Natech Management in Turkey

Serkan Girgin, Ph.D.

girgink@gmail.comhttp://www.teknolojikkazalar.org

3rd International Disaster and Risk Conference30 May – 3 June 2010, Davos – Switzerland

Emerging Risks – NATECH Risk Reduction and Its Implementation

Major Natural DisastersBetween 1990-2005

17,46019,497,0001,078,20055,80219,964TOTAL

135245,00045,00052017701/05/03Earthquake (Bingol)

95222,00030,0003274203/02/02Earthquake (Sultandağı)

750600,00035,0004,94876312/11/99Earthquake (Duzce)

13,00015,000,000675,00043,95317,48017/08/99Earthquake (Kocaeli)

5001,500,00088,0001,60014527/06/98Earthquake (Ceyhan)

1,0001,200,00040,000471021/05/98Flood (West. Blacksea)

3017,0009,0006-14/08/96Earthquake (Corum)

1,000300,0006,5001176304/11/95Flood (Izmir)

100120,00040,0002409401/10/95Earthquake (Dinar)

6510,0002,000467413/07/95Landslide (Senirkent)

103,0001,100951351993Avalance (31 events)

2530,00011,600533281992Avalance (14 events)

750250,00095,0003,85065313/03/92Earthquake (Erzincan)

Damage(M US$)

AffectedHomelessInjuredDeadDateEvent

Ref: Ergunay, 2007

23%46%Dams

25%51%Ind.

26%45%Pop.

24%42%Area

0.3 – 0.4≥ 0.4PGA

IIIZone

66%

71%

76%

69%

Ref: Gülen and Kalafat, 2000

Ref: Özmen, 2000

Kocaeli Earthquake, 1999Date:17 August 1999, 03:02am

Duration:45 s

Location:40.7 N, 29.9 E

Depth:15.9 km

Magnitude and Intensity:MW - 7.4, MSK - X

Dead:17,480

Injured:43,953

Damage:15 B US$

Homeless:675,000

Affected:15,000,000

TUPRAS Izmit Refinery Fire

� Fire at chemical warehouse� Breaking of containers

and reaction

� Fire at crude oil unit� Collapse of 115m tall, 10m

diameter stack breaking 63 pipelines and a heater

� Fire at naptha tank farm� Sparks created by

bouncing of the floating roofs

� Started at 4 tanks, spread to 2 additional tanks

TUPRAS Izmit Refinery Fire

� Evacuation of nearby settlements

� Marine pollution

� No domino effect

� No deaths or injuries during fire fighting

� Operational in 2.5 months, full capacity in 12 months

� Cost of recovery: 57.8 M $

Ref: Danis and Gorgun, 2005

AKSA Acrylonitrile Spill� Acrylonitrile release to air,

sea and groundwater� Damage of 3 storage tanks� Amount: 6400 tons

� Death of all animals and vegetation within 200m radius

� Intoxication of 27 workers

� Evacuation of nearby villages

� Doubts on fatalities due to increased cancer risk

� Clean-up� 53,000 m³ GW pumped out for

treatment/recovery in 4 years� Concentration: 80,000ppm to

non-detectable levels

Ref: Demir, 1999

Common Shortcomings� Inadequate design and construction

� Insufficient emergency planning

� Natech events were not foreseen although natural disaster (earthquake) risks were well known

� Insufficient first response

� Collapse of relied response mechanisms

� Lack of sufficient response equipments

� Limited human resources

� Poor emergency management

� Especially at local level

TUPRAS Izmit RefineryLessons Learned

� Revised emergency response plans� Natech events are taken into

consideration

� Disaster plans� Fire events at four different

locations� Fire at the largest storage tank

with minimal water supply

� Bi-monthly emergency response practices� Based on probable scenarios

including natechs� Participation of all refinery

personnel

� Increased response capacity� Portable diesel water pump

(900m³/h), monitor and 6”hose (2km)

� Water sprinkler and foam systems at all tanks

� Water canons (50 fixed, 10 portable)

� Increased fire water capacity (5 times)

� Sea water connection to fire water system

� Gas and flame sensors� Increased oil barrier stock

(3 km)

� Evolution of disaster management� 1923 – 1942

� Response to disasters on a case-specific basis

� 1943 – 1952� Law on Protection from Floods (1943)� Law on Precautions to be Taken Before and After Earthquakes (1944)

� Earthquake Zones Map � Building Code

� 1953 – 1999� Law on Civil Defense (1958)� Disaster Law (1959)� Settlement Law (1959)� Establishment of G. D. of Disaster Affairs (1965)

� 1999 onwards� Proactive measures and emergency management oriented regulations

Legislative FrameworkDisaster Management

Legislative FrameworkDisaster Management

Emergency Response Committee

DistrictEmergency Response

Service GroupsEmergency

Response Services

Head Official

Emergency Response Committee

Province

Emergency Response Service Groups

Emergency Response Services

Governor

Disaster Office

Emergency Response

Plan

ResponseTeams

ResponseTeamsEmergency

ResponsePlan

National Prime Ministry

Central Disaster Coordination Council

Ministries

Military

Military

General Staff

Natechs should be taken into

consideration

Service Groups:

• Communication• Transportation• Rescue and Debris Removal• First Aid and Medical• Preliminary Damage Assessment and Temporary Shelter• Public Security• Approbation, Renting, Confiscation and Distribution• Agricultural• Lifeline

Service Groups:

• Communication• Transportation• Rescue and Debris Removal• First Aid and Medical• Preliminary Damage Assessment and Temporary Shelter• Public Security• Approbation, Renting, Confiscation and Distribution• Agricultural• Lifeline

Legislative FrameworkEmergency Management

Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center

General Secretariat of National Security

Council

General Staff,

Ministries, Public

Institutions

Provinces

Districts

Crisis Management Center

Crisis Management Center

Crisis Coordination

Council

Crisis Assessment and Follow-up Council

Secretariat

1997

General Directorate of Emergency Management

1999

Ministry of Heath

State Minister of Economics

2002

Disaster and Emergency Management Administration

2009

Regional Crisis Management Center

Crisis Management Center

Crisis:

Terrorism, Natural disasters, Technological accidents, Epidemics, Economic depression

Emergency:

Natural disasters, Technologicalaccidents, Immigration

Prime Ministry

� Disaster and Emergency Management Administration(Earthquakes, Landslides, Rock Falls, Avalanches)

� Ministry of Settlement and Public Works

� G. D. of Highways (Landslides)

� Ministry of Environment and Forestry(Forest Fires, Industrial accidents)

� G. D. of State Hydraulic Works(Floods)

� G. D. of State Meteorological Works(Storms)

Responsible AuthoritiesRisk Assessment and Mitigation

Legislative FrameworkManagement of Industrial Accidents

� Circular on Emergency Planning for Major Industrial Accidents (Ministry of Environment, 1996)

� Inspired by 82/501/EEC (Seveso) Directive and UNEP/APELL

� Not legally binding

� Accident Information Form was incorporated to the Regulation on Environmental Auditing

� Draft Regulation Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 1999)

� Adaptation of Seveso Directive

� Not approved by the Council of Ministries

Legislative FrameworkManagement of Industrial Accidents

� Environmental Emergency Action Plan for the Marmara Region (Ministry of Environment, Middle East Technical University, 2001)

� Regional action plan for environmental emergencies including Natech events inline with disaster management framework

� Uniformed emergency responseplan format for establishments

� Supervision principles

� GIS-based information system to collect data on natural disaster risks, natural resources and industrial facilities

� Put not into practice

Legislative FrameworkManagement of Industrial Accidents

� Approximation of Seveso II Directive in Turkey (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Ekodenge, 2006)

� DSIP for the Seveso II Directive

� Draft Regulation on Control of Major Industrial Accident Hazards

� Draft Communiqués on Safety Report and Emergency Plans, Public Information, Inspection

� Web-based information system to collect data on establishments

� Regulatory impact assessment of Seveso-II Directive (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Regional Environmental Center, 2010)

� Technical support projects for Seveso II Directive(Ministry of Environment and Forestry, EU, 2011)

Conclusions� Although not quantified sufficiently, natural disaster

risks are high in Turkey

� Serious Natech events have been occurred in the past, and are quite likely to happen in the future

� Preparedness of industrial facilities to natech events:

� High in facilities having natech experience

� Not only natech, but also major industrial accident preparedness is limited in majority of facilities

Conclusions� Although there have been several efforts, legal

framework for control of major industrial accidents is lacking

� Risky establishments are not known

� Data for risk assessment is not sufficient

� Legal framework for disaster management still focus onnatural disasters (mainly earthquakes)

� Information on natural disaster risks are limited

Conclusions� Natech risk assessment is not sufficient

� Lack of information on technological and natural disaster risks hinders Natech risk assessments

� Methodologies are required for regional Natech risk assessment and mapping

� Credible Natech scenarios

� How to develop realistic Natech scenarios?

� What should be the scope?

� Preparedness to Natech events

� Are we ready for the Istanbul Earthquake?

Istanbul Earthquake ScenarioFuture Natechs?

� Mw=7.0, probability is 41-62% in 25 years

� Expected outcomes:

� 70.000 fatalities

� 130.000 injured

� 600.000 homeless

� 50.000 heavily damaged buildings

� 60 billion USD economic losses (25-28% of GNP)

� Natechs?