political identities in changing polities

7/27/2019 Political Identities in Changing Polities

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Political Identities inChanging Polities* C H A R L E S T I L L Y HENRY VIII was, as we know, a bit of an opportunist. In 1521, ata time when Henry had allied England with the Habsburgsagainst France and a lso laidclaim to the French crown, he wrotea pamphlet cr i t ic iz ing Martin Luther's doctrines. For his effor ts ,the pope dubbed Henry "Defender of the Faith." Churchmen,however ,began voicing doubts about that t i t le nolater than1525,when Henry levied a major tax onchurch property to pay for h iswars w ith Catholic France. As thepope himself delayed sanction-ing Henry's divorce from Catharine of Aragon to marry AnneB oleyn, Henry sacked h is papal legate, Cardinal W olsey, and, aftersomemaneuvering, declared the English church independent ofRome. The break with the pope brought Henry substantialchurch revenues. In 1534, Henry rammed through the Act ofSupremacy, which made him and his successors heads of an inde-pendent English church; he also rendered refusalto take anoathof recognition, a capital crime of high treason. Utopia author,former chancellor, and future saint Thomas More lost h is headfor just such a refusal .

By 1536,with thehelp of ThomasCromwell, Henry was hav-ing AnneBoleyn executed on a trumped up charge of adultery,beginning dispossession of the monasteries, publishingWilliam Tindale's translation of the Bible, and putting downmajor rebellionsagainsthis religiousinnovations. Within threeyears, nevertheless, he issued the Six Articles, which defined

*A n earlier vers ionof this paperse rved as keynote address atthe conference "Redef in -ing Europe, " New York University, November 30 , 20(Jl. A few paragraphs are adaptedfrom Til ly (2002) .

S O C IA L R ESEA R C H, Vol. 70 , No. 2 (Summer 2003)

Tilly, Charles, Political identities in changing polities,

Social Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Summer 2003), 605620.


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606 SOCIAL RESEARCHbeliefs and practices greatly resembling those of the CatholicChurch except in their substitution of the king for the pope.Through al l these gyrations, Henry's enforcers missed noopportunity to seize church revenues or to raise money fromchurch members. After Henry's death in 1547, English believers had to follow twists and turns through reigns of a rathermore Protestant Edward VI, a quite Catholic Mary, and a warilyProtestant Elizabeth I. The sixteenth century dragged ordinaryEnglish people through a maze of alternating religious andpolitical identities.

Eamon Duffy, in his dense, complex, but ultimately vivid reconstruction of parish life in sixteenth-century More bath, Devon, hasdemonstrated how deeply the top-down turmoil stirred by HenryVIII and his successors shook local social relations and practices(Duffy, 2001). DuffY's chief historical informant, the long-servingvicar Sir Christopher Trychay, did his best to protect his initiallyCatholic parishioners from the opposite dangers of over-eagerreform and dogged resistance. But changing definitions of reli-gious and political affiliation, with their accompanying obliga-tions, impoverished the local church, destroyed the roughequality of household involvement in parish affairs that had characterized the early sixteenth century, and caused recurrent struggles of locals with outsiders who sought to impose or profit fromthe current realignment.Henry's 1547 Injunctions, for example, combined an attackon votive lights and sacred images with dissolution of thechantries that had supported memorial masses, the proceedsgoing to pay for war with Scotland. In sheep-raising Morebath,this reform simultaneously struck at practices that entwinedreligion with kinship and forced sale of the church sheep,whose wool had provided the major income supporting localdevotions.

Most of the time Morebath's people fought their identity battles with weapons of the weak. In 1549, however, they paid the


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 607expenses of sendingfive local men to a rebel camp ncar Exeterinwhat came to be known as the Western Rebellion. More or lesssimultaneously Edward VI's regime had imposed the ProtestantBookof Common Prayer plus new taxes on sheep and cloth tosupport the expanding w ars against France and Scotland. Therebelsof 1549 centered their demands onthe restoration ofreli-gious life as defined toward the end of Henry's reign: largelyCatholic beliefs , practices, and identities within an independentChurch of England. The king's forces, backedby foreign mercenaries, slaughtered the rebels. No commoners were going to decide thecontent of England's rel igious andpoliticalidentitiesas seen from the topdown.

*

Since the destruction of the World Trade Center's two mamtowers on September 11, 2001 , the United States and Europehave been reliving some ofthe sixteenth-century's identity struggles. Insistence that rulers know better than c i tizens where theline between U sand Themfalls , rais ing of revenue and restrictionoflibert ies in the name ofholy war, smitingof enemiesand theirunwittingor unwill ing accompliceswith m assive military action,andpublic displays of support for all these measures have a sur-prisingly sixteenth-century air about them. But let me suppressthe urge to catalog parallels between the American war againstterrorismand the w arsof Henry V III infavorof another, relatedta sk: topoint out how deeply negotiatedpolitical identities affectthework of changing pol i tie s .

Rogers Brubaker and Fred Cooper, tw o students of socialprocesses whose contributions deserve great respect, haverecentlyproposed that w e expunge "identity" from ouranalyticlexicon because the term has acquired too many meanings andtoo few specifications (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). I propose


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608 SOCIAL RESEARCHinstead that we get identity right. We can escape the search forinner selves about which Brubaker and Cooper rightly complainby recognizing that people regularly negotiate and deploysocially based answers to the questions "Who are you?" "Who arewe?" and "Who are they?" Those are identity questions. Theiranswers are identities-always assertions, always contingent,always negotiable, but also always consequential. Identities aresocial arrangements.

Identities belong to that potent set of social arrangements inwhich people construct shared stories about who they are, howthey are connected, and what has happened to them. Such stories range from the small-scale production of excuses, explanations, and apologies when something goes wrong to thelarge-scale production of peace settlements and national histories. Whatever their truth or falsehood by the standards of historical research, such stories play an indispensable role in thescaling of agreements and the coordination of social interaction.Stories and identities intersect when people start deployingshared answers to the questions "Who are you?" "Who are we?"and "Who are they?"

To be more precise, identities have four components:1) a boundary separating me fi,om you or us from them;2) a set of relations within the boundary;3) a set of relations across the boundary;4) a set of stories about the boundary and the relations.

Thus, as of 1536 Henry VIII had forced a boundary betweenAnglicans and Catholics partially into place, relations within theAnglican category were undergoing rapid renegotiation, relationsbetween Anglicans and Catholics had become matters of negotiation in some places and civil war in others; at the same time, manyparties, including the parson of Morebath, had started to fashion,promulgate, and even believe new stories about Anglican-


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 609Catholic relations as w ell as about the boundary separating thetw o categories.Identities become politica l identities when governmentsbecome parties to them. The religious identities ofMorebathparishioners polit icized as Henry V IIIandh is suc cesso rs begantomanipulateand controlpermissible answ ers forre l igious ly tingedversions of"Whoare you?" "Whoarewe?" and"Who are they?"The identities ofAmericans as patriotic or otherwise becomeevenmorepoliticalas the United S ta te s government becomes aparty to w e-they boundaries. AmericanM usl ims and ArabAmericansfind themselvesbattlingto locate onthe rightside ofincreasin g ly dangerousboundaries. Europeans maneuveraround similarquestionsnotonly in decidingwhether to alignw ith United S ta tesmili tarypol icy buta lso indeciding whetherTurksare Europeansandwhether M u slim s in general l ie on the opposite side of thew e-they boundary.

Manypeopleregardidentity claims primarilyas a formofself expression, or even ofself-indulgence-what others do whenthey are too comfortable, too confused, or too dis tressed forseriousp o li t ic s . Iargue, onthecontrary, that identityclaimsandtheirattendantstories constituteseriouspoliticalbusiness. Consider the social movement-the collect ive public stating ofclaims onpower holdersbymeans of meetings, marches,associations,petitions,and similar disp lays ofworthiness, uni ty , numbers, and commitment. Although every major social inventionhas precedents, w e can reasonably date the invention of thesocial movement as a distinctive form ofpolit ics to the latereighteenthcentury,when advocates of civil liberties, opponentsof slavery, zealotsfor democracy,and cri tics ofwar-bloatedtaxa tional l challenged authoritiesinnewways. Those newways sooncrystall ized into institutions that remain familiar and potenttoday .

Inventionof thesocia l movement did notmerelycreatea newvehicle forolddemands;it also facil itated the staking ofclaims in


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610 SOCIAL RESEARCHthe name of prev io us ly unrecognized political ac tors . At variouspoints in American history, soc ia l movements helped establishopponents ofslavery andenemies of alcoholalong with women,MricanAmericans, gays, Vietnamveterans,and indigenous peoples as v iable political ac tors . Socia l movement actions typicallycouple program claims in the form "W e demand, we support, w eoppose" and so on with existence claim s stating, in essence, "W eexist, we have a right to ex ist, and you'd betterpayattention to us."That is precisely w hy authorities, rivals,and opponents of newmovements so regularly denigrate their members' worthiness,unity , numbers, and commitment.P ol i t ica l rights and obligationsare at stake .

P o li t ica l rights and obligations themselves depend on negotiated c la im s linking members ofestablished political categories,whichmeans that th ey, too, involve identity claim s. Workingoutacceptedansw ers tothequestions"Who areyou?" "Whoare we?"and "Who are they?" with w idely accepted stories to back thoseanswers is noself-indulgence;it pla ys a consequential part in public po litics . A nsw ers to the questions affect thevery feasibility ofdemocracy. Without a d is t inc tive identity called "ci t izen" or itsequivalent,democracycannotexist.

Ata national scale , sixteenth-century England lacked democracy precisely because (despite the intermittent power ofP arl ia-ment) no categoricallydefined rightsand obligat ions relatedthelarge body ofEnglish peopleto their rulersac ross the boundarybetween them. The next century's revolutions, which combinedbloody civil w ars w ith struggles betweenParliament andwhoeverwas currentlyruling, laid some of the groundwork forsuch ca te-g o r ica lly defined rights and obligations. But not until the sameperiod that brought us the socia lmovement didthe Englishpea-


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 611

ple and their rulers-now including Parliament-begin to bargain out the broad protections, binding consultations, andmutual obligationsthat constitute democracy. Intheprocess, theycreatedan identity called "B ri t ish sub jec t ," implying somethingl ike citizenship,despite its name.

Three kinds ofevidence could, in principle, te l l u s that suchcreationsofsharedpolitical identities do notmerely form as by-productsofdeeperpolitical processes butac tua l ly make a d iffer-ence in their own right. First, w e might discover that whenpoliticalidentitieschange, sodoa wide rangeof other meanings,practices, andrelations. Second,w e mightobserve thatsim ilar lysituatedpeople in different t im es andplaces adopt different col-lect ive identi ties, which organize publicclaim-making ind ist inc t ly different ways. Third,w emightnoticebundlesofrightsandob lig -ations that vary with the identitiesac t iva ted , andvisibly bind theparticipantsin politicalaction.

In sixteenth-century Morebath, w e saw all three kinds ofevi-dence of identity effects: widespread consequences within theparishof the new Anglican identity'semergence,d ist inct ly d iffer-ent public religious p o li t ic s that prevailed ac ro ss villages else-where in sixteenth-century Europe, and painful negotiation ofnewrights and obligations tied to locat ionsontheAnglicanandCatholic s ides ofan increasingly formidable frontier . My readingof thehistoricalevidenceassigns largeeffec ts tochanges in pol i t-ica l ident it ies.

Howdo suchchanges occur? The question leads to more spe -cific agendas for the study of p o li t ica l identities, of s to r ies , ofpol it icalchange,andoftheir interactions. Ineachcase , w e neednew workontw o classes ofproblerns: generationandconstraint.

Genera tion:Whatcausestheprocesses inv o lve d to begin andthen to change? How did Europeans, for example, puttogetherthesto r ies , relations, and boundariesthat now dis-tinguish theEuropeanUnionand its members from their


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612 SOCIAL RESEARCHcontinental neighbors and make crossing boundaries sodesirable to outsiders?Constraint: Once they are m operation, how do theprocesses affect both small-scale and large-scale socialbehavior? For example, at what point and how should weexpect participants in European social movements routinely to make claims on behalf of categories that span longestablished national boundaries?

My own earlier analyses of these problems have used entrepreneurial-interactive accounts of generation and constraint.Political entrepreneurs in the forms of would-be ethnic leaders and movement organizers figure prominently in thoseanalyses.

These political entrepreneurs draw together credible storiesfrom available cultural materials, similarly create we-they boundaries, activate both stories and boundaries as a function of currentpolitical circumstances, and maneuver to suppress competingmodels. Yet interaction among parties to struggle alters stories,boundaries, and their social reinforcements. In this regard, myaccount resemblesJohn Walton's conclusions concerning thenarratives of public history:

Public history is constructed, not, in the main, for the purposes of posterity or objectivity, but for the aims of presentaction (conquest, social reform, building, political reorganization, economic transformation). Narratives makeclaims for the virtues of their individual and institutionalauthors, often as counterpoint to rival claimants. They characterize the past in certain ways for the purpose of shapingthe future. The ability of narratives to effect changedepends in the first instance on their institutional power;whether they are produced by a powerful church, conquer-


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 613

ing state, fledgling to w n , orcontendingvoluntary associations ( W a l ton , 2001: 294).

Something l ike this process often doesoccur . But suchan accountcontainsan excessively instrumental bias. It of fe rs no explanationof the fact that mostwould-be politicalentrepreneurs generallyfail. Nor does it provide a sat isfa c tory explanation of day-to-clayinteractions around political identities, much less w hy peoplesometimes r isk their lives in the course of those interactions.Clearly, w e needmore subtleandcomprehensive explanations ofgeneration andconstraint.

In the case of identity s to r ies , we have a few clues concerninggeneration. Although no one lives without s tor ies , interactingpeoplecreate new stories about their interactionafterthe fact, asthey terminate sequences and seal agreements. The beleagueredsixteenth-century parson of Morebath mediated between his parishioners and outside authorities in negotiating new sharedaccounts of Christianity and the practices it entailed. Thoseaccounts connectedreligious and pol i t ica l identities ina newway,cementing theAnglican Church in place without entirely t r ansforming daily practices within the village. In thatregard, pol i t i ca lstories resemble peace treaties, comrnencementaddresses,memoirs , annual reports, and labor-management contracts. T o besure, materials for stories come la rgely from existing culturalrepertoires. V isibly viab le new stories reassemble famil iar clements. Certifying agentssuch as elders, peers, public authorities,and international organizations monitor s to r ies , and often provide modelsfor theirproperconstruction.

Nationalist s tor ies , for example, bear a striking resemblancefromonepart of theworld to another.Theyspeakof sharedculture, longstanding tradition, connectedness, common geographic origin, and distinctness from others w ith whom theclaimed nationmight be confused. Thosecommonpropertiesdonot spring from primordial consciousness, but from a body of


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614 SOCIAL RESEARCHnationalist models and practices that have spread through theworld since 1789. Still w e ha ve no convincinggeneralaccount ofthe process by which the speci f ic contents of pol i t ical ly conse-quential stories-nationalistor otherwise-form andgain credi-bility. Nor do w e have a persuasive account of change inprevailing sto ries . W e lack a compelling and comprehensiveexplanation forthegeneration of the particular boundaries, re la -t ion s, and stories thatconstitutepoliticalidentities.

A-; for constraint, how do s tor ies and identities produce theirdiects? In the construction and deployment of pol i t ica lly effec-tive s tor ies , what happens atthe sm all scale ofan individual or apair of ind iv idua l s , at the large scale of astate or a national m ove-ment, and in the interactionbetween those scales?

Three bad answ ers springtomind. The f i rs t is that stories alterindividual consciousnessin closely similarways across ind iv id uals ,before individual consciousness aggregates into col lec t ive con-sc iousness. This answer is bad because it provides noaccount ofhow exposure to stories interacts w ith previous learning acrossindividuals who ha ve variedconsiderably inpreviousexperience.We could, after all, plausibly expect such individuals to adopt dif-ferent, even contradictory, s tor ies . How does re la t ive uniformityin public storytelling come about? Much le ss doesthe aggregationof individual consciousness explain how people who have theirdoubts about shared storiesnevertheless cooperate in their public promulgation. At the beginning of 2001, it was easy for outsiders to suppose that the Taliban had brainwashed theirMghancompatriots. By year's end, any such conversion seemed utterlyimplausible. Sic transit gloria victoriae.

The second commonly proposed bad answer is that society doesit: those s to r ies that se rve socie ty as a wholeor (morelikely) rein-force the interests of dominant groups prevail. This second answeris w oefully inadequatebecause it invokes a dubious agent-societyas a wholeor a unified dominant group-andbegsthe question ofhow that agent does its wo rk. H olis t ic ontologieskeep returning to


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 615social science in such forms as evolutionary models and world-system analyses. But their vagueness with respect to agency-whodocs what to whom, why, and how-has greatly diminished theirpopularity among social scientists at large. That vagueness renders"society does it" answers unhelpful explanations for the prominence of stories and identities in political change. I t was not the"social system" that broadcast and implanted new tales of religiousidentity in sixteenth-century England.

A third frequent bad answer credits culture, as the repository ofcollective experience, with the production of constraint. Thisanswer is even worse than the first two because it combines theirdefects: it begs the question of how culture-that is, sharedunderstandings and their representations in objects and practices-changes as it invokes a dubious agent. Like "society doesit," the cultural answer fails to specify how that agent creates itseffects in social life. I t is unquestionable that available culture figures importantly in political storytelling and identity politics. People undoubtedly draw on previously known representations andpractices as they struggle with one another. But how? Since struggling people are constantly modifying their definitions of whothey are and what they are fighting about, exactly how does culture constrain them? Social movements always draw on theirambient cultures, thus producing distinctive variation in socialmovement forms and practices from one setting to another. Butin no way can we explain social movements as straightforwardemanations of existing culture.

Let me suggest three possible good answers as possible alternatives to the bad answers. Call them entrepreneurship, creative interac-tion, and cultural ecolog,y. The three would take future work insomewhat different directions, but they would not necessarilyyield incompatible results.Entrepreneurship? We might improve a crude entrepreneurialaccount by looking at analogies with intellectual, artistic, andreligious schools. In those fields investigators usually discover


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616 SOCIAL RESEARCHstrong network effec ts , polarization effec ts , and mutual remforcementof common culture; brokers both connect and dividecrucial actors. In religious, art ist ic , and intellectual f ields, brokers play crucial roles in establishing or activating boundariesbetween professionals and lay people, between leaders and fol-lowers , between schools of thought. W e can certainly see g lim -mers of the same effec ts in the history of identity pol i t ics . InBritish socia l movement polit ics, for example, offstage connections amongsuchentrepreneurs as William CobbettandFrancisPlaceclearlyaffectedwhich stories and identities becameprominent in successive campaigns for parliamentary reform. Theyspent a significant portionoftheir efforts erecting oractivatingUs-Them boundaries. An entrepreneurial account of identityeffec t s would, however , lead us not so much toward individualentrepreneurs as toward soc ia l processes that produce connections and shared boundaries where they previously did not organize political action.

Creative interaction should help us explain the contingency,mutabi l ity , and negotiationof identity cla ims. Creative interactionappears most vis ibly in such activities as jazzand soccer . In thesecases, participants work within rough agreements on proceduresand outcomes; arbiters set l imits on performances, individualdex te r i ty , knowledge; and disciplined preparation generally y ie ld superior play. Yet the rigidequivalent of militarydrill destroystheenterprise. Both jazz and soccer, when well executed, proceedthrough improvised interaction, surprise, incessant error anderror-correction,alternation between solo andensemble action,and repeated responsesto understandings sharedby atleast pairsof players . Mter the fact , participantsand spectators createsharedstories of what happened, and striking improvisations shapefuture performances.W e can see creative interaction at w ork , for example, in thetwo-century-old process by which solemn processions and presentations ofpetitions evolved into street demonstrations. Although


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 617you will not find it inscribed in constitutions, the demonstrationis a remarkable political creation. It consists of:

gathering deliberately in a public place, preferably a placecombining visibility with symbolic significance;

displaying both membership in a politically relevant population and support for some position by means of voice,printed words, or symbolic o ~ j e c t s ;

communicating collective determination by acting in a disci-plined fashion in one space or moving through a series ofspaces-for example by marching from Washington's Viet-nam Memorial to Capitol Hill.

American and British opponents of royal policy in North America used existing rights of assembly and petition to fashion large,regular displays of popular opposition despite efforts by royalauthorities to disperse them with troops, militias, and constables. Although the term "demonstration" itself only emergedduring the 1830s, by then North Americans and Western Europeans had created a new, distinctive, durable, and effective political form. It became a standard instrument of social movementactivists.

Creation of the demonstration also generated a new, relativelynonviolent set of police practices for containing public assem-blies, displaced immediately destructive forms of assembly such asthe sacking of dishonored houses, and thus reduced the overallviolence of collective claim making. If we could explain howhuman beings bring off such improvisatory adventures, we wouldbe well on our way to accounting for how sets of interacting people store histories in contentious repertoires, conversation, rightsand obligations, war and peace, and similar phenomena. Thestudy of creative interaction would lead us deep into the actualprocesses by which people change their collective answers to thequestion "Who are you?"

Cultural ecology? Social life consists of transactions amongsocial sites, some of them occupied by individual persons, but


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618 SOCIAL RESEARCHmost occupied byshifting aspects or clusters ofpersons. None ofthe sites , goes the reasoning, contain a ll the culture-all theshared understandings or representations-on which transactions in its vic ini ty draw . But transactions among site s produceinterdependence among extensively connected sites, depositrelated cultural material in those si tes, transformshared understandings in the process, and thus make largestores ofcultureavailable to any particular site through it s connections withothersites .Although all this may sound m yster iou s , implausible, and difficult, as a practical matter w e oftenassume asimple version of cultural ecology: challenged by an impending purchase, anintellectual conundrum, or a w eightypersonal choice, we turn to a wise friend or colleague not necessari ly because she will havethe rightanswer, but because shewill knowwhom to ask orwhereto search. A computer model of cultural ecology would featuredistributed intell igence. Suchamodel would, in turn, clarify whatobservers of political conflict often call spontaneousorganization:the formation or activation of coordinating connections amongsm all pocketsof individuals who initiate attacks or demands atalo cal sca le on their ow n, but somehow articulate w ith l a rger-sca leidentities and collect iv e s truggles .

A po litic a l ly sens i tive version ofcultural ecologywould take usinto the thick of meaningful, sol id ar i ty-sus ta in ing soc ia l ties. I twould help us learn why os tensibly irrational high-risk activismoccurs,and how mobilized people manage the contradictions ofsm all-scale bonding and large-scale confrontation. Thus we mightdiscover that identity po li t icscreates it s i l lusions of unity bymeansof incessantly negotiated interchangeamongdistinct sites; it thenfixes its i l lus ions by means of collectiv ely produceds tor ies. W e cansee signs of cultural ecology, forexample, in James Sco tt 's , V iviana Z elize r 's , and Eamon D uffy 's documentation of dispersed localknowledge as a counter to uniform top-down templates (Scott ,1985, 1990, 1998; Zelizer, 1999, 2001; Duffy, 2001). They seepeople's joint action-including theircol lect ive ans wers to "Who are


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POLITICAL IDENTITIES 619you?" questions-as outcomes of negotiated interactions betweentop-down and bottom-up exercises of power (Tilly, 1999).

Consider entrepreneurship, creative interaction, and culturalecology to be three cloudy mirrors held up to narrative and identity processes from different angles. Analysts of stories, identities,and political change face the challenge of clearing the mirrors, orcreating better glasses. Improved vision should help us explainhow Europeans are creating new identities, acting as if theybelieved their own shared answers to the question "Who are you?"and creating consequential stories about the past, present, andfuture of Europe. It should also help us explain how scatteredMuslim activists enter into connected confrontations with theworld's great powers, how and why ostensibly ethnic conf1ictsswelled to lethal proportions in Yugoslavia and the former SovietUnion, why civil war has over the last half century displaced interstate war as the primary site of large-scale killing, and whethertransnational coalitions have a chance of checking the excesses ofglobal capital.

Identity processes, in short, do not merely concern people'sindividual states of mind. They figure centrally in the world'sgreat political struggles today, as they did in sixteenth-centuryEngland.

ReferencesBrubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. "Beyond 'Identity."' Theory

andSociety29 (2000): 1-47.Duffy, Eamon. The Voices ofMorebath. Reformation and Rebellion in an Nng-

lish Village. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.Scott, James C. Weajmns of the Weah: l\veryday Forms of Peasant lu:sistance.

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.---. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.---. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Con-

dition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.Tilly, Charles. "Power-Top Down and Bottom Up." Journal of PoliticalPhilosophy 7 ( 1999): 330-352.


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620 SOCIAL RESEARCH--- . Stories, Identities, andPolitical Change. Lanham, M d.: Rowman and

Litt lefield, 2002.Walton, John. Storied Lan d: Communit y and Memory in Monterey. Berkeley:

University ofCalifornia Press, 2001.Zelizer, Viviana. "Multiple Marke ts, M ult iple Cultures." Diversity and its

Discontents: Cultural Conflict and Com mon Ground in ContemporaryAmerican Society. Eds. Neil Smelser and JeffreyAlexander. Princeton:Princeton U niversity Press, 1999.

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