimed at preparing an outline Long-range perspective program for improvingrural roads, based on a screening study of the entire network, followed bypreparation of a five-year program for priority roads.
1.28 In regard to Organization and Maintenance, the study found that ingeneral there is a sufficient number of staff in the various departments ofMOI already engaged in roadworks, to handle responsibilities for rura!roads. However, to be effective, a reorganization is required to clarifyresponsibilities and to reassign the staff in accordance with needs. Thestudy was primarily concerned with roads, which constitute by far the largestworks activity of the institutions involved, although it also considered therequirements of other works activities in any reorganization.
1.29 The consultants put forward three alternative proposals forreallocating responsibilities and reorganizing the departments/offices of theMOI and for deployment of their staff to assist the changwats. The alterna-tive which was favored by the high level Committee for Governmental andAdministrative Reform chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister was to combine theworks functions, including rural roads, of both ARD and PWD in one "RuralWorks Department". ARD's social programs would probably be transferred to theCommunity Development Department. The proposals are being considered by theGovernment, but no decision has yet been made.
1.30 In any event, the consultants' proposals were essentially that onedepartment of MOI be given responsibility, and the available resources, fordischarging MOI's responsibilities for rural roads. It would itself generallycarry out programs of rural road construction and major improvements, throughits regional offices, by contract. In addition, it would redeploy much of theavailable technical staff and equipment, to assist the changwats in carryingout maintenance of rural roads. The consultants' proposal was to set up theorganization, particularly for maintenance of rural roads, initially in pilotareas, consisting of groups of changwats. The system would be extended to theremainder of the country in stages, taking into account the experience gainedin the pilot project. The proposals also included the training of staff.
1.31 The study included the preparation, for the first time, of aninventory of rural roads. This found a total of about 106,000 km, includingabout 10,000 km of special purpose roads (para. 1.21) and about 10,000 km ofvillage access roads less than 4 km long. The total length and density of thenetwork is much greater than had previously been thought. They are nearly allof low standard, with an average width of about 4.5 m, but some as narrow asabout 3 m and others as wide as 6 m. They are mostly poorly drained, with fewculverts and with temporary bridges. However, past Government programs haveresulted in about 70% of the total length receiving at least a thin gravelsurfacing. The roads are normally passable in the dry season, but the rainyseason causes a large number to become impassable, because of poor drainage,failure to maintain the surface shape, and lack of gravel on the remaining 30%of the roads.
- 16 -
1.32 Based on the inventory, the consultants outlined and evaluated amaintenance and upgrading program to bring the condition of the roads up to asatisfactory level, over a period of five years, and to keep them in thatstate. At 1981 prices, the annual budgetary requirement would be about US$50million equivalent. This would not include the approximately 10,000 km ofspecial purpose roads which, it is assumed, will continue to be maintained bytheir parent agencies, with their own budgetary funds. Nor does it includethe approximately 10,000 km of village access roads linking single villages tothe general rural road network; these should be the responsibility of thevillages.
1.33 The Rural Road Development part of the study was a screening of theentire rural road network followed by simplified feasibility studies of aselected 5,000 km completed early 1982. Of these, 3,700 km were found to befeasible. The 5,000 km were selected from roads proposed by ARD and PWD andsubjected to screening indicating that they had an adequate economic rate ofreturn based on reduction in transport costs and on developmental benefits butweighted by region to give the overall balance required by the Government:Northeast 50%, North 25%, South 10%; and Central 15Z.
Planning and Engineering of Rural Roads
1.34 The ARD and PWD carry out planning and engineering for most of thoserural road improvements which involve substantial amounts of work. Minorroadworks are arranged by the changwats, often with some assistance fromcentral government staff, particularly PWD. Efforts have been made to involvechangwats in rural road planning, but success has been limited by the chang-wats' capabilities. The projects have usually been chosen on very generaleconomic, administrative, security, and political considerations, with onlylimited quantitative evaluations carried out. However, proposals fordeveloping planning capabilities for rural roads, and for an initialdevelopment program, have been prepared through the Study of Rural Roads.Local firms of consultants are available to suppLement the capacities of ARDand PWD staff for carrying out design and supervision of works.
Construction
1.35 Rural road construction, or major improvement, has usually beenundertaken by ARD (mainly by force account) and PWD (mainly by contract).However, some smaller projects and lower standard improvements have beenundertaken by the changwats, districts and groups of villages, under thevarious government projects.
Maintenance of Rural Roads
1.36 The bulk of the rural road system receives no regular maintenance.The specialized agencies maintain the approximately 10,000 km under their owncontrol. In addition, ARD maintains about 18,000 km of roads built by itselfto its own standards; it does not provide assistance to the changwats formaintenance. The remaining approximately 80,000 km of rural roads have verylittle maintenance, and are consequently in poor condition. About 10,000 kmare short (less than 4 km) access roads to single villages, and the
- 17 -
consultants propose that these be left to the villagers themselves to main-tain. The remaining approximately 70,000 km would be the responsibility ofthe changwats. These roads should be the responsibility of the proposedmaintenance organization, based on the changwats, but with technicaL staff andequipment supplied by a central government de-iartment. Most of the routinemaintenance would be carried out by force account, but work exceeding ARDcapacity would be contracted out. Thailand has a weLl-developed contractingindustry, including many small local contractors who could carry out the worksefficiently.
1.37 The rural roads study shows that maintenance has the highestpriority for improving the condition of the rural roads system. The consul-tants estimate the capital cost (at 1981 prices) of setting up a maintenanceorganization at about US$50 million and a recurrent cost of about US$50 mil-lion per year to maintain the system to a reasonable standard.
II. THE STATE RAILWAY OF THAILAND
A. ORGANIZATION
2.01 The State Railway of Thailand (SRT) was established as an indepen-dent legal entity under the State Railway of Thailand Act of 1951. Twoamending acts of 1959 and 1966 introduced minor modifications to the 1951Act. The amendments give overall supervisory powers to the Ministry ofCommunications, incLuding veto power over any action by SRT which is deemedinconsistent with Government policies. A Board of Commissioners, consistingof a chairman and four to six members, who are appointed by the Council ofMinisters, formulates policy and supervises SRT. The Council of Ministersapproves the capital budget, the borrowing of money, and changes in standardpassenger fares and freight charges. Abandonment of lines and services alsoneeds the Council's approval.
2.02 The Board appoints, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, aGeneral Manager who is responsible for the management and administration ofSRT and serves as an ex-officio Board member. SRT's organizationalarrangements are satisfactory.
B. MANAGEMENT, STAFF AND TRAINING
2.03 SRT operations are well managed. Officers are competent and staffdiscipline is good. The total number of staff has declined by some 9% since1982 to about 27,800 by the end of FY84. About 4% are temporary employees.Productivity per employee is high: it increased from 286,0ao traffic units inFY77 to about 444,000 in FY84.
2.04 SRT staff training facilities, located at the Railway TrainingCenter in Bangkok, are adequate. For training in specialized fields, SRTsends its staff to local and foreign universities and other training insti-tutions. Training needs currently exist in costing, marketing and planning,as well as in operation and maintenance of signalling equipment and permanentway maintenance equipment.
- 18 -
2.05 Labor-management relations are good. SRT salaries, which have keptpace with the consumer price index since 1972, are generally higher than thosefor corresponding grades in Government service, but lower than those inprivate industry.
C. FACILITIES
Permanent Way
2.06 The rail network consists of about 3,800 route-km of meter gaugelines, of which 90 km are double-track and the remainder single-track(Map 13621 R2). Three main lines (3,046 km) radiate from Bangkok: theNorthern Line to Cniang Mai (751 km, of which 90 km is double-track); theNortheastern Line system to Nong Khai on the Laotian border and to UbonRatchatani (total length 1,093 km); and the Southern Line to the Malaysianborder at Padang Besar and at Sungai Kolok (total length 1,202 km). In addi-tion, there are nine branch lines (total length 749 km), including the EasternLine to Aranyaprathet on the border of Kampuchea. One branch line, theMaeklong Line (65 km), serving an area west of Bangkok (running from Thonburito Samut Sakhon) is separated from the main network.
2.07 A line capacity study under bilateral (Japanese) financing ispresently being undertaken to assess SRT's overall transport capacity and thefeasibility of doubling sections of the Northern and Eastern Lines. A new 130km single-track line connecting Chachoengsao, a station about 60 km fromBangkok on the Eastern Line, to the deep-sea port at Sattahip has beenconstructed. It was partially opened to traffic early 1985 but full operationis not expected until 1986 after signalling has been completed. As part ofthe planned Eastern Seaboard industrial development, two new single-tracklines are under consideration: an extension of the Sattahip line to Rayong(about 40 km); and a line (about 80 kn) connecting the Eastern Line with BanPhachi or Kaeng Khoi on the Northeastern Line to provide a shorter connectionbetween Sattahip/Rayong ant. the Northeast.
2.08 Except for the Sila At-Chiang Mai section (263 km) of the NorthernLine and the Kaeng Koi-Nakhorn Ratchasima section (139 km) of the NortheasternLine, where the maximum gradient is 2.6% and 2.4% and the minimum curve radius180 m and 200 m respectively, the main lines of SRT have gradients less than1.2% (for most sections less than 1.0%) and curve radii exceeding 300 m (formost sections exceeding 400 m). Curves represent about 11% of total tracklength.
2.09 There are about 2,430 m of tunnels and about 2,600 bridges, of whichabout 466 are wooden structures. Of the total 3,890 km of track, about 795 kmare laid with 80 lb/yd rails, about 2,580 km with 70-75 lb/yd rails and about515 km with 50-60 lb/yd rails. About 82% of the track on the main lines hascontinuous welded rails. About 86% of the sleepers are wooden, while 14% aretwo-block and mono-block concrete sleepers. The ballast consists of crushedstone. Maximum axle-load allowed on the network is 15 tons, and maximum speedis 80 km/hr. However, there are a number of permanent speed restrictions onapproaches to weak bridges and sharp curves. The roadbed is generally stable,and track maintenance and riding quality are good. The bridge and track
- 19 -
improvement program for FY82-86 includes replacing about 310 wooden and steeLbridges with new structures, replacing about 572,000 wooden sleepers withconcrete sleepers, and welding about 12,000 rail joints.
Signalling
2.10 The signaling system is generally poor. SRT's signaling technologyranges from reasonably modern color light signals and a full interlocking andtokenless block system in the Bangkok area to primitive hand-operatedkeylocked points, with no signals in some parts of the network. Improvementworks about to begin with bilateral Japanese financing.
Telecommunications
2.11 The SRT telecommunication system consists mainly of 12-channeLcarrier telephones and teleprinters, all recently instalLed, and an old trainoperating control telephone system. SRT intends to replace the old, outmodedtelephone system during the next five years with bilateral financing.
Motive Power and Rolling Stock
2.12 SRT has a reasonably modern fleet of locomotives and wagons. Thefleet consist of 272 diesel locomotives (232 main line, 40 shunters), 8 steamlocomotives in emergency reserve, 128 railcars (79 powered, 49 trailers),1,115 passenger cars, bogie cars and 9,170 freight cars (3,034 bogie cars,6,136 four-wheelers). Twenty obsolete diesel locomotives, supplied in 1958-62, will be scrapped in FY83-86. Also scrapped will be 50 passenger cars(about 30-40 years old), 200 oil cank bogie cars (about 30-40 years old) andabout 1,000 two-axle freight cars (about 40 years oLd). About 135 flat carsare being equipped with oil tanks.
Workshops
2.13 SRT's mechanical workshop facilities include a central workshop atMakkasan near Bangkok, three regional workshops and seven main depots.Makkasan handles major overhauls of locomotives and rolling stock, as well asthe manufacture of passenger and freight cars. Its buildings and equipmentwere improved in FY77-81, but the capacity for manufacturing and maintenanceis still inadequate. In order to improve maintenance, manufacturing is beingdiscontinued in the present workshop and improvements in the maintenance shopsare being planned.
2.14 Overflow major overhaul from the Makkasan workshop as well as someunscheduled repair works are carried out in the three regional workshops atUttaradit, Nakhon Ratchasima and Thung Song. DaiLy servicing of locomotivesis done in the seven main depots at Bang Sue, Thon Buri, Lampang, Uttaradit,Hat Yai, Thung Song, and Nakhon Ratchasima. In the long run, the only viablesolution to improvements of the Makkasan workshop appears to be to redesignthe facility and move it out of Bangkok. The value of the present real estatemay well pay for this change.
- 20 -
Other Facilities
2.15 Yards and stations are adequate for the traffic, except that theBang Sue yard and about fifteen smaller yards need expansion. To meet theincrease in the Bangkok metropolitan commuter traffic, plans are underconsideration for constructing a new passenger station about 9 km north of theexisting Bangkok station. The buildings, stations, offices and general plantof SRT are adequate and well maintained.
D. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS
Past Freight Traffic
2.16 Between FY75 and FY80 freight traffic grew at an average annual rateof 5.6% in terms of tons (from 4.8 million tons to 6.3 million tons) and at4.6Z annually in terms of ton-kun (from 2.35 billion ton-km Lo 2.94 billionton-km), Tables 2.1-2.2. An average increase in freight tariffs of 73Z inJune 1981, coupled with a general economic slow-down, led to a decline infreight traffic to 6.1 million tons (2.73 billion ton-km) in FY81 andcontinuing to 5.3 million tons (2.50 billion ton km) by FY83 althoughsubstantial rebates were offered. The financial results were thus onlymarginally positive. In FY84, freight traffic again increased by 6.0% interms of cons and 8.0% in terms of ton-km over FY83.
2.17 The main commodities carried by SRT are bulk commodities - petroleumproducts, cement, rice and maize, other agricultural products, gypsum, andlumber and Logs. The length of haul is about 480 km.
Past Passenger Traffic
2.18 Between FY75 and FY81 passenger traffic grew at an average rate of4.2% annually in numbers of passengers, from 61.6 million in FY75 to 78.8million in FY81., and at 9.1% annually in terms of passenger-km, from 5.6billion to 9.5 billion (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). The stronger growth inpassenger-km reflects the fact that the average length of journeys increasedfrom about 92 km in FY75 to more than 120 km in FY82. The number of commuters(and pass-km) in the Bangkok metropolitan area is estimated to have grown at12.5% a year in FY75-81, while other passenger traffic grew at 2Z a year innumbers and 9Z in pass-km. A 35% increase in average fares in June 1981,coupled with reduced growth in personal income, slowed down the passengertraffic growth in FY82 to 2.0Z.
Operations
2.19 Operating efficiency is in general good, although the utilization offreight cars declined with the drop in traffic. Some efficiency indicatorsare given below:
-21 -
Index FY84FY77 FY84 (FY77 = 100)
Traffic units per employee ('000) 286 444 155Availability (X)
Diesel line locomotives 80.8 85.5 106Passenger cars /a 86.2 88.9 103Freight cars /a 85.6 90.6 106
Traffic units per available linelocomotive (million) 50.7 63.5 125
Average number of passengers perpassenger train 336 475 141
Passenger-km per availablepassenger car ('000) /b 5,959 10,718 180
Average freight net ton-km perfreight train-km 300 353 118
Net ton-km per available freight car(bogie car equivalent) ('000) 661 538 81
/a Excluding cars for work trains.7- Including railcars.
Source: SRT
E. TARIFFS AND COSTS
Tariffs
2.20 SRT passenger fares and freight rates are uniform throughout thesystem and are tapered. Passenger fares are divided into three classes:First, Second and Third. Considerable discounts are given to commuters, warveterans, and students. Public freight tariffs are grouped into four classes,with petroleum tariffs being separately quoted for the petroleum companies.Freight Class 1 covers dangerous goods and Class 2 covers less-than carloadtraffic. The major commodity in Class 3 is logs/lumber, with all othercommodities, except petroleum, in Class 4. Traffic moving i; "special" unittrains is charged at negotiated rates, which are lower than published rates;such traffic constitutes about one half of SRT's freight traffic.
2.21 All changes in standard rates and fares require the approval ofSRT's Board of Commirsioners, the Minister of Communications, various Govern-ment agencies and the Cabinet. After a period of twenty years of unchangedtariffs, substantial increases in standard rates were made in November 1975.The standard rates again remained unchanged until June 1981, when furthersubstantial increases in passenger fares and freight rates were introduced.Under the State Railway of Thailand Act of 1976, SRT nominally has the freedomto set tariffs up to a level of 25X above, and 50% below, standard rates. inpractice, all rate changes require the approval of the Minister of Communic.%-tions. The most recent 7.1% increase for passenger in June 1983, was evensubmitted by the Minister to the Cabinet prior to implementation. Another5.8% increase is expected shortly.
- 22 -
2.22 The tariffs introduced in June 1981 raised standard first classpassenger fares by 55%, second class by 44%, and the dominant third classfares by 32%. The average increase weighted by traffic volumes (pass-km) was35%. In freight traffic, the standard rates for Classes 3 and 4 were raisedon average 50-150% and 40-200Z, with the increases being higher withdistance. The rates for petroleum were increased by about 13%. Rates forspecial trains were also renegotiated. The resulting effective rate increasefor freight traffic, weighted by traffic volumes (ton-kim), was 73% on theaverage. Subsequent to the formal rate increases, however, a variety ofrebates in the range of 5-29% were granted to counter the resulting decline infreight traffic. Some concessions were made in passenger fares also. As aresult, the effective increase was 31% in passenger fares and 59% in freightrates. The June 1983 rate increase was 7.1% for passenger tariffs only.
Costs
2.23 The Fifth Railway Project required SRT to revalue its assets byHarch 31, 1980. Although a revaluation of assets was done, the resultantadjustment to the depreciation charges was not carried out. As a result,SRT's cost calculations substantially understate its operating costs. For thefuture, SRT should revalue its assets periodically, say, every 5 years. Theresultant depreciation charges should then be included in cost calculationsfor tariff purposes.
2.24 In FY1980, average revenues were B 0.149 per passenger-km andB 0.262 per ton-km. These compare with long-run variable costs (LRVC) ofB 0.145 per passenger-km and B 0.291 per ton-km. Thus, by SRT's own calcula-tions, which are based on unrevalued assets, freight was carried substantiallybelow LRVC, while passengers were carried marginally above LRVC, but at amargin insufficient to contribute much towards fixed costs.
2.25 The June 1981 tariff increase improved the relationship betweenrevenues and costs, and many of the traffic items now produce revenues mar-ginally above LRVC based on unrevalued assets (Table 2.5). However, theserevenues are still below those required to cover fixed costs. Using valuesfor depreciation that reflect estimated current costs of assets, in line withthe financial projections, gives the following results (for 1982):
Estimated Long-runaverage variable cost Full costrevenue SRT Restated/a SRT Restated/a
Passengers(per pass-kim) B 0.202 0.191 0.218 0.255 0.298
Freight(per ton-km) B 0.412 0.455 0.524 0.594 0.710
/a Based on revalued assests.
Source: SRT
- 23 -
Again, on a revalued basis, revenues fall short of LRVC. To narrow this gapbetween revenues and costs, further tariff increases that more than cover theincreases in costs are necessary at regular intervals for the next few years.
F. BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING
Budgets
2.26 SRT prepares detailed annual capital and operating budgets whichrequire the approval of its Board of Commissioners. The capital budget needsthe approval of the Council of Ministers also. SRT has flexibility in reallo-cating funds in the operating budget, but only limited flexibility regardingthe approved capital budget. NESDB exercises control over expenditures underthe capital budget.
Accounting
2.27 SRT has a commercial accounting system, which is almost fullycomputerized. A traffic costing system was introduced by consultants financedunder the Fourth Railway Project. However, these systems are not detailedenough to enable SRT to develop separate accounts for the branch lines and theBangkok metropolitan commuter traffic in order to estimate the tariffs,required to cover at least LRVC for those operations. The costing andaccounting systems, therefore, need refinement.
2.28 SRT prepares final annuaL accounts within about three months of thefiscal year-end. For upper management review and action, SRT also prepares amonthly, so-called "quick report" of traffic and financial performance, within3-4 weeks from the end of each month.
G. UNECONOMIC LINES AND SERVICES
2.29 In contrast to the three main lines, which in principle could beprofitable, SRT does not expect to operate at a profit the eight remainingbranch lines (Hat Yai-Songkhla has been closed) and the Bangkok metropolitancommuter services. One line, Ban Dara-Sawankhalok, will be closed as soon asa parallel road under construction is completed. The branch lines wereidentified as unprofitable and requiring special Government compensation forlosses some years ago, and a covenant to this effect is incorporated in theGuarantee Agreement for the Fifth Railway Project (Loan 1662-TH). SRT hassince submitted proposals to the Cabinet to discontinue operations on thebranch lines Nong Pla Duk-Suphan Buri, Nong Pla Duk-Nam Tok and Wongwien Yai-Maeklong. SRT has also proposed that the Government reimburse operatinglosses on the branch lines Bangkok-Aranyaprathet, Thung Po-Khiri Ratthanikhom,Thung Song-Kan Tang and Klao Chum Thong-Nakhon Si Thammarat. The Bangkokmetropolitan commuter services were identified as unprofitable in the courseof preparation of this project. Branch lines are beiLg operated for reasonsof security and to foster regional/local deveLopment. The Bangkok commuterservices are being provided, at subsidized rates, for reasons of urban socialwelfare.
2.30 Total recorded branch line traffic in FY80, excluding one line(Maeklong) for which statistics were not available, was 803 million pass-km
- 24 -
and 338 million ton-km, against an SRT total of 8,861 million pass-km and2,942 million ton-km. The branch line losses in that same year are estimatedat over B 120 million or about 40% of the total loss.
2.31 The Bangkok metropolitan commuter traffic was of the order of 15-16million commuters (650-700 million pass-km) in FY80, one-third by ordinarytrains and two-thirds by diesel rail cars. The estimated operating loss wasabout B 35 million.
H. COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES
2.32 Article 43 of the State Railway Act of 1951 requires the Goverrnentto compensate SRT for overall deficits incurred in any fiscal year. Further,Sections 3.02(a) and 3.04 of the Guarantee Agreement for Loan L662-TH requirethe Government to take satisfactory measures to ensure adequate and promptcompensation for branch line losses and overall deficits. Compensation fromthe Government for the overall losses incurred by SRT over the period FY74-76was paid in installments over the period FY76-80. In FY77, SRT made anoverall profit; therefore, only compensation for the loss on branch. lines forthat year was payable; B 50 million was paid toward this only in FY80.Compensation for losses in FY78, FY79 and FY80 was paid in FY81, FY82 andFY83 (Table 2.6).
2.33 Total compensation for the years FY81, FY82, FY83 and FY84,remaining to be paid, amounts to about B 1,300 million. The delays incompensation payments result from the time neededed to complete the requiredformalities. The Government budget for the upcoming year is preDared duringthe first part of the current fiscal year. By the time it is completed, SRT'sfinancial statements for the previous year are yet to be certified by theOffice of the Auditor General. The Bureau of the Budget requires this certi-fication in order to make provision for the payment in the budget. Conse-quently SRT's losses are provided for in the Government's budget with anaverage payment delay of 30 months.
2.34 In the past, early reimbursement of losses was of no particularurgency: SRT knew it would be compensated eventually, and the cost to theGovernment, i.e. the finance charges related to the additional borrowingsrequired by SRT, was both modest (as long as interest rates were low) andhidden (as it was included in the deficit of subsequent years). In thefuture, if in line with the Government's objective of making State enterprisesfinancially less dependent on subsidies, SRT no longer receives loss compensa-tion for its main-line operations, but only for its "noncommercial" operations(uneconomic Lines and services), it will have to bear the interest cost ofcarrying accumulated past losses caused by delays in payment of compensation.
I. SRT FY82-86 INVESTMENT PLAN
2.35 SRT's FY82-86 Investment Plan (Table 2.7) was initially prepared bySRT on the basis of a tentative railway traffic growth target in FY82-86 ofabout 10% p.a. set by the Government in its general approach to the 1982-86Plan. Subsequently, the investments were reduced in accordance with morerealistic traffic forecasts (of 4-5% annual growth) and in conjunction withexplicit targets for improvement of SRT's future operational performance. Themotive power and rolling stock required to meet the traffic growth in FY87-88are also included in the plan.
- 25 -
2.36 SRT's proposed investments have been carefully scrutinized andrepresent a prudent program for making the railway more efficient, replacingaging assets and putting SRT on a continued expansion course. About 70Z ofthe investments under the Plan are for additional transport capacity to servenew traffic. The overall size of the Plan, incLuding contingencies, isB 8,844 million equivalent, of which about B 1,500 million (17%) is expectedto be carried o:er to 1987/88.
J. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
2.37 The major problem facing SRT is that costs are higher thanrevenues. Presently revenues are not enough to meet cash operating expenses(i.e. salaries and wages, fuel, materials and other) and interest on debt, nordo they provide adequately for depreciation. This situation developed in thelate 1970s, and has deteriorated further. The reasons for this are primarilythe political/social ramifications of tariff changes, as operationally SRT'sperformance has been generally good. The following describes briefly how thissituation has developed, and discusses SRT's prospects for a reversal of thistrend in the future.
Past Performance
2.38 SRT's financial performance (Table 2.8) has deteriorated steadilyover the last several years, the major reasons for this being:
(a) Large increases in labor costs even -hough staff numbers remainedreLatively stable (average increase Ln compensation per em oyee forthe years FY77 to FY82 was about 4.7% p.a. in real terms);-
(b) more than doubling of fuel costs in FY80, and further increase ofmore than 20% in FY81;
(c) tariff increases by the Government approved only in June 1981,which, although large, covered only part of the increase in costssince the previous tariff increases in 1975 and
(d) delays in receiving Government compensation for losses.
The tariff increase of June 1981 was high enough to reverse the trend slightlyand produce a somewhat better financial result in FY82 than in FY81, despite aloss in traffic and further cost increases during FY82.
2.39 The successive operating Losses from FY79 on have contributed to asevere cash drain on SRT. This cash drain was further aggravated by theGovernment's delays in compensating SRT for the losses of previous years, andin its failure to provide SRT with sufficient funds (as required under Loan1662-TH) to enable SRT to maintain cash of at least one month's workingexpenses plus debt-service requirements. Cash requirements are met by heavyreliance on overdrafts.
1/ From 1977 to 1982 the Consumer Price Index went up 71% and labor costswent up 106%.
- 26 -
Present Situation
2.40 In light of the budgetary difficulties faced by Thailand, theGovernment (Cabinet) in 1982 formulated a policy of reducing subsidies forState Enterprises by allowing, in principle, those which faced financialdifficulties, to raise prices of their goods and services, provided that theyupgrade their services at the same time. However, the small size of the June1983 passenger tariff increase made up only a small part of the past increasesin costs, thereby delaying the possibility of SRT achieving financialviability several more years. Another 7% increase is planned but has not yetbeen implemented.
2.41 To reduce the losses, SRT has embarked on a program to improveefficiency in train operations, maintenance, fuel consumption, braking andsignalling systems and to contract out the operation of its dining cars and tosell its hotels. Other schemes have been mentioned in the press such asleasing SRT land in Bangkok for commercial development. These measures arecommendable, but not sufficient to close the growing gap between expenses andrevenues.
2.42 Some 15Z of the services of SRT are operated for social, securityand other reasons and can be expected to create losses indefinitely whichshould be covered by the Government. The objective here is to contain thelosses, or even reduce them, through efficiency measures and changes in thelevel of services (e.g. selective closings). The other services of SRT, the"Commerical Operations" comprising the three main lines, could be expected toproduce a surplus if operated along commercial principles. It was the prin-cipal objective of the proposed Sixth Railway Project and its Plan of Action,to move the commercial operations of SRT towards financial viability by thelate 1980s. The Plan of Action required substantial average tariff increasesfor the commer_.;ial operations (of about 20Z for passengers and about 10% forfreight by October 1983) followed by further tariff increases of about 3.5?per annum in real terms. The actual tariff increases so far have beensubstantially lower.
Prospects for Future
2.43 SRT's financial projections for the coming years, indicate that noimprovement can be anticipated in the immediate future. If the situationdeteriorates further, it would be even more difficult to initiate measures toreverse the trend. Even larger tariff increases would be required, and therecovery period would be prolonged substantially. Hundreds of millions ofBaht would be added to the annual deficits with the cumulative effect well inthe billions. Costs will then have outgrown revenues to such an extent that apolicy of financial viability will no longer be practicable as it could forcethe railway out of existence.
2.44 To "break even" total revenues must grow faster than total expensesover the coming years, which can be achieved through a combination ofmarketing efforts, tariff increases, cost containment and efficiency measures,accompanied by improvement in service. A Bank mission in February 1985specifically addressed these matters and recommended a number of actions toachieve these aims.
2.45 The Government and SRT appear to be at a point of historicsignificance: the Government still has the option of moving SRT towards
- 27 -
financially viable operations. However, if this process is not started soon,this option may cease to exist. Then it is unlikely that SRT will be able toreverse the trend of financial deterioration, and the Government will be facedwith the need for ever-increasing subsidies indefinitely.
III. PORTS SUBSECTOR
A. THE PORTS SYSTEM
3.01 Thailand's seaborne dry cargo trade comprises: (a) conventionalbreak bulk and containerized imports and exports shipped through the BangkokPort; and (b) agricultural exports handled through Bangkok or, when exportedin bulk, through Mah Boon Krong and the deep sea anchorage at Ko-Sichang, bothon the Eastern Seaboard. Petroleum products are handled through Sri Racha,also on the Eastern Seaboard.
3.02 Plans for the deveLopment of a second deepwater port, within reason-able distance of Bangkok, have been under consideration for some time and werefinally narrowed down to a choice between a site at Laem Chabang and theexisting port at Sattahip. Sattahip was built in 1966 as a military portunder the control of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) to handle traffic associatedwith the Viet-Nam conflict, and was handed over to civil control in late 1979.
3.03 Two other ports in Southern Thailand, Phuket (West Coast) andSongkhla (East Coast) are being developed, under financing by the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB), as deep-sea ports to serve overseas traffic from thesouthern region.
3.04 The Bangkok Port comprises private and public wharves and is spreadalong some 40 km of the river Chao Phya upstream from its mouth. The mainwharves, operated by the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT), are located about27 km up-river at Klong Toei. The Bangkok port system includes, in additionto Bangkok port, the Sattahip Commercial Port, the deepwater anchorage at KoSichang and the jetty close to Sri Racha (Mah Boon Krong) used for bulkcassava exports in deep draft ships.
B. ORGANIZATION
3.05 The Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) was established as an auton-omous organization in 1951, aided by Loan 37-TH. It is responsible formanaging and operating the general cargo wharves at Klong Toei, and for thedredging and maintenance of the navigation channel in the Chao Phya riverwithin the port limits, including the Bar Channel at the river mouth. PAT hasalso been given the responsibility for operating Sattahip as a civilian port.
3.06 PAT is directly responsible to the Ministries of Communications andFinance. It is managed by a Board of Commissioners consisting of a Chairman,the Director General, and nine members. The Director General, assisted bythree Deputy Directors and the chiefs of the various service and operationaldepartments, is responsible for day to day operations. The major departmentsinclude Technical Office, Port Operations (Port of Bangkok and Sattahip
- 28 -
Commercial Port), Engineering, Marine, Personnel, and Comptrollers. Totalpermanent staff is about 5,950; PAT also employs about 100 temporary staff.
3.07 PAT has comprehensive responsibilities for handling break bulkgeneral cargo at Klang Toei after it is landed on the berths. Its functionsfor container operations are limited to provision of the container yard forstorage of containers and delivery to consignees. Stevedoring, i.e., thetransfer of goods from the ships' hold to the berth, is mostly undertaken bythe stevedoring companies or shipping companies.
3.08 Except for some operating problems, discussed later, the managementof the ports of Klong Toei and Sattahip is generally satisfactory. PAT's mainweaknesses are slowness in achieving egreed objectives and a tendency toprefer the "status-quo". Both Klong Toei and Sattahip have separate managersand staff reporting to the Director General of PAT, and separate accounts arekept which are consolidated into overall PAT accounts on an annual basis.
3.09 The Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance has a majorfunction in Thailand ports, as elsewhere. Relations between PAT and customsare good but there are some difficulties in disposing of goods which have beenin storage an excessive time and remain unclaimed. The Customs Departmentcurrently has the responsibility for such disposal, but much cargo continuesin storage after the auction of unclaimed cargo, and PAT is not able todispose of these. The Government has undertaken to remedy this situatiopduring the present project (the Bangkok-Sattahip Ports Project, Loan 1918-TH).
C. EXISTING FACILITIES
Port of Bangkok
3.10 The port of Bangkok comprises wharves, warehouses and mid-streamberths stretching for some 40 km along the Chao Phya river from its mouth.These facilities are mostly privately owned and operated except for PAT'swharves at Klong Toei and are largely used for export of agricultural pro-ducts; imports must, by law, be handled over PAT's facilities at Klong Toei.
3.11 The maximum draft of ships which can use the port is limited by theavailable depth of 8.5 21 below Mean Sea Level (MSL) at 7 entrance channel(10,000 to 12,000 dwt - general cargo and 400/500 TEU - container ships).The navigational channel has varying depths between 8.5 m and 11.5 m below MSLand permits passage of ships up to 172 m (565 ft) length. The tidal range inthe port basin is 1.37 m. Deep water exporting facilities are available inthe Gulf of Thailand at Mah Boon Krong on the Eastern Seaboard and theanchorage at Ko Sichang island opposite Mah Boon Krong. The capacity of theriver navigation channel needs to be assessed in view of the increasing numberof ships calling; this is to be done under the Bangkok Sattahip Ports Project.
2/ Deadweight tons.
3/ Twenty-foot equivalent unit.
- 29 -
3.12 The privately operated wharves at Bangkok include 82 public andprivate wharves, landing places and finger piers and 21 mid-stream anchoragesand moorings (13 existing and 8 under construction) at different locationsalong a considerable length of the river.
3.13 PAT's facilities, the Klong Toei wharves, comprise at present:
(a) ten conventional (break-bulk) general cargo berths on the West Quaywith a total length of 1,660 m and a dredged depth of 11.0 m belowMSL backed up by transit sheds, port warehouse space, and openstorage; which is generally adequate if excessive length of storageis avoided;
(b) six berths for container ships on the East Quay totalling 1,240 mwith 11.0 m depth below MSL and two berths for lighters totalling288 m with 6.5 m depth below MSL; two container berths, wereoriginally designed for break-bulk cargo and are backed up bytransit sheds which are currently being used as container freightstations (cfs); the remaining four are backed up by a containeryard; and
(c) thirty-six dolphin berths located midstream opposite the Klong Toeiberths, which are mostly used for export cargo loaded from barges;however, when there is congestion in the port, the CustomsDepartment also permits homogenous non-break bulk imports to bedischarged to barges at the dolphin berths for subsequent landing atprivate facilities.
3.14 Adequate mechanical equipment is available for conventional cargohandling, but the container yard equipment needs to be augmented. Floatingcraft are adequate for operations, however, the dredgers are old andinefficient, and should be replaced. Maintenance of the existing facilitiesis good. Roll-on roll-off facilities could be readily provided if suchtraffic developed.
3.15 Road access to Klong Toei berths, improved under Loan 37-TH, issatisfactory, and there is a good rail connection to the East Quay.
3.16 As previously noted, PAT is responsible for all operations involvedin handling break bulk general cargo handled over the Klong Toei West Quayberths; however, when the ships are tied up alongside, cargo is dischargedboth on to the berth and overside to barges; that proportion landed to bargesis landed ex-barge at private facilities and warehouses.
The Port of Sattahip
3.17 Sattahip harbor is located in a large bay on the eastern side of theGulf of Thailand and at the southern end of Thailand's Eastern Seaboard. Itis protected from the open sea by a breakwater some 1,000 m long. The dredgedentrance channel is about 150 m wide and has an available depth of 11 m belowMean Lower Low Water (MLLW). There has been very little silting in thechannel or harbor, but tugs are necessary, due to a cross current of about1 knot in the entrance channel at some stages of the tide. Tidal range isabout 1.28 m.
- 30 -
3.18 To form the required berths within the harbor, land has been re-claimed behind quay walls constructed of concrete caissons built out from theoriginal shore line. There are three 182 m long berths on the west face(berths 1-3 inclusive), each of which has a transit shed, and two 175 m longberths on the north face (berths 4 and 5), which have no transit shed. Thereare no berths on the south face which fronts the entrance channel and is opento wave action during south westerly weather conditions. The present depthalongside the berths is 9.3 m below MLLW. The dredged fairway fronting thewestern berths is adequate for safe ship handling but that for the northernberths requires improvement. Minor improvements, including fender renewal,provision for railway tracks and a container yard within the port, areprovided for in the Bangkok-Sattahip Port Project.
3.19 Over 60 ha of open storage is available, but the pavement isinadequate, and both new paving and renewal of the existing paving isrequired. For the current traffic, sufficient mechanical handling equipment,trailers and small craft are available. Except for the three transit sheds,there is little covered storage space available. There is, however, a goodmechanical workshop. Ancillary works and services are satisfactory. Adequatespace is available for future development inside the bay and the existingbreakwater.
3.20 The Government has constructed a railway line to Sattahip. The newline joins the existing eastern line from Bangkok at Chachoengsao. Theimmediate road access to the port is adequate, and there are a number ofalternative roads between Bangkok and Sattahip which are also adequate.
D. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS
Traffic
3.21 Import and export trade through the Bangkok Port System (Table 3.1)excluding petroleum products has increased from 15.0 million tons in 1976 to26.3 million tons in 1984. The breakdown is as follows:
Imports Exports Total… --------- (in million tons)-----
1976 3.96 11.02 14.981978 5.48 13.03 18.511982 5.67 19.50 25.171983 7.39 15.27 22.661984 6.86 19.41 26.26
Source: PAT
The fluctuations in exports are caused largely by bulk agricultural products.
3.22 Comparative figures for container and break-bulk cargo through PAT'sinstallations at Klong Toei (Table 3.2) are suamarized below:
- 31 -
Container Conventional AllImports Exports Total Imports Exports Total Traffic------ (In million tons) - ---------…
1978 0.58 0.47 1.05 2.81 0.26 3.07 4.121982 1.11 1.16 2.27 2.27 0.28 2.55 4.821983 1.49 1.33 2.82 2.87 0.25 3.12 5.941984 1.54 1.82 3.36 2.61 0.15 2.76 6.121985 /a 1.72 2.04 3.76 2.53 - 2.53 6.291990 _a 2.77 3.28 6.05 2.17 - 2.17 8.22
/a Forecast
Source: PAT
The only containerized traffic handled through Bangkok port is that over PAT'sKlong Toei wharves shown above.
3.23 Traffic at Sattahip in 1982 (Table 3.1) was 44,786 tons of importsand 263,413 tons of exports, totalling 308,199 tons. There was no containertraffic. The 1985 forecast is for 435,000 tons of total traffic, which againdoes not include any containerized traffic, but it may be necessary to divertsome containerized traffic from Klong Toei.
3.24 Shipping at PAT's Klong Toei wharves in 1982 amounted to 1,747ships. A breakdown by type of ships - conventional break bulk, container, andcombination vessels - is not currently reported, but a ship classificationsystem is being considered in the current tariff review financed under theongoing project.
Break Bulk Cargo Operations
3.25 PAT's cargo handling operations for break bulk cargo at Klong Toeiare in general satisfactory, although the handling rate in 1982, 11.1 tons pernet gang hour for goods handled over the West Quays, could be improved. Goodsunloaded at the West Quay and handled overside to barges and subsequentlylanded ex-barge through private wharves and warehouses on the river wasdischarged at a much better rate of 24.9 tons per net gang hour in 1982.
3.26 Efforts have been made over the years to introduce a multi-shiftsystem for cargo handling operations; but these have been resisted by PAT andthe Government, and it is unlikely such a system wilL be introduced in theforeseeable future. Not only do the current arrangements result in excessiveworking hours to the point of inefficiency, but also in high overtime paymentsfor this inefficiency. A study was made by consultants (WD Scott Pty.,Australia) under Loan 702-TH which strongly recommended a change from thepresent system to a multi-shift system.
- 32 -
3.27 PAT's main operational problems are (i) the large quantities ofgoods in storage for excessive periods; (ii) inability to move these goodsinto bonded warehouses (outside the port); and (iii) inability to dispose ofcargo which has not been claimed by the consignee or sold at the auctions forunclaimed cargo. PAT has undertaken to remedy this situation with the CustomsDepartment.
Container Handling
3.28 Each of the ten shipping companies represented in the port handlesits own import and export containers in the space allotted. Most containersare unstuffed in the container yard, where export containers are also beingstuffed. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that empty con-tainers, which are a high proportion of the total TEU in the yard, are stackedin the same area.
3.29 To streamline container operations, improve handling rate andincrease traffic handled, the container yard responsibilities were redefinedunder the present project and new container freight stations were constructedby PAT using its own funds. The container yard was also increased in size bysome 30,000 sq m and the charge for empty container storage has beenincreased. A container operations specialist provided by UN is also workingwith PAT to improve the existing system and it is expected PAT's participationin container handling will increase.
Traffic Capacity at KLong Toei and Proposed Diversion ofContainer Traffic to Sattahip
3.30 At the time of appraisal of the ongoing port project (February1980), conventional break bulk ships were limited to the West Quay berths andwere experiencing excessive waiting time. The traffic forecast also anticipa-ted continuing growth of break bulk cargoes. It was accordingly agreed thatthe six East Quay container berths which were not being fully utilized wouldbe allocated for use by break bulk vessels as might be necessary to ensurethat annual waiting time for all berths at Klong Toei did not exceed 1,000days per annum. Any container capacity lost by using East Quay berths forconventional ships would be accommodated by transferring container ships toSattahip and moving the containers offloaded there to the proposed Bankfinanced inland container freight station at Bang Sue by rail.
3.31 In practice, container traffic has developed faster and conventionalcargo slower than expected (Table 3.2). The need to convert container berthsto conventional break bulk cargo usage has not therefore arisen, and the sixberths continue to be availabLe for container traffic at Klong Toei. With anestimated capacity of some 3.0 million tons (300,000 TEU), the need totransfer overflow traffic out of Klong Toei is now imminent (TabLe 3.3).
3.32 The size and scope of the inland container freight station proposedat Bang Sue for handling container traffic brought from Sattahip by rail, hasbeen reviewed and reduced in scope. This follows che Government's decision tolimit development of Sattahip to handle only the overflow traffic from Bangkokuntil Laem Chabang is available about 1990.
- 33 -
E. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
3.33 The Government has been considering development of a new port atLaem Chabang on the Eastern Seaboard since about 1972. The Bank has advisedagainst such development on the ground that development at Sattahip was moreeconomic and also on environmental grounds given the closeness of Laem Chabangto the resort town of Pattaya.
3.34 The Bank and the Government agreed in 1979 that Sattahip should as afirst stage be developed to handle traffic to 1990/95. Further development tohandle traffic to the year 2000 and beyond was to be studied. The resultingproject financed by Loan 1918-TH was appraised in February 1980 and signed inDecember 1980. The study for Sattahip development for traffic to the year2000 was financed by the Australian Government and undertaken by consultants,Maunsell and Partners (Australia) in association with Sindu Pulsirivong andPartners (Thailand). It was completed in 1982 and indicated that Sattahipcould be economically developed to handle bulk and container traffic to theyear 2000 with break bulk traffic continuing to be handled at Klong Toei.
3.35 The Government determined, however, on the basis of an internalstudy, that Laem Chabang would be the best location for additional major portfacilities to handle future container and conventional cargo traffic. TheCovernment also decided that Sattahip would in the long run be dedicatedsolely to bulk handling of material for the proposed Eastern Seaboardindustrial development in the Rayong area.
3.36 Subsequently, following advice from a specialist port missionfinanced by the Japanese Government,a bulk port for the Eastern SeaboardIndustrial Estate at Map Ta Pud near Rayong was brought into consideration.The present proposals under consideration by the Government are:
(a) to proceed with provision of a breakwater, one break bulk berth andthree container berths with back-up facilities at Laem Chabang;
(b) to proceed with provision of a dredged channel, breakwater and twobulk berths at Map Ta Pud; and
(c) to proceed with development of Sattahip only to the first stagerequired to handle overflow container traffic from Klong Toei untilLaem Chabang is available (1990-1995).
3.37 In this context, two important considerations are: (1) the type ofshipping Thailand can attract and utilize which will help determine the draftrequirements and hence the amount of dredging required (a high cost initiallyand possibly for maintenance); and (2) the type of port facilities to bebuilt, considering the possible traffic to be handled at the ports. A reviewof the port development plans by recognized, independent experts would beuseful.
- 34 -
F. FINANCES
3.38 PAT's consolidated income accounts and balance sheets for 1976-84(Table 3.4 and 3.5) show profitable operations with annual surpluses around B200 million except for 1982 which registered an operating deficit of B 21million due to a decline in total traffic over Klong Toei wharves in 1982compared to 1981. The net income position in 1984 indicates a surplus of B364 million.
3.39 The principal ratios for 1981 through 1984 are:
1981 1982 1983 1984
Operating 84 102 81 74Times interest earned 10.7 -1.3x 17.6x 30.3xCurrent 3.9x 2.2x 3.1x 4.3xDebt/equity 7/93 6/94 5/95 4/96
IV. INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL PORTS
A. INLAND WATERWAYS
Inland Waterways System
4.01 Thailand has a well-developed inland waterways system which coverswell over one-third of the country and extends over some 1,600 km of navigablewaterways. Most of this length is in the northern corridor between Bangkokand Uttaradit along the rivers Chao Phrya and Nan, and the remainder along theMekong river on the Thai-Laotian border. The principal navigable rivers are:
(a) the North Chao Phrya River System comprising the Chao Phya Riverfrom the Chao Phrya dam (at Chainat) and its two main tributariesthe Nan and Ping rivers. From the dam to the northernmost part(Uttaradit) on the Nan is about 450 km and to Kamphaeng Phet on thePing about 265 km;
(b) the lower Chao Phrya from the Gulf of Thailand to the Chao Phya Dam(280 km);
(c) the Supha Tha Chin/Noi Rivers (about 150 km each);
(d) the Pasak River from Ayutthya to the Rama VI Dam (about 45 km);
(e) the Mae Klong River System from Samut Prakan on the Chao Phya to theTha Chin River on to the Mae Klong River up to Kanchanaburi (about250 km); and
(f) the Bang Pakong River from the Gulf of Thailand to Chachoeng Sao(about 35 km). This river is of minor importance for inland rivertraffic except for lighterage operation at the estuary. Thistraffic is regulated under the Bangkok Port System.
- 35 -
4.02 River levels, flows and navigation are influenced by the season.With the arrival of the monsoon in May, water levels rise until they peak inAugust, thereafter declining since December, followed by the dry season fromJanuary to May when water levels are low. These influences are to some extentmodified by a system of irrigation canals and single or multipurpose dams.Nevertheless there are navigation problems in the dry season. The dams ofprimary interest to navigation in the Northern Corridor are the multipurposeSirikit dam on the Nan river about 60 km north of the diversion dam nearChainat and the Rama VI diversion dam at Tha Reua. The multipurpose dams areused for electricity generation, and all dams serve irrigation. Other watermanagement considerations are domestic and industrial water supply and watersalinity control in the lower Chao Phya, which is affected by ocean tides.
4.03 The principal navigation problems arising from the low water levelsin the dry season exist on a stretch of the Nan south of Taphan Hin, a stretchof the upper Chao Phya between Nakhon Sawan and Phayuha Khiri and a stretch onthe lower Chao Phya between Chainat and Angthong. During some 50 days of thisperiod, available water depths in the first two sections falls to about 1.5 m,forcing barges to reduce payloads. On the Last section, water depths can beas low as 0.9 m, effectively preventing navigation. When the lower Chao Phyabetween Chainat and Angthong is closed for navigation, barges detour on abypass consisting of sections of the Noi and Tha Chin rivers, but these routeswith a total of ten locks are narrow, winding, slow and costly. Further, thelocks permit the passage of only traditional wooden barges (50-80 tons dead-weight). Deepening of all critical Chao Phya and Nan river sections up toTaphan Hin to a minimum water depth of 1.7 m, which involves dredging to 2.2 mdepth to aLlow for clearance and some siltation between maintenance dredgingoperations, is being carried out under the ongoing Inland Waterways andCoastal Ports Project (Loan 1889-TH).
4.04 More than 100 terminals and a number of minor loading pcints arelocated along the waterways. Their density is highest near population centersand in the rice-exporting areas. All are privately owned and opt..ated andmost handle onLy one commodity. Terminals on the lower and upper Chao Phyaand Nan are relatively primitive. Some have a floating raft to bring thebarge alongside, others not. Some mechanical equipment is being used,primarily for handling of sand and cement, and a few rice terminals areequipped with Loading chutes. Otherwise loading or unloading is ':ith basketsand bags by hand. In the rice and maize-exporting areas, a considerablenumber of rice mills and covered storage facilities are located o.. the river-banks. Two of the larger existing loading points on the Chao Phya-Nan riversare Nakhon Sawan and Taphan Hin. Their present capacity is, however, inade-quate to handle expected traffic increases resulting from improvement of thewaterways, and new constrution is being carried out under the ongoing project.
Traffic
4.05 The river-influence areas are important agricultural productionzones; they also have large mineral deposits. Some 5.4 million tons oftraffic were generated in 1981 over the several systems as follows:
- 36 -
Inland System(Tons)
North Chao Phya 1,000,000Lower Chao Phya 1,800,000Tha Chin/Noi 30,000Pasak 2,300,000Mae Klong 260,000
5,390,000
Source: DECONS
4.06 In order of tonnage, the major commodities carried by rivertransport are sand, maize, rice, cement, gravel, tapioca pellets, andminerals. Potash and soda ash are potential large users of river tranportfollowed by fluorite and lead ore. Most of the sand and rice carried by thewaterways now comes from the North Chao Phya River System, maize comes mainlyfrom this area and the Pasak and cement from the Pasak. The lower Chao Phyahandles sand, rice and tapioca pellets.
4.07 At present, inland waterways handle a relatively small share of thebulk commodities suitable for barge transport, largely due to lack of invest-ment in both barges and waterways. Although speed is not essential for themajority of the commodities being transported, timing is of importance in thepresent marketing system for several export commodities, e.g. rice, maize andtapioca. Therefore reliability is important and the ongoing project will helpassure more reLiable transport on the North Chao Phya and Nan Rivers by reduc-ing the number of shoal areas the barges must cross.
Waterways Transport Industry
4.08 Thailand's inland waterways transport industry is highly competitiveand free from regulation. The barge fleet consists of some 4,500 units withindividual capacities of 40 to over 300 dwt plus 3,000-3,500 smaller units(Table 4.1). About 3,300 of the 4,500 barges are of traditional design, madeof wood and with a capacity of below 100 dwt each. Construction of woodenbarges has all but been discontinued. The total capacity of the 4,500-unitfleet is 450,000 dwt, which handles 8.6 million tons anually. All barges aremoved by towboats using the pull-towing astern method which requires thefollowing barges to have crew for steering and stopping the convoy. If thebarges were pushed, a barge train could consist of more than ten units andimprove transport efficiency appreciably. Development of more efficient bargedesigns and methods of operation are part of the ongoing project. A require-ment for some new barge types will be the capability to sail on the openwaters of the Gulf of Thailand on journeys between upcountry and Ko Sichang,Mah Boon Krong and Sattahip loading terminals/anchorages in the Gulf ofThailand for agricultural exports.
4.09 The inland waterways fleet of barges and towboats is in privatehands except for a few units owned and operated by the Government-ownedExpress Transport Organization (ETO). The traditional wooden barges are gen-erally operated by the owners who live on them with their families. Most of
- 37 -
these boats are engaged in rice transport. A few owner-operators have beenable to enter the transport markets for sand, cement and maize, but thesetrades are dominated by companies with modern steel barges. Several of thesetransport firms own between 50 and 100 steel barges and towboats.
DeveLopment Planning
4.10 There is a limited capacity for planning in the Harbour Depart-ment. Recognizing this, the Government has requested financing for developingthis capability (para. 4.21). Feasibility studies are done by consultantsand, currently under study are the Pasak River (Rama VI Dam to Amphur KaengKoi-45 km) and Klong (canal) Sanpasamit, Klong Tachin and Mae Klong River toKanchanaburi (30, 30, 140 km respectively). The questions being addressed arethe navigation potential of these river systems and the improvementsrequired. The Pasak needs to have the navigation locks at the Rama VI Damenlarged to permit the current larger barges to pass and the removal of someshoals. The Mae Klong system will require dredging and embankment works. Aprefeasibility study (1982) estimated the cost of these works in the order ofUS$20.0 million.
B. COASTAL PORTS
Inventory
4.11 In addition to its two existing deepsea ports (Bangkok and Sattahip)and two new ones (Songkhla and Phuket) under construction, Thailand has some30 shallow draft "coastal" ports. Coastal ports vary greatly in size andconsist in some cases of little more than wooden wharves or jetties forlanding fish and small volumes of cargo. Some coastal ports serve only localneeds, while others are of regional importance. While virtually all weredeveloped by private initiative at a time when Land transport was difficult,costly or unavailable, many retain their importance for regional develop-ment. The majority of coastal ports are located on the east and west coastsof the southern peninsula and the remainder on the northern fringe of the Gulfof Thailand from west of Bangkok eastwards to the Cambodian border (Map No.14856R1).
4.12 Most coastal ports are riverine and subject to severe draftrestrictions at the channel entrance; many have a channel depth of only 0.5 rmor less below MSL. The more exposed east-coast ports on the southernpeninsula also face operational restrictions due to the north-east monsoon.Because of the shallow entrance channels, lighterage is required for a sub-stantial part of the export and some of the domestic trade, and the movementof small cargo and larger fishing vessels in and out of the ports is generallylimited to high tide. Continuous siltation from riverborne and littoralsources aggravates these problems and necessitates frequent channel dredging.
Administration
4.13 Most coastal ports are privately owned and operated. In some cases,municipalities and provincial governments manage wharves and jetties, and theFish Marketing Organization (FMO), a Government organization, has constructedfishing wharves in more than ten locations as well as a number of cold storageplants. Land title for ports managed by municipal and provincial governments
- 38 -
is retained by the Ministry of Finance. When there is a dispute over paymentfor the rental of the port, the Harbour Department will manage the w;arves andjetties. The Department's role is normally limited to maintenance or improve-ment dredging of navigation channels. The Customs Department maintainscustoms posts in a number of the coastal ports.
Traffic
4.14 Ships' manifests, surrendered to the Customs Department when shipsenter or leave a port, are the-primary cargo data source for estimatingcoastal traffic. Traffic statistics for 1981 covering some 20 porte account-ing for 75% to 80% of total estimated traffic show a domestic cargo of about1.2 million tons and foreign cargo of about 1.1 million ton. Fish Landings atcoastal ports were estimated at about 1.8 million tons in 1981. Total comr-bined volumes of domestic cargo and fish are thus in the neighborhood of3 million tons annually.
4.15 Some 60% of the cargo at the coastal ports in FY81, consisted ofbulk petroleum products. Transport of petroleum products to southernThailand's depots is almost exclusively by sea, and distribution from thedepots to market is by road. Domestic dry cargo consists of a variety ofconsumer goods, fertilizers, cement and other construction materials, most ofthem originating from the Bangkok area, and of primary products such astimber, fish meal and palm oil with Bangkok generally being the transit orfinal destination. Rice in bulk is carried by rail and not sea because ofGovernment regulations designed to prevent smuggling.
4.16 Competition with land traffic, poor port facilities and shallowdraft, complicated documentation, inefficient institutional procedures, fewinvestment incentives and an attitude of benign neglect, are all contributingto the decline of coastal shipping. Possible changes in the Government'spolicies intended to stimulate coastal shipping have been investigated under astudy on coastal shipping being carried out by the Japanese InternationalCooperation Agency. Institutional and operational improvements for theHarbour Department are being provided for under the Bank's ongoing project,and these will provide more frequent and efficient channel dredging which willbe a further stimulant for the coastal shipping sector.
Coastal Fleet
4.17 Only one common carrier, Harinsu Transport Company, Ltd., maintainsregular domestic coastal shipping services but only to Songkhla. The companyhas a fleet of 12 vessels of 100-250 net tons. Three other small companies,with eight vessels, operate weekly non-scheduled services serving Bangkok,Songkhla, Ko Somni, Pak Panang and Tha Thong. All carriers are privatelyowned and operated and all but two of the 18 vessels are wooden. The maincoastal traffic, bulk petroleum, is carried by tankers operating out of SriRacha which are made up of units of 300 to over 2,000 dwt. Of the six east-coast ports on the southern peninsula with oil depots, all but one (Songkhla)require tankers to be well below the 2,000 dwt size te enter fully laden. TheBank is financing a program for port development, including capital andmaintenance dredging of entrance channels, which will permit the use of largervessels and generate substantial economies of scale.
- 39 -
Development Planning
4.18 The coastal ports and shipping sector has received relatively littleGovernment attention and support. The reasons for this are many, including(a) the predominance of private and local interests in the management andownership of coastal ports, (b) the fact that the Government's main emphasishas been on land transport, (c) lack of a clear-cut mandate to a particularGovernment agency for port development, and (d) a Harbour Department which isonly gradually acquiring development planning expertise. It is only latelythat regional policy considerations and rising energy costs have led theGovernment to pay more attention to coastal shipping needs and resulted insuch studies as those to develop Phuket and Songkhla ports. Also the CoastalPorts Study financed by the Bank has stimulated further interest in the futurerole of domestic waterborne transport. Future planning requirements fallingon the Harbour Department will be (a) the extension of development studies forports not yet fully reviewed, and (b) the development of a rational programfor capital and maintenance dredging of port channels and sections of theinland waterways. The Department's ability to meet these requirements arebeing improved under the ongoing project and feasibility studies are under wayfor possible projects, using the previous Bank-financed study as a basis.
C. HARBOUR DEPARTMENT
Functions and Organization
4.19 The Harbour Department is a part of the Ministry of Communications(HOC). It is responsible for planning, undertaking and controlling main-tenance, improvement, and navigation on inland waterways and coastal ports inThailand. Its specific responsibilities for inland waterways are regulationand control of navigation, improvement and maintenance of navigation channels,inspection and registration of waterway transport companies and vessels,waterway development planning and licensing of companies for sand dredging inriverbeds. The Department's role with respect to coastal ports is generallylimited to maintenance or improvement dredging of navigation channels, whichare the principal problems of the coastal ports. Presently it is responsibleonly for port management and operations of the two inland waterways ports,Nakhon Sawan and Taphan Hin.
4.20 The Department was last reorganized in 1974. It is headed by aDirector General and two deputies, one for Administration and one forTechnical Matters, and divided into ten Divisions which are subdivided intoSections. The most important divisions are (a) the Technical Divisions, whichis in charge of project planning, and (b) the Dredging and MaintenanceDivision, which is responsible through force account for dredging of naviga-tion channels on the coast and inland waterways.
4.21 The Harbour Department's planning and management of works is weakand operation of the dredgers it controls needs improvement, mainly because oflack of qualified staff. Some expertise in planning has been acquired fromparticipation in the consultants' studies for the ongoing project and from thestudies undertaken for the Phuket and Songkhla ports. To strengthen it, tech-nical assistance is being provided to develop a management information systemand to train staff in project evaluation. Overseas training in coastal
- 40 -
engineering dredging techniques, survey engineering and economic planing isalso being considered.
4.22 Capital and maintenance dredging of navigation channels is organizedaround four regional centers, at Songkhla on the east and Kantang on the westcoast of the southern peninsula, at Chanta Buri southeast of Bangkok and atAyutthya on the Chao Phrya river. Despite the fact that dredging is, by far,the Department's most important function on which the largest percentage ofits manpower and budget are focused, it is weak in planning, management andexecution of such works. Further, control of works is inadequate, with poormeasurement and accounting techniques and lack of surveys of completed work.While some measures to alleviate this problem are being taken under the on-going project, lack of qualified staff to be trained is a continuing issue.
Staff
4.23 The Department's total approved staff is about 600 officers withcivil service status, 830 permanent and 160 temporary subordinate personneland labor. About 50 officers' posts are vacant because of unattractive publicservice employment conditions and lack of budget appropriations. The Dredgingand Maintenance Division has a total of 570 approved positions of which 10lare unfilled, and the Technical Division has an approved staff strength of 210with 15Z vacancies.
Revenues and Expenditures
4.24 The Harbour Department's budget expenditures in FY84 were aboutB 236 million (Table 4.2). Between 50% and 60% of expenditures for the yearshave been for dredging and maintenance and between 20% and 25% were overgeneral administration. Actual expenditures are consistently less thanbudgeted, ranging from 40X to 89% of total budgeted. Revenues collected bythe Harbour Department amounted to B 45 million annually, virtually all fromservice charges such as vessel licensing and piloting. All revenues are beingcollected for deposit to the Treasury account. Departmental revenues rangefrom 15% to 25% of expenditures.
D. ISSUES
4.25 The main issues are land acquisition and staffing. The HarbourDepartment does not have right of eminent domain and, when land owners orsquatters contest the acquisition, it must institute legal proceedings whichare time consuming. In the case of the ongoing project this has taken somethree years. The staffing problem stems from the Government's moratorium onnew hiring and, to some extent, from the inability of the Department toattract and retain qualified staff in sufficient numbers to carry out thenecessary work due to the low salary scales. While not all project delays canbe attributed to lack of quaLified staff, much more time is spent reviewingproposals and contracts as well as supervising work than should be the casewith adequate numbers of well qualified personnel.
- 41 -
V. SHIPPING
A. FLEET COMPOSITION
5.01 The Thai oceangoing merchant fleet consists of 87 dry cargo vesselswith a capacity of 435,341 dwt and 62 tanker vessels with a capacity of243,236 dwt, for a total fleet of 149 vessels with a combined capacity of678,577 dwt. The fleet serves domestic (coastal), regional and long distanceforeign routes. The largest number of vessels (76) with a combined capacityof 248,000 dwt serve the trade with southeast Asia. Other major servi:es areto Japan, Korea, and Europe. Twenty-eight vessels with a capacity of 65,000dwt serve the domestic trade exclusively while 2 ships with 9,000 dwt and 22ships with 175,000 dwt capacity are respectively designated as serving foreignor unspecified trades.
5.02 There are 46 dry general cargo ship owning companies, of which 25own only one ship each and only 5 companies own more than 3 ships each. Mostof the single ship companies own smaller ships and trade in the domestic orASEAN coastal trades. There are 22 tanker owning companies, with some owningas many as 15 tankers, but there are also 6 tanker companies which own only asingle (small) ship and ten of the 62 tankers are gas carriers (LNG or LPG).Only 2 are large 70,200 dwt tankers, owned by Thai Ocean Transportation, whichoperate worldwide. The others serve essentially domestic coastal trade.
5.03 The average age of the fleet is about 20 years. The age distribu-tion varies little with ship type: the average age of oil tankers is 19years, of general cargo ships 21 years and of gas carriers 19 years. Thereare no container or modern Ro-Ro vessels in the fleet. (The average age ofthe world merchant fleet is less than 11 years.) A large expansion of theThai fleet took place in 1965-70 with little further investment since then.
5.04 The fleet is not only relatively old, but also lacks the two mostimportant types of ships used in the foreign trade of Thailand, viz containerships and dry bulk carriers. Thailand has moved very cautiously towardscontainerization and, although a significant proportion of its general cargoin foreign trade is now containerized, few main line services provide directlong distance container ship calls at Thai ports. Some of the smaller Thaivessels have been adapted to container feeder service and operate betweenBangkok and Singapore or Hong Kong, where cargo is transferred to or from mainline container vessels. But participation of Thai shipping even in feederservices is quite marginal. There is only one 4,000 dwt full container feedership in the fleet. Dry bulk cargo, mainly agricultural goods such as tapioca,rice and similar exports, are usually carried by large foreign flag bulkcarriers. Ships in the Thai fleet are too small to participate effectively inthe bulk trade except in short distance transport of bulk commodities.
5.05 Thailand, a late signatory of the UNCTAD Liner Code of Conduct, withits recomendation for cargo sharing, has yet not ratified this agreement,which came into force on October 6, 1983. At the same time the Thai Govern-ment has continued to introduce various pieces of legislation designed toadvance the interests of Thai shipping. Government agencies are encouraged touse the Government-owned forwarding agent and vessels belonging to the ThaiMaritime Navigation Co. Ltd., the United Thai Shipping Co. Ltd. and the UnitedThai Shipping Corporation. The Mercantile Ma'-ine Promotion Act B.E. 2521,
- 42 -
passed in October 1978, aims at promoting Thai flag vesssels through fiscaland other measures, including cargo preference and the prevention of dumpingby foreign flag vessels. It empowers the Government to permit a deductionamounting to not more than 50% of the costs of carriage from the shippers' netincome prior to income Lax calculation when using Thai flag vessels for theseaborue transportation of cargoes ordered by government agencies and enter-prises. MOC has issued regulations requiring government agencies, govern-mental organizations, and state enterprises to use Thai ships to transporttheir imported goods on five routes (Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, andEurope). Goods purchased through loans from foreign governments and inter-national financial institutions are exempt from the regulations. To date,-most imports have fallen into the non-reserved category. Most of the legisla-tion deals with liner type shipping, but much of Thailand's foreign trade isin bulk shipping of agricultural exports, and petroleum, cement, etc.,imports. As long as Thailand does not acquire reasonable bulk carryingcapacity, legislation designed to promote the shipping subsector would bemoot.
5.06 The Government recognizes that incentives provided by the MercantileMarine Promotion Act may not suffice to encourage significant growth of theThai merchant fleet. Thailand's foreign trade exceeded $15 billion in valuein 1981 and has in recent years consistently exceeded 50X of the country'sGNP. But only about 5% in volume (and slightly more in value) of Thailand'sforeign trade is carried by Thai ships. The cost of foreign trade shippingservices is difficult to estimate but should approximate nearly US$1 billion,or about 7% of the value of Thai international trade.
5.07 Privately owned Thai shipping companies appear to be more efficientin their operations and marketing and participate quite effectively in compe-tition with government-owned shipping. However, as already mentioned, owner-ship and management of Thai shipping is highly fragmented.
5.08 While the larger shipping companies serving Japan, Korea and Europeare usually members of the respective conferences serving the trade, most ofthe smaller companies serving domestic and Asean trades provide nonconferenceservices with less regular scheduling. The 17 tanker operating companies aremainly engaged in contract or charter trades for Thai national or private oilcompanies.
B. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
5.09 The shipping industry is supervised by MOC and the Mercantile MarinePromotion Commission. There is also the Thai Shipping Association to whichmost owners and operators belong, and which represents the industry in discus-sions with the Government. The primary concern of the Government and industryis the size and age of the existing fleet and the possibility of fleetexpansion and renewal. The industry needs to replace obsolete tonnage andexpand the fleet if it is to carry a larger share of Thai foreign trade.
5.10 The Goveranent has indicated that it would encourage the strength-ening of both the Government and privately owned sectors of the shippingindustry. It is looking at alternative approaches to shipping financing andlarger participation in both long distance liner and bulk trade.
- 43 -
5.11 Thai shipping companies are short of experienced managers. Mc t ofthem, in particular the smaller ones are managed by investors and not byexperienced shipping managers. A rationalization of the industry into fewerlarger companies, similar to the approach used in Korea recently, could offeran attractive solution. The main problem is the lack of financial strengthand inability to raise money for ship acquisition.
5.12 Thai shipping would probably be adequately served by acquisition ofyoung second hand ships which can be procured at low cost. For example, a5-year third generation container ship, or a 60,000 ton dry bulk carrier ingood condition can be purchased at 40-50X of the price of a new ship. Theproblem is that supplier and foreign Government credit is usually not avail-able for such transactions, and the seller (sometimes a bank) will normallyrequire cash payment. Commercial banks have recently become disinterested inship financing and particularly lending for the purchase of second handships. The exception may be purchase of a vessel acquired by a bank in aforeclosure proceeding.
C. FUTURE PROSPECTS
5.13 The main trades in which the Thai merchant fleet has opportunitiesfor expansion are the Thai dry bulk cargo trades in which it participates verylittle, the container feeder service trade to Singapore, Hong Kong and otherlarge container transhipment centers, and the overseas long distance containertrade to selected destinations such as Japan/Korea/Taiwan/China/NorthwestEurope and the US West Coast. Expansion into the dry bulk and containerfeeder service trades should form the first phase of fleet expansion, whichshould occur only after (voluntary) rationalization of the Thai shippingindustry. Expansion into long distance full container service should consti-tute a second phase of fleet expansion and should occur after rationalizedcompanies have been able to establish firm relationships with large foreigncontainer operating companies and have been admitted to or are at leastacceptable to the relevant liner conferences.
5.14 It is important to develop incentives for fleet rationalization.Technical assistance should include development of a formal program for fleetratiopalization, marketing studies, and development of financing plans. Itshould also include training of shipping managers, ship operating crew,terminal operators, and marketing and booking staff.
D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.15 The Thai shipping industry is too fragmented to permit effectiveexpansion and modernization. It is largely composed of old, small andinefficient vessels competing with modern foreign vessels. Thailand spends alarge amount of foreign exchange for shipping services rendered by foreignshipping.
5.16 Coastal shipping capacity is adequate, and additional requirementsfor coastal shipping capacity can readily be provided by transfer of oceangoing vessels as these are replaced by larger modern vessels. The most
- 44 -
important need is to acquire a reasonable number of dry bulk carriers andsmall full container (and possibly RoRo) vessels to establish effective Thaifeeder services, followed by the purchase of larger full container vesselsdesigned to serve a limited number of high-density container shippingtrades. Decisions on these should, of course, be taken after carefulevaluation of the economic and financial viability of specific investmentproposals. Alternatively, the Government could consider leasing ships tocarry a part of its foreign trade.
5.17 To accomplish this, a formal plan or program for fleetrationalization is required and should be developed in parallel with the-provision of technical assistance to the industry.
VI. URBAN TRANSPORT 1
A. OVERVIEW
Urbanization in Thailand
6.01 One out of six of Thailand's 48 million people (1980 .opulation)live in urban areas. In relation to most other East Asian count-ies, this isa low level of urbanization. However, the annual rate of population growth inurban areas has been about 5.3% between 1970-80, approximately twice thenational rate, reflecting increasing migration from rural areas to thecities. Bangkok dominates the urban scene with well over half of the nation'surban population - 4.7 million out of 8.4 million. The next largest city,Chiang Mai, has a population of only 160,000, which is less than Bangkok'sAnnual growth. There are only 11 cities (including Bangkok) with populationsexceeding 50,000. Still, by the end of the century, the country's urban popu-lation is expected to more than double to about 17-20 million, and the greaterBangkok metropolitan area is expected to approach or exceed 10 million.
Vehicle Ownership and Use
6.02 Bangkok dominates the urban transport subsector to an even greaterextent. With a population of only 10% of the national total, motor vehicleregistrations in Bangkok account for about 39% of the national total (exclud-ing 2-wheelers). About 80Z of cars and taxis and 70% of buses are registeredin Bangkok. Moreover, motor vehicle registrations in Bangkok have grown 13%per annum over the past five years (1978-83), or 9% p.a. excluding motor-cycles. This annual growth rate has resulted in a doubling of the motorvehicle fleet from about 500,000 in 1978 to over 1,000,000 by the end of1984. Currently 4,000 motorized vehicles with 3 or more wheels and about4,000 motorcycles are added every month to Bangkok's motor vehicle
1/ The Bank has so far made only one loan for urban transport - the BangkokTraffic Management Project (Loan 1638-TH) for US$16.0 million, whichbecame effective in 1979. A Regional Cities Project was appraised inOctober 1983.
- 45 -
population. As a result, over half of all vehicle-km of traffic in thecountry is concentrated in the Central Region within a radius of 150 km ofBangkok.
B. EXISTING TRANSPORT CONDITIONS IN BANGKOK
6.03 Bangkok's traffic conditions are among the worst in Asia, and inrecent years have been steadily deteriorating. Severe congestion is theprincipal symptom, with long journey times, high fuel consumption, and highlevel of pollution. Rapid growth of the human and vehicle populations,divided responsibility among separate agencies with no coordinating authority,and inadequate investments have contributed to the growing seriousnes- of thesituation oveP the past 10-15 years. Recent developments indicate that moreeffective attention may soon be given to these problems.
Road System
6.04 Bangkok's transport infrastructure is characterized by a very lowproportion of space devoted to roadways (not more than 10% in the inner core)and a road network dependent on a limited number of major roads with only afew connecting links, particularly outside the grid network in the centralarea of the city. The remaining road network, consisting of a discontinuousjumble of minor streets, or "sois", is typically narrow and winding, and haspoor system continuity. The problem is being compounded as the city growsoutward, with private land developers providing subdivision roads withoutrelationship to an overall arterial road network. The result is a configu-ration of road space that is unable to cope with existing transport demands,let alone projected or latent transport growth. As the motor vehicle fleet isexpanding at about 9% annually, the comparatively modest road building andtraffic management measures that have been introduced have not been able tokeep pace with needs. Travel speeds have accordingly declined and willdecline further until a point is reached where certain trips are deferred oraltogether cancelled as the cost of travel becomes too high. There is someevidence that this point may already have been reached as typical car speedsare only 12 km/h and bus speeds 9 km/h during the heaviest travel hours in thecentral area of the city. Furthermore, congestion has reached such highlevels that no "peak hours" are discernible as heavy traffic spreads through-out most of the working day. Further evidence of the deteriorating situationis the progressive spreading of acute congestion outward from the city centeras motor vehicle ownership increases. Associated with the considerable traf-fic congestion are high levels of air and noise pollution and poor environ-mental and safety conditions for pedestrians.
Existing Public Transport System
6.05 Within Bangkok about 60% of person-trips on arterial streets arecarried by buses and minibuses which constitute only 6Z of the stream ofpassenger vehicles. In contrast, private cars, which comprise over half ofthe traffic stream, carry only one-fourth of all person-trips. A dominantproportion of public transport services in Bangkok are provided by BMTA, a5,000-bus. 24,000-employee operation, which is among the largest urban buscompanies in the world. BMTA carries about 3.8 million passengers daily withoperations on 135 routes (of which 17 have air-conditioned buses). About 20%
- 46 -
of public transit trips are provided by minibuses, both Legally registered andillegally. Relatively minor amounts of intra-urban public transit servicesare provided by taxis, the State Railway of Thailand and ferries across andalong the Chac Phrya River. Outside Bangkok, in the regional cities, publictransit services are provided by private operators, most typically by severaloperators in each city plying routes with minibuses and 3-wheeled vehiclescalled "samlors".
6.06 Since its inception in 1976, when it was formed from the consolida-tion of 24 private companies, BMTA has been severely under-capitalized, notbeen given a suitable fare structure for profitable operation, and has lackedsuitable management control over its operations. In spite of a B 2.2 billionGovernment grant in 1983, BMTA is clyrying a debt of over B 1 billion (mid-1983) and losing B 2 million daily.- The fare structure of 1.5 Baht fortrips up to 10 km is too low to ensure cost recovery even if BMTA operationswere substantially improved. Attempts to raise the basic fare from 1.5 to 2.0Baht were made3 n 1982, but pressure from the public resulted in fares beingkept at B 1.5. The fare was finally raised, on February 15, 1985, to a flatrate o B 2.0 for non-airconditioned service. The fare should be at leastB 2.5 to allow BMTA to break even after allowing for depreciation and debtservice. Air-conditioned service at a base fare of B 5.0 is also losingmoney. Furthermore, while the city has grown, public transit service has notkept pace: the number of BMTA buses in daily operation has not increasedsince 1978 (while overall motor vehicle registrations have doubled).
6.07 In addition to its financial problems, BMTA has other pressingproblems including:
(a) a shortage of suitably qualified and experienced personnel at themanagerial level;
(b) an inadequate management information system;
(c) a rapidly aging BMTA-owned bus fleet and expensive leasing andmaintenance contracts for the remainder of the fleet under BMTAmanagement; and
(d) inadequately structured bus routes (with considerable overlap).
C. PROPOSED INVESTMENTS IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
6.08 In view of the severe urban transportation problems facing Bangkok,a number of investment proposals are being considered by public authorities.Among these are:
2/ Total grants and subsidies to BMTA amounted to one-third of all urbantransport oriented public investments in Bangkok during the five-year1980-84 period.
31 The fare was successfully raised from B 0.75 to B 1.50 in 1978.
- 47 -
(a) a 50 km elevated mass transit system;
(b) a second phase toll road system (to be added to the existing 20 km,system);
(c) elevating approximately 13 km of the existing national rail systemto facilitate passenger and freight service as well as to minimizedisruption to the arterial road system;
(d) expansion and modernization of the BMTA bus fleet and maintenancefacilities;
(e) completion of the middle and outer ring road system; and
(f) extensions to the primary and secondary arterial road system.
The above investments, would amount to about US$2.0 billion in total, or aboutUS$400 per resident of Bangkok, a very high level relative to the Government'sfiscal resources.
6.09 The Government has addressed this problem of conflicting urbantransportation investment priorities through a consultant-assisted investXelntreview under NESDB management, taking into account financial constraints.-This review will assist the Government in (a) establishing an urban transportinvestment strategy over the short term and (b) serve as the basis for settingup an interagency steering group for continuing the urban transportationinvestment and policy dialogue in the metropolitan area.
D. URBAN TRANSPORT INSTITUTIONS
6.10 Urban transport problems in Bangkok are exacerbated by a highlyfragmented institutional structure, duplication and conflict over functions,insufficient coordination among the concerned agencies, and, in some cases,lack of suitably trained staff. There are approximately 15 agencies concernedwith providing urban transport infrastructure and services in Bangkok. Themost important are: (1) the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) PublicWorks Department (road construction and maintenance), (2) the Bangkok MassTransit Authority (bus service), (3) the Expressway and Rapid TransitAuthority (tollroad system), (4) the Office of the Committee for Management ofRoad Traffic (OCMRT) and the BMA Traffic Engineering Division (trafficmanagement), and (5) the Metropolitan Police Command of the National Police(traffic enforcement). The National Highway Department and the NationalPublic Works Department also construct a few major roads and bridges inBangkok.
6.11 Lack of clarity and cooperation in interagency roles is particularlyacute in (a) traffic management, (b) road system development planning, and(c) multi-modal transportation policy/planning/programming. Civilian
4/ Metropolitan Bangkok Short Term Urban Transport Review Project, HalcrowFox and Associates.
- 48 -
authorities (OCMRT and BMA's Traffic Engineering Division) and the Police havenot fully sorted out their respective roles in traffic management. As aresult proposals advanced by one organization are often not accepted by theothers. For example, computer controLled traffic signals installed by OCMRTare frequently overridden by traffic police through manual control atintersections. Recently, police proposals for an expansion of the existingone-way street system was resisted by OCMRT. Six agencies have responsibilityfor planning roads in Bangkok 7ut no single agency has overall (or evencoordinative) responsibility.' Consequently, each agency conducts its ownroad planning on a more or less independent basis. There is no active bodyundertaking overall multi-modal transport policy/planning/programming. OCMRThas been created to perform this function, but has not yet been fully effective.
6.12 The rapidly growing urban transport problem needs to be met with anaction program to develop needed Governmental staff resources. Particularlyneeded are traffic engineers, transport planners, a core of traffic policewith traffic operations training, and bus company managers.
E. AN URBAN TRANSPORT STRATEGY FOR BANGKOK
6.13 Past and current analyses of Bangkok's transport problems emphasizethe following points:
Ci) The greatest opportunities for short-run, low-cost improvement liein a combination of traffic engineering and demand managementmeasures;
(ii) An expanded and comprehensively planned road-building program isneeded, especialLy on the developing urban fringe and to fill in thegaps in the existing system;
(iii) Improvement of bus system operations is needed for the efficientmovement of larger numbers of people. This cannot be achievedwithout some increase in fares, an expansion and upgrading of thebus fleet, and better overall management.
(iv) Given existing congestion levels and projected travel-demandincreases, it is necessary to begin providing transport infrastruc-ture which partially or completely segregates public transporttraffic from arterial street traffic. This segregated system mustbe carefully planned and designed to keep costs at reasonableLevels, and should be based on an options analysis of alternativetechnological solutions (bus, light-rail, and heavy-rail transit).
5/ The six are Department of Town and County Planning, City Planning Depart-ment (in BMA), Department of Highways, Expressway and Rapid TransitAuthority, Department of Public Works, and Public Works Department (inBMA).
- 49 -
Each of these points is discussed briefly below.
Traffic Engineering and Demand Management
6.14 While traffic engineering measures such as traffic signalization,median barriers, right turn and bus bays, intersection channelization, on-street parking removal, street signing and marking, and street lighting areincr.rasing vehicle throughput capacity and improving safety conditions on theexisting urban road network, these measures will only marginally delay orreduce congestion levels. Traffic demand management measures aimed atincreasing people (as opposed to vehicle) throughput on the urban road systemwould have considerably more impact and could substantially defer the need tomake costly road and rail investments. This can be accomplished by encourag-ing public transit usage and discouraging the use of low-occupancy vehicles.Further removal of on-street parking, more aggressive enforcement of parkingregulations, increased charges for parking spaces, and more extensive andbetter enforced bus lanes, are among the techniques which should be tried.Among all proposed demand management measures, charging low occupancy vehiclesfor entering or using road space in the center of Bangkok would probably havethe most significagv impact, but would require substantial political supportto be implemented.-
Urban Road Nctwork
6.15 Even with considerable advances in the application of trafficengineering and public transit priority measures, Bangkok's annual growth ofabout 250,000 persons and 100,000 motor vehicles will require substantialinvestments directed at expanding and upgrading the existing urban roadnetwork. In some cases this will require costly rights-of-way acquisition inrapidly urbanizing or urbanized areas. Overall, roadway investments must bemade at a higher rate than historical or current levels, both to catch up withpast deficiencies in road development and to meet future growth in traveldemand. Among the types of road investments needed are (a) substantialincreases in the level of expenditures on new roads to serve raoidlydeveloping suburban areas, (b) a substantial increase in existing roadrehabilitation and maintenance programs, (c) secondary road development tocompliment the existing primary road network, and (d) provision of a series ofmissing road links to fill gaps in the primary and secondary road systems.The bulk of these investments would logically be the responsibility of BMA,which should also assume a much stronger role in road system planning withinthe metropolitan area.
6.16 The land acquisition process for acquiring needed right-of-way forexpanding the urban road network needs to be streamlined to reduce delays andoverall costs associated with road construction. Improved measures must aLsobe incorporated into the public regulation of the land development process.Key arteriaL road rights-of-way should be preserved through Government review
6/ This measure is part of the Bangkok Traffic Management Project, but noaction has been taken to date. Only Singapore has successfullyimplemented such a scheme. A trial area road pricing scheme will undergotesting in Hong Kong during 1985.
- 50 -
of land developer requests, and developers should be required to providesubdivision roads to reasonable standards in support of and in proper relationto the existing and proposed arterial road system.
Bus Service
6.17 A key ingredient to any urban transport strategy in Bangkok shouldbe a more convenient and comfortable bus service. While it may be unrealisticto expect that public transit wiLl attract a higher percentage of riders thannow, every effort should be made to avoid shifts from bus to less efficientand congestion-inducing private transport (mainly automobiles and motor-cycles). If BMTA remains a publicly owned and operated organization, cheGovernment needs to assign high priority to (1) stabilizing BKTA's financialcondition, (2) assisting BMTA in making needed capital investments in its busfleet and fixed facilities (preferably by allowing fare increases), and (3)assisting BMTA in improving its staffing and managerial situation. However,given the failure to address the numerous problems facing BKTA up to now,there is also a need to re-address the potential role of private transitoperators in providing public transit services. Several options should beconsidered including (a) more extensive franchising of BMTA routes to privateoperators, (b) private management of (a publicly-owned) BMTA, and (c) provi-sion of higher quality services (such as no-standing and/or air-conditionedservices) exclusively by private operators subject to improved publicregulation.
Segregated Right-of-Way Facilities and Mass Transit System
6.18 Given the severity of existing congestion problems in Bangkok,combined with the substantial estimated population and travel-demandincreases, it is necessary to begin providing transport facilities that arecapable of moving larger numbers of people at higher speeds. This can only beaccomplished by the provision of facilities which partially or completelysegregate public transit traffic from existing arterial street traffic. Atpresent a combination of toll roads, expressways, mass rail transit, andelevated SRT rail lines are proposed solutions which, if all were implemented,would severely strain available Government resources. Furthermore, theseproposals have not been proposed as an integrated system, nor are theyadequately planned with regard to the existing road system and bus network.Prior to proceeding with any of these costly investments, a segregatedtransport right-of-way and mass transit facilities plan should be developedand approved by Government. As part of developing the plan, mass transitoptions such as (i) buses on expressways and segregated busways, (ii) lightrail transit, (iii) heavy rail transit, and (iv) combinations thereof, shouldbe specifically addressed as recommended in the study mentioned inpara. 6.09. This potentially costly investment program should be subjected tivigorous economic analysis and should be combined with a travel-demandrestraint program aimed at constraining the use of low-occupancy vehicles incongested areas (as indicated in para. 6.14) for maximum effectiveness.
- 51 - Table 1.1
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Department of Highways Roads by Regions in 1984(kcm)
National highways Provincial roads National and provincial roadsUnim- Unim-
Paved Gravel Total Paved Gravel proved Total Paved Gravel proved Total
North 3,303 17 3,320 4,353 750 4,466 9,569 7,656 767 4.466 12,889
Northeast 4,597 39 4,636 3,885 1,831 2,257 7,973 8,482 1,870 2,257 12,609
Central 4,253 22 4,275 3,605 1,498 1,935 7,038 7,858 1,520 1,935 11,313
Seuth 2,920 8 2,928 2,822 798 1,683 5,303 5,742 806 1,683 8,231
Total 15,073 86 15,159 14,665 4,877 10,341 29,883 29,738 4,963 10,341 45,032
Source: Department of Highways.
-ay 1985
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Roads Maintained by the Department of Highways, 1963-84(km)
Provincial roads National highwaysNptional highwava Improved roads Unimproved and provincial roads
Paved Gravel Total a Paved Gravel Totala roads /b Total Paved Gravel Unimproved Total
1963 4,157 4,917 9,074 203 1,998 2,200 5,800/c 8,000 4,360 6,915 5,800/c 17,0741964 4,702 4,702 9,404 257 1,957 2,214 n.a. n.a. 4,959 6,659 n.a. n.a.1965 5,046 4,436 9,482 405 2,389 2,794 n.a. n.a. 5,451 6,825 n.s. n.a.1966 5,008 4,490 9,498 427 2,569 2,996 n.a. n.a. 5,435 7,059 n.a. n.a.1967 5,507 4,011 9,518 581 3,311 3,892 n.a. n.a. 6,088 7,322 n.a. n.a.1968 6,613 3,131 9,744 1,131 4,078 5,209 n.a. n.a. 7,744 7,209 n.a. n.a.1969 7,822 2,146 9,968 1,281 4,448 5,729 n.a. n.s. 9,103 6,594 n.a. n.a,1970 8,620 1,781 10,401 1,479 4,413 5,892 n.a. n.a. 10,099 6,194 n.e. n.a.1971 9,681 1,296 10,977 1,781 4,347 6,128 n.a. n.ea. 11,462 5,643 n.a. n.a.1972 10,493 1,014 11,507 2,288 3,891 6,179 n.a. n.ea 12,781 4,90 n.a. n.ea.1973 11,065 1,008 12,073 9,560 4,039 6,599 n.ea. n.ea. 13,625 5,047 n.a. n.a.1974 11,750 747 12,497 3,025 3,986 7,011 n.a. n.a. 14,775 4,733 n.e. n.a.1975 11,840 818 12,658 3,396 4,043 7,439 15,447 22,886 15,236 4,861 15,447 35,5441976 11,968 752 12,720 4,276 4,601 8,877 14,857 23,734 16,244 5,353 14,857 36,4541977 12,218 722 12,940 4,920 5,022 9,942 14,200 24,142 17,138 5,744 14,200 37,0821978 12,762 548 13,310 6,210 5,546 11,756 15,220 26,976 18,972 6,094 15,220 40,2861979 13,613 207 13,820 8,129 5,549 13,678 14,880 28,558 21,742 5,756 14,880 42,3781980 13,734 160 14,874 8,669 5,587 14,256 14,709 28,965 22,403 5,747 15,689 43,8391981 14,054 121 14,175 10,661 5,180 15,841 12,819 28,660 24,715 5,301 12,819 42,8351982 14,249 100 14,349 11,517 5,136 16,653 11,708 28,361 25,766 5,236 11,708 42,7101983 14,980 92 15,072 13,036 5,040 18,076 10,875 28,951 28,016 5,132 10,875 44,0231984 15,073 86 15,159 14,665 4,877 19,542 10,341 29,883 29,738 4,963 10,341 45,042
. .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
/a Roads which receive the normal allocation of maintenance funds. 0
7T Roads which receive only "minimum maintenance" (that is, only about 25Z of the normal allocation of mmaintenance funds and are often not passable in rainy weather) or are under construction or improvement.
/c Lengths not available (n.a.) before 1975; length of unimproved (provincial) roads in 1963 believed to havebeen about 5,800 km.
Source: Department of Highways.
May 1985
- 53- Table 1.3
TRAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Motor Vehicle Registration /a
OtherYear Cars Buses Trucks vehicles Subtotal Motorcycles Total
Number of lUnits ('000)
1970 222 19 136 23 400 338 7381971 235 18 147 19 419 364 7831972 240 20 159 38 457 376 8331973 251 22 179 27 479 408 8871974 301 23 232 31 587 459 1,0461975 290 23 238 31 582 479 1,0611976 298 20 285 30 633 512 1,1451977 331 27 345 38 741 648 1,3891978 362 28 368 33 791 727 1,5181979 389 30 399 47 865 756 1,6211980 412 30 468 47 957 907 1,8641981 45i 64 472 50 1,037 1,141 2,178
Annual Growth Rates (Z)
1972-76 4.9 2.1 14.2 19.0 8.6 7.1 7.91977-81 8.6 26.2 10.6 10.8 10.4 17.4 13.7
/a Classification by Police Department (License Division).
Source: Police Department.
May 1985
-54 - Table 1.4
THAILAMD
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Registered Motor Vehicles by Area of Registration (1978)(Z)
Total DistributionVehicle type share Bangkok Non-Bangkok
Cars and taxis, 4 wheels 19.9 78.2 21.8
BusesLight buses, 4 wheels 6.0 75.7 24.3Heavy buses, 6 wheels 2.9 47.2 52.8
Subtotal buses 8.9 70.5 29.5
TrucksLight trucks, 4 wheels 48.5 27.0 73.0Heavy trucks, 6 wheels 12.0 38.7 61.3Heavy trucks, 10 wheels 7.6 12.5 87.5
Subtotal trucks 68.1 28.1 71.9
Truck tractors } { 38.5 61.5Farm and construction tractors 1 3.1 { 69.1 30.9Taxis, 3 wheels } { 71.0 29.0
Subtotal all vehicles,3 wheels or more 100.0 54.0 46.0
Motorcycles 22.5 77.5
Overall Total 38.9 61.1
Source: Transport Planning Unit (Ministry of Communications) and consultantsBCEOM.
May 1983
-55 - Table 1.5
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Vehicle-Kilometers on National, Provincial and Rural Roads /a
National andprovincial roads Rural roads Total
Mln v-km X % Mln v-kml % Mn v-km Z
Cars and taxisRegular 4,304.5 20.0 23.7Light commercial ,320.0 6.2 7.3
BusesLight buses 3,281.1 15.3 18.1Heavy buses 1,481.3 6.9 8.1
Subtotal 10,386.9 48.4 57.2
TrucksLight trucks 2,453.1 11.4 13.5Heavy trucks6-wheel 2,453.1 11.4 13.5> 10-wheel 1,698.3 7.9 9.3
Subtotal 7,794.7 36.3 42.8
Total 18,181.6 84.7 100.0 1,467.0 62.5 197648.6 82.0(Z) (92.5) (6.5) (100.0)
Motorcycles andtricycles 3,296.5 15.3 879.9 37.5 4,176.4 18.0(%) (78.9) (21.1) (100.0)
GRAND TOTAL 21,478.1 100.0 2,346.9 100.0 23,825.0 100.0(Z) (90.1) (9.9) (100.0)
/a Estimate for 1978, excluding city roads.
Source: Transport Planning Unit (Ministry of Communications) and consultantsBCEOM.-
May 1983
Table 1.6-56 -
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Department of Highways' Five-Year Investment Plan, 1982-86 /a
Ongoing New projectsprojects (1984-86) Total
Length Costs Length Costs Length Costs(ka) (B mln) (km) (B mln) (km) (B mln)
National Highways
Reconstruction/strengthening ofpaved road 1,188 2,768 1,105 1,728 2,293 4,496
Improvement of congested road 98 1,724 80 628 178 2,352
New construction 234 1,786 52 399 286 2,185
Upgrading to bitumen standard 57 68 - - 57 68
Subtotal 1,577 6,346 1,237 2,755 2,814 9,101
Provincial Roads
Upgrading to gravel road standard 64 117 128 108 192 225
Upgrading to bitumen standard 3,902 6,685 2,819 5,359 6,721 12,044
Reconstruction/strengthening ofpaved road 347 482 263 368 610 850
Improvement of congested road 2 28 8 48 10 76
New construction 29 183 35 332 64 515
Subtotal 4,344 7,495 3,253 6,215 7,597 13,710
Total 5,921 13,841 4,490 8,970 10,411 22,811
la 1985 revision
Source: Department of Highways.
June 1985
- 57 - Table 1.7
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Rural Road Density by Region)(km of roads per 1,000 sq km)
SES 1975/76 Region /a Paved G,ravel Earth Total
North-Upper 2.58 45.23 28.90 76.70North-Lower 1.53 119.07 36.39 156.98Northeast-Upper 0.63 173.42 32.65 206.67Northeast-Lower 1.10 122.61 90.63 214.36Center-West 4.83 103.71 13.68 122.25Center-Middle 13.91 234.89 53.60 302.31Center-Fast 1.90 207.12 21.65 230.64South-Upper 0.78 103.62 52.34 156.70South-Lower 0.00 137.68 0.22 137.90
(km of roads per 1,000,000 rai of area under holding)
North-Upper 47.98 840.66 537.17 1,425.61North-Lower 8.13 633.78 193.68 835.52Northeast-Upper 2.90 796.92 150.05 949.71Northeast-Lower 4.24 471.33 348.42 824.04Center-West 36.94 793.74 104.73 935.59Center-Middle 37.06 625.58 142.75 805.12Center-East 9.40 1,026.94 107.35 1,143.56South-Upper 4.86 647.36 326.99 978.98South-Lower 0.00 956.16 1.53 956.68
(km of roads per 1,000 population)
North-Upper 51.79 907.40 579.82 1,538.79North-Lower 24.05 1,874.49 572.82 2,471.16Northeast-Upper 7.12 1,957.26 368.53 2,332.53Northeast-Lower 11.42 1,267.66 937.08 2,216.29Center-West 80.16 1,722.18 227.24 2,029.96Center-Middle 78.76 1,329.54 303.38 1,771.12Center-East 24.42 2,667.37 278.84 2,970.28South-Upper 9.99 1,330.46 672.04 2,012.03South-Lower 0.00 1,433.16 2.29 1,435.45
/a Socio-Economic Survey, 1975176 classification by the National StatisticalOffice.
Source: Study of Rural Roads: Road Inventory Analysis, Department ofHighways, Ministry of Communications, May 1981.
- 58 - Table 2.1
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic('000 tons)
Fiscal Petroleum Crude Rice and Con-year products oil Cement maize tainers Others Total
Actuals
1975 1,188 - 852 609 - 2,170 4,819
1976 1,203 - 1,026 660 - X,267 5,156
1977 1,324 - 1,456 761 - 2,061 6,142
1978 1,430 - 1,622 468 - 2,641 6,161
1979 1,483 - 1,829 530 - 2,605 6,447
1980 1,376 - 1,614 776 - 2,535 6,301
1981 1,434 - 1,598 716 51 2,322 6,121
1982 1,539 - 1,551 755 36 1,786 5,667
1983 1,450 213 1,462 573 63 1,537 5,298
1984 1,402 695 1,480 676 66 1,299 5,618
Forecast
1985 1,392 1,113 1,409 654 60 1,362 5,990
1986 1,418 1,113 1,565 654 60 1,372 6,182
1987 1,440 1,113 1,616 669 230 1,425 6,493
1988 1,484 1,113 1,630 697 230 1,462 6,616
Source: SRT.
May 1985
59 - Table 2.2
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic(Million ton-km)
Fiscal Petroleum Crude Rice and Con-year products oil Cement maize tainers Others Total
Actuals
1975 620 - 207 458 - 1O68 2,353
1976 594 - 209 533 - 1,169 2,505
1977 647 - 326 586 - 1,353 2,912
1978 708 - 333 400 - 1,349 2,790
1979 739 - 371 436 - 1,352 2,898
1980 682 - 326 677 - 1,257 2,942
1981 691 - 326 559 37 1,119 2,732
1982 718 - 290 639 24 849 2,520
1983 716 82 279 537 43 843 2,500
1984 718 268 268 628 41 778 2,701
Forecast
1985 717 430 282 606 35 820 2,890
1986 735 430 335 610 35 845 2,990
1987 753 430 335 633 71 881 3,123
1988 772 430 359 660 71 916 3,208
Source: SRT.
May 1985
- 60 - Table 2.3
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic('000 passengers)
Express & rapid trains Ordinary trains Bangkok Total-Fiscal Classes Class Sub- Class Class Sub- commuter allyear I 6 II III total II III total trains /b trains
Actuals /a
1975 - - - - - - - 61,600
1976 - - 55,800
1977 - - - - - - - 58,000
1978 -- - 59,000
1979 - - - - - - - 64,400
1980 1,372 8,131 9,503 311 64,472 64,783/c - 74,286
1981 1,418 9,129 10,547 302 56,975 57,277 11,00 78,824
1982 1,549 8,010 9,559 184 58,288 58,472 12,275 80,306
1983 1,629 8,381 10,010 150 59,054 59,204 12,190 81,404
1984/d 1,680 10,830 12,510 325 57,500 57,825 15,515 85,850
Forecast
1985 1,770 11,410 13,180 335 57,700 58,035 17,535 88,750
1986 1,870 12,020 13,890 345 58,000 58,345 19,565 91,800
1987 1,980 12,730 14,710 355 58,300 58,655 21,535 94,900
1988 2,090 13,450 15,540 365 58,600 58,965 23,695 98,200
/a Details not available for 1975-79.7i Excludes an estimated 6 million commuters carried by ordinary trains from
1981 on.{c Includes all Bangkok commuter traffic.7T Estimate.
Source: SRT.
May 1985
-61 - Table 2.4
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic(Million pass-km)
Express & rapid trains Ordinary trains Bangkok Total-Fiscal Classes Class Sub- Class Class Sub- commuter allyear I & II III totaL II [II total trains /b trains
Actuals /a
1975 - 5,640
1976 - - - - - - - 5,352
1977 - - - - - - - 5,649
1978 - - - - - - - 6,039
1979 - - - - - - - 7,029
1980 980 4,198 5,178 107 3,576 3,683/c - 8,861
1981 1,015 4,548 5,563 101 3,332 3,433 487 9,483
1982 1,011 4,221 5,232 47 3,529 3,576 423 9,231
1983 1,022 4,677 5,699 87 3,499 3,586 414 9,699
1984/d 1,140 4,860 6,000 120 3,580 3,700 600 10,300
Forecast
1985 1,230 5,170 6,400 130 3,620 3,750 650 10,800
1986 1,300 5,400 6,700 135 3,765 3,900 700 11,300
1987 1,360 5,660 7,020 140 3,880 4,020 760 11,800
1988 1,440 5,980 7,420 150 4,010 4,160 820 12,400
/a Details not available for 1975-79.7i Excludes an estimated 250 million pass-km of commuter traffic carried by
ordinary trains from 1981 on.tc Includes all Bangkok commuter traffic.7d Estimate.
Source: SRT.
May 1985
- 62 - Table 2.5
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
SRT Traffic Unit Costs and Revenues - FY82 /a
LRVC Revenue
Baht per pass-kmPassengers
Express 0.24456 0.33161
Rapid .015931 0.20540
Ordinary - Diesel rail cars 0.19216 0.16089- Others 0.18878 0.15135
Commuter - Diesel rail cars 0.21435 0.15399- Others 0.18123 0.15677
Mixed trains 0.43326 0.16733
Overall average 0.19096 0.20182
Baht per ton-kmiFreight
Cement - bulk /b 0.44451 0.42829
- bagged /E 0.45919 0.45296
Petroleum /b 0.38866 0.40467
Gypsum /b 0.38158 0.40205
Less-than-carload traffic. 2.76777 1.87823
Overall average - all freight /c 0.44519 0.41202
/a SRT system-wide average long-run variable costs (LRVC) and revenues.Depreciation based on historic values of assets.
/b Bulk transport in unit trains.7-T Carload traffic only.
Source: SRT.
May 1985
- 63 - Table 2.6
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Government Compensation for SRT Losses
SRT losses eligible Recieipt of compen-for compensation sation from government Accumulated
Main Branch Main Branch arrears ofPeriod lines lines Total lines lines Total compensation
- --------- t-(B million)
FY74 104.7 N/A 104.7 - - - 104.7FY75 286.6 " 286.6 - - - 391.3FY76 170.3 " 170.3 105.0 - 105.0 456.6
Total FY74-76 561.6 561.6 105.0 - 105.0 456.6
FY77 - 71.8 71.8 272.1 - 272.1 256.3FY78 85.4 54.5 139.9 105.1 - 105.1 291.1FY79 17.8 79.4 97.2 29.4 - 29.4 358.9FY80 142.2 116.5 258.7 50.2 50.0 100.2 517.4
Total FY74-80 807.0 322.2 1p129.2 561.8 50.0 611.8 517.4
FY81 204.6 140.4 345.0 85.4 54.5 139.9 722.5FY82 47.2 174.6 221.8 17.8 79.4 97.2 847.1FY83 203.9 173.5 382.4 142.2 116.5 258.7 970.8FY84 145.1 186.2 331.3 - - - 1,302.1
Source: SRT.
May 1985
-64 - Table 2.7
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Summary of SRT FY82-86 Investment Plan
ForeignLocal Foreign Total as Z of
- (Baht million ------ total
Commercial InvestmentsMotive power & rolling stock 579.6 3,481.5 4.061.1 86Capacity increasing trackinvestments 178.2 40.3 218.5 18
Track modernization andrehabilitation 325.4 656.9 982.3 67
Signaling & telecommuni-cations 256.7 765.9 1,022.6 75
Workshop improvements 64.4 96.6 161.0 60Miscellaneous 34.3 8.0 42.3 19
Base Cost (mid-FY83 prices) 1,438.6 5,049.2 6.487.8 78
Physical contingencies 94.8 180.3 275.1 65Price contingencies 239.5 938.4 1,177.9 80
Total 1,772.9 6,167.9 7,940.8 77
Noncommercial InvestmentsDiesel rail car sets 104.9 699.2 804.1 87
Base Cost (mid-FY83 prices) 104.9 699.2 804.1 87
Prince contingencies 11.4 87.9 99.3 88
Total 116.3 787.1 903.4 88
GRAND TOTAL 1,889.2 6,955.0 8,844.2 79
May 1983
Source: SRT.
- 65 - Table 2.8
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECIOR REVIEW
SRT - Incone Statement (Commercial and Noncommercial Operations Cosbined)MLL3im BEdt)
Actual Projected by SRTFY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 Fn84 F85 FY86 1Y87
Operating Revenues
Passenger 904.8 1,041.2 1,286.6 1,545.5 1,826.1 1,964.4 2,054.5 2,129.0 2,468.6 2,857.6
Freight 588.9 691.7 813.1 881.2 1,048.4 968.9 1,016.8 1,115.5 1,307.2 1,417.4
Other 122.3 133.8 135.9 161.3 196.9 221.0 253.6 176.5 182.5 195.2
Total OperatingRevenues 1,616.0 1,866.7 2,235.6 2.587.9 3,071.1 3.154.3 3,324.9 3,421.0 3,958.3 4,470.2
Operating Expenses
Salaries and wages 772.1 1,015.8 1,235.0 1,391.2 1,608.6 1,787.6 1,851.0 2.045.2 2,231.3 2,397.8
Fuel 238.5 289.6 607.3 680.2 714.7 709.1 707.3 690.2 826.9 888.9.
Materials and other 325.6 428.4 513.4 726.7 835.1 793.2 789.3 727.0 802.0 868.8
Total WorkinExpenses 1,336.2 1,733.8 2,355.7 2,798.1 3,158.4 3,289.9 3,347.C 3,462.4 3,860.2 4,155.5
Depreciationla 169.4 171.1 171.3 202.2 213.4 213.7 267.0 436.2 505.9 551.5
Total OperatingExpenses 1,505.6 1,904.9 2,527.0 3,003.3 3,371.8 3,503.6 3,614.6 3,898.6 4,366.1 4,707.0
Net Operating Srpluses (loss) 110.4 (38.2) (291.4) (412.4) (300.7) (349.3) (289.7) (477.6) (407.8) (236.8)
Net other revenue 22.9 35.9 86.2 8.5 16.1 20.8 24.4 12.0 12.8 13.7
Interest 75.8 71.1 75.3 76.8 97.4 111.0 202.8 412.4 514.0 562.8
Net Income 57.5 (73.4) (280.5) (480.7) (382.0) (439.5) (468.1) (878.0) (909.0) (785.9)
Cash Income (Loss) /b - 226.9 97.7 (109.2) (278.5) (168.6) (225.8) (201.1) (441.8) (403.1) (234.4)
Operating ratio (Z) 93 102 113 116 110 111 109 114 IO 105
/ Based on historical asset basis.
/b Net Income vith depreciation added back.
Source: SRT.
May 1985
- 66 - Table 3.1
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVI W
Import and Export Trade (non-POL) Through Bangkok Port System - By Facilities, 1975-84('000 tons)
Facilities/traffic 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Klong ToelImports
Containers 2,267 2,981 { 354 581 776 839 1,126 1,107 1,496 1,537Breakbulk ' { 3.114 2,814 2,953 2,747 2.608 2,271 2,867 2,614
Subtotal 2,267 2,981 3,468 3,395 3,729 3,586 3.734 3,378 4.363 4,151
ExportsContainers 89 249 { 223 468 676 895 1,059 1,156 1,330 1,825Breakbulk ( 146 113 66 21 108 226 235 150Bulk 57 123 106 142 115 100 64 56 15 -
Subtotal 146 372 475 723 857 1,017 1,231 1,438 1,580 1,975
Total 2,413 3,350 3.943 4,117 4,586 4.603 4,965 4,816 5,943 6,126
Sattahip -lnports
Containers - - - - - - - - - -Breakbulk - - - - - 331/a 70 45 107 77
Subtotal - _ - _ - 331 70 45 107 77
ExportsContainers - - - -Breakbulk - - - - - 171/a 235 263 232 172Bulk - - - - - - - - - -
Subtotal _ _ - _ - - 171 235 263 232 172
Total - - - - - 502 305 308 339 249
Other FacilitiesImportsTMN wharves 140 150 233 292 275 149 261 140 173 104Dolphins & anchorage 355 281 442 838 } 2,821 2,097 1,903 2,106 2,744 2,526Private wharves 326 548 893 964 }
Subtotal 821 979 1,568 2,094 3,096 2,246 2,164 2,246 2,917 2,630
Exports /b 8,586 10,647 12,050 12,305 11,584 11,610 13,722 17,797 13,457 17,259
Total 9,407 11,626 13,618 14,399 14,680 13,856 15,886 20,043 16,375 19,889
All FacilltiesImports 3,088 3,960 5,036 5,480 6,825 6,163 5,968 5,669 7,387 6,858Exports 8,732 11,019 12,525 13,028 12,441 12,798 15,188 19,498 15,269 19,406
Total 11,820 14,979 17,561 18,508 19,266 18,961 21,156 25,167 22,656 26,264
/a Pipes and pipe coating material for natural gas development project.7T Includes exports of tapioca through deep-water anchorage at Ko Sichang and jetty at Mah Boon Krong.
Source: PAT.
June 1985
- 67 - Table 3.2
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Couparative Statement of Container and Break Bulk CargoesThrough Klong Toei Wharf During the Years 1978-90 (January-December)
(Million metric tons)
Actual Forecast1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Container
Inward 0.58 0.78 0.84 1.12 1.11 1.49 1.54 1.72 1.89 2.08 2.29 2.52 2.77
Outward 0.47 0.68 0.90 1.06 1.16 1.33 1.82 2.04 2.24 2.46 2.71 2.98 3.28
Subtotal 1.05 1.46 1.74 2.18 2.27 2.82 3.36 3.76 4.13 4.54 5.00 5.50 6.05
Break Bulk -
Inward 2.81 2.95 2.75 2.61 2.27 2.87 2.61 2.53 2.45 2.38 2.31 2.24 2.17
Outward 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.15 -
Subtotal 3.07 3.13 2.87 2.78 2.55 3.12 2.76 2.53 2.45 2.38 2.31 2.24 2.17
Total 4.12 4.59 4.61 4.96 4.82 5.94 6.12 6.29 6.58 6.92 7.31 7.43 8.22
Source: PAT.
June 1985
- 68 - Table 3.3
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Container Traffic at Bangkok (Klong Toei)(in thousands)
Actual ForcastPort/traffic 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
InboundTotal number of con-tainers 27/a 47/a 61 71 91 102 117 132 146 158
Total number of TEO 38 63 83 96 120 132 152 171 190 205
Tonnage 354 581 776 839 1,126 1,107 1,496 1,537 1,720 1,890
OutboundTotal number of con-tainers 24/a 42/a 59 69 92 98 117 131 146 160
Total number of TEU 35 57 81 93 122 128 152 170 190 208
Tonnage 223 468 676 895 1,059 1,156 1,330 1,825 2,040 2,240
Total TED 73 120 164 189 242 260 304 341 380 413
Total tonnage 577 1,049 1,452 1,734 2,185 2?263 2,826 3,362 3,760 4,130
Tons/TEU (Units) 7.9 8.75 8.85 9.17 9.02 8.70 9.30 9.86 9.89 10.00
/a Outbound traffic is underestimated due to statistical method.
Sources: PAT.
June 1985
- 69 - Table 3.4
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
PAT Consolidated Income Accounts: 1976-85(Million Baht)
Actual Forecast1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Operatlng RevenueShip handling 61 69 78 70 76 77 79 114 139 134Cargo handling 281 366 430 547 596 632 574 822 903 900Storage 145 125 142 210 230 254 251 283 326 316Other 10 19 14 15 23 27 40 52 74 52
Total Operating Revenue 497 579 664 842 925 990 944 1.271 1,442 1,402
Operating ExpensesSalaries and wages 282 300 341 465 520 584 687 739 779 841Repairs and maintenance 25 27 31 36 38 43 57 57 58 60Fuels 24 29 27 29 45 66 67 71 65 60MNlcellaneous 18 15 21 27 58 64 49 62 72 70
Total Working Expenses 349 371 420 557 661 757 880 929 974 1,031
Depreciation 39 40 42 42 62 73 85 96 104 109
Total Operating Expenses 388 411 462 599 723 830 965 1.025 1,078 1,140
Operating surplus (deficit) 109 168 202 243 202 160 (21) 246 364 262Interest charged 15 15 16 16 15 15 16 14 12 37Interest earned 21 24 33 40 62 59 51 40 81 75Net revenue surplus (deficit) 115 177 219 267 249 204 (14) 272 433 300Payments to Governient andemployee bonus 48 56 85 128 118 137 8 186 333 205
Revenue surplus to balancesheet 67 121 134 139 131 67 6 86 100 95
RatiosOperating 78 71 70 71 78 84 102 (1) 83 84Times interest earned 7.3x 11.2x 12.6x 15.2x 13.4x 10.7x -1.3x 17.6x 30.3z 7.1x
Source: PAT.
June 1985
70 _ Table 3.5
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
PAT Consolidated Balance Sheets: 1976-85(Million Baht)
Actual Forecast1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
AssetsCurrent Assets
Cash & short-term deposits 307 386 520 623 654 457 364 558 742 639Other 79 74 102 108 135 142 124 160 233 209Total Current Assets 386 460 622 731 789 599 488 718 975 848
Fixed AssetsGross nondepreciable 54 54 54 54 54 54 59 59 59 59Cross depreciable 969 971 1,002 1,777 2,164 2,440 2,509 2,754 2,848 2,942
Subtotal 1,023 1,025 1,056 1,831 2,218 2,494 2,568 2.813 2,907 3,061
less accumulated depreciation 417 448 489 525 585 704 735 822 922 1,023Net fixed assets in operation 606 577 567 1,306 1,633 1,790 1,833 1,991 1,985 1,978Wbrk in progress /a 708 795 807 117 81 75 154 50 19 86
Total Fixed Assets 1,14 1.372 1,374 1,423 1,714 1,865 1,987 2,041 2,004 2,064
Other Assets 16 22 35 62 125 166 195 205 199 278
Total Assets 1,716 1,854 2,031 2,216 2,628 2,630 2,670 2,964 3,178 3,191
Liabilities & EquityCurrent liabilities 115 113 130 150 141 150 219 230 226 211Long-term debt 183 206 212 205 184 176 152 132 105 137
Equity AccountsCapital 322 318 338 348 664 784 902 942 940 941Retained income 1,096 1,217 1,351 1.513 1,634 1,520 1,397 1,660 1,907 1,902
Total Equity 1,418 1,535 1,689 1,861 2,298 2,304 2,299 2,602 2,847 2,843
Total Liabilities & Equity 1,716 1,854 2,031 2,216 2,628 2,630 2,670 2,964 3,178 3,191
RatiosCurrent 3.4x 4.1x 4.8x 4.9x 5.5x 3.9x 2.2x 3.1x 4.3x 4.0xDebt/equity 11/89 12/88 11/89 10/90 8/92 7/93 6/94 5/95 4/96 6/94
/a Excess assets held in work-In-progress account until resolution of accounting dispute in 1978.
Source: PAT.
June 1985
-71- Table 4.1
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Inland Waterways Fleet During 1980-82
1980 1981 1982Type of vessel/ No. of Total /b No. of Total No. of Totalcapacity range /a units capacity units capacity units capacity
Wooden Barge40.1- 60.0 dwt 1,814 90,795 1,871 93,343 1,871 93,34360.1- 80.0 1,188 82,668 1,202 83,602 1,205 83,80680.1-100.0 287 23,779 289 23,954 291 24,133
100.1-200.0 103 14,913 105 15,165 105 15,165200.1-400.0 104 22,889 104 22,889 104 22,889Over 400.0 53 24,409 53 24,409 53 24,409
Subtotal 3,549 259,453 3,624 263,362 3,629 263,745
Steel Barge100.1-150.0 dwt 89 11,839 96 12,700 100 13,258150.1-200.0 223 39,473 223 39,473 223 39,473200.1-300.0 448 100,869 455 102,444 460 103,579Over 300.0 59 23,541 87 32,865 87 32,865
Subtotal 819 175,722 861 187,482 870 189,175
Total 4,368 435,175 4,485 450,844 4,499 452,920
Tow Boat50-100 hp 645 53,700 651 54,240 652 54,330
101-200 352 48,240 352 48,240 352 48,240Over 200 75 21,750 75 21,750 78 22,620
Total 1,072 123,690 1,078 124,230 1,082 125,190
/a Excludes about 3,000-3,500 units with a capacity of below 40 dwt each.
/b Capacity measured in dwt for barges and hp for tow boats.
Source: Harbour Department.
June 1983
-72 - Table 4.2
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Harbour Department
Budget Appropriations and Actual Budget Expenditures, 1978-84(Million baht}
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Budget Appropriations
Operating budget 117.57 138.47 124.75 184.33 156.28 205.43 190.23
Capital budget 16.81 37.10 41.12 55.66 173.56 246.07 415.28
Total 134.38 175.57 165.87 239.99 329.94 451.50 605.51
Actual Budget Expenditures
Operating budget 99.66 121.00 104.42 144.69 114.15 161.90 82.20
Capital budget 14.19 35.94 39.83 29.39 144.85 180.84 153.60
Total 113.85 156.94 144.25 174.08 259.00 342.74 235.80
Sources: Harbour Department.
June 1985
- 73 -Table 4.3
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
larhour Department
Revenue Collection, FY79-84(B000)
Revenue items 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Miscellaneous sales 333 307 330 918 761 2,464
Charges for waterwaystransportation ser-vices /a 43,495 41,813 41,293 45,805 46,118 48,827
.- iscellaneous servicecharges 608 835 826 1,523 1,365 1,557
Compensation 724 1,073 1,124 3,913 1,640 4,167
Other revenues 3 18 94 - 76 21
Total 45,165 44 048 43.671 52,159 49,960 57.036
/a Charges for waterways transportation services included: registered, transferredand mortgaged vessels, vessels licensed, vessels and engines surveyed, shipoperator examination, pilot services and dredgers licensed.
Source: Harbour Department.
June 1985
_74 Table 6.1
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Composition and Growth of Motor Vehicle Fleet Registere.3 in Bangkok
Percent ofmotor vehicle fleet
Vehicle registered Annual in 1983General Vehicle (000's) percent Including Not incl.category type 1978 1983 increase motorcycles motorcycles
Private Private car 250 415 11% } 15% 44 75transport Motorcycle 149 391 21% } 42 -
Commercial Truck /a 58 115 6% 6% 12 21
Public Taxi 14 14 0% 0% 1 3transport 3 wheelers 7 7 0% 1 1
Total 505 942 13% 100 -
Total W/O Motorcycles 356 551 9% - 100
la Includes vehicles being used as public buses.
August 1984
Table 6.2- 75 -
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Estimated Person-Trips by Mode in Primary Travel Direction onArterial Streets in Central Bangkok
Public or Specific Percentage Estimatedprivate vehicle of Estimated percentage of
transportation type vehicles occupancy person trips
Private transportation Private car 57.5 1.9 26.1Motorcycle 23.0 1.3 ' 7.2
Subtotal 80.5 33.3
Public transportation Bus 3.5 60.0/b 50.2Minibus 2.5 20.0 12.0Taxi 9.0 1.5 3.3Samlor 4.5 1.2 1.2
Subtotal 19.5 66.7
Total 100.0 100.0
/a Based on observations at 13 locations generally between 07:30-09:00 and17:00-17:45, November 1977. All observations made in primary traveldirection.
/b Seating capacity of bus is 40 passengers; actual average occupancy may havebeen substantially higher.
August 1984
Table 6.3
- 76 -
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Bangkok: Urban Transport Investments, 1980-84(in millions 1984 Baht)
Mode of transportType of Expenditure Nontoll Toll
Public Total roads roadsPhysical transit expendi- Z by (arte- (express-
Agency works subsidies tures agency rials) ways) Bus Rail
BETA 0 5,393 5,393 (33.3) - - 5,393
EMA 3,103 0 3,103 (19.2) 3,103 - - -
DOH 2,867 0 2,867 (17.7) 2,867 - - -
ETA 2,790 0 270 (17.2) - 2,790 - -
DPW 1,536 0 1,536 (9.5) 1,536 - - -
SRT 157 256 413 (2.6) - - - 413
-,CMRT 84 0 84 (0.5) 84 - - -
Total 10.537 5,649 16,186 (100.0) 7,590 2,790 S393 413
Z (65.1) (34.9) (100.0) - (46.9) (17.2) (33.3) (2.6)
Source: Metropolitan Bangkok Short Term Urban Transport ReviewProject, Halcrow Fox and Associates.
June 1985
- 77 -Table 6.4
THAILAND
TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Agencies Involved in Urban Transport within Bangkok
1. The Committee for the Management of Road Traffic (CMRT)
2. Office of the Committee for the Management of Road Traffic (OCMRT)
3. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)
4. Ministry of Interior - Office of Policy and Planning
5. Ministry of Interior - Town and Country Planning
6. Ministry of Interior - Public Works Department
7. Ministry of Interior - Metropolitan Policy Division of the NationalPolice
8. Ministry of Communications - Highway Department
9. Ministry of Communications - Land Transport Office
10. Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority (ERTAT)
11. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration - City Planning Division
12. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration - Bureau of Public Works
13. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration - Traffic Engineering Division
14. Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA)
15. State Railway of Thailand
16. Ministry of Finance - Office of Budget Bureau
TIATASD
o TIANNtA St1O? cr TfI AT I RIoWvAT
EM,,x N,,4elC f.c,,IMhE 4..qarvwwt.-c.1 LOC.,CPA fl.I .,A.'P L&AIO.AMO,EI UAY1:A T.A-%l. T.AFltQOEF ~LDa'CVflmoLS. v,14rA1sw o.l,s.o O,vM(lI .. f O-o, M Ajp: o.,VjmV -rvf, CNI"Of WW0 M-0 Ctg
CA,flhflrV. SitiW PtCCtNC UR,ICI PWtIMIA? CMOI%A Ap4h rtUTfI wooll OIUL SIAVICI* LA' IVA&UAINM lOWAL YZf-lWYV SNCACY AWIPSIMV UCTIC Oy1It*FIY wtYl mAtUY. EYA AA%CPA%YC M *t.*¶.1fltl,A CA.Y1RATr,, LHOC
U,,m, WM" Ml.*L g!"StAC 6SIYLVIOA LACClIIII14. NMLWAY'IG ACYC.t MLAGSAA'.UASYL T.G *LA-W.I*A 1j.k0 t
.ctw. woaft %VI LU-1-15% SIMON ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cUGAYA.,UCT~ HelOm% 0IEEGABICAC
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rto k . |
0,,- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -O1fu1fb1pV WM_
*zGCtadVbGI~~~L#LA 'SAY1S PM.C £Y'JATvYA, filal hnCHv L l ^Gbu , s c Cdi) tYI tAICAMY I L)S H Pit in..l Pa AtL L I CACCA tltwfllV 4LlGAD
ucteL tM~~~~.flh*^ S SPY *YCM. *A%aYYG f lveuvosG ort t AL- LA. LAAAAO. OAAIf A*AiC *dT ,SYB lot r,ulsF tf n C^-AP^
*YY)LVLA ~~~~~ ~ *~~uL, MA, ~~ A .. , sped00 ADE1MAS ASIfh Ain 9*T. I1k L"'fANU
'YtinY.inf ALICE~~~V -lwln "*v LIC
".v$ UCTII moo. ~ CWCIAV
.,*Yb -lss_ r,v.*Lslc-lt _riW.. _im 'rlowf SA.All
C"l; z<0^ss n | GZWs GIKAl *M | | WSli Gl c"IGl {
I I I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~m I outAoLD000A
I I I J | | | *c ..unsI~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ItllxC
m $1S ;<1 A 3 :91>; 1S1 > SsatLEElw
!~~~ ^^s|hweltwt.uAm l tw@ utw"litaW|l[ |8 l8t
mHu 5¢ " " 9Office of the Secretary
ft W M n * w 9 ~ 4g o9 I Personnel Divislon _
2 .fgg Sl. f e S ; ; y yFinance dnd Accounts Div.
a.¢ £ ^ : p g ̂ .. ehi ^Procurement Division _
I g & e e5 n z b ° nTechnical Services Div.gta ^ | w t ° ̂ z g (Training'
or nm m a v 1 f ° Public In'ormation Div. _II E I!! Ij n nTResearch and Evaluation Div.
rt # fi 0m ^ [ E ¢ r " i ,Planning and Project Div.
4 " nz C B 8 eM " ff e R Rural Youth Division _ 8 a [ t t 8 " ¢ | b b | Occupational and Income n'4 a | o; g 2 o Xa Promotion Division _ -
0 m~~~~~~~~~~~~~F09 | " F¢¢5 gaAgri. Business Division _
ao Office of the ARD Inspector _
N 8' F.I g n | Internal Audit Unit _
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P nnt14- ~ ~ ~ ~ I 5 C, (A 0iI*.
r~~~~~r
X 0 n I M Iv O
5 ffi 9 ; ; ; ; lx a ~~~~ Engineering and TechnLcal Div g r g H W " 8s a ~ (Maintenance of Civil Works) _
M t v v _ v | _ 8 | ~~~~~~~Survey and Design DLvision _
g o nn n | nn N na Construction and Haintenance is fi| Control Div. (Construction _ t ___________ pof Roads and Bridges)
l n 1 P~~~~~~~~~~~~ield Operation Division I g 0" 2 o2 1 Z Z 9 9 o2 1 9 La a n (Construction of Water Resource_.
n C3 n a la, " | | u"3 { a f f | 8 ~n | | n |Workshop Division_2
'~aOO C 3 flO U z0 g g | 1 8EquipOment Control DivisionU I B;1 ~~~~~~~~n 1 J C. I FI
r il3"t X" l ii ______________ ha
aa Tc l DIvIl wn m l l l l
CHART 3
- 80 -
THAILANDTRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW
Organiation Chart of Stast Railway of Thailand(as of December 30, 1982)
Bwowd ofCo4fmnmlson.r,
l ~~~~~~~~~D"nmnwt At chdRaway Adviwon =raM to tha Gae
F~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I Deputy Gr M nqnrw || DepoutyGwwfUl|| Deput Geral Mage
Operatb. Development nd Planning Adminilmation
TMarkting Doperun | AdmnI atin
- rr_par;on Pu_nil - C nl~~~~~~~Dparenn 140 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tral
- contrCol Freight -Wrlh and Labor-Goods Enipkrnent
_ fOw|_- Public Relations-Hotls _ Ste Bue
AIntrno Auditing
4 Dbctsr Coeordiating Buwum- Auditing- Ring Stode Conrutlon LP a Evaluai tn nd _ I P- Locomntlw Reair Coldkntimn Dividonal nd Budgpt- Roigh Swde Repair - Disronmmat Auditing
- Producdon ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Data Proomaaig-hbkknm Workdop _ Railwy Training M- issnrous Auditing
Lega Bureau
Technical SwAy & Desirs ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~aditiSueecoIW 163Wrl Bnk2Cr
_ Cila EnghInwng nowISu_
- qbrtrnc ofBngt &Bilig
- Promb & Pbrmln
-Tehnkrl Surm zd: u
Accoul ndnrlg Sumo
Tw eonV 1983 |irdok
I~~~~~~~~~~~~
THAlLANI)TRANSPORT SECTOR RE'IIEW
ORGANIZATION OF HARBOUR DEPARTMENT
HARBOUR DEPARTMENT
DIRECT611 GENERIAL
DIPUTY DWPUTYDIRECTOR 0EN1RAL DIRECTOR GENERALL z ~ ~ i i * z ... .. ...._ _ _ _ ___ ._
_ _ _ _ _ _ ._
__..._ _ _
Iship survey j ship Reagistration Suivep- andd~'DMioiw lltnJPiotDIvISIOntwd MO PvodiotIun DMsIen
Mvshuit Marine RI.e abLV~eMIn Centre I Po || c lO hble 1|7
CX~~~~X
z t \, ~~~~~~~~DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
.tbt,.) jg' [h o a n' d g
er rvy; CX A~~~~~~~~~~~VIET NAM
f ; ~~~~~SECOND PROVINCIAL ROADS PROJECT L
=3FA E~ ~~~~~AL k S I A _ J
t __ n X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ THALND
GUIFA O F 'N A-
w_ > ___ ~~~OLES D,m-RA-, RE-_-i _ _ 4
54~~o
'4. O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~EtAOCRAIIC KAMPUCHEEA
0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
THAILAND
~~~~ "~~~~SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT
e5< *~~~~~~~~~~~- *,WnI bO. Tasa ut
N,PASS NOLK STATISA
SUGLE TRACK ISKWOMNOSt
Li ot% Je WMGU TRACK MAN LMIS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S
IS. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~N.
.- 1 INSAT L lOUNDAS - . S i .
SA GULF OF TH r....
7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ . .a.na a.
Z- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a
CIA.-~av -. K: ; 71
/ CHINA
BURMA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A
THAILAND ~ I - KHRAM
MOC//BANKK A DSTTA H ~IP
R @ 2 ..... -g PORTS. PE
-L ADIUCCEA BAN
tW 0t ( 5 z THAI-AND
y M? tx a - - CHANGWAT CENTS
A,n d o mn o n '1
Seo
MSLES e o .9
. t N 5SAT_T
6 ~
Mr TH'~MA AYIAN
BANGKO AND SATTAHIP
lUUMblEsEIS~~~ORT PROw,.1>/J ECT
1~~0" CHNGA CETES 10- i -
99*' 1 2 <-,l9 .
K- -0 t A _x
' t - llAMA t
( %_KAMPHA~~EN4G PHE1T i\ /
THAILAND aK3 37 {FINLAND WATERWAYS AN \ J \\COASTAL PORTS PROJECT SN)
Chao Phrya Waterway 337
_ooft DEPTH OVER 2 METERS Khn 2751\I_ DEPTH LIMIT 1.7 METERS THANI
* CHANGWAT CENIERSj /
RAILROADS CIU W4 DS\7r
RIVERS 83 \\) // 151 ~ CHANGWAT BO)UNDARIES 3 s IINTERNATIONAL 3OLONa*RIES -. K .NGu¶- I
UH- S UHAN5 HW 1 i -
A,. ~1 A ! .
'C~~~~~~~~1 NA'i NVO
- *.~~~~ ,~~ KANR.m SAtJ
