northwestern callahan esman neg district5 round1

7/24/2019 Northwestern Callahan Esman Neg District5 Round1

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1NC


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1NC

U.S. withdrawal from South Korea wrecks the overall nuclear non-prolif regime---causes global prolif

Van Jackson -, Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New

American Security, and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, !!"#,$%&E '(VER%) (F *I+ER%ARIAN %&ININ- A+(.% %&E ./S/0(REAN A**IANCE,1htt23!!warontherocks/com!45"#!5!the62o7erty6of6li8ertarian6thinking6a8out6the6u6s6korean6alliance!

Second,were the U nited S tates to a8andon South orea, the global taboo against nuclear

2rolif erationwould dissolve and new nuclear 2owers would emerge, starting with South

orea / %he s2read of nuclear wea2ons is inimical to ./S/ interests, which is why the .nitedStates maintains a massi7e 8ureaucracy dedicated to the issue of arms control anddisarmament/When South orea9s 'resident 'ark Chung6&ee saw indications of ./S/a8andonment in the ":5s and early ";5s, he launched a clandestine nuclear 2rogram that wasonly shut down in res2onse to ./S/ assurances/ And after North orea9s multi2le attacks against

South orea in 45"5, a discourse among the country9s 2olicy elites emerged calling for a ninde2endent nuclear ca2a8ility, something that the ma


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defence 8udget has grown8y o7er #5since 455;, and fully a third of it is de7oted to nuclear wea2ons3 twice

the share of, say, France/ China , long a nuclear minnow, is adding to its stocks and in7esting hea7ily in

su8 marine s and mo8ile missile 8atteries/ 'akistan is amassing do)ens ofbattlefield nukes

to make u2 for its inferiority to India in con7entional forces/ North orea is thought to 8e ca2a8le of adding awarhead a year to its stockof around ten, and is working on missiles that can strike the west coast of the .nited States/E7en the No8el 2eace laureate in the White &ouse has asked Congress for almost G=#5 8illion to undertake a decade6long

2rogramme of modernisation of America9s arsenal/ @ New actors with more 7ersatile wea2ons ha7e turnednuclear doctrine into guesswork/ E7en during the cold war, des2ite all that game theory and 8rain2ower, the So7iet.nion and America fre?uently misread what the other was u2 to/ India and 'akistan, with little e2erience and less contact, ha7e

7irtually nothing to guide them in a crisis 8ut mistrust and 2aranoia/ If wea2ons 2roliferate in the Biddle East, asIran and then Saudi Ara8ia and 2ossi8ly Egy2t


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Failure to contain 2roliferation in 'yongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout

,sia / Ja2an and South orea might seek nuclearwea2onsand missile defenses/A 2entagonal

configuration of nuclear 2owers in the 'acific 8asin Russia, China, Ja2an, and the two oreasnot including the

.nited States, with its own 'acific interestsD could 2ut deterrence at risk and create enormous

temptation toward nuclear preemption / A2art from actual use or threat of use, North orea could e2loit

the mere eistence of an assumed nuclear ca2a8ility in order to su22ort its coerci7e di2lomacy/"@A fi7e6sided nuclearcom2etition in the 'acific would 8e linked, in geo2olitical deterrence and 2roliferation s2ace, to the eistingnuclear deterrents of India and 'akistan, and to the emerging nuclear wea2ons status of Iran /An

arc of nuclear instabilit# from %ehran to %okyo could place US prolif eration

strategies into the ash heap of histor# and call for more drastic military o2tions , not

ecluding preemptive war , defenses and counter6deterrent s2ecial o2erations/ In addition, an unrestricted

nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood ofaccidental or inad7ertent nuclear war / It

would do so 8ecause3 "D some of these states already ha7e histories of 2rotracted conflictK 4D states mayha7e2olitically unrelia8leor immature command and control systems, es2ecially during a crisis in7ol7ing adecision for nuclear first strike or retaliationK unrelia8leor immature systems might 2ermit a technical

malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deli8erate, 8ut unauthoriHed, launch 8y roguecommandersK and=D faulty intelligenceand warning systems might cause one side to misinter2retthe other9s defensi7e mo7esto forestall attack as offensi7e 2re2arations for attack, thus triggering amistaken 2reem2tion/


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$he United States should declare to the +eople"s epublic of China that in theevent of Korean unification the United States will not move its armed forces abovethe current /emilitari)ed 0one.

$he United States should increase its third-part# sanctions against North Korea"seports and financial sector including but not limited to designating North Koreaas a primar# mone#-laundering concern under Section 211 of the +atriot ,ct

$he United States should offer monetar# rewards for information leading tointerdiction of consignments bound for North Korea.

Solves Chinese securit# concerns about U.S. troops in a united KoreaBichael 3c/evitt 11, Vice 'resident and irector, Center for Na7al Analyses Strategic Studies,Fe8ruary 45"", $eterring North orean 'ro7ocations,1htt23!!www/8rookings/edu!research!2a2ers!45""!54!north6korea6mcde7itt're2aring to deal with hostile actions 8y North orea is intertwined with deterrence/ %he cruel

irony that the alliance faces is that while it 2ossesses escalation dominance with 8othcon7entional and nuclear wea2ons, it is disad7antaged 8y geogra2hy 8ecause of Seoul9s location/%his susce2ti8ility to con7entional attack com8ined with 'yongyang9s track record of high risk

8eha7ior ha7e, until recently, made the allies reluctant to test the im9s willingness to escalate ifthe alliance retaliates/Whether this new more aggressi7e stance will ha7e the desired effect and make im Jong6il more risk6a7erse remains to 8e seen, as

does the willingness of alliance leaders to actually go through with a stronger 0 and riskier 0 res2onse to a 2ro7ocation/What thealliance can do is to continue to em2loy a full range of di2lomatic and economic res2onses/Ne7ertheless,so long as these traditional methods do not ha7e whole6hearted su22ort from China

the retaliatory effect will 8e limited / %o sol7e this 2ro8lem the alliance mustsomehow persuade

4ei(ing that its security concerns are understood andwill not 8e com2romised if actions +ei6a86""e=68="6545>"44c#">8story/html

Bany 8elie7e that ./S/ sanctions against North orea are maed out/ In fact, ./S/ sanctions are

relativel# weak/ %here are no tra7el sanctions against North orea as with Cu8aD nor any against human rights 7iolators as with Sudan, Iran and +elarusD/ Criticall# ,

there are no 8road68ased, third62arty sanctions against North orea9s eports or financial

sector / Iran and +urma are designated as 2rimary money6laundering $concerns 1 under

Section ="" of the 'atriot Act, which restricts their access to the glo8al financial system/ +utNorth orea, the world9s most notorious counterfeiter and money6launderer, is not / Im2ort sanctions wererelaed 8etween 455O and 45"", and Americans can s till e2ort to North orea if they o8tain a license/@(22onents of sanctions argue that they would harm the most 7ulnera8le North oreans/ +u t North oreansare not hungry 8ecause their go7ernment is 2oor/ im Jong .n has more than G" 8illion in Euro2ean 8anks and hundreds of millions more in China/ In the "5s, while an estimated :55,555 to 4/# million Northoreans star7ed to death, im Jong Il 8ought doHens of new war2lanes 8ut im2eded the deli7ery of food aid/ %he World Food 'rogram sought GO million last year to feed hungry North oreans/ In 45"4 alone, 8y
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-north-korea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-north-korea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-north-korea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-north-korea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html


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South orean go7ernment estimates, im Jong .n s2ent G"/= 8illion on his missile 2rograms, an amount that could ha7e eliminated North orea9s food deficit for years/ Although multi2le ./N/ Security Councilresolutions 8an North orea from im2orting luury items, im recently s2ent G=55 million on a water 2ark, a fitness center, a dol2hin a?uarium, a =6 cinema and a ski resort stocked with Canadian

snowmo8iles/@%here is good reason to 8elie7e that cutting 'yongyang9s links to the glo8al financial

system could force changes in its behavior. In Se2tem8er 455# , the ./S/ %reasury

sanctioned a Chinese 8ank for laundering money, including counterfeit dollars, for then6leaderim Jong Il/ %he sanctions 8locked the 8ank9s access to corres2onding accounts in ./S/ financial

institutionsthat led to the glo8al financial systemK this caused a run on the bank and nearl# destro#ed it.

(ther banks around the world , ?uestioned 8y the %reasury e2artment a8out their North orean de2osits,8egan to 8lock or close

those accounts /Soon, im Jong Ilwas financially isolated/ &e 8egan selling his gold reser7es to sustain his regime/ (ne North

orean di2lomat told a ./S/ counter2art, 67ou finall# found a wa# to hurt us .8 @%he8i2artisan

North orea Sanctions Enforcement Act would block the offshore accounts that pa# for

im Jong .n9setra7agant lifestyle, weapons programs and the secret 2olice, 8order guards and others who terroriHe the North orean 2eo2le/ im9srule has 8een marked 8y 8ru tal 2urges and crackdowns/ Financial 2ressure could u ndermine his ca2acity to seal 8orders, frighten his 2eo2le and 8uy the loyalty of North orea9s elites/@A financial strategy also

would 8e harder for China to undermine than a di2lomatic strategy or traditional trade sanctions/ In 455# and again last year, Chinese 8anks shunned North orean de2osits that were targeted 8y the .nitedStates/ %he Chinese go7ernment may not share Washington9s or Seoul9s security or humanitarian goals, 8ut Chinese 8anks would not risk their access to the glo8al economy to sa7e im/ And without the hel2 of

Chinese 8anks, +ei


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*ithdrawal would start with the U.S. transferring wartime operational control ofthe 9K armed forces back to South Koreaoug 4andow 15, aff guy, ;!4O!">, $South orea3 Fore7er e2endent on America,1

htt23!!www/cato/org!2u8lications!commentary!south6korea6fore7er6de2endent6americaAt the same time, there is wides2read fear, mostly among South oreans, that transferring ('C(N would encourage America to

$a8andon1 the R(/ +ut retired ./S/ -en/ Ronald -riffith sharedthe concern3 $the first ste2 to withdraw ./S/

forces is turn over the command / %hat9s ste2 num8er one, and it9s a sli22ery slo2e/1(f course, the .nited States has 2ermanent military de2loyments in Ja2an and across Euro2e without eercising o2erational controlof host nations9 militaries/ Boreo7er, the 7ery conce2t of a8andonment is odd/ Washington has defended the South for sity6fouryears/ -i7en the dramatic change in the regional6threat en7ironment, withdrawing American forces would 8e a natural act of goodsense/

Indeed, ('C(Nmerely is the sym2tom, since it grows out of the"#= defense treaty, mutual in name only/ A 8iHarreinsistence that commitments cannot change with circumstances similarly afflicts the 2lanned rede2loyment south of ./S/ forces/-en/ Curtis Sca2arrotti, commander of the ./S/ Forces orea,ad7ocates retaining a troo2 tri2wire north of Seoul to ensure automaticAmerican in7ol7ement in any conflict3 $there may 8e a need o2erationally to lea7e some residual in those areas !5;!south6korea6de2endence6in6the6age6of6o2con!Lall2agesPyes

While ('C(N transitiongi7es rise to concerns o7er the credi8ility of the ./S/ commitment, it also heightens the

possibilit# of entrapment for Seoul / Which is to say, the necessar# steps toward transfer of

control could in7ol7e the R( in ./S/6dri7en 2olicies that it would rather avoid / %his is

e7ident in the case of missile defense/ %he R( is undou8tedly concerned a8out the 'R9s missile

2rogram andrecently statedthat itsown orean Air and Bissile efense system ABD is incapable of

independentl# intercepting the 'R9s Rodong 6class wea2ons / While it has 7arious 2lans to u2grade

its low6tier system, Seoulrecently stated that it is open to the 2otential ./S/ de2loyment ofa %erminal &igh

Altitude Area efense $:,,/ D 8attery to the orean 'eninsula/ %his could signal Seoul harnessing a ./S/

commitmentin order to avoid strategic decoupling or abandonment , 8ut it could also lead toentra2ment/

(n the one hand, Seoul is o2en to the %&AAde2loyment 8ecause it offers another layer of defense at no initial cost/ Also, thesystem could2otentially8e integrated into ABthrough a later 2urchase, thus enhanc ing Seoul9s a8ility to

more inde2endently deterthe threat from 'yongyang/ $aking on full op erational con trol

would re;uire as much /At this 2oint, Seoul denies it has 2lans to 2urchase such a system/ (nthe other hand, many ./S/ officials and defense analysts 7iew the 2otential %&AA de2loyment as another ste2 towards integrating


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the R( into the larger .S6led 8allistic missile defense +BD system/ In fact, there has 8een s2eculation that Washington is

2ushing Seoul to 5 and other non62roliferation resolutions/%he 2ractice of seeking absolute strategic advantage

should 8e a8andoned /Countries should neither de7elo2 missile defense systems that undermine glo8al strategic sta8ility nor de2loy wea2ons in outer s2ace/ &is s2eech ga7e th e world a clear6cut signal that China was not infa7or of any kind of missile defense system, which, he e2lained, would harm the sta8ility in the re gion/4@China9s concerns o7er the .S missile defense 2rogram ha7e re2eatedly 8een cited in o fficial 2u8lications/ %he white 2a2er on China National efense of 45"5said, $International military com2etition remains fierce/ Ba


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Asia6'acific region will ha7e negati7e effects on glo8al and regional strategic stabilit#, and go against thesecurity needs of the countries in the Asia6'acific region/1 &e continued that China o7er decades had clearly demanded through 7arious channels that the .nited States fully res2ect and take care of th e security concerns of rele7ant 2arties, including China, act2rudently on the issue of missile defense, and sol7e the 2ro8lem of missile 2roliferation through 2olitical and di2lomatic means/ $We also urge rele7ant countries in the Asia6'acific region to act 2rudently in coo2erating with the .S on missile defense, and not

de7elo2 or de2loy missile defense systems that eceed the needs of its de7elo2ment/1 *uo added that China also $firmly o8/ She said, $Some countries ha7e 2ushed forward anti6missile system de2loyment in the Asia6'acific region to seek unilateralsecurity, which runs against regional sta8ility and mutual trust as well as 2eace and sta8ility in Northeast Asia%his mo7e causes e7en more concerns, under the 8ackdro2 of com2le and sensiti7e regional situation/1 She called on rele7ant countries to 2roceed from

the 8roader 2icture of regional 2eace and sta8ility and 8e committed to maintaining regional security through 2olitical and di2lomatic means/ $Rele7ant countries should not take their own security concerns as ecuses for damaging others9 security interests/1: @+ythe end of 45">, the discussion o7er the 2ossi8le de2loyment of %&AA in South orea again 2reoccu2ied the media in China and the R(/ In No7em8er 45">, Am8assador to South orea iu -uohong warned that if South orea allows the .nited States to de2loy

the %&AA 8attery on its soil, it would hurt Seoul6+ei


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Korea

$roop withdrawal undermines deterrence against North Korea---triggers full-scalewar%om Nichols 15, 'rofessor of National Security Affairs at the Na7al War College and an ad, $W&) A (REAN '.**(.% IS A REA**) +AIEA,1 htt23!!warontherocks/com!45">!5;!why6a6korean62ullout6is6a6really68ad6idea!In a recent article for War on the Rocks, ./S/ Army Ba and returned home/ %his, for 8oth Stalin and im,was an indication that an
http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/


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in7asion would not 2ro7oke a ./S/ res2onse/ %his was a terri8le miscalculation , and itwas

grounded in a U.S. troop withdrawal /

%he North oreans , 2articularlythe old marshals of the orean military for whom the orean

War is still a sacred memory,wouldno dou8t love to see a repla# of 15 , andwould consider it

a great 7ictory/ %hey would 8e a8le to gloat that they had achie7ed what e7en their 8ig 8rothers in China

had 8een una8le todo for o7er :5 years3 a oreawhose soil is completel# untainted b#,merican boots / Boreo7er, remo7ing American troo2s from oreawill signal to the

Chinese thatwe want no further ./S/ 2resence in their region, and remo7e one more

com2lication in any Chinese strategy of e2ansion or intimidation/

In sum, a 2ullout would raise North Korea"s stature , reduce China9s dwindling influence o7er

its client, and lea7e 'yongyang0 in its own eyes 0 a 2eer to +ei!5=!north6korea6human6rights6tolerating6the6intolera8le!%he current situationas it standswith the 'R isonewithout a military solution/ Not only does the maim$if you 8reak it you own it1 as 'aul Whitefield recently notedD a22ly, 8ut a far a more o87ious reason 2ersists/ %hat is, the 'Rhas nuclear wea2ons/ No re7olution in military affairs is going to guarantee with a8solutecertaintythat such wea2ons will 8e eliminated 8efore North orea could use them / Boreo7er, the

./S/itself, despite its heavil# militari)ed orientation toward the North, has prevented

the 9K from taking escalator# actions in res2onse to what are normally considered acts

of war/ As aniel 'inkston writes3 $%he ./S / 2olitical and military leadershi2s are unwilling to fight

a full-scale war in Korea o7er the shooting down of an aircraft, the sinking of a shi2, theinsertion of 'A S2ecial Forces for limited o2erations, or firing artillery on a fishing 7illage/1 +ruce Cuming9s

descri8es the ./S/ 2resence as dual deterrence or ci7il6war deterrence, meaning the

simultaneous deterrence of North orea from starting a conflagration and of South Korea

from escalating it/ What is more, nuclear wea2ons notwithstanding, e7en the R'9s con7entional ca2a8ilities thoughdated and far less ad7anced than ./S/ and R( arsenalsD make 7ery real 'yongyang9s threat to turn Seoul into $a sea of fire/1 %houghan all6out conflict would likely 8ring a8out the end of the 'R as a so7ereign state, it would 7ery likely inflict immense damage onthe South orean ca2ital, threaten %okyo, and 2otentially 8ring a8out larger insta8ility in the region 8efore its demise/ In sum,

8ringing the regime down through greater 2ressure is not possible , 8oth8ecause ke#

regional powers will not allow it and the military o2tion is untena8le in any rationaland

moralD calculation/ %he 7ery real 2otential for e7en greater human suffering and destruction is sim2ly too 2rohi8iti7e a risk/ %hislea7es the third o2tion, engagement/


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China

0ero chance of U.S.-China escalation---ever# side has obvious incentives tomaintain peace

Anthony &/ Cordesman 12, the Arleigh A/ +urke Chair in Strategy at CSISK and Ashley &ess,BA in international relations from Seoul National .ni7ersity, June 45"=, $%he E7ol7ing Bilitary+alance in the orean 'eninsula and Northeast Asia3 Volume II,1htt23!!csis/org!files!2u8lication!"=5#"=B+7olume4/2dfChina does not ha7e a military 2resence in North orea, 8ut might well su22ort the 'R inany conflict it felt could threaten the sur7i7al of its regime, totally defeat the 'R9s forces,and!or 8ring R( and .S forces near the 'R6Chinese 8order/ %he dis2osition of Chinesemilitary forces near the oreas can 8e seen in Figures IV/= to IV/>4, and Figure IV/>= showsthe command structure of the Chinese military/ It is clear that China can already de2loy massi7e

amounts of ground and air forces in a orean conflict if it chooses to do so, 8ut faces ma(or

;ualitative limits relati7e to the forces the .S can 2ro


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im3 A lot of the animosity 8etween North orea and the .S forces could 8e resol7ed through ste2ssuch as an inter6orean confederation and 2eace agreementsigning/ If we 2ursue reunification in

that manner, there ma# not be a large US@K facing China directly across its 8orders/&ani3 &as the South orean go7ernment de7elo2ed any ideas for the role and future of .SF after reunificationLim3 %he one who had the most 2ioneering de8ate on a 2ost6reunification role for .SF was im ae6


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./S/6China war in a cou2le of ways/@First, 8oth the . nited S tates and China are immense ly

large countriesaccording to the Central Intelligence Agency, the ./S/ and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world 8y area, at ,O4:,:;# and ,#:,:" s?uare kmres2ecti7ely/%hey also ha7e difficult to2ogra2hical features and com2le 2o2ulations/ As such, they are

virtuall# uncon;uerable 8y another 2ower/@%hisis an im2ortant 2oint and differentiates the current

strategic en7ironment from historical cases where 2ower transitions led to war / For eam2le, in Euro2e

where many of the historical cases deri7e from,each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their2ower ca2a8ilities to such a degree that they could credi8ly threaten the other side9s nationalsur7i7al/ Neither China nor the ./S/ has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen

their insecurity and therefore the securit# dilemma they o2erate within/@+esides 8eing immensely large countries,

China and the ./S/ are also se2arated 8y the 'acific (cean, whichwill also weaken their

sense of insecurit# and threat perception towards one another/ In many of the 7iolent

2ower transitions of the 2ast, starting with S2arta and Athens 8ut also including the Euro2ean ones, the ri7al states were located inclose 2roimity to one another/ +y contrast,when great 2ower conflict has 8een a7oided, the states ha7eoften had considera8le distance 8etween them, as was the case for the ./S/ and +ritish 2owertransition and the 2eaceful end to the Cold War/ %he reason is sim2leand similar to the one a8o7e3 the difficultyof 2ro


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egionalism

South Korea is a leader nowJo3 4#4D/ %he new dimension can 8etermed structural foreign 2olicy4 which seeks to influence or sha2e sustaina8le 2olitical, legal, socio6economic, security and mentalstructures at the international le7el/

U.S. presence is ke# to the effectiveness and scope of South Korea"s leadership---provides the ps#chological securit# necessar# for 9K polic#makers to focus onissues be#ond the peninsula

Andrew 9"Neil 1%, 'rofessor of 'olitical Science and &ead of the School of -o7ernment andInternational Relations at -riffith .ni7ersity, June 45"#, $South orea as a Biddle 'ower3-lo8al Am8itions and *ooming Challenges,1 htt23!!www/cfr/org!asia6and62acific!middle62ower6korea!2=::4=LcidPotr6marketing6use6middle2owerkoreaIn addition to unilateral declarations 8y a growing num8er of states that mirror their national6role conce2tion as middle 2owers,

one tangi8le eam2le of the 2ersistence of middle62ower identity is the so6called BI%A initiati7e/Formed in Se2tem8er 45"= at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Beico, Indonesia, South orea, %urkey, and Australia, the


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2ur2ose of BI%A was descri8ed 8y the R(9s foreign minister as $2laying a 8ridging role 8etweencountries with different 7iews on the international stageand e2anding their role in esta8lishing a 8etterworld order 8y taking ad7antage of indi7idual middle 2ower countries9 di2lomatic assets andcoo2erati7e mechanisms/1O %he most recent meeting of BI%A was held on the sidelines of the No7em8er 45"> -45summitK the


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of the need to maintain some distance strategically from +ei


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security, 2olitical issues and other core elements/ Although there would undou8tedly 8e many hurdles andconstraints in this 2rocess,with 2olitical will and wisdom, regional coo2eration in Northeast Asia, ande7en in Asia generally, has a real chance/

China refuses participation in an# multilateral securit# mechanism---means the

U.S. alliance s#stem is the bedrock of securit# coop and balancing in the region-udrun*acker 1%, Senior Fellow in the Asia Research i7ision at the -erman Institute forInternational and Security Affairs, Bay 45"#, $Security Coo2eration in East Asia3 Structures,%rends and *imitations,1htt23!!www/sw26

8erlin/org!fileadmin!contents!2roducts!research2a2ers!45"#R'5>wkr/2dfWhile the region isfacing a 8road range of security challenges, it is at the same time home to a com2le we8 of8ilateral and multilateral security arrangements/ In 2lace of one regional mechanism, se7eral 2artially o7erla22ingorganiHations ha7e emerged in East Asia/ Some of them deal eclusi7ely with security issuesK others address additional issues as well/In contrast to Western6DEuro2e, all of them are characteriHed 8y weak institutionaliHation/

&owe7er, the hard 6 backbone8 of securit# in 'acific Asia is2ro7ided not8y these di7erse

regional forums 8ut8y the fi7ebilateral securit# alliances of the .S$hu8s and s2okes1D/ In 7iew

of the fact that China has 8een growing stronger in the last ten years, including in military terms, these

alliances seem indispensable , which is why they ha7e 8ecome closer and more intensi7e/%hanks to its growing economic significance for the neigh8oring countries, which was accom2anied 8y a di2lomatic $charm

offensi7e1,4 China had initially im2ro7ed its standing in the region after the late "5s/ Since 455, howe7er, +ei


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%he aggregate data suggests otherwise , howe7er/ %he Institute for Economics and 'eace has constructed a $-lo8al'eace Inde1 annually since 455;/ A key conclusion they draw from the 45"4 re2ort is that $%he a7erage le7el of2eacefulness in 45"4 isa22roimately the same asit was in 45 5;/1=O Interstate 7iolencein 2articular hasdeclinedsince the start of the financial crisis 0 as ha7e military e2endituresin most sam2led

countries/ (ther studies confirm that the -reat Recession hasnot triggered any increase in 7iolent

conflictK the secular decline in 7iolence that started with the end of the Cold War has not 8een re7ersed/= Rogers +ru8akerconcludes, $the crisis has notto date generatedthe surge in 2rotectionist nationalism or ethniceclusion that might ha7e 8een e2ected/1>5None of these data suggest that the glo8al economy is o2erating swimmingly/ -rowth remains un8alanced and fragile, and hasclearly slowed in 45"4/ %ransnational ca2ital flows remain de2ressed com2ared to 2re6crisis le7els, 2rimarily due to a drying u2of cross68order inter8ank lending in Euro2e/ Currency 7olatility remains an ongoing concern/ Com2ared to the aftermath ofother 2ostwar recessions, growth in out2ut, in7estment, and em2loyment in the de7elo2ed world ha7e all lagged 8ehind/ +ut the-reat Recession is not like other 2ostwar recessions in either sco2e or kindK e2ecting a standard $V16sha2ed reco7ery wasunreasona8le/ (ne financial analyst characteriHed the 2ost6455O glo8al economy as in a state of $contained de2ression/1>" %he

key word is $contained,1 howe7er/ -i7en the se7erity, reach and de2th of the 455O financial crisis, the2ro2er com2arison is with -reat e2ression/ And8y that standard, the outcome 7aria8les look

im2ressi7e/ As Carmen Reinhart and enneth Rogoff concluded in %his %ime is ifferent3 $that its macroeconomic outcomehas 8een only the most se7ere glo8al recession since World War II 0 and not e7en worse 0 must 8e regarded as fortunate/1>4


20/51


21/51

C+


22/51

9verview

Second it offers monetar# rewards for information leading to interdiction ofshipments bound for North Korea---that crushes their abilit# to circumventsanctions b# encouraging their facilitators outside the countr# to turn each other

in for competitive advantageJohn S/ +ark 15, research associate at BI%, $%he ey to the North orean %argeted Sanctions'uHHle,1 %he Washington uarterly [ =;3= 22/ "04">,htt2s3!!tw?/elliott/gwu/edu!sites!tw?/elliott/gwu/edu!files!downloads!'arkFall45">/2dfIn summary, sanctions ha7e strengthened the North orean regime 8y forcing it to inno7ate/ %he large North orean state trading com2anies did not constitute the inno7ationtheir newly formed 2rocurement

channels with uni?ue Chinese middlemen o2erating in the glo8aliHing Chinese national economy did/ Bore efficient Chinese middlemen6centric

2rocurement networks 8ased in a glo8aliHing Chinese national economy ha7e replaced the

North orean regime9s 2re7ious method of conducting direct transactions and utiliHing its

freighters for shi2ment/@%he scale of this inno7ation grew significantly after then6'remier Wen Jia8ao signed a set of economic de7elo2ment, tourism, and education agreements in(cto8er 455 that, while sounding innocuous, ser7ed as 2olitical co7er under which Chinese com2anies could O -i7en that these middlemen

2eriodically utiliHe 2rocurement channels which transit through congested 2orts in Singa2ore

and uala *um2ur, monetar# rewards leading to the interdiction of North orea68ound

consignments could 2ro7e to 8e effecti7e in disrupting /+K procurement networks/ For

these middlemen, this incentive program could present opportunities to epose and

nullif# a competitor /


23/51

,$A +erm

+erm fails---withdrawing troops crushes negotiating leverage and signals that ourdiplomatic efforts aren"t credible-eoffrey @attig 12, BA candidate at .C San iego9s School of International Relations!'acific

Studies, S2ring 45"=, $A New A22roach to North orea3 Em2owering Regional Actors 8yReducing the American Bilitary Foot2rint,1 htt23!!www/iar6gwu/org!sites!default!files!article2dfs!A45New45A22roach45to45North45orea45645-eoffrey45Fattig/2df

%his risk would 8e amplified rather than minimiHedthrough a new engagement 2olicy with its longstanding

ad7ersaries, es2eciallywith American troo2s lea7ing the 'eninsula/ Rather than acting as a catal#st

for change such a mo7e could embolden the /+K to maintain its current posture

and lead to the regime 8ecoming more belligerent and difficult to engage / Indeed, man#

anal#sts regardthe songun, or military first, foundations of the im regime as 8eing an insurmounta8le 8arrier to

meaningful 2rogress through negotiation and dialogue/iii According to this 7iew, the only thing that North orea

understands is strength, and a combined strateg# of engagement and militar#withdrawal on the 2art of the U nited S tateswould 8e sending eactl# the wrong signal /

Combining sanctions with militar# resolve is ke# to comprehensive deterrence---sanctions alone don"t solveuk6min7un 15, Chancellor of the orea National i2lomatic Academy, 'h// in 'oliticalScience, eio .ni7ersity, and Wooseon Choi, No7 " 45">, $+reaking the North orean Nucleareadlock3 a -lo8al Action 'lan,1 htt2s3!!tw?/elliott/gwu/edu!8reaking6north6korean6nuclear6deadlock6glo8al6action62lan'ro7iding incenti7es will act as an im2ortant com2onent of the glo8al action 2lan/ +ut these steaks must also come with hammersthe international community must

8e willing to im2lement consistent sanctions according to .N resolutionswhile firml#

showing itswill to im2ose stronger sanctions in case of further 2ro7ocations/ In order to achie7e this, the .nitedStates and South orea should strengthen their coordination with Ja2an/ @It is also critical to maimiHe Chinese coo2eration/ China has 8ecome a lifeline for North orea3 a8out 5 2ercent of North orean trade,including its oil and food im2orts, de2ends on China/: North orea also uses China as an im2ortant conduit for international financial transactions/ %hus, for effecti7e s anctions, Chinese 2artici2ation is2aramount/ South orea can hel2 here 8y u2grading its 2olitical relationshi2 with China/ South orea and China ha7e actually im2ro7ed their relationshi2 in recent years, while North orea9s relationshi2 withChina has 8een strained due to the nuclear 2ro8lem/ %o hel2, the .nited States and South orea need to institutionaliHe a trilateral strategic dialogue with China as a coordinating channel/ %he first "/#6track

trilateral dialogue was held in Seoul last year/ @Recently, China has 8een more willing to use tough measures in d ealing with North orea, although it has not 8een willing to risk desta8iliHing North orea/ uringthe June 45"= Sunnyland summit and 'resident 'ark9s June 45"= 7isit to China, Chinese leaders9 attitude re7ealed that they ha7e 8egun to realiHe the im2ortance of effecti7e 2ressure in 2ursuing thedenucleariHation of North orea/ In fact, China has acti7ely 2artici2ated in the .N sanctions ado2ted after the third nuclear test of North orea while holding off on im Jong6un9s 7isit to China/ %he +ank ofChina cut off doing 8usiness with North orea9s 2rimary foreign echange 8ank, the Foreign %rade +ank,; and it was fu rther re2orted that China has sto22ed its oil e2ort to North orea since early this year,

ece2t for some oil 2roducts such as gasoline and kerosene/O@%his 2ressure through sanctions should combine with militar#

resolve to strengthen comprehensive deterrence / %he U nited S tates and South orea

must reinforce their capabilities and show their firm will to punish an# North

Korean militar# provocations , 8ut Washington and Seoul must not act 2ro7ocati7ely themsel7es/


24/51

,$A China

China doesn"t need to get on board---financial sanctions scare off Chinese bankseven if the Chinese government tries to undercut themJoshua Stanton 15, attorney and former ./S/ Army Judge Ad7ocate in orea, ad7ised the

&ouse Committee on Foreign Affairs on North orea issues, and Sung6)oon *ee, assistant2rofessor of orean studies at %ufts .ni7ersity9s Fletcher School of *aw and i2lomacy,$Financial sanctions could force reforms in North orea,1 Fe8 45 45">,htt2s3!!www/washington2ost/com!o2inions!financial6sanctions6could6force6reforms6in6north6korea!45">!54!45!:"d"a=a>6a86""e=68="6545>"44c#">8story/html%here is good reason to 8elie7e that cutting 'yongyang9s links to the glo8al financial system

could force changes in itsbehavior / InSe2tem8er 455#, the ./S/ %reasury sanctioned a Chinese

8ankfor laundering money, including counterfeit dollars, for then6leader im Jong Il/ %he sanctions 8locked the 8ank9s access tocorres2onding accounts in ./S/ financial institutions that led to the glo8al financial systemK this caused a run on the 8ank and nearlydestroyed it/ (ther 8anks around the world, ?uestioned 8y the %reasury e2artment a8out their North orean de2osits, 8egan to8lock or close those accounts/ Soon, im Jong Il was financially isolated/ &e 8egan selling his gold reser7es to sustain his regime/(ne North orean di2lomat told a ./S/ counter2art, $)ou finally found a way to hurt us/1@%he 8i2artisan North orea SanctionsEnforcement Act would 8lock the offshore accounts that 2ay for im Jong .n9s etra7agant lifestyle, wea2ons 2rograms and the

secret 2olice, 8order guards and others who terroriHe the North orean 2eo2le/ im9s rule has 8een marked 8y 8rutal 2urges andcrackdowns/ Financial 2ressure could undermine his ca2acity to seal 8orders, frighten his 2eo2le and 8uy the loyalty of North

orea9s elites/@A financial strategyalso would be harder for China to undermine thana

di2lomatic strategy or traditional trade sanctions/ In 45 5# and again last year, Chinese 8anks

shunned North Korean deposits that were targeted b# the U nited S tates / %he

Chinese go7 ernment may not share Washington9sor Seoul9s security or humanitarian goals, 8ut Chinese

8anks would not risk their access to the global econ om# to save Kim . And withoutthe

hel2 of Chinese 8anks, +ei


25/51

Solves Nucleari)ation

&ndependent of negotiations sanctions undermine North Korea"s capacit# forprolif and solve their international signaling args+ruce Klingner 12, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, &eritage Foundation, $North

orean0Cu8an Arms Shi2ment Shows Need to %ighten Sanctions,1 July 44 45"=,htt23!!www/heritage/org!research!re2orts!45"=!5;!north6korean6cu8an6arms6shi2ment6shows6need6to6tighten6sanctionsCritics of ./N/ and ./S/ sanctions fre?uently ?uestion their effecti7eness, since they ha7e not yet

forced +#ong#ang to a8andon its nuclear and missile 2rograms/ +ut neither did re2eated

8ilateral and multilateralefforts atnegotiation and unconditional engagement . Ado2ting such a narrow

7iew2oint o7erlooks the multifaceted utilit# of sanctions 3@ $he# send a strong signal

that the glo8al community will u2hold ./N/ resolutions/ If laws are not enforced and defended, they cease to ha7e7alue/@%hey show that there are conse?uences for defying international agreements 8y im2osing a hea7y 2enalty on 7iolators/@%hey constrain

North orea9s a8ility to ac;uire the components tech nolog# and finances to

augment and epand its arsenal /@%hey imped e North Korean nuclear missile and

conventional arms prolif eration / @In con5O=>O/htmlIts difficult to se7er No rth o rea s trade networks / .nder a .nited Nations resolution enacted to 2ressure thecountry to a8andon its nuclear wea2ons 2rogram, countries are gi7en 8road authority to search shi2s for North orean cargo/@Notall countries ha7e the ca2acity to eercise that a8ility, said elsey a7en2ort, director for non62roliferation 2olicy at the non2rofitArms Control Association/ Countries dont always ?uickly re2ort 8ack if there are concerns, and we dont hear a8out issues until

months later/@ :owever sanctions ha7e 8een most effecti7e against North oreawhen

imposed on financial institutions that manage the countr#Es treasure /@In455#, the

%reasury e2artment 8egan in7estigating 4 anco / elta ,sia, a small family6owned 8ank in the Chinesegam8ling encla7e of Bacau/ .nder Section ="" of the 'atriot Act, the de2artment was granted a mandate with a 8road set of tools to

2ursue any money laundering connected to terrorist grou2s/ Wielding its newfound financial wea2on, the %reasury warned

that the 8ank would 8e 8arred fromany dealings in the ./S/ financial system causing a run on the

8ank/ Cut off from a8out G4> million, North orea 8ecame a financial pariah as 8anks and other

institutions 8egan to back awa# , fearing similar actions 8y the ./S/@ /espite the fact that

the ./S/ has no trade with North orea, there were no bank accounts in the U.S. fro)en ,

and this was not the su8


26/51

isolated in a way they never felt in recent memor# ,Juan Marate, author of a 8ook on Section ="" called

%reasurys War, said in a 45"= XA with %he Wall Street Journal/ It was the first time the No rth o reans called

the *hite :ouse to initiate talks / %hey 8egan and ended e7ery con7ersation saying they wanted their money8ack/@%he sanctions were e7entually lifted under the -eorge W/ +ush administration after 'yongyang 8egan testing nuclear

wea2ons in 455:/ +ut the sanctionsannounced on Friday could 8e aimed at cultivat ing a similar fear

among financial institutions and within the current North Korean regime /@%hey

ha7e the effect of instilling some ps#chological doubt in Kim Jong Un , said Sung6)oon

*ee, an assistant 2rofessorof orean studies at %ufts .ni7ersitys Fletcher School/ Is that going to change im Jong .ns

8eha7ior o7ernightL No/ +ut the longer the duration and greater enforcement of sanctions, the strong

the U.S. will be when negotiating later on/@%o effecti7ely 2unish North orea for its di2lomatic 8elligerence

and alleged role in 8reaching Sonys ser7ers, the ./S/ must make it difficult for regime leaders to

access their mone#, a7en2ort said/@ $he Kim regimeEs primar# concern is regime

survival not the well68eing of the North orean 2eo2le, she said in an inter7iew on Friday/ 'ressures on the economy alonewill not dri7e the im regime to make decisions in the same manner that other countries would/


27/51

China ,dvantage


28/51

Not $hreatening

China doesn"t care---the#"d never be stupid enough to think we"d use US@K againstthem and the# know we"d draw them down in the event of reunification---that"sKim

Foldsteina magaHine affiliated with the Chinese Na7y ran a series of articles in August 45"4 that e7aluatedthe 2ossi8le role of .S tactical nuclear wea2onry that may 8e de2loyed to the orean 'eninsulaas a 2art of new and e7ol7ing Air0Sea +attle doctrine/ Such de2loyments, the article concludes,constitute a $huge threat1 to China9s ca2ital, as well as northeastern industrial centers and na7al

8ases

U.S. forces in Korea don"t antagoni)e China%ommy R/ 3i)e 1


29/51

oreans also seek to a7oid eacer8ating tensions with China and therefore do not fa7our forms

of coo2eration with the .S that could 8e 2ercei7ed 8y +ei


30/51

No *ar

No China war --- the#Ell be restrained because of economic and political concernsStutter 15 =!"!"> Ro8ert Sutter is 'rofessor of 'ractice of International Affairs at -eorge

Washington .ni7ersity, China6.S Focus, Barch ", 45">, Why China A7oids Confronting the

./S/ in Asia, htt23!!www/chinausfocus/com!foreign62olicy!why6china6a7oids6confronting6the6u6s6in6asia64!

Forecasts talk of./S/ retreat from domineering China or an ine7ita8le ./S/6China conflict/ :owever

enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting ,merica , the

regional leader/ omestic 2reoccu2ations Chinese economic growth and one62arty rule re?uire sta8ility/ And

protecting Chinese securit# and sovereignt# remains a top concern / %hough Chinaalso

has regionaland glo8al am8itions, domestic concerns get overall priorit# . 'resident QiJin2ing is

preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimac#, 2er7asi7e corru2tion, wides2read

mass 2rotests, and unsustaina8le economic 2ractices/ +ei, %he World 'ost 2artnershi2 of the &uffington 'ost and +erggruenInstitute, htt23!!www/huffington2ost/com!artyom6lukin!world6war6iii8#:>::>"/html

%here are three reasons war is unlikel# an#time soon /First, des2ite the dou8le6digit annualgrowth in its defense 8udgets, Chinas military still significantly lags 8ehind the ./S/ It will take China "# to 45 years

to attain 2arity or near62arity with the ./S/6Ja2an allied forces in the East Asian littoral/Second, for all the talk of mutual interde2endence, China depends on ,merica much

more than the other way round/ China is still critically reliant on the ./S and its allies, the E.

and Ja2an, as its principal eport markets and sources of ad7anced technologies and know6

how/ (7erall, Chinas de2endence on international markets is ver# high , with the trade to

-' ratio standing at #= 2ercent/ China im2orts many 7ital raw materials, such as oil and iron


31/51

ore/ As most of its commodity im2orts are shi22ed 8y the sea, China would 8e etremel# vulnerable to a naval blockade ,

which is likely to 8e mounted8y the ./S/ in case of a ma


32/51

egionalism


33/51

South Korean Headership

$he 9K"s alread# adopted an effective diplomac#---based on independent Koreanpriorities---it"s effectiveJo3 =D/

South Korea"s doing ever#thing it possibl# can to make its leadership effectivenow---it"s working---)ero reason this advantage is uni;ue or the plan"s ke#Jo


34/51

influential in international affairs, a middle 2ower like orea would 8e com2elled to 2rioritiseits o8


35/51

U.S. Not Ke#

egionalism will either fail because of ingrained nationalism or succeed becauseshared interests overwhelm politics&idetaka7oshimatsu 1I, -raduate School of Asia 'acific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia 'acific

.ni7ersity, Barch 45"5, $Regional -o7ernance and Coo2eration in Northeast Asia3 %he Cases ofthe En7ironment and I%,1htt23!!www/a2u/ac/


36/51

!con /efense

!ven massive economic decline has )ero chance of warRo8ert Jervis 11, 'rofessor in the e2artment of 'olitical Science and School of Internationaland 'u8lic Affairs at Colum8ia .ni7ersity, ecem8er 45"", $Force in (ur %imes,1 Sur7i7al, Vol/

4#, No/ >, 2/ >5=6>4#E7en if war is still seen as e7il, the security community could 8e dissol7ed if se7ere conflicts of interest were to arise/ Could themore 2eaceful world generate new interests that would 8ring the mem8ers of the community into shar2 dis2utesL ># A Hero6sum

sense of status would 8e one eam2le, 2erha2s linked to a stee2 rise in nationalism/ Bore likely would 8e a worsening ofthe current economic difficulties ,which coulditself 2roduce greater nationalism , underminedemocracy and 8ring 8ack old6fashioned 8eggar6my6neigh8or economic 2olicies /While these

dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead

the mem8ers of the community to contem2late fighting each other/ It is not so much thateconomic interde2endencehas 2roceeded to the 2oint where it could not 8e re7ersed0 states that were more

internally interde2endent than anything seen internationally ha7e fought 8loody ci7il wars/ Rather it is that even if

the more etreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become

discredited , it ishard to see howwithout 8uilding on a 2reeisting high le7el of 2olitical conflict leaders andmass o2inion would come to8elie7e that their countries could 2ros2er 8y im2o7erishing ore7en attacking others/ Is it 2ossi8le that 2ro8lems will not only 8ecome se7ere, 8ut that 2eo2le will entertain the thoughtthat they ha7e to 8e sol7ed 8y warLWhile a 2essimist could note that this argument does not a22ear asoutlandish as it did 8efore the financial crisis, an o2timist could re2ly correctly, in my 7iewD that

the 7ery fact that we ha7e seen such a sharp economic down-turn without an#one

suggesting that forceof arms is the solutionshows that even if bad times bring about

greater economic conflict , it will not make war thinkable /

&nterdependence means )ero chance that economic decline causes war*eslie &/ Felb 1I, 'resident Emeritus of the Council on Foreign RelationsK was a senior officialin the ./S/ efense e2artment from ":; to ": and in the State e2artment from ";; to";, No7em8er!ecem8er 45"5, $-' Now Batters Bore %han Force,1 Foreign Affairs, Vol/O, No/ :%o an un2recedented degree,the ma


37/51

Chinamakes 2erha2s the 8est case for the 2rimacy of economics/ Although it might emerge as a s2oiler decades hence, +ei


38/51

1N


39/51

/eterrence


40/51

9K estraint Hink

*ar games prove presence restrains South Korea from escalatinga7id Santoro ./S/ uadrennial efense Re7iew, felt it could not allow 'yongyang to$escalate TitsU way out of failed con7entional aggression/1 It was also moti7ated 8y a desire to hold North orea accounta8le for

8reaking the nuclear ta8oo and to send a message to other states that future nuclear use would ha7e se7ere conse?uences/%he res2onses of the ./S/, Ja2anese and orean teams were somewhat 2redicta8le and in line with common understandings of

etended deterrence and assurance/ +ut the Baui eercisealso eem2lified that, at times,the .nited States

seeks to discourage or deter actions b# its allies and , con7ersely, assure its ad7ersaries/

./S/ efforts to deter allies and assure ad7ersaries should not 8e sur2rising/ eterrencethe act of using fear of conse?uences or2unishment to change a country9s calculus and inhi8it 8eha7iorhas 8een a key feature of alliance relationshi2s,


41/51

military res2onse would escalate the conflict / Some 2ointed to the 45"= ./S/6South orea

C ounter6 + ro7ocation + lan,which includes 2rocedures for consultation for a combined

U.S.-South Korean response / (thers noted that there may 8e a difference of inter2retation

8etween ./S/ and South orean officials a8out which North orean targets should 8e included

in a retaliatory strike/ In short, the ./S/ team wished to maintain control over South

Korea and was 2re2ared to restrain constrain and 2ossi8ly e7en deter , some of Seoul9s

actions/


42/51

,$A Kell#

Kell# concludes neg---their ev is (ust him switching sidesRo8ert E/ Kell# 15, associate 2rofessor of international relations in the e2artment of 'oliticalScience and i2lomacy at 'usan National .ni7ersity, "5!";!">, $.S retrenchment from orea

2art =D3 A res2onse to my critics,1 htt23!!www/lowyinter2reter/org!2ost!45">!"5!";!.S6retrenchment6from6orea62art6=D6A6res2onse6to6my6critics/as2I do not say all this to 8e testy or contrarian / By own gut feeling , 2er my .SF e2eriences

a8o7e, is for the US to sta# in Korea / %his is 2ro8a8ly 8ecause I think North orea is


43/51

U

Uni;ueness for our disad is perfect---there"s a latent risk of North Koreanprovocations but overall the#"ll be fairl# chill nowKimEun/html

No rth Ko rea could take further provocative actions after the latest nuclear testthat drew

strong 2rotests from the international community, eperts in Seoulwarned/With its fourth nuclear test, the communist country is likely to accelerate its effort to seek the status of a nuclear6armed state,e2erts said/ Washington reaffirmed its 2osition that it would not gi7e 'yongyang such a recognition/

$We do not and will not acce2t North orea as a nuclear6armed state, and actions such as this latest test onlystrengthen our resol7e,1 said./S/ Secretary of State John erryin a statement after the test/im %ae6woo, a nuclear e2ert who s2ecialiHes in the North orean nuclear issue, said 'yongyang will 2ursue its longstandingdemand for a 2eace treaty with Washington while kee2ing nuclear wea2ons/Nuclear6armed state$North orea wants the nuclear recognition without


44/51

,$A SK Solves

Joint US-9K deterrence is the onl# effective option against North Korean nuclearthreats:ongyudok 1%, 'rofessor of International Relations, Sookmyung Women]s .ni7ersity,

formerly e2uty Binister for efense Reform at the Binistry of National efense, :!""!"#,$(2tion "3 Enhancing Bilitary eterrence,1 htt23!!www/theasanforum/org!o2tion6"6enhancing6military6deterrence!(n A2ril ">6"#, 45"# in Washington, 'ark and (8ama administration defense officials agreed toesta8lish the R(6.S eterrence Strategy Committee SCD to integrate the res2onse to Northorean nuclear, other WB, and 8allistic missile threats/ %he SC is a com8ination of theformer Etended eterrence 'olicy Committee E'CD and Counter Bissile Ca2a8ilityCommittee CBCCD, and it seeks to actualiHe > o2erationsdetect, defend, disru2t, anddestroy/ %o deter and res2ond effecti7ely to North orea9s nuclear and missile threats,

interoperabilit# of the two forces needs to be enhanced and upgraded /

'yongyang will return to the negotiating ta8le onl# when its nuclear option is no longer

viable / %he 'ark go7ernment has done its utmost to find incenti7es through 7arious di2lomaticchannelsK howe7er, it also needs to demonstrate that North orea9s nuclear ca2a8ility can 8e

deterred 8y em2loying non6nuclear strategic wea2ons/=" %he good news is that confidence in

the (oint counter capabilit# is growing in the face of 'yongyang9s continuing missile

firings and rhetoric of nuclear 2reem2tion/ 'aradoically, the 'ark -eun6hye go7ernment9s trust8uilding efforts can only 8e effecti7e when 'yongyang9s strategic su2eriority o7er Seoul 8egins tolose its momentum/ Negotiating from strength has long 8een recogniHed as ideal/ %his ises2ecially so with 'yongyang/ %here is no alternati7e 8ut to 2ut strengthen ing South orea9sdeterrence ca2a8ilities first on the list of strategic o2tions/

*ithdrawal crushes C5&S---the 9K can"t fill inRo8ert E/ Kell# 15, associate 2rofessor of international relations in the e2artment of 'olitical

Science and i2lomacy at 'usan National .ni7ersity, "5!";!">, $.S retrenchment from orea2art =D3 A res2onse to my critics,1 htt23!!www/lowyinter2reter/org!2ost!45">!"5!";!.S6retrenchment6from6orea62art6=D6A6res2onse6to6my6critics/as2In August, I wrote a cou2let on the .S military commitment to South orea, trying to illustrate arguments for 8oth a .S retrenchment and for staying/I am ha22y to say that these 2osts swung me an in7ite to a roundta8le discussion at .S Forces orea .SFD to 2resent my arguments/ I also got somefeed8ack from my friend, 7eteran orea6watcher a7e Bawell/ Some of this sheds etra light and deser7es a res2onse/@At .SF, unsur2risingly, most

of the listeners strongly su22orted the retention of the US militar# in Korea . %here seemed to 8e two

main sets of concerns, one s2ecific to orea and the other a8out the .S 2osition in Asia and the world/@ First,there is definitely aconcern that South orea is not ready to defend itself without .S assistancea concern I think a7eBawell and many others shareD/ %his is why the 2ro2osed ('C(N transfer transferring wartime control of South orean troo2s from Washington to

SeoulD is now tied to South orean ca2a8ilities, rather than to an ar8itrary date/@Whene7er I talk to .S military 2ersonnel inoreaat conferences and such, I always come away ner7ous that the R( is more 7ulnera8le than a lot of

us think/ +articularl# on things like missile defence and C5&Scommand, control, communications, com2uters,

intelligence, sur7eillance and reconnaissanceD, there seems to 8e a strong consensus in the .S 2rofessional

military community that the R( cannot do this alone, and may ne7er 8e a8le to/ S2ecifically, a

lot of the C5&S assets the US shares would be eorbitantl# epensive if not

impossible for Seoul to tr# to recreate on its own ,there8y heavil# impinging on

readiness / So there is a strong efficiency argument for sim2ly continuing the current

relationship in which .S networked 8attlefield technologies are a 2owerful force multi2lier, in 2articular for the South orean Army/
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/17/US-retrenchment-from-Korea-(part-3)-A-response-to-my-critics.aspxhttp://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/17/US-retrenchment-from-Korea-(part-3)-A-response-to-my-critics.aspxhttp://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/17/US-retrenchment-from-Korea-(part-3)-A-response-to-my-critics.aspxhttp://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/17/US-retrenchment-from-Korea-(part-3)-A-response-to-my-critics.aspx


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!ffective &S is ke# to deterrence and prevents miscalc---failure causes unintendedescalation-eneral Curtis B/ Scaparrotti 1%, Commander, .nited States6Re2u8lic of orea Com8inedForces Command and Commander, .nited States Forces orea, statement 8efore the &ouse

Armed Ser7ices Committee, A2r "# 45"#,htt23!!docs/house/go7!meetings!AS!AS55!45"#5>"#!"5==5;!&&R-6"">6AS556Wstate6

Sca2arrotti.SAC645"#5>"#/2df(ur to2 concern is that we could ha7e7ery little warning of a North orean asymmetric

2ro7ocation , which could start a cycle of action and counter6action, leading to unintended

escalation / %his underscores the need for the Alliance to maintain a high level of

readiness and vigilance and to do so together /@Critical Ca2a8ilities/ uring the recent SCB, our national

leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the com8ined defense of South orea/ %hey also confirmed se7eral critical ca2a8ilitiesthe Alliance must im2ro7e to ensure continued readiness to res2ond / %hese are3 @[ Intelligence, Sur7eillance, and

Reconnaissance, or &S/@[ Command, Control, Communications, Com2uters, and Intelligence, or C>I/@[ +allistic Bissile efense, or +B/@[

Critical Bunitions/@We must continue to 2ursue ISR ca2a8ilities/ %he Alliance9s a8ility to distinguishthe indications and warnings associated with an im2ending North orean asymmetric or

con7entional attack directl# impacts the Alliance9s decision space / In7estments here can

mitigate the risk of miscalc ulation and escalation b# providing a more accurate

and timel# picture of North Korean actions /

$he plan shifts reliance eclusivel# to the nuclear umbrella---that"s not credible foreither deterrence or assurance%om Nichols 15, 'rofessor of National Security Affairs at the Na7al War College and an ad, $W&) A (REAN '.**(.% IS A REA**) +AIEA,1 htt23!!warontherocks/com!45">!5;!why6a6korean62ullout6is6a6really68ad6idea!%his is where the argument 8ecomes e7en more con7oluted3 once ./S/ con7entional forces are gone, *ee offloadsany further 8urden of deterrence onto the ./S/ nuclear guarantee 3 $%he ('C(N transfer wouldnot change the security guarantee of etended deterrence under the.nited States9 nuclear

um8rella/1 In this conce2t, a22arently, the South is 2rotectednot only 8y its own to26notch military, 8ut8y a2romise on the 2art of the .nited States to start us ing nuc lear wea2onsin Asia even if there has

not been a single ,merican casualt# and e7en if North orea does not use nuclear

wea2onsin an attack on the South/&ere, *ee wishes away the deterrence 2ro8lem8y 2resenting nuc lear wea2ons as akind of dummy

7aria8le that 2uts the deterrence e?uation right should the ./S/ con7entional withdrawal throwit out of 8alance/ %he .nited States, howe7er, remo7ed nuclear arms from the 'eninsula o7er twodecades ago0 and has since 2olitely refused any further discussion a8out returning them there/ )et *ee9s strategyessentially amounts to saying3 $We9re lea7ing, immediately and much to the chagrin of our ally,8ut e7eryone 8e

warned3 we ha7e nuclear wea2ons/1%his ismerely an u2dated 7ersion of the Eisenhower6era strategysuch that it wasD of $ Bassi7eRetaliation,1 and it is 8ased on the same idea3 to sa7e the cost of e2ensi7e con7entional forces 8yre2lacing them with 7ague nuclear threats/ Bassi7e Retaliation was a 2oor su8stitute for a

strategye7en in its day/ It wasmore an act of desperation than anykind of actual deterrent, an

o87ious attem2t to rely on a ./S/68ased nuclear crutch rather than a sturdier force in Euro2e/ It

was unworkable and dangerous and it was soon (unked /
http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/


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,$A 4andow

e(ect libertarian criti;ues of the alliance like 4andow---their authors structurall#underestimate the war-preventing effect of U.S. presence---risks nuclear war

Van Jackson -, Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New

American Security, and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, !!"#,$%&E '(VER%) (F *I+ER%ARIAN %&ININ- A+(.% %&E ./S/0(REAN A**IANCE,1htt23!!warontherocks/com!45"#!5!the62o7erty6of6li8ertarian6thinking6a8out6the6u6s6korean6alliance!While rare, arguments in fa7or of a8andoning the ./S/ alliance with South oreaare not new, and are

always reduced to narrow cost08enefit transactions/ %he /onald $rump-like simplicit# of

this a22roach o8scures an honest assessment of the issue and the 2ur2orted solution/ %he case of

orea is instructi7e of the numerous high risks and hidden costs in libertarian

arguments a8out ./S/ foreign 2olicy/

As he hasoccasionally done for decades , oug +andowof the li8ertarian Cato Institute recently

reanimated the $a8andon orea1 argument in %he National Interest/ &is


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,$A /efense

/isregard old defense---escalation management is uni;uel# trick# right now---entrapment risk is highaniel A/ +inkston 1-


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Ukraine &mpact

$roop withdrawal from South Korea crushes the perception of U.S. militar#resolve and credibilit# around the globe---particularl# N,$9 deterrence inUkraine

%om Nichols 15, 'rofessor of National Security Affairs at the Na7al War College and an ad, $W&) A (REAN '.**(.% IS A REA**) +AIEA,1 htt23!!warontherocks/com!45">!5;!why6a6korean62ullout6is6a6really68ad6idea!

In a recent article for War on the Rocks, ./S/ Army Ba


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ripe with potential for escalation / In the current en7ironment, any incident that results in

a loss of lifeor in etensi7e damage to one side or the otherwould8e likely to 2ro7okea res2onse in7ol7ing anincreased alert le7el, higher tem2o of military o2erations in 8order regions, or e7en direct 2uniti7e military action/ %his

could feed a spiral of growing tensions that may 8e difficult for any side to completel#

control or stop /

>/ AV(IIN- .NIN%EN%I(NA* ESCA*A%I(N3 '(*IC) REC(BBENA%I(NS%he threat of escalationem8edded in current de7elo2ments needs a concerted crisis managementres2onse/Recomendation "3 %he Russian leadershi2 should urgently re6e7aluate the costs and risks of continuing its more asserti7e military2osture, and Western di2lomacy should 8e aimed at 2ersuading Russia to mo7e in this direction/Russia should return to its 2re6Barch 45"> 2atterns of 8eha7iour/ Some will argue that this is unlikely 8ut the Russian leadershi2most likely understands the 2rohi8iti7e costs of a direct military conflict with NA%( countries and has a strong interest in a7oidingsuch a direct confrontation, the end conse?uences of which could not 8e 2redicted/

Ne7ertheless,Russian leaders currently seem to 8e assumingthatWestern countries would 8ack offfrom direct confrontation if an incident s2irals out of control, and therefore Russia can continue with a moreasserti7e 2olicy/ %his is an unwise assum2tion and a gam8le at 8est/+esides that, Russian actions ha7e resulted so far in an un2recedented mo8iliHation of NA%( and ad


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,$A /eterrence @ailing

No escalation because of U.S. deterrence---our evidence assumes the most recenttensions and provocations

Van Jackson 1%, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on

Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, O!4>!"#, $'re2aring for the Net orean War,1htt23!!thedi2lomat/com!45"#!5O!2re2aring6for6the6net6korean6war!&ow do you fight and win with one hand tied 8ehind your 8ackL ./S/ and South orean officials would do well to figure out, ?uickly/

A dark cloud descended o7er the orean 'eninsula last weekas a series of North orean actions along the BMescalated tensions to the highest le7el since 45"5/ es2ite ongoing talks 8etween the two sides, tensions remainhigh/ %he 2ros2ect of limited war on the orean 'eninsula is all too real, and the alliance must reorient its 2re2arations accordingly/I97e s2ent most of my tenure since lea7ing go7ernment warning a8out limited war in oreaa conflict in which 8oth sides a7oidnuclear echanges, no in7asion of 'yongyang occurs, and 8oth sides limit their o8


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that lacks the logistics and sustainment ca2acity re?uired of an in7asionK the 'A is numerically large, 8ut regularly di7erted frommilitary tasks to 2erform agricultural and industrial la8or functions to su22ort a mori8und economy/ %he 'A isn9t a force that9sca2a8le of a long duration military cam2aign/

northwestern callahan esman neg district5 round1

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