pro-european presidency: poland on the way to the club of ...in search of a common...

Tiia Lehtonen FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 87 • September 2011

87

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN IN S T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A IN S T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

POLAND ON THE WAY TO THE CLUB

OF HEAVYWEIGHT EU MEMBERS

PRO-EUROPEAN PRESIDENCY

• PolandtookoveritsfirstPresidencyoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionon1July2011.Theinitialstepshavenowbeen taken,yet themost significantmoves, aswell as theoutcomesof variousmeetings,forums,summitsandnegotiationsarestilltofollow.

• Coming into force due to the Lisbon Treaty of December 2009, the rules on which Councilpresidenciesarefoundedhavebeensubstantiallymodified.Asaconsequence,thePolishpresidencyhasalsobeenaffectedinmanywaysbythischange.

• Withaviewtotheiragenda,thePolesattempttoengageinsixparticularareasduringthesix-monthtermofoffice:theEUinternalmarket,economicchallengesandfuturefinancialframework,EasternPartnershipandneighbourhoodpolicies,defencecooperation,externalenergypolicyandEurope’sintellectualcapital.

• ThelistofthePolishprioritiesseemsextensivetosaytheleast.Byhavingintroducedfewerandmorespecificgoals,Polandcouldhavebestsecuredmoreintensiveinvolvementinthemostimportantissueareas.

• ToPoland’scredit,itsreasonablypro-EuropeanGovernment,civilservantsandpoliticalelitearemostlikelytohaveapositiveimpactontheeventualsuccessofitsPresidency;theonlydisadvantagebeing thenational elections thatwill beheld inOctober thatmanypresumewill interrupt thesmoothrunningoftheagenda.

FIIA Briefing Paper 87

September 2011

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

The European Union research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Tiia Lehtonen

Researcher


POLAND ON THE WAY TO THE CLUB

OF HEAVYWEIGHT EU MEMBERS

PRO-EUROPEAN PRESIDENCY

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

On1July2011,PolandtookoverthePresidencyofthe Council of the European Union. It is the firstPresidency for Poland during its seven-year EUmembership.Asanambitious, largeandrelativelynewmemberstate,Polandisnowstrivingtowardsjoining the club of heavyweight players in theEU.AlthoughthePolishGovernmentandpoliticalelitearehighlypro-European,thisworkremainsnothingbutdemanding.Nevertheless,PolandisnodoubtthemostpowerfulstateinthePresidencytriocompris-ingofPoland,DenmarkandCyprus.

Coming into force due to the Lisbon Treaty ofDecember 2009, the rules on which the Councilpresidencies are founded have been substantiallymodified.Asaconsequence, thePolishPresidencyhasalsobeenaffectedinmanywaysbythischange.Inplaceofsix-monthPresidenciesthatrotateauto-matically,theTreatyintroducedthePresidentoftheEuropean Council on the one hand, and theHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyintheCouncilofForeignAffairsontheother.

Whereas the Foreign Affairs Council is now per-manently chaired by the High Representative forForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyandtheEuropeanCouncilbythepermanentPresident,thetraditionalrotatingPresidencyremains in theGeneralAffairsCouncil,withrestoftheCouncilconfigurationsnowheld by the group of threemember states, called‘trios’, foraperiodof18months.However,agreatdeal of political power was transferred from the

rotatingPresidenciestotheEuropeanCouncilPresi-dentandtheHighRepresentative.

Evenifthemembersofthetriosareencouragedtoshare their responsibilities and assist each other,dividingtheburdenhasbeendemandingforPoland,Denmark and Cyprus, apparently due to theirdiverging orientation towards a number of issues.In search of a common ‘trio-identity’, Poland iswithout question the most enthusiastic of thesestates.AlthoughthememberstatePresidencieshavenow lost some power, a number of old tasks andresponsibilities have remained, such asmanagingandmediatingdecision-making and searching forcompromises,aswellas initiatingandstimulatingpoliticaldebatesandprocesses.

Due to the overwhelming financial and economiccrisis,theEuropeanUnionisgoingthroughperhapsthemost difficult period in its history.The globaldevelopments, including the Arab Spring, withintheUnion’scloseneighbourhoodforcesittospeakwithonevoice.TheEUisnowalsofacingenormouschallenges in theareasofCSDP, energyandneigh-bourhoodpolicies.Aparticularlyhighlevelofaspi-rationwouldbeneededfromanyPresidencytotakeadvantageofthesecontroversiesathand.

PolanddeclaresinitsPresidencyprioritiesthatitwillengageinactionstoguaranteethreemajordevelop-ments:Europeanintegrationasasourceofgrowth,thesecurityofEuropeandthebenefittingofEurope

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski (left), President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and Polish Prime Minister

Donald Tusk at the inaugural meeting of the Polish Presidency in July. Photo: European Commission Audiovisual Services.


fromopenness.1Theseconcernsare,however,stilllooselydefinedassuch.Acloserlookatofficialstate-ments and recently publishedmaterial reveals sixmoredetailedareasinwhichPolandwillattempttoengageduringitsPresidency:1)theinternalmarket;2) economic challenges and financial frameworkof 2014-2020; 3) Eastern Neighbourhood and thePartnershipprogramme;4)CommonSecurityandDefence Policy; 5) external energy policy; and 6)Europe’sintellectualcapital.

GiventhatthemonthsofJulyandAugustareholidaymonthsinliterallyallthememberstates,nomajorsteps could have been taken by Poland thus far.Therefore,insteadofconductingasoundmid-termreviewinordertoanalysetowhatextentPolandhasbeenabletoaddressitsagenda,itistheaimofthispapertoreflectupontheoriginalprioritiesofPolandwith a view to thepotential prospects for successandfailure.

Financial Matters and the Single Market

ThePresidencytrioofPoland,DenmarkandCypruswillmarkthe20thanniversaryoftheestablishmentof the internalmarket. Its growthpotential,how-ever,hasnotyetbeenfullyexploitedanditistheaimofPolandtodevelopitsformationandfunctioning.WithregardstotheSingle Market Act,adoptedbythe European Commission in April 2011,2 Polandintendstoadvocatethestrengtheningoftheinternalmarketinordertoaddresstheeconomiccrisisandtofindsourcesofeconomicgrowth.Specialatten-tionshallbepaidtotheregulationsofthefinancialsectorand thedevelopmentof thedigital servicesmarket.Thisincludesmeasuressuchastheremovalofexistingbarriersinintra-Uniontradeandbarriersblockingcross-borderonlinetransactions,reducingroamingcharges,thefreetransferofexpertiseandinnovation,andimprovingconditionsforsmallandmediumenterprises, aswell as fulfillingEuropean

1 “Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the Eu-

ropean Union, 1 July 2011 – 31 December 2011.”MinistryofFo-

reignAffairs,Warsaw2011.

2 “Together for new growth, Single Market Act.” European

Commission,InternalMarketandServices,2011,and“Your Single

Market? Single Market Act for a highly competitive social market

economy.” EuropeanCommission,InternalMarketandServices.

Luxembourg,2010.

Commission proposals stemming from ProfessorMarioMonti’s reporton the futureof the internalmarket.3Furthermore,ithasbeenstatedbythePol-ishMinister of ForeignAffairs, Radosław Sikorski,thatanEU-widecommonsalescontractandabetterpatentregimewouldtransformthewaybusinessisdoneacrossEurope.

ThereisnodoubtthatthefinancialcrisiswillaffecttheEuropeanagendamorebroadly in the foresee-ablefuture.Theeurozoneisfacingitsmostdifficultcrisissincethebirthofthesinglecurrency.Thescaleof the economic challenges confronting EuropealsorequiresappropriateandeffectivemeasurestobetakenbytheCouncilPresidency.Theeconomicdownturn is now reflected in almost every Euro-peanpolicy–thoughmostimportantlyinthesocialagenda, internalmarketandEurope2020strategy.MostrecentlyithasbecomeevidentthatoftheEUmemberstates,Greeceneedstobebailedoutagain,whereas Ireland, Italy,PortugalandSpainhaveallbeen forced to introduce heavy budgetmeasures.Moreover, the EU has remained divided over thesocalled‘six-pack’rulesaimedatstrengtheningofeconomicgovernancebyforcingeurozonecountriestorestricttheirspendingandmaketheeconomiesofmemberstatesgenerallymorecompetitive.

GiventhatPolandisoutsidetheeurozone,particu-lar issuesof economiccoordinationandmonetarypolicy fallunavoidablyoutside its fullcompetence.Ontheotherhand,asaPresidency-countryitchairsthe EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council(ECOFIN). Poland could arguably increase overalloptimism by boosting the citizens’ confidencealso away from the decision-making tables givenits economy is doing relativelywell, thanks to aneconomicgrowthrateofabout3.8%in2010;itwas,in fact,oneof thebest results inEurope lastyear.Reconstruction of European-wide social trust infurthereconomicgrowthisamatterofurgencyandPolandcouldcrediblyinterveneinthisventure.

AproposalfortheEU’s2014-2020budgetwaspub-lishedbytheCommissionthissummer.ThePolishPresidency thus fell within a period of intensivetalks regarding these proposals, which underline

3 “A new strategy for the Single Market at the service of

Europe’s economy and society.”ReporttothePresidentofthe

EuropeanCommissionbyMarioMonti.May,2010.


that the new Multi-annual Financial Framework(MFF) should serve as an instrument to supportsustainable economic growth in Europe. WhilePolandhasgenerallybeeninfavourofincreasingtheEUbudget,oppositionhasemergedfromcountriesliketheNetherlands,Finland,GermanyandtheUK.Polandwillthereforehavetoactasamoderatorandpotentialbridge-builderwhennationalinterestsareatstakewithinthisissue.It isalsoPoland’saimtopublishapaperduringitsPresidencytoadvanceamorein-depthdiscussiononbudgetarymattersin2012.Thefact that theCommissioner forFinancialProgrammingandBudget,JanuszLewandowski,isPolishdoesnotdecreaseitspotentialtoconductsuc-cessfulnegotiations.

However,reachinganagreementinbudgetarymat-ters is not the aimof thePolishPresidency exclu-sively.Evenifapreliminarypoliticalagreementonthefinancialperspectivefor2014-2020isrequiredduringthefirstEuropeanCouncilin2012,carryingoutthenegotiationswithinthe2014-2020financialframeworkwillbeoneofthemostdemandingtasksof the whole Poland-Denmark-Cyprus trio. ThebudgetwillbefinalisednotearlierthanduringtheCyprusPresidencyinthesecondhalfof2012.

Enlargement and Eastern Policies

Duetoitsgeopoliticallocationandhistory,PolandisnotonlywillingbutpracticallyobligedtofocusontheEUpoliciestowardsitsEasternneighbours.The

agenda of strengthening the Eastern Partnership(EaP) was inherited in its entirety fromHungary,whichdecidedtopostponetheEasternPartnershipSummitoriginallyscheduledforMay2011.Thesum-mitwillnowbeheld inWarsawon29and30Sep-tember.TheadoptionofthisprioritythusreflectsthePolishaspirationtopromoteEasternpolicyissuesingeneral,andtheEaPprogrammeinparticular.

TheEasternPartnership,inauguratedin2009,wasdesigned to intensify cooperationbetween theEUanditssixpost-Sovietneighbouringstates:Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Georgia,MoldovaandUkraine.Strongpublic support for furtherEU enlargementgives Poland an appropriatemandate for the EaPinitiative.The implementation of the partnershipincludes strengthening economic cooperationbetween the EU and partner states, negotiatingfree-tradeareasandallowingeasiertraveltotheEUthroughvisa liberalisation–as soonas theneces-sarypreconditionsaremet.Moreover,theEaPaimstosupportdemocraticandmarket-orientedreformsamong the post-Soviet countries and bring themclosertotheEU,botheconomicallyandpolitically.AccesstotheEUfree-tradeareawilleventuallybedependent on thepolitical anddemocraticstatus quo in thesecountries.Negotiationof theassocia-tionagreements,especiallywithUkraineandMol-dova,hasremainedamongthetopobjectivesforthePoles.Shouldthesecountriescontinuouslymanagetowork on the stated reforms, further decisionscouldpotentiallybetakenintheEuropeanCouncilinDecember.

Cars queueing at the Polish-Ukrainian border. Poland seeks to strengthen the EU's

Eastern Partnership programme. Photo: Michael Eisenriegler / Flickr.com.


Thethirdmeetingof theEasternPartnershipCivilSocietyForumwillbehostedbyPolandinNovem-ber.TheeventwillbecomprisedofrepresentativesfromCivilSocietyOrganisationswithintheEasternpartnershipstates,asoneofthePoland’saimsistofostercooperationbetweentheseorganisationsandgovernmentsintherespectivecountries.Ithasbeenstated by the Polish PrimeMinister,Donald Tusk,thatEUmembershipshouldappearontheagendasofallwesternBalkancountries.Moreover,renewingand modernising the framework for cooperationbetween Russia and the EU is also on the Polishagenda.Nevertheless,theformalisationandshapingofEUpoliciestowardsRussiaisalong-termprojectandrequiresmanyyears.

Alongwith themeasures thatwillbe taken in thename of the Eastern Partnership and neighbour-hoodpolicies, it isPoland’s aim to sign theAcces-sionTreatywithCroatia.TheaccessionnegotiationsreachedanendduringtheHungarianPresidencyon30June2011,andthesigningofTreaty,togetherwiththeCroatianreferendum,areexpectedtotakeplaceinthesecondhalfof2011.TheaccessionofCroatiatotheEUisexpectedtotakeplaceon1July2013,giventhat the parliaments of all 27member states haveratifiedtheTreaty.WithregardstoTurkey,Polandstrongly supports the continuation of its acces-sion negotiations. Indeed, the Presidency shouldundertakeeveryeffort toguarantee thatTurkey iscommittedtoconductingmeaningfulpoliticalandsocio-economicreformswithaviewtoitsmember-ship.Thesamealsoappliestoothercandidatecoun-triesandthecountriesinthewesternBalkanregion.

The Issues of Security: Defence and Energy

Theconceptofsecurityencompassesthreeaspectsduring the Polish Presidency: food, energy anddefence.AsecureEuropedirectsattentiontofinan-cial,economicandbordersecurities.Thereformofthe Common Agricultural Policy is indispensable,asaretheissuesofenergysupplies:yet,duetothecurrentNorthAfricaandMiddleEastcrises,itcanbeseenasaratherinauspiciousmomenttoincludetheissueofdeepeningdefencecooperationasapriority.Giventhattherehasbeenagulfbetweenthememberstates’ positions towards theuse ofmilitary forceabroadingeneral,andoperativeactionstakenbytheEUintheMiddleEastinparticular,itwilldefinitelybe demanding to getmilitary cooperation among

the27memberstatesbackontrackortokickoffanyreasonabledebate regarding it.Moreover,defencebudgets have been streamlined all over Europe,meaningthePolishintentionsmaythusprovemuchmoreproblematic.

IthasbeenstatedbyPolishDefenceMinisterBogdanKlichthatonmilitarysecurityPolandhasfourpri-orities:upgrading theEuropeanUnion’sefficiencyintheareaofmilitaryservice(i.e.deepeningdefencecooperation amongmember states and reformingtheEUcommandstructure);furtherdevelopingandreopeningthedebateonEUBattlegroups;ensuringproper partnerships withNATO; and engaging ina strategic dialogue with the Eastern Partnershipstates.Deepeningdefencecooperationis,however,nottheonlyissuetheEUasawholeshouldbecon-cerned about today. Right at thismoment it is oftheutmostimportancetotheEUtoavoidsignallingpolitical weakness towards third countries or itsclosest neighbourhood – especially towards coun-triessuchasUkraine,Moldova,LibyaandSyria.ItiswithintheseveryissuesthatthePresidencyshouldactasanhonestbrokerinordertoachievetheneces-sarycompromises.

Tobeabletospeakwithasinglevoice,theEUmustfocus on reinforcing particular institutional set-tings.Guaranteeingcoherenceininternationalrela-tionsalsofalls intotheresponsibilitiesoftheHighRepresentativeoftheUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy.ThecountryholdingthePresidencyoftheEUshouldatleastengageinconstantdialoguewiththeExternalActionService(EEAS),currentlyledbyCatherineAshton.WithregardtothePolishPresidency,ithasbeenofparticularinteresttotherestoftheUniontoseewhowillstandoutasthetopleaderinthe‘topicsoftheday’,suchastheEasternPartnership,theMiddleEast,LibyaandUkraine.ItstillremainstobeseenastowhatrolePolandingen-eral,andtheForeignMinisterSikorskiinparticular,will continue to take towards the EEAS and MsAshton,evenifithasbeenstatedbythelatterthathewillactastheformer’s“loyaldeputy”.

Poland has proposed an in-depth debate in ordertofindwaystostrengthentheEU’sexternalenergypolicy and to preserve the competitiveness of theEuropeanenergysector.TheEuropeanCouncilmadeanagreementtoestablishasingleEuropeanenergymarketby2014duringitsmeetinginFebruarythisyear.Thegoal is to elaboratenewmechanisms for


solidarity and competitive energy policy compli-antwiththeprovisionsoftheLisbonTreaty.Anewenergy strategy calls for a detailed analysis of theEU’s existing external energy policy, so that theappropriate recommendations can be drawn up.ShouldPolandbeable tocomeupwithapaperordocument analysing the European energymarket,whichisthenfollowedbysoundadviceforfurtheraction,thenthePresidencycouldbedeemedasuc-cessinthisfield.

TheenergyrelationshipsbetweentheEUandthirdcountriesneedtobeappropriatelysettledinthenearfuture.ThepositionoftheEuropeanUnionvis-à-vis themainconsumers,producersandenergytransitcountries should be much more consistent andstronger.TheroleofthePresidencycanbeseenasdecisivewhen fostering thesevery issues. In addi-tiontothis,ithasbeenofgreatinterest,particularlyto thePoles, todecreasedependenceonRussia asregardsenergy.

Byandlarge,theissuesofenergypoliciesshouldbereflectedinthenewbudgetaryframework.Duringthis period of economic downturn, however, it ischallengingforanyactortotakeexcessiveenviron-mentalmeasures.Bythesametoken,thequestionhasbeenraisedastowhetherPolandcancoherentlyrepresenttheEUattheclimatechangeconferencethatwillbeheldinSouthAfricainNovember.

Lastly,thePolishPresidencyintendstostimulatethegrowthofintellectualcapitalbylaunchingconcrete

initiatives incooperationwiththeCommission, inordertotakefulladvantageof it.BetterutilisationoftheintellectualresourcesoftheEUcould,accord-ingtoPoland,beguaranteedbyenhancingcohesionandsynergybetweenEUpoliciesandinitiatives.Inthiscontext,thepromotionofyouthmobility,themodernisationofuniversities andbetteruseageofthe EU’s scientific potential are also inWarsaw’sinterests.Throughthesemeasures,Polandaims toboostEurope’scompetitiveadvantage.

Polish Pro-European Administration and Political Elite

PolandiswithoutdoubtoneoftheEuropeanUnion’smostpro-Europeanmembers.Asregardsthepoten-tial success of its Presidency, this enthusiasm ofboththePolishGovernmentanditscitizenscanbeconsideredagreatadvantage.Thededicationofthepoliticaleliteontheonehandandthecommitmentof the public administration and civil servants ontheotherhavealwaysbeenkeysuccessfactorsforacountryholdingthePresidency.

Polishoptimismcouldwell invigorate theEU dur-ing this financial and economic crisis.The PrimeMinister,DonaldTusk,hasdeclaredthatincreasingeurosceptisismcanbefoughtforandarguedagainst,whereas Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski hascontended that integration is thebest security forEurope.BothministersseemtohaveacrystallisedvisionofEuropeanintegrationasasourceofgrowth,and together they have called for the strengthen-

Foreign Minister Sikorski visited the EUFOR troops in

Bosnia and Herzegovina last May. Deepening European

defence cooperation has been on Poland's agenda during

its Presidency. Photo: Markus Rumpold / EUFOR.


ingofcommoninstitutions.EncouragingeconomicgrowthinEuropeis,accordingtoSikorski,astartingpointforgreatersolidarity,greatergenerosityintheneighbourhoodandagreateropenness toenlarge-ment.ForSikorski,theissuesoftheEasternneigh-bourhoodhavealsobeenofgreatinterest.

As with anymajor deviations in domestic events,thePolishparliamentaryelectionsthatwillbeheldinOctobermayplayacrucialrolewithregarstothedevelopments potentially having an effect on theultimatesuccessorfailureofthePolishPresidency.Preparations for thePresidencytakeyearsbut thecivilservantsrunningthegrassroottasksandcoor-dinatingtheprojectasawholecanliterallychangeinaday.Itisstilllargelyunknownastowhatextentthepoliciesofthenewadministrationandgovernment-to-bedifferfromthatoftheirpredecessors.Forthetimebeingitis,however,likelythatPrimeMinisterTusk’sCivicPlatformwillbere-elected.

Being a second-half-of-the-year Presidencywithlimited working months, the timeframe for thesmooth running of the Polish agenda will be sig-nificantly restricted. The election campaign willthusposeamajorchallengeforWarsaw,asitcomesexactlywhenthePresidencyissupposedtobeinfullswingandtheministersexclusivelyinvolvedintheirvariousEU assignments.There isnoneed to exag-geratethesituation,butitgoeswithoutsayingthatabundantsensitivity isneededonthepartofboththe opposition and the government to exclude allPresidency-relatedissuesfromelectioncampaigns.Fewnational priorities havebeenpushed forwardduring thePolishPresidency so far,butwhen thetwo major parties, the ruling Civic Platform andtheoppositionLawandJustice,seriouslystarttheircampaigns,unexpectedturnsinthepoliticalcoursewillnodoubtbeseen.

Prospects for Potential Losses and Victories

Ithasnowbeenrecognisedthatthereisstrongpres-sureonPolandtosucceedin itsPresidency,andithas a number of chances to shine. However, itsagenda seems extensive andhighly ambitious. Sixmonths is a short amount of time to master anysingleissuenowlabelledaPresidencypriority.Thesuccess of the Polish Presidency presumes that ittakestherightad hocmovesanddisplaysappropri-ateleadershipinthemostimportantdomainsonan

EUlevel.IfanyofthePolishministersendupbeingabsentfromthemeetingsofCouncilconfigurationsduetotheelectioncampaigninOctober,perceptibleharmcouldbedone.DeteriorationofthePresidencyduetothenationalelectionissomethingtheEUcandowithout.

ThequestionremainsastowhatextentPolandwillmanagetotackleevensomeoftheissuesofitswideagenda. Leading the European Union “towardsfastereconomicgrowth”insixmonthsdoesnotlackaspiration ina situation inwhich it is stillunclearhowthedefaultofGreekeconomywillbeaddressedor what political and economic measures will betaken inorder toavoid furtherdeepeningofeuro-zonecrisis.IthasalsobeendeclaredintheagendathatPolandwillsupporttheEUforeignandsecuritypoliciesaimedatenhancingtheEU’s internationalposition.InlightoftherecentdevelopmentsintheEuropeanUnion’sEasternandSouthernneighbour-hood,ithasbecomeapparent,however,thattheEUisneitherstrongnorunifiedenoughtopresentitselfasareferencepoint forothercountries. Insteadofactivelypromotingtheprocessofstabilisationanddemocratisation, theEU hasmore often than notsignalledpoliticalweaknesstowardsthetransitionstates.ItisontheseveryissuesthatthePresidencyshould take on a determined leader and bridge-builderroleinordertoinitiatedemocratictransfor-mationsandguaranteeoverallpositiveprogress inthosecountries.

Among a number of other negotiations, the out-comesof theEasternPartnershipSummitand thethirdmeetingoftheEasternPartnershipCivilSoci-etyForumstillremaintobeseen.ExpectationsarehighandtheEUshouldbeabletoconcludeassocia-tionagreementswithatleastUkraineandMoldova,aswellascreatingcomprehensive free tradeareaswiththecountriescoveredbytheEasternPartner-ship.Moreover,someprogressintheprocessofvisaliberalisationshouldbemadebytheendofthisyear.Intheseissues,itisthePresidency–namelyPoland–thatshouldonceagainactasareliablemediator.

Intensive consultation, correct and close coopera-tionwithotherkeyactors–e.g.formerPresidencies,membersofthetrio,theCommission,theEuropeanParliamentandthePresidentoftheEuropeanCoun-cil–willincreasePoland’spotentialtosuccessfullymanage the planned actions. By coordinating theworkof thesectoralCouncils, thePresidencymay


exert significant influence over a range of topicalissues.

To avoid pure rhetoric is always reasonable.WithaviewtotheprioritiesofthePolishPresidency, itbecomesevidentthatacertainamountofvaguenessexists. To illustrate, Poland has declared that thePresidency shallsupport anumberof actions, ini-tiativesandproposalstoimprovetheregulationandsupervisionofthefinancialmarkets;assistsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesinthirdcountrymarkets;start a debateregardingthepreparationsandplan-ningofthecivilianandmilitarynatureoftheEU;anddraftdocuments,papersandproceduresonvariousissues.Nevertheless,itremainsuncleartomostofusjustwhatconcretemeasureswillbetakentocarryouttheseobjectives.

Due to thepost-Lisbondivisionand the increasedcomplexityofintergovernmentaldecision-making,itbecomesevermorechallengingtopointout thepotential winners and losers in Council decision-making. Individual Presidenciesmay easily claimtheir victories in particular negotiations, even ifthedecisionswouldhavebeenmasteredbyvariousparties under different Council configurations. Byandlarge,thereislittle,ifany,evidencethatPolandwilladvance itsownnationalprioritiesduringthePresidency.On the contrary, the Polish prioritiesallegedlydependon the long-termEU agenda.Tothisextent,PolandhasmadeeveryefforttomakeitsagendaEuropeanbydefinition.

Having taken all this into account, the ongoingPresidency appears to benothingbut challenging,yetatthesametimepromising.Byhavingselectedfewer priorities, Poland could have guaranteedmoreintensiveinvolvementinspecifictopics;afterall, the indicatorsofPolish lossesorvictories can-notbeidentifiedbeforethelastweekofDecember.The challenges, however, lie in fourmajor activi-ties: addressing thefinancial stateof affairs in theUnion; implementing EU directives connectedwiththeinternalmarket;performingtheapparentdutieswithintheEU’scloseneighborhoodandtheEasternPartnership;anddecreasingthelackofunitybetweenmemberstates.TheeconomicstatusoftheEUnecessitatesaPresidencythatiscapableofactingrapidlyandforcefullywheneverneeded.The‘activeand energetic engagement’ of Poland towards theEUPresidency,aspromisedbyPolishPrimeMinisterTusk,maywellturnouttobeasuccessstory.


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