Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-8414 February 28, 1957MANGHARAM B. HEMMANI,petitioner-appellant,vs.THE EXPORT CONTROL COMMITTEE,respondent-appellee.De la Cruz, Fernandez & Mate for appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista for appellee.The Solicitor General has made a accurate exposition of the facts of the case. They may be summarized as follows: On August 28, 1952, petitioner requested permission from the Export Control Committee, created under section 2 of Republic Act No. 613 and composed of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, the Secretary of National Defense and the Administrator of the Economic Coordination, as Members, to ship to his Hudson Sedan, Model 1949, Motor No. 48149039, valued at P4,500, to Osaka, Japan, on board theS. S. President Wilson, "to be used in connection with his business thereat." The respondent Committee approved the request on the same day, on condition that petitioner would file a bond equal to the value of the car, to guarantee the return of the same in the Philippines within six months from the date of its shipment.On August 29, 1952, petitioner posted with the Filipinas Compaia de Seguros a surety bond (Annex A) in the sum of P4,500 in favor of the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Customs), guaranteeing that the Hudson Sedan car would be re-exported back to the Philippines from Japan within six months from the execution of the bond. Accordingly, petitioner took the car in question to Osaka, Japan, on August 29, 1952, but failed to bring it back to the Philippines as promised. Instead petitioner filed two requests for extension of six months each to be followed to re-export the car back to the Philippines until March 1, 1954, alleging that he was still on a business tour and it would be impracticable to return the car on time. Notwithstanding the two extensions given him by the respondent the car in question was not brought back in the Philippines.On February 24, 1954, Atty. Teotimo A. Roja, in behalf of the petitioner, requested the respondent to order the cancellation of the surety bond of P4,500 that he and the Filipinas Compaia de Seguros (Bond No. 27914) had executed, alleging that it would be impracticable and expensive to return the car to Manila, considering its dilapidated condition and utility in Japan, but the respondent denied said request, though at its meeting held on February 24, 1954 it decided to reduce the liability under the bond to P2,250.00 for the reason that this was the value that the car would have at the state it was then if it were brought back in the Philippines, thus allowing a depreciation of 15 per cent each year.On May 13, 1954, petitioner requested respondent for reconsideration of its resolution of February 24, 1954, alleging that: (1) the Committee had no jurisdiction to imposed saidpenalty; and (2) granting, for the sake of argument that the Committee had jurisdiction to impose saidpenalty, the penalty imposed was highly excessive and violative of the Constitutional prohibition against excessivefines". Again this motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent under date of June 30, 1954; hence the institution of this petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 6, 1954, which was answered by the Solicitor General in due time. The case was then submitted on the stipulation embodying the facts aforementioned, and the Court rendered decision on September 24, 1954. dismissing the petition for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. From this decision the petitioner appealed to Us and in the instance his counsel maintains that the lower court erred:1. In not finding that appellant's car in question is personal effect and therefore not subject to statutory or reglementary prohibition against exportation;2. In not sustaining appellant's claim that the bringing out of his car in the instant case did not constitute exportation;3. In not finding that the respondent had acted without jurisdiction in requiring appellant to file a bond and later ordering its forfeiture; and4. In denying the petition forcertiorari.Section 3 of Republic Act No. 613, approved on May 11, 1951, authorizes the President "to control, curtail, regulate and/or prohibit the exportation or re-exportation of materials, goods and things referred to in Section 2 of the Act and to issue rules and regulations as would be necessary to carry out the provisions thereof". Section 2 of said Act prescribes in turn "that all applicants for permit to export or re-export any of the articles mentioned in the preceeding section 1, should be filed before a Committee to be composed of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as Chairman, the Secretary of National Defense and the Administrator of Economic Coordination as Members". Republic Act No. 613 further provides the following:SEC. 1.In order to promote economic rehabilitation and development and to safeguard national security, it shall be unlawful to any person, association or corporation to export or re-export to any point outside thePHILIPPINES MACHINERIES AND THEIR SPARE PARTS, scrap metals, medicines, foodstuffs, abaca seedlings, gasoline, oil, lubricants and military equipment or supplies suitable for military use without a permit from the President which may be issued in accordance with the provisions of the next succeeding section.In virtue of the power vested in him, the President issued on June 19, 1951, Executive Order No. 453, series of that year (47 Off. Gaz. No. 6, p. 2793), section 2 whereof reads as follows:SEC. 2.The exportation of all articles included in the list marked Annex A, hereto attached as an integral part of this Order, is absolutely prohibited:Provided, however, That licenses issued or authority granted prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 613, by the Interdepartmental Committee from February 28, 1951, by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Civil Aeronautics Administration and by the Sugar Quota Office on nonferrous metals pursuant to the Cabinet Resolution of November 21, 1950, are valid and subsisting.(The articles pertinent to this case that are included in the list marked Annex A referred to above as enumerated in Paragraph IV of said annex which will be quoted hereafter).The President, however, amended this Executive Order by another, No. 482, issued on October 31, 1951 (47 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p. 5039), in the following manner:SEC. 2.The exportation of all articles in the list marked Annex A, hereto attached as an integral part of this Order,is absolutely prohibited; Provided, however, That in exceptionally meritorious cases and where the Committee is fully satisfied that the overall economic and military requirements of the country are not prejudiced, such exportation may be allowed subject to the provisions of Section 4 of this Order, (which refers only to applications concerning articles included in the list marked Annex C and not in Annex A).Because of the amendment made by Executive Order No. 482, the Hudson Sedan automobile herein involved was allowed by the Committee to be exported to Osaka, Japan, with the obligation on the part of the plaintiff to report it back to the Philippines from Japan within the period granted to him to do so, extensions included, which obligation he failed to fulfill. Naturally, he is in duty bound to abide by the consequences of his failure and must pay the amount of the bond he posted, as ultimately reduced, or P2,250. Plaintiff, however, contends that this car in question was hispersonal effectand, therefore, not subject to statutory or reglementary prohibition against exportation. It seems, however, that plaintiff confuses the term "personal effects" with "property of the person" or personal property". As pointed out by the Solicitor General:The word "personal" used with "effects" much restrict its meaning (Childvs.Orton, 183, A. 709, 710-119 N. J. Eq. 438), and certainly (that meaning, cannot be understanding without any qualifying words includes only such tangible property as attends the person.Among the articles the exportation of which is prohibited according to said Executive Order are:IV. Imported Machinery (light and heavy), mechanical, electrical, agricultural, construction, engineering, andtransportation equipment of all types, including surplus equipment, spare parts, accessories, wires and other allied articles, except those already approved by the Bureau of Customs or NICA or order Government agencies as well as licenses covered in section 2 herein.It is undisputed that petitioner's car is covered with the term "transportation equipment of all types" and not as "personal effects", as counsel would want to classify it. Petitioner's car was admittedly brought by him to Osaka, Japan, "to be used in connection with his business" (p. 16, Record on Appeal) , and that when he asked for extension of time to re-export the motor vehicle back to the Philippines, his reason was that he was still on a business tour, (p. 17, Record on Appeal).If by personal effects of passengers in transit transportation equipment used in one's business were included, then it would be a simple matter to defeat the intention of the law, that is, to promote the economic and industrial development of the country. To seal any possible loophole, the Executive Order made it clear that exportation of all articles included in the list is prohibited irrespective of the use for which they were intended.The cardinal rule in the interpretation of law is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent (Roldan and Dazavs.Villaroman (1949), 69 Phil. 12), and the intention of the Legislature in enacting a law is part of the law itself, and is to be followed and applied, where ascertainable, in construing apparently conflicting provisions (Altabanvs.Masbate Consolidated Mining Co., et al. (1940) 69 Phil. 696). These principles of statutory construction are more true in the case at bar because the wording of the law is too plain and clear.On the other hand, the Solicitor General further contends that contrary to the assertions of plaintiff's counsel, the respondent is expressly authorized by the provisions of section 6 of said Executive Order No. 453 to require the petitioner to file a bond in this case to insure either the reaching of goods to their intended destination or its return to the Philippines, and section 4 of Republic Act No. 613 provides that in case of a violation of said Acts which regulates, controls and/or prohibits certain exports from the Philippines, the materials intended for export in violation of said Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, shall be confiscated by and forfeited to the Government. Consequently, if the petitioner violated the provisions of said Executive Orders by not returning or re-exporting back to the Philippines the automobile in question, and this property cannot be confiscated because it is beyond the jurisdiction of this country, it would appeal to reason that plaintiff should pay the equivalent value of the automobile which he placed beyond the reach of the Government to the Philippines, That is why he was required to give the bond and should pay the Government for the automobile that it should not seized and forfeit.But even assumingarguendo, that the respondent were not authorized to require the petitioner to file the bond in question, nevertheless, the Republic of the Philippines being a political entity has an incident to its sovereignty the capacity to enter into contracts and take bonds in cases appropriate to the just exercise of its power through its instrumentalities or agencies whenever, as in the instant case, such contracts or bonds are not prohibited by law, although the making of such contracts or the taking of such bonds may not have been specifically prescribed by any pre-existing statute (Solicitor General's brief, p. 6-8).Certainly petitioner could not have taken from the Philippines his automobile if he had not furnished the bond required from him and which he voluntarily furnished. He had been enjoying the benefits which the bond intended to secure and now he cannot come and allege that he is not bound by the terms of the bond. The present case has a legal aspect similar to the one We solved in the case of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas and S. S. Co. of 1912& S. S. Co. Svandoorg (A. P. Moller, Maersk Line), petitioner,vs.The Collector of Internal Revenue, respondent, G.R. No. L-9071, promulgated January 31, 1957. It appeared in that case:That while the M/V Hulda Maersk, represented locally by Tabacalera, was moored alongside Manila's Pier no. 9, its chief steward, Henry Anderson, took from its stores 30 cases of cigarettes of foreign manufacture, which he sold to two persons in uniform for two thousand dollars ($2,000.00). With this help the cargo was surreptitiously unloaded and withdrawn from the pier,import taxesunpaid. The Customs authorities somehow discovered the anomaly, and promptly investigated. Anderson admitted the sale; Captain Jansen, the ship's master, swore that the cigarettes belonged to the ship's stores and declared their willingness to pay the corresponding duties upon presentation of the bill to their local agents, the Tabacalera. The latter in turn, thru its Acting Manager of the Shipping Department Edward N. Bosch, who was present during the investigation, signed the following guaranty:The Commission of CustomsManilaDEAR SIR:We hereby confirm our agreement to pay immediately upon presentation of the corresponding bills, all taxes due on 30 (Thirty) Cases Chesterfield, Lucky Strike and Camel cigarettes, each case containing fifty cartoons of two hundred cigarettes each, removed from the above vessel.Accordingly, on March 5, 1952,upon receipt of the corresponding bill, Tabacalera paid the amount of P6,613.05 representing specific taxes on the aforesaid cigarettes. Thereafter it submitted a request for refund, which the Collector of Internal Revenue denied, and the Court of Tax Appeals likewise denied.In the cited case Tabacalera's demand for returned was made after the ship Hulda Maersk and the persons involved in the attempted smuggle had already left the Philippines, a fact that the Bureau of Customs would not have allowed to happen if the Tabacalera had not agreed to pay the taxes due upon presentation of the bill, and We affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals rendered in the case.Wherefore, on the strength of the foregoing considerations and finding no error in the decision appealed from, We hereby affirmed the same, with costs against plaintiff. It is so ordered.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.

EN BANC[G. R. No.5013.March11, 1909.]JEREMIAH J. HARTY, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, Province of Tarlac,Defendant-Appellant.D E C I S I O NTORRES,J.:On January 17, 1908, the representative of Mgr. Jeremiah J. Harty, archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, as the legal administrator of the properties and rights of the Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila, filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the municipality of Victoria, alleging that the parish of the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land within the said municipality, known as the plaza of the church of Victoria; that it had acquired said parcel of land more than sixty years previously, and had continued to possess the same ever since up to 1901, in which year theDefendantmunicipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said property, claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the present day. For the purposes of the complaint, a description of the metes and bounds of the land in question was set forth in the writing, andPlaintiffprayed that, in view of what was therein set forth, judgment be entered holding that the said land was the property of the parish of Victoria, of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, and that theDefendantbe ordered to vacate the same and to pay the costs of the action.TheDefendantmunicipality answered the complaint through its attorney and offered a general denial of all the facts stated therein, especially of those numbered 4, 5, 6, and 7; in special defense it alleged that the plaza described in No. 4 of the complaint was founded when the sitio denominated Canarum, a barrio of the town of Tarlac, was converted into a civil town in 1855; that the parish of Tarlac was established many years after the civil town, and that therefore, it neither had then, nor has now any title to the plaza claimed, and that the complaint injured theDefendant, and for this reason it prayed that judgment be entered absolving theDefendantof the complaint with costs and damages against thePlaintiff.Evidence was adduced by both parties, and the documents exhibited, to one of which thePlaintiffobjected, were made of record; the trial court rendered judgment on the 15th of June, 1908, holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, had a better right to the possession of the land described in the complaint, and sentenced theDefendantto vacate the same and to pay the costs. To said judgment the representative of theDefendants excepted and moved for a new trial on the ground that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the court that, if his motion were overruled, he would appeal to the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial was overruled; theDefendantexcepted, and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which, after receipt of a copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party, was approved. On the 1st of September last, theAppellantwas ordered to furnish bond in the sum of P1,000 to insure the fulfillment of the judgment in the event that it should be totally or partially affirmed. To said order theDefendantexcepted, but furnished the bond as directed by the court.In the view of the nature of the action brought by thePlaintiffagainst the municipality of Victoria, Province of Tarlac, the question that has arisen between the contending parties consists only in determining who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that surrounds the parish church of the said town, and which is called the public plaza of the same.Article 339 of the Civil Code reads:chanrobles virtualawlibraryProperty of public ownership is:chanrobles virtualawlibrary1.That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. Article 344 of said code also reads:chanrobles virtualawlibraryProperty for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces. From the evidence presented by both parties it appears that the town of Victoria, which was formerly only a barrio of the town of Tarlac and known as Canarum, was converted into a town in 1855, and named Victoria; to this end they must have laid out the streets and the plaza of the town, in the center of which were situated the church and parish house from the commencement, and at the expiration of about twelve years the parish of said town was constituted and the priest who was to perform the office of curate was appointed; that from the very beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public plaza, destined to the use of all the residents of the recently founded town; public performances and religious processions were held thereon without hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or of the curate of said town.It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old barrio, being interested in the conversion of the barrio into a civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the center of the future town which was subsequently called Victoria, should have streets and a public plaza with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal or building destined for the use of the municipality and the local official at the time called the gobernadorcillo and later on capitan municipal, as has occurred in the foundation of all the towns in these Islands, under the old administrative laws.It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro Taedo, who owned the space of land where the church and parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the Catholic Church, the only known at the time, but proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Tanedo comprehended the whole of the large tract which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the town.It was a custom observed by all the towns established administratively in these Islands under the old Laws of the Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas, commons, and special and communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the said large space of land was left vacant in the center of the town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town, more than twelve years prior to the appointment of a permanent curate therein, there are good grounds to suppose that the late Vicente Tanedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house in said municipality for religious purposes, or to the church, but not to the parish curate, because at the time there was no curate at the new town of Victoria.Even though all the remaining space of land which now forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned by the said Tanedo, it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the creation or establishment of the town, down to the present day, all the residents, including the curate of said town, have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has not been satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it being a public plaza destined to public use and was not private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the Province of Tarlac.It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to the public use are not subject to prescription. (Art. 1936, Civil Code. )cralawThat both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the plaza, does not constitute an act of private ownership, but evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve the and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of the townspeople.Certain it is that thePlaintiffhas not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its creation. For the above reasons it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in consequence thereof, theDefendantis absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both instances.Arellano,C.J.,Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard,JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-9865 December 24, 1915VERGO D. TUFEXIS,plaintiff-appellant,vs.FRANCISCO OLAGUERA and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF GUINOBATAN, represented by its president, Agapito Paulate,defendants-appellees.Rafael de la Sierra for appellant.Attorney-General Avancea for appellee Municipal Council of Guinobatan.No appearance for the other appellee.TORRES,J.:Counsel for plaintiff, in his written petition of May 13, 1913, prayed the Court of First Instance of Albay to declare that his client was entitled to the possession and use of the land referred to in the complaint in conformity with the terms of the Government concession (Exhibit A), of which he claimed to be the sole and lawful owner; that the defendants be ordered to remove from the said land all the stores, sheds, billiard tables, and other obstructions thereon, so that plaintiff might reconstruct the public market building on the said land in accordance with the provisions of the said concession, and that they be ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff, as damages, the sum of P250 per month from March 1, 1912, until the date on which the land be vacated, and to pay the legal costs and expenses of the suit.After the complaint had been answered by counsel for the defendant Francisco Olaguera, who prayed that his client be absolved therefrom, with the costs against the plaintiff, the provincial fiscal, in the name and representation of the municipality of Guinobatan, demurred on the ground that plaintiff lacked the personality to institute the action and further alleged that the complaint did not set forth sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.1awphil.netBy an order of August 25, 1913, the court sustained the demurrer filed by the defendant municipality of Guinobatan, allowed plaintiff ten days in which to amend his complaint, and notified him that unless he did so within that period the action would be dismissed.Counsel for plaintiff, by a writing of the 27th of the said month, set forth: That he objected to the above ruling as he believed it erroneous and contrary to law; that he did not desire to amend his complaint, wherefore, in accordance with the provisions of section 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court should render such judgment in the case as the law might warrant, and his exception to the said ruling should be entered on the record. By an order of September 1, 1913, the court, overruling the motion made by the defendant Olaguera, dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Vergo D. Tufexis, against the municipal council of Guinobatan on the ground that plaintiff had not amended his complaint. Plaintiff's counsel, when notified of this ruling, excepted thereto and moved for a rehearing and a new trial. This motion was overruled, whereupon the plaintiff excepted and filed the proper bill of exceptions.In the complaint filed by counsel for Vergo D. Tufexis, it was alleged that on September 30, 1911, plaintiff acquired at a public sale held in execution of a judgment rendered against Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece of property situated in the municipality of Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong materials with a galvanized-iron roof, erected on a parcel of land belonging to that municipality and intended for a public market; that plaintiff also acquired at the sale all the right, interest, title, and participation in the said property that appertained or might appertain to Pardo y Pujol; that the said building was constructed by virtue of a concession granted by the former Spanish government to Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, father of the judgment debtor, who, by a public instrument of July 31, 1912, renounced his right to redeem the said property and conveyed it to plaintiff, together with all his rights therein, the instrument of grant, Exhibit A, being attached to the complaint as a part thereof; that on January 2, 1912, the said building was totally destroyed by an accidental fire; that subsequent to the date just mentioned and for several months thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan carried on negotiations with plaintiff for the purchase of his rights in the said concession; that these negotiations could not be brought to a conclusion because the municipal council had acted therein deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad faith and for the sole purpose of beguiling, deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him from exercising his right to reconstruct the burned market building and utilize it in accordance with the terms of the said concession; that the defendant municipal council, without plaintiff's consent and in connivance with the other defendant, Francisco Olaguera, had authorized the latter unlawfully to take possession of all the land from March 1, 1912, in violation of plaintiff's rights; that the said Olaguera occupied the same with booths or stores for the sale of groceries and other merchandise, for billiard tables, and other analogous uses and derived unlawful gain from the revenues and rents produced by the said buildings; that plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the said land in accordance with the concession, which was in full force and effect and belonged to plaintiff; that plaintiff proposed to construct another public market building on the same land, but that the defendants had prevented him from using the land and reconstructing thereon the said public market building, and refused to recognize plaintiff's right and to vacate the land that had been occupied by the burned edifice.The provincial fiscal alleged as a ground for the demurrer that in no part of the instrument of concession did it appear that the privilege granted to Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas had likewise been granted to his successors or assignees, and that therefore such rights and actions as might have appertained to the assignee, Pardo y Cabaas, could not be conveyed to nor could they be acquired by any other person; that it was alleged in the complaint that the building was completely destroyed by fire on January 2, 1912, and that if plaintiff's right to the possession of the land was conditioned by the existence thereon of the said market building, such right had terminated by the disappearance of the building, inasmuch as plaintiff's right of action for the possession of the land was a corollary of the existence or nonexistence of the market building, and upon the disappearance of the latter the eland had reverted to the control of its owner; that pursuant to the terms of the said concession, the land belonging to the municipality was granted for the purpose of constructing thereon a market, and as this market had disappeared plaintiff would need a new concession, if it could be obtained, in order to be entitled to the possession of the land and to construct a new building; that by plaintiff's acquiring the right, title and interest of Ricardo Pardo y Pujol in the land he could not be understood to have also acquired such right and interest in the building intended for a public market, for the purchase of the building refers only to the edifice itself and it never could be understood that plaintiff acquired any right in the concession, which was never sold to him, as the complaint contains no allegation whatever that he purchased or acquired such right; that a personal privilege like the said concession is only temporary and is extinguished at the death of the grantee, unless otherwise provided in the grant; and that, from the lack of an allegation in the complaint that plaintiff legally purchased or acquired the right in the said concession, it was evident that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and was fatally defective.The question presented in the case at bar consists of whether a building of strong materials, erected by the said debtor's father, Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, on land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan and intended for a public market, by virtue of a concession granted on August 4, 1884, under the conditions therein imposed upon the grantee, could be attached and sold for the payment of a certain debt owed by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol to a third person who had obtained a final judgment.In deciding this question it is indispensable to determine what rights were acquired by Pardo y Pujol's father by virtue of the said concession granted to him by the Spanish Government, in the building erected by him on a parcel of land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan. The concession referred to contains, among other provisions, the following:itc-a1fARTICLE 1. There is hereby granted to Mr. Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas the parcel of land in the pueblo of Guinobatan, a prolongation of another parcel belonging to him, situated between the store and house of the Chinaman Valentin Garcia and that of Mr. Roco, following the line of Calle Real or Calzada de Albay and that of Calle del Carmen, up to and as far as the square that is to be laid out in the said pueblo.ART. 2. On the said land the petitioner shall construct a public market building, with a galvanized-iron roof, in accordance with the plan submitted to this office on the 13th of last May and which was approved by his Excellency the Governor-General in conformity with the changes recommended by the advisory board of the consulting board of public works; and these changes are those hereinafter specified.ART. 3. The said Mr. Pardo is granted the right to enjoy the revenue derived from the floor space of the market for the period of forty years, since the revenue from such floor space appertains to the grantee of the said service. By floor space is meant the right to shelter or retail merchandise in the market belonging to the grantee.ART. 4. On the expiration of the said period both the land aforementioned and the building thereon constructed shall be the property of the Government and the building shall be delivered to it in good condition.ART. 5. It shall be obligatory for every vendor to sell his goods in the said market, which shall be the only one in the said pueblo.ART. 7. The said authority shall put Mr. Pardo in possession of the land affected by this concession, and the proper proceedings in connection therewith shall be had in the presence of the chief engineer of public works of the said district and the headmen of the pueblo.ART. 8. Mr. Pardo shall inform this office of the date of the commencement of the work of construction, and the work shall be inspected by the public works officials residing in Albay; the building when completed shall be examined and accepted by the chief engineer of the district of Nueva Caceres or by the deputy to whom the latter may delegate this duty: all with the knowledge of the office of the inspector of public works.The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the foregoing articles, contained in the franchise granted by the Government of the former sovereignty, belongs to the municipality of Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the expense and with the money of the grantee, Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, it is, nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said municipality, and was temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of its floor space for forty years, but on the termination of this period the said right of usufruct was to cease and the building was to belong finally and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof.For these reasons, then, there is no question that the building and the land on which it was erected, since they did not belong to the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, nor do they belong to his son and heir, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by the latter.The concession granted by the former Spanish Government is personal and transferable only by inheritance, and in no manner could it be conveyed as a special personal privilege to another and a third person unless were an hereditary successor of the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, without knowledge and consent of the administrative authorities under whose control the special right of usufruct in the floor space of the said market building was enjoyed and exercised.Even though it is unquestionable that the creditor has a right to collect the money due him, out of his debtor's property, yet when among such property is included the right of usufruct in a public-service building and this right is closely related to a service of a public character, the right that lies in behalf of the creditor for the collection of a debt from the person who enjoys the said special privilege of right of usufruct in the floor space of a building intended for a public market is not absolute and may be exercised only through the action of a court of justice with respect to the profits or revenues obtained under the special right of usufruct granted to the debtor.Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, as the successor and heir of the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, is bound to pay his debts and his property can be attached on petition of his creditors. However, his personal privilege of usufruct in the floor space of the public market building of Guinobatan cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would mean that a person who has contracted with the state or with the Governmental authorities to furnish a service of a public character would be substituted, for another person who took no part in the contract, and that the regular course of a public service would be disturbed by the more or less legal action of the creditors of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public interests.It is indeed true that the building, which for many years served as a public market in the pueblo of Guinobatan, was erected out of the private funds of the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, and at first sight it seems natural that the latter, who paid the cost of the construction of the building, should be its owner. However, judging from the agreement between him and the Government authorities, he was granted the right to usufruct in the floor space of the said building in order that, during the period of forty years, he might reimburse himself for and collect the value of the building constructed by him; and it must be believed that Pardo y Cabaas, before executing the contract with the Government for the purpose of obtaining the right of usufruct granted to him and before accepting the contract, thought over its conditions deliberately and maturely and felt sure that he would profit thereby, that is, that he would reimburse himself for the value of the building he erected, and obtain interest on the investment and other advantages by enjoying the usufruct for the space of forty long years, as in fact even after his death this right continued to be enjoyed by his son, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol. Therefore, the said privilege conferred on the grantee by the Spanish Government on August 4, 1884, was neither onerous nor prejudicial to him or his heir, but on the contrary was beneficial to them.So, if neither the land nor the building in question belongs to Pardo y Pujol, it is evident that they could not be attached or sold at public auction to satisfy his debt and, consequently, the attachment and sale of the said Government property executed on petition of the creditor of the said Pardo y Pujol are notoriously illegal, null and void, and the acquisition of the property by plaintiff confers upon him no right whatever based on the said concession.In the decision in the case ofLopez vs. Alvarez(9 Phil. Rep., 28) the principle was asserted that:In attachments of all kinds it is an essential condition that the thing which is attached shall be the property of the debtor, and from no provision of the Mortgage Law can any conclusion be drawn which shall be contrary to this principle.This same principle was set up in the decision of the case ofAlvaran vs. Marquez(11 Phil. Rep., 263).It having been demonstrated by the foregoing reasons that the building constructed on land of the municipality of Guinobatan for a public market could not be attached and sold as the result of a debt contracted by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol in favor of a third person, we shall now proceed to examine whether an attachment would lie of the special right, granted by the former Spanish Government to the said debtor's father, of usufruct in the floor space of the said market and right to collect the revenues therefrom for the period of forty years, counted from the date of the granting of the said right.Without the consent of the proper administrative official, a grantee, or one charged with conducting a public service such as a market of the municipality of Guinobatan, cannot be permitted to be substituted by any other person, though this latter be a creditor of the usufructuary grantee. Hence, we hold that the attachment of the right of usufruct in the said building and of collecting the revenue obtained from the floor space of the said public market of Guinobatan, was illegal, because, were this right susceptible of attachment, a third person, as a creditor or a purchaser, might exercise such right, notwithstanding his personal status, instead of the grantee contractor. This theory does not bar the creditor from collecting the money owed him by the grantee, inasmuch as he has the right to petition the courts to allow him through proper legal proceedings to collect his money out of the revenues produced by the usufruct conferred by the Government on the grantee of the said service.The concession obtained by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father on August 4, 1884, is a true sovereignty and the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, and therefore the stipulations made by and between the contracting parties, the obligation to which that contract may have given rise, and the consequences that may have been entailed by the contract, all come within the scope of the civil law which guarantees the rights of the contracting parties.Although in our opinion the said concession is somewhat of the nature of a franchise, yet we do not think that the provisions of sections 56 to 61 of Act No. 1459 are applicable to the case at bar, for these sections refer to a franchise granted to a corporation, while the concession given by the former Spanish Government was granted to a private party and not to a corporation or judicial entity. Therefore, though under the said Act a franchise is subject to attachment, the Act contains no express provision whatever which authorizes the attachment and sale of a right or franchise especially granted to a private party under the conditions in which the concession in question was granted. The substitution of a third person instead of the one who obtained such an administrative concession must be explicitly authorized by the proper official of the administrative branch of the Government in order that the substitute may exercise the right so granted.In the case of Ricardo y Pujol, the grantee of the usufruct on the floor space in the said market building in Guinobatan, his creditor, in order to obtain the payment of his credit, could have applied to the courts for an attachment of the revenues or proceeds collected by his said debtor by virtue of the said concession; but it was in no wise proper to attach and sell the right granted by the public administration to operate and enjoy the usufruct of the floor space of the said public market.Although there is no similarity between the management of a public market and that of a railroad company, yet for the reason that the operation of the one as well as the other is of public interest, when a creditor of such a company sues to collect a debt it would be improper to attach the stationary equipment and rolling stock of the railroad only the gross receipts of the business over and above the amount required for its operation could be touched. This same legal principle holds in the case where the grantee of a market is a debtor and his property is attached on petition of his creditor. The receipts of the market may be attached, but not the right to operate and conduct the service, which is of a public character.In fact, article 1448 of theLey de Enjuiciamiento Civil,cited in this decision, not as a law now in force, but for the purpose of setting out a principle of law, prohibits the levy of attachments on railroads opened to public service, and on the stations, stores, shops, lands, works and buildings necessary for their operation, or on the locomotives, rails and other material intended for the operation of the line. When execution is levied on such railroad companies, the proceedings are governed by the provisions of the Law of November 12, 1869, extended by a royal order of August 3, 1886, to the overseas provinces. This law prescribes among other things that attachments may be levied and executed only on the gross receipts remaining after the necessary operating expenses have been deducted.In harmony with this legal provision, the supreme court of the State of Nebraska, in which State there is no law whatever that authorizes the attachment and sale of a bridge belonging to a corporation, in the case of the Overton Bridge co.vs.Means (33 Neb., 857) laid down the principle that such a bridge and the rights of the corporation therein could not be sold to satisfy a judgment against the corporation for the reason that:The property of corporations which are closed as public agencies, such as railroad and bridge companies, which is essential to the exercise of their corporate franchise, and the discharge of the duties they have assumed toward the general public, cannot, without statutory authority, be sold to satisfy a common law judgment.It cites decisions of several states, and also, in the decision referred to, cited Morawetz on Private Corporations, section 1125, and held that after attachment of the property not necessary to enable the corporation to perform its duties to the public, the only remedy remaining to a judgment creditor was to obtain the appointment of a receiver and a sequestration of the company's earnings.The supreme court of Alabama, in deciding a similar case (Gardnervs.Mobile & Northwestern R.R. Co., 102 Ala., 635, 645), affirmed the same principle and said:The only remedy of a judgment creditor is to obtain the appointment of a receiver and the sequestration of its income or earnings.It is to be noted that section 56 of Act No. 1459, which permits the sale under execution of a corporation's franchise, is in no wise applicable to the case at bar, for the reason that, since this Act was promulgated on March 1, 1906, it could not and cannot affect the laws, decrees, and orders of the Spanish government in conformity with which the administrative concession, Exhibit A, was granted to Pardo y Cabaas.The operation of a railroad is of public interest, and concerns both the public and the state, even though the superintendent and management thereof be conducted by a private company. Therefore, the property of a railroad, either its rolling stock or permanent equipment, is not subject to attachment and sale, and the rights of the creditors of the operating company may be exercised for the collection of their credit only of the gross receipts after the operation of the railroad is insured from its own income.This decision is based on the provisions of the aforecited law and the premise that the usufruct of the floor space of the public market of Guinobatan, granted to Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father was not subject to attachment on account of its being of a public character, but still the latter's creditor could have applied for a writ of execution and laid an attachment on the proceeds obtained from the operation of the market, which proceeds or income could have been collected by a receiver and intervenor.This, however, was not done, but on the creditor's petition the public market building, which was not his debtor's property, together with all the right, interest, title and participation which the latter had or might have had therein, was attached and sold; and as plaintiff was unable to acquire any right or title in such property illegally sold and illegally acquired by him at public auction or in the usufruct of the floor space of the building, it is unquestionable that he lacks the personality to claim possession of the land that belongs to the municipality or the enjoyment and exercise of the right conferred by the aforesaid administrative concession, which was and is inalienable on account of its being a personal right. For the same reason, plaintiff has no right to reconstruct the burned building on the land where it formerly stood.The only right to which the creditor was entitled was to petition for the attachment of the income and proceeds obtained from the use of the floor space of the market; but he did not avail himself of this right, nor were the receipts therefrom attached, nor were they adjudicated either to the creditor or to the plaintiff Tufexis. Therefore, the order of dismissal appealed is in accordance with law and the merits of the case, and likewise the errors assigned thereto have been duly refuted by the reasons set forth herein.For the foregoing considerations, we hereby affirm the said order of dismissal, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.Arellano, C.J., Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-24950 March 25, 1926VIUDA DE TAN TOCO,plaintiff-appellant,vs.THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO,defendant-appellee.Arroyo & Evangelista for appellant.Provincial Fiscal Borromeo Veloso for appelle.VILLAMOR,J.:It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the said judgment was on appeal affirmed by this court.1On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion which the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the defendant municipality.Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion but the court, by order of August 12, 1925, declared the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the defendant municipality null and void, thereby dissolving the said attachment.From this order the plaintiff has appealed by bill of exceptions. The fundamental question raised by appellant in her four assignments of error is whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from execution.The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code, provides that:Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and through their respective municipal government in conformity with law.It shall be competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire and hold real and personal property for municipal purposes, and generally to exercise the powers hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred upon them by law.For the purposes of the matter here in question, the Administrative Code does not specify the kind of property that a municipality may acquire. However, article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and towns (municipalities) into property for public use and patrimonial property. According to article 344 of the same Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and public waters, drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are property for public use.All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the provisions of the Civil Code except as provided by special laws.Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa says that "In accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we must distinguish, as to the patrimonial property of the towns, "between that a common benefit and that which is private property of the town. The first differs from property for public use in that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited to neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and, furthermore, such use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kind of property, for by its very nature it may be enjoyed as though it were private property. The third group, that is, private property, is used in the name of the town or province by the entities representing it and, like and private property, giving a source of revenue."Such distinction, however, is of little practical importance in this jurisdiction in view of the different principles underlying the functions of a municipality under the American rule. Notwithstanding this, we believe that the principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.The American Law is more explicit about this matter as expounded by Mcquilin in Municipal Corporations, volume 3, paragraph 1160, where he says that:States statutes often provide the court houses, jails and other buildings owned by municipalities and the lots on which they stand shall be exempt from attachment and execution. But independent of express statutory exemption, as a general proposition, property, real and personal, held by municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is exempt.For example, public buildings, school houses, streets, squares, parks, wharves, engines and engine houses, and the like, are not subject to execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of liquors carried in a town dispensary, are exempt. The reason for the exemption is obvious. Municipal corporations are created for public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their aggregate or public capacity. That they may properly discharge such public functions corporate property and revenues are essential, and to deny them these means the very purpose of their creation would be materially impeded, and in some instances practically destroy it. Respecting this subject the Supreme Court of Louisiana remarked: "On the first view of this question there is something very repugnant to the moral sense in the idea that a municipal corporation should contract debts, and that, having no resources but the taxes which are due to it, these should not be subjected by legal process to the satisfaction of its creditors. This consideration, deduced from the principles of moral equity has only given way to the more enlarged contemplation of the great and paramount interests of public order and the principles of government."It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used for a public purpose but for quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a judgment against the municipality, and may be sold. This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipal corporation, and the like. But the mere fact that corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily used for private purposes does not make it subject execution.If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed, the insurance money stands in lieu thereof and is also exempt.The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are not personally liable for the debts of the municipality, except that in the New England States the individual liability of the inhabitant is generally maintained.In Corpus Juris, vol 23, page 355, the following is found:Where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sough to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held. The rule is that property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares parks, promenades, wharves, landing places fire engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses, public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation. The rule also applies to funds in the hands of a public officer. Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a municipal corporation or country cannot be seized under execution by a creditor of such corporation. But where a municipal corporation or country owns in its proprietary, as distinguished from its public or governmental capacity, property not useful or used for a public purpose but forquasiprivate purposes, the general rule is that such property may be seized and sold under execution against the corporation, precisely as similar property of individuals is seized and sold. But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for private purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution. Whether or not property held as public property is necessary for the public use is a political, rather than a judicial question.In the case ofCity of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd.(140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a wharf for unloading sugar and molasses, open to the public, was property for the public use of the City of New Orleans and was not subject to attachment for the payment of the debts of the said city.In that case it was proven that the said wharf was a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River where all shipments of sugar and molasses taken to New Orleans were unloaded.That city leased the said wharf to the Louisiana Construction Company, Ltd., in order that it might erect warehouses so that the merchandise upon discharge might not be spoiled by the elements. The said company was given the privilege of charging certain fees for storing merchandise in the said warehouses and the public in general had the right to unload sugar and molasses there by paying the required fees, 10 per cent of which was turned over to the city treasury.The United States Supreme Court on an appeal held that the wharf was public property, that it never ceased to be such in order to become private property of the city; wherefore the company could not levy execution upon the wharf in order to collect the amount of the judgment rendered in favor thereof.In the case ofKlein vs. City of New Orleans(98 U. S., 149; 25 Law. ed., 430), the Supreme Court of the United States that a public wharf on the banks of the Mississippi River was public property and not subject to execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New Orleans where said wharf was located.In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River, which formerly was the shore of the river and which later enlarged itself by accession, was converted into a wharf by the city for public use, who charged a certain fee for its use.It was held that the land was public property as necessary as a public street and was not subject to execution on account of the debts of the city. It was further held that the fees collected where also exempt from execution because they were a part of the income of the city.In the case ofTufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of Guinobatan(32 Phil., 654), the question raised was whether for the payment of a debt to a third person by the concessionaire of a public market, the said public market could be attached and sold at public auction. The Supreme Court held that:Even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of his debtor's property, yet when among such property there is included the special right granted by the Government of usufruct in a building intended for a public service, and when this privilege is closely related to a service of a public character, such right of the creditor to the collection of a debt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said special privilege of usufruct in a public market is not absolute and may be exercised only through the action of court of justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained under the special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor.The special concession of the right of usufruct in a public market cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would be to permit a person who has contracted with the state or with the administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage a service of a public character, to be substituted, without the knowledge and consent of the administrative authorities, by one who took no part in the contract, thus giving rise to the possibility of the regular course of a public service being disturbed by the more or less legal action of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public interests.The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy the usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attached and sold, and a creditor of such person can recover his debt only out of the income or revenue obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said privilege, in the same manner that the rights of such creditors of a railroad company can be exercised and their credit collected only out of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has been made therefrom of the operating expenses of the road. (Law of November 12, 1896, extended to the overseas provinces by the royal order of August 3, 1886.)For the reasons contained in the authorities above quoted we believe that this court would have reached the same conclusion if the debtor had been municipality of Guinobatan and the public market had been levied upon by virtue of the execution.It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the municipality be exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted authorities, is exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1, page 467, Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the public good. They exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a portion of the sovereign power. The main object of their creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and to provide for the police and local government of certain designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are invested with certain governmental powers and charged with civil, political, and municipal duties. To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these duties, they are clothed with the authority to raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes as by licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the essential means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work. Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a corporation is practically destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based upon considerations of this character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained, although the corporation is in debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes which it is authorized to collect.Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the holding of the courta quothat the proper remedy for collecting the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was by way or mandamus.While this question is not necessarily included in the one which is the subject of this appeal, yet we believe that the holding of the court, assigned as error by appellant's counsel, is true when, after a judgment is rendered against a municipality, it has no property subject to execution. This doctrine is maintained by Dillon (Municipal Corporations, vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based upon the decisions of several States of the Union upholding the same principle and which are cited on page 2679 of the aforesaid work. In this sense this assignment of error, we believe, is groundless.By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.Avancea, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real., JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-301 April 7, 1948CARLOS PALANCA,petitioner-appellee,vs.THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Lorenzo M. Taada and Solicitors Pedro S. Reyes and Felix V. Makasiar for movant-appellant.Roxas, Picazo, and Mejia for petitioner-appellee.Vicente Sotto as amicus curiae.PADILLA,J.:In 1941 Carlos Palanca applied for citizenship under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Hearing on the petition was held but no decree was entered because the Pacific War supervened. On 11 September 1944, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the Japanese sponsored Republic of the Philippines entered a decree granting the petition upon the evidence heard before the outbreak of the war. However, the petitioner did not take the prescribed oath as a condition precedent to the issuance of the certificate of naturalization. After the reconstitution of the record of the proceedings which had been destroyed as a result of the battle for the liberalization of Manila, the petitioner took the oath and he was issued certificate of naturalization No. 1000.On 3 July 1945, the Solicitor General filed a motion which he amended on 8 August, praying for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization issued to the petitioner, on the ground that the latter does not and did not possess good moral character, that he has not conducted himself in an "irreproachable manner in his relation with the constituted government," that he is not loyal to the Commonwealth Government of which he desires to be citizen, and that citizenship being a political status, the decree granting it entered by a court exercising judicial powers under the authority of the enemy sponsored Government is null and void.At the hearing of the motion for cancellation, when Solicitor Pedro S. Reyes was starting to present the evidence for the Government, counsel for the petitioner asked leave of the court to be allowed to prove that the petitioner is a Filipino citizen, and informed the court that upon that ground he would join in the move to cancel the certificate of naturalization issued to the petitioner (p. 17, t.s.n.). The leave having been granted, counsel for petitioner submitted evidence which shows that Carlos Palanca arrived in the Philippine in the year 1884 and that since his arrival he continually resided in the City of Manila with the exception of the occasion, in the year 1902, when he left the Philippines for two months to attend the burial of his uncle Don Carlos Palanca, which took place in China; that in 1894 he wanted to marry a Filipina, and because the Archbishop of Manila had decreed that a Chinaman, even if Christian, could not marry a native of the Philippines, in that year (it must have been in 1893) he applied for Spanish citizenship; that in connection with said application he received from the Gobernadorcillo de Sangleyes the document Exhibit A, dated January 19, 1894, wherein the petitioner, Carlos Palanca was informed of the Royal Decree of the regent, the Queen Maria Cristina, of November 30, 1893, by which he was granted Spanish citizenship in accordance with the laws of the Monarchy, which was to be effective upon giving his oath provided for in such cases and after he shall have renounced his foreign allegiance; that in addition to Exhibit A, petitioner also received and presented as Exhibit B a notification to the Gobernadorcillo de Sangleyes from the Secretaryship of the General Government whereby the former was informed of the royal decree of the Regent, Queen Maria Cristina, dated November 30, 1893, by which the applicant, Carlos Palanca was granted the Spanish citizenship to enter into effect upon his giving the corresponding oath (In this communication the text of the Royal Decree is quoted); that on the day following the receipt of Exhibit A, the petitioner repaired to Malacaang and there gave his oath of allegiance and received the corresponding certificate of Spanish citizenship, which was burned in his house at Taft Avenue during the battle for liberation of Manila on the return of the Americans in 1945; that Exhibit B was the communication referred to as having been received by the Gobernadorcillo de Sangleyes from the Secretaryship of the General Government; that on February 4, 1894, and after having acquired the Spanish citizenship, Carlos Palanca Tan Tiaojua (Quian Lay) married Cesarea Cano Torres, native and resident of the District of Binondo, Manila (Exhibit D); that from then on the petitioner, Carlos Palanca, considered himself a Spanish subject, was registered as such in the Spanish Consulate General in Manila and has as late as March 2, 1942, received from said Consulate Duplicate Certificate No. 548 issued by the Spanish Consul General, Jose del Castano (Exhibit C); that because the petitioner, Carlos Palanca, believed himself to be a Spanish subject and desirous of acquiring Filipino citizenship by naturalization, he instituted this case in 1941, and when he married on April 12, 1945, his present wife, Rosa Gonzales, prior to the receipt of his Certificate of naturalization No. 1000, he made it appear therein that he was of Spanish nationality; and that during the course of his application for Filipino citizenship by naturalization, he also adduced evidence to show that he had acquired the Spanish nationality during the Spanish regime in these Islands (Order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated 7 January 1946.)Holding that the petitioner is a Filipino citizen pursuant to section 4 of the Act of the Congress of 1 July 1902 and section 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, the trial court granted the motion for cancellation of the certificate of naturalization issued to the petitioner, not upon the grounds alleged in the motion but for the reason that the certificate of naturalization was unnecessary. From this order the Solicitor General in behalf of the Government appeals.It is earnestly urged by the Solicitor General that, because of the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris which stipulated that The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress,section 4 of the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902, which provides That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, ... shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands . . . .and section 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, which provides That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, ... shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, . . . .should be construed to refer not to all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands but only to native inhabitants thereof. Stated differently, the term "all inhabitants" means native inhabitants only, according to the interpretation and contention of the Solicitor General. The provisions of the Acts of Congress quoted above do not have the import given them by the Solicitor General, even if they were construed in connection with the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris also quoted above. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded to the United States the territory known as the Philippine Islands. There was no need of stipulating on the future political status of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands thus ceded, except perhaps on the status of those who might choose to preserve their allegiance to Spain (Article IX, par. 1, Treaty of Paris), because the power and authority to determine the political status of said inhabitants was inherently vested in the United States. There could be no limitation upon the power and authority to determine the political status of said inhabitants by the United States, and for that reason the enactment of a law by the latter declaring that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided therein, are citizens thereof, cannot be construed to contravene the treaty stipulation referred to. The plenipotentiaries of Spain who signed the Treaty of Paris could not have been solicitous only about the future political status of her subjects residing in the Philippine Islands who were not born in Spain. If Spain had allowed her subjects born in Spain who were residing in the Philippines Islands to become citizens of the latter upon their failure to preserve their allegiance to her (Spain), it could not have been her intention not to allow her subjects residing in the Philippine Islands who were not born in Spain to become citizens of the country of their residence, in the same way that she allowed her subjects born in Spain and residing in the Philippine Islands to become citizens of the latter, or, by failing to stipulate on their future political status, to make them citizens of their country of origin, the citizenship of which they had renounced by becoming Spanish subjects. There seems to be no doubt that the lack of treaty stipulation regarding Spanish subjects residing in the Philippine Islands, who were not born in Spain, was merely due to an oversight. It was not deliberate for the purpose of reverting them to the citizenship of their country of origin, for a change of citizenship must be voluntary or by an act, express or implied, of the citizen or subject. Hence, it may safely be asserted that the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris is not a limitation upon the power of the United States to determine the political status of all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and continued to reside therein. There being no limitation, as there could be none, the petitioner, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act of congress of 1 July 1902 and of section 2 of the Act of congress of 29 August 1916. under the Constitution he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.Before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, there was no law providing for causes which may result in the forfeiture of Philippine citizenship, but international law recognizes expatriation, naturalization in a foreign country, military service rendered in and for another country, and marriage of a female citizen to aforeigner to cite some instances as causes which may give rise to the loss of citizenship. The evidence does not show that the petitioner had expatriated himself, that he had been naturalized in a foreign country, or that he had rendered military service in and for another country. Except an absence of two months in 1902 he has never been out of the Philippines.His holding out as Spanish subject, as shown in his two marriage certificates (Exhibits D and F) and his registration in the Spanish Consulate as such subject, has been satisfactorily explained. He only came to know after he had filed his petition for naturalization that, under the Treaty of Paris and the Acts of congress of the United States already referred to, he is a Filipino citizen. A proof thereof is his application for citizenship in 1941. But his mistake or misapprehension as to his citizenship is not a sufficient cause or reason under the law for the forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship. Neither may such mistake or misapprehension constitute estoppel.The motion for cancellation is based upon the provisions of section 18 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 473. But the trial court ordered the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of naturalization, not because he had obtained it fraudulently or illegally, but because he does not need it, as he is a Filipino citizen. Upon the facts established, it cannot be held that the petitioner secured his certificate of naturalization fraudulently or illegally. Thus, under the law invoked by the Solicitor General, the cancellation prayed for cannot be granted for lack of evidence to show fraud or illegality on the part of the petitioner in the obtainment of the certificate of naturalization. At most, the certificate may be held illegal because it was issued pursuant to a decree entered by a court exercising judicial powers under the authority of the enemy sponsored Republic of the Philippines. Logically, however, the cancellation was correctly ordered, because a Filipino citizen need not apply for such citizenship by naturalization or have a certificate of naturalization to be citizen of the Philippine Islands of which he is already a citizen.The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ.,concur.

Separate OpinionsPERFECTO,J.,dissenting:Appellee Carlos Palanca was a Chinese citizen by birth and continued to be so until November 30, 1893, when he was granted Spanish citizenship in accordance with the laws of the monarchy, by a Royal decree of the regent, the queen Maria Cristina of Spain. He wanted to marry a Filipina but the Archbishop of Manila had decreed that a Chinaman, even if Christian, could not marry a native of the Philippines. To accomplish the marriage, appellee applied for Spanish citizenship.On February 4, 1894, after having acquired Spanish citizenship, Palanca married Cesarea Cano Torres. Since then he considered himself a Spanish subject. He registered as such in the Spanish Consulate General in Manila and has as late as March 2, 1942, received from the said consulate duplicate certificate No. 548. In 1941 he instituted this case to acquire Filipino citizenship. On April 12, 1945, when he married Rosa Gonzales, his present wife, he made it appear in the contract of marriage that he was of Spanish nationality.The above facts are stated in the brief for appellee Palanca.In these naturalization proceedings, after the Solicitor General had filed on July 3, 1945, a motion to set aside the certificate of naturalization issued to Carlos Palanca pursuant to a decision rendered during the Japanese regime on September 11, 1944, the lower court issued on January 7, 1946, an order declaring Carlos Palanca, a Filipino citizen, which is now under our consideration.The motion to set aside the certificate of naturalization issued to Carlos Palanca reads as follows:Now come the undersigned counsel on behalf of the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines and to this Honorable Court, with leave first being had, respectfully set forth and allege:1. That the above-titled case was heard and tried before the Court of First Instance of Manila in the month of November, 1941, and was pending decision therein when the Commonwealth Government was overthrown and displaced by the Imperial Japanese Forces in the early part of 1942;2. That the applicant, after the Japanese Military Administration had ordered the suspension of action on cases of this nature, in his motion dated July 29, 1944, asked the Court of First instance of Manila organized and existing under the Japanese sponsored Republic of the Philippines, that the case be decided and given due course asserting that the applicant was neither hostile to nor an enemy of the Japanese Empire;3. That on September 11, 1944, Judge Roman A. Cruz of the Court of First Instance of Manila during the regime of the Japanese sponsored Republic of the Philippines, promulgated the decision decreeing that the applicant, Carlos Palanca, satisfied the requirements of law to become a Filipino citizen and ordering the issuance of a certificate of naturalization in his favor once the decision becomes final;4. That on the basis of the said decision, upon oral petition of the applicant and on the strength of the certificate dated April 14, 1945, one by Honorable Sixto de la Costa, Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines, and the other by Macario M. Ofilada, Acting Assistant Clerk of the Honorable Court, the applicant was allowed on the same date to take the oath of allegiance before Judge Arsenio F. Dizon of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II; and as a result thereof the proper naturalization certificate was issued to the applicant by the Clerk of this Honorable Court on April 16, 1945;5. That on April 17, 1945, the said Judge Arsenio P. Dizonmotu propio, ordered and directed the cancellation of the oath and the certificate of naturalization referred to in paragraph 4, on the ground that before the applicant could legally take the oath of allegiance, the records of the case which had been burned or lost sometime in February, 1845, must first be reconstituted in accordance with law;6. That upon motion of the applicant dated April 24, 1945, and the submission of an authentic copy of the decision rendered by Honorable Roman A. Cruz on September 11, 1944, this Honorable Court on April 30, 1945, declared the records of these proceedings as reconstituted, and allowed the applicant to take the prescribed oath of allegiance and the Clerk of this Honorable Court to issue the corresponding certificate of naturalization;7. That on April 30, 1945, the applicant took the prescribed oath of allegiance before this Honorable Court, and on the same day the certificate of naturalization was issued to him by the Clerk of the Honorable Court;8. That Carlos Palanca during the period of enemy occupation, holding himself before the public as a citizen and subject of Spain, a country which is Pro-Axis in sympathy, was president of the "ASOCIACION CHINA PRO-NIPONA," an association which, from its very name, was engaged, among other things, in collecting contribution, especially of money, for the support of the Japanese Imperial Army and to which he himself gave a personal contribution of P60,000; and that as a consequence of his sympathy, work, aid and support of enemy, he enjoyed privileges from the Japanese Military Authorities, especially by the way of a big alcohol quota for his distillery;9. That the facts alleged in the paragraph immediately preceding are supported by the affidavit of Maria Teresa Palanca Cuartero (Teresa del Rio) hereto annexed as "Annex A-1," and that of Benigno del Rio, hereto annexed as "Annex A-2," both of which are attached as integral parts hereof;10. That Carlos Palanca was at one time confined in Bilibid Prisons from 1896 to 1899, as shown by the following:(a) "Se ha recibido en este Establecimiento al Chino Carlos Palanca Tan Tiao JunaliasTan Cuin Lay en clase de preso provisional a disposicion del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Binondo a resultas de la causa No. 7766 por estafa y falsification de documento mercantil, segun mandamiento de dicho juzgado."Bilibid, 29 de agosto de 1896."El Alcalde 1."(Fdo.) MANUEL GARCIA"

"Copiado del folio 377 del Expediente de la Causa Criminal No. 7765 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Binondo."(b) "I certify that the records in this office shows that Carlos Palanca Tan Tiao Jim known by the name of Tan Guin Lay, charged with "Estafa" and "Falsification" was received for confinement at this Prison, on July 7th 1896, by order of the Court of First Instance of Binondo, Manila, P.I. and was released on April 13th, 1899."(Sgd.) GEO. N. WOLFE"Warden"

which fact was not brought out to lights in the proceeding originally had in this case, this making the naturalization certificate issued to him, one that is 'fraudulently procured";11. That, considering the sympathies and activities of Carlos Palanca during the period of the enemy occupation, he had demonstrated that he had not 'evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos'; that he has not conducted himself in an "irreproachable manner in his relation with the constituted government"; and that he is not loyal to the Commonwealth Government of which he desires to be citizen; all of which facts, under the provisions of law, disqualify him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines and consequently render the certificate of naturalization issued to him revocable for being fraudulently and illegally procured;12. That the grant of citizenship by naturalization to the applicant, Carlos Palanca, by the Japanese-controlled government being merely a privilege purely political in nature, conferred no vested rights, and cannot give force and effect beyond the life of the authority from which it emanated;13. That only the Commonwealth Government has power and authority to decide who should become naturalized citizens of the Philippines and entitled to its protection in return for their allegiance thereto; consequently the courts of the Japanese-controlled Republic of the Philippines has neither the authority nor the right to decide and determine who should be naturalized citizens of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;14. That, as a matter of public policy the herein applicant who formally and solemnly affirmed, on July 29, 1944, that he was neither hostile nor an enemy of the Japanese Empire should not be admitted to Philippine citizenship, especially considering that the Philippines is still at war with Japan;15. That, as against the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the decision of Judge Roman A. Cruz of September 11, 1944, and the certificate of naturalization issued in pursuance thereof, are null and void and without any legal force and effect; and16. That the certificate of naturalization issued to the applicant, Carlos Palanca, is illegal on the further ground that he does not and did not possess that moral character above reproach which is required by law as one of the qualifications for citizenship by naturalization;Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that the decision of Judge Roman A. Cruz promulgated on September 11, 1944, and the certificate of naturalization issued to Carlos Palanca be cancelled, set aside and declared without any legal effect.Manila, August 8, 1945.(Sgd.) LORENZO TAADAActing Solicitor General(Sgd.) PEDRO S. REYESActing Solicitor

Upon the facts in this case, it seems unnecessary to engage in a fruitless long discussion and interpretation of the Treaty of Paris and applicable legal provisions. The proceedings which took place in the lower court appeared to be highly anomalous. What Palanca failed to obtain by direct procedure, was granted to him in an indirect way.There is no question as to his Spanish citizenship. He was of that firm conviction even after he obtained in 1944 a decision allowing him to be registered as a naturalized Filipino. On April 12, 1945, he stated in a public document, one of the most solemn that he could ever execute, his marriage contract with his present wife Rosa Gonzales, his Spanish nationality.Carlos Palanca, as we can deduce from his own testimony and the record, is a very intelligent person. He is and has been assisted by competent counsel. When he filed his application for naturalization, he did it with the assistance of counsel. That years after he filed said application, after obtaining the corresponding certificate of naturalization, and after the Solicitor General had moved for the cancellation of said certificate