Cover story I West Africa piracy

Despite what others say about piracy in WestAfrica, Chris Trelawny, the senior deputydirector responsible for maritime securityand facilitation at the International MaritimeOrganisation (IMO), the UN specialised agency(writing here in his personal capacity andnotthatofthe IMO), thinks political leadersshould change their mindsets and focus on theopportunities afforded by the maritime sectorand not get unduly distracted by problems suchas piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Piracy inWest Africa:A sypiptomof widerproblems?

R EPORTS IN THE WORLD PRESS WOULD HAVE US BELIEVEthat piracy and armed robbery against ships in theGulf of Guinea have reached epidemic proportions.This perceived threat to the supply of oil from theregion, the adoption of United Nations SecurityGouncil resolutions 2018(2011) and 2039(2012) andthe recent focus on piracy and armed robbery by the EconomicCommunity of Gentral African States (ECCAS), the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf ofGuinea Commission (GGC), to name but a few, have added tothe impression that the threat from these criminals has suddenlystarted to spiral out of control.

But is this really true? Even if it is, is piracy actually the prob-lem or is it a diversion from bigger issues? If the problem isnot piracy, then what are the real problems? And, more impor-tantly, how do we fix them?

Before we go any further, it is important to clarify what theterms "piracy" and "armed robbery against ships" actually mean.The legal definitions are given in the box opposite. However,essentially both are crimes committed by persons in one vesselagainst persons and property in another vessel for the purposeof personal gain.

The main difference between them is that piracy takes placeoutside of a state's jurisdiction, i.e. outside ofthe coastal state'sterritorial waters (12 nautical miles) whereas armed robberyagainst ships takes place within a coastal state's jurisdiction, interritorial waters. Although to the victim the difference may seemirrelevant, the rights and obligations of states to intervene andestablish jurisdiction are critical factors in the response, or lack ofresponse, to these crimes. Put simply, piracy is a universal crimeand all states have an obligation to intervene. Inside territorialwaters, it is the coastal state's responsibility.

16 New African March 2013

us sailors on an anti-piracy patrol stop and board a suspect skiff.What made the skiff suspicious was the number of men onboardwith no obvious legitimate purpose

Table i. Piracy and armed robbery incidentsin West Africa reported to IMOfrom 1 January-31 December 2012CHEMICAL TANKERS

PRODUCT TANKERS

BULK CARRIERS

O I L TANKERS

TANKERS

CONTAINER SHIPS

GENERAL CARGO SHIPS

REFRIGERATED CARGO CARRIERS

OTHERS (VEHICLE CARRIERS, ETC.)

1611

6

5

5

4

4

4

5

Legal definitionsArticle 101 of the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as:

"Any iilegai acts of violence or detention, or any act ofdepredation, committed for private ends by the crewor the passengers of a private ship and directed on thehigh seas, against another ship, or against persons orproperty on board such ship, or against a ship, personsor property in a piace outside the jurisdiction of anyState.Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of aship with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship.Any act of inciting to or of intentionally facilitatingsuch acts."

IMO Assembly resolution A.1025(26) on Code ofPractice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracyand armed robbery against ships offers the followingdefinition:2.2."Armed robbery against ships" means any of thefollowing acts:1. Any illegal act of violence or detention or any actof depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act ofpiracy, committed for private ends and directed againsta ship or against persons or property on board sucha ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagicwaters and territorial sea;2. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating anact described above.

The IMOThe International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is the specialisedagency ofthe UN responsible for all aspects of maritime safety,maritime security (including countering piracy), facilitation ofinternational maritime transport, and protection ofthe marineenvironment. As such, the IMO receives reports of reported andattempted attacks by pirates and armed robbers and publishes themvia its Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS)(http://gisis.imo.org). Whereas nobody would pretend that thestatistics are totally accurate (there is known to be under-reportingof less serious attacks for a variety of reasons), they are useful in-dicators of general trends.

A study ofthe statistics reveals some interesting facts. Forexample, the number of acts of piracy and armed robbery againstships in West Africa reported to the IMO covering the period iJanuary to 31 December 2012 was 60, a drop of 8% compared to 65reported incidents in 2011. Ofthe 60 incidents reported in 2012, 37were attacks on tankers (16 chemical tankers, 11 product tankers,5 oil tankers and 5 tankers, see Tables i and 2).

Of the 554 attacks and attempted attacks in West Africa thathave been reported to IMO over the past 10 years (see Tables ^ and4), just under 20% took place in international waters. It thereforefollows that ovet 80% of these crimes took place within nationaljurisdictions, and even though some ofthe coastal states of WestAfrica lack maritime law enforcement capability, there is no voidof authority, like that in Somalia. So what is not being done?

Piracy and armed robbery against ships are land-based problems.Although the offences take place at sea, the criminals operate frombases ashore and must return to shore to sell their ill-gotten gains.To a certain extent the problem can be deterred or containedthrough action at sea but the only sustainable solutions are goodpolicing and the rule of law ashore. It therefore follows that the

New African March 2013 17

Cover story West Africa piracy

failure to address maritime crime at sea is symptomatic of widerproblems on land.

Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the Culf of Cuineafit broadly into one of three categories. The first is the low-gradetheft of ship's stores, crew possessions and money - essentiallymaritime mugging. Sometimes very violent, this type of crimi-nal activity is most often under-reported as the values involvedare often below insurance claim minima, delaying the shippending investigation of the offence is costly, and there is aperception that having local police on board may lead to furtherlosses. The second, and from a financial viewpoint the mostsignificant category, is the theft of oil and hydrocarbons, oftenduring ship-to-ship transfer operations. (As these attacks tendto occur further offshore, the third category of pirate attacksare attacks on other ships to get food, fuel and other materi-als as logistic support for the vessels conducting the oil theft).

The cost of oil and hydrocarbon theft to legitimate exchequersis enormous - the cost to Nigeria alone is estimated at some $6bnper year - money which if invested in nurturing legitimate busi-ness ashore could significantly improve the economic conditionof many people.

The effect ofthese crimes on marine insurance rates is also dam-aging to coastal states' already fragile, under-developed economies.Some of the pirate attacks include the taking of ships containingoil, which are then taken to the coast and offloaded for processingin refineries.

The oil sagaThe whole issue of oil and hydrocarbon theft poses a series ofuncomfortable questions, the answers to which are probably moresignificant than the piracy and armed robbery itself.

How much collusion is there between poorly paid crew memberson the feeder ships and the pirates? Where do these ships go to beoffloaded? Who doesn't notice an ocean-going vessel offloadingthousands of tonnes of oil at an illegal jetty? Who processes these

huge quantities of stolen oil? Who doesn't ask the right questions?Although piracy and armed robbery against ships are important

issues, they are largely the symptoms of organised crime, institu-tional corruption and lack of efFective law enforcement ashore.It would be a mistake to focus on countering piracy and armedrobbery in isolation - what is needed is comprehensive action toincrease maritime security and improve maritime law enfotcementin the widest sense. The most urgent priority must therefore be toaddress the governance and rule of law issues on land rather thanbeing sidetracked into taking superficial actions at sea. Althoughit is tempting to point at the reduction in the pirates' success ratein the waters off Somalia, as a justification for increased action bynaval forces and the employment of privately contracted armedsecurity personnel on board merchant ships in the Culf of Cuinea,even the briefest analysis should dispel this myth. On the high seas,the law of the flag state applies. However, as detailed above, 80%of incidents in West Africa happen within coastal states' jurisdic-

Table 2. West Africa incidents reported to IMO in 2012

JANUARY

FEBRUARY

MARCH

APRIL

MAY

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

SEPTEMBER

OCTOBER

NOVEMBER

DECEMBER

TOTAL

Suspicious Approach

31

2

I

1

1

9

Vessel Fired Upon

1

2

3

3

1

1

1

12

Boarded & Robbed

5

3

2

2

3

1

4

4

1

2

1

28

Hijacked

3

1

1

1

2

1

2

11

Total

6

8

5

7

4

5

6

7

3

51

3

60

Ships Hijacked

SAPHINA, FOURSEAS S W

BW RHINE

ARK CHARLY

CHEMTRANS ELBE

JASCON 33, ENERGY CENTURION

ABU DHABI STAR

ORFEAS, WAPPEN VON HAMBURG

18 New African March 2013

Piracy and Armed Robbery AgainstShips in West Africa

70

60 1

50

40

30

20

10

0

- - 1 - 1-~m

H

"In most cases the relevant coastalstate laws are unknown to theinternational community."

tion. This means rhat the carriage of firearms, the proceduresfor embarkation and disembarkation ofsecurity personnel, theirweapons and equipment, and the rules for the use of force are allsubject to the various legal regimes of the coastal states concerned.In most cases the relevant coastal state laws are either unknownto the international community or non-existent.

Given that many states in the region have recently emerged fromcivil conflict or have their own security concerns, it is unlikely thatthe presence of foreign warships or merchant ships carrying whatsome may see as armed foreign mercenaries within territorial waterswill be welcomed. Furthermore, if there is indeed institutionalcorruption and local officials are involved (by commission or omis-sion) in maritime crime, coupled with a lack of transparency on

Far left: A rare success. Crew from the Spanish navy ship Patinocapture a group of suspected pirates. Left: Nigerian coast guardvessels on patrol

national laws, the likelihood of armed security personnel gettinginto trouble is significantly heightened. So what should be done?

The UN's Security Council, through Resolutions 20i8 (2011) and2039 (2012), has recognised the need for adopting "a comprehensiveapproach led by the countries of the region to counter the threat ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and theirunderlying causes"; and the need to build on "existing national,regional and extra-regional initiatives to enhance maritime safetyand security in the Gulf of Guinea".

Piracy summitThe forthcoming Summit of Gulf of Guinea Heads of State,envisaged in Resolutions 2018 and 2039, provides a welcome op-portunity for African states to develop regional maritime securityin its widest sense.

It is worth noting that the UN Security Gouncil resolutionsconcerning the situation in Somalia are enacted under GhapterVII of the Gharter of the UN, with a focus on piracy as a threatto international peace and security in the region.

However, Resolutions 2018 and 2039 are focused on promotingthe maintenance of peace and stability in general in the Gulf ofGuinea region. This is an important distinction as it calls for a dif-ferent response from that employed against Somalia-based piratesoperating in the international waters of the Gulf of Aden and thewestern Indian Ocean.

There are a number of non-African initiatives too. These includethose of the EU, France, the UK and the US (including AFRIGOMand the Africa Partnership Station). Glearly there is no shortage ofideas or policies, but do these seek to address the real problems ordo they just focus on alleviating some of the symptoms, specificallypiracy and armed robbery against ships? And, more importantly,is there regional state buy-in? Do the states in the region actu-ally have the political will to implement maritime and maritimesecurity strategies?

It should not be forgotten that states in the region have com-mitted themselves through accession to various internationalconventions, to perform what are sometimes referred to as "coastguard functions". These include the development of search andrescue capabilities; the prevention of pollution and protectionof the marine environment; maritime and energy supply security;and countering piracy and armed robbery against ships, illegalmigration, and the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people.

It would be fair to say that a failure to implement some of thesecoast guard functions could have far more serious consequencesthan a failure to address piracy and armed robbery against ships.

For example, illegal fishing off West and Gentral Africa iscurrently at unsustainable levels. Given that many states in theregion are dependent on fish for over 60% of their edible protein,the strategic implications of the failure to protect and sustain thisvital resource should be clear.

Even in the short term, according to the Environmental Jus-tice Foundation, "global losses due to illegal, unreported andunregulated (IUU) or 'pirate fishing' are estimated to be between$iobn and $23.5bn per year. West African waters are estimated

New African March 2013 19

Cover story West Africa piracy

'TaWejyr^lm armed robbery incidents reported to iMO (2002-2012) ^ ^ |Pirate attacks

110

Armed robbery

444Number of ships hijacked24

Number of seafarers held hostage

444Number of seafarers killed

44

Table 4. Piracy and armed robbery incidentsin West Africa reported to IMO1 January 2002 to 31 December 2012IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS

IN TERRITORIAL WATERS

IN PORT AREA

AT ANCHOR

STEAMING

N O T STATED

110

174

270

345149

53

to have the highest levels of IUU fishing in the world, represent-ing up to 37% of the region's catch. Along with the economiclosses, pirate fishing in West Africa severely compromises the foodsecurity and livelihoods of coastal communities." Why are thesesignificant losses to the economy and threats to food security notbeing addressed?

Proper implementation of these coast guard functions couldplay a major role in coastal states' abilities to develop their mari-time sectors and to reap the benefits of intra-African trade by sea.The development and maintenance of exclusive economic zones,including growing viable national fishing industries, will contributeto sustainable development, consistent with the UN's MillenniumDevelopment Goals. It is therefore important for political leaders to

change their mindsets and to focus on the opportunities affordedby the maritime sector and not get unduly distracted by problemssuch as piracy and armed robbery against ships.

'Sea blindness'Addressing "sea blindness" in many African states, that is, the lackof policies with respect to the opportunities offered by a developedmaritime sector, must be moved up the political agenda as Afri-can governments need to focus on the sea as well as on land. Thedevelopment of the maritime sector should be a strategic nationalinterest, not a minor departmental interest. The first prioritiesshould be for states to develop their national maritime strategies(how they will develop and benefit from their exclusive economiczones); their national and regional maritime security strategies;their national legal frameworks; and their organisational structures.

Specific actions bygovernments could include: Conducting a review of national maritime and criminallegislation, its implementation and the integrity of thoseimplementing it, in order to ensure that it is fit for purpose. Strengthening inter-agency co-operation in both a nationaland regional basis, including better use of informationtechnology and enhanced maritime situational awareness. Developing African ports, domestic shipping and maritimeindustries so as to enhance intra-African trade. Facilitating maritime transport, i.e. the need for governments

20 New African March 2013

to reduce bureaucratic overload in border controls and showgreater accountability. Attracting investment in the African maritime transportsector. Promoting the study of maritime subjects and, in particular,maritime technology, in universities in Africa.

These processes should involve all relevant agencies: navy,coast guard, gendarmerie maritime, police, intelligence, port andmaritime authorities, judiciary, finance, industry, academia, etc.

They should address holistically all maritime safety and securitythreats, including threats to energy production and supply; combat-ting illegal fishing, illegal dumping; trafficking of people, drugs andweapons; and of course piracy and armed robbery against ships.

An inter-agency approach, involving a range of agencies andcollective responsibility, accountability and shared benefit may, ofitself, serve to reduce corruption and mismanagement. The IMOhas been working in West and Central Africa since 2006 promotingthe concept of an "integrated coast guard function network", i.e.encouraging a joined-up, multi-agency approach to maritime lawenforcement including countering trafficking and border control,maritime safety, security and protection ofthe marine environment.

Fifteen out of 20 coastal member states of MOWCA have al-ready signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) developedin 2008, which lays out a strategy for enhancing maritime security.

Although the MoU is an agreement between ministers of trans-

port, it is a credible blueprint for the development of a wider dip-lomatic agreement on maritime security between the states in theGulf of Guinea and throughout the wider region.

The enhancement of maritime security will be a building blockfor greater stability on land. Ignoring the work already done indeveloping the MOWGA MoU, simply because it has been signedby the ministers of transport (and not a "higher" department)would be a mistake. We should not waste time repeating what hasalready been said or achieved. We simply do not have time for that.

ConclusionPiracy and armed robbery against ships is just one ofthe maritimechallenges faced by African coastal states.

More significant, however, are the lost opportunities resultingfrom a failure to develop the maritime sector as a strategic nationalasset. Concerted action by governments to develop national mari-time strategies protected by national and regional maritime securitystrategies and good governance will lead to increased prosperity andstability throughout the region and a reduction in maritime crime.

Focusing on one symptom alone would be counter-productiveas it could delay the action necessary to develop a sustainablemaritime sector in West and Central Africa. I

(Chris Trelawny's views expressed in this article are intended topromote discussion and action, and should not be taken as a reflectionofthe views or policies of any organisation)

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