plant and equipment theft a practical guide

7/28/2019 Plant and Equipment Theft a Practical Guide

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Plant and Equipment Theft:

A Practical GuideSecond Edition


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Plant and Equipment Theft:

A Practical Guide

2007 OPERC

With the exception of research, private study or review, no part of this

publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by

any means, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Applications for reproduction should be made to the publisher.

First edition 2006

Second edition 2007

Author:Dr David J. Edwards

Editors:Miss Philippa Spittle and Dr Gary Holt

Published by:The Off-highway Plant and Equipment

Research Centre (OPERC)

PO Box 5039

DudleyDY1 9FQ

Email: [email protected]

Tel: +44 (0) 1384 356202

Distributed by:IRAS Group

PO Box 3258

Wolverhampton

WV3 7YT



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Conditions of Use

The material contained within this document constitutes general guidelines

only and is not, at the time of publication, mandatory. The guidanceprovided does not reduce, or replace, any legal obligations upon employers

(or employees), for example, to comply with any statutory duties under

relevant legislation.

The guidance is given in good faith; but the reader must accept that

because (among other things) of the infinite particular and specific hazards

(risks) relating to any given item of plant operating in any given working

environment, the guide cannot and therefore does not, purport to offer

optimal advice for all possible circumstances. Readers must use the guide

as a basis for learning about the subject only; and consult as appropriate,specific agencies, technical consultants, or specialist manufacturers etc.

before acting upon any recommendations contained within it. Every effort

has been made to ensure that the contents of this guide are correct, error

free, and representing best practice, but no guarantee is made express or

implied, that this is the case. Accordingly, this publication is offered without

legal liability or responsibility on the part of the author, editors, publisher,

distributor, or anyone else involved in its production.

OPERC does not endorse or specifically recommend any of the products

or services referred to in this guide. Any reference to a commercial

organisation, product or service is for information and / or educationalpurposes only.

Whilst written principally in a UK context, for the most part, the principles

and concepts discussed within this publication hold equal international

relevance.

OPERC acknowledges with appreciation all who have helped in the

development and publication of this guide. In particular, special thanks

go to those companies that offered direct support through sponsorship:

Automatrics, Hewden, Mtrack and Thiefbeaters. Individuals who also

contributed via editorial and / or other input include Mr Richard Taylor

(Automatrics) and Jeff Schofield (Hewden). Finally, a thank you is extended

to Mr Richard Carmichael for his original contribution on the first edition.

Acknowledgements

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The Off-highway Plant and Equipment Research Centre (OPERC) has

gained an enviable reputation as the leading international centre of

excellence for plant and equipment science. OPERC represents all those

associated with off-highway plant and equipment - whether industry

practitioners, professionals or scholars. This combination of experience,

information and ongoing scientific research, ensures that the products and

services provided by OPERC are of the highest quality and of value to all

stakeholders.

OPERC is a non-partisan and non-profit making organisation. Its main

objective is to advance off-highway plant and equipment knowledge and

share this among all interested parties. Funds generated by the associationare used to help research, author, publish and make available information

(such as this guide), that would otherwise be too time consuming and / or

expensive for any single member to produce in isolation.

There are many benefits to be gained from becoming an OPERC member

including access to free information and publications; access to teaching,

learning and assessment materials; excellent networking opportunities; and

attendance at OPERC events. More comprehensive description of OPERC

benefits, along with details of how you can join the organisation, can be

found on the official OPERC website at: www.operc.com.

Alternatively, if you have any queries regarding OPERC, then please do

contact our administration team who will be happy to assist you:

Telephone: +44(0) 1384 356202


Web: www.operc.com

Welcome to OPERC

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Since this guide was first published in 2006, the subject of plant and

equipment theft has gained increased recognition throughout many sectorsof industry. This is to be applauded, for the more prominence afforded

the issue then the more likely are hirers, owners and operators of such

equipment, to take practical steps to make their assets more secure.

However, commentators presently quantify the cost of plant theft within

the UK at approximately 100 million per annum. When this is considered

alongside average recovery rates of between five and ten per cent for

stolen plant items, the need to continue fighting back against the criminal is

self evident.

Fortunately, the technologies that underpin plant theft security and stolen

asset recovery systems continue to evolve. If properly employed, these

technologies can make it harder for criminals to carry out a theft, while

also increasing the probability of stolen assets being reunited with their

legitimate owners. Nevertheless, owners and operators must still maintain

an awareness of the issues regarding plant theft and take practical

measures to address them if they want to avoid becoming victims.

This revised second edition of OPERCs guide on plant and equipment

theft has been updated to include the provision of additional practical

guidance, as well as the inclusion of more recent statistics and reporting onadvancements in security systems. Its overriding aim remains: to contribute

something to helping reduce this unfortunate criminal activity.

Preface

Mr Graham Eaves

OPERC President, 2007-2008

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Contents

Introduction 1

The Plant Theft Process 3

Understanding the Theft Process 3

Why Steal Plant and Equipment? 4

Who Steals Plant and Equipment 5

Opportunist Thieves 5

Professional Thieves 5

How Plant and Equipment is Removed 6

Plant Theft via Fraudulent Hire 6

The Stolen Plant Market 7

Summary 8

The Nature and Extent of the Problem 9

The Costs of Plant Theft 9

Some Plant Theft Statistics 11

Summary 13How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft 15

Using the Plant Theft Process to Apply Security 15

Categorising Security Systems 16

Deterrent Systems 16

Preventative Systems 17

Recovery Systems 17

Specific Anti-theft and Theft-recovery Systems 18

Personalisation 18

Marking 19

Registration Schemes 23

Alarms 25

Immobilisers 25

Recovery Devices 27

Site Security 30

Installation and Testing of Security Systems 31

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What to do if a Theft Occurs 31

What of the Future? 33

Summary 33

Concluding Summary 35

References 37

Further Information 38

List of FiguresFigure 1 The Plant Theft Process 3

Figure 2 The Costs of Plant Theft 9

Figure 3 An Example of Preventing Access to the Cab 15

Figure 4 Typical Manufacturers VIN Plate 19

Figure 5 Adding Identification to an Excavator Using DeepImprint Stamping 20

Figure 6 Overtly Etched Glass Highlighted within a Warning Sign 20

Figure 7 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label:Clearly Visible on an Excavator Arm 21

Figure 8 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label:With Security Etching in a Concealed Position 21

Figure 9 Example of the Type of Information Held on a Microdot 23

Figure 10 Specimen Marking Database Registration Document 24

Figure 11 Typical Theft Detection Recovery Report 29

List of Tables

Table 1 Stolen Plant Recovery Statistics: as Reported by TER

in Support of the Police for the Period 2004 to2006 Inclusive 4

Table 2 Covert Marking Methods 22

Table 3 Some Types of Mechanical Immobilisers and TheirTypical Application 27

Table 4 Examples of How to Improve Site Security 30

Table 5 Examples of Shared Responsibilities to Help Combat

Plant Theft 36

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The issue of plant and equipment1 theft represents an ongoing challenge

for industry. Even by the lowest estimates, the aggregated value of planttheft within the UK represents a multimillion pound (obviously illegitimate!)

business. In practice (and for a variety of reasons), levels of plant

security generally tend to be less than optimal providing little immediate

prospect of the problem diminishing. Neither is the situation helped by an

apparent degree of apathy towards plant security on the part of owners and

operators. One survey for example, found that two-thirds of plant owners

did not even make a record of the serial number of their plant or equipment,

whilst less than one in four of those who had fallen victim to plant theft had

bothered to chain up and lock their plant items (Smith and Walmsley,1999).

In view of this situation, it is something of an irony that there is an

increasing awareness of the plant theft problem, as is witnessed by the

greater media coverage that it now attracts. This awareness has partly

been encouraged by recent changes to plant insurance arrangements. For

example, before issuing policies, many insurers now enquire about the

specification of installed security devices (such as alarms, immobilisers

and trackers) as well as the proposed usage and storage arrangements for

the plant. Depending upon the answers to these kinds of queries, insurers

may subsequently require increased security arrangements for the assets

that they are being asked to insure, or in the extreme, refuse to offer cover.

Conversely, insurers may give discounted premiums and excesses on plantand equipment that is more securely protected and stored.

There is a growing realisation among plant owners of the enormous costs

to business of plant theft. The financial costs are not simply limited to

the value of the stolen item itself, but can also represent numerous other

indirect costs which, because of their nature, are not always covered by

insurance. Furthermore, for the victim of plant theft the experience can

be traumatic and prove extremely inconvenient with respect to business

operations.

In view of this, it is essential that plant hirers, owners and operators are to

some extent informed on the subject of plant theft, so that they may take

whatever action is reasonably practicable to minimise their chances of

becoming a victim. They need to understand the basics of the plant theft

process, including how and why their plant may be vulnerable to theft, and

what measures they can take to prevent or deter such theft. They also need

to know what to do in the event of theft, including both reporting the theft

and recovering the plant.

Introduction

1

Introduction

1The term plant and equipment embraces an almost limitless group of mechanical tools, including for

example, excavators, face shovels, tracked and wheeled loaders, dumpers, rollers, generators, drillingequipment, access equipment, mechanical hand tools and so on. For ease of reading throughout thisguide therefore, the shortened term plant will often be used but should be perceived by the reader,where appropriate, as potentially referring to all these types of plant and equipment. For similar reasons,the singular term thief should also, as appropriate, be perceived as referring to all parties to a theft, forexample, where the act of theft might involve an organised gang comprising several members.


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There are currently many types of plant security system available, offering

varying levels of theft prevention, as well as an equally broad array of theft

recovery systems, all of which can take a long time to research and assess.

To help offset this situation, this guide provides a useful resource for the

busy practitioner, presenting an overview of the issues associated withplant theft and also some of the technologies relating to theft prevention

and recovery. Remember however that the guide is only an overview and

readers must consult specific agencies, anti-theft consultants or specialist

manufacturers, as appropriate, before acting upon any recommendations

contained within it.

The following chapters make up this guide:

The Plant Theft Process

This chapter reviews the plant theft process, looking briefly at the motive for

theft, the methods that might be used to take plant away from its legitimateowner and some of the markets for stolen plant resale. It is concluded

that plant theft may be perceived as a low risk, high gain crime by some

criminals, where recovery of stolen goods is lower than, for example, stolen

private road vehicles and where the stolen plant might reappear anywhere

in the world.

The Nature and Extent of the Problem

This chapter uses some basic statistics to underline the nature and extent

of plant theft. The annual cost of plant theft in the UK is shown to vary

depending on how it is calculated, but is always a multi-million pound

figure. Excavators are identified as a favourite target item and urban

located building sites as a particularly high risk plant theft environment. It is

concluded that plant theft is a significant problem whether represented in

terms of the numbers of thefts or by the financial value of the items stolen.

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant Theft

This chapter provides a categorisation of the various plant security systems,

followed by a more specific description of the anti-theft and theft-recovery

solutions. It is concluded that a diverse range of solutions is available and

that specialist advice and close consultation with manufacturers may be

called for, in seeking to choose an optimum system for a given plant itemand / or a given working or plant storage environment.

The guide also provides bibliographic details of reference sources used in

its compilation, along with a comprehensive alphabetical listing of where

additional information may be found.

It is reiterated at this point that OPERC does not endorse or specifically

recommend any of the products or services referred to in this guide and

that any reference to a commercial organisation, product or service is for

information or educational purposes only.

Introduction

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Understanding the Theft Process

Plant theft is a series of processes which begin with identification by

the thief of the plant item to be stolen and conclude with its resale (or

redeployment). The relationship between these processes is shown

sequentially in Figure 1.


Figure 1 The Plant Theft Process


Thief identifies appropriate item,or sees opportune item to steal

Resale method is mainly dependent upon

plant type - from simple auction orblack market to existing well establishedinternational criminal networks

To the point of resale (or redeployment*).Method depends upon size of asset and

whether item is destined for UK or overseas

Preparation for resale(or redeployment*) is carried out

(e.g. removal of identifying marks or features)

Plant is transported away for processing.

Easier for smaller items, but may requiretrailer, low-loader etc. for larger plant

For self-propelled plant, activation is made(e.g. of the engine and hydraulics)

Access to (e.g. the place of storage),or into (e.g. for self-propelled plant)

the item is made

RESALE(or redeployment*)

TRANSPORTATION/

SHIPPING

PROCESSING

REMOVAL

ACTIVATION

ACCESS

IDENTIFICATION

3

*Redeployment means that the item was stolen to be redeployed elsewhere and not

necessarily stolen to be sold on.


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Table 1 Stolen Plant Recovery Statistics: as Reported by TERin Support of the Police for the Period 2004 to

2006 Inclusive

Plant Type Percentage (%) of all Recoveries

2004 2005 2006

Telehandlers 33 10 17

Excavators 31 50 40

Trailers 18 24 26

Dumpers 8 2 2

Tractors 4 3 n/a

Rollers 3 4 4

Undefined other items 3 7 11

Why Steal Plant and Equipment?

It is implicit that the motive for theft of any kind is dishonest financial gain

and this applies equally to the taking of plant and equipment. It has been

suggested that thieves see plant theft as a low risk (i.e. lesser chanceof being caught), high gain (i.e. in terms of financial returns) crime. This

perception is somewhat borne out by the statistic for recovery of stolen

plant which is estimated to be between five to ten per cent of items

(depending on what source of data is used); compared for example, to 70

per cent for stolen private vehicles (Construction Manager, 2005).

Based on recovery statistics of stolen plant made during the period 2004

to 2006 as reported by The National Plant and Equipment Register (TER),

Table 1 illustrates that the probability of recovery will vary significantly

dependent upon plant type. The table also shows that recovery rates for

types of plant item may vary from year to year.

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Who Steals Plant and Equipment?

Those responsible for carrying out plant theft may be broadly categorised

as being either opportunist thieves or professional thieves.

Opportunist ThievesOpportunist thieves will mainly steal on impulse taking, for example, plant

that has been left unattended or that has few or no security measures

attached to it and therefore represents a soft target. Very often they will

take equipment laying around on construction sites or that which has been

left momentarily unattended by the highway (for example, by utility service

workers). Workers who leave plant in such a way are failing to implement

even fundamental security measures and the opportunist thief will always

be on the lookout to capitalise on this.

Opportunist thieves will target those assets which are easiest to steal

and which equally, are easiest and quickest to sell on. They are mainly

responsible for the theft of smaller equipment (such as hand-held tools,

breakers, small electrical generators etc.), trailer mounted items (such as

traffic signal systems and pneumatic generators) and the more commonly

used plant items (which by definition therefore are also the types of item

that offer the greatest prospect of a quick resale).

These types of thieves will steal anything that presents them with the

opportunity, which although beyond the remit of this guide, might also

include construction materials or other non-plant items.

Professional ThievesProfessional thieves represent the most significant threat to the theft of

higher value plant and equipment. They are normally organised criminals

(individuals, gangs and networks) often with well established links to

national and foreign crime syndicates.

Many professional criminals have spent their lifetime in the trade,

developing their expertise and expanding their contacts with fellow

criminals (BSIA, 2005). They tend to target the larger, more expensive

items often for export and resale and often in accordance with specific

purchaser requirements. This is why professional thieves are largely

responsible for the international stolen to order theft of plant, which, due

to the complexities of its removal, transport and processing, is very often

backed up by a considerable criminal organisation.

The money generated by professional criminal activity is thought to help

support a vast array of additional illegal activities ranging from other types

of organised crime to the funding of illegal organisations. It has even been

suggested that professional theft may also be funding terrorism(Gerrard, 2006).


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6

How Plant and Equipment is Removed

The ingenuity of the thief has brought about many methods for the removal

of plant, whether it be from a storage container, a storage compound or the

actual site upon which a larger item is working, for example, from where itis parked. As a result of this, it would be folly for any owner to consider that

their plant is either too small or irrelevant, or conversely, too cumbersome

or large to be stolen. However, it is the case that the smaller the plant,

the greater the risk, mainly because of its ease of movement (Smith and

Walmsley, 1999).

Equipment such as unattended power tools and road breakers can most

easily be taken, as a thief can simply place them in the back of a car or van

and drive off within seconds. Similarly, items of towed equipment, such as

trailer-mounted generators and compressors are relatively easily hitched

to any vehicle with a towing facility and in such circumstances, can be very

quickly removed from site. Small earthmoving plant such as micro diggers,

mini diggers and self propelled barrows, are generally taken by picking

up the plant item in its entirety, often using a lorry mounted knuckle boom

crane (e.g. HIAB). They can then be placed upon a trailer, or the bed of a

lorry, for easy removal.

If a plant item can be accessed and started, it may be loaded under its

own power onto an awaiting trailer or if it is a road-going vehicle, it may

simply be driven along the highway to a place where it will be processed

prior to resale. Larger plant items can also be transported by a variety of

other means including within cargo and shipping containers, within open or

closed cargo deck lorries and on other specialist transport such as low-

loaders.

The fact that thieves identify the opportunity and have the confidence to

take such large plant items bears testament to the poor levels of security

that are often associated with them. It also reinforces the apparent ease

with which theft can sometimes be carried out. Fortunately, there is much

an owner or operator can do to change this situation and we look at this in

more detail later in this guide.

Plant Theft via Fraudulent HireWith plant security systems and other forms of deterrent becoming more

prominent and effective, one of the latest ways that plant and equipment is

stolen is through fraudulent hire. This is normally performed by professional

gangs and the scam is targeted at plant hire companies.

First, the gang sets up and registers a bogus company. They then proceed

to build up a credit history and payment record for that company based on

small purchases and legitimately paid invoices. At this point, they will hire

a substantial quantity of plant from a hire company (or companies) only to

then disappear without trace.



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7

For this type of criminal activity, deterrents are not effective. What is

required is thorough checks on new companies that apply to hire largeplant items (for example, to consider credit history, size of previous credit

purchases, settlement history, company age etc.). References should alsobe sourced by the hire company prior to releasing any equipment to such

previously unknown customers.

Note also, that if the hire company installs protection to its fleet by wayof tracking equipment, this should not be disclosed to any other parties

and in particular, to anyone hiring the plant!

The Stolen Plant Market

Because of the high capital cost of new plant and its much lower (i.e.depreciated) residual value as it ages, there is quite understandably a

legitimate national and international market in used plant and equipment. It

is not uncommon therefore, for plant to spend the latter part of its working

life in other (often developing) countries, helping to improve infrastructure or

assisting in agricultural operations. Unfortunately, parallel to this legitimate

trade, is its illegal counterpart in stolen plant and equipment.

Put simply, stolen UK plant is destined for one of either two markets. The

first is the home market, where (typically the smaller) items circulate within

the used-equipment sector, usually after having had their original identity

erased or altered in some way. The second is the export market and a verysignificant amount of stolen UK plant ends up overseas (Gardner et al,

2002).

Stolen plant is exported to numerous locations around the world, including

via the following trafficking routes:

q from England, to Ireland, to Africa, to the Middle East and Cyprus;

q from England, to Ireland via France;

q from the UK via sea direct to Eastern Europe;

q from the UK through Western Europe, on to Eastern Europe;

q from the UK to Western Europe via Ireland; and

q from the UK to Western Europe, to the Balkans, Greece, The Middle

East, and Africa (TER, 2004).

Clearly, in view of the global market for stolen plant and equipment the

demand for these illicit products is always going to exist. This in turn

indicates that there will always be a financial motive to encourage this

type of theft; so the problem is not simply going to go away. It is therefore

a significant responsibility of plant owners (and others) to take whateveraction they can to minimise their possibility of becoming another victim.



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8


Summary

Plant theft can be considered as a series of several processes:

identification, access, activation, removal, processing, transportation and

resale (or redeployment).

The fundamental motive for plant theft is easy financial reward.

Furthermore, and partly because of the relatively low recovery rates

associated with stolen plant, this type of crime is sometimes perceived by

thieves as a low risk, high gain activity.

Thieves are very ingenious and will steal anything from the smallest hand

tool to the largest of mechanical earthmoving plant, so anyone who owns

such items is at risk of becoming a victim of plant theft.

In general, thieves are either opportunist (being typically amateurs who

act mainly on impulse, given an easy opportunity to steal) or professional

(being typically much more organised and also possibly operating in

established networks at home and abroad).

There are many ways in which plant may be removed for processing andresale, including in the back of a van (for smaller plant items), by being

towed away, loaded onto a trailer or if road-going, by being driven alongthe highway.

Stolen plant is destined for sale either on the used equipment market at

home or, as is generally the case with larger more expensive items, on theinternational network of stolen goods that may end up just about anywhere

in the world. Such a vast market looks set to ensure that the demand forstolen plant will long continue.


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9


The Costs of Plant Theft

As demonstrated in Figure 2, the total cost of having a plant item stolen

includes both the direct costs of the theft, i.e. the value of the stolen item,

and also some of the other indirect costs associated with its loss.


Figure 2 The Costs of Plant Theft

Even by the lowest estimates, the total value of plant theft within the UK

is many millions of pounds. However, this value can vary significantly

depending on exactly how it is calculated and/or the source and nature of

those data used in the calculations, such as whether new replacement cost

or residual plant value is used.

...TO WHICH MIGHT BE ADDED ANY COMBINATION OF...

These are often more obscure and relate particularly to the owner or operators

business. For example:

Emergency costs (e.g. repair damage to plant storage area)

Short term hire of replacement plant

Loss of productivity and output

Increased labour to recover negative impact on work programme

Other negative impact on business (e.g. client goodwill)

Administration of the process (e.g. dealing with police, reporting or recovery)

Insurance policy excess and increased insurance premiums

Social costs such as trauma, de-motivation and stress

This is the value of the stolen plant item which may be expressed in several

ways. For example:

Its replacement (i.e. new-for-old) value

Its residual (i.e. depreciated) value

THE LESS OBVIOUS OR INDIRECT COSTS

THE OBVIOUS OR DIRECT COST


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The value of plant theft as reported to the UK National Plant and

Equipment Register(TER) for the period 200304 was 36.8 million, an

increase of 1.8 million on the previous year (TER, 2004). The equivalent

value based upon 2005 statistics showed a further rise, of approximately

13 per cent, reaching 43 million (TER, 2006A). Some encouragement wasprovided by the 2006 data, as TER reported a decrease in thefts for the first

time since their records began in 1995; this decrease was 18 per cent (as

compared to the preceding year), with the total value of items stolen being

31.5 million (TER, 2007).

A total value as anecdotally [sic] stated by the (then) Policing and

Reducing Crime Unit of the Home Office, was put at as much as 1 billion

per annum in 1997 (Smith and Walmsley,1999). Note that not all plant and

equipment is registered with the TER database so their particular estimates

do not necessarily represent the entire value of plant theft within Great

Britain for any given period, whereas one would reasonably infer that thefigure provided by the Home Office does attempt to quantify the gross value

of such losses (i.e. including indirect costs).

As alternative comparisons, the (then) Police Scientific Development

Branch (now known as the Home Office Scientific Development

Branch) estimated the annual cost of stolen plant to be in excess of 100

million (Gardner et al, 2002). Meanwhile, one particular insurers records

showed that stolen UK construction plant represents a depreciated cost

in excess of 70 million per annum; while also pointing out that the UK

construction sector alone is losing the equivalent of 400 million a yearas a result of indirect theft costs such as loss of business and late delivery

penalties (Allianz and Cornhill, 2005). The earlier cited TER (2007)

document reported that the Home Office estimate the value of plant theft

within the UK to presently stand at 1 million per week (one assumes this is

a direct cost); while recent statistics presented to the Plant Theft Action

Group2 quantified Plant theft costs to be valued at 100 million per year

(Clancy, 2007).

2The Plant Theft Action Group (PTAG) was established by the Home Office but they no longer have

any direct involvement and PTAG has in effect become an industry-led group. Contact details are givenunder Further Information at the end of this guide.

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11


Some Plant Theft Statistics

Based upon previous research, the overall risk of plant theft within the

UK has been quantified in terms of 26 thefts per 1,000 plant units, which

compares to 18 thefts per 1,000 units for motor vehicles, on an analysis of1997 figures (Smith and Walmsley,1999). In view of the longer term upward

trend in plant theft, one might reasonably assume the risk (i.e. probability

of theft or attempted theft) to have increased since that research was

undertaken.

Indeed, over the period 2000 to 2004 inclusive, the total value of thefts

reported to The National Plant and Equipment Register (TER) increased

by approximately 75 per cent (from 21 million in 2000, to 36.8 million in

2004), while the average value of each item of stolen plant increased from

7,500 in 2000 to approximately 10,200 in 2004. By 2005, comparative

statistics showed a further 13 per cent increase in the value of thefts as

compared to 2004 (with a 20 per cent increase in the number of thefts)

to give a figure of 43 million total value (TER, 2006). According to latest

statistics from the same source, total thefts reported during 2006 were

valued at 31.5 million with an average value of 8,900 per stolen asset;

while excavators represented just over one third of these thefts by value, at

almost 12 million (TER, 2007).

Based on the latest annual report (ibid.), the most commonly stolen typesof plant and equipment during 2006, as defined by percentage of total

number of reported thefts, were (in descending order) as follows:

qother(which includes forestry equipment, compaction equipment,loading shovels, skid steers, platforms, pumps, quarrying equipment,

surveying equipment) 31.2% [2005 = 26%, 2004 = 28%];

q trailers 25.5% [2005 = 25%, 2004 = 25%];

qexcavators 22.3% [2005 = 27%, 2004 = 29%];

qquad bikes 7.4% [2005 = 6%, 2004 = n/a];

qdumpers 6.6% [2005 = 7%, 2004 = 6%];

qrollers 5.6% [2005 = 5%, 2004 = 4%]; and

qbreakers 4.4% [2005 = 4%, 2004 = 4%].

[Percentages shown in square brackets are corresponding 2005 and 2004

figures for comparison purposes].

Noteworthy from these statistics, is that excavators (here the definition

of which includes all classes such as hydraulic, midi, mini and backhoe

loaders) accounted for almost half of the total theft value in 2004 and 2005and almost 38 per cent of theft value in 2006.


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Smith and Walmsley (1999) reported on research that was undertaken to

assess the risk, cost and nature of plant theft within the construction sector.

(Their definition of plant was limited to self propelled machinery or that

which required towing and so did not include therefore, items such as hand

tools, breakers or road drills).

They found that most construction plant was taken from urban areas and

that 15 per cent of all thefts were from the roadside (refer to the discussion

about opportunist thieves in the preceding chapter). After becoming a victim

of theft, approximately two-thirds of plant owners then went on to buy new,

replacement plant items of which two-thirds of these purchases were

supported by insurance claims and of which approximately half of these

claimants subsequently witnessed a rise in their insurance premiums. While

considering this latter aspect in terms of cost to theft victims, insurance

policy excesses might also be considered, which for large plant items can

represent quite substantial sums.

Their research generally found that security relating to plant and equipment

within the construction industry was very poor, with building sites in

particular being cited as the places of plant operation with least security

measures (see advice on site security in the next chapter for indication

of how this might be addressed in practice). Conversely, it was found

that depots of various types were found to have better levels of security,

including measures such as closed-circuit television monitoring.

Regardless of their source, plant theft statistics certainly confirm the extentof the problem to industry and the enormity of this in financial terms to

business was outlined earlier. However, the reader is reminded that any

calculated value of theft depends upon numerous factors, but principally:

q the nature of the plant cost or value data used, for example, whether

the value of a stolen item is expressed as new-for-old replacement

value (purchase cost) or whether its depreciated residual value

is stated; and

q the defined calculation parameters, for example, whether the directcosts alone are considered or whether (and to what extent)

other indirect business costs are included in any calculation of losses.


12


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Summary

The overall risk of plant theft has previously been quantified as 26 thefts

per 1,000 plant units. The general (longer term) trend has remained upward

and this is borne out partly by the 20 per cent increase in theft numbers

(13 per cent by value) as reported to TER during 2005 (albeit most recent

comparative figures do show a slight decline). The average value of stolen

plant per item also demonstrates a longer term upward trend.

Excavators of various types remain a favourite target for thieves, the extent

of their removal tending to represent between approximately one-third and

almost one-half of the total value of reported thefts over recent years.

Earlier research relating to plant theft within the construction sector

identified urban areas as presenting a higher risk and in particular buildingsites. Plant and equipment security generally within this sector has been

noted to be lacking.

Combined, these high levels of theft represent significant financial losses,

the quantum of which can vary significantly depending upon the method of

calculation employed.


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Using the Plant Theft Process to Apply Security

As discussed previously (refer to Figure 1), plant theft can be considered

as a series of separate processes. For each of these processes, there are

some obvious actions which can be taken to help make the act of theft

more difficult, and as a result, minimise the risk of theft occurring3. Some

examples of these actions are as follows.

If the identification by a thief of a suitable plant item can be avoided,

then the temptation, particularly for opportunist theft, is removed altogether.

Arguably, the simplest example of this is to lock smaller items of plant

securely away and out of view. Along similar lines, it should be an objective

to deny access to plant, for example to the site where it is stored in the

case of smaller equipment, or to the cab or the controls in the case of

larger self-propelled plant. In the latter respect, Figure 3 shows a tracked

excavator that has been parked with all cab access points covered and

locked up. Not only does this make access more difficult, but it also affords

some protection to window glass.

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and

Equipment Theft

How to Minimise the Risk of Plant and Equipment Theft

Figure 3 An Example of Preventing Access to the Cab

3Note here, that it is important to balance between continually developing technological responses to

plant theft (some of which are discussed later); and more simple good practice in the managementof plant to, from and whilst employed on site. That is, even in those situations where it would not befeasible or practical to implement emerging technologies, good management can often reduce thethreat of plant theft with minimal time and cost.


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The removal of stolen plant through its activation (if carried out) and

transportation, might be hampered by physically locking the item in

place or by the use of other physical barriers to its movement. Methods

of immobilisation may also be considered for this purpose and tracking

systems, whilst not impeding the act of physical movement, have obviousbenefits here too particularly real time tracking methods that can identify

transportation routes.

Preparation of the stolen plant for resale or redeployment during the

processing stage, can be made more difficult for the thief by the use of

distinct identifying marks and other traceable features. These features

may be overt or covert and anything that adds time and inconvenience to

the processing stage might deter the thief from taking the asset in the first

place (which is why warning labels are used with covert or hidden systems).

Intervention during transportation of a stolen asset to the point of resale or

redeployment might be possible, but this is principally the responsibility of

police and other authorities.

The method ofresale will depend on whether the plant is to be sold in the

home or export market. Professional thieves may have a well established

international network into which they feed their stolen goods and again,

any intervention here is principally the remit of national and international

authorities. Within the UK, smaller plant items in particular may surface for

resale in auctions, private sales, newspapers or the trade press.

Categorising Security Systems

Although there are many different types of security system, they can

generally be classified as either deterrent systems, preventative systems or

recovery systems.

Deterrent SystemsThese types of system aim to make plant less appealing to a thief, usually

by reducing its anonymity. This might be achieved by making a plant item

more instantly recognisable with overt or covert features. Alternatively, it

may be possible to increase the awareness of an ongoing theft, because

of distinct, recognisable livery or by locking the plant item into a strange

configuration that would make it look odd if it were being moved or

transported. Deterrent systems do not always directly affect the operation

or ease of removal of a plant item, but tend to increase its individuality.


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Deterrent systems often work by making an asset and its component parts

traceable to their legitimate owner for longer than would be the case, were

such systems not employed. A thief would much rather steal an unmarked,

unregistered plant item, of which there are thousands similar, in preference

to an item covered in many forms of covert and overt markings, which istherefore more easily identifiable.

Deterrent systems include distinct corporate livery, tagging methods,

audible alarms, plant registration schemes and covert marking.

Preventative SystemsThese systems aim to insert a barrier of some kind between the thief and

their need to activate, or physically remove, a plant item. This may be

achieved in a variety of ways such as by:

q preventing the operation of one or more critical parts of the plant (e.g.

the power source or a sub-system such as a hydraulic pump);

q providing a physical barrier between the thief and the item (i.e. to make

the plant inaccessible); or

q employing some other physical method to prevent its removal (e.g. by

locking the item in place).

Preventative systems include locks, chains, lockable storage containers or

compounds, barriers, key activated systems and immobilisers.

Recovery SystemsRecovery systems are not anti-theft devices in themselves, but rather,

their purpose is to increase the likelihood of recovery of stolen plant items.

Typically, they are covertly installed, tracking and location finding devices.

Distinct markings and registration schemes can be used in conjunction with

location finders in order to definitively confirm that a recovered plant item

has been stolen and / or to identify its owner. Such an approach combines

the deterrent system with the recovery system.

The most effective plant security systems will generally comprise a

combination of all three of the above classifications. That is, they deter,

prevent and, if necessary, aid recovery.

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Specific Anti-theft and Theft-recovery Systems

The following discussion provides further detail on specific forms of plant

security system and the method(s) by which these systems are designed

to work in practice. The systems discussed are personalisation, marking,registration schemes, alarms, immobilisers and recovery devices.

Wherever possible, trade or brand names have not been used in the

discussion but contact details of numerous manufacturers (of these types

of anti-theft system) may be found at the end of this guide under Further

Information. Note that, where appropriate, processional security advice

should always be sought, for example when making purchasing decisions.

Two good starting points in this respect are Thatcham (see: http://www.

thatcham.org/) and Sold Secure (see: http://www.soldsecure.com/) who

perform testing and provide ratings for security products.

PersonalisationPersonalisation refers to any modification made to a plant item whichdistinguishes it in some way from its mass-produced, standardised

equivalent. Personalisation is a mechanism by which to make a givenitem much more readily identifiable, or traceable, to its legitimate owner.

Any such distinguishing features would of course need to be removed bythieves prior to resale and this requirement makes the processing aspect

of plant theft more difficult. With so many standard machines in use (andhence available to be stolen), personalisation might significantly help to

reduce the risk of theft.

Perhaps the easiest method of marking plant is to personalise its livery.

This could for example include the addition of several highly visibleinstances of the company name, company logo and telephone contact

number. Not only are these a deterrent to thieves but they also give theadded bonus of providing a form of company advertising.

Personalised plant paint schemes are the most visible of identificationmethods. Their use also adds significant difficulty to stolen plant

processing as they will normally demand a total re-spray of the asset.

Many plant manufacturers now offer a service to supply new plant inany colour scheme and many large utility and construction companieshave taken advantage of this facility. In addition to the advertising

aspect mentioned above, personalised paint schemes may also form acomponent of corporate branding.


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MarkingLegitimate items of plant are marked as standard with a 17 digit VehicleIdentification Number (VIN) orProduct Identification Number (PIN). An

example of a typical manufacturers plant identification plate showing suchinformation as the VIN, engine serial number, transmission serial number

and year of manufacture is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Typical Manufacturers VIN Plate

Because VIN and PIN numbers are located in the same places on a given

type of plant item, criminals soon learn of these locations and hence

the numbers can more easily be removed or modified. It is therefore a

worthwhile security measure to add VIN or PIN identities in a number of

further visible and / or hidden locations.

Figure 5 shows a mini excavator having additional identification numbers

affixed to it in various places, using a deep imprint stamping method.

Taking actions such as this will increase the amount of work required by

thieves during processing to remove the additional identification, as well as

providing more chance of confirming the legitimate owner of a recovered

stolen item. Furthermore, evidence of identification numbers having

previously been removed (e.g. ground out) on a machine might give cause

for checking that it is not stolen.


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The marking of plant can be further classified into one of three types,

these being overt marking, concealed marking and covert marking. We will

consider each of these in a little more detail.

q Overt markings are intentionally clearly visible. Factory installed

markings include product identification plates and engraved

markings on major components. In addition to these standard markings

it is possible to add additional overt ones. These include adhesive strips

to warn potential thieves that the plant has extra covert markings, asset

labels bonded to the machine and the etching of VIN / PIN numbers

onto vehicle glass (in a similar way to that used for etching registration

numbers onto private cars see Figure 6).

20

Figure 5 Adding Identification to an Excavator Using DeepImprint Stamping

Figure 6 Overtly Etched Glass Highlighted within a Warning Sign



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qConcealed-markings are additional VIN and PIN numbers that

manufacturers affix to plant in concealed locations, in case overt

numbers are destroyed or otherwise become unreadable (for example

due to everyday wear and tear). Their location is only revealed to

authorised organizations (i.e. with a genuine interest), such as plantrecovery companies or law enforcement agencies. Several specialist

companies offer a service to install extra concealed-marking using

a combination of stamping, etching and engraving. The exact locations

for a specific asset are stored on a secure database (see later) with the

information only made available to legitimate parties. Figures 7 and 8

show examples of how typical warning labels can be affixed to

a plant item to confirm that it has had concealed-marking applied to it.

In this context, the labels themselves become a deterrent.

Figure 7 Example of a Concealed-marking Warning Label: Clearly Visibleon an Excavator Arm

Figure 8 Example ofa Concealed-marking

Warning Label: With

Security Etching in a

Concealed Position

qCovert marking uses technology that is extremely difficult to detect

and equally as difficult to remove, as a means of personalising plant.

This method is also ideally used in conjunction with overt asset warning

labels (as above) to act as a deterrent to thieves. A typical systememploys a coded microchip transponder or electronic tag that

is hidden inside a component of the asset. Each tag is pre-programmed

with a unique serial number and because they are so small they are

virtually impossible to find. Identity tags are but one method of

covert plant identification a range of additional methods are listed in

Table 2.


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Arguably, the covert marking of plant coupled with suitable overt warning

of its presence might have the most significant effect on discouraging theft.

This combination reduces the risk (i.e. it puts the thief off stealing the item

in the first place) while also increasing the likelihood of recovery should the

item indeed be stolen (by making it identifiable and traceable to its owner).

PRACTICAL NOTE

Professional installation of covert marking is the most effective method of ensuring

thorough application, although for smaller plant items, DIY kits are available to do this.

A useful system for vehicle security is considered to be microdots, which each hold

upon their surface laser-etched plant owner information (see Figure 9). The use of

radio frequency tags is unregulated, with different manufacturers using different

frequencies, which requires the police forces to have numerous different detectors.

Table 2 Covert Marking Methods

Method Description

Micro-dotting

Microdots are less than 1mm in diameter. Upon them theyshow identifying information such as a unique ID numberfor the asset, the asset owners company name and contactinformation. Micro dots are applied by means of a spray(within special adhesives) or they may form a constituentof paint. They are detected by use of ultra-violet light andthe information on them is read using a microscope or other

(mobile) high-powered magnification method.

DNA Tagging

This is very similar to the concept of micro dotting butmuch more difficult to remove entirely from a plant item. Itcomprises synthetic DNA that has been encoded with thelegitimate plant owners details. It is so difficult to removebecause a trace will always remain in crevices and / or upon

rough surfaces to which it has been applied.

Chemical Tracing

This involves application to the plant item of a uniquechemical compound, that when forensically identified can beused to confirm the items owner. It is similar in many waysto DNA tagging and almost impossible to remove completelyfrom an asset to which it has been applied.

Radio FrequencyTags

This is a small device containing a microchip and an aerialwith identifying data stored on it. It can be installed inlocations that are hard to get at, such that it means they arevery time-consuming to remove. The microchip is read witha special hand-held electronic scanner designed for thatpurpose.

Radio FrequencyRead/Write Tags

Similar in many ways to radio frequency tags, but theinformation on the microchip can be modified by specialistmeans, thereby allowing plant identifying details to be keptup-to-date (for example, where change of asset ownership, orchange of contact details occurs).

Stamping/Etching

Additional identification numbers are applied in hiddenplaces by more simple or traditional methods. Records ofthese numbers and locations are kept secure on file, forfuture reference to help identify stolen plant.


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Figure 9 Example of the Type of Information Held on a Microdot

Registration SchemesThe use of manufacturer applied VIN and PIN markings (and any other

proprietary marking systems) can only be used to effectively identify a

stolen plant item if a suitable audit trail for these types of identifier exists.

Currently there is no single, central register (similar to that of the Driver

and Vehicle Licensing Agency in the UK for road going vehicles) that holds

details of (for example), all plant VIN and PIN numbers, registered owners

and marking system(s). Instead, there are numerous individual databases

holding such information with many of the covert marking system

manufacturers maintaining their own databases as well4.

The CESAR scheme5 is a recently launched registration scheme that also

combines identifying technologies to any asset registered with it (e.g. visible

ID plate, RF tags and DNA coding) (Anon, 2007).

The various types of database that are available can be categorised as:

registration databases, marking databases and manufacturer databases.

q Registration databases are maintained commercially in return for

an initial registration fee and / or an annual fee. They typically

comprise a record of the subscribing legitimate owner and their plant

item(s), while the information held may include such things as

photographs, the VIN number and make / model details. Should

the item be stolen (and the database organisation informed)it will be highlighted as being so on the database. Subsequently,

interested parties such as auctioneers or sellers, potential buyers and

law enforcement agencies may contact the database organisation to

check if a specific plant item is listed as stolen.

4Smith and Walmsley (1999) did however point out that arguably the most comprehensive database of

stolen plant items is that held on the Police National Computer. However, for reasons of the way thedatabase is structured and the way therefore that data are entered onto it (for example, stolen plantitems are sometimes misclassified due to their specialist nature of intended application), it has beensuggested that it can be difficult to abstract meaningful data from that database for research purposes.5CESAR: The Construction Equipment Security and Registration Scheme.


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Limitations of the system include that not all plant is listed on such

databases; that a database is only as good as the accuracy of those

data held within it (e.g. data require updating where ownership changes

or items are scrapped); and that their effectiveness relies upon people

using the facility (e.g. to check if an item is listed as stolen prior to itspurchase). Some companies charge a fee for access to this kind of

data which may also discourage the systems optimal widespread

take-up and use.

q Marking databases contain information to link details of covert

marking systems to legitimate owners. The contact information for

these database organisations is generally provided on Warning

decals provided on the plant item, such as on windows or in the

operators cab (refer to Figures 6 and 7 earlier). These types of

database tend only to hold information for specific commercial

products, for example, a covert transponder manufacturer will

maintain its own database of its customers and their plant items.

Figure 10 shows a specimen registration document for an excavator

that has been entered onto a marking database. This example entry

identifies the exact locations of where the excavator has been

stamped, etched and engraved. It also shows that this plant item has

an electronic tag and that it has had microdots applied to it as well.

Figure 10 Specimen Marking Database Registration Document



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q Manufacturer databases are sometimes maintained by other

commercial third-parties and comprise VIN and PIN information on

the first owners of the plant (and sometimes subsequent ones where

they are kept updated)

PRACTICAL NOTES

The National Plant and Equipment Register database facility liaises fully with police

forces and is a point of contact to check if any plant or equipment (e.g. that you propose

to buy) is stolen. See: http://www.ter-europe.org/.

A recent registration initiative (launched April 2007) is the Construction Equipment

Security and Registration Scheme (CESAR). Lead organiser is the Construction

Equipment Association. See: http://www.coneq.org.uk.

AlarmsThe main purpose of any alarm system is to raise awareness of an attempt

to steal the item to which it has been fitted; either as a way of summoning

help and / or of scaring the thief away. The system may be overt, in which

case it may also act as a deterrent prior to attempted theft, or it may be

hidden and designed to go off with an element of surprise if activated

during the theft process. With respect to larger plant and equipment, alarms

are usually activated when the operator cab is accessed illegitimately.

Alarms are typically audible, although alternative and more sophisticated

systems can send a signal when set off, for example, to a mobile phone.

One failing of alarms is that people might simply ignore them even whenthe alarm signals that a theft really is occurring. Another disadvantage is

that plant often operates in remote rural locations so an audible alarm used

in these conditions (i.e. one that cannot be heard by anyone) will provide

little deterrent.

Once fitted, a good alarm system should be hard to detect or overcome

and be able to resist attack for a minimum of six minutes.

Immobilisers

The fundamental purpose of immobilisers is to prevent the activation ofone, or more, systems on a plant item, such as the engine, a hydraulic

system, an electrical system or any combination of these. This in turn

prevents the item from, for example, being started, operated or moved. In

the case of self-propelled plant, immobilisation also avoids transportation

under the equipments own power or its self-propelled loading onto another

vehicle (such as a low-loader) for removal.

Methods of immobilisation may be categorised under the three groupings

of electronic immobilisers, hydraulic immobilisers and mechanical

immobilisers.


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q Electronic immobilisers work on electrical systems within the item to

which they are fitted and resultantly deactivate things such as brakes,

steering or other essential plant controls. As plant technology becomes

more advanced and the use of electronic engine management systems

becomes more commonplace (encouraged also by the need to reduceengine emissions), there is increasing scope for the use of these

electronic systems, to operate (or not, to be more precise!) and act as

immobilisers to completely disable plant. The type of immobiliser

selected must be able to withstand the extremities of exposure and the

general wear and tear inflicted upon it, as a result of the harsh

operating environments within which plant tends to work. The plant

owner should therefore be aware that although there are a large

range of immobilisers available, many would be unsuitable for this type

of exposure. Consultation with a specialist supplier is advised.

q Hydraulic immobilisers operate by immobilising the hydraulic systemthat typically controls the movement of backhoes, loading shovels and

a variety of other appendages. These types of immobiliser can also be

employed to lock equipment in a certain posture such that it becomes

difficult to transport or, because of the way it is locked in position, will

look suspicious if the plant is being moved by a thief. Both electronic

and hydraulic immobilisers are installed and become an integral part

of the plant item. Normally they are operated by the use of keys, coded

keypads or small radio frequency tags (for example on plant key rings).

q Mechanical immobilisers work by physically restraining part of a plant

item. Common methods include physical (lockable) restraints forhydraulic rams, booms, tracks, legs and wheels. Though very often

simple in design, they can be highly effective and particularly suited

to smaller plant that normally lack more sophisticated systems such

as concealed immobilisers (and equally, physical mechanical locks

are typically less suitable for larger plant because their required larger

size would make them difficult to use and move manually). Mechanical

immobilisers are also more capable of preventing the lifting (for

removal) or towing away of smaller plant items. A range of mechanical

immobilisers is described in further detail, in Table 3.

26

PRACTICAL NOTESElectronic and hydraulic immobilisation systems are perhaps better suited to mediumor larger sized plant and equipment where mechanical immobilisation is impractical(due to the physical size and hence weight of the devices required).

The use of mechanical immobilisers must be well managed. Operators must befully trained in their use and be encouraged to apply them in practice! If the dailyinstallation of mechanical immobilisers is forgotten or neglected by an operator, thentheir effectiveness is removed altogether.



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Immobiliser Type Features

Tracklock

A device that is suited to mini or midi sized tracked plant. Itis fitted to inhibit the movement of the tracks and can be usedto secure the plant item to a trailer or some other large secureor heavy object using a security chain.

Trailerlock/Hitchlock

These immobilise trailers or trailer-mounted plant such aselectricity generators and air compressors, by preventing theuse of the hitching mechanism. They can also accommodatea security chain to anchor the device to some other object asdescribed for the Tracklock.

Ramlock

This is fitted to a fully extended hydraulic ram, therebypreventing the movement of the rams hydraulic piston. It

is generally installed on the steering ram. (Note: a ramlockcan become difficult and cumbersome to use on larger plantitems).

Wheel Clamp

A highly effective means of securing wheel-mountedmachines (similar to those used for illegal parking of roadgoing vehicles). There are modified / reinforced versions forcommercial use.

Leglock

This locks the stabiliser leg(s) in a lowered position by meansof a mechanism installed to the leg. This way a vehicle cannotbe moved (until the leg is raised again). Generally consideredeffective and easy to use.

Table 3 Some Types of Mechanical Immobilisers and TheirTypical Application

Recovery DevicesTracking and recovery systems provide accurate location of plant via radio,satellite and cellular technologies. These kinds of device are an aid to crime

detection rather than crime prevention and because of their effectiveness,

they should be very seriously considered for the higher risk or more costly

plant items.

Trackers can either be remotely activated after a theft, or be proactive

whereby movement or geofence violations cause the tracker to activate

automatically. Information may then be accessed via a PC, laptop or mobile

phone. More sophisticated systems utilise Secure Operating Centres (SOC)

to provide a 24 hour, 7 days a week, 365 days a year service. These kindsof systems should also attract insurance incentives for plant owners that

use them.

Until recently, there were only two broad forms of tracking device available,

these being radio frequency (RF) transmitters and Global Position System

(GPS) satellite systems. A more recent development utilises the (mobile

phone) Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) location facility.

Devices which combine GSM and RF location are proving exceptionally

effective.


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q Radio frequency transmitters, when activated, emit radio frequency

pulses that can be detected by police forces within the UK (i.e. that are

within the vicinity of a stolen vehicle with an RF transmitter fitted to it) or

in some cases, by the system providers.

q GPS satellite systems offer real-time location of plant fitted with this

kind of device. Upon activation, the monitoring company can determine

the plants location and this can be updated every few seconds to

therefore track plant in transit. GPS plant management systems also

allow owners or plant managers to monitor the current and historic

locations of their fleet. Note however, that GPS systems can be power

hungry and are likely therefore to need wiring into an assets

power supply.

q GSM location systems are benefiting from the increased accuracy

required by directives such as E9116. GSM location also has

advantages over GPS in that the tracking device can be detected

even when hidden undercover or when hidden inside a steel container.

When considering recovery devices, the aspect of transferability is worthy

of some consideration. Many tracking systems cannot be transferred and

in effect have to be written off when the asset to which they are affixed is

changed or replaced. Whilst some systems can be transferred at a cost,

very few can be transferred without cost. Generally, wired tracker systems

cannot be transferred by owners whereas wire free systems can be easier

to install and transfer any time thereafter. The latter are also more difficult

to detect by potential thieves in that there is no wiring, antenna lead orvisible antenna associated with them.

The costs associated with recovery devices have two components. The

first component is the capital cost of the device and any related cost of its

installation. This can typically range from capital cost plus zero installation

cost for some of the no wire interface systems, up to 2,500 (capital cost

plus installation cost) for more complex arrangements. However, exact

figures will of course vary from manufacturer to manufacturer and between

system types.

The second component is annual subscription. This can typically range

from 120 to 500 dependant on the service subscribed to. The fee is

paid to a management company to cover fees, user licenses, monitoring

services and in some cases private finding services. The service provider

will normally contact owners in the event of a theft to initiate and manage

the tracking process.

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6The wireless Enhanced 911 (E911) rules. These deal with improved effectiveness of wireless 911

service and provision of additional information on wireless 911 calls. See: http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/.


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Figure 11 Typical Theft Detection Recovery Report

PRACTICAL NOTE

The National Plant and Equipment Register advice on theft recovery includes to:

qconsider installing tracking and theft recovery systems;

qgive preference to a theft recovery system with an independent power source,

that is also unobtrusive, easily concealed and which can be moved from asset to

asset; and

qonly inform personnel that a theft recovery system has been fitted to an asset (or

any other detail relating to the system such as where it is fitted or what type it is) if

you have to.

Source: TER (2006B, p10).

Specialist tracking services will often use a Secure Operating Centre

(SOC) which generally provides a service 24 / 7, 365 days per year to

monitor and co-ordinate finding and recovery between plant owners, the

police, the insurance company and the find and recovery team. SOCs

can be external to the tracking system provider and will typically also bemonitoring fire and security alarms for banks, businesses and schools etc.

Plant owners that require theft recovery tracking should seek services with

the appropriate SOC quality assurance, such as CE FC ISO 9001 and

certification to NSAI Standard 228.

Detection Recovery Reports are typically used to help administer theft

recovery operations within the SOC, while also providing an event log for

traceability and quality assurance purposes. Figure 11 shows a typical

Detection Recovery Report .


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Source: Based on Smith and Walmsley (1999).

Method Comments

Perimeter Fencing

Secure fencing around the place of work and / or plantstorage to limit access wherever possible. Types of fence canrange from temporary systems to more robust and permanentforms.

Security Lighting

In terms of theft risk, it is safer to store plant in a well lit area.Consideration can be given to using motion-activated securitylighting, which can identify when a person approaches an

asset and may also act as a deterrent.

Closed-circuitTelevision (CCTV)

The cost of CCTV systems has reduced considerably and they can also be combined with computer technology.Wireless, portable CCTV systems are available for internalor external use. Remote access allows video feeds to bemonitored or recorded at a central location, desktop PC,laptop or mobile phone.

Intruder Alarms

These are best suited to semi-permanent and permanentinstallations. Additional configurations include covert systems,immediate police callout, warning phone calls and SMSmessages (when the alarm is activated).

General Access

Security Systems

These tend to be based on lockable access gates,management of personnel movement and good entrance

lighting. May also be combined with CCTV.

Key Security

Keys should always be stored in lockable places and bemanaged such that keys are signed in and out. A separatekey to activate self-propelled plant is desirable to single keysystems.

Security GuardsIf costs permit their use, 24 hour guards represent aconsiderable deterrent against all kinds of intrusion or theft.

Security SignageWell designed and sensibly located signage acts as a visualdeterrent to potential thieves.

Table 4 Examples of How to Improve Site Security

Site Security

In addition to plant-specific anti-theft systems, the security of the site upon

which a plant item is stored or working can have a large impact on the

likelihood of its theft. It is generally accepted that if a plant item is easy toaccess and / or to remove from its place of work or storage, then security

on the item itself is somewhat made redundant.

While it is appreciated that much plant is operated within environments

where more permanent security measures would not be cost effective to

install, there are a number of good practice actions that can be taken to

reduce theft risk. Some of these, as advocated by the Home Office, are

listed in Table 4.


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Installation and Testing of Security Systems

To ensure maximum effectiveness, it is essential that all security systems

are installed exactly as recommended by the system manufacturer and fully

tested prior to their use. Poor installation might impair a systems abilityto operate as designed, or reduce its effective attack time (i.e. reduce

the time a system can withstand attack by a thief attempting to remove or

disable it).

Ideally, wired systems should be installed to Vehicle System Installation

Board (VSIB) requirements, or equivalent. This may be achieved by

using VSIB approved companies or plant manufacturer recommended

companies. An installer must be experienced at fitting systems specifically

in commercial plant, because there is a considerable difference in the

complexity of plant installation in comparison to standard road vehicles, forexample.

Some security system manufacturers have their products tested by

independent testing houses such as Sold Secure orThe Motor Insurance

Repair Research Centre (Thatcham) to gain a category rating (see

Further Information section for website and contact details). This security

rating is based on attack trials which are carried out to establish the types

of attack that a product can withstand and for what period(s) of time it can

withstand them. It must be noted that it is not mandatory for devices to

conform to these standards and manufacturers submit devices for approval

only if they so desire.

What to do if a Theft Occurs

It is difficult to be totally prescriptive as to the actions to take if an item

of plant is stolen, as each site, item of plant and working environment

(etc.) will be different, so specific actions may vary from circumstance

to circumstance. However, there is some basic advice that should be

considered and will apply to most instances.

First, upon realising a theft has occurred, the plant owner (or operator)

should act immediately to set the reporting and administration process

in place. This will involve notifying relevant parties, which will probably

include the police (remember to keep a record of any crime number the

insurance company will normally require this), the asset insurer in the case

of owned plant (or the hirer if the asset has been hired) and the registration

or tracking company, if recovery devices are fitted to the stolen item.


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Regarding the actual scene of the theft, this should be left undisturbed

if possible so that police can investigate it for evidence. Details of any

witnesses should be recorded before they leave the scene and other

relevant information might be noted, such as the approximate time of the

theft, what is believed to have happened and who for example, was the lastperson to see the asset before it was taken.

With respect to the stolen item, it must be appreciated that the police can

only begin to find it, if they have reliable and precise information about

it. Ideally, this will all be listed on the plant registration or identification

document, or from a report generated by an in-house asset database for

example. If no such formal documents exist, then the owner will need to

compile relevant information for the police including:

q machine make and model;

q colour and other distinguishing or identifying features;

q VIN or PIN number;

q other serial numbers if relevant, such as the engine number; and

q a list of any stolen appendages or attachments such as buckets,

breakers or consumables.

This is not necessarily an exhaustive list and generally, too much

information about the item is better than not enough.

In short, in the event of theft occurring:

q act right away;

q inform relevant parties;

q preserve evidence; and

q provide authorities with accurate information on the asset.

Remember to report to all relevant parties should the stolen plant item be

recovered!


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What of the Future?

It is of course prudent for owners and operators to take full advantage of

advancements in anti-theft or theft-recovery technologies; perhaps a most

recent example of this is the use of GSM for asset tracking and locationfinding purposes.

Potential areas for future development may include swipe or electronic

(micro-chipped) keys, fobs or cards to be used for access to plant and

for activation of engines and (electronic, hydraulic) systems; either as a

replacement or as a complement to key-operated security systems. There

may also be scope for biometrics to be applied to access or key systems

where, for example, an individuals personal characteristics (fingerprints,

facial features, hand measurements etc.) may become an essential part of

a plant items activation (e.g. start-up) process.

While as in any subject it is difficult to accurately predict the future, in this

context the overriding aim has to be, that plant and equipment owners

keep ahead of the criminal in applying any advancements in anti-theft

technology.

Summary

There are numerous ways in which plant and equipment can be modified

in order to minimise the risk of theft occurring and / or to maximise theprobability of recovery should theft unfortunately have taken place. These

systems may be broadly defined as deterrent (to deter the temptation of

theft), preventative (to make the act of theft as difficult as possible) and

recovery (to maximise the possibility of recovering stolen items).

Arguably, the best system will comprise a hybrid of all these and should be

installed and tested professionally. In view of the greatly diverse range of

plant and equipment security systems available (and their equally diverse

range of operating environments), systems must be selected with care.

Specialist advice and close consultation with system manufacturers may becalled for.

Should an owner become a victim of theft, general advice is to act right

away, preserve evidence and witnesses, and inform all relevant parties with

accurate asset information.

Plant owners and operators must maintain an awareness of the risk of plant

theft and accordingly, keep ahead of criminals by using any technological

advancements that are made in anti-theft and theft-recovery systems.


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Plant and equipment theft is not only inconvenient for its victims, but in

addition, is normally accompanied by significant negative impact on thevictims business operations, such as delay in work progress, interruption to

productivity and a loss of client goodwill.

The costs of becoming a victim extend beyond simply those of the stolen

plant item. They also include numerous additional indirect costs to the

owners business such as administration of the theft reporting and recovery

process, hire of replacement plant to maintain workflow, insurance excess

payments and increased insurance premiums. There is also a social cost

that might be described in terms of distress or trauma.

While some recent statistics do show a slight downturn in certain plant and

equipment thefts, the extent of the problem remains immense and may be

conveniently stated to represent a direct cost of approximately 1 million

per week within the UK. Indeed, the international demand for stolen plant

looks set to ensure that the risk of theft will always exist. Excavators of all

types remain a favourite target for the thief.

The basic advice therefore, has to be to encourage action on the part of

plant hirers, owners and operators to do all that is reasonably practicable

to:

q try and discourage the thief from taking plant (DETER);

q try and make the process of theft as difficult as possible

(PREVENT); and

q maximise the probability of tracing and identifying stolen items

(RECOVER).

However, it has previously been highlighted that these responsibilities

embrace numerous other parties too, including plant and equipmentmanufacturers, security system manufacturers, the police and insurance

companies. A description of how plant theft can be tackled jointly by all

these stakeholders is shown in Table 5.

Concluding Summary

Conclusion


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Party Responsible Typical Responsibilities

Plant Owners

Keep auditable, secure records of plant (e.g. VIN and PINnumbers); maintain an up-to-date asset database or usea commercial plant registration database; install securitysystems commensurate with the risk (taking into account thework location); pay particular attention to protecting higherrisk plant; be clear as to the lines of responsibility for security;provide adequate advice and support about security andsecurity systems for plant users and operators; engendera security minded approach throughout the workplace.Thoroughly check prospective hire clients and ask forreferences prior to releasing valuable plant.

Plant Operators

Use plant security systems where they are provided in exact

accordance with guidance; observe and contribute to general(e.g. site) security; report suspicious activities or perceivedsecurity risks; take personal responsibility; and comply withemployers security instructions.

Plant and EquipmentManufacturers

Research, continue to develop and engineer-in to plantimproved security measures as inherent features; increasethe marking of equipment and its sub-components withidentifying features.

Security SystemManufacturers

Continue to strive for advancements in anti-theft technologies;ensure good consumer awareness of available systems;encourage use of systems particularly for higher risk asset

plant and equipment theft a practical guide

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