Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao: History, Context, and Issues

F. Lara Jr. PhD

Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao Autonomy:

Parliamentary System and Role of LGUs

20 July 2015, Philippine Senate

Four propositions

To understand power relations in Muslim Mindanao we need to understand institutional multiplicity and integrity, and challenge the simplistic propositions offered by the advocates of good governance and democracy.

To understand the foundations of political legitimacy and authority in Muslim Mindanao we need to recognize the historical origins and sources of power of local strongmen and the nature and dynamics of clan institutions.

To understand the nature of political transitions and political settlements we need to focus our attention on the decisive role that local elites play in Muslim Mindanao.

To recognize the potential for transition-induced violence we need to study the ungoverned spaces of Muslim Mindanao and the evolution and resilience of Mindanaos shadow economies.

Proposition 1: Good governance and institutional multiplicity

Institutional multiplicity: the interplay between formal and informal institutions and their respective political agents in narratives of state fragility or resilience (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel, 2007). Individuals and organizations operate often simultaneously in multiple institutional systems, governed by very different sets of incentives thus placing them in complex, often unsolvable situations, but at the same time offering them the possibility of shifting strategically from one institutional universe to another. (Putzel, 2006).

Institutional integrity: Institutions that are indigenously designed, adopted or adapted are far more likely to be effective because they are more likely to enjoy both local legitimacy and appropriateness. Governance and management (however distinctive and different their purposes or designs), may be said to have integrity when the institutional arrangements sustain the integrity of its personnel and its processes and crucially when the personnel and processes sustain the institutions because they perceive it to be both legitimate and effective.

Institutional map of people living in Muslim Mindanao

Clan

( safety net)

Islam (Symbols, family laws)

Rebels (protection/rido)

State/OIC/ODA

(legal documents, property rights, some welfare provision, access to aid)

Among the four rule systems the most embedded are clan rules

and dynamics. Clans influence is manifest across other

institutions. Clans pay for the costs of missionaries and the

construction and maintenance of the madrasah, clan structures are transported into the state, rebel factions emerge from tribes and clans, even humanitarian work

for ICGs are shaped by clan dynamics.

Implications

Institutions do not necessarily complement each other, oftentimes they rival, clash, or collide with each other.

Institutions do not reproduce themselves automatically. Political agency is strategic to making them work across different situations.

Constant need to identify which institutions trump the rest.

Constant need to appeal to various institutions.

Problems with good governance

The World Bank used over 100 indicators to introduce a composite index of good governance, based on perceptions of voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and levels of corruption.

The indicators failed to account for country-specific challenges and conditions, with cross-country statistical analyses suffering from selection bias and ignoring the interlinkages among a wide array of variables. Worse, good-governance reforms are now a condition for international aid, forcing developing-country governments to mimic donor expectations, instead of addressing the issues that are most pressing for their own citizens.

Moreover, the required reforms are so wide-ranging that they are beyond the means of most developing countries to implement. As a result, good-governance solutions tend to distract from more effective development efforts. And though so-called good governance standards are formally neutral, they often favour particular vested interests, with grossly unfair consequences. Reforms aimed at decentralization and devolution have, in some cases, enabled the rise of powerful local political patrons.

MAYBE WE SHOULD JUST AIM FOR GOOD ENOUGH GOVERNANCE?

Political Settlement

(configuration of power on which states and sub-states are built)

State Organisations

Executive Authority

Legislative Authority

Judicial Authority

State Institutions

Property rights & entitlements

Control over assets

Access to income streams

Organisational structure of the

state

Regulatory Structure of the

economy

Rules governing

transactions

Taxation rules

Rules on Access to state

organisations

Good Governance agenda attempts institutional changes without attention to the political settlement

Political Settlement

(configuration of power on which the state is

built)

State Organisations

Executive Authority

Legislative Authority

Judicial Authority

State Institutions

Property rights & entitlements

Control over assets

Access to income streams

Organisational structure of the

state

Regulatory Structure of the

economy

Rules governing

transactions

Taxation rules

Rules on Access to state

organisations

Object of contention & bargaining

When institutions are at odds with configuration of power within state organizations, a settlement is unstable.

Can observe the political settlement by looking at organisations and institutions of the state.

Proposition 2: Origins and sources of strongman rule

Cognatic kinship and segmentary systems

Kinship defined beyond blood to include authority (responsibility for protection)

Combination of alliances based on kinship as well as skills

The ability to foment violence is among those skills.

Hence, a thin line between power, legitimacy, and authority.

The extension of legitimacy and authority across the Sulu zoneand nowadaysincluding various quarters/ghettoes in the country.

THESE QUALITIES PRIVILEGE THE CLAN

CLAN INSTITUTIONS RULE! Tribal and clan origins of insurgent groups

1969-1996

Nur Misuari and the MNLF

Tausug and Sama

Kiram, Tan, Loong, Salapuddin

1988-2009

Hashim Salamat, Al Haj Murad and MILF

Maguindanao

Mastura, Sinsuat, Ampatuan, Datumanong

1996-2009

Pundato MNLF Reformist Group and Bravo MILF

Maranao

Alonto, Lucman, Dimaporo, Adiong, Mutilan

Clan dynamics

Clans determine inheritance rules. Clans collect zakat and possess the tarsila that trace their royal lineage.

Clans observe rules in allocating the use of land. Numerous cases of rido have started from institutional clashes in the case of communally owned land being subjected to VOS/agrarian reform. Rare cases of fixed rent, usually a share in the harvest given as tribute.

Clans provide protection to members, demand obedience to rules, impose penalties, decide on rido (start and end).

Clans often demand that rebel members (MNLF or MILF) join them whenever a rido erupts (either to fight or mediate). In exchange, clans provide additional warm bodies and HPFs when rebellion-related conflict erupts.

Clans deliver the votes to candidates that are either clan members, or supported by the clan.

Clans are distinguished by their level of engagement in the illegal economy, providing capital, and mediating when conflicts arise. Few cases of inter/intra clan conflict over the informal economy (bad for business), though politicians expect payments for protection.

Clan networks extend beyond Muslim Mindanao. Rules and penalties are imposed as far away as Manila, Cebu, etc.

Clan imprint on the ARMM state (Lara 2009)

Gov. Andal Ampatuan,

Maguindanao

Akmad Ampatuan, Acting Vice Gov. Maguindanao

Gov. Zaldy Uy Ampatuan

ARMM

Sarip Ampatuan, Datu Puti Ampatuan, Nuali Ampatuan : provincial board members of

Maguindanao province

Datu Saudi B., Jr. Ampatuan Mayor, Datu Saudi Ampatuan

Datu Yacob Ampatuan, - Mayor, Rajah Buayan

Anwar Ampatuan Sr. Mayor, Sharif Aguak

Mayor Andal Ampatuan Jr.

Municipality of Datu Unsay

Didagen Dilangalen Rep, 1st District, Maguindanao (Grandson of Andal Sr.)

Simeon Datumanong Rep. 2nd District, Maguindanao. (Nephew of Andal Sr.)

Some conclusions ..

In Muslim Mindanao, clan institutions trump all other institutions, including (a) constitutional rules, local governments/devolution (b) Islamic rule systems (c) rebel rule-systems, even (d) the international rules and agreements imposed by aid givers. To emphasize this point, clan institutions and organizations were more important in providing protection and welfare, and consequently in maintaining legitimacy (Buldon);

Successful rule in MM entailed using clans, or kinship networks (Mc Coy) as a corridor for dealing with other institutions. Successful rule required simultaneous but calibrated identification with competing sources of legitimacy. This was critical in bargaining with elites and fortifying political and social support.

Proposition 3: National-regional-local continuum..

Shift in the power of Moro elites due to the post-Aquino constitution which made national elites more beholden to them. Solid vote banking (2004, 2007) became more important in determining electoral competition. (1M floor)

LGC and the IRA (government-to-government fund transfers) fed local warlords, and institutionalized the soft-budget constraint.

Prior to 2004, warlords extended the reach of the State and were harnessed to fight the separatists and communists. The outsourcing of violence leads to the Maguindanao massacre. Guns are used against competing Moro elites. However, impunity means violating other institutional identifications.

Local elites gain further legitimacy through their links to supranational criminal networks and to ODA

Proposition 4: Ungoverned spaces

Informal economies are: alternative economic systems that are

unrecorded in official accounts and statistics, yet are interlinked with formal/official economies in complex ways, and are as much political and social as they are economic. Mac Gaffey (1991, 1-3)

social networks that exacerbate the

regulatory problems of weak and corrupt states, yet constitute an informal mechanism of economic coordination that fills the gaps in state provision, and a novel form of economic governance that is surprisingly efficient and flexible in the face of widespread economic uncertainty. (Meagher,2010; Stiglitz, 2000; Hamilton, 1996, Castells, 1996, Granovetter, 2005)

SIZE OF INFORMAL SECTOR

-

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009

Per

cen

t

Philippines Luzon Visayas Mindanao

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009

Philippines Luzon Visayas Mindanao

employment income

INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, BY REGION (2009)

Source: 2009 Labor Force Survey (LFS)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100N

CR

CA

R

Iloco

s

Cag

ayan

V

C. L

uzo

n

CA

LAB

AR

ZON

MIM

AR

OP

A

Bic

ol

W. V

isay

as

C. V

isay

as

E. V

isay

as

Zam

Pen

N. M

ind

anao

Dav

ao

SOC

CSK

SAR

GEN

AR

MM

CA

RA

GA

Luzon Visayas Mindanao

Pe

rce

nt

INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, BY PROVINCE (1988 AND 2009)

What does proposition 4 tell us?

The informal economy as a drag on state building. Revenue generation needs to address the soft-budget constraint especially in Mindanao. Yet regulation will be a trigger for violent conflict (secondary land markets).

The informal economy as a survival mechanism. Gradual incorporation in the formal economy depends upon the ability to provide conditions for alternative livelihoods and government protection. The informal economy as indicative of access barriers in formal markets that need to be disentangled and removed (insurance markets in Mindanao).

The informal economy as an arena for legitimacy construction and the creation of inclusive political settlements. The informal economy as the basis of elite bargains and social contracts in places beyond the effective control of the State (Olsons roving and stationary bandits)

HENCE, ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN MUSLIM MINDANAO.

A final note: beware the rise in transition-induced violence

Violent conflict in Mindanao has many sources and triggers, apart from vertical political violence.

Wars make states!

BBLs Fate Hangs in the Balance

Despite its positive effects, every political settlement will encounter problems related to:

Incompleteness: not all critical issues are addressed

Counter-productiveness: new problems have been created

Potential blowback: peace outcomes create conditions for future turbulence.

.

Vertical and horizontal conflict 2011-2014

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Vertical conflict Horizontal conflict

2011

2012

2013

2014

.

Violence density is highest in Basilan.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Basilan Maguindanao Sulu Lanao del Sur Tawi Tawi

2011

2012

2013

Violence density refers to the number of violent incidents per 1,000 square kilometers

Causes of violent conflict, 2011-2014

Shadow economies

33%

Extra-judicial issues 20%

Political issues 23%

Identity-based 13%

[CATEGORY NAME]

[PERCENTAGE]

Resource-based 3%

Number of incidents

Conflict deaths

-1200 -1000 -800 -600 -400 -200 0

Shadoweconomies

Political issues

Extra-Judicialissues

Identity-based

Governance issues

Resource-based

2011 2012 2013 2014

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

2011 2012 2013 2014

While GDP was falling during the war, tax revenues increased in the ARMM provinces

-

10,000,000,000.00

20,000,000,000.00

30,000,000,000.00

40,000,000,000.00

50,000,000,000.00

60,000,000,000.00

-

200,000,000.00

400,000,000.00

600,000,000.00

800,000,000.00

1,000,000,000.00

1,200,000,000.00

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Tax collections

Nominal GDP

26

Thank you