CyberterrorContention One is Cyberterror:The NSA’s electronic backdoors undermine overall cybersecurity – also shuts out the US from establishing cyber-normsSasso, technology correspondent for National Journal, 14 Brendan, "The NSA Isn't Just Spying on Us, It's Also Undermining Internet Security", April 29 2014, Natio nal Journal, www.nationaljournal.com/daily/the-nsa-isn-t-just-spying-on-us-it-s-also-undermining-internet-security-20140429

*NSA backdoors infrastructure to make hacking easy

*This encryption is available to anyone that finds it = hacking

*Necessary for international norm- modelling- people won’t follow til USA does their shit

Bolstering the nation’s defenses against hackers has been one of the Obama administration’s top goals. Officials have warned for years that a sophisticated cyberattack could cripple (destroy) critical infrastructure or allow thieves to make off with the financial information of millions of Americans. President Obama pushed Congress to enact cybersecurity legislation, and when it didn’t, he issued his own executive order in 2013. “ The cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face,” Obama wrote in a 2012 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. But critics argue that the N ational S ecurity A gency has actually undermined cybersecurity and made the U nited S tates more vulnerable to hackers . At its core, the problem is the NSA’s dual mission. On one hand, the agency is tasked with securing U.S. networks and information. On the other hand, the agency must gather intelligence on foreign threats to national security. Collecting intelligence often means hacking encrypted communications . That’s nothing new for the NSA; the agency traces its roots back to code-breakers deciphering Nazi messages during World War II. So in many ways, strong Internet security actually makes the NSA’s job harder. “This is an administration that is a vigorous defender of surveillance,” said Christopher Soghoian, the head technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union. “ Surveillance at the scale they want requires insecurity .” The leaks from Edward Snowden have revealed a variety of efforts by the NSA to weaken cybersecurity and hack into networks. Critics say those programs, while helping NSA spying, have made U.S. networks less secure. According to the leaked documents, the NSA inserted a so-called back door into at least one encryption standard that was developed by the N ational I nstitute of S tandards and T echnology. The NSA could use that back door to spy on suspected terrorists, but the vulnerability was also available to any other hacker who discovered it. NIST , a Commerce Department agency, sets scientific and technical standards that are widely used by both the government and the private sector . The agency has said it would never “deliberately weaken a cryptographic standard,” but it remains unclear whether the agency was aware of the back door or whether the NSA tricked NIST into adopting the compromised

standard. NIST is required by law to consult with the NSA for its technical expertise on cybersecurity. The revelation that NSA somehow got NIST to build a back door into an encryption standard has seriously damaged NIST’s reputation with security experts. “NIST is operating with a trust deficit right now,” Soghoian said. “Anything that NIST has touched is now tainted.” It’s a particularly bad time for NIST to have lost the support of the cybersecurity community. In his executive order, Obama tasked NIST with drafting the cybersecurity guidelines for critical infrastructure such as power plants and phone companies. Because it’s an executive order instead of a law, the cybersecurity standards are entirely voluntary, and the U.S. government will have to convince the private sector to comply. The Snowden leaks weren’t the first to indicate that the NSA is involved in exploiting commercial security. According to a 2012 New York Times report, the NSA developed a worm, dubbed “Stuxnet,” to cripple Iranian nuclear centrifuges. But the worm, which exploited four previously unknown flaws in Microsoft Windows, escaped the Iranian nuclear plant and quickly began damaging computers around the world. The NSA and Israeli officials have also been tied to “Flame,” a virus that impersonated a Microsoft update to spy on Iranian computers. Vanee Vines, an NSA spokeswoman, said the U.S. government “is as concerned as the public is with the security of these products.” “The United States pursues its intelligence mission with care to ensure that innocent users of those same technologies are not affected,” she said. According to Vines, the NSA relies on the same encryption standards it recommends to the public to protect its own classified networks. “We do not make recommendations that we cannot stand behind for protecting national security systems and data,” she said. “The activity of NSA in setting standards has made the Internet a far safer place to communicate and do business.” But due to concern over the NSA damaging Internet security, the president’s review group on surveillance issues recommended that the U.S. government promise not to “in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial encryption.” “ Encryption is an essential basis for trust on the Internet ; without such trust, valuable communications would not be possible,” the group wrote in its report, which was released in December. “For the entire system to work, encryption software itself must be trustworthy .” The White House’s cybersecurity coordinator said that disclosing security flaws "usually makes sense." In response to the report, the administration adopted a new policy on whether the NSA can exploit “zero-days”—vulnerabilities that haven’t been discovered by anyone else yet. According to the White House, there is a “bias” toward publicly disclosing flaws in security unless “there is a clear national security or law enforcement need.” In a blog post Monday, Michael Daniel, the White House’s cybersecurity coordinator, said that disclosing security flaws “usually makes sense.” “Building up a huge stockpile of undisclosed vulnerabilities while leaving the Internet vulnerable and the American people unprotected would not be in our national security interest,” he said. But Daniel added that, in some cases, disclosing a vulnerability means that the U.S. would “forego an opportunity to collect crucial intelligence that could thwart a terrorist attack, stop the theft of our nation’s intellectual property, or even discover more dangerous vulnerabilities.” He said that the government weighs a variety of factors, such as the risk of leaving the vulnerability un-patched, the likelihood that anyone else would discover it, and how important the potential intelligence is. But privacy advocates and many business groups are still uncomfortable with the U.S. keeping security flaws secret. And many don’t trust that the NSA will only exploit the vulnerabilities with the most potential for intelligence and least opportunity for other hackers. “The surveillance bureaucracy really doesn’t have a lot of self-imposed limits. They want to get everything ,” said Ed Black, the CEO of the Computer & Communications Industry Association, which represents companies including Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Sprint. “Now I think people dealing with that bureaucracy have to understand they can’t take anything for

granted.” Most computer networks are run by private companies, and the government must work closely with the private sector to improve cybersecurity. But companies have become reluctant to share security information with the U.S. government, fearing the NSA could use any info rmation to hack into their systems . “When you want to go into partnership with somebody and work on serious issues—such as cybersecurity—you want to know you’re being told the truth,” Black said. Google and one other cybersecurity firm discovered “Heartbleed”—a critical flaw in a widely used Internet encryption tool—in March. The companies notified a few other private-sector groups about the problem, but no one told the U.S. government until April. “Information you share with the NSA might be used to hurt you as a company,” warned Ashkan Soltani, a technical consultant who has worked with tech companies and helped The Washington Post with its coverage of the Snowden documents. He said that company officials have historically discussed cybersecurity issues with the NSA, but that he wouldn’t be surprised if those relationships are now strained. He pointed to news that the NSA posed as Facebook to infect computers with malware. “That does a lot of harm to companies’ brands,” Soltani said. The NSA’s actions have also made it difficult for the U.S. to set international norms for cyberconflict. For several years, the U.S. has tried to pressure China to scale back its cyberspying operations, which allegedly steal trade secrets from U.S. businesses. Jason Healey, the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, said the U.S. has “militarized cyber policy.” “ The U nited S tates has been saying that the world needs to operate according to certain norms, ” he said. “ It is difficult to get the norms that we want because it appears to the rest of the world that we only want to follow the norms that we think are important.” Vines, the NSA spokeswoman, emphasized that the NSA would never hack into foreign networks to give domestic companies a competitive edge (as China is accused of doing). “We do not use foreign intelligence capabilities to steal the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of—or give intelligence we collect to—U.S. companies to enhance their international competitiveness or increase their bottom line,” she said. Jim Lewis, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed that NSA spying to stop terrorist attacks is fundamentally different from China stealing business secrets to boost its own economy. He also said there is widespread misunderstanding of how the NSA works, but he acknowledged that there is a “trust problem —justified or not.” He predicted that rebuilding trust with the tech community will be one of the top challenges for Mike Rogers, who was sworn in as the new NSA director earlier this month. “All the tech companies are in varying degrees unhappy and not eager to have a close relationship with NSA,” Lewis said.

The risk of cyberterrorism is high—experts agree that adversaries have the technical skills and political motivation to carry out a dangerous cyberattack Burg, Principal US & Global Cybersecurity Leader, 14 David, Michael Compton Principal, Cybersecurity Strategy & Operations, Peter Harries Principal, Health Industries, John Hunt Principal, Public Sector, Mark Lobel Principal, Technology, Entertainment, Media & Communications, Gary Loveland Principal, Consumer and Industrial Products & Services, Joe Nocera Principal, Financial Services, Dave Roath Partner, Risk Assurance, "US cybercrime: Rising risks, reduced readiness Key findings from the 2014 US State

of Cybercrime Survey", June 2014, co-sponsored by The CERT Division of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, CSO magazine, United States Secret Service, www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.pdf

*experts

*other nations have better cybersecurity programs- Russia

The risks and repercussions of cybercrime In this 12th survey of cybercrime trends, more than 500 US executives, security experts, and others from the public and private sectors offered a look into their cybersecurity practices and state of risk and readiness to combat evolving cyber threats and threat agents. One thing is very clear: The cybersecurity programs of US organizations do not rival the persistence, tactical skills, and technological prowess of their potential cyber adversaries. Today, common criminals , organized crime rings, and nation- states leverage sophisticated techniques to launch attacks that are highly targeted and very difficult to detect. Particularly worrisome are attacks by tremendously skilled threat actors that attempt to steal highly sensitive—and often very valuable—intellectual property, private communications, and other strategic assets and information. It is a threat that is nothing short of formidable. In fact, the US Director of National Intelligence has ranked cybercrime as the top national security threat, higher than that of terrorism, espionage, and weapons of mass destruction.1 Underscoring the threat, the FBI last year notified 3,000 US companies—ranging from small banks, major defense contractors, and leading retailers—that they had been victims of cyber intrusions. “The U nited S tates faces real [cybersecurity] threats from criminals, terrorists, spies, and malicious cyber actors ,” said FBI Director James B. Comey at a recent security conference.2 “The playground is a very dangerous place right now.” Nation-state actors pose a particularly pernicious threat , according to Sean Joyce, a PwC principal and former FBI deputy director who frequently testified before the US House and Senate Intelligence committees. “ We are seeing increased activity from nation-state actors, which could escalate due to unrest in Syria, Iran, and Russia ,” he said. “ These groups may target financial services and other critical infrastructure entities.” In today’s volatile cybercrime environment, nation-states and other criminals continually and rapidly update their tactics to maintain an advantage against advances in security safeguards implemented by businesses and government agencies. Recently, for instance, hackers engineered a new round of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that can generate traffic rated at a staggering 400 gigabits per second, the most powerful DDoS assaults to date.

A cyber-attack would trigger military retaliation and escalate to nuclear warRobert Tilford 12, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast” 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa ***we don’t agree with the ableist language

*power grids- no backup generators

*radar systems go blank

*no communication

*launch nuclear weapons because we don’t know what the fuck is going on

To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid , for example

could also cripple (destroy) the U.S. military .¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also

power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours , not days, fuel

supplies would run out ”, he said.¶ Which means military c ommand and c ontrol centers could go dark .¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down

completely.¶ “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent.

And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power ”, said Senator Grassley.¶ “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world

would be left scrambling to maintain base functions ”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National

Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and

improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional

Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure.¶ A cyber attack

today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response.¶ That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.

That’s key to cybersecurity1. Backdoors make cyberterrorism a ticking time bomb

Seneque 14 Gareth, ICT professional with a particular focus on UNIX Architecture & Design, holds a degree in Philosophy/Politics from the University of Sydney, Alex Comninos, an independent researcher focusing on information and communications technology and politics, a Doctoral Candidate at Justus-Liebig University in Giessen, Germany at the Department of Geography, where he is conducting doctoral research on the challenges and constraints of the use of user-generated geographic information systems in Egypt, Libya, and North and Sudan in 2010 to 2011, "Cyber security, civil society and vulnerability in an age of communications surveillance", 2014, Justus-Liebig University Giessen and Geist Consulting, giswatch.org/en/communications-surveillance/cyber-security-civil-society-and-vulnerability-age-communications-sur

The relevance of Snowden’s disclosures to cyber security The scope and reach of the NSA’s surveillance is important. The NSA’s surveillance posture is – as has been repeated by General Keith Alexander, and is reflected in the NSA slide in Figure 1 – to "collect it all" : 32 from undersea cable taps, to Yahoo video chats, to in-flight Wi-Fi, to virtual worlds and online multiplayer games like Second Life and World of Warcraft. The NSA has at least three different programmes to get Yahoo and Google user data. This shows that they try to get the same data from multiple mechanisms.33 With the GCHQ under the MUSCULAR programme it hacked into the internal data links of Google and Yahoo34 for information that it could mostly have gotten through the PRISM programme. In addition to highlighting the NSA’s massive institutional overreach and global privacy invasion, Snowden’s disclosures also highlight the many points at which our data is insecure, and the vast numbers of vulnerabilities to surveillance that exist throughout our digital world. However, while the NSA is the largest threat in the surveillance game, it is not the only threat. Governments all around the world are using the internet to surveil their citizens. Considering the rate of technological change, it is not unforeseeable that the methods , tools and vulnerabilities used by the NSA will be the tools of states, cyber criminals and low-skilled hackers of the future. Regardless of who the perceived attacker or surveillance operative may be, and whether it is the NSA or not, large-scale, mass surveillance is a growing cyber security threat. It has also been disclosed that the NSA and GCHQ have actively worked to make internet and technology users around the world less secure. The NSA has placed backdoors in routers running vital internet infrastructures.35 The GCHQ has impersonated social networking websites like LinkedIn in order to target system administrators of internet service providers.36 The NSA has been working with the GCHQ to hack into Google and Yahoo data centres.37 The NSA also works to undermine encryption technologies , by covertly influencing the use of weak algorithms and random number generators in encryption products and standards.38 The NSA in its own words is working under the BULLRUN programme to "insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks, and endpoint communications devices used by targets" and to “influence policies, standards and specifications for commercial [encryption] technologies.”39 The NSA is also believed to hoard knowledge about vulnerabilities rather than sharing them with developers, vendors and the general public , 40 as well as even maintaining a catalogue of these vulnerabilities for use in surveillance and cyber attacks.41 None of these activities serve to make the internet more secure. In fact, they do the very opposite. As US Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren commented: “ When any industry or organisation builds a backdoor to assist with electronic surveillance into their product, they put all of our data security at risk. If a backdoor is created for law enforcement purposes, it’s only a matter of time before a hacker exploits it , in fact we have already seen it happen."42

2. Norms—Curtailing surveillance is key to effective norms-building—that prevents cyber-warfare

Farrell 2015, Henry Farrell, PhD in Government from Georgetown University, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, April 2015,

Promoting Norms for Cyberspace, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358?cid=nlc-press_release-press_note--link2-20150406&sp_mid=48385113&sp_rid=YWtpbWVyeUBoc3RvZGF5LnVzS0

*build norms- soft power is necessary- SPURS COOPERATION

*no one is listening to us rn

*AT: Treaties- no one listens to them

U.S. policymakers argue that the U nited S tates and others need to build norms to mitigate cybersecurity problems. Admiral Michael S. Rogers, head of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command, has argued that shared norms are a basic building block for cybersecurity. He has called on actors in academia and civil society to help design them and to assist in their spread.¶ It may seem strange that Pentagon officials are arguing for soft tools rather than hard military options , but there are four good reasons why norms are the best option available. First, the United States is vulnerable to cyberattacks and this weakness is difficult to address using conventional tools of military statecraft. Second, it is difficult to ensure that complex information systems are fully defended, since they may have subtle technical weaknesses. Third, classical deterrence is not easy in a world where it is often challenging to identify sophisticated attackers, or even to know when an attack has taken place. Lastly, treaties are hard to enforce because it is so difficult to verify compliance — particularly in cyberspace, where weapons are software, not missiles.¶ Although norms are hazier than treaty rules, they may still have important consequences. Norms against the use of nuclear weapons have taken hold since the 1950s, making their use nearly unthinkable in ordinary circumstances. Robust cybersecurity norms might, over time, rule out some kinds of attacks as normatively inappropriate. They might encourage other states to see norm breaches as attacks on their security, too, spurring cooperation to prevent or stop attacks. Finally, norms can provide shared understandings between states that allow them to work together where they have shared interests and manage relations where their interests clash.¶ Challenges to Norm Promotion¶ It is hard to spread norms, even in the best circumstances. Unfortunately, these are far from the best circumstances for the United States. U.S. policymakers face three major problems. First, it is easiest to promote norms when one can invoke common values to support them, yet the world's cyber powers have different—and radically incompatible—values over how to protect cyberspace. The clashing interests between democratic and authoritarian regimes on the value of an open Internet and definitions of security make effective global treaties impossible.¶ Second, the potential adopters of norms are likely to be more receptive if they do not think the proponent of the norms is acting in bad faith. To be sure, many states were happy to use the Snowden revelations as a cover for opposition to any rules of behavior Washington might offer. But for others, efforts at persuasion have been damaged by the exposed gap between U.S. rhetoric and actions. At the very least, other states must be persuaded that following a norm is in their national interest. The disclosures, however, reinforced the view of many states that the United States disproportionately benefits from an open, global, and secure Internet, and is only committed to these values to the extent that they further U.S. economic, political, and military objectives.¶ In light of the Snowden disclosures , the U nited S tates is poorly placed to persuade other actors of its good faith or its commitment to shared interests and values. The extent of the damage to the U.S. reputation was revealed when the United States accused North Korea of hacking into Sony's servers and announced its intention to retaliate against North Korea through low-level sanctions. Building on previous indictments of Chinese soldiers for hacking into U.S. firms, U.S. officials followed an approach of "naming and shaming" cyberattackers while pursuing sanctions and possible

criminal charges. These actions are highly unlikely to result in successful prosecutions, but potentially serve a normative purpose by signaling to the world that some actions are unacceptable. Although a few states criticized North Korea, many did not buy U.S. claims that Pyongyang was responsible. Members of the business and technology communities also expressed polite skepticism over the evidence supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3. Trust—The SSRA would rebuild trust between the government and the private sector—that’s key to cybersecurityZezima, reporter @ The Washington Post, 15 Katie, "Obama signs executive order on sharing cybersecurity threat information", Feb 12 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02/12/obama-to-sign-executive-order-on-cybersecurity-threats/

*government and industry aren’t working together

*AT: XO- that just makes communication easier doesn’t mandate it

*encryption sets up problems with private and public sectors

PALO ALTO, Calif. – President Obama signed an executive order Friday that urges companies to share cybersecurity-threat information with one another and the federal government. Obama signed the order, which is advisory in nature, at the first White House summit on Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection at Stanford University here. The summit, which focused on public-private partnerships and consumer protection, is part of a recent White House push to focus on cybersecurity. Obama said the prospect of cyberattacks are one of the nation's most pressing national security, economic and safety issues. The specter of a cyberattack crippling the nation's air traffic control system or a city with a blackout is real, and hacks such as the one on Sony Pictures last year are "hurting America's companies and costing American jobs." He also said they are a threat to the security and well-being of children who are online. "It’s one of the great paradoxes of our time that the very technologies that empower us to do great good can also be used to undermine us and inflict great harm," Obama said before a cheering, friendly audience here at Stanford's Memorial Auditorium. The order the president signed here encourages the development of central clearinghouses for companies and the government to share data and creation of centers where data can be shared across specific geographic regions. Obama pushed for collaboration between the public and private sectors. " There’s only one way to defend America from these cyber threats, and that is through government and industry working together , sharing appropriate information as true partners," he said. MasterCard chief executive Ajay Banga praised Obama’s executive action but said that eventually “we need a real legislative solution . An executive action can only take you this far.” “Rather than fight this in individualized groups, there’s some merit in joining hands and doing it together,” Banga said. Obama's order is part of a broader White House effort to beef up the nation's cybersecurity infrastructure, something the administration wants to push on Capitol Hill. Last month Obama proposed legislation that would shield companies from lawsuits for sharing threat data with the government. Last month he proposed legislation that would shield companies from lawsuits for sharing threat data with the government. Obama said shortly after he took office he realized that cybersecurity is "one of the most serious economic national security challenges that we face as a nation" and made confronting them a priority. Obama has signed other executive orders, including one that calls for the creation of voluntary standards to bolster the security of computer networks in critical industries and a framework for cybersecurity and another last year to protect consumers from identity theft. So far nothing has been able to stem the tide of attacks such as the one against Sony or others against retailers including Home Depot. Both privacy groups and Silicon Valley companies have said they would oppose the legislation Obama proposed last month unless reforms are first made to the NSA's surveillance program . In an

interview with Re/Code, Obama acknowledged tensions with Silicon Valley after the NSA disclosures. " The Snowden disclosures ... were really harmful in terms of the trust between the government and many of these companies , in part because it had an impact on their bottom lines ," Obama said. The president also said that there should be a "public conversation" about encryption and said he likely leans more toward strong data encryption than law enforcement, but is sympathetic to them because of the pressure they are under to keep people safe. U.S. government surveillance activities have been seen as a potential liability for tech companies that operate globally. “Seventy to 80 percent of the user bases for a lot of these companies are the foreigners who get very little protection under our system,” explained Julian Sanchez, a senior fellow focused on technology and civil liberties at the Cato Institute. “If they don’t display some push back, they know they won’t do very well with those markets.” In December of 2013, major tech companies including Apple, Google, Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft and Yahoo joined together in the Reform Government Surveillance coalition, urging the President and Congress to impose restrictions and oversight measures on U.S. spying programs. The President agreed in principle to some limits on spying programs, including the bulk collection of domestic phone records, during a speech last year. But progress on reforms has been too slow for some privacy advocates , as the administration urged for legislative action that has yet to succeed. Tech companies , meanwhile, have taken some measures into their own hands by strengthening and expanding their deployment of encryption to secure users' online activities – setting up a conflict between the companies and law enforcement who warn that such actions may make it harder for them to pursue crime and terrorism which increasingly includes a digital component. “I think it’s fair to say that changes on the technology front have outpaced governmental and legislative efforts,” said Andrew Crocker, a legal fellow at civil liberties group the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Plan TextThe United States federal government should substantially curtail its use of backdoor encryption standards and metadata collection programs.

InternetContention 2 is Internet:International outrage at NSA surveillance threatens internet globalization—support is growing for a “Balkanization” of the internetFontaine, President @ Center for a New American Security, 14 "Bringing Liberty Online Reenergizing the Internet Freedom Agenda in a Post-Snowden Era", Sept 2014, Center for a New American Security, www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_BringingLibertyOnline_Fontaine.pdf

*other countries are getting pissed because of NSA spying

*authoritarian countries are using USA spying

*= balkanized internet

The Snowden Fallout and the Internet Freedom Agenda

The dramatic revelations about NSA spying that began to emerge in June 2013 provoked a storm of international reaction .17 Political leaders expressed outrage at American surveillance practices and threatened a raft of retaliatory measures . President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil cancelled a planned state visit to the United States and the Brazilian government later organized an international meeting (NetMundial) to discuss the future of Internet governance.18 German Chancellor Angela Merkel was deeply affronted by the alleged monitoring of her personal cellphone. Chinese and other officials charged America with blatant hypocrisy. The fallout affected the private sector as well; where previously the focus of many observers had been on the aid given by U.S. companies to foreign governments engaged in Internet repression, the gaze shifted to the role American corporations play – wittingly or not – in enabling U.S. surveillance. Countries that had been the target of American reproaches rebuked the U.S. government for what they saw as hypocrisy. ¶ The United Nations and other international venues became platforms for international criticism of the United States. Germany and Brazil together sponsored a resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in late 2013 backing a “right to privacy” in the digital age. 19 In June 2014, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report that endorsed digital privacy as a human right and criticized mass surveillance as “a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure.” 20 Some European officials began to question the existing Internet governance model itself. In a statement, the European Commission said, “ Recent revelations of large-scale surveillance have called into question the stewardship of the US when it comes to Internet Governance . So given the US-centric model of Internet Governance currently in place, it is necessary to broker a smooth transition to a more global model.”21¶ Nongovernmental groups that might otherwise be partners with the U.S. government in promoting Internet freedom reacted sharply as well. Reporters Without Borders, for instance, listed the NSA as an “Enemy of the Internet” in its 2014 report on entities engaged in online repression. Drawing no distinction between surveillance aimed at protecting national security and surveillance intended to suppress free expression and political dissent, the organization

declared the NSA “no better than [its] Chinese, Russian, Iranian or Bahraini counterparts.”22 Mass surveillance methods used by democracies like the U nited S tates , it added, are “all the more intolerable” as they “ are already being used by authoritarian countries such as Iran, China, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to justify their own violations of freedom of information .” 23 Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, said, “Mass surveillance is the most immediate threat to the open Internet and the most insidious because we can’t see it.”24 The Electronic Frontier Foundation asserted that “mass surveillance is inherently a disproportionate measure that violates human rights,”25 and officials with Human Rights Watch observed that the surveillance scandal would render it more difficult for the U.S. government to press for better corporate practices and for companies to resist overly broad surveillance mandates. “Now,” its chief researcher said, “the vision and credibility of the U.S. and its allies on Internet freedom is in tatters.”26¶ The reactions to the Snowden disclosures threatened to go beyond verbal denunciations, diplomatic protests and critical press. The most serious commercial fallout came in the rising support for data localization requirements. Russia in July 2014 approved legislation that requires data operators to store the personal data of its citizens within the country’s borders.27 Indonesia, Brazil and Vietnam have also called for their citizens’ data held by companies such as Facebook to be stored domestically.28 Data localization has been debated in the European Parliament and elsewhere on the continent as well.29 Apart from the chilling effect on innovation and the loss of business to America companies, Internet freedom itself could become a casualty of such mandates . If a user’s data must be held within the borders of a repressive country, its government will have new opportunities to censor, monitor and disrupt online information flows. ¶ Such moves, combined with increasing questions about the multistakeholder approach to Internet governance (and possible support for a government driven approach), together give rise to concerns about the potential “Balkanization” of the Internet , in which a constellation of national-level systems could take the place of the current global online infrastructure . As former NSA general counsel Stewart Baker warned, “The Snowden disclosures are being used to renationalize the Internet and roll back changes that have weakened government control of information.”30

Curtailing surveillance is the only way the US can regain trust as a responsible steward of the internet and avoid BalkanizationMeinrath, director of the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, 13 Sascha, "We Can’t Let the Internet Become Balkanized", Oct 14 2013, Slate, www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/10/internet_balkanization_may_be_a_side_effect_of_the_snowden_surveillance.html

*disconnecting from US internet and make their shit

*NSA caused this because of spying

Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff’s recent indictment of the U nited S tates’ cyberspying practices has profound global repercussions for the U.S vision of a borderless, open Internet . What makes this backlash especially potent and

lamentable is that it is being fueled not by democracies that oppose American ideals, but rather by allies that resent Washington’s betrayal of its own overarchingly positive vision. Rouseff’s offensive to change Internet governance follows reports that the National Security Agency’s watchful eye could see as far as her Palácio do Planalto in Brasília. According to leaked documents, the United States has been surveilling Rousseff’s email, intercepting internal government communications, and spying on the country’s national oil company. After canceling an official visit to meet with President Obama in Washington, Rousseff took to the podium at the U.N.’s General Assembly to call on other countries to disconnect from U.S. Internet hegemony and develop their own sovereign Internet and governance structures. Rousseff’s move could lead to a powerful chorus—one that would transform the Internet of the future from a global commons to a fractured patchwork severely limited by the political boundaries on a map. Brazil is one of a handful of countries—including Indonesia, Turkey, and India—that have wavered in the debate over whether to develop an international framework to govern the Internet, one that would replace the role that the United States has played as chief Internet steward. Traditionally, that debate has featured America in the role as champion of a free and open Internet, one that guarantees the right of all people to freely express themselves. Arguing against that ideal: repressive regimes that have sought to limit connectivity and access to information . The NSA’s actions have shifted that debate, alienating key Internet-freedom allies and emboldening some of the most repressive regimes on the planet . Think of it as an emerging coalition between countries that object to how the United States is going about upholding its avowed principles for a free Internet, and countries that have objected to those avowed principles all along. Our close allies in the European Union, for instance, are now considering revoking data-sharing agreements with the United States and requiring American website providers to prominently warn Europeans that their data is subject to U.S. government surveillance. Meanwhile, repressive regimes like Iran, Syria, and China are wresting control of information over their networks, poisoning popular applications and services, and undermining the foundations for the Internet’s open, interconnected structure. NSA misdeeds undoubtedly further embolden these regimes to do as they please. The motivations of those nations questioning America’s de facto control over the global Internet may vary, but their responses are all pointing in the same troubling direction : toward a Balkanized Internet. Today, the Internet is in danger of becoming like the European train system, where varying voltage and 20 different types of signaling technologies force operators to stop and switch systems or even to another locomotive, resulting in delays, inefficiencies, and higher costs. Netizens would fall under a complex array of different jurisdictions imposing conflicting mandates and conferring conflicting rights. And much as different signaling hampers the movement of people and the trade of physical goods, an Internet within such a complex jurisdictional structure would certainly hamper modern economic activity. The NSA has opened a Pandora’s box that treats “citizens” and “foreigners” differently (even defining both groups in myriad different ways). Its rules also impose geo-locational-based jurisdictional mandates (based upon the route of your Internet traffic or the location of the data services and databases you use). They also include requirements based upon ownership; the location of a company’s headquarters may lead to surveillance mandates covering services and infrastructure in other countries. This creates tremendous technical challenges for startups and entrepreneurs—who will have to overcome impossible compatibility hurdles just to get up and running—stifling innovation at a moment when we need greater economic momentum, not dead weight. Already, a German citizen accessing a New York City data center via a Chinese fiber line may find her data covered by an array of conflicting legal requirements

requiring privacy and active surveillance at the same time. Fracturing the Internet undermines Internet freedom as well. The basic principle at the heart of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—protecting the right to freedom of opinion, expression, and the opportunity to participate in the information society—is at risk. Brazil may not be pressing to assert control over everything online or censor its own people, or spy on them, but plenty of other countries with darker motives are cheering Brazil on. The U.S. has done a disservice to all people already living and working under repressive regimes by creating a new international norm that massive-scale surveillance is acceptable. As others adopt the U.S. model, particularly in areas where movements for fundamental freedoms are burgeoning and fighting against oppression, there will be even less access to basic communications, hampering the ability to interact online outside of the regime’s control and censorship. Furthermore, the NSA has made a remarkably myopic tradeoff—overreaching its legal authorities for a slight boost in signals intelligence today that will lead to massive problems in response. Even before all the recent revelations of NSA misbehavior, the United States was already facing calls for a more “democratic” global system of Internet regulation that gave other countries more say in setting rules. Now, for the sake of a free Internet, it is imperative for Washington to move fast to restore a belief that America is a trustworthy Internet steward . It’s time for bold leadership to defend our core principles. Reforms need to go far beyond pro-forma reviews carried out by intelligence and administration insiders. There are precedents for the United States’ exercising restraint in order to advance larger interests. As a country, we agreed to stop atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, not to stockpile or deploy chemical weapons, and not to militarize outer space. There must be a cyberspace equivalent of this restraint—a restoration of balance that prioritizes civil rights, not surveillance, as vital to (inter)national security. Is the benefit of spying on Brazil’s oil company worth the cost of antagonizing the people of our hemisphere’s second-largest democracy and giving China and Russia the moral high ground in debates over how people around the world should access information? Do we really want a world where this behavior is normalized and where it’s acceptable for every country to surveil and hack indiscriminately? The answer to that question seems pretty clear. Today we need bold reforms from Washington— we need to curtail our unhealthy addiction to surveillance and covert hacking. Only by being radically transparent about the scope of current activities and ceasing activities that transgress national norms will we regain global trust and shift the rather bleak trajectory we are currently on.

Preserving global internet stability is key to solve existential crisisDeNardis, 2014 Laura, tenured Professor and Associate Dean in the School of Communication at American University, The Global War for Internet Governance, pg 15-18

Internet Globalization The preservation of the Internet's stability and security parallels other global collective action problems that have cumulative effects on all nations. Some of these global problems obviously include environmental protection, the prevention of terrorism, the eradication of infectious diseases, and the protection of human rights . Similar to these global collective action problems, the regional value of Internet infrastructure is dependent on the network effects afforded by globally coordinated Inter-net governance functions. Universal and consistent technical standards are the common denominator enabling interoperability among computing devices. The international coordination of Internet names and numbers ensures that each is globally unique. Cooperation at Internet interconnection points collectively creates the Internet's global backbone.

Globally coordinated responses to Internet worms and viruses collectively minimize the impact of new cybersecurity threats. International trade agreements provide coordinated enforcement of intellectual property rights. The local value of stable and secure global Internet governance is inestimable in contemporary societies dependent on networked tech nologies to handle basic business transactions, the movement of currency, and the exchange of financial securities. The amount of money changing hands electronically measures in the trillions range annually.1* Social life is also intertwined with digital life. Reputation systems serve as social currency. Couples meet in online dating sites and social life materializes in social media platforms. Press freedom and individual freedom of expression alike are dependent on online infrastructures and the policies enacted to preserve both liberty and infrastructure reliability. Political campaigns rely on Internet-based fundraising and communi- cation with voters. Law enforcement and national security efforts use digital infrastructures for data gathering and information warfare. No less than economic security, modern social life , culture, political discourse, and national security are at stake in keeping the Internet globally opera- tional and secure.

Next is the Cloud Computing Scenario:Domestic surveillance erodes American competitiveness in the cloud-computing industry—other countries are using the specter of NSA surveillance as a selling point, costing American companies billionsKehl, Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute, 14Daielle, Kevin Bankston, Policy Directorat OTI, Robyn Greene, Policy Counsel at OTI, Robert Morgus, Research Associate at OTI, "Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity", July 2014, New America's Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf

*trust gap in squo

*webhosting services are having an economic fallout- foreign companies are benefiting

*180 billion dollar loss in 3 years

*long term drought for this market= econ collapse

Costs to the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry and Related Business Trust in American businesses has taken a significant hit s ince the initial reports on the PRISM program suggested that the NSA was directly tapping into the servers of nine U.S. companies to obtain customer data for national security investigations.28 The Washington Post’s original story on the program provoked an uproar in the media and prompted the CEOs of several major companies to deny knowledge of or participation in the program.29 The exact nature of the requests made through the PRISM program was later clarified,30 but the public attention on the relationship between American companies and the NSA still created a significant trust gap , especially in industries where users entrust companies to store sensitive personal and commercial data. “Last year’s national security leaks have also had a commercial and

financial impact on American tech nology companies that have provided these records,” noted Representative Bob Goodlatte, a prominent Republican leader and Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in May 2014. “They have experienced backlash from both American and foreign consumers and have had their competitive standing in the global marketplace damaged .” 31 Given heightened concerns about the NSA’s ability to access data stored by U.S. companies, it is no surprise that American companies offering cloud computing and webhosting services are among those experiencing the most acute economic fallout from NSA surveillance . Within just a few weeks of the first disclosures, reports began to emerge that American cloud computing companies like Dropbox and Amazon Web Services were starting to lose business to overseas competitors.32 The CEO of Artmotion, one of Switzerland’s largest offshore hosting providers, reported in July 2013 that his company had seen a 45 percent jump in revenue since the first leaks,33 an early sign that the country’s perceived neutrality and strong data and privacy protections34 could potentially be turned into a serious competitive advantage.35 Foreign companies are clearly poised to benefit from growing fears about the security ramifications of keeping data in the United States. In a survey of 300 British and Canadian businesses released by PEER 1 in January 2014,36 25 percent of respondents indicated that they were moving data outside of the U.S. as a result of the NSA revelations. An overwhelming number of the companies surveyed indicated that security and data privacy were their top concerns, with 81 percent stating that they “want to know exactly where their data is being hosted.” Seventy percent were even willing to sacrifice performance in order to ensure that their data was protected.37 It appears that little consideration was given over the past decade to the potential economic repercussions if the NSA’s secret programs were revealed.38 This failure was acutely demonstrated by the Obama Administration’s initial focus on reassuring the public that its programs primarily affect non-Americans, even though non-Americans are also heavy users of American companies’ products. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg put a fine point on the issue, saying that the government “blew it” in its response to the scandal. He noted sarcastically: “The government response was, ‘Oh don’t worry, we’re not spying on any Americans.’ Oh, wonderful: that’s really helpful to companies [like Facebook] trying to serve people around the world, and that’s really going to inspire confidence in American internet companies.”39 As Zuckerberg’s comments reflect, certain parts of the American technology industry are particularly vulnerable to international backlash since growth is heavily dependent on foreign markets. For example, the U.S. cloud computing industry has grown from an estimated $46 billion in 2008 to $150 billion in 2014, with nearly 50 percent of worldwide cloud-computing revenues coming from the U.S.40 R Street Institute’s January 2014 policy study concluded that in the next few years, new products and services that rely on cloud computing will become increasingly pervasive. “ Cloud computing is also the root of development for the emerging generation of Web-based applications —home security, outpatient care, mobile payment, distance learning, efficient energy use and driverless cars,” writes R Street’s Steven Titch in the study. “And it is a research area where the United States is an undisputed leader .” 41 This trajectory may be dramatically altered, however, as a consequence of the NSA’s surveillance programs . Economic forecasts after the Snowden leaks have predicted significant, ongoing losses for the cloud-computing industry in the next few years . An August 2013 study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) estimated that revelations about the NSA’s PRISM program could cost the American cloud computing industry $22 to $35 billion over the next three years.42 On the low end, the ITIF projection suggests that U.S. cloud computing providers would lose 10 percent of the foreign market share to European or Asian competitors, totaling in about $21.5 billion in losses; on the high-end, the $35 billion figure represents about 20 percent of the companies’ foreign market share. Because the cloud computing industry is undergoing

rapid growth right now —a 2012 Gartner study predicted global spending on cloud computing would increase by 100 percent from 2012 to 2016, compared to a 3 percent overall growth rate in the tech industry as a whole43— vendors in this sector are particularly vulnerable to shifts in the market . Failing to recruit new customers or losing a competitive advantage due to exploitation by rival companies in other countries can quickly lead to a dwindling market share . The ITIF study further notes that “the percentage lost to foreign competitors could go higher if foreign governments enact protectionist trade barriers that effectively cut out U.S. providers,” citing early calls from German data protection authorities to suspend the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor program (which will be discussed at length in the next section).44 As the R Street Policy Study highlights, “Ironically, the NSA turned the competitive edge U.S. companies have in cloud computing into a liability, especially in Europe.”45 In a follow up to the ITIF study, Forrester Research analyst James Staten argued that the think tank’s estimates were low, suggesting that the actual figure could be as high as $180 billion over three years . 46 Staten highlighted two additional impacts not considered in the ITIF study. The first is that U.S. customers—not just foreign companies—would also avoid US cloud providers , especially for international and overseas business. The ITIF study predicted that American companies would retain their domestic market share, but Staten argued that the economic blowback from the revelations would be felt at home, too. “You don’t have to be a French company, for example, to be worried about the US government snooping in the data about your French clients,” he wrote.47 Moreover, the analysis highlighted a second and “far more costly” impact: that foreign cloud providers , too, would lose as much as 20 percent of overseas and domestic business because of similar spying programs conducted by other governments. Indeed, the NSA disclosures “have prompted a fundamental re-examination of the role of intelligence services in conducting coordinated cross-border surveillance,” according to a November 2013 report by Privacy International on the “Five Eyes” intelligence partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.48 Staten predicts that as the surveillance landscape around the world becomes more clear, it could have a serious negative impact on all hosting and outsourcing services, resulting in a 25 percent decline in the overall IT services market, or about $180 billion in losses.49 Recent reports suggest that things are, in fact, moving in the direction that analysts like Castro and Staten suggested.50 A survey of 1,000 “[Information and Communications Technology (ICT)] decision-makers” from France, Germany, Hong Kong, the UK, and the USA in February and March 2014 found that the disclosures “have had a direct impact on how companies around the world think about ICT and cloud computing in particular.”51 According to the data from NTT Communications, 88 percent of decision-makers are changing their purchasing behavior when it comes to the cloud, with the vast majority indicating that the location of the data is very important. The results do not bode well for recruitment of new customers, either—62 percent of those currently not storing data in the cloud indicated that the revelations have since prevented them from moving their ICT systems there. And finally, 82 percent suggested that they agree with proposals made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in February 2014 to have separate data networks for Europe, which will be discussed in further detail in Part III of this report. Providing direct evidence of this trend, Servint, a Virginia-based webhosting company, reported in June 2014 that international clients have declined by as much as half, dropping from approximately 60 percent of its business to 30 percent since the

leaks began.52 With faith in U.S. companies on the decline , foreign companies are stepping in to take advantage of shifting public perceptions. As Georg Mascolo and Ben Scott predicted in a joint paper published by the Wilson Center and the New America Foundation in October 2013, “Major commercial actors on both continents are preparing offensive and defensive strategies to battle in the market for a competitive advantage drawn from Snowden’s revelations.”53 For example, Runbox, a small Norwegian company that offers secure email service, reported a 34 percent jump in customers since June 2013.54 Runbox markets itself as a safer email and webhosting provider for both individual and commercial customers, promising that it “will never disclose any user data unauthorized, track your usage, or display any advertisements.”55 Since the NSA revelations, the company has touted its privacy-centric design and the fact that its servers are located in Norway as a competitive advantage. “Being firmly located in Norway, the Runbox email service is governed by strict privacy regulations and is a safe alternative to American email services as well as cloud-based services that move data across borders and jurisdictions,” company representatives wrote on its blog in early 2014.56 F-Secure, a Finnish cloud storage company, similarly emphasizes the fact that “its roots [are] in Finland, where privacy is a fiercely guarded value.”57 Presenting products and services as ‘NSA-proof’ or ‘safer’ alternatives to American-made goods is an increasingly viable strategy for foreign companies hoping to chip away at U.S. tech competiveness.58

The current business climate in the technology sector will do lasting damage to American economic competitiveness—only meaningful government reform can change the economic trajectoryKehl, Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute, 14Daielle, Kevin Bankston, Policy Directorat OTI, Robyn Greene, Policy Counsel at OTI, Robert Morgus, Research Associate at OTI, "Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity", July 2014, New America's Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, https://www.newamerica.org/downloads/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf

*declining prices in overseas markets

* “secure alternatives”

Costs to Overseas Tech Sales ¶ The economic impact of NSA spying does not end with the American cloud computing industry. According to The New York Times, “Even as Washington grapples with the diplomatic and political fallout of Mr. Snowden’s leaks, the more urgent issue, companies and analysts say, is economic .”59 In the past year, a number of American companies have reported declining sales in overseas markets like China (where, it must be noted, suspicion of the American government was already high before the NSA disclosures), loss of customers including foreign governments, and increased competition from non-U.S. services marketing themselves as ‘secure’ alternatives to popular American products. ¶ There is already significant evidence linking NSA surveillance to direct harm to U.S. economic interests . In November 2013, Cisco became one of the first companies to publicly discuss the impact of the NSA on its business, reporting that orders from China fell 18 percent

and that its worldwide revenue would decline 8 to 10 percent in the fourth quarter, in part because of continued sales weakness in China.60 New orders in the developing world fell 12 percent in the third quarter, with the Brazilian market dropping roughly 25 percent of its Cisco sales.61 Although John Chambers, Cisco’s CEO, was hesitant to blame all losses on the NSA, he acknowledged that it was likely a factor in declining Chinese sales62 and later admitted that he had never seen as fast a decline in an emerging market as the drop in China in late 2013.63 These numbers were also released before documents in May 2014 revealed that the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit had intercepted network gear—including Cisco routers—being shipped to target organizations in order to covertly install implant firmware on them before they were delivered.64 In response, Chambers wrote in a letter to the Obama Administration that “if these allegations are true, these actions will undermine confidence in our industry and in the ability of technology companies to deliver products globally.”65¶ Much like Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard all reported in late 2013 that sales were down in China as a result of the NSA revelations.66 Sanford C. Bernstein analyst Toni Sacconaghi has predicted that after the NSA revelations, “US technology companies face the most revenue risk in China by a wide margin, followed by Brazil and other emerging markets.”67 Industry observers have also questioned whether companies like Apple—which hopes to bring in significant revenue from iPhone sales in China—will feel the impact overseas.68 Even AT&T reportedly faced intense scrutiny regarding its proposed acquisition of Vodafone, a European wireless carrier, after journalists revealed the extent of AT&T’s collaboration with the NSA.69¶ American companies are also losing out on business opportunities and contracts with large companies and foreign governments as a result of NSA spying. According to an article in The New York Times, “American businesses are being left off some requests for proposals from foreign customers that previously would have included them.”70 This refers to German companies, for example, that are increasingly uncomfortable giving their business to American firms. Meanwhile, the German government plans to change its procurement rules to prevent American companies that cooperate with the NSA or other intelligence organizations from being awarded federal IT contracts.71 The government has already announced it intends to end its contract with Verizon, which provides Internet service to a number of government departments.72 “There are indications that Verizon is legally required to provide certain things to the NSA, and that’s one of the reasons the cooperation with Verizon won’t continue,” a spokesman for the German Interior Ministry told the Associated Press in June.73¶ The NSA disclosures have similarly been blamed for Brazil’s December 2013 decision to award a $4.5 billion contract to Saab over Boeing, an American company that had previously been the frontrunner in a deal to replace Brazil’s fleet of fighter jets.74 Welber Barral, a former Brazilian trade secretary, suggested to Bloomberg News that Boeing would have won the contract a year earlier,75 while a source in the Brazilian government told Reuters that “ the NSA problem ruined it for the Americans .” 76 As we will discuss in greater depth in the next section, Germany and Brazil are also considering data localization proposals that could harm U.S. business interests and prevent American companies from entering into new markets because of high compliance costs.¶ Cost to Public Trust in American Companies¶ The pressure is increasing on American companies to respond to the revelations in order to mitigate potential backlash and prevent foreign companies from poaching their business. According to the R Street Institute study, “It appears the NSA’s aggressive surveillance has created an overall fear among U.S. companies that there is ‘guilt by association’ from which they need to proactively distance themselves.”79 Some companies have tried to regain trust by publicly stating that they are not part of PRISM or other NSA programs, issuing disclaimers along the lines of those published by Amazon and Salesforce in June 2013.80 Others that have been directly linked to the NSA programs have publicly criticized the American government and called for greater transparency in order to rebuild user confidence and counteract potential economic harms.81 To that end, nine major American companies—AOL, Apple, Dropbox, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, and Yahoo—joined together in the “Reform Government Surveillance” campaign in January 2014, where they launched a website and wrote an open letter to government leaders laying out principles for surveillance reform, including an end to bulk collection and opposition to data localization requirements.82 Since the launch, the coalition has urged reform on Capitol Hill through outreach and letters to Congress, supported the February 2014 “The Day We Fight Back” activist campaign, and hired a lobbyist to bolster their efforts to curb the NSA’s reach.83 This unlikely, public partnership of some of Internet’s biggest rivals speaks to the seriousness of the threats to their collective business interests.84 Indeed, according to an April 2014 Harris poll commissioned by a data security company, nearly half of the 2,000 respondents (47 percent) have changed their online behavior since the NSA leaks, paying closer attention not only to the sites they visit but also to what they say and do on the Internet.85 In particular, 26 percent indicated that they are now doing less online shopping and banking since learning the extent of government surveillance programs. Clearly, there are significant financial incentives for companies to distance themselves from the programs, and as a result, they are expending capital—actual and political—to do so.¶ Other companies have taken it a step further, developing new products or taking additional precautions to assure customers that their data is safe from the NSA. “Many tech

companies feel they have no choice but to try to develop NSA resistant products because customers from China to Germany threaten to boycott American hardware and cloud services they view as compromised,” wrote USA Today in February 2014.86 Companies like Yahoo and Google have devoted increased resources to hardening their systems against NSA surveillance in order to assure users that their data is adequately protected.87 Yahoo implemented automatic encryption on its email service in January 2014, and in March 2014 began encrypting all traffic that moved between its data centers, as well as queries on its homepage and its messaging service.88 Google’s Vice President for Security Engineering, Eric Grosse, referred to efforts to protect users’ data from government surveillance as “an arms race,” when discussing the company’s move last fall to encrypt all information travelling between its data centers.89 In June 2014, Google unveiled a source code extension for the Chrome browser called “End-to-End” which is designed to make email encryption easy, and announced a new section of its transparency report called “Safer Email” which details the percentage of email that is encrypted in transit and identifies the providers who support encryption.90 These changes are part of a new focus on encouraging users and companies to harden their systems against NSA surveillance, and the strategy appears to be working. Almost immediately, Comcast announced its plans to work with Google to encrypt all email traffic exchanged with Gmail after the cable company was described as one of the worst offenders in the new report.91¶ Meanwhile, Microsoft has been publicizing its policy that allows customers to store their data in Microsoft data centers in specific countries.92 John E. Frank, deputy general counsel at Microsoft, told The New York Times, “We’re hearing from customers, especially global enterprise customers, that they care more than ever about where their content is stored and how it is used and secured.”93 IBM is reportedly spending over a billion dollars to build overseas data centers in an effort to reassure foreign customers that their data is protected from U.S. surveillance.94 In reference to foreign customers asking about whether their data is protected from government snooping, an IBM executive said, “My response is protect your data against any third party — whether it’s the NSA, other governments, hackers, terrorists, whatever,” adding that it is time to “start talking about encryption and VPNs and all the ways you can protect yourself.”95¶ Finally, faced with an impossible choice between maintaining user trust and complying with government requests, a handful of American companies that provide secure email services have had to shut down their operations altogether. Lavabit, a secure email service provider that experienced a 1,900 percent increase in account registrations after the Snowden revelations, shuttered its business after it became clear that user data could not be protected from government surveillance. When the NSA could not read Lavibit’s communications directly by breaking its encryption, the agency obtained orders compelling the company to hand over information related to its encryption keys, which would have given the NSA the ability to decrypt the communications of all 400,000 of Lavabit’s customers.96 Silent Circle, a secure communications provider that saw a 400 percent revenue increase following the Snowden revelations, followed Lavabit’s lead and shut down its secure mail service,

explaining that the decision was made because “we see the writing on the wall.”97¶ It is abundantly clear that the NSA surveillance programs are currently having a serious, negative impact on the U.S. economy and threatening the future competitiveness of American tech nology companies . Not only are U.S. companies losing overseas sales and getting dropped from contracts with foreign companies and governments—they are also watching their competitive advantage in fast-growing industries like cloud computing and webhosting disappear, opening the door for foreign companies who claim to offer “more secure” alternative products to poach their business. Industry efforts to increase transparency and accountability as well as concrete steps to promote better security by adopting encryption and other best practices are positive signs, but U.S. companies cannot solve this problem alone. “It’s not blowing over,” said Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith at a recent conference. “In June of 2014, it is clear it is getting worse, not better.”98 Without meaningful government reform and better oversight, concerns about the breadth of NSA surveillance could lead to permanent shifts in the global technology market and do lasting damage to the U.S. economy.

Our evidence is reverse casual- the cloud-computing industry is necessary to save the economy—the information economy affects all organizations and is ripe for innovationCoviello, Executive Vice President, EMC Corporation, 11

Art, "Can Cloud Computing Save The American Economy?", March 13 2011, Forbes, www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/03/13/can-cloud-computing-save-the-american-economy/

The American dream is in peril from the confluence of sky rocketing deficits , high unemployment , and the ticking time bomb of an aging baby boomer generation , with its coincident increase in the burden of entitlements as a percentage of GDP. For the first time, the next generation of Americans, our grandchildren, risk having a lower

standard of living than we enjoyed. It is not a problem that can be remedied with tax increases and budget reductions. We will not save or cut our way back to economic prosperity. The way forward is innovation . America must innovate its way out of economic stagnation and back to economic growth . As has been the case for the last 150 years, Americans have always responded well in a crisis and yet again, we are well positioned to lead the world out of this one. Want proof? American businesses systemically and culturally react fast. Two years after the economic downturn began the United States was generating 97% of its economic output with only 90% of the labor. This sort of gain in productivity ultimately translates into increased economic activity, the ability to pay down debt and a higher standard of living for those of us who are employed. Unfortunately it does not directly address the issue of unemployment.

The fact is that productivity gains from working harder can only take us so far. Innovation and technology can and must take us the rest of the way, creating new jobs and new industries . Our “so called”

information economy , for example, is ripe for innovation . Today, all organizations are dependent on information tech nology. What makes me optimistic about the future is that we have not even begun to scratch the surface of all that can be accomplished by actually applying information technology pervasively. We have spent trillions of dollars worldwide for the computers to create and process information, networks to move it around and the hardware to store it. But we are at a point where we spend 60 to 70% of “IT” budgets just to maintain those systems and infrastructures . No wonder progress in

applying IT is so slow. This is the technology equivalent of every organization in the world, big or small, investing the capital and human resources to build and operate their own electricity producing power plants. But instead, picture a world where software platforms are available online and easily customizable. Picture a world where compute power is generated off site, available in quantities when and where you need it. And picture a world where information is safely stored, efficiently managed and accessible, when and where you need it. These are cloud infrastructures. The economies of scale, flexibility and efficiency they offer will not only save organizations massive amounts of capital and maintenance costs but emancipate them to apply and use information as never before. An unbelievable opportunity to raise productivity while creating unprecedented opportunities for businesses and workers. Now picture a health-care system where a doctor has medical records at his fingertips, can see x-rays with the click of a mouse, is able to learn and apply the latest diagnostic and surgical technique from anywhere in the world. Think of the efficiencies in hospital supply chains, the delivery of prescription drugs, the processing of billing and insurance claims, reductions in fraud, and the application of best practices for cost controls. The capacity for improvement is endless. As a matter of fact, these innovations are already being applied in isolated

pockets. But for us to seize the opportunity before us it’s imperative that we move from isolated centers of excellence to connected systems of excellence . Pick any industry and systemic improvements like these are available. A new age of innovation and technology advancement is within our grasp – an opportunity for job creation, greater productivity and economic growth. The time for cloud computing is now. We need government and industry to accelerate broad scale adoption of cloud infrastructures so we can reap the rewards of a true information based economy. As I said at the outset, Americans respond well in a crisis. It is the nature of our society: egalitarian, free, open and competitive that make us the most adaptive, inventive and resilient country in the world. Time again for us to lead.

Competitiveness is vital to hegemony and conflict suppression Hubbard, Open Society Foundations program assistant, 2010(Jesse, “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis”, 5-28, http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stability-theory/)

*regression analysis

*instability- bad economy

*If lose economic powers other hegemons challenge

Regression analysis of this data shows that Pearson’s r-value is -.836. In the case of American hegemony, economic strength is a better predictor of violent conflict than even overall national power , which had an r-value of -.819. The data is also well within the realm of statistical significance, with a p-value of .0014. While the data for British hegemony was not as striking, the same overall pattern holds true in both cases. During both periods of hegemony, hegemonic strength was negatively related with violent conflict, and yet use of force by the hegemon was positively correlated with violent conflict in both cases. Finally, in both cases, economic power was more closely associated with conflict levels than military power. Statistical analysis created a more complicated picture of the hegemon’s role in fostering stability than initially anticipated. VI. Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy To elucidate some answers regarding the complexities my analysis unearthed, I turned first to the existing theoretical literature on hegemonic stability theory. The existing literature provides some potential frameworks for understanding these results. Since economic strength proved to be of such crucial importance, reexamining the literature that focuses on

hegemonic stability theory’s economic implications was the logical first step. As explained above, the literature on hegemonic stability theory can be broadly divided into two camps – that which focuses on the international economic system, and that which focuses on armed conflict and instability. This research falls squarely into the second camp, but insights from the first camp are

still of relevance. Even Kindleberger’s early work on this question is of relevance. Kindleberger posited that the economic instability between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the lack of an economic hegemon (Kindleberger 1973). But economic instability obviously has spillover effects into the international political arena. Keynes, writing after WWI, warned in his seminal tract The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Germany’s economic humiliation could have a radicalizing effect on the nation’s political culture (Keynes 1919). Given later events, his warning seems prescient. In the years since the Second World War, however, the European continent has not relapsed into armed conflict. What was different after the second global conflagration? Crucially, the United States was in a far more powerful position than Britain was after WWI. As the tables above show, Britain’s economic strength after the First World War was about 13% of the total in strength in the international system. In contrast, the United States possessed about 53% of relative economic power in the international system in the years immediately following WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild Europe’s economic strength with billions of dollars in investment through the Marshall Plan, assistance that was never available to the defeated powers after the First World War (Kindleberger 1973). The interwar years were also marked by a series of debilitating trade wars that likely worsened the Great Depression (Ibid.). In contrast, when Britain was more powerful, it was able to facilitate greater free trade, and after World War II, the United States played a leading role in creating institutions like the GATT that had an essential role in facilitating global trade (Organski 1958). The possibility that economic stability is an important factor in the

overall security environment should not be discounted, especially given the results of my statistical analysis. Another theory that could provide insight into the patterns observed in this research is that of preponderance of power. Gilpin theorized that when a state has the preponderance of power in the international system, rivals are more likely to resolve their disagreements without resorting to armed conflict (Gilpin 1983). The logic behind this claim is simple – it makes more sense to challenge a weaker hegemon than a stronger one. This simple yet powerful theory can help explain the puzzlingly strong positive correlation between military conflicts engaged in by the hegemon and conflict overall. It is not necessarily that military involvement by the hegemon instigates further conflict in the international system. Rather, this military involvement could be a function of the hegemon’s weaker position, which is the true

cause of the higher levels of conflict in the international system. Additionally, it is important to note that military power is, in the long run, dependent on economic strength . Thus, it is possible that as hegemons lose relative economic power, other nations are tempted to challenge them even if their short-term military capabilities are still stron g. This would help explain some of the variation found between the economic and military data. The results of this analysis are of clear importance beyond the realm of theory. As the debate rages over the role of the United States in the world, hegemonic stability theory has some useful insights to bring to the table. What this research makes clear is that a strong hegemon can exert a positive influence on stability in the international system. However, this should not give policymakers a

justification to engage in conflict or escalate military budgets purely for the sake of international stability. If anything, this research points to the central importance of economic influence in fostering international stability . To misconstrue these findings to justify anything else would be a grave error indeed. Hegemons may play a stabilizing role in the international system, but this role is complicated. It is economic strength, not military dominance that is the true test of hegemony. A weak state with a strong military is a paper tiger – it may appear fearsome, but it is vulnerable to even a short blast of wind.

Great power war Zhang et al., Carnegie Endowment researcher, 2011(Yuhan, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry”, 1-22, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/, ldg)

*no one can challenge USA and attack us

*bandwagon so they don’t just attack USA but USA and squad

*without hegemony there will be trade blocs and regional power wars

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the

once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military . Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and

the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers , so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid . As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of

equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society

in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by

Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did

international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

Econ decline causes nuclear war Harold James 14, Professor of history at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School who specializes in European economic history, 7/2/14, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-world-war/article19325504/

As we get closer to the centenary of Gavrilo Princip’s act of terrorism in Sarajevo, there is an ever more vivid fear: it could happen again . The approach of the hundredth anniversary of 1914 has put a

spotlight on the fragility of the world’s political and economic security systems. ¶ At the beginning of 2013, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker was widely ridiculed for evoking the shades of 1913. By now he is looking like a prophet. By 2014, as the security situation in the South China Sea deteriorated, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe cast China as the equivalent to Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany; and the fighting in Ukraine and in Iraq is a sharp reminder of the dangers of escalation. ¶ Lessons of 1914 are about more than simply the dangers of national and sectarian animosities. The main story of today as then is the precariousness of financial globalization, and the consequences that political leaders draw from it. ¶ In the influential view of Norman Angell in his 1910 book The Great Illusion, the interdependency of the increasingly complex global economy made war impossible. But a quite opposite conclusion was possible and equally plausible – and proved to be the case. Given the extent of fragility, a clever twist to the control levers might make war easily winnable by the economic hegemon . ¶ In the wake of an epochal financial crisis that almost brought a complete global collapse, in 1907, several countries started to think of finance as primarily an instrument of raw power, one that could and should be turned to national advantage. ¶ The 1907 panic emanated from the United States but affected the rest of the world and demonstrated the fragility of the whole international financial order. The aftermath of the 1907 crash drove the then hegemonic power – Great Britain - to reflect on how it could use its financial power. ¶ Between 1905 and 1908, the British Admiralty evolved the broad outlines of a plan for financial and economic warfare that would wreck the financial system of its major European rival, Germany, and destroy its fighting capacity. ¶ Britain used its extensive networks to gather information about opponents. London banks financed most of the world’s trade. Lloyds provided insurance for the shipping not just of Britain, but of the world. Financial networks provided the information that allowed the British government to find the sensitive strategic vulnerabilities of the opposing alliance.¶ What pre-1914 Britain did anticipated the private-public partnership that today links technology giants such as Google, Apple or Verizon to U.S. intelligence gathering. Since last year, the Edward Snowden leaks about the NSA have shed a light on the way that global networks are used as a source of intelligence and power.¶ For Britain’s rivals, the financial panic of 1907 showed the necessity of mobilizing financial powers themselves. The United States realized that it needed a central bank analogous to the Bank of England. American financiers thought that New York needed to develop its own commercial trading system that could handle bills of exchange in the same way as the London market. ¶ Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging . Then an economically declining power , Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against its

larger and faster growing competitors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China – according to some calculations, set to become the world’s largest economy in 2014. ¶ In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction , but also as potential instruments for the application of national power. ¶ In managing the 2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on U.S. dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. The United States provided that support to some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the “Dollar Trap.” ¶ Geo-politics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to build up the renminbi as a major international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias of the existing (American-based) agencies. ¶ The next stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. ¶ The test is in the Western imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s calculation in response is that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious about the financial war. It would turn into a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of Europe and America. ¶ The threat of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty , one that mirrors the decisive feature

of the crisis of the summer of 1914 . At that time, no one could really know whether clashes would escalate or not. That feature contrasts remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the 1960s, when the strategic doctrine of M utually A ssured D estruction left no doubt that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate . ¶ The idea of network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage by surprise, and to win at no or low cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others might, but also might not be able to, mount the same sort of operation. Just as in 1914, there is an enhanced temptation to roll the dice , even though the game may be fatal.¶

Prioritize stopping flashpoints of war over structural violence – stats prove this is a better approach to stop injusticeJoshua Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “ if you want peace, work for justice .” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way . War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices . 9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace . Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate .