1. Ty v. CA Facts: Reyes was married previously to Anna Marie Villanueva but their marriage was declared void ab initio because of lack of consent in the part of the parties. Subsequently, Reyes married Ty on April 1979. On January 1991, Reyes filed a civil case with the RTC of of Pasig praying that his marriage with Ty be declared null and void because allegedly, they had no marriage license when they got married furthermore, at the time they married each other, Reyes did not secure a decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria. The Decree was only rendered on August 4, 1980. Ty defended her marriage with the respondent claiming that she personally secured a valid marriage license, hence the allegation of Reyes was not true. She submitted their marriage license as evidence and Reyes for his part also submitted that copy of the decree issued by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Marriage before securing a decree of nullity is undisputed. Issue: Whether or not there the marriage between Ty and Reyes is valid and subsisting Whether or not damages be awarded for breach of Marital Obligation Held: 1. The marriage was ruled to be valid and subsisting because the Civil Code is silent on the matter (decree of nullity) and based on the precedents, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The provisions of the Family code cannot be retroactively applied to the present cases, for to do so would prejudice vested rights of petitioner. 2. On the matter of the damages and attorneys fees the SC ruled in the negative because if her prayer granted then we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of

breach of marital obligation. Petition is granted. There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation 2. Arcaba v. Batocael Facts: Francisco, a widower, had no children to take care of him after his retirement. He asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latters cousin, Luzminda Paghacia and petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take care of his house as well as the story inside. A few months befre his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of his lot consisting of 10 square meters, together with his house, to CIrila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner, a petition for declaration of nullity of the deed of donation because it is against Art. 87 of the Family Code. The CA affirmed the relatives. Hence petition. Issue: The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this case. Held: Affrimative Cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children. Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." These documents show that Cirila saw herself as

Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. 3. Ayala Investment V. CA Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan from Ayala. Alfredo Ching the Executive Vice President of PBM executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severely answerable with PBMs indebtedness to Ayala. PBM failed to pay loan. And thus Ayala filed a case for sum of money against PBM. On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership Ayala questioned that decision of the court enjoining the sale. In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner: "WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is granted and the challenged order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar as it seeks to enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with Civil Case

No. 46309 is, however, denied. No pronouncement is here made as to costs. . .." On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and academic with the consummation of the sale. Issues: What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? Held: ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. There is no presumption hence, proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Ayala contends that the benefits anticipated are:

1. Employment of Ching would be prolonged and his monthly salary will be extended. 2. Shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate through the loan obtained. 3. Prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and career boosted. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a byproduct or a spin-off of the loan itself. Issue does not fall in the exception enunciated in Article 122 (1). The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondent-husband. This theory is new as it is novel. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. 4. Spouses Go V CA Facts: The Ongs were married and had a video coverage of their marriage taken provided by herein petitioners at a contract price of P 1650. Three times afterward, the spouses tried to claim the video because they wanted to show it to their relatives in the US where they are going spend their honeymoon and also thrice failed because the tape was not yet processed. The parties agreed to get the tape upon their return. When they returned, they found out that the video was erased. Hence they filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the RTC. The petitioners were ordered to pay the costs. Hence this petition. Petitioner contends: Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented to

prove that they acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such, should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that there is no evidence to show that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages. They insist that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty days, as agreed upon in their contract, the erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice to minimize losses. Petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when his wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was acting alone for her sole interest. Issues: Held: Petitioners' argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration. In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below, petitioners did not even present Lim to corroborate their contention that they were mere agents of the latter. As to the contention of Alex Go, the court found it to be meritorious. The wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them. 5. Zulueta V Pan American Highways Facts: Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were

passengers aboard defendants plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away. Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective announcing system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal manager. He was told that they would open his bags which here fused and he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant. Contention of the Pan American Highways in their motion for reconsideration: Assails the amount of damages awarded, etc and the non-enforcement of the compromise agreement between the defendant and plaintiff's wife, Mrs. Zulueta. They cited cases involving airlines. The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered, in which relying upon Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law," and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases We denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for the dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned she having settled all her differences with the defendant, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50,000 therefor "without prejudice to this sum being deducted from the award made in said decision." Defendant now alleges that this is tantamount to holding that said compromise agreement is both effective and ineffective. Issue: Damages awarded to the wife. HELD: The cases cited by defendant is not applicable in this case. In the present case, the contract of carriage was

concededly entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during the marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that such breach of contract was coupled also with quasi-delict constitutes an aggravating circumstance and cannot possibly have the effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such rights. For the agreement: This, of course, is not true. The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due) from the defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. The Court ordered that said sum of P50,000 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parentsin- law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs, that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was for her personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds. that they are deemed conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even if

the purchase had been made by the wife.And this is the rule obtaining in the Philippines. A breach of plaintiffs' contract of carriage Thereto having been "acquired by onerous title during the marriage . . ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article 148 of our Civil Code. Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not make the property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption pertained to the wife. In the absence, however, of proof that such right of redemption pertains to the wife and there is no proof that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefor belongs to Mrs. Zulueta the property involved, or the rights arising therefrom, must be presumed, therefore, to form part of the conjugal partnership. 6. Wong v. IPA Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. They have three children but even during the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson with money borrowed from an officemate. His father needed the amount for investments in Angeles City and Palawan. In 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check but it bounced, hence Katrina was charged with estafa. In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court. After trial, the court promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. The land was levied. A public auction

ensued. After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 of the levy on execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224, the property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on account of the mortgage loan of P8,000 which Romarico and Katrina had obtained from said bank. The property was sold by the sheriff. About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1978, Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision alleging that he was not given a day in court. And that he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in the case were null and void. prLL First ruling: On whether the properties may be levied upon as conjugal properties, the appellate court ruled in the negative. It noted that the properties are Romarico's exclusive capital having been bought by him with his own funds. But granting that the properties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina's obligations as the latter were exclusively hers because they were incurred without the consent of her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and they did not redound to the benefit of the family. The court underscored the fact that no evidence has been submitted that the administration of the conjugal partnership had been transferred to Katrina either by Romarico or by the court before said obligations were incurred. Issue: Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed. Held: On the matter of ownership of the properties

involved, however, the Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. Petition affirmed with modifications. 7. Go V Servacio Facts: On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. After 23 years later, Jr executed an affidavit of renunciation and Waiver whereby he affirmed under oath that it his father who bought the land. Subsequently, the his mother, Marta Barola Go died. Protacio Sir. and Rito Go sold a portion go the property with an area of 5, 560 sure meters to Ester L. Servacio. The petitioners demanded the return of proper but Servacio refused. Petitioners contention: Following Jrs renunciation, the property became conjugal property and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between his father and mother is null and void. Rito response: Protcio Sr. had exclusively owned th property he had purchased it with his own money.

The RTC declared that it was conjugal property. Nonetheless it affirmed the validity of the sale. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that: ". . . As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid." Alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. Issue: whether or not Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable in the case at bar. Held: The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights. The appeal lacks merit. It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta's death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an

implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta's share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta's share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share. This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. 9. Lilus V Manila Road Facts: Lilius is a published author, and with the help of his wife, his works have been published to various languages. In the morning of May 10, 1931, Aleko along with his wife and child drove to the municipality of Pagsanjan province of laguna on a sight seeing trip. This was his first time and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and trees along the road, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing,

coming from Calauan, the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be the defendant company's train coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's car right in the center and dragged the car and then threw it upon a siding. Contention of Aleko: This case originated from a complaint filed by Aleko E. Lilius et al., praying, under the facts therein alleged, that the Manila Railroad Company be ordered to pay to said plaintiffs, by way of indemnity for material and moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the said defendant entity's employees, the sum of P50,000 plus legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, with costs. The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services, society and conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now under consideration. Contention of Manila: The defendant the Manila Railroad Company, answering the complaint, denies each and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and co-plaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint. Issue: Whether or not the awarding of damages were befitting. Held: Therefore, under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household duties, including the care and education of the children and attention to the husband upon whom

primarily devolves the duty of supporting the family of which he is the head. When the wife's mission was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of the marriage alone, that she performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become man's equal in all the activities of life, commercial and industrial, professional and political, many of them spending their time outside the home, engaged in their businesses. Inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render (Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil., 54), it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing. Thus, in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co. , it was held that the patrimonial and moral damages awarded to a young and beautiful woman by reason of a scar in consequence of an injury resulting from an automobile accident which disfigured her face and fractured her left leg, as well as caused a permanent deformity, are personal to her. 10. Go V Yamane Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Facts: Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot located at Res. Sec. 'K', Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane.

As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil Case entitled 'Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation ,' which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs therein, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Pucay sisters, the subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981. aHTcDA Third-Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. Sold to public auction, and did no redemption has been made. RTC ruled that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane spouse of respondent and was not their conjugal property. CA reversed the RTCs decision. According to the appellate court, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose. That the land was acquired during the spouses' coverture was sufficiently established by the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both indicating that Muriel Pucay Yamane was "married to Leonardo Yamane. Issues: Whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal. Held: The Petition has no merit. The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.

In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. Exclusive daw because: 1. The respondent never denied nor opposed her claim of exclusivity during her lifetime. 2. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole name of Muriel. Petitioners posit that, had the spouses jointly purchased this piece of land, the document should have indicated this fact or carried the name of respondent as buyer. 3. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land within the redemption period after the auction sale indicated that he was not its co-owner. For I: The nature of a property whether conjugal or paraphernal is determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses. Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of a conjugal property. Besides, the issue presented was not the nature of the subject piece of land being levied upon, but whether Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging lien. II: Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. Hence, it cannot be contended in the present case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the parcel of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and exclusive property. III: The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the period prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence of his right or title to it. Contrary to petitioners' allegation, the fact is that he filed a Third-Party Claim with the sheriff, upon learning of the levy and impending auction sale. This

fact was specifically admitted by petitioners. Respondent claimed that the parcel of land was conjugal, and that he could not answer for the separate obligation of his wife and her sisters. Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands. The next question before us is, whether the charging lien of Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against the piece of land in question. Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for Muriel's personal obligation. 11. Pana vs. Heirs Juanete Facts: This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims' heirs. The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City. Efren was acquitted but his wife and another person was found guilty as charged and sentenced to the penalty of death they were also ordered (those who were guilty) to pay each of the heirs of the victims P50, 000.00 for civil indemnity, and another for meal damages and P150, 000.00 actual damages. The conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. The decision of the court became final and executory and upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 2002, the RTC ordered the

issuance of the writ resulting to the levy of real properties registered to Melencia and Efren. Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia's civil liability in the murder case. Held: To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses' property relations. Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement. RTC and CA ruled that properties of the spouses are governed by the absolute community of property. The SC said that: While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. The court sited Art 76 of the family code as regards to the modification of marriage settlements. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal

separation (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135 (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia. What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. Since Efren does not dispute the RTC's finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. Contrary to Efren's contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." Court affirms the CA with modifications. 12. Carlos V Abelardo Loan of wife with the lack of consent of husband. Facts: For failure to pay the amount of US$25,000.00, which the petitioner advanced to the respondent and his wife for the purchase of a house and lot, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife. Since the respondent and his wife were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, they filed separate answers.

The wife admitted securing a loan with her husband from the petitioner. Respondent claimed that the amount he received from the petitioner was part of the profit sharing which was promise to him by the petitioner for reviving an erstwhile losing company of the latter. He also denied the claim that he made threats to petitioner. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife. A motion for reconsideration of the above decision having been denied, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court. Issues: Whether or not the conjugal property is liable. Held: The petition was granted. According to the Supreme Court, respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he was entitled to the profits and income of the corporation. Moreover, there was no showing that respondent was a stockholder of the corporation. Not being a stockholder, he could not be entitled to salaries or commission from the corporation. The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in finding that respondent's liability was not proved by preponderance of evidence. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently established his claim that the amount he advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan. The Court also found sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner. His claim of verbal and written threats by the respondent was duly supported by the evidence on record. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family code. While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

All these pieces of evidence, taken together with respondent's admission that he and his wife received the subject amount and used the same to purchase their house and lot, sufficiently prove by a preponderance of evidence petitioner's claim that the amount of US$25,000.00 was really in the nature of a loan. Respondent tried to rebut petitioner's evidence by claiming that the US$25,000.00 was not a loan but his share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction. He alleged that he received money from petitioner amounting to almost P3 million as his share in the profits of the corporation. To prove this, he presented ten (10) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) checks allegedly given to him by petitioner. He argued that if indeed, he and his wife were indebted to petitioner, the latter could have easily deducted the amount of the said loan from his share of the profits. No proof that he was a stock holder in the Carlos Construction. 13. Costune v. Domdomon **Exception to the rule. Facts: The spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna during their marriage acquired three parcels of land with an aggregate area of 599 square meters all of which lots are located in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna. On November 8, 1976, Amadeo executed his last will and testament. He was then 68 years old. Following the execution of the last will and testament aforesaid, the spouses were beset with marital problems. Sometime in November, 1977, Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs for which he was treated at various hospitals, such as the Bonifacio Maternity Clinic and the Bago Bantay General Hospital, on different dates. While already ill, or on April 17, 1977, relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there were documents that needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties. Since then, Amadeo was never returned to the petitioner and stayed with his sister. Later, or on June 23, 1978, Amadeo filed an action for partition before the then Juvenile Domestic and

Relations Court. Failing to get the petitioner's consent to the desired partition notwithstanding repeated demands therefor, Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale, on July 10, 1978, over the one-half (1/2) undetermined portion of the conjugal property, without his wife's consent, in favor of Laureana Domondon. Moot and academic na because of death of Amadeo. Plus, its a matter of life and death sa kay Amadeo kay amo nalang to ang makapalawig pa sa iya life, galing iya wife ging snob lang siya. Tapos gusto pa niiya na kuhaon balik ang properties kay tunggod nga conjugal to kuno kag wala siya kalibutan kuno sang sale. In favour sa respondent ni ang result, tapos nag appeal siya. CA validity of the sale; Valid ang sale. The general rule is, the husband may not validly sell real estates belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. However, this rule accepts exceptions, wherein the husband may sell the real properties owned by the conjugal partnership even without the consent of the wife: 1) sale of personal properties 2) real properties acquired before the effectivity of the New Civil Code 3) real properties acquired after effectivity of the New Civil Code if wife is confined in a leprosarium, declared non compos mentis or spendthrift, or under civil interdiction 4) if the purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (Article 161) 5) if the purpose is to secure the future of their children or finishing a career (Art. 162); and 6) moderate gift for charity (Art.174). The support of either spouses (sic) is definitely for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. For if either of them is physically ill, the conjugal partnership likewise suffers. Issues: Validity of the sale Held: The central issue is the validity or nullity of the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of the respondent over his one-half (1/2) aliquot share in the conjugal partnership without the consent of his

wife. The ancillary issue is whether or not the conjugal partnership should be made liable for the payment of the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned the conjugal home and his wife. What was sold by Amadeo without the petitioner's consent was only an undetermined one half (1/2) share in the community properties. He left intact that other undetermined 1/2 share which should belong to the petitioner. And the reason for the sale was, as correctly found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, for Amadeo's hospitalization and medication. It was therefore Amadeo's understandable human spirit to live longer that induced him to execute the deed of sale without the consent of the petitioner. We concede that the consent of the petitioner is essential for the validity of the sale, but, in this case, where consent was unreasonably withheld, we are constrained to relax the application of the law and consider the sale as falling within the recognized exceptions. The Court can not overlook the vital fact that Amadeo executed a last will and testament designating the petitioner as his sole heir. In this connection, we find merit in the respondent's assertion that no other motive could be attributed to the petitioner but her greed. \ Petition denied. 14. Guiang V. CA Facts: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null, and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. LibLe Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioners-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void. The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband

sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Issues: Validty of sale Held: Void, because the consent of the wife is wanting. Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal property without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. A void sale cannot be ratified. Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. DENIED 15. Manalo v. Camaisa Facts: The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses. Everything was set, the tax declaration, tax payment receipts, location plans and vicinity map was presented to the petitioner. Plus she met up with the owner, the husband Edilberto Camaisa stating that the said sale was with the knowledge of the wife. They bargained and at last came up with an amount. Agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale.

Signatures were affixed including the wife. Petitioner later received a call from respondent Norma, requesting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. They met up and arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses. As well as the CA explaining: the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. Issues: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent. Held: The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits. ATcEDS The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void pursuant to Art. 124 of the Family Code. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated

in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. Petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted. The court ruled in the negative: Court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. DENIED Synopsis: Petitioner herein responded to an advertisement in the newspaper for the sale of a ten-door apartment owned by herein respondents spouses. After the purchase price and the term of payments were agreed upon by the petitioner and the respondent husband, a contract to sell was prepared. The husband signed the contract, but unfortunately the wife changed her mind as she did not agree with the term of payments by the petitioner. Hence, petitioner herein filed a complaint for specific performance against the spouses to compel the wife to sign the contract to sell. The respondent wife filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case by the trial court. Hence, this appeal. The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the wife's written consent. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court agreed with the trial court that summary judgment was applicable to this case as there was no genuine controversy as to the facts involved herein. According to the Court, the properties subject of the

contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contract to sell to be effective, the consent of both the husband and wife must concur. In the absence of proof that the wife was incapacitated to give her consent to the contract, a court authorization cannot be sought in this case. 16. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo Facts: Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City. Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. One year lapsed without the property being redeemed hence ownership was consolidated to the highest bidder. The husband died. When the wife returned she was surprised at what has become of her property. She claimed that she had no knowledge whatsoever of the mortgage which was conjugal in nature. She instituted a Nulilty of of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale, affidavit of consolidation of ownership, dead of sale, reconveyance with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages against petitioner. The petitioner alleged that the said property was the exclusive property of the husband who sold it. RTC ruled in favour of the owner spouse (basta

atong wala kalibutan) Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership. The appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent > Art. 124. Issues: Validity of the sale. Held: I. Petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states: ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. Petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.'s share in the conjugal partnership. The court applied the case of Guiang v CA II. Petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent

that it redounded to the benefit of the family. Art 121: liability of the conjugal property of gains invoked. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Petitioner's sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Another point: Never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. DENIED. 17. Spouses Tarrosa v. De Leon Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. de Leon, then single, and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Nag marry siya daun sa kay Anita de Leon with 2 kids after (April 24, 1968). Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single". Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister (Tarrosas) without the signature of the wife on Januray 1974. Na reads daub si Bonafacio sang Feb. 1996. Danilo and Vilma the children of the deceased filed a notice of adverse claim before the register of deeds of quezon city to protect their rights over the subject

property. Contention of the Tarrosas: The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. T RTC rendered judgement in favour of the De Leon. CA affirmed the RTC. Just like the RTC, the CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. The appellate court held further that the cases they cited were inapplicable. RTC Issues: Whether the [CA] gravely erred in concluding that the land purchased on installment by Bonifacio O. De Leon before marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property. Held: Petition lacks merit. Sale was void. Petitioners assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land was Bonifacio's exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. The SC disagreed. Invoking Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to

Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. Petitioners' argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio's exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. Interest in the Conjugal Partnership is Merely Inchoate until Liquidation -the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. DENIED 18. Dino V DIno Facts: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and

support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. RTC affirmed the psychological incapacity of the wife. Issues: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Held: The petition has merit. Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19 (1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. The SC ruled in the affirmed in this respect. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Invoking Art 147 and its requisites. All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. Sec 19 of the Rule does not apply because it does not apply to cases under Articles 147 and 148. Section 19 (1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. AFFIRMED RTC WITH MODIFICATIONS. 20. Fransisco v. Master Iron Works. Art. 148 Facts Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on January 15, 1983. August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale for P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon located at St. Martin de Porres Street, San Antonio Valley. On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record of the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property. 7 On January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan of P157,000.00. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November 27, 1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities. On June 14, 1994, Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a

public auction one stainless, owner-type jeep for P10,000.00 to MIWCC. Sheriff Alejo issued a Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment over the lots covered by TCT No. 87976 (60550) and 87977 (60551) for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband Eduardo had no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which she attached to her affidavit. In the end, the parcel of land was sold at a public auction and when she learned of this, she filed an amended complaint impleading MIWCC. MIWCC cited Article 116 of the Family Code of the Philippines and averred that the property was the conjugal property of Josefina and her husband Eduardo, who purchased the same on August 31, 1984 after their marriage on January 14, 1983. MIWCC asserted that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver to evade the satisfaction of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 and to place the property beyond the reach of creditors; hence, the said affidavit was null and void. Josephine filed an annulment against the husband because allegedly, he had a subsisting marriage. RTC ruled in favour of Josephine. The trial court held that the property levied by Sheriff Alejo was the sole and exclusive property of Josefina, applying Articles 144, 160, 175 and 485 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also held that MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo Francisco contributed to the acquisition of the property. CA ruled that it was conjugal property. Issues: (a) whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco (b) whether or not the subject properties may be held to answer for the personal obligations of Eduardo. Contention of the petitioner: The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to Eduardo is void ab initio, there is no occasion that

would give rise to a regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the Family Code governs their property relationship, the respondents must adduce evidence to show that Eduardo actually contributed to the acquisition of the subject properties. Contention of the respondent: The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the appellate court was correct in ruling that the properties are conjugal in nature because there is nothing in the records to support the petitioner's uncorroborated claim that the funds she used to purchase the subject properties were her personal funds or came from her mother and sister. Held: The petition has no merit. Failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee on September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15, 1983. We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New Civil Code does not apply in the present case. Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the very beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. In this case, the petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry her. Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be

applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in question. (pursuant to Art 105 of the code) Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Thus, even if Eduardo and Carmelita were married before the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the property still cannot be considered conjugal property because there can only be but one valid existing marriage at any given time. Article 148 of the Family Code also debilitates against the petitioner's claim since, according to the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that the parents prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property. In the following manner: 1. The petitioner failed to prove that she had any savings before her cohabitation with Eduardo. 2. Despite Eduardo's affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless affixed his marital conformity to the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioner over the property in favor of Leonila on January 13, 1986. 3. The petitioner testified that she borrowed the funds for the purchase of the property from her mother and sister. 4. the petitioner testified that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver because she discovered that he had a first marriage. 5. Eduardo belied the petitioner's testimony when he testified that he executed the affidavit of waiver because his mother-in-law and sister-in-law had given the property to the petitioner. DENIED

21. Abrenica V Abrenica Facts: Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm"). In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner alleging that he refused to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery Batangas. The secod was for Accounting andReturn and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents sough to recover fmor petitioner retainer fees that he received from 2 clients. And thus the trial ensued. Dismissed because wrong remedy. While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot which formed part of the absolute community of property. Issue: Held: Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for Reconsideration. WE deny the petitioners claims. The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer available to them, because they had already filed an

appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando's children, her claim cannot be sustained. ( as to the representation of the step children). As to the motor vehicles -> Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage. DENIED. 22. Quiao v Quiao Facts: On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao. This involves the liquidation of properties after the legal separation decree was issued. On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned the RTC explained. Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration Consequently, the RTC issued another Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned." On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Issues: IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF

THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE? Contention of the Petition: The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. Held: Marriage was held on January 6, 1977, they did not agree on a marriage settlement then - conjugal partnership of gains automatic. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63 (2) of the Family Code. Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63 (2) and 129 of the Family Code? The SC replied in the negative. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife." He invokes the Art 256 which prohibit retroactivity of the code if it will prejudice vested rights. Vested rights was discussed further by the SC using jurisprudence: The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected

against arbitrary state action. It is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. Clarification the net profits: The computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. The definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102 (4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102 (4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." The SC compared the Absolute Community Regime and the Conjugal Partnership of gains in this respect. In the discussions, the SC saw that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. See further discussion of ACP and CPG in the case itself. AFFIRMED the 2005 decision and MODIFIED the 2006 clarification. 23. Beumer v. Amores Facts: This is a case involving a Dutch National married to a Filipina where he wanted to be reimbursed of the money he used for the purchase of a property. They were married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former's psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated December 14, 2000. Their properties distributed but the wife in defense averred that with the exception of two residential houses on lots 1 and 2142 they did not acquire conjugal properties during the marriage.

She said that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were purchased out of her exclusive funds and another two lots by way of inheritance. In the trial, the Dutch said that the properties mentioned by the woman (the lots) were purchased using the money received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit. The RTC ruled that regardless of the source of funds of the acquisition of the lots, the petitioner could not be able to acquire any right because of the constitutional prohibition. Petitioners plea for reimbursement was also denied for not having come to court with clean hands. CA had the same ruling with the RTC. Issue: Should the Dutch be reimbursed? Held: Petition lacks merit. SC invoked the ruling In Re: Petition for Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the [above-cited] constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter's name. Clearly, petitioner's actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner's claim for reimbursement. As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Further: Neither can the Court grant petitioner's claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. DENIED. 24. Fuentes V Roca Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. With the help of one Atty. Plagata, they prepared the documents for sale. And according to the Atty, he had already acquired the signature of Rosario when he went to Manila (he let her sign the affidavit of consent daw which later proved to be false because the signature was apparently forged). Na reads na ang spouses who allegedly sold the property and then after 8 ears, their children filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC alleging that their mother did not consent to the sale. The spouses denied the allegations and presented Atty Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit. Both of the parties presented handwriting experts at the trial. The RTC dismissed the case and ruled that action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling of sale forgery or fraud already prescribed under Art. 1391 of the Civil Code 4 years after discovery plus failure to present convincing evidence of fraud. The CA ruled that since the Rosario and husband were married in 1950, their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal

consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years after transaction. Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Issues: Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.AEc Held: The signature was forged. The spouses lived separately, plus Atty plagata admitted ly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario's consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wife's consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife's consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband's sale of the real property. It

simply provides that without the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. As to the issue on Fraud: the victims of fraud was in this case Fuentes spouses. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband's sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost? The answer is no. Because VOID. As to the Fuentes problem on their stay: As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. 24What