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Breanna Nordholm

Professor Ball

Philosophy100

December 7, 2011

The Case for Determinism and Its Incompatibility with Free Will

In this essay I am going to explain and defend Paul Holbach’s argument for determinism

and its incompatibility with free will laid out in “The Illusion of Free Will”. Many would argue

against Holbach, including the philosophers Aj Ayer and Roderick Chisholm. The attacks against

Holbach are not sufficient to prove that humans have free will or prove that free will is

compatible with determinism. I will show the mistakes made in the other philosopher’s

arguments and defend the argument for determinism made by Holbach.

The argument is as simple as this: First, all physical objects are subject to, and act

according to the necessary and immutable laws of nature. Second, man is a physical object.

Therefore, Man acts according to the necessary and immutable laws of nature.

The first premise, laid out more clearly is that the laws of nature, such as gravity, are

necessary and immutable. Necessary, in this argument, meaning it is impossible for it to be any

other way, and immutable having the equivalence to permanent or inflexible. No one would

argue that we can break the laws of gravity, even in cases of birds or airplanes. The force of

gravity still acts upon those things, but they have characteristics which allow them to withstand

the force of gravity to a certain extent. Holbach attempts to prove it is the same for humans and

the necessary and immutable laws imposed on their will.

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His second premise is that man is a physical object. “In whatever matter man is

considered, he is connected to universal nature” (Holbach pg. 284). Although he does not make

an attempt to prove that men are physical beings in his argument, it seems to be common sense.

Holbach does not believe that humans have any kind of spirit or soul that exists apart from our

body, or that the mind or spirit can exist after we are gone. You can infer this from some of the

statements he makes throughout the essay. One example of this is when he says “The will is a

modification of the brain” (Holbach pg 84). He says the brain instead of the mind because he

does not that the mind is separate or can exist without the brain. He makes his argument with this

foundational belief that humans are physical beings, and nothing else.

If the first and second premises are true, and it seems they are, then the result is the

absence of free will. If man acts only according to certain laws, then there is no important sense

of free will. Every choice is made as a result of a complex system of causes and we are not able

to act in any other way than we do. Holbach believes that due to these truths, humans cannot

claim to have any important sense of free will. If every action and every choice we make is

determined and we ca’nt act other than we do then we also can’t be held morally responsible for

anything. Morally responsibility implies that we had the ability to do otherwise and we are held

responsible for choosing to do whatever the action was. But as Holbach points out we do not

have the ability to chose our path, it is chosen for us. “Man’s life is a line that nature commands

him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without ever being able to swerve from it, even for

an instant” (Holbach pg. 284).

Chisholm would agree that there are laws that act upon humans, but would disagree with

the interaction between the two. He would say that we are inclined to act according to casual

laws but not necessitated. Chisholm believes in two types of cause, and would use the distinction

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of two types of cause to try to argue his case for free will. The first type of cause is immanent:

agent causes an action, nothing caused the agent. The second kind of cause is transuent: event

causes action, that event was caused and each event has a cause. Chisholm would say that

humans are inclined by casual laws which could be considered transuent causes and every action

that follows would also be a transuent cause of the next action. Humans however, he would

argue, are capable of acting other than inclined and therefore acting as an immanent cause.

Chisholm thinks that if he can prove that humans can act as the primary cause of their own

actions then he will be able to show that we have free will and in turn that we can be held

morally responsible.

Holbach would say that it is a mistake to speak of free will as “the original motive of his

actions” (Holbach pg. 285). He would respond to Chisholm by saying that although we may

sometimes think we are the primary cause of our actions that is only because we are ignorant of

the causes behind some of our actions. He would say that humans cannot be an “immanent”

cause because everything we do, every decision we make is a result of a complex system of

causes that came first. He would make the distinction that although man does have desires; he is

not in control of them. He is also not in control of resisting those desires. He will not be able to

act in any other way than he does. Chisholm might call these causes transuent and say that they

only incline us to act as we do, but if we acted other than inclined it would only be because there

are other motives that are stronger that force us to act the way they do. “Man, it is said,

frequently acts against his inclination, from whence it is falsely concluded he is a free agent; but

when he appears to act contrary to his inclination, he is always determined to it by some motive

sufficiently efficacious to vanquish this inclination.

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Holbach explains that humans are under an illusion of free will because of the

complexity of the chain of causes behind every action. “It is the great complication of motion in

man, it is the variety of his action, it is the multiplicity of causes that move him, whether

simultaneously or in continual succession, that persuades him he is a free agent” (Holbach pg.

288). Professor Ball used a great example of this in class. He told us that there was this plane

crash, and investigators looked through the ruins and examined all the broken pieces of the plane

and engine. After extensive examination and reviewing all evidence, they could not see one

reason (cause) for the plane to crash. The investigators came to the conclusion that there was no

cause, that it just happened for no reason at all. Of course that is ridiculous. Planes don’t just

crash, engines don’t just fail without any cause at all. The point of the example is that just

because they didn’t know what caused the crash, doesn’t mean that it had no cause. The same

rules apply to humans, we may think that we make our decisions and we act as an “immanent

cause” as Chisholm would say but saying that nothing caused us to act is just like saying the

plane crashed for no reason at all. Everything we as humans do is a result of a complicated chain

of events and circumstances that we may not be able to trace.

Holbach adds the following statements to his argument as if he knew the attacks that

would be used against him; Choice does not prove free will. The absence of restraint is not free

will. The absence of necessity (the possibility to act other than they will), is the equivalence to

free will.

The reason choice does not prove freewill is because the choices we make are the result

of our motives or desires, which are only a result of a variety of causes that came before such as

who raised us, where we grew up, the people places and things we were exposed to, the amount

of contributing variables are almost infinite. While trying to prove the existence of free will,

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using choice man can actually only further the argument for determinism. If a man says he can

prove he is free by jumping out of a building, the very desire of proving that he is a free agent

will become a necessary motive for him jumping. The desire to live may be stronger than the

desire to prove himself in that case becoming the necessary motive causing him to choose not to

jump. Either way he is not free of the motive of which he will act upon. To understand the

argument for free will, man only has to identify the motive by which his will is determined, he

will always realize that this motive is not in his control. It is caused by a complex system of a

chain of operations which one cannot trace completely.

Aj Ayer would attack Holbach by redefining free will and determinism. He would say

that freewill is the absence of constraint. To clarify, absence of constraint would mean that we

had the ability to act other than we did and that nothing was limiting us to act in the way we did.

He would define determinism as something that happens in the mind; the ability to predict future

occurrences by using factual correlations; x type event is always followed by y type event. He

would say that determinism is nothing but the observation of reoccurring correlations. Using

these new definitions, Ayer would say that we have free will and that free will is compatible with

determinism. He would say that unless we are constrained in some way, like held at gunpoint, or

locked up in chains, or afflicted by a disease which has consequences that are out of our control,

then we are free and can act other than we do and therefore can be held morally responsible for

those actions.

Holbach would respond to Ayer by saying that the absence of constraint does not prove

that we have free will. Even when we are not constrained we are not free, we are controlled by

our motives and desires, they govern our every action. The easiest way to think of this is to think

of every one of your impulses, which is caused by your ideas, and experience, as a force. In

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every choice we make the strongest force or combination of forces will win. Suppose I have been

invited to a party, but I have alot of homework to do that night. If it is a close friend my desire to

go may be a strong force. If I choose not to go, it was not because of my power to break the laws

of which I am subject to, but there is a cause I may not be aware of. My desire to do homework

could be very weak while my desire to get good grades plus my desire to be responsible and my

desire to not disappoint my teachers or parents may all be moderate to strong. Those forces

combined result in the necessary motive that wills me to stay home. Regardless of if I am aware

of these motives or not I can’t say I was free because nothing kept me home. Although I was not

physically restrained, I do not have the ability to overpower my strongest motives.

In Holbach’s argument he uses an example of a man in prison. A man in prison locked in

chains does not have the ability to leave any time he desires, he is constrained in his jail cell. He

stays in the jail cell because he does not have the ability to do anything other than just that. He

points out that although his chains prevent him from acting, they do not prevent him from the

desire to be free. He would leave if he was not chained, but even if that was possible he would

not be acting as a free man; fear or the idea of punishment would be adequate motives for

leaving. “Man may, therefore cease to be restrained, without, for that reason, becoming a free

agent: in whatever manner he acts, he will act necessarily, according to motives by which he will

be determined.” (Holbach pg. 287) He also uses the example of Socrates, who was submitted to

the laws of his country. Socrates was put in jail but with the doors left unlocked, and he would

not leave. In this instance, there was still no free action, he was kept in jail by his good etiquette,

his respect for the law, the fear of jeopardizing his reputation, and these were strong enough

motives to keep him in jail. He may not have been constrained by chains, but his motives, the

necessary and immutable laws he is subject to, could not have been overpowered.

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Most would agree that the most important aspect of free will is that if we are free then we

can be held morally responsible. Ayer would say that we can be free and determined, and

therefore can be held morally responsible for our actions. Holbach would say that humans are

determined, and that because we are determined there can be no important sense of free will. If

every action was a result of the strongest impulse then can we be held morally responsible?

Holbach would say that we are not free in any one instant of our lives. If we aren’t free can we

be held morally responsible? Free will implies that we have the ability to do what we want, but

as said in Holbach’s argument, our desires come to us involuntarily. Holbach would say that we

do not have control over our desires, our desires cause our motives, we act according to our

strongest motives, and we cannot act in any other way. If we cannot act in any other way then we

cannot be held morally responsible. Moral responsibility implies that we could have acted

otherwise, and Holbachs argument shows very clearly that we cannot. Without morally

responsibility we lose any important sense of free will.

Although both Ayer and Chisholm would have strong arguments against Holbach, when

the arguments are simplified and really evaluated, Holbach’s argument makes the most sense.

Chisholm would want to say that humans act as immanent causes, which really means we are

uncaused. Just like the plane crash example, it would seem common sense that our actions cant

be completely uncaused. If you were to look at every decision you have made carefully enough

you would find a motive behind every one. Ayer would like to redefine words to make his

argument against Holbach, and prove that free will and determinism are compatible. In the end,

Holbach would say that we are determined by our motives, every action we make has a cause

behind it, and we cannot overpower those motives. If we can’t act other than how we do then,

that leaves no real important sense of free will.

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