G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962

MINDANAO BUS COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.

THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the BOARD OF TAX APPEALS of Cagayan de Oro

City,respondents.

Binamira, Barria and Irabagon for petitioner.

Vicente E. Sabellina for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for the review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 710 holding

that the petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance

and repair equipment hereunder referred to.

Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner's above-mentioned

equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground

that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor, so

petitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the assessment.

In the Court of Tax Appeals the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

Petitioner and respondents, thru their respective counsels agreed to the following stipulation of facts:

1. That petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor

trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public

Service Commission;

2. That petitioner has its main office and shop at Cagayan de Oro City. It maintains Branch Offices and/or

stations at Iligan City, Lanao; Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur; Davao City and Kibawe, Bukidnon Province;

3. That the machineries sought to be assessed by the respondent as real properties are the following:

(a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "A";

(b) Storm Boring Machine, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "B";

(c) Lathe machine with motor, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "C";

(d) Black and Decker Grinder, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "D";

(e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "E";

(f) Battery charger (Tungar charge machine) appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "F";

and

(g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "G".

4. That these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms as may be seen in the attached

photographs which form part of this agreed stipulation of facts;

5. That petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor

trucks; a repair shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries which are placed

therein, its TPU trucks are made; body constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be

serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it operates;

6. That these machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipments to produce

finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the general public

indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes for which petitioner has never engaged in, to

date.1awphîl.nèt

The Court of Tax Appeals having sustained the respondent city assessor's ruling, and having denied a

motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought the case to this Court assigning the following errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals erred in upholding respondents' contention that the questioned

assessments are valid; and that said tools, equipments or machineries are immovable taxable real

properties.

2. The Tax Court erred in its interpretation of paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code, and

holding that pursuant thereto the movable equipments are taxable realties, by reason of their being

intended or destined for use in an industry.

3. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in denying petitioner's contention that the respondent City Assessor's

power to assess and levy real estate taxes on machineries is further restricted by section 31, paragraph

(c) of Republic Act No. 521; and

4. The Tax Court erred in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondents contend that said equipments, tho movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance

with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 415. — The following are immovable properties:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an

industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to

meet the needs of the said industry or works. (Emphasis ours.)

Note that the stipulation expressly states that the equipment are placed on wooden or cement

platforms. They can be moved around and about in petitioner's repair shop. In the case of B. H.

Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 663, the Supreme Court said:

Article 344 (Now Art. 415), paragraph (5) of the Civil Code, gives the character of real property to

"machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land

for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly

adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry."

If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co.,

Inc., in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar and industry, converted them into

real property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not

permanent in character because, as essential and principle elements of a sugar central, without them

the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was

established. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment

installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be

permanent. (Emphasis ours.)

So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and

principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to

function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." We may here distinguish,

therefore, those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and

principal elements in the industry for those which may not be so considered immobilized because they

are merely incidental, not essential and principal. Thus, cash registers, typewriters, etc., usually found

and used in hotels, restaurants, theaters, etc. are merely incidentals and are not and should not be

considered immobilized by destination, for these businesses can continue or carry on their functions

without these equity comments. Airline companies use forklifts, jeep-wagons, pressure pumps, IBM

machines, etc. which are incidentals, not essentials, and thus retain their movable nature. On the other

hand, machineries of breweries used in the manufacture of liquor and soft drinks, though movable in

nature, are immobilized because they are essential to said industries; but the delivery trucks and adding

machines which they usually own and use and are found within their industrial compounds are merely

incidental and retain their movable nature.

Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and

principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor

trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate

and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as

petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could

be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another

shop belonging to another.

The law that governs the determination of the question at issue is as follows:

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an

industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to

meet the needs of the said industry or works; (Civil Code of the Phil.)

Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also requires that the industry or

works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus in the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu

Unjieng, supra, the "machinery, liquid containers, and instruments or implements" are found in a

building constructed on the land. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or less

permanently, and the sawing is conducted in the land or building.

But in the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the

transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as

demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.

Resuming what we have set forth above, we hold that the equipments in question are not absolutely

essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is not carried on in a

building, tenement or on a specified land, so said equipment may not be considered real estate within

the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition for review is hereby set aside and the equipment in

question declared not subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the real estate tax.

Without costs.

So ordered.

G.R. No. L-58469 May 16, 1983

MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC., and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate

Court) promulgated on August 27, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. SP-12731, setting aside certain Orders later

specified herein, of Judge Ricardo J. Francisco, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First instance of Rizal

Branch VI, issued in Civil Case No. 36040, as wen as the resolution dated September 22, 1981 of the said

appellate court, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

It appears that in order to obtain financial accommodations from herein petitioner Makati Leasing and

Finance Corporation, the private respondent Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted and assigned

several receivables with the former under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of

the receivables assigned, private respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials

inventory as well as a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range.

Upon private respondent's default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the

properties mortgage to it. However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned to implement the foreclosure failed to

gain entry into private respondent's premises and was not able to effect the seizure of the

aforedescribed machinery. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with the Court

of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, docketed as Civil Case No. 36040, the case before the lower court.

Acting on petitioner's application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure, the enforcement

of which was however subsequently restrained upon private respondent's filing of a motion for

reconsideration. After several incidents, the lower court finally issued on February 11, 1981, an order

lifting the restraining order for the enforcement of the writ of seizure and an order to break open the

premises of private respondent to enforce said writ. The lower court reaffirmed its stand upon private

respondent's filing of a further motion for reconsideration.

On July 13, 1981, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order, repaired to the premises of private respondent

and removed the main drive motor of the subject machinery.

The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and prohibition proceedings subsequently filed by herein private

respondent, set aside the Orders of the lower court and ordered the return of the drive motor seized by

the sheriff pursuant to said Orders, after ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of

replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the

new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it

from respondent's plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor, the reason why all that the

sheriff could do to enfore the writ was to take the main drive motor of said machinery. The appellate

court rejected petitioner's argument that private respondent is estopped from claiming that the

machine is real property by constituting a chattel mortgage thereon.

A motion for reconsideration of this decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, petitioner has

brought the case to this Court for review by writ of certiorari. It is contended by private respondent,

however, that the instant petition was rendered moot and academic by petitioner's act of returning the

subject motor drive of respondent's machinery after the Court of Appeals' decision was promulgated.

The contention of private respondent is without merit. When petitioner returned the subject motor

drive, it made itself unequivocably clear that said action was without prejudice to a motion for

reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, as shown by the receipt duly signed by respondent's

representative. 1 Considering that petitioner has reserved its right to question the propriety of the Court

of Appeals' decision, the contention of private respondent that this petition has been mooted by such

return may not be sustained.

The next and the more crucial question to be resolved in this Petition is whether the machinery in suit is

real or personal property from the point of view of the parties, with petitioner arguing that it is a

personality, while the respondent claiming the contrary, and was sustained by the appellate court,

which accordingly held that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon is null and void, as contended by

said respondent.

A similar, if not Identical issue was raised in Tumalad v. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143 where this Court,

speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, ruled:

Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by

ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only

have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they

should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject

house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and

although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when combined

with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to

treat the house as personality. Finally, unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. & Plaza Theatre, Inc. &

Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery & Williamson, wherein third persons assailed the validity of the

chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking

the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein

defendants-appellants, having treated the subject house as personality.

Examining the records of the instant case, We find no logical justification to exclude the rule out, as the

appellate court did, the present case from the application of the abovequoted pronouncement. If a

house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as

personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the

contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason

why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or

purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped

from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.

In rejecting petitioner's assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the Court of Appeals lays

stress on the fact that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of

such house. But the law makes no distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which the

house is built and We should not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.

It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as chattel by the private

respondent is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the

parties. As stated inStandard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the

parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real

property, as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.

Private respondent contends that estoppel cannot apply against it because it had never represented nor

agreed that the machinery in suit be considered as personal property but was merely required and

dictated on by herein petitioner to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was in a blank form at

the time of signing. This contention lacks persuasiveness. As aptly pointed out by petitioner and not

denied by the respondent, the status of the subject machinery as movable or immovable was never

placed in issue before the lower court and the Court of Appeals except in a supplemental memorandum

in support of the petition filed in the appellate court. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true,

such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said

contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in

court. There is nothing on record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed

that steps were taken to nullify the same. On the other hand, as pointed out by petitioner and again not

refuted by respondent, the latter has indubitably benefited from said contract. Equity dictates that one

should not benefit at the expense of another. Private respondent could not now therefore, be allowed

to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom,

From what has been said above, the error of the appellate court in ruling that the questioned machinery

is real, not personal property, becomes very apparent. Moreover, the case of Machinery and

Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. CA, 96 Phil. 70, heavily relied upon by said court is not applicable to the case

at bar, the nature of the machinery and equipment involved therein as real properties never having

been disputed nor in issue, and they were not the subject of a Chattel Mortgage. Undoubtedly, the

Tumalad case bears more nearly perfect parity with the instant case to be the more controlling

jurisprudential authority.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby reversed and

set aside, and the Orders of the lower court are hereby reinstated, with costs against the private

respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-11139 April 23, 1958

SANTOS EVANGELISTA, petitioner,

vs.

ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Briefly, the facts are: On June 4, 1949, petitioner herein, Santos Evangelista, instituted Civil Case No.

8235 of the Court of First, Instance of Manila entitled " Santos Evangelista vs. Ricardo Rivera," for a sum

of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon a house, built by

Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding

notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, on June 8, 1949. In due course,

judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who, on October 8, 1951, bought the house at public

auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. The corresponding definite

deed of sale was issued to him on October 22, 1952, upon expiration of the period of redemption. When

Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that

he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. — respondent herein — and that

the latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definite deed of

sale of the same house had been issued to respondent, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held, on

September 29, 1950, in compliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6268 of the same

court, entitled "Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Maximo Quiambao, Rosario Guevara and Ricardo

Rivera," in which judgment, for the sum of money, had been rendered in favor respondent herein, as

plaintiff therein. Hence, on June 13, 1953, Evangelista instituted the present action against respondent

and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his (Evangelista) title over said house, securing

possession thereof, apart from recovering damages.

In its answer, respondent alleged, in substance, that it has a better right to the house, because the sale

made, and the definite deed of sale executed, in its favor, on September 29, 1950 and May 10, 1952,

respectively, precede the sale to Evangelista (October 8, 1951) and the definite deed of sale in his favor

(October 22, 1952). It, also, made some special defenses which are discussed hereafter. Rivera, in effect,

joined forces with respondent. After due trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment

for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and respondent to deliver the house in question to petitioner herein

and to pay him, jointly and severally, forty pesos (P40.00) a month from October, 1952, until said

delivery, plus costs.

On appeal taken by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved said

respondent from the complaint, upon the ground that, although the writ of attachment in favor of

Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of respondent,

Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the

house in question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is

"ostensibly a personal property." As such, the Court of Appeals held, "the order of attachment . . .

should have been served in the manner provided in subsection (e) of section 7 of Rule 59," of the Rules

of Court, reading:

The property of the defendant shall be attached by the officer executing the order in the following

manner:

(e) Debts and credits, and other personal property not capable of manual delivery, by leaving with the

person owing such debts, or having in his possession or under his control, such credits or other personal

property, or with, his agent, a copy of the order, and a notice that the debts owing by him to the

defendant, and the credits and other personal property in his possession, or under his control, belonging

to the defendant, are attached in pursuance of such order. (Emphasis ours.)

However, the Court of Appeals seems to have been of the opinion, also, that the house of Rivera should

have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of

manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelists could not

have . . . validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession

thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction."

Evangelista now seeks a review, by certiorari, of this decision of the Court of Appeals. In this connection,

it is not disputed that although the sale to the respondent preceded that made to Evangelists, the latter

would have a better right if the writ of attachment, issued in his favor before the sale to the respondent,

had been properly executed or enforced. This question, in turn, depends upon whether the house of

Ricardo Rivera is real property or not. In the affirmative case, the applicable provision would be

subsection (a) of section 7, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which the attachment should be

made "by filing with the registrar of deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the

property attached, and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a copy of such order, description, and

notice with the occupant of the property, if any there be."

Respondent maintains, however, and the Court of Appeals held, that Rivera's house is personal

property, the levy upon which must be made in conformity with subsections (c) and (e) of said section 7

of Rule 59. Hence, the main issue before us is whether a house, constructed the lessee of the land on

which it is built, should be dealt with, for purpose, of attachment, as immovable property, or as personal

property.

It is, our considered opinion that said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other

personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in

Laddera vs. Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is

immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee.

This is the doctrine of our Supreme Court in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil., 644. And

it is amply supported by the rulings of the French Court. . . ."

It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal

property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, * 48 Off. Gaz., 2664; Standard Oil Co. of

New York vs.Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72 Phil., 464). However, this view is

good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of

estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it

in point where there has been no contractwhatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved,

as in the case at bar. Apart from this, in Manarang vs. Ofilada (99 Phil., 108; 52 Off. Gaz., 3954), we held:

The question now before us, however, is: Does the fact that the parties entering into a contract

regarding a house gave said property the consideration of personal property in their contract, bind the

sheriff in advertising the property's sale at public auction as personal property? It is to be remembered

that in the case at bar the action was to collect a loan secured by a chattel mortgage on the house. It is

also to be remembered that in practice it is the judgment creditor who points out to the sheriff the

properties that the sheriff is to levy upon in execution, and the judgment creditor in the case at bar is

the party in whose favor the owner of the house had conveyed it by way of chattel mortgage and,

therefore, knew its consideration as personal property.

These considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the rules on execution do not allow, and, we

shouldnot interpret them in such a way as to allow, the special consideration that parties to a contract

may have desired to impart to real estate, for example, as personal property, when they are, not

ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation governing sales on

execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property

is suited to its character, not to the character, which the parties have given to it or desire to give it.

When the rules speak of personal property, property which is ordinarily so considered is meant; and

when real property is spoken of, it means property which is generally known as real property. The

regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties may have privately given to the

property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the convenience or agreement

of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings. We therefore hold that the

mere fact that a house was the subject of the chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property

by the parties does not make said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its

sale of public auction. This ruling is demanded by the need for a definite, orderly and well defined

regulation for official and public guidance and would prevent confusion and misunderstanding.

We, therefore, declare that the house of mixed materials levied upon on execution, although subject of a

contract of chattel mortgage between the owner and a third person, is real property within the purview

of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture of the land, which, is

real property. (42 Am. Jur. 199-200; Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644;

Republic vs. Ceniza, et al., 90 Phil., 544; Ladera,, et al. vs. Hodges, et al., [C.A.] Off. Gaz. 5374.)"

(Emphasis ours.)

The foregoing considerations apply, with equal force, to the conditions for the levy of attachment, for it

similarly affects the public and third persons.

It is argued, however, that, even if the house in question were immovable property, its attachment by

Evangelista was void or ineffective, because, in the language of the Court of Appeals, "after presenting a

Copy of the order of attachment in the Office of the Register of Deeds, the person who might then be in

possession of the house, the sheriff took no pains to serve Ricardo Rivera, or other copies thereof." This

finding of the Court of Appeals is neither conclusive upon us, nor accurate.

The Record on Appeal, annexed to the petition for Certiorari, shows that petitioner alleged, in paragraph

3 of the complaint, that he acquired the house in question "as a consequence of the levy of an

attachment and execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 8235" of the Court of First Instance of

Manila. In his answer (paragraph 2), Ricardo Rivera admitted said attachment execution of judgment. He

alleged, however, by way a of special defense, that the title of respondent "is superior to that of plaintiff

because it is based on a public instrument," whereas Evangelista relied upon a "promissory note" which

"is only a private instrument"; that said Public instrument in favor of respondent "is superior also to the

judgment in Civil Case No. 8235"; and that plaintiff's claim against Rivera amounted only to P866, "which

is much below the real value" of said house, for which reason it would be "grossly unjust to acquire the

property for such an inadequate consideration." Thus, Rivera impliedly admitted that his house had been

attached, that the house had been sold to Evangelista in accordance with the requisite formalities, and

that said attachment was valid, although allegedly inferior to the rights of respondent, and the

consideration for the sale to Evangelista was claimed to be inadequate.

Respondent, in turn, denied the allegation in said paragraph 3 of the complaint, but only " for the

reasons stated in its special defenses" namely: (1) that by virtue of the sale at public auction, and the

final deed executed by the sheriff in favor of respondent, the same became the "legitimate owner of the

house" in question; (2) that respondent "is a buyer in good faith and for value"; (3) that respondent

"took possession and control of said house"; (4) that "there was no valid attachment by the plaintiff

and/or the Sheriff of Manila of the property in question as neither took actual or constructive

possession or control of the property at any time"; and (5) "that the alleged registration of plaintiff's

attachment, certificate of sale and final deed in the Office of Register of Deeds, Manila, if there was any,

is likewise, not valid as there is no registry of transactions covering houses erected on land belonging to

or leased from another." In this manner, respondent claimed a better right, merely under the theory

that, in case of double sale of immovable property, the purchaser who first obtains possession in good

faith, acquires title, if the sale has not been "recorded . . . in the Registry of Property" (Art. 1544, Civil

Code of the Philippines), and that the writ of attachment and the notice of attachment in favor of

Evangelista should be considered unregistered, "as there is no registry of transactions covering houses

erected on land belonging to or leased from another." In fact, said article 1544 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, governing double sales, was quoted on page 15 of the brief for respondent in the Court of

Appeals, in support of its fourth assignment of error therein, to the effect that it "has preference or

priority over the sale of the same property" to Evangelista.

In other words, there was no issue on whether copy of the writ and notice of attachment had been

served on Rivera. No evidence whatsoever, to the effect that Rivera had not been served with copies of

said writ and notice, was introduced in the Court of First Instance. In its brief in the Court of

Appeals, respondent did not aver, or even, intimate, that no such copies were served by the sheriff upon

Rivera. Service thereof on Rivera had been impliedly admitted by the defendants, in their respective

answers, and by their behaviour throughout the proceedings in the Court of First Instance, and, as

regards respondent, in the Court of Appeals. In fact, petitioner asserts in his brief herein (p. 26)

that copies of said writ and notice were delivered to Rivera, simultaneously with copies of the complaint,

upon service of summons, prior to the filing of copies of said writ and notice with the register deeds,

and the truth of this assertion has not been directly and positively challenged or denied in the brief filed

before us by respondent herein. The latter did not dare therein to go beyond making a statement — for

the first time in the course of these proceedings, begun almost five (5) years ago (June 18, 1953) —

reproducing substantially the aforementioned finding of the Court of Appeals and then quoting the

same.

Considering, therefore, that neither the pleadings, nor the briefs in the Court of Appeals, raised an issue

on whether or not copies of the writ of attachment and notice of attachment had been served upon

Rivera; that the defendants had impliedly admitted-in said pleadings and briefs, as well as by their

conduct during the entire proceedings, prior to the rendition of the decision of the Court of Appeals —

that Rivera had received copies of said documents; and that, for this reason, evidently, no proof was

introduced thereon, we, are of the opinion, and so hold that the finding of the Court of Appeals to the

effect that said copies had not been served upon Rivera is based upon a misapprehension of the specific

issues involved therein and goes beyond the range of such issues, apart from being contrary to the

aforementioned admission by the parties, and that, accordingly, a grave abuse of discretion was

committed in making said finding, which is, furthermore, inaccurate.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered

affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Manila, with the costs of this instance against respondent,

the Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 120098. October 2, 2001]

RUBY L. TSAI, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC. and MAMERTO R.

VILLALUZ, respondents.

[G.R. No. 120109. October 2, 2001]

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EVER TEXTILE

MILLS and MAMERTO R. VILLALUZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

These consolidated cases assail the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32986, affirming

the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. 89-48265. Also assailed is

respondent court’s resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso

(P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the

loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot under TCT

No. 372097, where its factory stands, and the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule

attached to the mortgage contract. The pertinent portions of the Real and Chattel Mortgage are quoted

below:

MORTGAGE

(REAL AND CHATTEL)

xxx

The MORTGAGOR(S) hereby transfer(s) and convey(s), by way of First Mortgage, to the MORTGAGEE,

xxx certain parcel(s) of land, together with all the buildings and improvements now existing or which

may hereafter exist thereon, situated in xxx.

“Annex A”

(Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by Ever Textile Mills in favor of PBCommunications – continued)

LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT

A. Forty Eight (48) units of Vayrow Knitting Machines-Tompkins made in Hongkong:

Serial Numbers Size of Machines

xxx

B. Sixteen (16) sets of Vayrow Knitting Machines made in Taiwan.

xxx

C. Two (2) Circular Knitting Machines made in West Germany.

xxx

D. Four (4) Winding Machines.

xxx

SCHEDULE “A”

I. TCT # 372097 - RIZAL

xxx

II. Any and all buildings and improvements now existing or hereafter to exist on the above-mentioned

lot.

III. MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT situated, located and/or installed on the above-mentioned lot

located at xxx

(a) Forty eight sets (48) Vayrow Knitting Machines xxx

(b) Sixteen sets (16) Vayrow Knitting Machines xxx

(c) Two (2) Circular Knitting Machines xxx

(d) Two (2) Winding Machines xxx

(e) Two (2) Winding Machines xxx

IV Any and all replacements, substitutions, additions, increases and accretions to above properties.

xxx[3]

On April 23, 1979, PBCom granted a second loan of P3,356,000.00 to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by

a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. These listed

properties were similar to those listed in Annex A of the first mortgage deed.

After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX

purchased various machines and equipments.

On November 19, 1982, due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency proceedings docketed as SP

Proc. No. LP-3091-P before the defunct Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXVIII. The CFI

issued an order on November 24, 1982 declaring the corporation insolvent. All its assets were taken

into the custody of the Insolvency Court, including the collateral, real and personal, securing the two

mortgages as abovementioned.

In the meantime, upon EVERTEX’s failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced

extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX under Act 3135, otherwise known as “An Act to

Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages”

and Act 1506 or “The Chattel Mortgage Law”. A Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was issued on December 1,

1982.

On December 15, 1982, the first public auction was held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the

highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date. On December 23, 1982,

another public auction was held and again, PBCom was the highest bidder. The sheriff issued a

Certificate of Sale on the same day.

On March 7, 1984, PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. In

November 1986, it leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai for P50,000.00 a

month. On May 3, 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai for P9,000,000.00,

including the contested machineries.

On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with

the Regional Trial Court against PBCom, alleginginter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject

mortgage was in violation of the Insolvency Law. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been

transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such

assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets.

Further, EVERTEX averred that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested

properties, which were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of November 26, 1975 nor in the

Chattel Mortgage of April 23, 1979, and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff’s

Sale dated December 1, 1982 and Certificate of Sale dated December 15, 1982.

The disputed properties, which were valued at P4,000,000.00, are: 14 Interlock Circular Knitting

Machines, 1 Jet Drying Equipment, 1 Dryer Equipment, 1 Raisin Equipment and 1 Heatset Equipment.

The RTC found that the lease and sale of said personal properties were irregular and illegal because they

were not duly foreclosed nor sold at the December 15, 1982 auction sale since these were not included

in the schedules attached to the mortgage contracts. The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff corporation and against the defendants:

1. Ordering the annulment of the sale executed by defendant Philippine Bank of Communications in

favor of defendant Ruby L. Tsai on May 3, 1988 insofar as it affects the personal properties listed in par.

9 of the complaint, and their return to the plaintiff corporation through its assignee, plaintiff Mamerto

R. Villaluz, for disposition by the Insolvency Court, to be done within ten (10) days from finality of this

decision;

2. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff corporation the sum

of P5,200,000.00 as compensation for the use and possession of the properties in question from

November 1986 to February 1991 and P100,000.00 every month thereafter, with interest thereon at the

legal rate per annum until full payment;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff corporation the sum of P50,000.00

as and for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;

4. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff corporation the sum of P200,000.00

by way of exemplary damages;

5. Ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim of the defendants; and

6. Ordering the defendants to proportionately pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Dissatisfied, both PBCom and Tsai appealed to the Court of Appeals, which issued its decision dated

August 31, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, except for the deletion therefrom of the award for exemplary damages, and reduction of

the actual damages, from P100,000.00 to P20,000.00 per month, from November 1986 until subject

personal properties are restored to appellees, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, in all

other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.[5]

Motion for reconsideration of the above decision having been denied in the resolution of April 28, 1995,

PBCom and Tsai filed their separate petitions for review with this Court.

In G.R. No. 120098, petitioner Tsai ascribed the following errors to the respondent court:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) ERRED IN EFFECT MAKING A CONTRACT FOR

THE PARTIES BY TREATING THE 1981 ACQUIRED MACHINERIES AS CHATTELS INSTEAD OF REAL

PROPERTIES WITHIN THEIR EARLIER 1975 DEED OF REAL AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE OR 1979 DEED OF

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISPUTED 1981

MACHINERIES ARE NOT REAL PROPERTIES DEEMED PART OF THE MORTGAGE – DESPITE THE CLEAR

IMPORT OF THE EVIDENCE AND APPLICABLE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) ERRED IN DEEMING PETITIONER A

PURCHASER IN BAD FAITH.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) ERRED IN ASSESSING PETITIONER ACTUAL

DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION – FOR WANT OF VALID FACTUAL AND

LEGAL BASIS.

V

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) ERRED IN HOLDING AGAINST PETITIONER’S

ARGUMENTS ON PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[6]

In G.R. No. 120109, PBCom raised the following issues:

I.

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY DECREE THE MACHINERIES LISTED UNDER PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE

COMPLAINT BELOW AS PERSONAL PROPERTY OUTSIDE OF THE 1975 DEED OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

AND EXCLUDED THEM FROM THE REAL PROPERTY EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSED BY PBCOM DESPITE

THE PROVISION IN THE 1975 DEED THAT ALL AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTIES DURING THE LIFETIME OF

THE MORTGAGE SHALL FORM PART THEREOF, AND DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT SAID

MACHINERIES ARE BIG AND HEAVY, BOLTED OR CEMENTED ON THE REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGED BY

EVER TEXTILE MILLS TO PBCOM, AND WERE ASSESSED FOR REAL ESTATE TAX PURPOSES?

II.

CAN PBCOM, WHO TOOK POSSESSION OF THE MACHINERIES IN QUESTION IN GOOD FAITH, EXTENDED

CREDIT FACILITIES TO EVER TEXTILE MILLS WHICH AS OF 1982 TOTALLED P9,547,095.28, WHO HAD

SPENT FOR MAINTENANCE AND SECURITY ON THE DISPUTED MACHINERIES AND HAD TO PAY ALL THE

BACK TAXES OF EVER TEXTILE MILLS BE LEGALLY COMPELLED TO RETURN TO EVER THE SAID

MACHINERIES OR IN LIEU THEREOF BE ASSESSED DAMAGES. IS THAT SITUATION TANTAMOUNT TO A

CASE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT?[7]

The principal issue, in our view, is whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the

foreclosed properties is proper. The secondary issue is whether or not the sale of these properties to

petitioner Ruby Tsai is valid.

For her part, Tsai avers that the Court of Appeals in effect made a contract for the parties by treating the

1981 acquired units of machinery as chattels instead of real properties within their earlier 1975 deed of

Real and Chattel Mortgage or 1979 deed of Chattel Mortgage.[8] Additionally, Tsai argues that

respondent court erred in holding that the disputed 1981 machineries are not real properties.[9] Finally,

she contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding against petitioner’s arguments on prescription

and laches[10] and in assessing petitioner actual damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, for

want of valid factual and legal basis.[11]

Essentially, PBCom contends that respondent court erred in affirming the lower court’s judgment

decreeing that the pieces of machinery in dispute were not duly foreclosed and could not be legally

leased nor sold to Ruby Tsai. It further argued that the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that the

pieces of machinery in question were personal properties have no factual and legal basis. Finally, it

asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in assessing damages and attorney’s fees against PBCom.

In opposition, private respondents argue that the controverted units of machinery are not “real

properties” but chattels, and, therefore, they were not part of the foreclosed real properties, rendering

the lease and the subsequent sale thereof to Tsai a nullity.[12]

Considering the assigned errors and the arguments of the parties, we find the petitions devoid of merit

and ought to be denied.

Well settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of

fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the

assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.[13] This rule is applied more stringently when

the findings of fact of the RTC is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[14]

The following are the facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals that are decisive of

the issues: (1) the “controverted machineries” are not covered by, or included in, either of the two

mortgages, the Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, and the pure Chattel Mortgage; (2) the said

machineries were not included in the list of properties appended to the Notice of Sale, and neither were

they included in the Sheriff’s Notice of Sale of the foreclosed properties.[15]

Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or

cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable

under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion, however, does not settle the

issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We have to look at the parties’ intent.

While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real

and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar,

both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and

the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. The pertinent portion of

respondent appellate court’s ruling is quoted below:

As stressed upon by appellees, appellant bank treated the machineries as chattels; never as real

properties. Indeed, the 1975 mortgage contract, which was actually real and chattel mortgage, militates

against appellants’ posture. It should be noted that the printed form used by appellant bank was mainly

for real estate mortgages. But reflective of the true intention of appellant PBCOM and appellee EVERTEX

was the typing in capital letters, immediately following the printed caption of mortgage, of the phrase

“real and chattel.” So also, the “machineries and equipment” in the printed form of the bank had to be

inserted in the blank space of the printed contract and connected with the word “building” by

typewritten slash marks. Now, then, if the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in

the real estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically

mentioning as part III of Schedule A a listing of the machineries covered thereby. It would have sufficed

to list them as immovables in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage of the land and building involved.

As regards the 1979 contract, the intention of the parties is clear and beyond question. It refers solely

to chattels. The inventory list of the mortgaged properties is an itemization of sixty-three (63)

individually described machineries while the schedule listed only machines and 2,996,880.50 worth of

finished cotton fabrics and natural cotton fabrics.[16]

In the absence of any showing that this conclusion is baseless, erroneous or uncorroborated by the

evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to depart therefrom.

Too, assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the

parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. As far back

as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963), an immovable may be considered a personal property if there

is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is

executed over it, as in the case at bar.

In the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled as “Real Estate Mortgage and

Chattel Mortgage,” instead of just “Real Estate Mortgage” if indeed their intention is to treat all

properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate “LIST OF

MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT”. These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties’

intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels. A fortiori, the contested after-acquired

properties, which are of the same description as the units enumerated under the title “LIST OF

MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT,” must also be treated as chattels.

Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the respondent appellate court’s ruling that inasmuch as the

subject mortgages were intended by the parties to involve chattels, insofar as equipment and machinery

were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Law applies, which provides in Section 7 thereof that: “a chattel

mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted

property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the property

originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding.”

And, since the disputed machineries were acquired in 1981 and could not have been involved in the

1975 or 1979 chattel mortgages, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include

subject machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages.

As the auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void, no valid title passed in its

favor. Consequently, the sale thereof to Tsai is also a nullity under the elementary principle of nemo dat

quod non habet, one cannot give what one does not have.[17]

Petitioner Tsai also argued that assuming that PBCom’s title over the contested properties is a nullity,

she is nevertheless a purchaser in good faith and for value who now has a better right than EVERTEX.

To the contrary, however, are the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that she is not a

purchaser in good faith. Well-settled is the rule that the person who asserts the status of a purchaser in

good faith and for value has the burden of proving such assertion.[18] Petitioner Tsai failed to discharge

this burden persuasively.

Moreover, a purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without

notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for

the same, at the time of purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person

in the property.[19] Records reveal, however, that when Tsai purchased the controverted properties, she

knew of respondent’s claim thereon. As borne out by the records, she received the letter of

respondent’s counsel, apprising her of respondent’s claim, dated February 27, 1987.[20] She replied

thereto on March 9, 1987.[21] Despite her knowledge of respondent’s claim, she proceeded to buy the

contested units of machinery on May 3, 1988. Thus, the RTC did not err in finding that she was not a

purchaser in good faith.

Petitioner Tsai’s defense of indefeasibility of Torrens Title of the lot where the disputed properties are

located is equally unavailing. This defense refers to sale of lands and not to sale of properties situated

therein. Likewise, the mere fact that the lot where the factory and the disputed properties stand is in

PBCom’s name does not automatically make PBCom the owner of everything found therein, especially in

view of EVERTEX’s letter to Tsai enunciating its claim.

Finally, petitioners’ defense of prescription and laches is less than convincing. We find no cogent reason

to disturb the consistent findings of both courts below that the case for the reconveyance of the

disputed properties was filed within the reglementary period. Here, in our view, the doctrine of laches

does not apply. Note that upon petitioners’ adamant refusal to heed EVERTEX’s claim, respondent

company immediately filed an action to recover possession and ownership of the disputed

properties. There is no evidence showing any failure or neglect on its part, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been

done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where by reason of the lapse of time, it

would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. Moreover, except for very strong

reasons, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an

owner.[22]

As to the award of damages, the contested damages are the actual compensation, representing rentals

for the contested units of machinery, the exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

As regards said actual compensation, the RTC awarded P100,000.00 corresponding to the unpaid rentals

of the contested properties based on the testimony of John Chua, who testified that the P100,000.00

was based on the accepted practice in banking and finance, business and investments that the rental

price must take into account the cost of money used to buy them. The Court of Appeals did not give full

credence to Chua’s projection and reduced the award to P20,000.00.

Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof

but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or

best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.[23] However, the allegations of respondent

company as to the amount of unrealized rentals due them as actual damages remain mere assertions

unsupported by documents and other competent evidence. In determining actual damages, the court

cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent

proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.[24] However, we are not

prepared to disregard the following dispositions of the respondent appellate court:

… In the award of actual damages under scrutiny, there is nothing on record warranting the said award

of P5,200,000.00, representing monthly rental income ofP100,000.00 from November 1986 to February

1991, and the additional award of P100,000.00 per month thereafter.

As pointed out by appellants, the testimonial evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Jonh (sic) Chua

and Mamerto Villaluz, is shy of what is necessary to substantiate the actual damages allegedly sustained

by appellees, by way of unrealized rental income of subject machineries and equipments.

The testimony of John Cua (sic) is nothing but an opinion or projection based on what is claimed to be a

practice in business and industry. But such a testimony cannot serve as the sole basis for assessing the

actual damages complained of. What is more, there is no showing that had appellant Tsai not taken

possession of the machineries and equipments in question, somebody was willing and ready to rent the

same for P100,000.00 a month.

x x x

Then, too, even assuming arguendo that the said machineries and equipments could have generated a

rental income of P30,000.00 a month, as projected by witness Mamerto Villaluz, the same would have

been a gross income. Therefrom should be deducted or removed, expenses for maintenance and

repairs. … Therefore, in the determination of the actual damages or unrealized rental income sued

upon, there is a good basis to calculate that at least four months in a year, the machineries in dispute

would have been idle due to absence of a lessee or while being repaired. In the light of the foregoing

rationalization and computation, We believe that a net unrealized rental income of P20,000.00 a month,

since November 1986, is more realistic and fair.[25]

As to exemplary damages, the RTC awarded P200,000.00 to EVERTEX which the Court of Appeals

deleted. But according to the CA, there was no clear showing that petitioners acted malevolently,

wantonly and oppressively. The evidence, however, shows otherwise.

It is a requisite to award exemplary damages that the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad

faith,[26] and the guilty acted in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, reckless or malevolent manner.[27] As

previously stressed, petitioner Tsai’s act of purchasing the controverted properties despite her

knowledge of EVERTEX’s claim was oppressive and subjected the already insolvent respondent to gross

disadvantage. Petitioner PBCom also received the same letters of Atty. Villaluz, responding thereto on

March 24, 1987.[28] Thus, PBCom’s act of taking all the properties found in the factory of the financially

handicapped respondent, including those properties not covered by or included in the mortgages, is

equally oppressive and tainted with bad faith. Thus, we are in agreement with the RTC that an award of

exemplary damages is proper.

The amount of P200,000.00 for exemplary damages is, however, excessive. Article 2216 of the Civil

Code provides that no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary for the adjudication of exemplary damages,

their assessment being left to the discretion of the court in accordance with the circumstances of each

case.[29]While the imposition of exemplary damages is justified in this case, equity calls for its

reduction. In Inhelder Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-52358, 122 SCRA 576, 585, (May 30,

1983), we laid down the rule that judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages

must always be exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. Thus, here the award of

exemplary damages by way of example for the public good should be reduced toP100,000.00.

By the same token, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation may be recovered when exemplary

damages are awarded.[30] In our view, RTC’s award ofP50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of

litigation is reasonable, given the circumstances in these cases.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 32986 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners Philippine Bank of

Communications and Ruby L. Tsai are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally Ever Textile Mills, Inc.

the following: (1) P20,000.00 per month, as compensation for the use and possession of the properties

in question from November 1986[31] until subject personal properties are restored to respondent

corporation; (2) P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, and (3) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and

litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000]

SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY, petitioners, vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE,

INC., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or

movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper

subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the January 6, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA)[2] in CA-GR SP No. 47332 and its February 26, 1999 Resolution[3] denying

reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated February 18, 1998 and Resolution dated

March 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33500 are hereby AFFIRMED. The writ of preliminary injunction

issued on June 15, 1998 is hereby LIFTED.”[4]

In its February 18, 1998 Order,[5] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 218)[6] issued a

Writ of Seizure.[7] The March 18, 1998 Resolution[8] denied petitioners’ Motion for Special Protective

Order, praying that the deputy sheriff be enjoined “from seizing immobilized or other real properties in

(petitioners’) factory in Cainta, Rizal and to return to their original place whatever immobilized

machineries or equipments he may have removed.”[9]

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:[10]

“On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (“PCI Leasing” for short) filed with the

RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money (Annex ‘E’), with an application for a writ of replevin docketed

as Civil Case No. Q-98-33500.

“On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of

replevin (Annex ‘B’) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI

Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.

“On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory,

seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other machineries.

“On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order (Annex ‘C’), invoking the

power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for

a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.

“This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex ‘F’), on the ground that the properties [were] still

personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.

“In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as

defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They

argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further

stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because the

contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical.

“On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the

remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the

rest.

“On April 7, 1998, they went to [the CA] via an original action for certiorari.”

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal

property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled that the “words of

the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties.” Observing

that Petitioner Goquiolay was an experienced businessman who was “not unfamiliar with the ways of

the trade,” it ruled that he “should have realized the import of the document he signed.” The CA

further held:

“Furthermore, to accord merit to this petition would be to preempt the trial court in ruling upon the

case below, since the merits of the whole matter are laid down before us via a petition whose sole

purpose is to inquire upon the existence of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC] in issuing

the assailed Order and Resolution. The issues raised herein are proper subjects of a full-blown trial,

necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties. The contract is being enforced by one, and [its]

validity is attacked by the other – a matter x x x which respondent court is in the best position to

determine.”

Hence, this Petition.[11]

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

“A. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERG’S became real property by virtue

of immobilization.

B. Whether or not the contract between the parties is a loan or a lease.”[12]

In the main, the Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property

which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. As a preliminary matter, the Court will also address

briefly the procedural points raised by respondent.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Preliminary Matter:Procedural Questions

Respondent contends that the Petition failed to indicate expressly whether it was being filed under Rule

45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It further alleges that the Petition erroneously impleaded Judge

Hilario Laqui as respondent.

There is no question that the present recourse is under Rule 45. This conclusion finds support in the

very title of the Petition, which is “Petition for Review on Certiorari.”[13]

While Judge Laqui should not have been impleaded as a respondent,[14] substantial justice requires that

such lapse by itself should not warrant the dismissal of the present Petition. In this light, the Court

deems it proper to remove, motu proprio, the name of Judge Laqui from the caption of the present case.

Main Issue: Nature of the Subject Machinery

Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ

issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property. Serious policy considerations, they argue,

militate against a contrary characterization.

Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal

property only.[15] Section 3 thereof reads:

“SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an

order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully

detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody.”

On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as follows:

“ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an

industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to

meet the needs of the said industry or works;

x x x....................................x x x....................................x x x”

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by

petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal

elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal

property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by destination because they are essential

and principal elements in the industry.”[16] In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said

machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.[17]

Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not

proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as

personal.[18] After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming

otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying

the truth of any material fact found therein.

Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio,[19] the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a

personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled:

“x x x. Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet

by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could

only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that

they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.”

Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills[20] also held

that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper

subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. Pertinent

portions of the Court’s ruling are reproduced hereunder:

“x x x. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be

considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the

parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is

absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by

destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so

agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.”

In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be

considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:[21]

“12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that

the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached

to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in

any manner to what is permanent.”

Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as

personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be deemed personal

property pursuant to the Lease Agreement – is good only insofar as the contracting parties are

concerned.[22] Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith

are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal.[23] In any event,

there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.

Validity of the Lease Agreement

In their Memorandum, petitioners contend that the Agreement is a loan and not a lease.[24] Submitting

documents supposedly showing that they own the subject machines, petitioners also argue in their

Petition that the Agreement suffers from “intrinsic ambiguity which places in serious doubt the intention

of the parties and the validity of the lease agreement itself.”[25] In their Reply to respondent’s Comment,

they further allege that the Agreement is invalid.[26]

These arguments are unconvincing. The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis mota of the

civil action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is effectively a resolution

of the merits of the case. Hence, they should be threshed out in the trial, not in the proceedings

involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure.

Indeed, in La Tondeña Distillers v. CA,[27] the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that

questions involving title to the subject property – questions which petitioners are now raising -- should

be determined in the trial. In that case, the Court noted that the remedy of defendants under Rule 60

was either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s bond. They were not

allowed, however, to invoke the title to the subject property. The Court ruled:

“In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ

of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon

therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction, and thereby put at issue the matter

of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied, the policy apparently being

that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the trial on the merits.”[28]

Besides, these questions require a determination of facts and a presentation of evidence, both of which

have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 or in a petition for review in this Court

under Rule 45.[29]

Reliance on the Lease Agreement

It should be pointed out that the Court in this case may rely on the Lease Agreement, for nothing on

record shows that it has been nullified or annulled. In fact, petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC

proceedings, which had ironically been instituted by respondent. Accordingly, it must be presumed valid

and binding as the law between the parties.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation[30] is also instructive on this point. In that case, the Deed of

Chattel Mortgage, which characterized the subject machinery as personal property, was also assailed

because respondent had allegedly been required “to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was

in a blank form at the time of signing.” The Court rejected the argument and relied on the Deed, ruling

as follows:

“x x x. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract

void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to

Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. There is nothing on record to show that

the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same. x x x”

Alleged Injustice Committed on the Part of Petitioners

Petitioners contend that “if the Court allows these machineries to be seized, then its workers would be

out of work and thrown into the streets.”[31] They also allege that the seizure would nullify all efforts to

rehabilitate the corporation.

Petitioners’ arguments do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. As earlier discussed, law and

jurisprudence support its propriety. Verily, the above-mentioned consequences, if they come true,

should not be blamed on this Court, but on the petitioners for failing to avail themselves of the remedy

under Section 5 of Rule 60, which allows the filing of a counter-bond. The provision states:

“SEC. 5. Return of property. -- If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant’s bond, or

of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he

does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the

return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in

double the value of the property as stated in the applicant’s affidavit for the delivery thereof to the

applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered

against the adverse party, and by serving a copy bond on the applicant.”

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-10817-18 February 28, 1958

ENRIQUE LOPEZ, petitioner,

vs.

VICENTE OROSA, JR., and PLAZA THEATRE, INC., respondents.

Nicolas Belmonte and Benjamin T. de Peralta for petitioner.

Tolentino & Garcia and D. R. Cruz for respondent Luzon Surety Co., Inc. Jose B. Macatangay for

respondent Plaza Theatre, Inc.

FELIX, J.:

Enrique Lopez is a resident of Balayan, Batangas, doing business under the trade name of Lopez-Castelo

Sawmill. Sometime in May, 1946, Vicente Orosa, Jr., also a resident of the same province, dropped at

Lopez' house and invited him to make an investment in the theatre business. It was intimated that

Orosa, his family and close friends were organizing a corporation to be known as Plaza Theatre, Inc., that

would engage in such venture. Although Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest of the same, he

agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction of the proposed theatre, and at Orosa's

behest and assurance that the latter would be personally liable for any account that the said

construction might incur, Lopez further agreed that payment therefor would be on demand and not

cash on delivery basis. Pursuant to said verbal agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used

for the construction of the Plaza Theatre on May 17, 1946, up to December 4 of the same year. But of

the total cost of the materials amounting to P62,255.85, Lopez was paid only P20,848.50, thus leaving a

balance of P41,771.35.

We may state at this juncture that the Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land with an area of

679.17 square meters formerly owned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., and was acquired by the corporation on

September 25, 1946, for P6,000. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of the remaining unpaid

obligation, the latter and Belarmino Rustia, the president of the corporation, promised to obtain a bank

loan by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre., out of which said amount of P41,771.35 would

be satisfied, to which assurance Lopez had to accede. Unknown to him, however, as early as November,

1946, the corporation already got a loan for P30,000 from the Philippine National Bank with the Luzon

Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in

favor of said company as counter-security. As the land at that time was not yet brought under the

operation of the Torrens System, the mortgage on the same was registered on November 16, 1946,

under Act No. 3344. Subsequently, when the corporation applied for the registration of the land under

Act 496, such mortgage was not revealed and thus Original Certificate of Title No. O-391 was

correspondingly issued on October 25, 1947, without any encumbrance appearing thereon.

Persistent demand from Lopez for the payment of the amount due him caused Vicente Orosa, Jr. to

execute on March 17, 1947, an alleged "deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of stock of the Plaza

Theater, Inc., at P100 per share or with a total value of P42,000 in favor of the creditor, and as the

obligation still remained unsettled, Lopez filed on November 12, 1947, a complaint with the Court of

First Instance of Batangas (Civil Case No. 4501 which later became R-57) against Vicente Orosa, Jr. and

Plaza Theater, Inc., praying that defendants be sentenced to pay him jointly and severally the sum of

P41,771.35, with legal interest from the firing of the action; that in case defendants fail to pay the same,

that the building and the land covered by OCT No. O-391 owned by the corporation be sold at public

auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to said indebtedness; or that the 420 shares of the capital

stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., assigned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., to said plaintiff be sold at public auction

for the same purpose; and for such other remedies as may be warranted by the circumstances. Plaintiff

also caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on said properties with the Register of Deeds.

Defendants Vicente Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc., filed separate answers, the first denying that the

materials were delivered to him as a promoter and later treasurer of the corporation, because he had

purchased and received the same on his personal account; that the land on which the movie house was

constructed was not charged with a lien to secure the payment of the aforementioned unpaid

obligation; and that the 420 shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., was not assigned to plaintiff as

collaterals but as direct security for the payment of his indebtedness. As special defense, this defendant

contended that as the 420 shares of stock assigned and conveyed by the assignor and accepted by Lopez

as direct security for the payment of the amount of P41,771.35 were personal properties, plaintiff was

barred from recovering any deficiency if the proceeds of the sale thereof at public auction would not be

sufficient to cover and satisfy the obligation. It was thus prayed that he be declared exempted from the

payment of any deficiency in case the proceeds from the sale of said personal properties would not be

enough to cover the amount sought to be collected.

Defendant Plaza Theatre, Inc., on the other hand, practically set up the same line of defense by alleging

that the building materials delivered to Orosa were on the latter's personal account; and that there was

no understanding that said materials would be paid jointly and severally by Orosa and the corporation,

nor was a lien charged on the properties of the latter to secure payment of the same obligation. As

special defense, defendant corporation averred that while it was true that the materials purchased by

Orosa were sold by the latter to the corporation, such transactions were in good faith and for valuable

consideration thus when plaintiff failed to claim said materials within 30 days from the time of removal

thereof from Orosa, lumber became a different and distinct specie and plaintiff lost whatever rights he

might have in the same and consequently had no recourse against the Plaza Theatre, Inc., that the claim

could not have been refectionary credit, for such kind of obligation referred to an indebtedness incurred

in the repair or reconstruction of something already existing and this concept did not include an entirely

new work; and that the Plaza Theatre, Inc., having been incorporated on October 14, 1946, it could not

have contracted any obligation prior to said date. It was, therefore, prayed that the complaint be

dismissed; that said defendant be awarded the sum P 5,000 for damages, and such other relief as may

be just and proper in the premises.

The surety company, in the meantime, upon discovery that the land was already registered under the

Torrens System and that there was a notice of lis pendens thereon, filed on August 17, 1948, or within

the 1-year period after the issuance of the certificate of title, a petition for review of the decree of the

land registration court dated October 18, 1947, which was made the basis of OCT No. O-319, in order to

annotate the rights and interests of the surety company over said properties (Land Registration Case No.

17 GLRO Rec. No. 296). Opposition thereto was offered by Enrique Lopez, asserting that the amount

demanded by him constituted a preferred lien over the properties of the obligors; that the surety

company was guilty of negligence when it failed to present an opposition to the application for

registration of the property; and that if any violation of the rights and interest of said surety would ever

be made, same must be subject to the lien in his favor.

The two cases were heard jointly and in a decision dated October 30, 1952, the lower Court, after

making an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the respective stands of the parties and the evidence

adduced at the trial, held that defendants Vicente Orosa, Jr., and the Plaza Theatre, Inc.,

were jointly liable for the unpaid balance of the cost of lumber used in the construction of

the building and the plaintiff thus acquired the materialman's lien over the same. In making the

pronouncement that the lien was merely confined to the building and did not extend to the land on

which the construction was made, the trial judge took into consideration the fact that when plaintiff

started the delivery of lumber in May, 1946, the land was not yet owned by the corporation; that the

mortgage in favor of Luzon Surety Company was previously registered under Act No. 3344; that the

codal provision (Art. 1923 of the old Spanish Civil Code) specifying that refection credits are preferred

could refer only to buildings which are also classified as real properties, upon which said refection was

made. It was, however, declared that plaintiff's lien on the building was superior to the right of the

surety company. And finding that the Plaza Theatre, Inc., had no objection to the review of the decree

issued in its favor by the land registration court and the inclusion in the title of the encumbrance in favor

of the surety company, the court a quo granted the petition filed by the latter company. Defendants

Orosa and the Plaza Theatre, Inc., were thus required to pay jointly the amount of P41,771.35 with legal

interest and costs within 90 days from notice of said decision; that in case of default, the 420 shares of

stock assigned by Orosa to plaintiff be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to the

payment of the amount due the plaintiff, plus interest and costs; and that the encumbrance in favor of

the surety company be endorsed at the back of OCT No. O-391, with notation I that with respect to the

building, said mortgage was subject to the materialman's lien in favor of Enrique Lopez.

Plaintiff tried to secure a modification of the decision in so far as it declared that the obligation of

therein defendants was joint instead of solidary, and that the lien did not extend to the land, but same

was denied by order the court of December 23, 1952. The matter was thus appealed to the Court of

appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling, and then to this Tribunal. In this instance, plaintiff-

appellant raises 2 issues: (1) whether a materialman's lien for the value of the materials used in the

construction of a building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the

building is adhered to; and (2) whether the lower court and the Court of Appeals erred in not providing

that the material mans liens is superior to the mortgage executed in favor surety company not only on

the building but also on the land.

It is to be noted in this appeal that Enrique Lopez has not raised any question against the part of the

decision sentencing defendants Orosa and Plaza Theatre, Inc., to pay jointly the sum of P41,771.35, so

We will not take up or consider anything on that point. Appellant, however, contends that the lien

created in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the construction, repair or refection of a

building, is also extended to the land which the construction was made, and in support thereof he relies

on Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, pertinent law on the matter, which reads as follows:

ART. 1923. With respect to determinate real property and real rights of the debtor, the following are

preferred:

x x x x x x x x x

5. Credits for refection, not entered or recorded, with respect to the estate upon which the refection was

made, and only with respect to other credits different from those mentioned in four preceding

paragraphs.

It is argued that in view of the employment of the phrase real estate, or immovable property, and

inasmuch as said provision does not contain any specification delimiting the lien to the building, said

article must be construed as to embrace both the land and the building or structure adhering thereto.

We cannot subscribe to this view, for while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and

the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct

from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties1 could mean only one thing —

that a building is by itself an immovable property, a doctrine already pronounced by this Court in the

case of Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644. Moreover, and in view of the absence of any

specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or

not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

A close examination of the provision of the Civil Code invoked by appellant reveals that the law gives

preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the

refection or work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the lien so created

attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was

incurred. Evidently, therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in

the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.

Considering the conclusion thus arrived at, i.e., that the materialman's lien could be charged only to the

building for which the credit was made or which received the benefit of refection, the lower court was

right in, holding at the interest of the mortgagee over the land is superior and cannot be made subject

to the said materialman's lien.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby

affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-32917 July 18, 1988

JULIAN S. YAP, petitioner,

vs.

HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, etc., and GOULDS PUMPS INTERNATIONAL (PHIL.), INC., respondents.

Paterno P. Natinga for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari at bar involves two (2) Orders of respondent Judge Tañada 1 in Civil

Case No. 10984. The first, dated September 16, 1970, denied petitioner Yap's motion to set aside

execution sale and to quash alias writ of execution. The second, dated November 21, 1970, denied Yap's

motion for reconsideration. The issues concerned the propriety of execution of a judgment claimed to

be "incomplete, vague and non-final," and the denial of petitioner's application to prove and recover

damages resulting from alleged irregularities in the process of execution.

The antecedents will take some time in the telling. The case began in the City Court of Cebu with the

filing by Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. of a complaint 2 against Yap and his wife 3 seeking

recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the

latter's premises. 4 The case resulted in a judgment by the City Court on November 25, 1968, reading as

follows:

When this case was called for trial today, Atty. Paterno Natinga appeared for the plaintiff Goulds and

informed the court that he is ready for trial. However, none of the defendants appeared despite notices

having been served upon them.

Upon petition Atty. Natinga, the plaintiff is hereby allowed to present its evidence ex-parte.

After considering the evidence of the plaintiff, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant (Yap), ordering the latter to pay to the former the sum of Pl,459.30

with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until fully paid, computed from August 12, 1968, date of the

filing of the complaint; to pay the sum of P364.80 as reasonable attorney's fees, which is equivalent " to

25% of the unpaid principal obligation; and to pay the costs, if any.

Yap appealed to the Court of First Instance. The appeal was assigned to the sala of respondent Judge

Tañada. For failure to appear for pre-trial on August 28, 1968, this setting being intransferable since the

pre-trial had already been once postponed at his instance, 5 Yap was declared in default by Order of

Judge Tañada dated August 28, 1969, 6 reading as follows:

When this case was called for pre-trial this morning, the plaintiff and counsel appeared, but neither the

defendants nor his counsel appeared despite the fact that they were duly notified of the pre-trial set this

morning. Instead he filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement which this Court received only this

morning, and on petition of counsel for the plaintiff that the Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement was not

filed in accordance with the Rules of Court he asked that the same be denied and the defendants be

declared in default; .. the motion for the plaintiff being well- grounded, the defendants are hereby

declared in default and the Branch Clerk of Court ..is hereby authorized to receive evidence for the

plaintiff and .. submit his report within ten (10) days after reception of evidence.

Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered the following day by Judge

Tañada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds (1) Pl,459.30 representing the unpaid balance of the pump

purchased by him; (2) interest of 12% per annum thereon until fully paid; and (3) a sum equivalent to

25% of the amount due as attorney's fees and costs and other expenses in prosecuting the action.

Notice of the judgment was served on Yap on September 1, 1969. 7

On September 16, 1969 Yap filed a motion for reconsideration. 8 In it he insisted that his motion for

postponement should have been granted since it expressed his desire to explore the possibility of an

amicable settlement; that the court should give the parties time to arrive at an amicable settlement

failing which, he should be allowed to present evidence in support of his defenses (discrepancy as to the

price and breach of warranty). The motion was not verified or accompanied by any separate affidavit.

Goulds opposed the motion. Its opposition 9 drew attention to the eleventh-hour motion for

postponement of Yap which had resulted in the cancellation of the prior hearing of June 30, 1969

despite Goulds' vehement objection, and the re-setting thereof on August 28, 1969 with intransferable

character; it averred that Yap had again sought postponement of this last hearing by another eleventh-

hour motion on the plea that an amicable settlement would be explored, yet he had never up to that

time ever broached the matter, 10and that this pattern of seeking to obtain last-minute postponements

was discernible also in the proceedings before the City Court. In its opposition, Goulds also adverted to

the examination made by it of the pump, on instructions of the City Court, with a view to remedying the

defects claimed to exist by Yap; but the examination had disclosed the pump's perfect condition. Yap's

motion for reconsideration was denied by Order dated October 10, 1969, notice of which was received

by Yap on October 4, 1969. 11

On October 15, 1969 Judge Tañada issued an Order granting Goulds' Motion for Issuance of Writ of

Execution dated October 14, 1969, declaring the reasons therein alleged to be meritorious. 12 Yap

forthwith filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Order" dated October 17, 1969, 13 contending

that the judgment had not yet become final, since contrary to Goulds' view, his motion for

reconsideration was not pro forma for lack of an affidavit of merit, this not being required under Section

1 (a) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court upon which his motion was grounded. Goulds presented an

opposition dated October 22, 1969. 14 It pointed out that in his motion for reconsideration Yap had

claimed to have a valid defense to the action, i.e., ".. discrepancy as to price and breach of seller's

warranty," in effect, that there was fraud on Goulds' paint; Yap's motion for reconsideration should

therefore have been supported by an affidavit of merit respecting said defenses; the absence thereof

rendered the motion for reconsideration fatally defective with the result that its filing did not interrupt

the running of the period of appeal. The opposition also drew attention to the failure of the motion for

reconsideration to specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment claimed to be contrary to law or

not supported by the evidence, making it a pro forma motion also incapable of stopping the running of

the appeal period. On October 23, 1969, Judge Tañada denied Yap's motion for reconsideration and

authorized execution of the judgment. 15 Yap sought reconsideration of this order, by another motion

dated October 29, 1969. 16This motion was denied by Order dated January 26, 1970. 17 Again Yap moved

for reconsideration, and again was rebuffed, by Order dated April 28, 1970. 18

In the meantime the Sheriff levied on the water pump in question, 19 and by notice dated November 4,

1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof on November 14, 1969. 20 But in view of the pendency of

Yap's motion for reconsideration of October 29, 1969, suspension of the sale was directed by Judge

Tañada in an order dated November 6, 1969. 21

Counsel for the plaintiff is hereby given 10 days time to answer the Motion, dated October 29, 1969,

from receipt of this Order and in the meantime, the Order of October 23, 1969, insofar as it orders the

sheriff to enforce the writ of execution is hereby suspended.

It appears however that a copy of this Order was not transmitted to the Sheriff "through oversight,

inadvertence and pressure of work" of the Branch Clerk of Court. 22 So the Deputy Provincial Sheriff

went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest

bidder. 23 He later submitted the requisite report to the Court dated November 17, 1969, 24 as well as

the "Sheriffs Return of Service" dated February 13, 1970, 25 in both of which it was stated that execution

had been "partially satisfied." It should be observed that up to this time, February, 1970, Yap had not

bestirred himself to take an appeal from the judgment of August 29, 1969.

On May 9, 1970 Judge Tañada ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution on Gould's ex

parte motion therefor. 26 Yap received notice of the Order on June 11. Twelve (1 2) days later, he filed a

"Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution." 27 As regards

the original, partial execution of the judgment, he argued that —

1) "the issuance of the writ of execution on October 16, 1969 was contrary to law, the judgment sought

to be executed not being final and executory;" and

2) "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New Rules of Court," i.e.,

notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its accessories being

immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code).

And with respect to the alias writ, he argued that it should not have issued because —

1) "the judgment sought to be executed is null and void" as "it deprived the defendant of his day in

court" and "of due process;"

2) "said judgment is incomplete and vague" because there is no starting point for computation of the

interest imposed, or a specification of the "other expenses incurred in prosecuting this case" which Yap

had also been ordered to pay;

3) "said judgment is defective because it contains no statement of facts but a mere recital of the

evidence; and

4) "there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes execution unjust and

inequitable" because Yap suffered damages by reason of the illegal execution.

Goulds filed an opposition on July 6, 1970. Yap's motion was thereafter denied by Order dated

September 16, 1970. Judge Tañada pointed out that the motion had "become moot and academic" since

the decision of August 29, 1969, "received by the defendant on September 1, 1969 had long become

final when the Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution was promulgated on October 15, 1969." His

Honor also stressed that —

The defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts decision was in reality one for new trial.

Regarded as motion for new trial it should allege the grounds for new trial, provided for in the Rules of

Court, to be supported by affidavit of merits; and this the defendant failed to do. If the defendant

sincerely desired for an opportunity to submit to an amicable settlement, which he failed to do extra

judicially despite the ample time before him, he should have appeared in the pre- trial to achieve the

same purpose.

Judge Tañada thereafter promulgated another Order dated September 21, 1970 granting a motion of

Goulds for completion of execution of the judgment of August 29, 1969 to be undertaken by the City

Sheriff of Cebu. Once more, Yap sought reconsideration. He submitted a "Motion for Reconsideration of

Two Orders" dated October 13, 1970, 28 seeking the setting aside not only of this Order of September

21, 1970 but also that dated September 16, 1970, denying his motion to set aside execution dated June

23, 1970. He contended that the Order of September 21, 1970 (authorizing execution by the City Sheriff)

was premature, since the 30-day period to appeal from the earlier order of September 16, 1970 (denying

his motion to set aside) had not yet expired. He also reiterated his view that his motion for

reconsideration dated September 15, 1969 did not require that it be accompanied by an affidavit of

merits. This last motion was also denied for "lack of merits," by Order dated November 21, 1970. 29

On December 3, 1970, Yap filed a "Notice of Appeal" manifesting his intention to appeal to the Supreme

Court on certiorari only on questions of law, "from the Order ... of September 16, 1970 ... and from the

Order ... of November 21, 1970, ... pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 5440." He filed his

petition for review with this Court on January 5, 1971, after obtaining an extension therefor. 30

The errors of law he attributes to the Court a quo are the following: 31

1) refusing to invalidate the execution pursuant to its Order of October 16, 1969 although the judgment

had not then become final and executory and despite its being incomplete and vague;

2) ignoring the fact that the execution sale was carried out although it (the Court) had itself ordered

suspension of execution on November 6, 1969;

3) declining to annul the execution sale of the pump and accessories subject of the action although

made without the requisite notice prescribed for the sale of immovables; and

4) refusing to allow the petitioner to prove irregularities in the process of execution which had resulted

in damages to him.

Notice of the Trial Court's judgment was served on Yap on September 1, 1969. His motion for

reconsideration thereof was filed 15 days thereafter, on September 16, 1969. Notice of the Order

denying the motion was received by him on October 14, 1969. The question is whether or not the

motion for reconsideration — which was not verified, or accompanied by an affidavit of merits (setting

forth facts constituting his meritorious defenses to the suit) or other sworn statement (stating facts

excusing his failure to appear at the pre-trial was pro forma and consequently had not interrupted the

running of the period of appeal. It is Yap's contention that his motion was not pro forma for lack of an

affidavit of merits, such a document not being required by Section 1 (a) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court

upon which his motion was based. This is incorrect.

Section 2, Rule 37 precisely requires that when the motion for new trial is founded on Section 1 (a), it

should be accompanied by an affidavit of merit.

xxx xxx xxx

When the motion is made for the causes mentioned in subdivisions (a) and (b) of the preceding section,

it shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. Affidavit or affidavits of merits shall also

be attached to a motion for the cause mentioned in subdivision (a) which may be rebutted by counter-

affidavits.

xxx xxx xxx 32

Since Yap himself asserts that his motion for reconsideration is grounded on Section 1 (a) of Rule

37, 33 i.e., fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have

guarded against and by reason of which ... (the) aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his

rights" — this being in any event clear from a perusal of the motion which theorizes that he had "been

impaired in his rights" because he was denied the right to present evidence of his defenses (discrepancy

as to price and breach of warranty) — it was a fatal omission to fail to attach to his motion an affidavit of

merits, i.e., an affidavit "showing the facts (not conclusions) constituting the valid x x defense which the

movant may prove in case a new trial is granted." 34 The requirement of such an affidavit is essential

because obviously "a new trial would be a waste of the court's time if the complaint turns out to be

groundless or the defense ineffective." 35

In his motion for reconsideration, Yap also contended that since he had expressed a desire to explore

the possibility of an amicable settlement, the Court should have given him time to do so, instead of

declaring him in default and thereafter rendering judgment by default on Gould's ex parte evidence.

The bona fides of this desire to compromise is however put in doubt by the attendant circumstances. It

was manifested in an eleventh-hour motion for postponement of the pre-trial which had been

scheduled with intransferable character since it had already been earlier postponed at Yap's instance; it

had never been mentioned at any prior time since commencement of the litigation; such a possible

compromise (at least in general or preliminary terms) was certainly most appropriate for consideration

at the pre-trial; in fact Yap was aware that the matter was indeed a proper subject of a pre-trial agenda,

yet he sought to avoid appearance at said pre-trial which he knew to be intransferable in character.

These considerations and the dilatory tactics thus far attributable to him-seeking postponements of

hearings, or failing to appear therefor despite notice, not only in the Court of First Instance but also in

the City Court — proscribe belief in the sincerity of his avowed desire to negotiate a compromise.

Moreover, the disregard by Yap of the general requirement that "(n)otice of a motion shall be served by

the applicant to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a

copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it," 36 for which no justification

whatever has been offered, also militates against the bona fides of Yap's expressed wish for an amicable

settlement. The relevant circumstances do not therefore justify condemnation, as a grave abuse of

discretion, or a serious mistake, of the refusal of the Trial Judge to grant postponement upon this

proferred ground.

The motion for reconsideration did not therefore interrupt the running of the period of appeal. The time

during which it was pending before the court — from September 16, 1969 when it was filed with the

respondent Court until October 14, 1969 when notice of the order denying the motion was received by

the movant — could not be deducted from the 30-day period of appeal. 37 This is the inescapable

conclusion from a consideration of Section 3 of Rule 41 which in part declares that, "The "time during

which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be

deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37. 38

Notice of the judgment having been received by Yap on September 1, 1969, and the period of appeal

therefrom not having been interrupted by his motion for reconsideration filed on September 16, 1969,

the reglementary period of appeal expired thirty (30) days after September 1, 1969, or on October 1,

1969, without an appeal being taken by Yap. The judgment then became final and executory; Yap could

no longer take an appeal therefrom or from any other subsequent orders; and execution of judgment

correctly issued on October 15, 1969, "as a matter of right." 39

The next point discussed by Yap, that the judgment is incomplete and vague, is not well taken. It is true

that the decision does not fix the starting time of the computation of interest on the judgment debt, but

this is inconsequential since that time is easily determinable from the opinion, i.e., from the day the

buyer (Yap) defaulted in the payment of his obligation, 40 on May 31, 1968. 41 The absence of any

disposition regarding his counterclaim is also immaterial and does not render the judgment incomplete.

Yap's failure to appear at the pre-trial without justification and despite notice, which caused the

declaration of his default, was a waiver of his right to controvert the plaintiff s proofs and of his right to

prove the averments of his answer, inclusive of the counterclaim therein pleaded. Moreover, the

conclusion in the judgment of the merit of the plaintiff s cause of action was necessarily and at the same

time a determination of the absence of merit of the defendant's claim of untenability of the complaint

and of malicious prosecution.

Yap's next argument that the water pump had become immovable property by its being installed in his

residence is also untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything

"attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom

without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." 42 The pump does not fit this description.

It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering

deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated

than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

Yap's last claim is that in the process of the removal of the pump from his house, Goulds' men had

trampled on the plants growing there, destroyed the shed over the pump, plugged the exterior casings

with rags and cut the electrical and conduit pipes; that he had thereby suffered actual-damages in an

amount of not less than P 2,000.00, as well as moral damages in the sum of P 10,000.00 resulting from

his deprivation of the use of his water supply; but the Court had refused to allow him to prove these acts

and recover the damages rightfully due him. Now, as to the loss of his water supply, since this arose

from acts legitimately done, the seizure on execution of the water pump in enforcement of a final and

executory judgment, Yap most certainly is not entitled to claim moral or any other form of damages

therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appeal DISMISSED, and the Orders of September 16, 1970

and November 21, 1970 subject thereof, AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-7057 October 29, 1954

MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF MANILA, IPO LIMESTONE CO., INC., and ANTONIO VILLARAMA, respondents.

Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.

Capistrano and Capistrano for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies Inc., from a

decision of the Court of Appeals denying an original petition for certiorari filed by said petitioner against

Hon. Potenciano Pecson, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., and Antonio Villarama, the respondents herein.

The pertinent facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which we quote:

On March 13, 1953, the herein petitioner filed a complaint for replevin in the Court of First Instance of

Manila, Civil Case No. 19067, entitled "Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc., Plaintiff, vs. Ipo

Limestone Co., Inc., and Dr. Antonio Villarama, defendants", for the recovery of the machinery and

equipment sold and delivered to said defendants at their factory in barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Upon application ex-parte of the petitioner company, and upon approval of petitioner's bond in the sum

of P15,769.00, on March 13,1953, respondent judge issued an order, commanding the Provincial Sheriff

of Bulacan to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order (Appendix I,

Answer). On March 19, 1953, two deputy sheriffs of Bulacan, the said Ramon S. Roco, and a crew of

technical men and laborers proceeded to Bigti, for the purpose of carrying the court's order into effect.

Leonardo Contreras, Manager of the respondent Company, and Pedro Torres, in charge thereof, met the

deputy sheriffs, and Contreras handed to them a letter addressed to Atty. Leopoldo C. Palad, ex-oficio

Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, signed by Atty. Adolfo Garcia of the defendants therein, protesting against

the seizure of the properties in question, on the ground that they are not personal properties.

Contending that the Sheriff's duty is merely ministerial, the deputy sheriffs, Roco, the latter's crew of

technicians and laborers, Contreras and Torres, went to the factory. Roco's attention was called to the

fact that the equipment could not possibly be dismantled without causing damages or injuries to the

wooden frames attached to them. As Roco insisted in dismantling the equipment on his own

responsibility, alleging that the bond was posted for such eventuality, the deputy sheriffs directed that

some of the supports thereof be cut (Appendix 2). On March 20, 1953, the defendant Company filed an

urgent motion, with a counter-bond in the amount of P15,769, for the return of the properties seized by

the deputy sheriffs. On the same day, the trial court issued an order, directing the Provincial Sheriff of

Bulacan to return the machinery and equipment to the place where they were installed at the time of

the seizure (Appendix 3). On March 21, 1953, the deputy sheriffs returned the properties seized, by

depositing them along the road, near the quarry, of the defendant Company, at Bigti, without the

benefit of inventory and without re-installing hem in their former position and replacing the destroyed

posts, which rendered their use impracticable. On March 23, 1953, the defendants' counsel asked the

provincial Sheriff if the machinery and equipment, dumped on the road would be re-installed tom their

former position and condition (letter, Appendix 4). On March 24, 1953, the Provincial Sheriff filed an

urgent motion in court, manifesting that Roco had been asked to furnish the Sheriff's office with the

expenses, laborers, technical men and equipment, to carry into effect the court's order, to return the

seized properties in the same way said Roco found them on the day of seizure, but said Roco absolutely

refused to do so, and asking the court that the Plaintiff therein be ordered to provide the required aid or

relieve the said Sheriff of the duty of complying with the said order dated March 20, 1953 (Appendix 5).

On March 30, 1953, the trial court ordered the Provincial Sheriff and the Plaintiff to reinstate the

machinery and equipment removed by them in their original condition in which they were found before

their removal at the expense of the Plaintiff (Appendix 7). An urgent motion of the Provincial Sheriff

dated April 15, 1953, praying for an extension of 20 days within which to comply with the order of the

Court (appendix 10) was denied; and on May 4, 1953, the trial court ordered the Plaintiff therein to

furnish the Provincial Sheriff within 5 days with the necessary funds, technical men, laborers, equipment

and materials to effect the repeatedly mentioned re-installation (Appendix 13). (Petitioner's brief,

Appendix A, pp. I-IV.)

Thereupon petitioner instituted in the Court of Appeals civil case G.R. No. 11248-R, entitled "Machinery

and Engineering Supplies, Inc. vs. Honorable Potenciano Pecson, Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Ipo

Limestone Co., Inc., and Antonio Villarama." In the petition therein filed, it was alleged that, in ordering

the petitioner to furnish the provincial sheriff of Bulacan "with necessary funds, technical men, laborers,

equipment and materials, to effect the installation of the machinery and equipment" in question, the

Court of Firs Instance of Bulacan had committed a grave abuse if discretion and acted in excess of its

jurisdiction, for which reason it was prayed that its order to this effect be nullified, and that, meanwhile,

a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the enforcement o said order of may 4, 1953.

Although the aforementioned writ was issued by the Court of Appeals, the same subsequently dismissed

by the case for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner, upon the following grounds:

While the seizure of the equipment and personal properties was ordered by the respondent Court, it is,

however, logical to presume that said court did not authorize the petitioner or its agents to destroy, as

they did, said machinery and equipment, by dismantling and unbolting the same from their concrete

basements, and cutting and sawing their wooden supports, thereby rendering them unserviceable and

beyond repair, unless those parts removed, cut and sawed be replaced, which the petitioner, not

withstanding the respondent Court's order, adamantly refused to do. The Provincial Sheriff' s tortious

act, in obedience to the insistent proddings of the president of the Petitioner, Ramon S. Roco, had no

justification in law, notwithstanding the Sheriffs' claim that his duty was ministerial. It was the bounden

duty of the respondent Judge to give redress to the respondent Company, for the unlawful and wrongful

acts committed by the petitioner and its agents. And as this was the true object of the order of March

30, 1953, we cannot hold that same was within its jurisdiction to issue. The ministerial duty of the

Sheriff should have its limitations. The Sheriff knew or must have known what is inherently right and

inherently wrong, more so when, as in this particular case, the deputy sheriffs were shown a letter of

respondent Company's attorney, that the machinery were not personal properties and, therefore, not

subject to seizure by the terms of the order. While it may be conceded that this was a question of law

too technical to decide on the spot, it would not have costs the Sheriff much time and difficulty to bring

the letter to the court's attention and have the equipment and machinery guarded, so as not to

frustrate the order of seizure issued by the trial court. But acting upon the directives of the president of

the Petitioner, to seize the properties at any costs, in issuing the order sought to be annulled, had not

committed abuse of discretion at all or acted in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or

personal hostility; on the contrary, it issued said order, guided by the well known principle that of the

property has to be returned, it should be returned in as good a condition as when taken (Bachrach

Motor Co., Inc., vs. Bona, 44 Phil., 378). If any one had gone beyond the scope of his authority, it is the

respondent Provincial Sheriff. But considering that fact that he acted under the pressure of Ramon S.

Roco, and that the order impugned was issued not by him, but by the respondent Judge, We simply

declare that said Sheriff' act was most unusual and the result of a poor judgment. Moreover, the Sheriff

not being an officer exercising judicial functions, the writ may not reach him, for certiorari lies only to

review judicial actions.

The Petitioner complains that the respondent Judge had completely disregarded his manifestation that

the machinery and equipment seized were and still are the Petitioner's property until fully paid for and

such never became immovable. The question of ownership and the applicability of Art. 415 of the new

Civil Code are immaterial in the determination of the only issue involved in this case. It is a matter of

evidence which should be decided in the hearing of the case on the merits. The question as to whether

the machinery or equipment in litigation are immovable or not is likewise immaterial, because the only

issue raised before the trial court was whether the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, at the Petitioner's

instance, was justified in destroying the machinery and in refusing to restore them to their original form

, at the expense of the Petitioner. Whatever might be the legal character of the machinery and

equipment, would not be in any way justify their justify their destruction by the Sheriff's and the said

Petitioner's. (Petitioner's brief, Appendix A, pp. IV-VII.)

A motion for reconsideration of this decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied , petitioner has

brought the case to Us for review by writ of certiorari. Upon examination of the record, We are satisfied,

however that the Court of Appeals was justified in dismissing the case.

The special civil action known as replevin, governed by Rule 62 of Court, is applicable only to "personal

property".

Ordinarily replevin may be brought to recover any specific personal property unlawfully taken or

detained from the owner thereof, provided such property is capable of identification and delivery; but

replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property or incorporeal personal property. (77 C. J. S. 17)

(Emphasis supplied.)

When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., machinery and

equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of

said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter

"without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it

became necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but , also, to cut some of its wooden supports.

Moreover, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an

industry" carried on said immovable and tended." For these reasons, they were already immovable

property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines, which are

substantially identical to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 334 of the Civil Code of Spain. As such immovable

property, they were not subject to replevin.

In so far as an article, including a fixture annexed by a tenant, is regarded as part of the realty, it is not

the subject for personality; . . . .

. . . the action of replevin does not lie for articles so annexed to the realty as to be part as to be part

thereof, as, for example, a house or a turbine pump constituting part of a building's cooling system; . . .

(36 C. J. S. 1000 & 1001)

Moreover, as the provincial sheriff hesitated to remove the property in question, petitioner's agent and

president, Mr. Ramon Roco, insisted "on the dismantling at his own responsibility," stating that.,

precisely, "that is the reason why plaintiff posted a bond ." In this manner, petitioner clearly assumed

the corresponding risks.

Such assumption of risk becomes more apparent when we consider that, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule

62 of the Rules of Court, the defendant in an action for replevin is entitled to the return of the property

in dispute upon the filing of a counterbond, as provided therein. In other words, petitioner knew that

the restitution of said property to respondent company might be ordered under said provision of the

Rules of Court, and that, consequently, it may become necessary for petitioner to meet the liabilities

incident to such return.

Lastly, although the parties have not cited, and We have not found, any authority squarely in point —

obviously real property are not subject to replevin — it is well settled that, when the restitution of what

has been ordered, the goods in question shall be returned in substantially the same condition as when

taken (54 C.J., 590-600, 640-641). Inasmuch as the machinery and equipment involved in this case were

duly installed and affixed in the premises of respondent company when petitioner's representative

caused said property to be dismantled and then removed, it follows that petitioner must also do

everything necessary to the reinstallation of said property in conformity with its original condition.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So

ordered.

G.R. No. 168557 February 16, 2007

FELS ENERGY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS and

THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 170628 February 16, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF BATANGAS, LAURO C. ANDAYA, in his capacity as the

Assessor of the Province of Batangas, and the PROVINCE OF BATANGAS represented by its Provincial

Assessor, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us are two consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 168557 and G.R. No. 170628, which were

filed by petitioners FELS Energy, Inc. (FELS) and National Power Corporation (NPC), respectively. The first

is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the August 25, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)

in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 and its Resolution2 dated June 20, 2005; the second, also a petition for review

on certiorari, challenges the February 9, 2005 Decision3 and November 23, 2005 Resolution4 of the CA in

CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. Both petitions were dismissed on the ground of prescription.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel

engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract, denominated as an

Energy Conversion Agreement5 (Agreement), was for a period of five years. Article 10 reads:

10.1 RESPONSIBILITY. NAPOCOR shall be responsible for the payment of (a) all taxes, import duties, fees,

charges and other levies imposed by the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines or any

agency or instrumentality thereof to which POLAR may be or become subject to or in relation to the

performance of their obligations under this agreement (other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on

the basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its employees and (ii) construction

permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and charges) and (b) all real estate taxes

and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of the Power Barges.6

Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS. The NPC initially

opposed the assignment of rights, citing paragraph 17.2 of Article 17 of the Agreement.

On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from

Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of Batangas City. The assessed tax, which likewise covered those

due for 1994, amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of

its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and

authority to represent it in any conference regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial

Assessor.

In a letter7 dated September 7, 1995, NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to

assess real property taxes on the power barges. However, the motion was denied on September 22,

1995, and the Provincial Assessor advised NPC to pay the assessment.8 This prompted NPC to file a

petition with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) for the setting aside of the assessment and

the declaration of the barges as non-taxable items; it also prayed that should LBAA find the barges to be

taxable, the Provincial Assessor be directed to make the necessary corrections.9

In its Answer to the petition, the Provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real property for

purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.

Before the case was decided by the LBAA, NPC filed a Manifestation, informing the LBAA that the

Department of Finance (DOF) had rendered an opinion10 dated May 20, 1996, where it is clearly stated

that power barges are not real property subject to real property assessment.

On August 26, 1996, the LBAA rendered a Resolution11 denying the petition. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. FELS is hereby ordered to pay the real estate tax in the amount

ofP56,184,088.40, for the year 1994.

SO ORDERED.12

The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal

property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at

a specific location with a character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the

barges–FELS, a private corporation–is the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC

responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the exemption of

FELS; such a privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot be extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also

ruled that the petition was filed out of time.

Aggrieved, FELS appealed the LBAA’s ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA).

On August 28, 1996, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas City issued a Notice of Levy and Warrant by

Distraint13 over the power barges, seeking to collect real property taxes amounting to P232,602,125.91

as of July 31, 1996. The notice and warrant was officially served to FELS on November 8, 1996. It then

filed a Motion to Lift Levy dated November 14, 1996, praying that the Provincial Assessor be further

restrained by the CBAA from enforcing the disputed assessment during the pendency of the appeal.

On November 15, 1996, the CBAA issued an Order14 lifting the levy and distraint on the properties of

FELS in order not to preempt and render ineffectual, nugatory and illusory any resolution or judgment

which the Board would issue.

Meantime, the NPC filed a Motion for Intervention15 dated August 7, 1998 in the proceedings before the

CBAA. This was approved by the CBAA in an Order16 dated September 22, 1998.

During the pendency of the case, both FELS and NPC filed several motions to admit bond to guarantee

the payment of real property taxes assessed by the Provincial Assessor (in the event that the judgment

be unfavorable to them). The bonds were duly approved by the CBAA.

On April 6, 2000, the CBAA rendered a Decision17 finding the power barges exempt from real property

tax. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Batangas is

hereby reversed. Respondent-appellee Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas is hereby ordered

to drop subject property under ARP/Tax Declaration No. 018-00958 from the List of Taxable Properties

in the Assessment Roll. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas is hereby directed to act accordingly.

SO ORDERED.18

Ruling in favor of FELS and NPC, the CBAA reasoned that the power barges belong to NPC; since they are

actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under

Section 234(c) of R.A. No. 7160.19 As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that prescription

did not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of

R.A. No. 7160. The Provincial Assessor filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by FELS

and NPC.

In a complete volte face, the CBAA issued a Resolution20 on July 31, 2001 reversing its earlier decision.

The fallo of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the resolution of this Board that:

(a) The decision of the Board dated 6 April 2000 is hereby reversed.

(b) The petition of FELS, as well as the intervention of NPC, is dismissed.

(c) The resolution of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Batangas is hereby affirmed,

(d) The real property tax assessment on FELS by the Provincial Assessor of Batangas is likewise hereby

affirmed.

SO ORDERED.21

FELS and NPC filed separate motions for reconsideration, which were timely opposed by the Provincial

Assessor. The CBAA denied the said motions in a Resolution22 dated October 19, 2001.

Dissatisfied, FELS filed a petition for review before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67490.

Meanwhile, NPC filed a separate petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67491.

On January 17, 2002, NPC filed a Manifestation/Motion for Consolidation in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490

praying for the consolidation of its petition with CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. In a Resolution23 dated February

12, 2002, the appellate court directed NPC to re-file its motion for consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No.

67491, since it is the ponente of the latter petition who should resolve the request for reconsideration.

NPC failed to comply with the aforesaid resolution. On August 25, 2004, the Twelfth Division of the

appellate court rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 denying the petition on the ground of

prescription. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Resolutions dated July

31, 2001 and October 19, 2001 of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

On September 20, 2004, FELS timely filed a motion for reconsideration seeking the reversal of the

appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490.

Thereafter, NPC filed a petition for review dated October 19, 2004 before this Court, docketed as G.R.

No. 165113, assailing the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490. The petition was, however,

denied in this Court’s Resolution25 of November 8, 2004, for NPC’s failure to sufficiently show that the

CA committed any reversible error in the challenged decision. NPC filed a motion for reconsideration,

which the Court denied with finality in a Resolution26 dated January 19, 2005.

Meantime, the appellate court dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. It held that the right to

question the assessment of the Provincial Assessor had already prescribed upon the failure of FELS to

appeal the disputed assessment to the LBAA within the period prescribed by law. Since FELS had lost the

right to question the assessment, the right of the Provincial Government to collect the tax was already

absolute.

NPC filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 8, 2005, seeking reconsideration of the February 5,

2005 ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491. The motion was denied in a Resolution27 dated November

23, 2005.

The motion for reconsideration filed by FELS in CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 had been earlier denied for lack of

merit in a Resolution28 dated June 20, 2005.

On August 3, 2005, FELS filed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 168557 before this Court, raising the

following issues:

A.

Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not

subject to real property tax.

B.

Assuming that the subject power barges are real properties, whether they are exempt from real estate

tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code ("LGC").

C.

Assuming arguendo that the subject power barges are subject to real estate tax, whether or not it

should be NPC which should be made to pay the same under the law.

D.

Assuming arguendo that the subject power barges are real properties, whether or not the same is

subject to depreciation just like any other personal properties.

E.

Whether the right of the petitioner to question the patently null and void real property tax assessment

on the petitioner’s personal properties is imprescriptible.29

On January 13, 2006, NPC filed its own petition for review before this Court (G.R. No. 170628), indicating

the following errors committed by the CA:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPEAL TO THE LBAA WAS FILED OUT

OF TIME.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE POWER BARGES ARE NOT SUBJECT

TO REAL PROPERTY TAXES.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ASSESSMENT ON THE POWER

BARGES WAS NOT MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.30

Considering that the factual antecedents of both cases are similar, the Court ordered the consolidation

of the two cases in a Resolution31 dated March 8, 2006.1awphi1.net

In an earlier Resolution dated February 1, 2006, the Court had required the parties to submit their

respective Memoranda within 30 days from notice. Almost a year passed but the parties had not

submitted their respective memoranda. Considering that taxes—the lifeblood of our economy—are

involved in the present controversy, the Court was prompted to dispense with the said pleadings, with

the end view of advancing the interests of justice and avoiding further delay.

In both petitions, FELS and NPC maintain that the appeal before the LBAA was not time-barred. FELS

argues that when NPC moved to have the assessment reconsidered on September 7, 1995, the running

of the period to file an appeal with the LBAA was tolled. For its part, NPC posits that the 60-day period

for appealing to the LBAA should be reckoned from its receipt of the denial of its motion for

reconsideration.

Petitioners’ contentions are bereft of merit.

Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:

SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person having legal interest in the

property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the

assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of

assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under

oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such

affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.

We note that the notice of assessment which the Provincial Assessor sent to FELS on August 7, 1995,

contained the following statement:

If you are not satisfied with this assessment, you may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt

hereof, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province by filing a petition under oath on the

form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of ARP/Tax Declaration and such affidavits or

documents submitted in support of the appeal.32

Instead of appealing to the Board of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC opted to file a

motion for reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law.

The remedy of appeal to the LBAA is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or

municipal assessor in the assessment of the property. It follows then that the determination made by

the respondent Provincial Assessor with regard to the taxability of the subject real properties falls within

its power to assess properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the LBAA.33

We fully agree with the rationalization of the CA in both CA-G.R. SP No. 67490 and CA-G.R. SP No.

67491. The two divisions of the appellate court cited the case of Callanta v. Office of the

Ombudsman,34 where we ruled that under Section 226 of R.A. No 7160,35 the last action of the local

assessor on a particular assessment shall be the notice of assessment; it is this last action which gives

the owner of the property the right to appeal to the LBAA. The procedure likewise does not permit the

property owner the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor. The

pertinent holding of the Court in Callanta is as follows:

x x x [T]he same Code is equally clear that the aggrieved owners should have brought their appeals

before the LBAA. Unfortunately, despite the advice to this effect contained in their respective notices of

assessment, the owners chose to bring their requests for a review/readjustment before the city

assessor, a remedy not sanctioned by the law. To allow this procedure would indeed invite corruption in

the system of appraisal and assessment. It conveniently courts a graft-prone situation where values of

real property may be initially set unreasonably high, and then subsequently reduced upon the request of

a property owner. In the latter instance, allusions of a possible covert, illicit trade-off cannot be avoided,

and in fact can conveniently take place. Such occasion for mischief must be prevented and excised from

our system.36

For its part, the appellate court declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 67491:

x x x. The Court announces: Henceforth, whenever the local assessor sends a notice to the owner or

lawful possessor of real property of its revised assessed value, the former shall no longer have any

jurisdiction to entertain any request for a review or readjustment. The appropriate forum where the

aggrieved party may bring his appeal is the LBAA as provided by law. It follows ineluctably that the 60-

day period for making the appeal to the LBAA runs without interruption. This is what We held in SP

67490 and reaffirm today in SP 67491.37

To reiterate, if the taxpayer fails to appeal in due course, the right of the local government to collect the

taxes due with respect to the taxpayer’s property becomes absolute upon the expiration of the period

to appeal.38 It also bears stressing that the taxpayer’s failure to question the assessment in the LBAA

renders the assessment of the local assessor final, executory and demandable, thus, precluding the

taxpayer from questioning the correctness of the assessment, or from invoking any defense that would

reopen the question of its liability on the merits.39

In fine, the LBAA acted correctly when it dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of

time; the CBAA and the appellate court were likewise correct in affirming the dismissal. Elementary is

the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and jurisdictional,

and failure in this regard renders the decision final and executory.40

In the Comment filed by the Provincial Assessor, it is asserted that the instant petition is barred by res

judicata; that the final and executory judgment in G.R. No. 165113 (where there was a final

determination on the issue of prescription), effectively precludes the claims herein; and that the filing of

the instant petition after an adverse judgment in G.R. No. 165113 constitutes forum shopping.

FELS maintains that the argument of the Provincial Assessor is completely misplaced since it was not a

party to the erroneous petition which the NPC filed in G.R. No. 165113. It avers that it did not participate

in the aforesaid proceeding, and the Supreme Court never acquired jurisdiction over it. As to the issue of

forum shopping, petitioner claims that no forum shopping could have been committed since the

elements of litis pendentia or res judicata are not present.

We do not agree.

Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds

embodied in various maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to

the interest of the

State that there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the

individual of being vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting

doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer

the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public

tranquility and happiness.41 As we ruled in Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals:42

x x x An existing final judgment or decree – rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a

court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority – is conclusive on the rights of

the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other

judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.

x x x

Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their

privies to litigate anew a question once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must

end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice

requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits

of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties.

This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the following elements: (1) the former

judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and the second

actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The application of the doctrine of res

judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties. There is

substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest or privity of interest between a party

in the first and a party in the second case even if the first case did not implead the latter.43

To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any proceeding regarding real

property assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition for review docketed as G.R. No.

165113, it did so not only on its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed decision in the

earlier petition for review filed in this Court was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.

67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner

FELS under the principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are substantially "identical parties"

as to warrant the application of res judicata. FELS’s argument that it is not bound by the erroneous

petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.

On the issue of forum shopping, we rule for the Provincial Assessor. Forum shopping exists when, as a

result of an adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks another and possibly favorable judgment in

another forum other than by appeal or special civil action or certiorari. There is also forum shopping

when a party institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble

that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.44

Petitioner FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since the elements of res judicata are not

present in the cases at bar; however, as already discussed, res judicata may be properly applied herein.

Petitioners engaged in forum shopping when they filed G.R. Nos. 168557 and 170628 after the petition

for review in G.R. No. 165116. Indeed, petitioners went from one court to another trying to get a

favorable decision from one of the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases.

It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the

vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially

the same reliefs.45 The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue

simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of

court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly

judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.46

Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as

represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the

relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that

any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to

res judicata in the other.47

Having found that the elements of res judicata and forum shopping are present in the consolidated

cases, a discussion of the other issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, for the peace and

contentment of petitioners, we shall shed light on the merits of the case.

As found by the appellate court, the CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are thus

subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was

dismissed for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Tax assessments by tax examiners are

presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving

otherwise.48 Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their

field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the

sensible exercise of the judgment of men especially trained in appraising property. Where the judicial

mind is left in doubt, it is a sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed.49 We find no reason to

depart from this rule in this case.

In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v. The City of New York, et al.,50 a power

company brought an action to review property tax assessment. On the city’s motion to dismiss, the

Supreme Court of New York held that the barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants

designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges which supplied fuel oil to the power plant

barges, and the accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to real property taxation.

Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which, though

floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are

considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by

destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an

industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to

meet the needs of said industry or work.51

Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are exempt from real estate tax under Section

234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner NPC, a

government- owned and controlled corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of

electric power.

We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS,

which in fine, is the entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article

2 of the Agreement:

OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings,

machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been

supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the

purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into electricity.52

It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its

exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160, which reads:

SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are exempted from payment of the

real property tax:

x x x

(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts

and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water

and/or generation and transmission of electric power; x x x

Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by the

government owned or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in

this provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement provides:

OPERATION. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, subject to the supply of the

necessary Fuel pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it will operate the Power Barges

to convert such Fuel into electricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7.53

It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law between the parties. Not

being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the parties to the contract

are bound by its terms and conditions.54

Time and again, the Supreme Court has stated that taxation is the rule and exemption is the

exception.55 The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and the entity that would seek to be

thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be

misinterpreted.56 Thus, applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions, and the

rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is considered a

taxable entity.

The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1 of the Agreement, that it shall be

responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not justify the exemption.

The privilege granted to petitioner NPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between FELS and

NPC and does not bind a third person not privy thereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas.

It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous litigation has seriously resulted in the local

government’s deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in

its magnitude, acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so that security against its abuse is to be

found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to

pay for it.57 The right of local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid

severe tax erosion. This consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy of

local governments58 and the objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy genuine and

meaningful local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest development as self-reliant

communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals.59

In conclusion, we reiterate that the power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the needed

revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic

services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and

prosperity of the people.60

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and Resolutions AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.