nissan oren - front in the balkans

7/29/2019 Nissan Oren - Front in the Balkans

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Popular Front in the Balkans: 2. BulgariaAuthor(s): Nissan OrenSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 5, No. 3, Popular Fronts (1970), pp. 69-82Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/259675 .

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P o p u l a r F r o n t i n t h eBa lkan s : 2 . B u l g a r i aNissan OrenIn the broadcontext of modernBulgarianpolitics,the impactofcommunismhas been enormous.No politicalmovementwith sowide an appeal,in both countrysideand town, could have failedto leave the deepest imprint on the country'spolitics. Yet cir-cumstances,coupled with a manifestincapacityas revolutionarydiagnosticians, ondemnedthe leadershipof the BulgarianCom-munistparty (CPB) to repeatedstrategicmiscalculations.Opposedto Bulgaria's ntanglementn the firstworldwar,thecommunists,or rathertheir predecessors he 'narrow'socialists,protestedbut did not joinup withthe anti-warparty,a stepwhichmight have deterredthe regime from enteringa disastrouswar.The revolutionaryervouraroused n the aftermath f defeatmadethe communists nto the secondlargestpolitical orcein the coun-try. Realpower,however,wasnot to be theirs.Rather, t was theAgrarianswho consolidated and held power during the im-mediate post-war years. Set in their orthodox Marxism, thecommunistsdiscounted he advantages f coalescingwith agrarianpopulism,and proclaimed heir neutralitywhen the hour struckfor the Agrarian egimein June I923. Castigatedby the Comin-tern for their un-Bolshevikbehaviour, hey undertooka revolu-tion of their own a few months later, in September,when allprospectsfor success had alreadyvanished.In differentcircum-stancesandyet in similar ashion heywere to repeat heirblundera decadelater,on the eve of the popularfrontera. The militarycoupcarriedout in May I934 againstapopularly lectedcoalition,found the communistsaloof anduninterestedn backing he causeof parliamentarism.Not unlike their Germancomradesa shortwhile earlier, they interpretedthe advent of militarism in thecountryas a blessingin disguise.11 The most comprehensiveand best treatment of the earlier history ofBulgariancommunism in a western language, remains Joseph Rothschild'sThe Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936 (NewYork, I959).

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYIt is in this light that the popularfront experimentmust beexamined.For the Bulgarianst began shortlybefore the seventh

congress of the Cominternand ended in the summer of 1939.These were fatefulandeventfulyears,but forBulgaria's articularbrand of communism unheroic. When the test came, and thecommunists launched armed resistance in I943, their revolu-tionaryelan was blunted. For a partyaccustomed o patronizingand deprecating he communistsof both Yugoslaviaand Greece,the spontaneousupsurge of a vigorous radical revolutionismtothe south and west duringthe war,was a bitter reminderof pastglories.In its general outlines the popular front effort in Bulgariadevelopedalong substantiallyparallel ines to those followed byother European communist parties whose countries were indanger of being engulfed by the might of Hitler's Germany.Yet in operational ermsthe implementation f the popularfronttactics within the particular context of Bulgaria's turbulentpolitical ife was bound to be substantiallydifferent.The initiativedevelopedearlyin I935, reachedits height duringthe 1937 and1938 elections, and ended with the German-Sovietpact. Fromthe outbreakof the second worldwar and until the entry of theGerman armies into Bulgariain early March I94I, the com-munists exhibitedmarked ndifference o co-operationwith otherpoliticalgroups.Whateverpoliticalalliancesweremade,remainedtentative and fragile. The mainstreamof Bulgariandemocraticactionwas out of reachof their influence.Since the hard core ofthe traditional anti-fascist forces were immune to persistentcommunistadvances, hey were forcedto remainsatisfiedwith aloose alliance.If the successor failureof popular rontstrategy s to be seen asafunctionof communist nteractionwithnon-communist orces,thebackground o Bulgaria'spolitics must be brieflysketched.Notunlike other small states, there is a sense in which Bulgariandomesticpolitics were themselvesin many respects the productof events outside the country. A small people, occupying acentral position in the Balkans,with its unrivalledmixture ofpeoples, the Bulgarianswere one of the last in Europeto attainstate sovereignty.From the outset the underlying impulse oftheir political behaviour was - and remains - to bring about a

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POPULAR FRONT IN THE BALKANS: 2. BULGARIAdelineationof political boundarieswhich would enclose withintheir domainthe entire Bulgariannation. That their perceptionof who was a Bulgariandiffered fromthe views both of theirneighboursand of manywithin the country,was one of the com-plexitiesmakingBalkanpolitics what they were. Since nationalgoalsexceedednationalcapabilities, he Bulgarianswerecast in arevisionistrole from the beginning.Warsandregionalalignments,and above all the permanentneed for at least one big Europeanpower as protector,seemed predetermined.The catastropheof1918was as much the logicalconsequenceof defeat n the secondBalkanWar, as the outcome of the second world war was theresult of defeat in the first. The impact of compoundedcatas-tropheon the domesticpoliticalscene was shattering.So long asthe German Empire lasted and Russia was Tsarist, small butvigorousmiddle-classpoliticalpartiescould comeforwardwith anappealingandcomprehensive artyprogramme imedatresolvingBulgaria'snationalproblemsby fosteringa pro-Germanor a pro-Russian orientation,but in the I920S this was no longer true;WeimarGermanywasyoungandweakandRussiawasBolshevik.Italyin the Balkansrepresentedonly a choice of the secondbest.When,in the thirties,GermanyandRussiare-emergedasthe onlytwopossiblesponsors,the middle-classpartiessplit. One sectionturnedcrypto-fascisto match ts pro-German eaning.The otherfound itself torn betweena desireto benefitfromGermany's evi-sionismasBulgaria's nlyhopeof attaininghernationalaspirations,and an aversion o fascismas a politicalphilosophy.FranceandBritainstayedaloofand werein any case tooremoteto constitutepracticalalternatives.The partieswerethusimmobilizedandcom-pelled to place their trust in the monarchas the only authorityequipped omanageBulgaria's ffairs orthetimebeing.Theirrolethereforewas not and couldnot be decisive.They werepowerfulenough as a countervailing orce vis-a-vis the extremists, butpowerlessto initiate an alternative ourse.2Given thenarrowmarginswithinwhich the middle-classpartiescouldoperate hroughout he interwarperiod,the developmentofrevolutionary lternativeswas inevitable.Agrarianpopulismandcommunismemergedas the maincompetitors ora radicalcourse.

2 A good if somewhat subjective account of the political scene in the interwarperiod is to be found in Dimo Kazasov, Burni godini, 1918-44 (Sofia, I949);see also Joseph Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy (London, I939).7I



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYStartingfrom distinctly different ideological premises and offering adistinctlydifferentset of answers,the two movementsbenefitedfrom the militarydefeat of I9I8. Strippedof its populistrhetoric,the Agrarianpoliticalprogrammewas as simple as it was impos-sibleto implement; n its extremeexpressionst promisedapeasantparadiseon earth. Not only were the peasants,whoformed thegreat majority, o retain the fruits of their labour,but the urbansector was to be made subservient to their economic interests.To this end, Bulgariawould have to tone down her nationalaspirations nddisentangleherself rom nternationalnvolvementsby seekinga lastingaccommodationwith Yugoslavia.The appealof this programmewas enormous.3So was the oppositionto it.Fears - real or assumed - that it would in due course meanacknowledginghe loss of Macedonia,as well as imposea peasantdictatorshipoverthe country,broughtabout a temporaryallianceamongstthe middle-classelements, the military,the Court, theChurch,andthe Macedonianexiles, an alliancewhich carriedouttheputschof June1923. Onlyin the late twentieswerethe scatteredand dissipatedAgrarian orces successful in reorganizing hem-selves under the leadershipof Gichev, one of the most out-standing politicalfiguresin Bulgarianpolitics. Following a sub-stantial modificationof their own doctrines, they succeeded ingaining the trust of part of the middle-classparties, and withthem establisheda coalition governmentin I931. This was toprove the last legally and freely elected regime Bulgariawas tohave. When it fell in May I934 to a military coup, the way wasopenedfor the emergenceof a one-manroyaldictatorshipwhichwas to last throughthe war.The true characterof the Bulgarianbody politic after I934is not easily definable. Party politics remained significant, al-though strictly limited in scope and depth. Until his death inAugust I943, King Borisretainedeffectivecontrolover all vitalmatters,and under his rule the freedomof politicalpartiesandfree tradeunions, abolished mmediatelyafterthe militarycoup,were not restored. But Bulgaria did not become a thoroughtotalitarian tate,norwasit to becomefascistin the truemeaningof the term. Political formationscontinuedto lead a shadowy

3 An insight into Stamboliiski's ideas can be gained from Nikola Petkov, ed.,Aleksandur Stamboliiski: Lichnost i idei (Sofia, 1930).72



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POPULAR FRONT IN THE BALKANS: 2. BULGARIAexistence, and although the regime could not acknowledge theexistence of formally organized political parties, the voters, whenconsulted, could and did give their votes to the men of theirchoice. The fact that Bulgaria escaped the worst impact of theworld depression had an ameliorating effect on the conduct ofpolitical life. Integrated within the German economic sphere, itseconomy showed a modest expansion through the thirties, andindustrial capacity continued to expand well into the war period.The standard of living of the working class, although low on theEuropean scale, rose until I943.4This was not what the communists had foreseen. Their argu-ment ran that as Bulgaria was well on the way towards capitalismand capitalism meant urbanism, the Agrarian ideology with itsemphasis on peasant welfare was simply reactionary. The nationalproblem would be resolved neither by new entanglements, nor bydisengagement, as advocated by the Agrarians. It could besettled only by the coming of the socialist revolution. But theywere not prepared to await the organic transformation of thepeasant economy into fully fledged capitalism before attemptingto bring about that revolution. In this the Bulgarian communistswere in line with the Bolsheviks, but they lacked Lenin's prag-matism and political flexibility. In the course of their history, theywere to produce a number of theoreticians and capable officials,but never a revolutionary strategist of the first rank.5Strengthenedby the traditional Russophile sentiments of the population as awhole, they succeeded in making inroads in the countryside aswell as among the urban middle classes. Their numerical growthin the early twenties gave them a sense of self-confidence whichwas in fact fatal. While their expectation that the revolution couldbe brought about before the development of capitalism was plaus-ible, their determination to pursue that goal without any helpfrom the Agrarians was a gross error. Their erratic behaviour inI923, resulting as it did in the crushing of their abortive revolu-tionary attempt, demonstrated the discrepancy between doctrineand political realities.The disaster of that year had a traumatic effect. For twentyyears and more, the failure to establish a united front with theAgrarian Union when this could have been profitable, constituted

4 Zhak Natan, Ikonomicheskaistoriia na Bulgariia (Sofia, I957), esp. 499-507.5 That is, excluding Christian Rakovsky, who was only half Bulgarian.73



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYthe centraltheme of intra-partydisputes.Nor couldthe practicalconsequencesof the debaclebe ignored.A largenumber of partymembers, including most of the leaders, found themselves inSoviet exile. There are no exactfigures,and the total variedfromtime to time,but it can be accepted hat asmanyas2000 Bulgariancommunistspassed their lives in the Soviet Union for twentyyears. Given their revolutionary ecord,their remarkableacilityfor cultural and linguistic adaptation, hey played a part in theCominternsecond only to the Germans,and the reputation heyestablished or themselveswasto playa criticalrole in lateryears.The physical break between the emigres and the cadres athome - the so-called Muscovites and natives - gave rise to ten-sions which were to persistlong afterthe returnof the exiles atthe end of the second world war. But since the core of the oldleadershipretained ts close connectionswith Moscow,its overallcontrolof the movementwasin the long runmaintained.When itcame to the point, those whomthe Russiansendorseddominatedthe Bulgarian ectionof the Cominternandin turncould and didexerciseauthorityover the partyat home.The patternof factionalismwithin the emigreranks can onlybe brieflysketched.The central heme was a tediousreplayof theeventsof 1923.The forumswereextendedplenary essionsheld inVienna, Berlin, and Moscow, lasting for weeks at a time.Thebattles were verbal n the main,and whilethe victorsconsolidatedtheir grip over party affairs,the victims did not - at the initialstagesat least - face the ultimatepenalty.There werethree maingroups.The rightists,or 'defeatists'as they weretermedby theirrivals, castigated he partyleadersfor having orderedthe disas-trousrevoltof September1923.The centrists,headedby KolarovandDimitrov,termedthe 'oldguard'by theirdetractors,weretheprincipaldefendersof the partyline in I923. The leftists,soon tobecome 'left sectarians',made up of the youngerleadingcadres,accusedtheirelders of passivityand lackof healthyrevolutionarysense.In the firstengagement he centristscombinedwith the leftiststo combatthe rightistsand emergedvictorious.By 1925 the so-called defeatists,who includeda numberof prominenttheoreti-cians, were neutralized.The alliance betweenthe two victoriousfactions was to prove temporary,however. Following the sixthcongressof the Cominternin 1928, and a turn to the left, the

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POPULAR FRONT IN THE BALKANS: 2. BULGARIAyoung leftists launcheda determinedassault on the old guard.Their position was strengthenedby the new Comintern ine aswell as by reinforcements f youngercommunistswho in the latetwenties made their way from Bulgariato the Soviet Union.For a time the Cominterngave free rein to the young militants.Their semi-insurrectionarytterances itted in well with its doc-trinethat 'thetemporary ndpartial tabilization f capitalismhadcome to an end'. At the second enlargedplenarysession of theBulgarian migresheld in Berlin n the summerof 1929, the leftistscapturedcontrol. At home, their allies did the same in the fol-lowingyear.The attemptof the old guardto defeatthemby com-bining with the remnantsof the rightistswas of no avail.6Theleaders of 1923 were pushed into the background,with at bestonly a marginal influence over Bulgarian communist affairs,Kolarovstayedin the Soviet Union andwasmadedirectorof theSoviet AgrarianInstitute and editor of its periodical. In theirdetermination o consolidateand hold powerover the Bulgariansection of the Comintern, he leftists,headedby Iskrov,a brilliantdoctrinaire, nsisted that Dimitrov be removed from Moscowaltogether.After an intensive search for an appropriateunction,he was in fact shippedto Berlin wherehe wasplacedin chargeofthe Leagueagainst mperialism, ndwasthusdoubly n exilewhentheReichstag iretrial ookplace.It wasto makehim world amous.That the manuponwhom the entireprogressiveworld ookedas amodel of heroism was regardedwith strong disfavourby theleadersandmuch of the rankandfile of his ownpartyathome andin exile, was little knownat that time. His triumphantreturn toMoscow in February 1934 markedthe beginning of the thirdengagement,at the end of which the Dimitrov ine was to prevail;ultimatelyhis rivals to the left were to perish.7The purge of the leftist leadership n exile proved a painfulprocessat first. So firmlywere Iskrovand his people entrenchedin the Comintern,andso eagerto accommodatehemselves o thenew turn to the right, that the Dimitrov-Kolarovforces couldpursuetheir ends only at a gradualpace. The ineptitudeof theCP B in the face of the May militaryputsch,whichhadtakenplace6 On the struggles within the party see D.A. Gilin, Komunisti (Sofia, I960);Stela Dimitrova, Moskovskoto suveshtanie na BKP, 1925 (Sofia, 1959); Izvestiiana Instituta po istoriia na BKP, XI (Sofia, I964), I24 ff.7 N. T. Nedev, Otrazhenie na laiptsigskiia protses v Bulgariia (Sofia, 1962).

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYonly a few months after Dimitrov'sreturnto Moscow, providednew ammunitionn the hands of the old guard.Still, thereis littledoubt that had old rivalriesnot intervened,and had Iskrovnotbeen compelled o face a man withso enhanceda statureas Dimi-trov's, the leftists would have adaptedthemselves to the UnitedFront and laterPopularFrontreorientations.In MarchI935 the Bulgarian xiles held a meetingin Moscow.The spotlight was on Kolarov,who in his opening speech de-manded that the party rid itself of all the leftist elements andcleanup its entireapparatus.Followingextendeddebates,duringwhichleading eftiststooka self-critical ine, the meetingresolvedto condemn the party's 'opportunistpassivity'duringthe Maycoup.8The appointmentof Dimitrov as generalsecretaryof theCominternat the seventh congress, and later, the start of theGreat Purge which was to play havoc among all foreign com-munistsin Moscow, sealedthe fate of the leftists. Iskrovand hismore prominent followers were arrested, tried in camera,andexecuted n 1938.In the courseof thepurgetwomajorconspiraciesinvolvinghundredsof Bulgarianexiles in the Soviet Union wereconcocted. The majority were accused of treason and spyingactivities on behalf of Germany.The others, particularly hoseworking among the Bulgariannational minorities in southernUkraine, were accused of conspiring to annex the southernUkraineto Bulgaria.Those who werenot dealtwith immediatelywere shipped to the various Siberianconcentrationcamps fromwhichonlya fewwereto return.The widelyheldviewthat,unlikeall other foreigners n the Comintern,the Bulgariansalone sur-vived the GreatPurgethanksto the protectionof Dimitrov,is nomorethan a myth.9The re-establishment f unchallenged upremacyby the oldguardover the emigrationdid not automaticallyextend to the party

8 V. Kolarov, Protiv iiiavoto sektantstvo i trotskizma v Bulgariia (Sofia, 1949).9 The communistregime in Bulgariahas still to acknowledge he magnitudeof the purge.A reliableaccountappears n Ivan KaraivanovThe Purgeof theBulgarian Political Emigration', Glas na bulgarite v Iugoslaviia, 15 January 1952.Karaivanovwas a prominent member of the Bulgarianold guard in Sovietexile who went over to Tito's side after the war. His article appearedin aperiodical n the Bulgarian anguagepublishedin Yugoslavia.BlagoiPopov, acodefendantatthe LeipzigtrialtogetherwithDimitrov,was arrestedn Moscowin 1937 and sentenced in 1939 as a left deviationist.He was releasedfrom aSiberianconcentrationcampin 1954 and allowedto returnto Bulgaria.

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POPULAR FRONT IN THE BALKANS: 2. BULGARIAat home. They wereunwillingto allow the popular rontstrategyto be launchedand directedby the established eftist leadershipnBulgaria, nsistingthat left sectarianism adfirst to be eradicated.This was to presentthem with the greatestof difficulties.It wasinconceivable hat the general secretaryof the Cominterncouldtoleratea stateof affairsn which his own party n his owncountrycontinued to be led by young upstartswho had for so long beenhis critics and detractors.The purgeof the home partyhadto becarriedthrough,by remote control.Beginningin late I934, andfor a numberof yearsthereafter, rusted functionaries rom theBulgariansection of the Cominternwere secretly dispatchedtothe countrywith instructions o rallythe forces of the old guard.10The pressurethey broughtto bear had the curious outcome ofcreatingtwo separateframeworks or the party'sactivities. TheCPB had been declared illegal as early as I924. When in I927party politics were revived, the illegal communist leadershipestablished the BulgarianWorkers party to serve as a frontorganizationand as a legally recognizedpolitical party. It wasunderthe auspicesof the Workerspartythat the communistshadwon their most impressive electoral victories. In the generalelections of 193I it gained 3I seats in the newly constitutedParliament, nda year atera clearpluralityn the Sofiamunicipalelections.Throughout,controlremainedn the handsof the illegalCommunistparty leadership.When all politicalformationsweremadeillegal followingtheputschof May I934, the Workerspartywas disbanded.In order to undercutthe influenceof the leftistswithin the movement, and for reasons of long-range tacticalexpediency,the Comintern'snewly arrivedagents undertooktore-establish he Workerspartyas anundergroundormation,hop-ing to attract to its ranks the more moderateold-timerswhose

10 The three most important Comintern agents sent to Bulgaria were TraichoKostov, later to become general secretary of the party; he was executed in I949;Dimitrov-Marek, one of the most prominent leaders of the Bulgarian emigra-tion, killed in an air crash on Soviet soil in August I944 while on his way backto Bulgaria; and Georgi Damianov, a veteran of the 1923 revolt, and laterinstructor in the Frunze Soviet Military Academy. On his return to the SovietUnion in I937, he took the name of Belov and became head of the cadresdepartment of the Comintem, a post he held until I943. The collected works ofthese three men are a major primary source for the purge in Bulgaria and thelaunching of the popular front campaign: T. Kostov, Izbrani statii, dokladi,rechi (Sofia, I964); Stanke Dimitrov-Marek, Izbrani proizvedeniia (Sofia, 1952);G. Damianov, Izbrani proizvedeniia (Sofia, I966).

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CONTEMPORARYHISTORYallegianceto Kolarov and Dimitrov was still intact. In this theywere successful, but they failed to depose the leftist leadershipof the illegal Communist party itself. As a result, after I935Bulgariahad dual communistorganizations, oth workingunder-ground,with the younger eftistsoperatingwithin the Communistpartyandthe older and moretrustworthypro-Dimitrovelementsin the Workersparty. The resulting confusion was enormous.Attemptsto bring about the consolidationof the two structureswere maderepeatedlybut failed.(Onlyin 1940,afterthe outbreakof war,when officialBulgarian-Soviet elationsshoweda markedimprovement,was the illegalCommunistpartyabsorbed nto theillegalWorkersparty.)11Given this state of affairs, he pursuitof popularfront tacticswas bound to be difficult.Communistcredibility n the eyes oftheir would-beallies remained ow, while the news of the publictrialsin Moscow,andreportsof the fate of Bulgarian xilesthere,didnot make he leadersof the democratic roupsmoreresponsiveto communistappeals.The dramaticdefection of the Soviet am-bassador o Sofia and his self-imposedexile in France was fullycoveredby the Bulgarianpress.12Seenagainst he background f the largerproblemsconfrontingall Bulgarianpolitical formations,the question of co-operationor non-co-operationwith the communistswas of secondary m-portance. Democrats, the Gichev Agrarians, he Radicals, andthe Social Democrats,all banned,concentratedon keepingtheirorganizationsalive. Depending on the momentarydispositionofthe regime,this provedpossiblein some degree,andthe prospectthat the governmentmight at any moment go into reverse anddecide to restore the legality of political parties, deterred theleaders of the democratic groups from seriously consideringcommunistovertures.In 1936,in orderto bring pressure o bearon the regime,fiveleadersof democraticgroupscreateda popularfrontof theirown. This was the famous'quintet'whichbroughttogetherrepresentativesromthe mainbody of the Agrarians,he

11There are two main sources on the dual structure of the party: Novo vreme,November I957; Izvestiia na Institutapo istoriia na BKP VIII (I961), 93-I39.12 He was Feodor Raskolnikov, an old Bolshevik hero, accredited as the firstSoviet diplomatic representative to Sofia in 1934. On being recalled to Moscow,he escaped to France and published an open indictment of the Stalin regime.He died in mysterious circumstances in Nice a few months later. His name wasrehabilitated by the Soviet leadership early in I964.

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POPULAR FRONT IN THE BALKANS: 2. BULGARIASocialDemocrats, he Liberals,partof the Radicalpartyandpartof the Democraticparty.The mainbody of the Democraticpartyunder Malinov remainedaloof, as did the left-wing Agrariansknownas the PladneAgrarians,who had brokenawayfrom theGichev Agrarian Union in 1932.In their frustration,the communist leaders at home turnedtheir attention to establishinga 'unitedfront from below'. Greatefforts were made to attract variouselements to enter popularfront committees. Achievementswere bound to be modest, andsuccesses isolated. This broughthome to them the growingim-portanceof the quintet, and in the late summer of 1936 theydecided to supportthe quintet and add their name to the jointappeals for the restoration of the Constitution. The PladneAgrarians nd the MalinovDemocratsdid the same.This wasthebeginning of the so-called People's ConstitutionalBloc, whichwashardlya bloc in the conventionalpoliticalsense, but ratheraloose confederationbetween the quintet on the one hand, andthe Workersparty,the PladneAgrarians,and the Democratsonthe other.The initiativevis-a-visthe governmentwas retainedbythe Agrarianleaders and the Social Democrats. The appealspublishedby the Bloc werealways ignedby thevariousparticipat-ing leaders,with a notationof the 'support'of the Workersparty.For the communists, he principalsignificanceof their affiliationwith the Blocopenedthe wayforthe creationof localcommittees,of which many were establishedin I937. They provided localcommunistactivistswith the opportunity o conductagitationandpropaganda nd to collectsignatures o petitionsfor the restora-tion of the Constitution.13In an endeavour o appease rising popularopposition,late inI936thegovernmentannounced ts decision o holdlocalelections,anda specialelectoral awwaspromulgatedn January 937. Thisprovedone of the mostreactionary lectoral awsever;candidateswere to place their own nominationsas private individuals,andbeforetheir candidacycould be approved, hey were required osubmit written declarations that they were not communists.Electionswereto be held on differentdates for eachmajorregion,13 S. Kolev, Borbata na BKP za Naroden front, 1935-1939 (Sofia, I959), isthe standard communist monograph, not altogether reliable. See also Istoricheskipregled, No. I, I967, 5I-5. The full text of a protest memorandum issued by theConstitutional Bloc appeared in the illegal organ of the Social Democrats, Narod,No. 8, 1937.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYso that the regimecouldconcentratets policeat the given localityon election day and shift it to the next on the schedule. Sincevotingwasobligatory or all citizens,the anti-regime orcesaskedtheir supportersto protest by defacing the ballot papers withslogans n favourof the restoration f the Constitution.Solidaritywithin the ConstitutionalBloc, however,was not maintained.Ina numberof localities,personsknownfor their affiliationwith thevariousdemocraticparties,did in fact put themselvesforwardascandidates, hus splitting the Bloc. Nevertheless,when in April1937the returnswere all in, morethan 2o per cent of the ballotscast were declared nvalid.In any case,for both governmentandopposition,whatwassignificantaboutthe 1937localelectionswasthat they served as a full-dressrehearsal or the generalelectionsstillto come.The ExecutiveCommitteeof the Cominternwasdissatisfiedwiththe performance f the communists n the localelections;in theireyes, the tacticsof invalidatingheballotsbywrite-insloganswerelittle more than a carry-over rom left-sectarian trategiesof thepast.The popular rontrequireda positiverather han a negativeapproachf it was to be effective.Late in 1937, in anticipationofthe forthcominggeneral elections, the Cominternreiteratedheneed to consolidatehe twocommunist ormations;he Communistpartymust be absorbed nto the Workerspartyforthwith.Thesedirectiveswere not carriedout. They were to remainunfulfilleduntil afterthe outbreakof war.In October 1937 the governmentannouncedits intention torestorea modifiedparliamentaryystem. This was in accordancewith King Boris's idea of 'controlled democracy'.Essentially,the electoral system applied to the local elections was tobeadopted for the general elections. The ban on politicalpartieswas maintained;deputieswere to be elected as individuals,andnot allowed to organize themselves into political groups. Theprinciple of proportionalrepresentationapplied in the I931generalelectionswas replacedby the single constituencysystem.Therewereto be I60 constituencies, achelectinga singledeputy.The governmentretainedthe right to determinethe size of theconstitutencies, thus opening the way for wholesale gerry-mandering.The communistsput forwarda minimalistPopularFront elec-

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POPULAR FRONT IN THE BALKANS: 2. BULGARIAtoral platform,hoping to make it acceptableto their would-beallies,but the democraticgroupsrefusedto run candidateson aplatformwith a PopularFrontlabel.14To defeatthe government,however,or at least to show the opposition'sown strength,theleaders of the various opposition groups consented to limitedelectoral co-operationwith communists. This meant that thepartieswould agree not to oppose each other's candidates,butwould concentrate nsteadon defeating hose of the government.By andlarge,the generalspiritof the understandingwasupheld,but in severalconstituencies ocal politiciansfailed to agreeon asingle opposition candidate.In the event, the communistsandtheirsympathizers ontributedmore to the oppositioncausethanthey received. Even personswith only the remotestaffiliationowhat could be vaguelydescribedas communism, oundit difficultand in many cases impossible to establish their eligibility ascandidates n the eyes of government udges.The elections were held in MarchI938. Giventheirnominallynon-politicalnature, t was not untilParliament onvenedthat theline between pro-governmentand anti-government orces couldbe drawn. For two months following the elections, the regimecarriedout what amounted o a post-electoral ampaign,aimedatrecruitingdeputiesof uncertainpoliticalcolouring nto the ranksof the governmentbloc. Flattery, promises, threats, and openbriberywere all used, with the result that a number of nominaloppositionistswere at the end drawn nto the governmentcamp.When on 22 May I938, Parliamentopened,out of the I60 newlyelected deputies, the governmenthad between ninety-threeandninety-five on its side. The opposition could count within itsranks32 Agrarians,8 Social Democrats,5 Communists,and anuncertainnumberfrom the middle-class ormations.The regimewas clearlydissatisfied,and used its majority o improve ts posi-tion. In June,the five communistswereexpelledfromparliament.The fact that the Bulgarian-language adio broadcasts fromMoscow had mentionedtheir names,was taken as proofof theircommunistaffiliation.In December I938, six Agrarianopposi-tionists from the Pladne wing were also expelled.The chargesagainstthem were that they had engagedin party parliamentaryactivities n violationof the standingrules. By such methods,the

14 The text of the Popular Front electoral platform is to be found in Izvestiiana Instituta po istriia na BKP IX (I962), 379-82.81 6



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYgovernmenteventuallycould count on I20 votes as againstfortyfor the opposition.15

The 1938electionsmarked he highpointof a moreor less uni-fied oppositioneffortwith communistparticipation.The show ofstrength by the opposition slowed down but did not checkBulgaria's move into the German camp. Relations betweencommunist and non-communistoppositionists, never intimate,deterioratedfollowing the Munich agreements, and the con-clusionof the Soviet-Germanpactbroughtall co-operation o anend. Fromthe outbreakof warand until the Germanattackon theSoviet Union, the Bulgariancommunistsstrove to influence theregime n a pro-Sovietdirection,urgingacceptanceby the govern-ment of the Soviet proposalsfor an agreementwhich in effectwould have made Bulgariainto a Soviet client. For the greatmajorityof the non-communistoppositionleaders, a clear pro-Soviet orientationwas unacceptable.When at the end of 1939,with the aim of improving ts positionin parliament, he regimeheld new generalelections,not even a semblanceof co-operationbetween communists and non-communistoppositionistswas inevidence.The popular rontspirithadevaporated.The openingof the PopularFront erafound the Bulgarian om-munists unpreparedand ill-equipped,both organizationally ndpsychologically. Its requirements contrasted so sharply withearlierpoliciesthat the adjustments ouldbe madeonly with thegreatestefforts.At a time whenpoliticalconditions n the countryrequired hem to summontheir strengthto survive,most of theirenergieswere consumedby internalstruggles,doctrinal cholasti-cism, andthe clash of personalities.Fundamentally,any real prospectsfor a popularfront whichalone might have constituted a countervailing orce against anautocraticmonarch,had disappearedwith the military coup ofMay I934. The switch in the Soviet-Cominternine cametoo lateto salvagepoliticalpluralism n Bulgaria.

15 Strictly speaking, participation of Bulgarians in the Spanish Civil Wardid not affect the popular front issue in Bulgaria itself. In all, some 400 Bul-garians took part in the fighting in Spain, of whom about one hundred camefrom the Bulgarian emigration in the Soviet Union. The subject is covered ingreat detail in D. Sirkov, V zashtita na Ispanskata republika, 1936-1939 (Sofia,I967).

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nissan oren - front in the balkans

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