on losing the information war
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On Losing the Information War. Greg Wilcox LTC USA (Ret.) July 2005. Sun Tsu. Four operational factors in war: Moral Mental Physical Circumstantial The primary target is the mind of the enemy commander Sun Tzu “the first Psychological Warrior”. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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On Losing the Information On Losing the Information WarWar
Greg WilcoxGreg Wilcox
LTC USA (Ret.)LTC USA (Ret.)
July 2005July 2005
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Sun TsuSun Tsu
Four operational factors in war:Four operational factors in war: MoralMoral MentalMental PhysicalPhysical CircumstantialCircumstantial
The primary target is the mind The primary target is the mind of the enemy commanderof the enemy commander
Sun Tzu “the first Sun Tzu “the first Psychological Warrior”Psychological Warrior”
Source: Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, pp. 40-41.
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T.E. LawrenceT.E. Lawrence
“I am not in favor of giving battle, especially at the outset of a war.
I am even convinced that an able generalcan wage war his whole life
without being compelled to do so.”
Source: B.H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence of Arabia
“We had to arrange (our soldiers) minds in order of battle just as carefully and as formally as other officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own men’s minds, though naturally they came first. We must also arrange the minds of the enemy so far as we could reach them; then those other minds of the nation supporting us b behind the firing line, since more than half the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle.”
Source: T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom
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Col. John Boyd: Three Aspects of Col. John Boyd: Three Aspects of WarWar
MoralMoral MentalMental PhysicalPhysical
Sources: Col John Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict” Dec 86,and “The Strategic Game”, Jun 87
Focus of American forcesFocus of Attrition Warfare
3:1
MORAL LEVERAGE• Find ways to overcome flaws/contradictions that generate mistrust and discord• Emphasize traditions/experiences that build trust and harmony• Reveal harsh statements of adversaries about us• Reveal adversary shortcomings/deficiencies• Acquaint adversaries with our way of life• Respect the culture of others, provide aid• Demonstrate we do not tolerate ideas that undermine our own culture and interests
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GEN Charles Krulak: The Strategic GEN Charles Krulak: The Strategic CorporalCorporal
Concept of the Strategic Corporal in the 21Concept of the Strategic Corporal in the 21stst Century Century Maybe the strategic Private?Maybe the strategic Private? Al Qaeda reveres their strategic corporals Al Qaeda reveres their strategic corporals The U.S. fears their strategic corporalsThe U.S. fears their strategic corporals
Bottom-up initiative based on guidanceBottom-up initiative based on guidance This is a company-level warThis is a company-level war
Source: Gen. Charles C. Krulak, USMC, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War”Marines Magazine, January 1999
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LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on IWLTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on IW
““There is ample evidence that both Hezbollah There is ample evidence that both Hezbollah and al-Qaeda are conducting a ‘4and al-Qaeda are conducting a ‘4thth Generation’ Generation’ type of war. In this endeavor, their principal tool type of war. In this endeavor, their principal tool is the media. Through it, they readily point out is the media. Through it, they readily point out any excess, whether by force or exaggeration.” any excess, whether by force or exaggeration.”
““A politically sensitive foe might come to see A politically sensitive foe might come to see the media as his enemy and suppress any the media as his enemy and suppress any potentially embarrassing detail. Unfortunately, potentially embarrassing detail. Unfortunately, there is a price to be paid for this type of there is a price to be paid for this type of secrecy. secrecy. An army that never admits to An army that never admits to error has no reason to improveerror has no reason to improve.”.”
To defeat a 4GW opponent, “…one must search To defeat a 4GW opponent, “…one must search for ‘for ‘ultimate truthultimate truth,’ quickly admit any ,’ quickly admit any setback, and then readily adapt to any setback, and then readily adapt to any unforeseen circumstances. He must accomplish unforeseen circumstances. He must accomplish the latter without sacrificing his ideals.”the latter without sacrificing his ideals.”
Source: Poole: Tactics of the Crescent Moon, pp. 223-224
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So Where Does Information Warfare So Where Does Information Warfare Fit?Fit?
Only one piece of a Holistic effort but CRITICALOnly one piece of a Holistic effort but CRITICAL (See Maj Isaiah Wilson, USA, “Thinking Beyond War”)(See Maj Isaiah Wilson, USA, “Thinking Beyond War”)
Depends on definition and context:Depends on definition and context: American military focus is on EW (C2W) American military focus is on EW (C2W)
i.e., technologyi.e., technology Focus should be on influencing peopleFocus should be on influencing people
Less shooting, more talkingLess shooting, more talking Protect the civiliansProtect the civilians Get out of the bunkersGet out of the bunkers
Beyond Definitions:Beyond Definitions: Our formal definitions, concepts, and even organizations have Our formal definitions, concepts, and even organizations have
little to do with the 4GW enemy we now face from Iraq to the little to do with the 4GW enemy we now face from Iraq to the Philippines. Philippines.
There is need and use for signals intelligence and computer There is need and use for signals intelligence and computer security, but… security, but…
The information war is the most important aspect of this war: The information war is the most important aspect of this war: the transmission of effective messages to the undecided, to our the transmission of effective messages to the undecided, to our friends, to the enemy, and most important, to our own people. friends, to the enemy, and most important, to our own people.
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What About Al Qaeda/Hezbollah What About Al Qaeda/Hezbollah IO?IO?
Past Masters (Culturally attuned to the use of Past Masters (Culturally attuned to the use of language to influence outcomes). Examples:language to influence outcomes). Examples: Bombings in SpainBombings in Spain
May have influenced national elections in Spain May have influenced national elections in Spain Al Qaeda followed bombings by unilateral offersAl Qaeda followed bombings by unilateral offers of truce to Europeof truce to Europe Threats followed by bombings in EnglandThreats followed by bombings in England
Free access to Moslem pressFree access to Moslem press Manipulate American/European pressManipulate American/European press
Creative Blog sitesCreative Blog sites
Al Qaeda Training Manual instructions:Al Qaeda Training Manual instructions: PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS sectionPRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS section
““IF AN INDICTMENT IS ISSUED AND THE TRIAL BEGINS, THE IF AN INDICTMENT IS ISSUED AND THE TRIAL BEGINS, THE BROTHER HAS TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING:”BROTHER HAS TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING:”
““At the beginning of the trial, once more the At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers mustbrothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State Security [investigators] before the judge.”State Security [investigators] before the judge.”
““Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.” Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.”
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Sophisticated Use of the Sophisticated Use of the MediaMedia
Mullah Omar condemning the United States andencouraging jihad by all Muslims against Americavia video-tape run by Al Jaazera and Al Arabia- A routine PSYWAR and Directive practice
Blog site showing video of captured American soldier.Use of Blog sites New!
DVD of beheading murder of Nick Berg by Zarqawi Is the hottest selling DVD in Iraq
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America’s 2d Television WarAmerica’s 2d Television War
Source: T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: War in the 21st Century
VietnamVietnam Ho Chi Minh determined US center of Ho Chi Minh determined US center of
gravity the American Publicgravity the American Public Objective was to get US to withdrawObjective was to get US to withdraw
War in press more important than War in press more important than bulletsbullets
Ho willing to accept attrition casualtiesHo willing to accept attrition casualties US media an unwitting supporter by US media an unwitting supporter by
broadcasting nightly grizzly imagerybroadcasting nightly grizzly imagery
Iraq/AfghanistanIraq/Afghanistan Jihaadists (Osama Bin Laden) learned Jihaadists (Osama Bin Laden) learned
lessons of Vietnamlessons of Vietnam US center of gravity is American publicUS center of gravity is American public Objective is to get US to withdrawObjective is to get US to withdraw
War in media more important than War in media more important than bulletsbullets
This time, Muslim multi-media available This time, Muslim multi-media available and supportive of jihaadistsand supportive of jihaadists
US media still providing nightly images US media still providing nightly images of casualties and warof casualties and war
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Other Means of IWOther Means of IW
Messages of the Imams and Madras
RUMOR:The greatestsource of misinformation in the Middle East
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Other Means of IW (Cont.)Other Means of IW (Cont.)
PollsPolls Questionable results if we Questionable results if we
don’t understand culturedon’t understand culture Self-fulfilling prophesies?Self-fulfilling prophesies?
Billboards, Signs, GraffitiBillboards, Signs, Graffiti
Unspoken MessagesUnspoken Messages Purple Fingers from voting Purple Fingers from voting
(Positive Impact Lost)(Positive Impact Lost) Assassinations/KidnappingsAssassinations/Kidnappings Disruption/Destruction Disruption/Destruction
(e.g., Long lines for gas (e.g., Long lines for gas stations)stations)
Absence of ServicesAbsence of Services
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Who’s Responsible for U.S. Who’s Responsible for U.S. Information Warfare?Information Warfare?
The Commander-in-Chief sets the objectives of warThe Commander-in-Chief sets the objectives of war The NSC is the main counsel on the use of all aspectsThe NSC is the main counsel on the use of all aspects
of the Government to prosecute the warof the Government to prosecute the war The SECDEF and the CJCS are the president’s The SECDEF and the CJCS are the president’s
principal military advisorsprincipal military advisors The State Dept is responsible for the messageThe State Dept is responsible for the message
No coherent organizationNo coherent organization No USIS (Note that it is strange that Zinni, Armitage,No USIS (Note that it is strange that Zinni, Armitage,
and Powell let this one go)and Powell let this one go) VOA under USAIDVOA under USAID
No coordinated message from top to bottom. No coordinated message from top to bottom. (Source: DSB Summer Study: Strategic Communications, 2004)(Source: DSB Summer Study: Strategic Communications, 2004)
Military does its own thing (PSYOPS, CA, Training Iraqi Forces, Military does its own thing (PSYOPS, CA, Training Iraqi Forces, Training own forcesTraining own forces
Evidently, no one is responsible for a coordinated US IW Evidently, no one is responsible for a coordinated US IW ProgramProgram NSC has done nothing about DSB Summer Study “Strategic NSC has done nothing about DSB Summer Study “Strategic
Communications 2004. Communications 2004. (Source: White House Staffer at CAMEL Conf, Arlington, VA, Nov 04)(Source: White House Staffer at CAMEL Conf, Arlington, VA, Nov 04)
Richard Pearle
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Who Are the Target Audiences for US Who Are the Target Audiences for US Policymakers?Policymakers?
EnemyEnemy LeadersLeaders ArmyArmy PopulationPopulation
SelvesSelves Armed ForcesArmed Forces PopulationPopulation Coalition PartnersCoalition Partners
Rest of WorldRest of World Potential enemiesPotential enemies NeutralsNeutrals Friends and potential Friends and potential
alliesallies
Difficult to address separate audiences in the information age
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US Information to the US Information to the AAmerican merican PublicPublic
Correspondents
Embedded Reporters
In-Theater Press Events
Pentagon Press Events
Authors and AnalystsPresidential Events
Free Press MediaAdministration
Statements
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What About Military IO?What About Military IO?
Communist Armies have a Political Officer Communist Armies have a Political Officer down to company level responsible for IOdown to company level responsible for IO One consistent message from top to bottomOne consistent message from top to bottom Focus on troop information and dealing with the Focus on troop information and dealing with the
populationpopulation
American military efforts disjointed and American military efforts disjointed and unevenuneven PSYOP seen as incompetent/focused on equipmentPSYOP seen as incompetent/focused on equipment HUMINT disregarded for decadesHUMINT disregarded for decades Soldiers in Vietnam called all Viets “Gooks”Soldiers in Vietnam called all Viets “Gooks” Soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan call natives “Ragheads”Soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan call natives “Ragheads” Little or no cultural trainingLittle or no cultural training Little or no language trainingLittle or no language training Attitude: “Leave it to Beaver” (CA, PSYOPS, SF, MI)Attitude: “Leave it to Beaver” (CA, PSYOPS, SF, MI) Do we need a “Political Officer” in each Do we need a “Political Officer” in each
company???company???
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US Military Relations with the US Military Relations with the MediaMedia
How about this guy?
At 50 meters would you thinkthis guy an enemy with an RPG or a photographer?
Trust is absent: No mutual respectSome success with embedded reporters:
• Soldiers tell the truth• Reporters get socialized
Jihaadists have threatened and killed journalistsUS forces have accidentally killed journalists/photographers
2 seconds to decide
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U.S. IW Not Done Well To DateU.S. IW Not Done Well To Date
No policy guidance or directionNo policy guidance or direction Absent cultural understandingAbsent cultural understanding
““Evil Eye” Leaflets in Falluja one day before killing of Evil Eye” Leaflets in Falluja one day before killing of contractorscontractors
False Starts with al-Iraqya TV, Radio Sawa, & al-SabahFalse Starts with al-Iraqya TV, Radio Sawa, & al-Sabah Confession Video having some success in IraqConfession Video having some success in Iraq
PSYOP Focus on Equipment and Things rather than peoplePSYOP Focus on Equipment and Things rather than people Command Information is inadequateCommand Information is inadequate Spotty Integration of Information/Intel/PSYOP/PAO and Spotty Integration of Information/Intel/PSYOP/PAO and
ActionsActions Limited Understanding of IO Function commonplaceLimited Understanding of IO Function commonplace
Makes it difficult to separate the fish from the sea Makes it difficult to separate the fish from the sea with inadequate Information Programwith inadequate Information Program
Makes it impossible to protect the rear with no Makes it impossible to protect the rear with no coordinated IW programcoordinated IW program
Source: Wilcox Presentation to IO Quarterly Conf 5 May 05: “IO and Cultural Knowledge”
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Integrated IWIntegrated IW
Required:Required: Focus on people, not Focus on people, not
technologytechnology Combined Combined
interagency/coalition effortinteragency/coalition effort Long term establishmentLong term establishment Information drivenInformation driven
Independent InformationIndependent Information Leadership by talent, not Leadership by talent, not
bureaucracybureaucracy Regional Fusion CentersRegional Fusion Centers
Similar in concept to Similar in concept to Provisional Reconstruction Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in AfghanistanTeams (PRT) in Afghanistan Multiply with securityMultiply with security Independent and networkedIndependent and networkedSource: Wilson, Richards, Wilcox Briefing:
4GW & OODA Loop Implications of Iraqi Insurgencywww.d-n-i.net
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How to “Get Well”How to “Get Well”
FUNDAMENTAL
CDR
Admin Log Info Ops Action Ops
Intel ChaplainPAOPSYOPCivil Affairs
Continue Focus on HUMINTContinue Focus on HUMINT Get the Intel Specialists out Get the Intel Specialists out
with small units to provide with small units to provide actionable intelligenceactionable intelligence
Build reliable infrastructureBuild reliable infrastructure
Regional Fusion CentersRegional Fusion Centers
Tell the truth & tell it oftenTell the truth & tell it often
Restructure Info/Intel FunctionRestructure Info/Intel Function
Cultural Knowledge Training Cultural Knowledge Training and Educationand Education
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PrognosisPrognosis
What price for the destruction of Falluja?
Thumbs Down
IW efforts so far have limited successIW efforts so far have limited success
No clear direction from White House No clear direction from White House likelylikely
Polls show decline in support both in Polls show decline in support both in Iraq and U.S.Iraq and U.S.
Generals perceived as less than candidGenerals perceived as less than candid
Organizational change unlikelyOrganizational change unlikely
Moral High Ground Lost in Abu GhraibMoral High Ground Lost in Abu Ghraib Impossible to recover despite localizationImpossible to recover despite localization Lasting images Lasting images firedfired jihaad jihaad
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BACKUP SLIDESBACKUP SLIDES
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LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on TrainingTraining
“…“…the U.S. infantryman lives in a doctrinally driven, the U.S. infantryman lives in a doctrinally driven, ‘top-down’ training environment. Such an ‘top-down’ training environment. Such an environment cannot match the learning dynamics of environment cannot match the learning dynamics of its experimentally driven ‘bottom-up’ antithesis. its experimentally driven ‘bottom-up’ antithesis. Unfortunately, most Eastern armies, Unfortunately, most Eastern armies, HezbollahHezbollah, and , and al-Qaedaal-Qaeda follow the latter. One produces follow the latter. One produces standardized procedures that are painfully dismissive, standardized procedures that are painfully dismissive, painfully predictable, and technologically dated. The painfully predictable, and technologically dated. The other produces current guidelines that are other produces current guidelines that are circumstantially unique, surprise oriented, and threat circumstantially unique, surprise oriented, and threat compensating.” compensating.” (Poole, (Poole, Tactics of the Crescent MoonTactics of the Crescent Moon, p. 234), p. 234)
Our soldiers ought to be trained by our own U.S. Our soldiers ought to be trained by our own U.S. Special Forces instead of frittering away this precious Special Forces instead of frittering away this precious resource in too many missions in too many places. resource in too many missions in too many places. (Poole, (Poole, The Tiger’s WayThe Tiger’s Way))
We need to shoot less, not more.We need to shoot less, not more. (Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon) (Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon)
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Kinetics vice SophisticationKinetics vice Sophistication
What price for the destruction of Falluja?
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US Information to our SoldiersUS Information to our Soldiers
http://Companycommand.nethttp://Platoonleader.net
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The Pen Is Mightier than the SwordThe Pen Is Mightier than the Sword
Multi-media is Priceless
RUMOR is the Coin of the Realm