Nuclear Waste Management A social, technical, and economic approach

Tianhao (Harold) Chen, Tunan Chen, Shucen Liu, Cheng Peng, Yicheng Shen ENERGY & ENERGY POLICY

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We would like to thank:

Professor R. Stephen Berry, University of Chicago

Professor George S. Tolley, University of Chicago

Dr. Roger N. Blomquist, Argonne National Laboratory

Dr. Francesco Ganda, Argonne National Laboratory

Dr. Mark A. Williamson, Argonne National Laboratory

for their invaluable guidance throughout the completion of this paper.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 3

1.1 Energy Sector Outlook ________________________________________________________ 3

1.2 Challenges to the Future of Nuclear Energy _______________________________________ 5

2 The Social Approach _______________________________________________________ 7

2.1 Intragenerational and International Justice _______________________________________ 7

2.2 Intergenerational Justice _____________________________________________________ 10

2.3 Why We Don’t Reprocess: The Short-term Perspective _____________________________ 17

2.4 A Society Built by the General Will _____________________________________________ 18

2.5 How Should We Recycle ______________________________________________________ 19

3 The Technical Approach ___________________________________________________ 20

3.1 PUREX ____________________________________________________________________ 20

3.2 UREX _____________________________________________________________________ 22

3.3 COEX _____________________________________________________________________ 23

3.4 NUEX _____________________________________________________________________ 24

3.5 Pyro-processing ____________________________________________________________ 25

3.6 Summary __________________________________________________________________ 28

4 The Economic Approach ___________________________________________________ 30

4.1 Methodology ______________________________________________________________ 31

4.2 Our Approach and Hypothesis _________________________________________________ 32

4.3 Data Collection and Analysis __________________________________________________ 33

4.4 Discussion of Quantifiable Costs and Benefits ____________________________________ 37

4.5 Discussion of Qualitative Costs and Benefits _____________________________________ 38

4.6 Conclusion ________________________________________________________________ 40

5 Conclusions: U.S. Policy Recommendations ____________________________________ 41

6 Notes __________________________________________________________________ 43

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1 INTRODUCTION

Nuclear power is a loaded term with various good and bad connotations associated with it. Ever since Fermi and Szilards’ Chicago Pile-1 was built in 1942, nuclear power, whether employed for military or energy generating purposes, has almost consistently been at the center of the debate. It is an extremely condensed source of energy that, if exploited properly, is sure to lead to new possibilities as society’s demand for energy grows ever larger. Nonetheless, every coin has two sides – as much as nuclear energy promises rich supply of energy, it is incredibly hard to manipulate in operation, hence the high security risk. Chernobyl disaster, Cuban missile crisis, and, more recently, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster are just three out of many nuclear incidents that had very serious consequences on society, showing that fundamental safety is still a problem even 70 years after the first nuclear fusion was performed. For all its hopes and promises, nuclear power as a means to generate energy deserves a careful scrutiny on its technical, economic, and social impact on our generation and beyond.

1.1 ENERGY SECTOR OUTLOOK

Before diving into the more detailed analysis, however, it is helpful to start from a higher level by looking at how nuclear energy has been changing in the past and how it compares to other forms sources of energy. Below is a chart that summarizes the scale of nuclear energy production for top countries as of 2012. According to the chart, 11 of the top 15 countries in nuclear energy production is also the world’s 15 biggest economies. Loosely speaking, nuclear energy contributes to a nation’s advancement of economic wellbeing.

Source: IAEA PRIS Database

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World population was 3 Billion in 1960, 6 Billion in 1999 and expected to be 9 Billion in 2046. Population growth and improving standard of living globally demand increasing amounts of energy. Statistics show that energy production must roughly double in the next 30 years to accommodate demand. While oil and coal has been the primary source of energy for the past half century, there is an increased focus on alternative energy sources. As shown in the graph below, between 1973 and 2014, natural gas, biofuels, and nuclear energy became increasingly important source of energy for OECD countries. Amongst those, nuclear energy shows the greatest growth in shares of energy supply, rising as much as 8.6%.

Source: IEA 2015

Behind the growing importance of sources like nuclear energy, the most obvious driver appear to be their low greenhouse gas emission. From London to Los Angeles, and now Beijing, the world has seen more than enough of the pitfall in burning fossil fuel. Over the years, there is a siginificant shift away from oil and coal in OECD countries as seen from the pie charts along with the rise of cleaner energy sources. , and it seems to be only a matter of time when fossil fuels cease to be a major source of energy.

Thanks to its “hygeneity” and incredible efficiency, nuclear energy enjoyed rapid growth over the years, more than other new energy sources like biofuels and hydro energy. In the case of OECD countries, nuclear plants’ share of the energy market grew over 4 times from 1973 to 2014. There are approximately 440 commercial nuclear power reactors currently operating across 30 countries. Collectively, these reactors supply approximately 14% of the world’s electric generation, according to the World Nuclear Association (WNA).i More importantly, nuclear power plants also need significantly less fuel than those generating power through the use of fossil fuels. On average, one ton of uranium can produce more than 40 million kilowatt-

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hours of electricity, which is equivalent to burning 16,000 tons of coal or 80,000 barrels of oil.ii Although nuclear energy has been blamed for its high safety risk, an interesting graph, perhaps a little bit dramatized one as well, shows a quick comparison of death rate per watts produced for nuclear, oil, and coal.

Source: Based on Data from the World Health Organization

While the graph oversimplifies the information from rather complicated data, it serves its purpose in telling the story of how nuclear energy is actually much safer than coal and oil in terms of actual deaths incurred. The list of advantages of nuclear power over coal and oil is rather obvious in many respects in the long term, and it is less interesting to proceed with any more analysis regarding fossil fuel versus nuclear power.

1.2 CHALLENGES TO THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

However, as much as nuclear energy is clean and efficient, it is still not amongst the top three sources of energy. The reason, in addition to the impact of nuclear accidents on how society views this technology, concerns with long-term sustainability. Natural gas, while also emits greenhouse gas, is a much cleaner form of energy than oil and coal, and it is playing a bigger role than nuclear power in energy market currently. In fact, shale gas is already posing a significant threat to nuclear power in the US. By the end of the year 2014, there were less than 100 nuclear plants making electricity in the US, first time in decades.iii Despite operating with decent efficiency, nuclear plants face fierce competitions from natural gas. The shale gas boom along with sustained low-cost natural gas supply make merchant nuclear plants that sell their power at market price difficult to maintain current size.

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As means to create sustainability and economic cycle, nuclear plants need to properly and efficiently control their cost and safety in order to fend off challenges from other sources. To be specific, it is imperative to address the safety and economic issues with nuclear plants, both of which ultimately lead to the problem with treating nuclear waste from reactors. In the US, only direct disposal method, the idea of which is rather self-explanatory, is employed while countries like France run reprocessing facilities to recycle left-over uranium and plutonium. Treating nuclear wastes, whether through direct disposal or reprocessing, face a variety of challenges from political, technological, economic, and social aspects. Only with a sustainable and feasible nuclear waste treatment figured out will nuclear power become the clean, efficient, and safe energy source and bring forth the future it meant to promise.

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2 THE SOCIAL APPROACH

Our approach to answering the urgent question of what to do with nuclear wastes is threefold: technological, economic, and social. But instead of taking the more traditional route of starting our argument by way of analyzing technological and economic feasibility, we choose to anchor our discussion around what we believe to be the most important type of problems when deciding what to do with nuclear wastes – that is, the social ramifications. While technological and economic feasibility are certainly crucial to the implementation of both disposing and recycling nuclear wastes, we believe the potential social problems that could arise from either approach are far more pressing, and thus outweigh the possible complications of a technological or economic nature. Therefore, we start our discussion by trying to answer the question, “What are the social problems with disposing or recycling nuclear wastes, and how do we best deal with them?” In answering such a broad question, we must first confine ourselves to a narrow definition of what constitutes “social problems.” To do so, we turn to one of the key principles of radioactive waste management laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which states that radioactive waste is to be managed in a way such that it “will not impose undue burdens on future generations.”iv In other words, there must be justice, or more specifically, intergenerational justice. The concept of justice – which we should often refer to in our discussion of the social problems of nuclear waste – was introduced by John Rawls in 1971 in his renowned work A Theory of Justice. In describing what social justice is, Rawls argues that a set of principles is required to choose among the various social arrangements which determine the division and distribution of advantages and disadvantages that come with entering such an agreement. “These principles are the principles of social justice: they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”v Using this definition, we break down all social problems that arise as the result of nuclear waste into two broad categories: intragenerational – that is, problems faced by us contemporaries – and intergenerational, as prescribed by the IAEA. We also break down the ways of dealing with nuclear wastes into two categories: direct disposal and reprocessing. From there, we argue that while both direct disposal and reprocessing have their own unique advantages and pitfalls under the framework of intragenerational/international justice, reprocessing’s clear superiority from an intergenerational perspective is why we favor it over direct disposal.

2.1 INTRAGENERATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

The most obvious type of social problems caused by nuclear wastes are the ones that we as contemporaries are facing today. While the current international consensus is that all nuclear-

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producing countries are individually responsible for their own wastes, the global impact of a potential mishap in dealing with them means that nuclear wastes are bound to be an international problem. We have to recognize the international nature of the waste problem for both direct disposal and reprocessing; with that in mind, our goal in choosing a method is to ensure international justice to be maximal extent.

2.1.1 Direct Disposal

In terms of direct disposal, there is a strong case to be made for building multinational repositories for both economic and security (non-proliferation) benefits, particularly as the number of “small nuclear club” members continue to grow. Since the disastrous Fukushima accident in 2011, 45 new countries had expressed serious interest in developing nuclear energy production. Since these small countries are not in a strong position to implement self-sufficient national repository programs for the various types of nuclear wastes produced in their countries, it is these countries that had particularly pushed for the multinational cooperation on the implementation of nuclear repository. In fact, there are already several agreements in place for international cooperation on nuclear waste management, such as what is termed the “fuel leasing” plan. For instance, Iran’s power reactor is currently “leasing” fuel from Russia; the existence of this leasing agreement, which mandates the spent nuclear fuel to be returned to Russia, is welcomed from a non-proliferation perspective. However, the building of such multinational repositories also raises concerns with regards to international justice: where should these repositories be located, if they are multinational? There is always the possibility that the consent of any given host nation could stem from economic or political imbalance with other countries. It is widely seen as essential to establish national and local public acceptance in the process of deciding upon the locations of multinational repositories. Yet, solely focusing on public acceptance could blind decision-makers to power or wealth imbalances between participating countries. This would be an unequal “distribution of benefits and burdens,” to use Rawls’ framework of justice. This type of international injustice was seen in the 1970s and 1980s, when there was substantial exporting of chemical waste from industrial to non-industrial countries. This was mainly attributable to the tightening of environmental laws in developed countries which led to enormous waste disposal costs. For companies, it became a cheap option to export most of their waste to African states where no such laws existed. In order to avoid such injustice, the Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal was introduced, preventing producing countries from exporting hazardous chemical waste to other countries. There are currently no such regulations for the exporting of nuclear wastes – if multinational repositories were to become a reality, the legal, financial, political, and institutional challenges posed by such repositories must be studied in details, so that we avoid the problem of international injustice.

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The unequal distribution of benefits and burdens caused by direct disposal also goes beyond the building of multinational depositories and into the nuclear fuel cycle itself. Whereas the majority of the world’s nuclear plants is located in developed countries, more than 30% of the world’s uranium production is coming from developing nations such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Namibia, and Niger. When there is direct disposal of nuclear wastes, those countries running the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle become exposed to greater risks as they are responsible for the milling and mining of additional uranium resources. This would also be considered unjust by Rawls’ definition.

2.1.2 Reprocessing

Similarly, reprocessing – the alternative approach to dealing with nuclear wastes – presents problems of international injustice in its own right. For starters, reprocessing plants are by no means small investments; in fact, most small countries currently utilizing nuclear energy do not have, and most likely will not build the reprocessing plants at all. This feeds into a vicious cycle of international injustice. Smaller countries, which tend to have fewer natural resources for energy production, tend to favor reprocessing for its efficient use of uranium. But these are also the countries that more often than not don’t have the reprocessing plants to begin with. In order to reprocess its wastes, smaller countries such as Netherlands have to transport their spent fuel to places with the capable technologies, such as La Hague (France). This is surely good news for the Dutch, as they reap the benefits of neither disposing the waste and potentially harming their environment nor spending the money to build the reprocessing plants, but exposes the Frenchmen to the additional risks associated with reprocessing. This would constitute an unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. There is also the added burden of potential proliferation when countries decide to reprocess spent fuel using the most common PUREX method (to be discussed in depth in the next section). While only the reprocessing countries (e.g. Japan, Netherlands, etc.) stand to benefit from the reusing of nuclear fuels, all countries, including the ones that are staunchly against reprocessing because of the proliferation risks (e.g. US), share the danger of nuclear proliferation, should the separated plutonium fall into the wrong hands. This, again, would be a form of international injustice according to Rawls.

2.1.3 Conclusion under an Intragenerational Framework

Dealing with nuclear wastes are projects spanning tens or even hundreds of thousands of years – so long that the relevance of national borders becomes highly questionable. Consider the example of Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, which has politically lain within the geographic borders of six different countries just in the last century alone. Slovenia could make unilateral

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and sovereign decisions regarding to nuclear wastes today but, as national boundaries shift, or successor states emerge, they may well impact other countries in the future. Under the international framework of justice, both broadly defined methods of dealing with nuclear wastes, direct disposal and reprocessing, have their pitfalls. It is unfair to declare one form of disadvantages better or worse than the other, so we shall refrain from making a hasty conclusion as to which method we prefer based on this framework alone. As we should see in the next section, the intergenerational social problems that arise from the methods will be far more important in our discussion of which method is better.

2.2 INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

To begin our discussion of the intergenerational justice in dealing with nuclear fuel wastes, we must note that the very notion that future generations even have rights has been challenged by some philosophers. “…the ascription of rights is probably to be made to actual persons – not possible persons.”vi In other words, since our action and inaction define the composition and identity of future people, such non-existing future people cannot be said to have rights. This is referred to as Derek Parfit’s “nonidentity problem,” a theory frequently debated in any discussion of energy policy.vii There also have been objections against these alleged rights on other grounds: some based their arguments on the inability to predict future properly, while others argued that we are ignorant of the need and desire of the future, as well as the contingent nature of future. Although we do not discredit such arguments as irrelevant, in this paper, we will adopt a similar approach as Rawls and consider these future rights valid. In his discussion of justice, Rawls has devoted an entire section, titled “The Problem of Justice Between Generations,” to the discussion of intergenerational justice. In it, Rawls introduces a principle of “just savings,” which can be understood to provide us with a sensible understanding of intergenerational sufficienarianism. Furthermore, Rawls specifies the sufficientarian threshold relevant for defining currently living people’s obligations of justice vis-à-vis future people: “the conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over time.”viii This concept of sustainable development, as laid out by Rawls, was used by the World Commission of Environment and Development in 1987, a moment that marked the introduction of intergenerational concerns in environmental policy. This Brundtland definition – named after commission’s chairperson – states that the key to sustainable development is an equitable sharing of benefits and burdens between generations ‘‘[…] that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’’ix The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Earth Summit) not only endorsed this concept of sustainable development formally among 178 national governments, it also explicitly included the concept of equity in its principles.x

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For our discussion under the framework of intergenerational justice, we use this definition of sustainability to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of direct disposal and reprocessing. More specifically, we divide the intergenerational social problems into three categories – supply certainty, radiological risks, and security (proliferation) risks – to determine the short and long-term consequences of direct disposal versus reprocessing.

2.2.1 Supply Certainty

Supply certainty, meaning the availability of resources to fulfill the needs, is a significant problem in any discussion of energy. This is why we start our comparison of direct disposal and reprocessing by determining which method ensures better supply certainty, that is, which method is more sustainable in the short and long run in terms of available uranium resources. To determine supply certainty, we must look at both uranium supply and demand. In this paper, we use the data provided by Uranium 2014: Resources, Production and Demand, a joint report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the supply side, we consider identified conventional resources (ICR) to be the measure of uranium resources usable in power production. ICR, as defined by NEA, consists of two things: reasonably assured resources (RAR), which measures the usable uranium that can be recovered from known mineral deposits, and inferred resources recoverable at a reasonable cost. As of 1 January 2013, the total identified resources amount to 5,902,900 tonnes of uranium metal (tU) when we consider “reasonable cost” to be less than USD 130/kgU. This number increases to 7,635,200 tU when we consider “reasonable cost” to be less than USD 260/kgU. As shown in Table 1.1, even though overall uranium availability has increased from 2011 to 2013, most of that increase comes from categories with higher costs. Notably, cheaper uranium costing less than USD 80/kgU has decreased from 3,078,500 tU to 1,956,700 tU, a net -36.4% change from 2011 to 2013. This should be an indication that obtaining new sources of uranium will be more expensive in the future.xi

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Source: NEA

On the demand side, there is a total of 437 commercial nuclear reactors connected to the grid in 30 countries, with an additional 68 reactors under construction as of 1 January 2013. This amounts to a total nuclear generating capacity of 371.8 GWe, which requires 59,270 tU of uranium annually. Among this requirement, 44,045 tU of uranium are expected to be required by OECD countries.xii

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Source: NEA

Assuming that the demand for uranium stays constant at 59,270 tU per year. We are able to create a sensitivity table analyzing the number of years current resources of uranium can sustain for energy production, if we do not reprocess nuclear fuel wastes. From the table, we are able to see that we do face risks of running out of uranium in the next hundreds of years with the direct disposal method, as obtaining new sources of uranium is bound to become both harder and more expensive over time.

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Identified Conventional Resources of Uranium (tU)

Annual Demand for Uranium (tU)

Number of Years Sustainable

<USD 260/kgU 7,635,200 59,270 128.8206513

<USD 130/kgU 5,902,900 59,270 99.5933862

<USD 80/kgU 1,956,700 59,270 33.01332883

<USD 40/kgU 682,900 59,270 11.52184916

Source: NEA On the other hand, NEA and IAEA have also calculated the supply certainty of uranium under reprocessing. In a study published in 2006, the agencies arrived at an estimated number of years that is many magnitudes greater than the number of years under direct disposalxiii. While the exact estimates may have changed since 2006, we argue that the principle that reprocessing is much more sustainable in the long run still holds: reprocessing to recover uranium and plutonium avoids the wastage of a valuable source of energy. This also explains why the reprocessing option has been chosen by countries without large fossil fuel resources such as France and Japan: to increase the energy recovery rate from natural uranium.

Source: NEA

This concludes our analysis of direct disposal versus reprocessing with regards to supply certainty under the intergenerational framework. While 129 years seems like a long time for the current generation of people, running out of uranium is a real danger when we take an intergenerational view. Therefore, we must recommend reprocessing as the superior way of dealing with nuclear fuel wastes.

2.2.2 Radiological Hazards

Before we start our discussion on the intergenerational nature of the radiological risks associated with direct disposal and reprocessing, we must first define the term. Radiological risks, as we perceive them in this paper, express the possibility that spent fuel leaks to the biosphere and harm both people and the environment.

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The NEA proposes three stages to assess radiological risks: (1) mining and milling, (2) power production, and (3) reprocessing. They compare the radiological risks of the OFC with the (once) recycled and reused MOX fuel. In the power production phase, NEA argues, there is no difference between the cycles. The main difference lies in the two other steps: mining and milling and reprocessing. They further argue that deployment of reprocessing decreases the need for enriched uranium and, therefore, natural uranium, of which the mining and milling involve the same radiological risks as reprocessing and reusing plutonium as MOX fuel. In fact, NEA argues that under the described circumstances there are equal radiological risks for both fuel cycles.xiv What NEA’s study fails to take into account, however, is the distinction between short and long-run radiological risks. For the short-run evaluation of radiological risks, NEA completely neglects the risks and hazards associated with the transport of waste in the case of reprocessing, saying that “…[R]adiological impacts of transportation are small compared to the total impact and to the dominant stage of the nuclear cycle.”xv However, if we are to consider the different aspects of public perception of risk, we cannot retain the idea that radiological risks of nuclear waste transportation are negligibly small. Only a few reprocessing plants are currently available around the world and spent fuel needs to be transported to those plants and back to the country of origin. In Great Britain, for instance, serious debates have taken place about the possibilities to return Japanese reprocessed spent fuel to Japan, indicating that transportation should not be considered risk-free. In other words, for the current generation of people and in the short run, reprocessing is riskier, as it exposes both people and the environment to additional radiological risks.

The story is the complete opposite in the long run, where risks associated with direct disposal are much higher. In fact, one of the main arguments in favor of reprocessing is the vast reduction of waste volume and its toxicity. In a study conducted by the World Nuclear Association in 2002, the researchers concluded that the recycling of plutonium in LWR-MOX reduces the eventual radiotoxicity of spent fuel by a factor of three, even if spent MOX fuel is disposed of after one use, i.e. not recycled. Furthermore, separating the plutonium and uranium from the fission products and minor actinides several times could lead to a decrease in the long-term radiotoxicity of waste to be disposed of by a factor of 10.xvi In other words, direct disposal poses much greater risks to people and the environment in the long run.

This concludes our analysis of direct disposal versus reprocessing with regards to radiological risks under the intergenerational framework. Starting from NEA’s study which claims that direct disposal and reprocessing have the same level of radiological risks, we were able to categorize the risks into two categories: short-run and long-run. From there, we showed that while reprocessing involves slightly higher short-run risks for the current generation, it is much safer than direct disposal in the long run because it significantly reduces the toxicity of radioactive wastes. Therefore, using Rawls’ framework of intergenerational justice, we recommend reprocessing as the superior way of dealing with nuclear fuel wastes.

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2.2.3 Security Risks

The last, but certainly not least value at play in waste management is security as a result of the separation of plutonium during recycling. Concerns regarding nuclear proliferation are certainly relevant given the current state of world security, and the threats of proliferation added by nuclear fuel reprocessing cannot be ignored. To illustrate, only eight kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium (239Pu) are needed to produce a Nagasaki-type bomb.xvii Using the intergenerational framework of justice, we again realize that the debate of direct disposal versus reprocessing can be boiled down to a tradeoff between present and future risks. On the one hand, reprocessing increases proliferation concerns for the contemporary people, as plutonium separated during the most commonly used PUREX method (to be discussed in more detail later) is vulnerable to being diverted from proper civil use. In fact, such concerns were the exact reason why President Gerald Ford issued a Presidential directive to indefinitely suspend the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in the U.S. in 1976. This act was followed on 7 April 1977, when President Jimmy Carter banned the reprocessing of commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel, which was hoped to encourage other countries to follow the lead of the U.S. However, it is worth noting that the exact significance of the proliferation risks added by reprocessing is questionable. France, the biggest adopter of PUREX nuclear reprocessing, has not reported a single incidence of stolen plutonium over the past 60 years in which its reprocessing facilities have operated – in fact, there are no known reports of stolen plutonium anywherexviii. Furthermore, even in the worst scenario in which plutonium were stolen, the making of a plutonium bomb requires a very high level of technical capability that is unlikely to be had by small rogue nations or terrorist organizations. While there is no denying that the possibility of a plutonium bomb-possessing rogue organization is catastrophic, it is questionable whether the possibility is a significant one. On the other hand, reprocessing decreases security concerns for future generations, since the spent fuel residuals will contain no more plutonium as plutonium is separated during reprocessing. While some may argue that the potential proliferation concerns of the direct disposal of spent fuel is negligible on the grounds that expensive reprocessing plants are required to separate the plutonium in the spent fuel for weapon manufacturing, other scholars have argued that the spent fuel in geological depositories in fact becomes a better weapon-grade material as time goes by, due to the natural enrichment of 239Pu.xix The natural enrichment is a process that takes place over thousands of years, where new technologies will have undoubtedly emerged and political spheres will have shifted. Therefore, we believe that the risks of stolen plutonium and plutonium-bomb-possessing rogue organizations, which we fear so much today, are in fact much greater in the long run, with uncertainties in future political paradigms and emerging technologies (i.e. technologies that make plutonium separation and plutonium bomb manufacturing more achievable by small organizations). Hence, it is fair to say that in the long run, reprocessing today will prove to be a much safer option in terms of potential for proliferation.

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This concludes our analysis of direct disposal versus reprocessing with regards to security risks under the intergenerational framework. We have shown that the security concerns are double-edged, as reprocessing nuclear fuel wastes increases short-term proliferation risks and decreases long-term proliferation risks, and we have argued that reprocessing should be adopted because long-term proliferation risks are much greater than short-term ones. Having sufficiently considered all three aspects of intergenerational justice – supply certainty, radiological hazards, and proliferation risks – we can confidently conclude that reprocessing is the superior method of nuclear waste management under the intergenerational framework.

2.3 WHY WE DON’T REPROCESS: THE SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE

So far, we have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear reprocessing using both an international and intergenerational approach, and we have shown that while both direct disposal and reprocessing have advantages and disadvantages under the first framework, reprocessing is clearly superior to direct disposal when we take on an intergenerational perspective. It then only becomes natural to ask: why doesn’t the U.S. recycle its nuclear fuel wastes, when nations such as France, Great Britain and Japan do and clearly recognize spent nuclear fuel as a valuable asset? The answer is certainly not an issue of legality, as President Ronald Reagan had lifted the ban on commercial reprocessing back in 1981. But rather, we argue that the answer has to do with the short-sightedness, shared by the general public and astute politicians alike. As we have shown through our intergenerational analyses, the tradeoffs in nuclear energy are reducible to a chief tradeoff between the present and the future: while direct disposal is to be associated with short-term benefits, reprocessing has much greater long-term benefits. This is summarized below, where “+” indicates benefits and “-“ indicates drawbacks.

Supply Certainty

Radiological Risks

Security Risks

Short Term

Long Term

Short Term

Long Term

Short Term

Long Term

Direct Disposal + - + - + -

Reprocessing + + - + - +

In theory, the society is focused on achieving Pareto efficiency – that is, each individual should be made as well off as possible, without making another worse off. This concept can also be modified to accommodate other scenarios; Kaldor efficiency is one of such modifications. This understanding of efficiency asserts that a choice, transaction, or policy decision meets the requirements of efficiency if the individuals who are positively affected by the change could hypothetically compensate those who are negatively affected so that no one person is any worse off than before the change was made.

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This view of efficiency, while sound in theory, becomes problematic when policies span multiple generations, as is the case with any policies on nuclear waste management. Since these policy decisions are intergenerational, there is no way the present generation could possibly compensate the future generations. As such, the self-interested nature of people makes them forgo the hypothetical compensation altogether, and instead focus on maximizing short-term gains for the current generation. In other words, Kaldor efficiency segregates the “haves” from the “have-nots” by focusing on short-term gains and profit maximization. In the context of nuclear regulatory policy, the “haves” can be considered the present generation who are in the position to make these policies, and the “have-nots” are the future generations who have no say in the process. The present generation has the maximum benefit of electricity generated from nuclear power and minimal problems from nuclear waste management, whereas future generations will be burdened with all the long-term drawbacks of current nuclear policy: less supply certainty, higher radiological risks, and higher security risks. The discounting of future risks and benefits is present in all countries, yet it is particularly prevalent in the U.S., where politics are driven by popularity and popularity by short-term promises. As such, politicians are focused on making and delivering these short-term promises, while disregarding what is good for the society in the long run. This problem of short-sightedness in policy-making is not peculiar to nuclear waste management either. As evident in the boom and bust nature of the United States economy, generations that were fortunate enough to live during prosperous times lacked the foresight or genuine care to plan ahead for the needs of future generations, such that the latter ends up bearing the burden of this lack of foresight. Therefore, we argue that a new framework of thought is necessary in order to properly take into consideration both present and future generational needs.

2.4 A SOCIETY BUILT BY THE GENERAL WILL

Building onto Rawls’ concept of intergenerational justice, we introduce Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work in The Social Contract, which outlines the underpinnings of a society in which the government is strictly responsive to the citizens by their collective consent. In his work, Rousseau uses the term “General Will” to refer to the collective consensus amongst citizens that always act in their best interest.

Find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint strength, the person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.’ This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract gives the answer.xx

Rousseau’s conception of the General Will in The Social Contract is akin to modern day public interest. By consenting to the social contract, citizens of the United States would gain a

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connection to public interest, as they would all become equally invested in society’s collective well-being. As such, we believe that Rousseau’s Social Contract would extend citizens’ public interest beyond the present generation and allow for the government to act in the best interest of future generations by permitting nuclear reprocessing. With the General Will being the cornerstone of a responsible government and its citizens willing to consent to the Social Contract, it would follow that the citizen would understand the benefit to be gained by unifying himself with the other members of his society. Through his acceptance of the Social Contract, the citizen gains greater power over his government, as the collective interest of all citizens is much more effective for influencing government than the individual interests of any one individual. By understanding this benefit, he would wish to see this level of commitment to his country and its people extend beyond his living years and become instilled in the following generation. Any issue that could potentially damage the Social Contract in the future could not go on unaddressed by present citizens because damaging the Social Contract and voiding the General Will would effectively cut the link between the citizens and their government. Such a scenario would give the government immoral power over the people, something a citizen who is invested in the General Will could never accept for any present or future citizen. Therefore, a citizen who engages in society and consents to the General Will cannot allow unresolved intergenerational issues, such as the long-term risks associated with direct disposal, to burden future members of the society and compromise their rightful claims in the Social Contract. Similarly, nor will such a citizen allow promising technologies that may benefit future generations, such nuclear reprocessing, to go unused. Hence, under this social framework imagined by Rousseau, reprocessing – the sensible choice in the intergenerational sense – will unquestionably be favored and adopted over direct disposal, by general citizens and policy makers alike.

2.5 HOW SHOULD WE RECYCLE

In the section outlining the social problems of nuclear waste management, we were able to show the superiority of nuclear reprocessing by analyzing the supply certainty, radiological risks, and proliferation concerns associated with both waste management approaches. Furthermore, we were able to dissect the reasoning behind US’s current policy of direct disposal, and propose a framework of General Will that should guide future policies in all intergenerational dilemmas. It then only becomes natural to wonder: if we were to reprocess nuclear fuel wastes, how should we do it? In the next two sections, we hope to find that answer by analyzing the technical and economic feasibility of nuclear reprocessing technologies.

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3 THE TECHNICAL APPROACH

In this section, we review various types of reprocessing technologies both in existence and under development from the technical perspective. Generally, reprocessing technologies could be divided into aqueous processing and electrometallurgical processing (‘pyro-processing’).

For aqueous methods, almost every analysis of reprocessing technology starts with PUREX (plutonium uranium extraction) process which is used by all commercial reprocessing plants today. However, U.S. has rejected PUREX mainly because of the proliferation risks (to be explained in depth later) associated with it. To address this problem, UREX (uranium extraction) process and several other technologies (COEX, NUEX, etc.) have been developed as modifications of PUREX. As opposed to aqueous methods, pyro-processing utilizes inorganic media. It is fundamentally different from aqueous processing and considered to have great potential.

In the following paragraphs, we will focus on the technical details of PUREX, UREX, COEX, NUEX followed by a discussion on pyro-processing.

3.1 PUREX

Despite rejection by U.S., PUREX (plutonium uranium extraction) process is the current standard method adopted by commercial reprocessing plants all over the world. PUREX separates uranium and plutonium effectively and efficiently as its name indicates. However, there has always been concerns that plutonium recovered by PUREX could be used for nuclear weapon instead of nuclear fuel. It is extremely difficult to regulate or monitor the use of PUREX for appropriate purpose outside United States. This is usually referred as proliferation risks associated with PUREX.

The chemistry of PUREX process is illustrated in the figure below. This begins with dissolving spent fuel in hot concentrated nitric acid followed by solvent extraction. In next steps, uranium and plutonium are separated from fission products and other elements before they are separated from each other. Finally, both plutonium nitrate and uranium nitrate are concentrated by evaporation and processed to produce PuO2 and UO2 respectively. The remaining liquid after Pu and U are removed is highly radioactive and needs extra treatment before stored in borosilicate glass pending disposal.xxi

Figure. PUREX process flow sheet

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Source: World Nuclear Association

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3.2 UREX

UREX, uranium extraction process, is designed to recover uranium and technetium from spent nuclear fuel while leaving the plutonium in waste with fission products and other actinides. It prevents plutonium recovery by using acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as the solvent to form plutonium and neptunium complexes. Thus, much of the proliferation risks associated with PUREX are alleviated.

As we can see from the flow sheet, UREX produces uranium trioxide and raffinate containing transuranium isotopes and fission products which would be converted to oxide product pending further separation. UREX aims to recover over 99% of the uranium and 95% of the technetium in different product streams and reject over 99% of the transuranic isotopes to the raffinate. In addition, UREX meets the requirement for low level waste and produces less waste at the end of its cycle than PUREX.xxii

Figure. UREX process flow sheet

Source: Thompson, M. C. "Demonstration of the UREX solvent extraction process with Dresden reactor fuel solution." Savannah River Site. Funding organization: US Department of Energy,

2002.

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3.3 COEX

Areva and CEA (Commissariat à l'énergie atomique, French Atomic Energy Commission) have developed COEX (co-extraction of actinides) process based on extensive French experience with PUREX. COEX separates spent nuclear fuel into three streams: uranium-plutonium, uranium, fission products and minor actinides. In COEX, uranium-plutonium mix is extracted together and converted into MOX fuel for use in light-water reactors. And the fission products and minor actinides stream would be vitrified and stored onsite pending disposal.xxiii

Compared to PUREX, COEX involves no separation of plutonium at any stage. Thus, most of proliferation risks are reduced. Moreover, this method features simultaneous construction and operation of reprocessing and recycling facilities on the same site, which is different from existing plants in France. COEX is believed to be scale-up readily from the laboratory scale.xxiv

Figure. COEX process flow sheet

Source: Hylko, James M. "How to solve the used nuclear fuel storage problem." Power, 152.8 (2008).

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3.4 NUEX

EnergySolutions and UK National Nuclear Laboratory developed NUEX as a modification of PUREX as well. This technology converts uranium and plutonium in spent fuel from light-water reactors into Uranium Oxide and Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. The primary separation stage of NUEX mostly produces a uranium stream as well as a mixed uranium-plutonium-neptunium stream. Both streams are then purified as the flow sheet illustrates.

There are two major advantages of NUEX compared with PUREX: proliferation resistant and lower radioactivity. On one hand, the mixed stream of uranium-plutonium-neptunium involves no independent separation of plutonium. And the existence of uranium increases the requirement for use in nuclear weapon. On the other hand, recycling the neptunium reduces radioactivity of high-level waste in the long run.

The process equipment for NUEX has been well proven and requires no further development.xxv

Figure. NUEX process flow sheet

Source: Hesketh, Kevin, Robert Gregg, and Chris Phillips. "Nuclear Proliferation Risk Mitigation Approaches and Impacts in the Recycle of Used Nuclear Fuel in the USA." Wmsym. org. National

Nuclear Laboratory 1 (2009).

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3.5 PYRO-PROCESSING

Different from aqueous methods previously discussed, which depend on aqueous solvents to extract the desired chemicals, pyro-processing is a recently developed batch-mode method of high temperature and molten salt. Developed by Argonne National Laboratory to close the nuclear fuel cycle, it utilizes solvents to separate actinide elements from fission products in the electro-refining procedures be reused in fast reactors. Starting with electrorefining, pyro-processing also typically includes following steps such as distillation and solvent-solvent extraction.

Pyro-processing starts with the removal of individual spent fuel cods and the cutting of these rods through a chopper into shorter segments of typically 6 to 7 mm. Then loaded into steel baskets and placed into an electrorefiner, these rods are to undergo a process called electro-refining. Electrorefining performs the task of the separation and recovery of actinides from the fission products currently residing in the spent fuel rods. The process is similar to that used in the minerals industry (consider cement manufacturing) by beginning with the placement of the spent fuel rods into steel baskets and lowering and suspending the baskets into an electrolyte salt layer typicaly of 500 to 800 degree Celsius. A cathode of cadmium chloride (CdCl2) is then added to the electrolyte. And under the current between the anode and cathode, actinides and other fission products are moved to the electrolyte as chlorides. xxvi

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Following the IFR electrorefining and after the electro-transportation of virtually pure uranium at the solid cathode, the steel cathode is removed and a liquid cadmium cathode is inserted. Nearly pure uranium is to be collected at the cathode and plutonium, americium, neptunium, curium, uranium and rare earth fission products collected at the liquid cadmium cathode. These cathode deposits are then recovered and sent to cathode processors, high temperature furnaces, where they undergo consolidation by melting and volatile materials are removed by vaporization. Then distillates are then transported to the cathode processor to be collected for recycle. And metal ingots produced by the cathode processing operation are essentially free of impurities to qualify as feed material for the next step of injection casting.xxvii

After the previous steps come the injecting casting steps to produce the appropriate metallic blend and carry-over fission products to case the alloys into slugs for new fuel rods.xxviii

Source: Yoon Il Chang “Fuel Cycle Based on Integral Fast Reactor and Pyro-processing” Argonne National Laboratory

3.5.1 Possible Advantages

There are many advantages that pyro-processing possesses as opposed to more commonly used aqueous methods. Since the majority of nuclear radioactivity of nuclear fuel waste comes from actinides, by removing the actinides, pyro-processing process neutralizes potential risks of

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waste fuel to a great extent, leaving the waste and by-products far less dangerous. What is more, the actinides recycled could be used again as fuel rods but a great proportion requires fast breed reactors to deliver full efficiency.xxix

Also by removing actinides, pyro-processing allows for five to ten times more spent fuel disposal for a given repository space as cumulative decay heat is greatly reduced, according to a report by Argonne National Laboratory.

Being a relatively compact fuel processing facility type, pyro-processing equipment takes up less space and could be integrated easily into future generation nuclear plants. Regarding proliferation risks, since facility for pyro-processing tends to be more compact and modular, by co-locating with fast reactions, it is easier to safeguard, monitor, and supervise to reduce possible weaponization. xxx

Other possible cost-saving aspects of pyro-processing include that the high temperature under which the reactions occur may shorten the waiting time before we could approach used fuel for recycling.

Source: Argonne National Laboratory

3.5.2 Technical Difficulties

On the other hand, significant practical drawbacks, compared to aqueous methods may include that the used salt produced from this method pyro-processing is less suitable for conversion into glass than wastes generated by the PUREX process and that as a relatively new method of reprocessing compared to PUREX, places in favor of recycling have already have PUREX equipment in place, generating little demand for future pyro-processing expansion and researches. And whether, under current technological and economics constraints, pyro-processing provide a viable solution for long-term large-scale fuel recycling is another question to be explored.

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Source: Yoon Il Chang “Fuel Cycle Based on Integral Fast Reactor and Pyro-processing” Argonne National Laboratory

3.6 SUMMARY

The review on reprocessing technologies above is not exhaustive and there are some other feasible methods left unmentioned, such as DIAMEX-SANEX and GANEX (both developed by Areva and CEA). Moreover, reprocessing technologies like Super-DIREX (Japan) are under laboratory tests worldwide. In fact, United States has been moving forward to developing both advanced aqueous methods and pyro-processing despite of the current non-reprocessing policy. Given the progress in these technologies as well as Generation IV reactors, expert estimates that there are over 30 years before U.S. revealing its final choice of reprocessing technology and it might be up to related businesses ultimatelyxxxi. But it is still meaningful to review the development of available reprocessing technologies at this stage so that U.S. could have better assessment on every feasible option.

According to the review on reprocessing technologies we conducted, PUREX is technically mature and by far the process with richest industrial experience. Nevertheless, the proliferation

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risks associated with PUREX remain to be a problem. The aqueous methods we discussed (UREX, COEX, NUEX) and pyro-processing alleviate proliferation concerns to a great extent. They are all technically feasible and have less radioactive waste at the end of cycle. Thus, the remaining factor influencing the choice between existing PUREX process and other technologies is economic feasibility. That is to say, which reprocessing technology is the most economically feasible? We would conduct a cost-benefit analysis in the next section.

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4 THE ECONOMIC APPROACH

For decades, the intense debates over the best approach to managing spent fuel and nuclear waste–whether it is better to dispose directly in geological repositories, or to recycle the heavy metal–have been centered on social ramifications and moral concerns. Due to the uncertainties around cost estimates, especially the costs of reprocessing technologies that are still under development, economic analysis of recycling has long been overlooked. Past academic journals that focused on cost benefit analysis gave out contradictory results, and thus it’s hard to draw a concrete conclusion based on previous studies. However, it is crucial to address the economic feasibility of recycling as people rely on cost benefit analysis to make the right decisions.

Source: World Nuclear Association

This is particularly important as nuclear industry is now facing an increasingly competitive landscape as a great number of, if not all, countries aim to ramp up nuclear energy production due to practical necessities and environmental concerns. At a minimum, if reprocessing facility is to be built for reasons other than economic ones, a ballpark estimate of the cost and returns is worthwhile to make as it provides a reference point to understand how much social resources are needed to achieve those other objectives.

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4.1 METHODOLOGY

In this analysis, we are going to present a direct comparison between two methods, PUREX and pyro-processing, mainly because the former is the only commercially implemented method as of now in recycling and the latter represents one of the most promising approaches still under development.

For some other methods, such as UREX and COEX, which are already discussed in the technology section, data on these approaches’ costs is not directly available. Furthermore, these technologies have never been put into commercial practices to reprocess fuel waste. The only well-documented method with widespread commercialized usage around the world, PUREX process, on the other hand, has been progressively improved during the last thirty years, which contributes to its large scale commercialization.

For the purpose of comparing pyro-processing and PUREX method, we set direct disposal as the basis point upon which we calculate the additional costs/benefits that each approach generates.

4.1.1 Quantifiable cost

Reprocessing, compared with open-ended nuclear fuel cycle, needs the development and construction of both separation machines and fast reactors.

Hence the two major components of the costs are 1. The R&D and construction cost of separation facilities and the R&D and construction of fast reactors. Based on the data collected, we take the maintenance, R&D, and construction costs of separation facilities as a variable cost with unit $/kgHM 2. Cost of reprocessing fuel waste for reusable material

4.1.2 Quantifiable benefits

Foreseeable and calculable benefits come in the form of 1. Amounts of Uranium saved by reprocessing and 2. Less storage needed by reprocessing. As we turn from an open fuel cycle to a close-end nuclear cycle, a certain proportion of nuclear resources, such as uranium extraction from the round, could be replaced by the uranium recovered from the reprocessing process. What is more, by recovering uranium and potentially other spent fuel components, the remaining waste to be stored and disposed is reduced.

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Source: The New York Times

Cost Benefits

Construction of Reprocessing Facilities; R&D and Construction of Fast reactors

Uranium Recovered from Reprocessing

Reprocessing fuel waste for reusable material Less Disposal Space Required

4.2 OUR APPROACH AND HYPOTHESIS

We assume we are going to build an integrated system of reactors and separation facilities in year 2016. The reactor is going to have a capacity of 150 GW per year and the reprocessing plant has a capacity of 800 tHM. We set constructing a LWR without reprocessing facilities as the benchmark, and we are going to compare the relative cost of building a system with pyro-processing and one with PUREX. Based on data provided by literatures, we assume PUREX will save 120 tons of Uranium per year, while Pyro-processing will save 240 tons per year. We use a constant discount rate of 7% each year. Both systems can last for 50 years.

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Assumptions:

Facility Construction Starts in Year 2016

Reactor Capacity 150 GW

Capacity Factor 85%

Annual Thermal Output 46,000

Mass of spent fuel 800 tHM

Reprocessing Plant Capacity 800 tHM

Uranium Saved by PUREX 120t/year

Uranium Saved by Pyro-processing 240t/year

Discount Rate Constant 7%

Facility Life Cycle 50 years

Source: Radovic 1997

4.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Review of literature:

Unit De Roo Shropshirexxxii

EPRI BCGxxxiii

Bunnxxxiv

Average

Front-end Fuel Costs

Natural Uranium $/kgHM 80 60 60 80 50 66

Enrichment of Natural Uranium

$/SWU 160 105 140 110 100 123

Fabrication of MOX $/kgHM 2,400 1,950 1,250 900 1,500 1600

Fabrication of FR fuel $/kgHM 2,400 2,100 2,600 1,500 2150

Reactor Costs

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LWR Capital $/kWe 4,000 2,300 2,500 1,500 2,575

FR Capital*

Reprocessing Cost

PUREX $/kgHM 1,600 2,020 1,000 600 1,000 1,244

UREX $/kgHM 1,600 1,700 1,000 1,433

Pyro-processing $/kgHM 3,200 2,900 2,750 1,000 2,463

Waste Costs

Interim Storage $/kgHM 200 120 150 150 200 164

Disposal (PUREX) $/kgHM 185 96 200 160

Disposal (UREX) $/kgHM 185 400 293

Disposal (FR, pyro-processing) $/kgHM 281 281

Discount Rate 7% 7.5% 3% 5% 6%

We use the average values of these 5 literatures as a reference for our data collection. A more detailed description of the data we use is as follows:

4.3.1 Construction and R&D of reactors

We consider the construction cost as a fixed cost that does not vary with years of operation and electricity produced

a. Light Water Reactor Construction: As to the cost of light water reactors construction, we adopt the formula developed by Rami H. Alamoudi (2012)xxxv, where the construction cost is dependent on the year the construction takes place, the capacity of the reactor, and the physical location. The formula is described as follows:

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● date: The date on which the construction permit was issued. The data are measured in years since January 1 1990 to the nearest month.

● cap: The net capacity of the power plant (MWe). ● ne: A binary variable where 1 indicate that plant was constructed in the north-east

region of US. The Cost of a future power plant can be calculated from the following relationship:

Cost = exp(1/( 0.760-0.00833date-0.000027cap-0.00860ne))

b. Fast Reactor Construction Due to limited sources of data and for the sake of simplicity, we assume the fast reactors needed by PUREX and pyro-processing have similar cost. The data of estimated construction costs lies in a wide range. While it costs France $ 9.1 billion to construct Superphenix reactor, some believe it will cost as much as $ 30 billion for the U.S. to build a commercial scale fast neutron reactor. In order to simplify the calculation, taken into consideration the spread of the data, we assume it will cost $ 10 billion to build a fast reactor with capacity of 150 GW per year.

4.3.2 Uranium Price

Nuclear utilities purchase uranium primarily through long-term contracts. Prices are determined by a number of factors, including base prices adjusted by inflation indices, reference prices (generally spot price indicators, but also long-term reference prices) and annual price negotiations. Contracts may contain other negotiated provisions as well. Hence, under these contracts, the actual price mechanisms are usually confidential.

The long-term price is published on a monthly basis and began the year at $50.00 per poundxxxvi. It declined to $44.00 per pound at the end of July 2014 and then rose to $49.00 at the end of the year. Long term contracting volumes were up compared to 2013, but were still much lower than those seen over the past ten years.

Even though spot prices are more volatile than long-term prices, spot price is a more accurate estimate in most cases. Hence, we use the most recent spot price $35.5 per pound as the price of Uranium in our calculation.

4.3.3 Formula

Taken into considerations of all the costs and benefits, we use the following formula to calculate the net benefit (cost) of PUREX and pyro-processing.

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The values of the variables are as follows:

Source: Hindawi Publishing Corporation

4.3.4 Calculation

Plugging the variables in the formula we got the net benefit of PUREX and pyro-processing.

A further breakdown shows that a huge proportion of additional cost of PUREX (around 75%) comes from construction of facilities, while, for pyro-processing, approximately 65% of total additional cost results from processing of used fuel. With the successful commercialization of PUREX, we are confident that future breakthroughs will drive the cost of recovering used fuel via pyro-processing, which will eventually bring pyro-processing’s net benefits closer if not bigger than those of PUREXxxxvii.

4.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis

From our sensitivity tables for various discount rate and uranium price, we are able to find that these two variables do not tend to change our outcome by a huge margin. Thus we are safe to conclude that under the framework of our model, with the quantifiable variables at hand, PUREX wins out as the more cost-effective method with current assumptions.

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4.4 DISCUSSION OF QUANTIFIABLE COSTS AND BENEFITS

The major costs of recycling are the construction and operating costs of fast reactors and reprocessing facilities. Even though the recycling technology can save Uranium and storage space, the quantifiable benefit it can bring is minimal, compared to the high cost of construction and operating. Hence, recycling can only be more economically feasible when the price of Uranium becomes higher or the construction and operating costs significantly drop.

Even though our calculation shows that both reprocessing methods have net negative benefits, it’s still too soon to draw the conclusion that reprocessing is not economically feasible. There are quite a few limitations in our calculation that need to be addressed.

4.4.1 Uncertainty of cost estimates

Since there is not any official database of nuclear energy, the accuracy of data cannot be guaranteed and is subject to the assumptions we made. Hence, if we adopt different assumptions, we may draw a different conclusion. This is especially problematic for technology that are still under development. The problem of uncertainty is also reflected in many previous academic literatures. The data provided by previous literatures is contradictory and the conclusions differ from people to people. If we want to end the discussion of which method is more economically feasible, we need more transparent data.

4.4.2 Uncertainty of future developments

Even though some data are relatively accessible, it’s rather hard to predict what the price will be in the future. For instance, while we assume, in our calculation, that both reactors are going to be built in 2016, in reality, there’s no plan for constructing pyro-processing systems in a foreseeable future. At the time when constructions of recycling systems are possible, the price of Uranium is rather unpredictable.

3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%20. 5 -8, 533, 635, 306 -8, 445, 540, 509 -8, 378, 627, 894 -8, 326, 900, 990 -8, 286, 227, 478 -8, 253, 722, 471 -8, 227, 345, 303 -8, 205, 633, 25225. 5 -8, 518, 197, 447 -8, 432, 651, 198 -8, 367, 674, 339 -8, 317, 443, 873 -8, 277, 947, 030 -8, 246, 382, 381 -8, 220, 768, 294 -8, 199, 684, 36430. 5 -8, 502, 759, 589 -8, 419, 761, 887 -8, 356, 720, 783 -8, 307, 986, 757 -8, 269, 666, 583 -8, 239, 042, 290 -8, 214, 191, 284 -8, 193, 735, 47535. 5 -8, 487, 321, 730 -8, 406, 872, 577 -8, 345, 767, 228 -8, 298, 529, 640 -8, 261, 386, 135 -8, 231, 702, 199 -8, 207, 614, 274 -8, 187, 786, 58640. 5 -8, 471, 883, 872 -8, 393, 983, 266 -8, 334, 813, 673 -8, 289, 072, 524 -8, 253, 105, 687 -8, 224, 362, 108 -8, 201, 037, 264 -8, 181, 837, 69845. 5 -8, 456, 446, 013 -8, 381, 093, 955 -8, 323, 860, 118 -8, 279, 615, 408 -8, 244, 825, 239 -8, 217, 022, 018 -8, 194, 460, 255 -8, 175, 888, 80950. 5 -8, 441, 008, 155 -8, 368, 204, 644 -8, 312, 906, 562 -8, 270, 158, 291 -8, 236, 544, 791 -8, 209, 681, 927 -8, 187, 883, 245 -8, 169, 939, 920

Sens i t i vi t y Anal ys i s f or PUREX ( Col umn: Ur ani um Pr i ce; Row: Di scount Rat e)

3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%20. 5 -37, 208, 710, 842 -32, 716, 980, 588 -29, 305, 276, 056 -26, 667, 852, 386 -24, 594, 013, 191 -22, 936, 665, 340 -21, 591, 760, 434 -20, 484, 718, 02425. 5 -37, 177, 835, 125 -32, 691, 201, 967 -29, 283, 368, 945 -26, 648, 938, 153 -24, 577, 452, 295 -22, 921, 985, 159 -21, 578, 606, 415 -20, 472, 820, 24730. 5 -37, 146, 959, 409 -32, 665, 423, 345 -29, 261, 461, 835 -26, 630, 023, 920 -24, 560, 891, 400 -22, 907, 304, 977 -21, 565, 452, 396 -20, 460, 922, 46935. 5 -37, 116, 083, 692 -32, 639, 644, 724 -29, 239, 554, 724 -26, 611, 109, 687 -24, 544, 330, 504 -22, 892, 624, 796 -21, 552, 298, 376 -20, 449, 024, 69240. 5 -37, 085, 207, 975 -32, 613, 866, 102 -29, 217, 647, 614 -26, 592, 195, 455 -24, 527, 769, 609 -22, 877, 944, 614 -21, 539, 144, 357 -20, 437, 126, 91445. 5 -37, 054, 332, 258 -32, 588, 087, 481 -29, 195, 740, 503 -26, 573, 281, 222 -24, 511, 208, 713 -22, 863, 264, 432 -21, 525, 990, 337 -20, 425, 229, 13750. 5 -37, 023, 456, 541 -32, 562, 308, 859 -29, 173, 833, 393 -26, 554, 366, 989 -24, 494, 647, 818 -22, 848, 584, 251 -21, 512, 836, 318 -20, 413, 331, 360

Sens i t i vi t y Anal ys i s f or Pyr opr ocess i ng ( Col umn: Ur ani um Pr i ce; Row: Di scount Rat e)

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The cost of constructing reactors is also subject to further technological development, which may substantially reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of recycling mechanism in the future. Having talked to the head of Argonne Nuclear Engineering Division–Dr. Mark A. Williamson over a phone interview, we learned that there’s a significant gap between the construction cost of 1st of a kind reactor and nth of a kind reactorxxxviii. As people build more reactors in the future, the construction and operation technology will naturally become more mature, and hence, the cost will see a significant drop. Since our current data points are mainly the cost of 1st of a kind reactor, it is rather difficult to estimate the real net benefits when all the government actually initiate the plan for building nuclear plant with recycling facilities.

4.4.3 The paradox of the economics of recycling

As we can see from our data, the major quantifiable benefit of recycling is the Uranium saved. This benefit is greater when the price of Uranium is higher. And even though the breakeven price of Uranium for reprocessing to be economically efficient as disposal is way higher than the current price now, we may expect the price to rise in the future due to reduced reachable Uranium ores and rising cost for cutting edge technology to extract Uranium from other sources such as the ocean. However, when recycling is more prominent, the price of Uranium will fall as the demand declines, which will in turn reduce the benefits of recycling.

4.5 DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS

These costs and benefits fall into two general categories. Some of the variables are hard to quantify due to low numbers of samples of observation. The rest of the variables, such as environmental hazard, are subject to great uncertainty about future events and highly contingent upon how fast and toward which direction our technology advances.

4.5.1 Radiation Hazard

It is hard to quantify the cost of radiation that each method potentially subject us to. To add radiation hazard to our model requires us to find a dose limit that the frequencies of stochastic effects of radiation is low enough to be deemed acceptable. Such research is not possible without further exploration of how each reprocessing method subject the general public but also the operators to radiation risk. The case is in favor of pyro-processing as this procedure does not include solvents containing carbon and hydrogen, which creates the risk of criticality accidents. In 1999, two workers died from radiation poisoning in Japan’s reprocessing facility in Ibaraki Prefecture. With pyro-processing, these lives could have been saved.

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4.5.2 Environmental Cost

In our research, we found it impossible to quantify the environmental cost due to the following reasons:

1. Based on our understandings of direct disposal, such method has the capability of preventing heavy metals from damaging the environment at least in a medium-term. Since the damage can only be realized when the containers of these chemicals malfunctions, the possibility of which is minimal as shown in the past, the risks of harming the environment are negligible in a 50-year period.

2. Even when the chemicals indeed leak from the container, it’s hard to measure the damage it could cause, as the local government would definitely take measures to minimize the environmental cost. Hence, instead of measuring the potential costs to the environment, we decided to estimate the cost to the government once an accident happens.

4.5.3 Potential Costs of Nuclear Leakage Accident

As there’s no case when disposed heavy metals leaked, we refer to the most recent nuclear disaster–Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, as an estimate of potential cost to the government when an accident happens. It is reported that, to deal with the nuclear disaster, Japanese government spends over 3.6 trillion Japanese yen (37 billion U.S. dollars). We suppose the cost of disposed heavy metal leakage would be only 10 percent as high as the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, which would be around 3.7 billion dollars. The potential cost of a disaster is also insignificant compared to the costs of construction and operating.

4.5.4 Proliferation risks

Proliferation risk refers to the concern of the plutonium diversion by the host state to develop nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices.xxxix An aqueous process that separates out plutonium and uranium, PUREX creates a proliferation risk that the plutonium is converted into plutonium oxide and stored before fuel fabrication. Proliferation concerns and irresponsible actions in the nuclear fields could threaten international peace and order. While 187 states now adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT), three states, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran have elected not to join.xl The risk of diversion of fissile materials for possible non-peaceful uses looms large. In fact, a major reason for moves toward direct disposal in the US, beginning in the 1970s, was the concern over proliferation. In the light of the culture of non-proliferation, France, for example, has proposed a variant of PUREX process, the COEX, which does not include a plutonium separation stream. Compared with PUREX which was

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designed for the extraction of nuclear material for the weapon production, Pyro-processing produces highly radioactive fuel, which is harder to manipulate for potential weapon proliferation.

4.6 CONCLUSION

Based on this result, both reprocessing methods are not economically feasible at this stage. This is the case because the price of Uranium and the saved quantity of Uranium are not high enough to offset the costs of fast reactors. Under current assumptions, PUREX is a more affordable option as its ongoing operating cost is much lower than the pyro-processing method. Taken into considerations of qualitative costs and benefits, PUREX has a higher cost in the long term due to its proliferations risks, and pyro-processing costs more in the short run due to its early-stage technology development. Despite a much higher cost than direct disposal under current assumptions, the result does not mean that we should not adopt recycling to close the fuel cycle. If a significant cost reduction in the construction of fast reactors is realized in the future, recycling would eventually be a viable option.

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5 CONCLUSIONS: U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

With our current methods of energy production, nuclear energy is clearly the energy of the future. It is both cleaner and safer than fossil fuels, and compared to renewables, it is much more efficient at producing energy at a large scale that is going to satisfy the energy-hungry demands of the modern world. As such, the fact that nuclear energy is a crucial part of our future also makes it all the more important to deal with its Achilles’ heel – nuclear waste management. Starting from a social comparison between direct disposal and reprocessing, we concluded very early on with the recommendation for reprocessing due to its overwhelming benefits in the long run, in terms of supply certainty, radiological hazards, and proliferation risks. From there, we delved into a feasibility analysis of the different reprocessing methods in an attempt to come up with a specific recommendation for reprocessing. Technologically, we found that PUREX is currently the most realistic option, and is in fact the only reprocessing method that is currently in use today, whereas safer technologies – UREX, derivations of UREX, and pyro-processing – still face significant barriers to being widely adopted due to technical difficulties. From an economic perspective, we found that while both PUREX and pyro-processing cost more than direct disposal, PUREX is the much cheaper option of the two, which also contributes to its global popularity. For those technical and economic reasons, we must recommend PUREX as the reprocessing method of choice. PUREX is a mature technology that has withstood the test of time, having been operated by countries around the global for decades already, and it is much more economically feasible compared to pyro-processing. While we cannot completely discount the proliferation risks associated with PUREX, we do believe that just how much of a risk it poses is questionable, since there had been no known incidence of stolen plutonium, and even it stolen, it would require a high level of technical expertise, unlikely to be had by terrorist organizations of rogue nations, to manufacture a plutonium bomb. However, we also do recognize the sensitive nature of nuclear proliferation and the potential catastrophic effect that could be had should the separated plutonium fall into the wrong hands, so we understand the conservative and cautious stance the United States takes on the subject. In the case that the U.S. cannot tolerate the risks associated with PUREX, we must urge the U.S. to continue funding places like the Argonne National Laboratory, which has been instrumental in our research of the topic, such that they could continue making advancements in the development and commercialization of safer methods such as UREX and pyro-processing. While the economic costs of these methods may be prohibitive today, there is absolutely no reason to believe that continued advancement in the relevant technologies will not drive their costs down. In fact, the researchers at Argonne fully expect that as the technology matures and more adoptions take place, pyro-processing will eventually become as affordable as PUREX due to economies of scale, since there is nothing intrinsically more expensive in pyro-processing than PUREX.

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In either case – whether the U.S. chooses to adopt PUREX or speed up the development and adoption of pyro-processing – we must recognize that reprocessing nuclear waste is our only option going forward in the long run. As responsible citizens of a just society, we cannot pass on our burdens to the future generations. Managing our own nuclear waste responsibly by reprocessing is an important step in the right direction.

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6 NOTES

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xxix Ibid.

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