myles f. burnyeat - aristotle's divine intellect

7/30/2019 Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle's Divine Intellect

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AristotlesDivine

Intellect


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the aquinas lecture, 2008

Aristotles

DivineIntellect

Myles F. Burnyeat


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2008MarquetteUniversityPressMilwaukee,Wisconsin53201-3141Allrightsreserved.

www.marquette.edu/mupress/

UndertheauspicesotheWisconsin-AlphaChapteroPhiSigmaTau

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Burnyeat, Myles.Aristotles divine intellect / Myles F. Burnyeat.

p. cm. (The Aquinas lecture ; 2008)Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN-13: 978-0-87462-175-4 (clothbound : alk.paper)ISBN-10: 0-87462-175-5 (clothbound : alk.

paper)1. Aristotle. 2. Intellect. I. Title.

B491.I55B87 2008128.3dc22

2008000291

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of theAmerican National Standard for Information Sciences

Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America.


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Prefatory

TheWisconsin-AlphaChapteroPhiSigmaTau,the International Honor Society or Philoso-

phyatMarquetteUniversity,eachyearinvitesascholartodeliveralectureinhonoroSt.ThomasAquinas.

The2008AquinasLecture,Aristotles DivineIntellect,wasdeliveredonSunday,February24,2008,byMylesF.Burnyeat,EmeritusFellowoAllSoulsCollege,OxordUniversity,andHon-oraryFellowoRobinsonCollege,CambridgeUniversity.

MylesBurnyeatstudiedClassicsandPhilosophyatKingsCollege,Cambridgeandpursuedgradu-

Myles F. Burnyeat


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M.F.Burnyeat

atestudiesatUniversityCollege,London,wherehealsotaughtrom194-1978.In1978hemovedtoRobinsonCollege,CambridgeUniversity,andwasappointedLaurenceProessoroAncientPhi-losophytherein1984.In199hewasappointedSeniorResearchFellowinPhilosophyatAllSoulsCollege,OxordUniversity.Hehasheldvisitingappointmentsatnumerousuniversities,includingtheUniversityoPittsburgh,PrincetonUniversity,HarvardUniversity,UniversityoCaliorniaatBerkeley,andtheCentralEuropeanUniversityinBudapest.Hehasgivenmanyinvitedlectures,includingtheTannerLecturesonHumanValues

atHarvardUniversity,theA.E.TaylorLectureatUniversityoEdinburgh,andtheBritishAcademyMasterMindLecture.

Amongotherhonorsandawards,Pro.Burnyeatwas elected a Fellowo the BritishAcademyin1984,wasPresidentotheMindAssociationin

1987,becameamemberotheInstitutInterna-tionaldePhilosophiein1988,wasmadeaForeignHonoraryMemberotheAmericanAcademyoArtsandSciencesin1992,andwasPresidentotheAristotelianSocietyin2005-0.MostrecentlyPro.BurnyeatwasnamedaCommanderothe

Ordero theBritishEmpire orhis services toscholarship.

Pro.Burnyeathasbeenaprolicscholar,havingpublishedtwobooks, The Theaetetus of Plato


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Aristotles Divine Intellect 7

(withits240pageintroduction)andA Map ofMetaphysics Zeta.Hehaseditedorco-editedeightbooks,includingDoubt and Dogmatism,Scienceand Speculation,andThe Skeptical Tradition.Hisbreadthoresearchinterestscanbegraspedromthetitles o a ewo hispublications,many owhichhavebeentranslatedintootherlanguages:AristotleonUnderstandingKnowledge.Ideal-ismandGreekPhilosophy:WhatDescartesSawandBerkeleyMissed,DidtheAncientGreeksHavetheConceptoHumanRights?,CultureandSocietyinPlatos Republic,AquinasonSpiritualChangeinPerception,Platonismin

theBible:NumeniusoApameaonExodusandEternity,ExamplesinEpistemology:Socrates,TheaetetusandG.E.Moore,ThePastinthePresent:PlatoasEducatoroNineteenth-CenturyBritain.

ToPro.Burnyeatsdistinguishedlistopublica-

tions,PhiSigmaTauispleasedtoadd:AristotlesDivine Intellect.


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AristotlesDivine Intellect

M. F. Burnyeat

Naturalselectioncouldonlyhaveendowedsavageswithabrainaewdegreessuperiortothatoanape,

whereasheactuallypossessesoneverylittleineriortothatoaphilosopher.

AlredRussellWallace

MytitleisambiguousandIintenditinbothsenses.AristotlesintellectmaymeantheintellectAristotlespeaksoasGodinMetaphysicsandastheActiveIntellectin

De AnimaIII5.ItmayalsomeantheintellectthatisactiveinAristotlehimselwhenhediscoursesontheselotythemes.Myclaimwillbethatbothsensesleadtothesamereerence.WhenwereadMetaphysicsandDe AnimaIII5,weencounterGod,theActiveIntellect,explainingitsel.Orso

Aristotlewouldhaveusbelieve:whenhis intel-lectisactivelyexplainingitsel,thatishisDeityexplainingitsel.1


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10 M.F.Burnyeat

Thisisocourseacontentiousinterpretation,butititswellwithanothercontentiousclaim,asollows.Oneothelessonswecangainromthehistoryophilosophyisthatpsychologicalstatesarenotgiventousaspartothenaturalorder.Toaconsiderableextent,whattheyare ishowtheyareconceivedatthistimeinhistoryorthat.Andhowtheyareconceivedisnotarecordingosome-thingantecedentlyixedbynature,butaresponsetoatheoreticalor-atleastasoten-apracticalproblem.Muchowhatcurrentphilosophyomindsocondescendinglycallsolkpsychologyistheprecipitateopastphilosophiesorreligious

movements.Theveryconceptothemindandthemental,asnowunderstood,canbeseencomingtobirthinthesecondoDescartesMeditations.

1.

The earliest testimony on what mental meantbeoreDescartesissimultaneouslytheirstextantoccurrenceotheworditsel.InhisLiteral Com-mentary on Genesis,havingsetouttodistinguishtriageneravisionum,threekindsovision,Augus-tinelistsandexplainsirstthecorporalegenuso

vision,secondthespirituale,andthensayshewillcallthethirdkindintellectualeabintellectu.Soar,nothingoutotheordinary.Butsuddenlyheintroducesanalternativewayonamingthethird


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kind.Onemightthinktocallitmentaleamente.Butno,hesays,thatwouldsoundjusttooabsurdbecauseothenoveltyothewordmentalis! 2 A word that doubles or intellectualis doesnotyetmeanwhatmentalmeansinphilosophytoday.Nordoesmensyetmeanmindinoursenseiitisintersubstitutablewithintellectus.AswitnessthatinmedievaltimesthetwoLatinnounsremainlargelyintersubstitutable,Icancallthegreatthinkeraterwhomthislectureseriesisnamed.Aquinassays,mensmaximediciturintel -lectus:Themindischielycalledtheintellect.Hegoesontoconstructadialecticalargumentwhich

inersthatintellectusisthesubjectovirtueromthepremisethatmensisthesubjectovirtue.3 Even more signiicant is Aquinas quotationromAugustineaewpagesearlier:Whenwecomeacrossanythingthatisnotcommontousandthebeastsotheield,itissomethingpertain-

ingtothemind.4TheoldAristotelianparadigmisstillincharge.Whathumanandotheranimalshaveincommonisthepoweroperception.Whatotheranimalslackandhumanshaveisthepoweroreason,intellect,mens.Itollowsthatmensdoesnotyetincludeperception.EnternowDescartes.

ThesecondMeditation,subtitledThenatureothehumanmind5, leavesunchallengedtheequivalenceomensandintellectus.Nearthebeginningweread,Iamamindorintelligence,or


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12 M.F.Burnyeat

intellect,orreason(ATIX27,13-15)

.DescartescansaythisbecausehehasalreadyusedtheCogitotodeconstructthetraditionalAristotelianaccountothehumansoul(anima)asresponsibleornutri-tion,movement,perceptionandthought(ATIX2,-8).Whenthebody-involvingelementsotheancienttraditionhavebeendoubtedandremoved,mind(mens, animus)isallthatisletasessentialtotheMeditator.AttheendothesecondMeditationwearetoldthat,properlyspeaking,itisonlytheintellect,notthesensesortheacultyoimagina-tion,thatperceives(percipere)7thewax,anditdoessobyunderstandingbodies,notbyseeing

ortouchingthem(ATIX34,2-5).8Inbetweenhehasworkedtobringordinarysense-percep-tionbackintohisaccountowhathehimselis,subjecttotheprovisothatbyperceptionwearetounderstandthemereseemingtoperceive,notveridicalcognitivecontactwiththingsexternalto

themind:Lastly,itisalsothesameIwhohassensorypercep-tions,orisawareobodilythingsasitwerethroughthesenses.Forexample,Iamnowseeinglight,hearinganoise,eelingheat.ButIamasleep,soallthisisalse.YetIcertainlyseem tosee,tohear,and

tobewarmed.Thiscannotbealse;whatiscalledhavingasensoryexperienceisstrictlyjustthis,andinthisrestrictedsenseothetermitissimplythinking.(ATIX29,11-18;tr.Cottingham) 9


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Thusdidsensoryexperiencecometoallwithinthescopeothemindandphilosophyomind. Finally,twoshortexcerptstoconirmthatDes-carteswaswellawarethathewasinnovating:

ButwhatthenamI?Athingthatthinks.Whatisthat?Athingthatdoubts,understands,airms,denies,iswilling,isunwilling,and alsoimaginesandhassensoryperceptions.10(ATIX28,20-22;tr.Cottingham)

Iamathingthatthinks:thatis,athingthatdoubts,airms,denies,understandsaewthings,isignorantomanythings,iswilling,isunwilling,and alsowhichimaginesandhassensoryexperi-ence;or,asIhavenotedbeore,eventhoughtheobjectsomysensoryexperienceandimaginationmayhavenoexistenceoutsideme,nonethelessthemodesothinkingwhichIreertoascasesosensoryperceptionandimagination,insoarastheyaresimplymodesothinking,doexistwithin

meothatIamcertain.11

(ATIX34,18-20;tr.Cottingham)

Theitalicsaremine,butthepunctuationcomesstraightromDescartesirstedition(147),theonlyonetohavebeencorrectedbyhim. 12Inbothexcerptsthephraseandalsosignalsasurprise

newadditiontothelistoitemsthatallundertheconceptomind.Inthesecondquotationargumentisaddedtoremindusothejustiica-


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14 M.F.Burnyeat

tiongivenearlierorhisnovel,greatlyexpandedconceptomind. Induecourse,evenphilosopherswhodonottreatperceivingasaormothinkingwillincludeperceivingamongthephenomenatobediscussedundertheheadingmind.Theywillpopulatethemindwithsensoryphenomena,notjustintellec-tualones:

[O]ursenses,conversantaboutparticularsen-sibleobjects,doconveyintothemindseveraldistinctperceptions,accordingtothosevarious

wayswhereinthoseobjectsdoaectthem.(JohnLocke,An Essay concerning Human Understanding

[190],II1,3)

All the perceptions o the human mind resolvethemselvesintotwodistinctkinds...Thosepercep-tions,whichenterwithmostorceandviolence,wemaynameimpressions;andunderthisnameIcomprehendalloursensations,passionsandemo-

tions,astheymaketheirirstappearanceinthesoul.(DavidHume,An Enquiry concerning HumanUnderstanding[1748,I1.1)

Butmytaskonthisoccasionistolookback-wardsromDescartes,notorwards.Backsome900yearsromAugustinesdistasteorthenewly

coinedwordmentalis,100romAquinas.ThewordsthatwillchielyconcernusromnowonareancientGreek:thenounnousandthecorre-spondingverbnoein.Andthephilosopherwhose


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dealingswiththemIshallbediscussingisAristotle.Ishallsuggestthat hisvocabulary is even moreinnovativethanDescartes,butintheoppositedirection.Whencomparedwithearlierphilosophy,Descartesbroadenedthescopeomind.Whencomparedwithearlierphilosophy,Aristotlegreatlynarrowedthescopeonous,noein.13

2.

Myproject,then,istolookatthewaythesetwotermsareusedandanalyzedinAristotlewithoutmakingthestandardassumptionthatheandwearelookingatthesameobject,viz.theworkingsothemind,insuchawaythatwecancompare

whathesayswiththeobjectaboutwhichhesaysit,andthenaskwhichelementinthatobjectitisthathecallsnous, noeinandwhetherhecharacter-izesitaccurately,interestingly,orplausibly.Iwe

dothis,wearelikelytosuppose,asmanyscholarsdosuppose,thathistopiciswhatwecallthink-ingandthenwewillbequitebaledtomakesenseohisremarks.

D.W.Hamlyninhiswell-knownClarendonAristotle Series commentary on the De Anima

(198,103)isbafed.HecomplainsoaconstanttendencyinAristotletoruntogetherthinkingandknowing.NowwhenIsaythatAristotleisnottalk-ingaboutwhatwecallthinking,Idonotmeanthat


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1 M.F.Burnyeat

heistalkingaboutsomethingquiteelseinstead,someotherelementothisneutralobject,andthatweshouldchangethetranslationtointuition,say,orknowledge.Heistalkingaboutsomeothethingsweusethenotionothinkingtotalkabout,butourthinkingandhisnousarepartandparceloadistinctiveapproachtomanandnature.Ourconceptualizationandhismaybecomparableaswholes,buttheyarecertainlynotcomparableinseparatepieces.HencetheextremedicultyotranslatingAristotleslongestandmostsustaineddiscussiononous, noein:De AnimaIII4-8.

Thesepointsmaybeillustratedbyoneothe

mostwidelyconsultedtranslationsothe DeAnima,thatoJ.A.SmithintherenownedOxfordTranslation of Aristotle,rstpublishedin1931andrecentlyrevisedbyJonathanBarnesorTheComplete Works of Aristotle: The Revised OxfordTranslation (1984).Theaultsothistranslation

when it comes to DA III4-8arecertainlynotduetoinadequateamiliaritywithancientGreek.Smith, who taught atBalliol College,Oxord,untilin1910hewaselectedWaynfeteProessoroMetaphysicsandMorals,wasamandeeplyversedinphilology...[who]acquiredwithextraordinary

acilityatleastareadingknowledgeomanylan-guages.Hehadaveryacuteeelingortheprecisemeaning,andthedevelopmentothemeaning,owords.14Barneslivelyandmany-sidedcontribu-


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tionstoourunderstandingoancientphilosophyandlogicrankhimasSmithsmostdistinguishedsuccessorinthegreattraditionoBallioltutors.LetusthenopenDe AnimaIII4andconsidertheollowingsentenceat430a2-3: [sc. ] .

In The Revised Oxford Translationthisreads,Thoughtisitselthinkableinexactlythesamewayasitsobjectsare.OnrstencounterItookthistobeSmithswording;IsupposedthathiskeenadmirationotheIdealistphilosophyoCroceandGentilemighthavemadehimmoretolerantosuchasentencethansomeotherswouldbe.In

act,itisBarnesrevision.Smithoriginallywrote,Mindisitselthinkableinexactlythesamewayasitsobjectsare.Barnespreerredtomirrortheverbalconnectionbetweenthenounnousandtheadjectivenotos.Smithoptedoramoresubstance-likeEnglishdesignationotheitemwearetoocus

on.ThetroubleisthatbothtranslatorsobliterateacrucialdierencewhichAristotleemphasisesquiteearlyinthetreatise:

Lastly,certainlivingbeingsasmallminoritypossesscalculationandthought( ), or(amongmortalbeings)thosewhich

possesscalculationhavealltheotherpowersabovementioned,whiletheconversedoesnotholdindeedsomelivebyimagination()alone,whileothershavenotevenimagination.Thertikos


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18 M.F.Burnyeat

nous presentsadierentproblem( ).(DA I3,415a7-12;tr.Smith)15

ThecrucialdierenceisthatexpressedbytwodistinctGreekwords,dianoiaandnous.BothSmithandBarnesusethoughtordianoiarightlyso,

ortheworddenotesapowerpossessedandexer-cisedbyallhumans.Togetherwithlogismos(cal-culation,orbetter:reasoning) itconstitutesthespeciicdierenceohumanbeings.BothhereandelsewhereAristotlemarksothespecieshumanwithinthegenusanimalbyhumanspossessionologismosand dianoia,1whichIproposetorenderreasoningandthought.Thehumanspeciescon-sistsoreasoning,thinkinganimals. ThesecondGreekwordisnousherequaliiedasthertikos nous.Smithsrenderingothephrasewasthemindthatknowswithimmediateintu-ition.Barnescrossedthatoutandwroterelective

thoughtinstead,whichtomesoundsconsiderablylessstrenuous.HereagainSmithwinstheprize,becausewewillsoonseethatnousisarareachieve-ment,notsomethingtobehadbymusing,pipeinhand,bytheireside.Eitherway, thertikosnormallycontrastswithpraktikosastheoretical

topractical,soIshallspeaksimplyotheoreticalnous.17ThequestionnowbecomeswhyAristotleshouldsaythatthisnousisadierentproblem


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(Smith)or,asIwouldputit,anothersubject,oranotherdiscussion.ThisisnotthersttimetheDe Animahasmade

suchaclaim.Thepassagejustquotedchimeswiththreeearlierstatementswhichinsistthat nousisspecial,evendivine,andisnottobetreatedonaparwithordinarythinking(dianoeisthai).18Aristotlehasremarkablylittletosayaboutordinarythoughtandthinking,eitherinthisoranyotherohisworks,butnousgetsthreewholechapterstoitselhereandanimportantdiscussionattheendothe Posterior Analytics,nottomentionregularasidesinDe AnimaBookIplussustained

attentioninthetheologicalcontextoMetaphysics7and9.Iconcludethat,whileAristotletakesthinkingmoreorlessorgranted,nousisadistincttopicandoneonwhichhemeanstoshine.

Ishalltranslatenousasintellect,theverbnoeinasunderstand,hopingthatbytheendothis

lecturetheseversionswillstrikeyouasappropriate,perhapsevencompelling.

3.

TheplacetostartisDe AnimaIII4andthetriple

scheme, as I like to call it, o irst andsecondpotentiality,irstandsecondactuality.OriginallyinvokedinDe AnimaII1asthekeytoexplain-ingsoulorlieitsel,thenelaborated,inII5s


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20 M.F.Burnyeat

complicatedaccountoperception,itreturns,inIII4toexplainnous:- Pot.1 Pot.2 Act.2 Act.1

Model: Manaknowerby

nature

Havinglearned

toread&write

Usingonesliteracy

read&write

or(i): Poweroperception

Perceiving

and(ii): Powerothought&

reasoning

Achievedintellectual

power

Actualexerciseo

intellectualpower

Thepoweroperceptionhasalreadyreachedsec-ondpotentiality=irstactualitywhenananimalemergesromwomb,eggorslime(DAII5,417a

1-18).Allithastodotostartactuallygaininginormationabouttheworldisopenitseyestoseeorexplorewithitsmeansotouch.Theintel-lectualpowersaccessibletohumanscomemoreslowly,throughtimeandeort.Allwearebornwithisthecapacitytothinkandreason,whichwemusttrainanduseiwearetoarriveattheoreticalunderstandingotheworld.19 Now let me introduce the identity thesis.AccordingtoAristotle,whenananimalopensits


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eyesandseesred,whathappensisthattheeyesinsomesensetakeonthatcolouror,ashealsoputsit,theybecomeredinaway(DA III8,431b20-432a3).Seeingredisbecomingred.Notsurpris-ingly,itismuchdebatedwhatexactlythisthesismeans.Aristotlemakesaparallelclaimabouttheintellect:

,

,

.

Andnowletussumupwhathasbeensaidconcern-ingthesoulbyrepeatingthatinamannerthesoulisallthethingsthatare.Forthethingsthatarearealleitherobjectsoperceptionorobjectsointel-lect,20andknowledgeisinawaythethingsthatareknowable,perceptioninawaythethingsthatareperceptible.(DA III8,431b20-23)21

Thisisnottheoccasionormetorevisitlong-standingcontroversiesaboutAristotlestheoryoperception.22Imerelypausetonotethistextsemphasisontheparallelismbetweenperceptionandintellectualknowledge.Eachissaidtobecometheirobjectinsomeway.Itiswidelyagreedin

thescholarlyliteraturethatnounderlyingmate-rialprocessesorconditionsareinvolvedwhentheintellectbecomesitsobjectbytakingonanintelligibleorm.Noteveryoneagreeswithme


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22 M.F.Burnyeat

thatnounderlyingmaterialprocessesareinvolvedwhen perception becomes its object by takingonaperceptibleorm,onlyastandingmaterialstateoreceptivityinthesenseorgan(transparenteye-jellyintheeye,stillairintheear,etc.).Isug-gestthatthosewhoinsistonunderlyingmaterialprocessesorperception,butnotorintellectualunderstanding,oweusanexplanationowhyAristotle should tolerate such a signiicant lackoparallelismbetweenthetwotypesocognitionwhoseparallelismhetrumpetsbothinthepassagejustquotedandelsewhere(III4,429a13-18). That said, Iturn to the question o where in

thetripleschemetolocatetheintellectualiden-titywhichparallelstheidentityosensewithitsobject.Inthecaseoperceptiontheanswerisclear:atthetransitionromirstactuality(=secondpotentiality)tosecondactuality,marked inthediagram.Forexample,whenyouwakeupin

themorningandopenyoureyestoseethewhitecolouroyourpillow.Whenyougotosleepyoudonotlosethepowerosight,whichthroughoutthenightremainsatsecondpotentiality=irstactuality. Fortheintellectmanyscholarsgivetheparallel

answer:theidentityisachievedatthetransitionbetweenirstandsecondactuality.23Hereistheprootextwhichshowsunambigouslythatthatiswrong:


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[sc. ] ( , ),

,

.

Whentheintellectbecomeseachthingintheway

inwhichanactualknowerdoes

24

(which happensas soon as the knower can exercise their power of theirown accord),eventhenitisstillinonesensejustacapacity:not,however,acapacityinthesamesenseasbeoreitlearnedordiscovered.(III4,429b5-9;tr.aterHicksandHamlyn,emphasismine)

Asmarkedbythesecond inthediagram,the

identityointellectwithitsobjectholdsalreadyatsecondpotentiality=irstactuality,beforetheknowerswitchestothesecondactualityoexercis-ingthatintellectualpowerotheirownaccord. Idonotmeanthattheidentityceasestoholdwhensecondactualityisachieved.Onthecontrary,

theormalreadyacquiredisthenactivelyguid-ingtheknowersthought.25Thedierenceisthatsensibleobjectsareparticularandexternaltotheperceivingsubject,sothatitisnotuptouswhatsensibleormsimpingeonoursenses,whereasscientiicknowledge(epistm) isouniversals

andthese,oncelearned,aresaidtoresideinaway in the soul itsel. In consequence, we canactivateourknowledgeothemwhenweplease(II5,418a19-2).Justthisisthestageindicated


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24 M.F.Burnyeat

bytheitalicizedclauseassoonastheknowercanexercisetheirpowerotheirownaccord. The inal preliminary is to consider whatAristotle means when he glosses irst actualityknowledgeoanintelligibleormastheknowershavingacquired,takenon,orbecomethatorm.InAristotle,asinPlato,toknowanintelligibleormistohavemasteredandinternalizedadei -nition.Notanyolddeinitionosomething,butthescientiicallycorrectdeinitionoitsessence.NowanAristotelianessenceisrathermorethanacommoneature,moreeventhanasetonecessaryandsuicientconditionsorbeingaso-and-so.It

isairstprincipleoexplanatorydemonstration.Toindtheessenceoakindistoindthecauseorexplanationothevariouspropertiesthatnecessar-ilybelongtomembersothekindinvirtueotheirbeingthatkindothing.InAristotleslanguage,theexplanandaaretheper seattributes(ta kath

hauta sumbebkota),theessencetheexplanans.Itisthispowerulexplanatoryprinciplethatissaidtobetakenonoracquiredbytheknoweratthestageosecondpotentiality=irstactualityknowledge. Thustheormolionexists,asonemightputit,

intwomodes.Inthelionitisirstandoremosttheessencewhichexplainsthevariouseaturesthattypiyalionanditslie.InAristotlestechni-caltalktheseexplanandaaretheper seeatureso


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lionlie,theeaturesthatbelongtolionsqualions,i.e.eaturesthatalllionspossessbecausetheyarelions.Amodernanaloguetotheessencethatcom-prehensivelyexplainsallsucheaturesmightbealionsgeneticcode.Secondly,however,theormoressenceolionexistsalsointheintellectoazoolo-gistwhohasinternalizedasecureunderstandingothatessenceanditspowertoexplainthetraitsthatbelongtoalllionsbecausetheyarelionsleadingalionslie.Thiswouldmatchazoologistsdrawingupthemapoalionsgeneticcode.

Suchacausewilltakesomending.ButAristotleoerssomeheuristicadvice:

,

,

,

,

,

,

, .


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2 M.F.Burnyeat

Itseemsthatnotonlyistheknowledgeoathingsessentialnatureuseulordiscoveringthecausesoitsattributes(asinmathematicsascertainingwhatstraightandcurvedare,orlineandsurace,isuseulorseeinghowmanyrightanglestheangleso a triangle are equal to), butalso, conversely,theattributescontributegreatlytotheknowledge

owhatathingis.Foritiswhenweareabletogiveanaccountoall,oratanyratemost,otheattributesas they appear to usthatweshallbestbeabletospeakabouttheessencetoo.Forthestart-ingpointoeverydemonstrationiswhatathingis,hencedeinitionswhichleadtonoinormationaboutattributes,ordonotevenhelpusconjec-

tureaboutthem,areclearlyalljustdialecticalandempty.(DAI1,402b1-403a2;tr.aterHicksandHamlyn)

Theideaisthatyoushouldamiliarizeyourselwiththeullrangeotheattributestobeexplained,because it is when you can give a provisional

account2oallormostothesethatyouwillbebestplacedtodeterminetheessencewhichisthestartingpointoexplanatorydemonstration.Howdolions,orexample,reproduce,digesttheirood,copewiththeirhabitat?Howwelldotheyperceive,ortracktheirprey?Whatistheirliecycle?And

soon.Acareullydetailedknowledgeowhatneedstobeexplainedisthebestpreparationoranattempttoormulateanadequateexplanation.


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Itappears,then,thatwewillnotinallybeinapositiontoixtheessenceolionuntilwehaveaprettythoroughpreliminaryknowledgeothespecies.Then,andthenonly,canweidentiyanddeinethesubstantialormwhichmakesalionwhatitisandgivesunitytothevariousphenomenawehavebeenstudying.Fortheorm,accordingtoAristotle,justistheessencewhichexplainstheremainingnecessarycharacteristicsthatbelongtoanylionbyvirtueoitsbeingthatkindothing.Andamongthesenecessarycharacteristicswemustocourseincludethematterwhichiscorrelativetolionorm.Thephysicalworldisnotpre-stocked

withlionmatterasitiswithcopperandiron;ittakesanactualpre-existingliontotakeintherelevantoodstusromwhichlionmatteristhenmade,andtheprinciplewhichexplainsthatmanu-acturingprocessis,onceagain,thesoul,ormoressenceolion(DAII4).

Insum,anAristotelianormisnottobegraspedonitsown,asasolitaryitemoknowledge,butonlyaspartandpinnacleoawholeexplanatorysystem.Wellmayonewonderwhethersuchagraspiswithinordinaryhumanreach.Aristotlerepeatedlyreservesthenamenous, noeinorthis

achievement.Whenhesays,orexample,thatnousisthedispositionthatgraspstheirstprinciplesoadeductivescience(APo. II19,100b5-17;ENVI;c.Met.A2,982a19-b10),heclearlymeans


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28 M.F.Burnyeat

graspingthemasthestartingpointsoelaborateexplanatory deductions. A single sentence, thishints,couldneverbeanadequateexpressionoachievednous.

4.

HereIpausetogathersomeothethingsAristotlesaysabouthisGodinBooksIandIIotheDeAnima.

(1)Intheveryirstchapterheraisesthequestionwhetherallattributes(path)osoulareshared(perhapsbetter:sharedin)bythebodyitanimates,oraretheresomethatbelongexclusively(idia) tosoul?Inmostcases,hesays,soulsbeingaectedoractingdoesseemtoinvolvethebodyaswell;thisistrueobeingangryorconident,desir-ingand,ingeneral,perceiving.27Themostplau-sibleexceptionwouldseemtobenoeinunless

thisdependsonabodyeitherbecauseitisitselsomekindoappearance(phantasia) orbecauseitcannotunctionwithoutappearance(403a3-10).28Theconclusionisthati,andonlyi,thereissomeunctionoraectionosoulwhichisexclu-sivetoit,i.e.whichdoesnotinvolvebodyaswell

assoul,thenitwouldbepossibleorsoultoexistseparately,onitsown(403a10-1:endechoit anautn chrizesthai).Supposenoeinissuchaunc-tionoraectionosoul.Thentherecouldbea


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kindosoulwhichhadintellectbutnobody,justasattheotherendothescala naturaetherecanbeandisakindosoul,thenutritive-reproductivesouloplants,whichdunatai chrizesthai tshaphskaipassaisthses:akindosoulwhichcananddoesexistwithoutanyothecognitivepowersthatdistinguishanimals(II2,413a20-b10).

I emphasisetheparallelwithplantsoulslestanyonetakethepassagetobescoutingtheideathatahumanindividualsintellectmightsurvivetheirdeathtocontinueunctioningonitsown.Aristotleisobviouslynotsayingthatananimalsnutritive-reproductivepowerscouldbeseparated

outorinstallationinaplantbody.Northenishecontemplatingabodylessimmortalityortheindi-vidualintellectoSocrates.Heiswonderingaboutanintellectwhichoitsownnatureunctionsquiteindependentlyobodiesandtheirpowers.Thisisourirstintimationothedivineintellecto De

AnimaIII5andMetaphysics. (2)ThesecondintimationcomeslaterinBookIromapassagewhich inter aliaconirmsthatnous/noeinisnotatallthesamethingasdianoia/dianoeisthai.Translatorsconstantlyignorethisnon-identity,renderingbothnounsandbothverbs

asthoughtandthinking.29

TheresultisachaosandconusionthatIwilldocumentinootnotes.ForthosewithoutGreek,letmejustnominatethe


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30 M.F.Burnyeat

passageas,currently,theworsttranslatedpassageinancientphilosophy:-

,

,

, , ,

.

,

.30

,

, .

,

, .

, .

, ,

.

, ,

.

Tosaythatthesoulisangryislikesayingthatthesoulweavesorbuilds.Imean:itissurelybetternottosaythatthesoulpities,learnsorthinks,butthatthehumanbeingdoesthiswiththeirsoul,andthis


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notbecausethemovementtakesplaceinthesoul,butbecausesometimesitreachestothesoulandatothertimescomesromit;e.g.perceptionstartsromthesethingsaroundus,whilerecollectionstartsromthesoulandreachestomovementsorremnantsinthesense-organs.

Itwouldseemthat intellect,ontheotherhand,comestoresideinusasakindosubstance,andonenotsubjecttodestruction.31Ianythingcoulddestroyit,itwouldbetheeeblenessooldage.Asthingsare,whathappensisdoubtlessjustlikewhathappenstothesense-organs.Ianagedmancouldprocureaneyeotherightsort,hewouldseejust

aswellasayoungster.Henceoldageisnotduetothesoulsbeingaectedinacertainwaywhatisaectedisthat[sc.thebody]inwhichthesoulresides,asisthecasewithdrunkennessanddis-ease. In likemanner, then,understandingandcontemplation32declinebecausesomethingelsewithinisdestroyed,whileinitselitisunaected.33

Butthinking()34andlovingorhatingarenotaectionsothat[sc.theintellect],butothisthing[sc.thehumanbeing]whichpossessesthat,totheextentthatitdoessopossessit.Hencealso,whenthis[thehuman]perishesthereisnei-therrememberingnorloving.Fortheseneverdidbelongto that[theintellect],35buttothethingwhich shared in it [the human] and which hasnowperished.Theintellect,ontheotherhand,isdoubtlessathingmoredivineandonethatcannotbeaected.(I4,408b11-29)


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32 M.F.Burnyeat

Thistextnotonlyconirmsmypreviousinsis-tenceondistinguishingbetweennousandordinarythinking(dianoia).Itimplies(a)thatnous,unlikeordinarythought,isdivineandimmortal,(b)thatitcancometoresideinahumanbeingasitselanextrakindosubstance,distinctromthemortalsubstanceitresidesin,and(c)thatitremainscom-pletelyunaectedbythedeathoitstemporaryhumanvehicle.Thistextalsosays,twiceandwithsomeemphasis,thatdianoia,likeloveandhate,doesnotbelongtonous. (3)TheissueoseparateexistencereturnsinII2,413b24-32:

About intellect and the contemplative3aculty( )nothingisclearasyet.Butitlookstobeageneri-callydierentkindosoul,andthisalonecanbeseparate(d),astheeternalisseparate(d)romtheperishable.37Whatisclearromtheseconsider-

ationsisthattheremainingpartsothesoularenotseparate,despitewhatsomesay.Inaccounttheyaredierent,tobesure,giventhatperceivingisdierentrombelieving/judging,andsimilarlywiththeotheracultiesmentioned.

Aristotledoesnotyetdeinitelyairmtheconclu-sionheisattractedto,buthereagainhemakesitperectlyclearthattheacultyothinking, believ-ing, judging(413b13: to dianotikon;b30: todoxastikon) isnotwhatheinclinedtoclassiyasa


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genericallydierent,becauseeternalanddivine,kindosoul.Thathonourisreservedorwhateveritisthathecallsnous, to notikon, to noein.

5.

LetthesepointstakeusbacktoDe AnimaIII4toseehowsmoothlyitleadsontoDe AnimaIII5andMetaphysics:

About the part o the soul by which the soulknowsandhassoundjudgement( )38regardlessowhetheritisseparate,ornotseparateinmagnitudebutonlyinaccountwemustinquirewhatitsdierentiaisandhowintellectualunderstandingcomesabout( ).

Nowiintellectualunderstanding( )39 isakintoperceiving,itwillbeacaseeitherobeingaectedbytheintelligibleobject(

),orsomethingsimilartothat.Itmustthen,whileitselimpassive(),bereceptivetotheormandpotentiallylikeitwithoutbeingit,andas the faculty of perception is to per-ceptible things, so must nous be to intelligible objects( ).Itisnecessary,thereore,sinceitunderstandseverything( ),40thatitbeunmixed,asAnaxago-rassays,in orderthat itmaymaster itsobjects,thatis,know()them(ortheintrusionoanythingoreigninterereswithit).Asaresult


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34 M.F.Burnyeat

it has no nature of its own other than its potential tobecome this or that.Accordingly,theso-callednousothesoul- by nous I mean that by which the soulthinks and judges ( )-isinactualitynoneothethingsthatarebeoreitunderstandsthem( ). Thatiswhyitisreasonableoritnottobemixedwiththe

body;thiswouldresultinitsbeingosomequal-ity,eithercoldorhot,anditwouldhaveanorganastheperceptiveacultydoes.Butasitis,itisnotanything.Andpeopledowelltosaythatthesoulistheplaceoorms,except that it is not the wholeof soul that is this, only the noetic soul,norisittheormsinactuality,onlyinpotentiality.Andthatthe

impassivityotheperceptiveisdierentromthatothenoeticacultiesisclearromthesense-organsandperception.Perceptionisincapacitatedbyanexcessiveobjectsuchaveryloudsound,andonecannotseeanexcessivelybrightcolourorendureanexcessivelystrongsmell.Butwhentheintellecthasunderstoodanextremelyintelligibleitem,itunderstandslesserthingsbetter,notworse.Forthe perceptual faculty cannot function apart fromthe body, but the intellect is separate ( , ).Andwhentheintellectbecomeseachthinginthewayinwhichanactualknowerdoes(which happens

as soon as the knower can exercise their power of theirown accord)...(III4,429a10-b7)

Ihavequotedenoughothistexttoshowwhereitjoinsontomyearlierquotationatp.23,rom


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whichIconcludedthattheidentitybetweenintel-lectandintelligiblestakesplaceatirstactuality=secondpotentiality.Itollowsthatthestagepriortotheachievementoidentityisirstpotential-ity.Itisthereorefirstpotentialitynouswhichisdescribedat429a23asthatbywhichthesoulthinksandjudges. Thisisanovelty,signalledbytheword (Imean=Iheremean).Toappreciateitssignii-cance,turnthesentencearound:thatbywhichthesoulthinksandjudgesisirstpotentialitynous.Whichistosaythatthehumancapacityorthinkingandjudging,acapacityweareborn

with alongsidethe capacity to reasonthetwocapacitiestogethercomprisingourdierentiaasabiologicalspeciesgivesusthepotentialtograsptheintelligibleormswhichexplaintheworldasitisobjectivelyspeaking.Forexample,justinvirtueoourbeingwhatitistobeahumanbeingweall

haveapotentialtoattainacompleteandaccurate,totallyobjectiveunderstandingolionlie.Thecapacityorordinarythinking(dianoia)canaterallbetitlednousandwassotitledalreadyatII3,414b18:to dianotikon te kai nousbutonlyinthesenseoirstpotentiality.

Lots ohuman lives never advanceto secondpotentialitynousaboutanything.Theyarenotonthataccount(tobe)judgedailures,ornotallousarecalledtointellectualachievementonaparwith


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3 M.F.Burnyeat

masteringthegeneticcodeolions.Nonetheless,Aristotlesclaimisthatmeremembershipothehumanspeciesgivesus,insomeimportantlyrealsense,thepotentialtodoso.41 ThisistheclaimwhichAlredRussellWallacethoughtinexplicableinevolutionaryterms.Withthat,ocourse,Aristotlewouldhappilyagree,onprincipleandnotonlybecauseo thecrudesimplicities o the evolutionary theories he wasacquaintedwith.Theprincipleisanexceedinglystrongversionotheprincipleothepriorityotheactual,meaningtemporalpriority,notjustprior -ityintheorderounderstanding.Anyinstance

obeingpotentiallysuch-and-suchisprecededbyaninstanceosomethingelsebeingactuallysuch-and-such(Met.8,1049b10-50a3).Moresimply,thereisnothingnewundertheSunnor,ocourse,abovetheSun,giventheunchangingcir-culationothestarsintheAristotelianuniverse.

AristoclesoMessana(2ndcent.AD),teacherothegreatcommentatorAlexanderoAphrodisias,saidthattwothingsaredriving(kinounta)AristotlewhenhepropoundsthetheoryotheAgentIntel-lectinDe AnimaIII5:oneistheanalogybetweennousandperception,theothertheprincipleothe

priorityoactualityoverpotentiality.42

IbelievethatthesetwothingsareindeedenoughtoenableustoreadthechapterasanancientGreekversionoWallacesconvictionthatappealtoGodisnec-


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essarytoexplaintheactthatmansmindsoarexceedsincapacitywhatisrequiredorordinaryhumanlieandthecontinuityothespecies.

6.

LetusgobacktotheparallelAristotleinsistentlydrawsbetweenperceptionandintellectualknowl-edge. I said that, in thecase o a lion, its irstactuality(lionsoul)issimultaneouslyasecondpotentialityboth(i)orstalkingproudlyaboutthelandand(ii)orbeingknownandunderstoodbythescientistwhostudieslions(aleontologist?).

Analogously,thegolden-browncolouroalionisboth(i)whatmakesitactuallybrown,and(ii)itspotentialityorbeingseen(asbrown).Butwecanmakethecorrespondenceneaterstill. Aristotleholds,andatleastinthecaseocolour,soundandsmellsweagree,thatanenablingcon-

ditionortheperceptionosensiblequalitiesisamediumthroughwhichtheycanbecognized.43Forsight,thenecessarymediumisairorwaterinastateoactualtransparency,whichstateoactualtransparencyAristotleequateswithlight.Lightinhisphysicsdoesnottravel(heberatesEmpedocles

orhisidiocyinthinkingitdoes):itisastateoairorwater,thestateinwhichitisactuallytransparentsothatthingscanbeseenthroughit.Moreor-mally,lightistheactualityothetransparentqua


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38 M.F.Burnyeat

transparent.44

NowacentralthesisoDe AnimaIII5istheollowing:aslightisaconditionorthestagewhichprecedesthetakingonovisibleorm,i.e.priortosightsbecomingcolour(ed),sothereissomethinglikelight(430a15)whichisaconditionpriortotheidentityoknowerandknown.Likelight,thistooisastate(hexis tis),notamovementosomekind.Anditissaidtomakeeverythinginawaythatparallelsthewaylightmakescoloursactuallyvisible.Incontextthismustmeanthatitmakesthingsactuallyknowable. WearenowreadyorthenotoriouslybrieandcrabbytextoDe AnimaIII5.Bywayopreace,

letmesuggestareasonoritsbrevity.TheDeAnimaisatreatiseinphysicsorsecondphilosophy,irmlyembeddedbyanetworkocross-reerences

withintheseriesthatrunsromPhysicstothebio-logicalworks.45ButIII5,asIproposetointerpretit,isirstphilosophy,theology,metaphysics.For

itiswhollyocussedonGod,theDivineIntellect.NowelsewhereAristotleshowshimselconcernedlestphysics,byencroachingontopicsthataretheproperconcernoirstphilosophy,leavenoscopeorthesupremesciencetooperateindependently(PA I1,41a32-b12;Met.VI1).Thatworry

wouldbereasonenoughtokeepIII5sexcursionintotheologyasbrieaspossible. Thisdoes notexcuse the crabbystyle,whichcontinuesuntilIII9embarksonawholenewsec-


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tiondevotedtoanimalmovement.ThecrabbinessensuresthattranslationoIII5isentwinedwithinterpretationateverystep.Theollowingtransla-tion-cum-interpretationothechapterisoeredasaplausibleclimaxtothevariousinterpretativechoicesembeddedinthetranslationspresentedsoar:

Since,as4inthewholeonaturethereissomethingwhich serves as matter to each kind47 (viz.thatwhichispotentiallyallthemembersothekind),andsomethingelsewhichservesascauseandpro-ducertothekind,byproducingallitsmembers,thetwobeingrelatedtooneanotherasarttoits

materialsincethatisso,onecessitythesesamedistinctionsmustobtainalsointhesphereosoul.48Thusthereisonekindof intellectthatexistsbybecomingall things, and anotherthat exists bymakingallthingsmakingtheminthewayadis-positionalstate()suchaslightmakesthings;orinawaylightdoesinactmakepotentialcolours

actualcolours.Andthislatterintellectisseparate,andnothingcanaectit,anditmixeswithnoth-ingelseallbecauseitsverybeingisactuality( ).49For50alwaysthatwhichactsisohigherworth51thanthatwhichisactedupon,theoriginativeprinciplethanthematter.Nowactualknowledge( )isidenticalwiththethingknown.Potentialknowl-edgeispriorintimeinanysingleindividual,butitisnotpriorintimequitegenerally, 52becausetheintellectunderdiscussion53isnotathingthat


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40 M.F.Burnyeat

exercisesitsunderstandingatsometimeswhileatothertimesitdoesnot.Andbeingseparated[sc.romeverythingelse],54itiswhatitisessentiallyandnothingelse.Andthisaloneisimmortalandeternal.Yetwedonotrememberbecause55thisisimpassive(),whereasthepassiveintellect( )isperishable.Andwithoutthis

nothingunderstands().5

Thepunch line, as I see it, comesat theveryend. Thisrecursineachothelastthreesentences,inthesecondowhichitcontrastswiththeweimplicitintheirstpersonpluralpresenttenseorm

otheGreekverbtoremember.Sothisisnotweandnoneousisthis.Thisaloneisimmortal,sowearenot.Noristhepassiveintellect,intro-ducedearlierasthekindointellectwhichexistsbybecoming,i.e.bycomingtounderstand,allthings.Butiandwhenthepassiveintellectdoes

cometounderstandathingortwo,itcannottheinalsentenceannouncesdosowithoutthis.Ourmortalintellectneedsanimmortalintellecttoachieveitsgoalounderstanding. Howdoestheimmortalintellecthelpus?Howdoesitmakethingsintelligibletoourmortalminds?Simplybyexisting,Iwouldsuggest,bybeingwhatitis:aneternalintellectconstituted,likeanyotherintellect,asasystemoconcepts.Thedierenceisthatthedivineintellectisasystem


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(better,perhaps,thesystem)oabsolutelycorrectconcepts.Assuch,thedeitydoesnotneedtoactonusromuphigh,butmerelytoilluminatetheintelligibleorms,somewhatinthewaylight,simplyinvirtueobeingwhatitis,illuminatescoloursandmakesthemactuallyvisibletous. HereIshouldemphasizethatlight,inAristotlesview,isitselastateoamediumsuchasairor

water.Lightneithertravelsnor,unlessitisdaz-zlinglybright,doesitaectoureyes.57Itmerelyenablescolourstoaectoursight.Justso,wemustsuppose,Aristotlesdivineintellectdoesnothingbutbewhatitis.Likelight,itisastate,notapro-

cess.Aslightisastateoamaterialmediumwhichmakesthevisibleorms(colours)actuallyvisibletosight,sothedivineintellectiscastasanon-mate-rialmediumthroughwhichtheintelligibleormsbecomeapparenttothehumanintellect.Puttheotherwayround,itenablestheknowertosee

throughtotheorms,tounderstandthemastheyreallyare.Thecomparisonwhichcomestomindisthatlimitingcaseoperspectivewhichcertainphilosophershavecalledtheabsoluteviewpointorthepointoviewotheuniverse.Totakeupthatviewpointistogetyourselinapositiontosee

howthingsreallyandobjectivelyare. TothosewhohavereadPlatosRepublicallthisshouldsoundincrediblyamiliar.AsthelightotheSunmakessensiblethingsvisibleandgivesus


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42 M.F.Burnyeat

theabilitytoseethem,sotheGoodmakestheintelligibleFormsknowableandgivesourintellect(ournous,theeyeothesoul)theabilitytoknowthem.IAristotlesubstitutestheirstprincipleandbestthinginhisuniverseortheirstprincipleandbestthinginPlatosuniverseandleavestheanalogyotherwiseuntouched,theresultwillbethetheorythatAlexander,thebestandmostpurelyAristo-telianotheancientcommentators,oundinDeAnimaIII5;thetheorythatBrentanodismissedasprattlewithoutallsenseandreason.58TheActiveIntellectisGod.59

Atthispointitisappropriatetorecallthatinthe

Aristotelianuniverseallnatureimitatesthedeity.ItisasinalcausethatGodisthePrimeMoveroeverything,startingwiththemostbasicmaterialelements(earth,air,ireandwater)whoseceaselessinterchangeistheirwayoachievingconstancyinimitationotheeternalirstcause(GCII10,33b

25-337a15;Met.8,1050b28-30).Nextcometheconstantreproductivecyclesolivingthings,plantsaswellasanimals(DA II4,415a2-b7;GA II1,731b24-732a11).Finally,itisbecauseGodslieocontemplationisthebestmodeoexistenceintheuniverse,andthemostpleasant,

that orus humans toocognitiveactivity is themostpleasant:notjustnoeticcontemplation,butalsostatesthatGoddoesnotsharesuchaswakingandperceiving,hopesandmemories(Met. 7,


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1072b13-24).Whatisspecialabouttheexerciseonous,thehighestormocognitionthathumanscanattain,isthatitisnolongeramoreorlessdistantimitationothedivinelie.ItisalimitedspanotheverysameactivityasGodenjoysoralltime. ThisisthekeytoAristotlesrecommendationothecontemplativelieinNicomachean EthicsX7,1177b2-34.Weshouldnottoollowthosewhoadviseus,beingmen,tothinkohumanthings,and,beingmortal,omortalthings.Instead,weshould,makeourselvesimmortalsoaraswecan( ).Tomake

ourselvesimmortal,toenjoyorawhilethesameunderstandingasGodhas,whatisthisbuttheothersideotheDe Animasidea(abovep.31)thatintellectcomestoresideinusasakindosubstance,andonenotsubjecttodestruction?Ortoputitanotherway,

I,then,Godisalwaysinthatgoodstateinwhichwesometimesare,thiscompelsourwonder;andiinabetter,thiscompelsityetmore.AndGodisinabetterstate.(Met.7,1072b24-;tr.Ross)0


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44 M.F.Burnyeat

NOTES

1IusetheneuterbecauseancientGreek ,like,isgrammaticallybothmasculineand

eminine,takingboththemasculineandemininearticles;moreover,thereareoccasionswhen / reerstoaemale.

2 Augustine,De genesi ad litteram12,7:Triageneravisionum ... corporale, spirituale, ... tertium verointellectualeabintellectu,quiamentaleamenteipsavocabulinovitatenimisabsurdumestutdicamus.

3 Aquinas,ST1a2ae,q.5,3a.3:Sed contraestquodmensmaximediciturintellectus.Subjectumautemvirtutisestmens,utpatetexdeinitionevirtutissuprainducta.Ergointellectusestsubjectumvirtutis.

4 ST1a2ae,q.55,a.4,citingAugustine,De Trini-tateXII3:Ubiprimooccurritaliquidquodnonsitnobispecoribusquecommune,illudadmentem

pertinet.5 Denaturamentishumanae:qudipsasitnotiorqumcorpus;Frenchversion:Delanaturedelsprithumain:etquilestplusaisconnatrequelecorps.

Sum igitur praecise tantum rescogitans, id est,mens,sive animus,siveintellectus,siveratio,where

(asalson.9below)italicssignalwordsnotrenderedintotheFrenchversion:jenesuisdoncprcismentparlantquunechosequipense,cestdireunEsprit,unEntendement,ouuneraison.


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7 Descartes learned readers would know that theverbhadamuchwiderrangethenthanitdoesnow.Inparticular,CicerousedittoLatinizetheStoics,theunchallengeablecognitivegrasponwhichtheirepistemologywasgrounded.

8 ...corpora,nonproprieasensibus,velabimagi-nandiacultate,sedasolointellectupercipi,necexeopercipiqudtanganturautvideantur,sedtantmexeoqudintelligantur...;Frenchversion:...proprementparlernousneconcevonslescorpsqueparlaacultdentendrequiestennous,etnonpointparlimaginationniparlessens,etquenousnelesconnaissonspasdecequenouslesvoyons,ouquenouslestouchons,maisseulementdecequenouslesconcevonsparlapense...

9 Idemdeniqueegosumquisentio,sivequirescor-poreastanquampersensusanimadverto:videlicetjamlucemvideo,strepitumaudio,caloremsentio.Falsahaecsunt,dormioenim.Atcerteviderevideor,audire,calescere.Hoc falsum esse non potest;hocestpropriequodinmesentireappellatur;atquehocpraecisesicsumptumnihilaliudestqumcogitare;

Frenchversion:Eninjesuislemmequisens,cest--direquireoisetconnaisleschosescommeparlesorganesdessens:puisqueneetjevoislalumire,joislebruit,jeressenslachaleur.Maislonmediraquecesapparencessontausses,etquejedors.Quilsoitainsi,touteoistoutlemoinsilesttrscertainquilmesemblequejevois,quejois,et

quejemchaue,etcestproprementcequienmoisappellesentir;etcelaprisainsiprcismentnestrienautrechosequepenser.

10 Sedquidigitursum?Rescogitans.Quidesthoc?Nempedubitans,intelligens,airmans,negans,


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4 M.F.Burnyeat

volens,nolens,imaginansquoque,&sentiens;Frenchversion:Maisquest-cedoncquejesuis?Unechosequipense;quest-cequunechosequipense?Cest--direunechosequidoute,quiconoit,quiairme,quinie,quiveut,quineveutpas,quiimagineaussi,etquisent.

11 Egosumrescogitans,idestdubitans,airmans,negans,paucaintelligens,multaignorans,volens,nolens,imaginansetiam&sentiens;utenimanteanimadverti,quamvisillaquaesentiovelimaginorextramenihilsint,illostamencogitandimodos,quossensus&imaginationesappello,quatenuscogitandiquidammoditantmsunt,inmeessesumcertus;Frenchversion:Jesuisunechosequipense,cest--direunechosequidoute,quiconoit,

quiairme,quinie,quiconnatpeudechoses,quienignorebeaucoup,qui aime, qui hait,quiveut,quineveutpas,quiimagineaussi,etquisent.Car,ainsiquejairemarquci-devant,quoiqueleschosesquejesensetquejimaginenesoientpeut-trerienditouthorsdemoi,et en elles-mmes,jesuisnanmoisassurquecesaonsdepenser,quejappellesenti-

mentsetimaginations,entantseulementquellessontdesaonsdepenser,rsidentetserencontrentcertainementenmoi(italicssignalwordsaddedintheFrenchedition).

12 SoRodis-LewisinherIntroduction,xii.13 Book I oDe Animacomplainsatsomelength

aboutthePreocraticsailuretodistinguishnousrom

lesserormsocognition:I2,404a27-b;405a9-17.Forrelevantdiscussion,seeFrede199b.14 Ross (1949), 818-20. My own appreciation o

Smith (inBurnyeat 2005) is due to hisobscurelynamedOnGeneralRelativeClausesinGreek


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(1917),inwhichhislinguisticingenuityannihilatesthesoleevidenceorthecommonassumptionthatPlatopositedaFormoreverygeneralterm.

15 Inoteinpassingthatisanotherpitallortranslators:thestandardrenderingimaginationitsamereeightlines(427b17-24)othelengthydiscussiondevotedtothetopicinDA III3.Themot justeorthenouncorrespondingtotheverb isappearance,thesensegiventoitbyPlatoatTht.152bc, Soph.24ab.

1 DA II3,414b18-19;c.I5,410b24;II2,413b12-13;29-31;414a12-13;3,414a31-2;Met.I1,980b27-8.

17 Thecontrastbetweentheoreticalandpractical isdiscussedinENVI11,whichisarromencourag-ingtheideathatpracticalwisdomisunrelective.

18 SeeDA I4,408b3-29;5,410b12-15;II2,413b24-32.

19 InBurnyeat2002Ioeralengthyexpositionothetripleschemeanditssigniicance.

20 Smithhererendersexistingthingsareeithersen-

sibleorthinkable,butcontinuesandknowledgeisinawaywhatisknowable.21 Translations not otherwise accredited are my

own.22 MymostrecenteortinthisareaisBurnyeat2002.

Caston(2004)givesaullandaircriticaloverviewothetwistsandturnsoalongdebatebetweenmysel,RichardSorabji,andothers.

23 So,orexample,Learchap.4.3;Hadot39(citingII1,412a10;5,417a28,whichmerelydistinguishsecondromirstactualitywithoutmentiono


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48 M.F.Burnyeat

theidentity),who,however,ollowswithasuperbaccountowhattheidentitymeansinPlotinus.24 Smith: Oncethemind hasbecome each seto

itspossibleobjects,asamanosciencehas,whenthisphraseisusedoonewhoisactuallyamanoscience.Barnes:Whenthoughthasbecomeeachthinginthewayinwhichamanwhoactuallyknowsissaidtodoso.

25 Asspelledout,orthecaseoproductivearts,inMet.2.

2 :anaccountwhichrendershowtheattributeappearstoaskilledscien-tiicobserverwhodoesnotyetcommandtheexplana-tionowhyitisasitis.SmithandBarnesagreeonor,whenweareabletogiveanaccountconormable

toexperienceoallormostothepropertiesothesubstance...

27 Notethatthislastpointsaysnomorethanthatperceivingrequiresabody;itdoesnotascribetothatbodysomematerialprocessunderlyingthepercep-tion.I at403a7appearstosubsumeunderperceivingthethreeitemspreviouslymentioned,viz.

gettingangry,beingconident,anddesiring,thatitsIII7,431a8-14.

28 Seen.15aboveorthetranslationo.29 Hicks ad 408b18-29doesacknowledgethe

assumeddistinctionbetween and,butonlytoaddthatitappearstomequitearbitrary,sinceeitherverbmaystandortheacto

thinking!AgoodcounterweighttothisarroganceisFrede(199b),whorightlyemphasizesthatnoeinorAristotleisnotordinarythinking,butinvolves


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intellectuallygraspingsomethingorhavinginsight,invirtueowhichwehavetrueknowledge(p.15).30 WithRossinhiseditio maior(191),butnothis

editio minor(195),Istartanewparagraphhere.LikewiseSmith,Barnes,Jannone-Barbotin.Another,less satisactoryway tosignal Aristotleschange osubjectisTheilers:ollowingRitter,heputsangledbracketsaround408b18-29andthewholeoIII5tomarkbothaslaterinsertions(byAristotlehim-sel).Siwek,bycontrast,keepsasingleparagraphonthegroundsthat408b18-29,soarrombeingadigression,isnecessarytocompletetheproothatneitherinitsineriornoritssuperioractivitiesisthesoulitselmoved.

31 Two comments on this sentence. (1) Barnes

replacedSmithsmindwiththought:Butthoughtseemstobeanindependentsubstanceimplanted

within us.How thoughtcouldbeanAristoteliansubstance,oanykind,beggarsbelie.(2)Rossadloc.rightlydeniesthatthispassagehastodowiththedoctrineoGAII3,73b27-9,thatnousalonecomesinromoutsideanditaloneisdivine.The

latter,asCaston(1999),215-,wellargues,belongswithAristotlessexistbiology,accordingtowhichaninantsormderivessolelyromtheather,itsmatterrom the mother. In the human case, the speciicormcontributedbytheatheristhepowertothinkandreason.Thispower,whichbecomesactualastheinantgrowsup,isinitially(asweshallsee)first

potentialitynous,nomore.ButorAristotleitisasindestructibleasthehumanraceitsel,thoughocourseany individualspower tothinkand reasonperisheswhentheydo.


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50 M.F.Burnyeat

32 hereispresumablytheexerciseotheintel-lectualunderstandingsigniiedby.Ipreservethetraditionaltranslationcontemplation,bothbecauseitsuggestsasurveyoresultsalreadywon(orinGodscase,alwaysknown)ratherthanreshexploration,andromdeerencetothewordsorigin(welltracedbyNightingale)intheritesoviewingasacredspectacle.BarnesreplacedSmithstheactivityomindorintellectualapprehensionbythinkingandrelecting.

33 In Hicks,Smith andTheiler the singularbecomesthepluralthemselves.ThesingularshouldstandintheEnglishbecause inmortalhumansistheintermittentexerciseothedisposi-tionalunderstandingcalled :theyareone

andthesamestateattwolevelsoactuality.34 Hicks renders asreasoninghere,

tokeepthinkingromturninguponbothsidesothecontrastalthoughthinkingwasthewordheusedorat408b14.Hamlynleavesuswithanunexplainedcontrastbetweenthoughtandthinking.Barnessimplyrepeatsthinking,

which in Smiths original stood in contrastto .Rossad loc.,surprisedatthewayAristotlegroupswithloveandhateasa eatureothecompositerationalanimal,ratherthanwith alone,venturesanunlikelyexplanation:Perhapshedoesthisbecausehethinksoreasoningasgettingatleastoneoitspremisesby

sense-perception.35 Alternatively,isthephilosophicalimperect,reairmingwhatwassaidat408b25-7(soTricot,Barbotin).


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3 Seen.32above.37 Mybracketsinseparate(d)donotindicatealterna-tivemeaningsobutalternativeEnglishexpressionsorasinglemeaning,asexplainednn.48and54below.

38 Inthelightothepairing atIII3,427a18-19andb7-11,Itakethetwoverbs ... to

contrastastheoreticaltopracticalknowledge.Smithchoosesthinkorboth and ,andproceedstoturnthechapterintoastudyothinkinginsteadointellectualknowledgeorunderstanding.

39 Rossinhissummaryswitcheshereromthinkingtoknowingandthentoreason(p.289).

40 Understandshereistobetakenashasthecapacitytounderstand,astheollowingsentenceconirms.41 ThesameclaimwasalreadymadeatDA II5,417a

21-7,thoughwiththesimplerexamplesoreadingandwriting;c.my(2002),48-9withn.59.

42 Alexander,De anima libri mantissa110.4-,withZellerscompellingemendation or

.43 Aristotlepositsamediumortasteandtouchaswellasorthedistancesenses.Thisenableshimtoarguethattheheartwithin,nottongueoringertip,istheorganotasteandtouch.FordetaileddiscussionImayreertoBurnyeat(1995)onAristotle,ollowedbymy(2001b)onAquinasinsightulresponse.

44 FordetaileddiscussionolightandthemediumovisioninAristotle,seemy(1995),422-7.

45 Fordeenceothisclaim,andrebuttalotheideathatAristotlescross-reerenceswitnesstothechro-nologyohiswriting,seeBurnyeat2001a,chap.5.


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52 M.F.Burnyeat

4 ForavigorousdeenceotheMSS,excisedbyRoss,seeCaston(1999),205-7.Thewordisansweredbyat430a13.

47 Notmatteroreachthingoagivenkind(Wedin172).

48 atline13parallels atline10andsomustbeequallygeneral:itcannot

mean,whatitissootenassumedtomean,e.g.byRoss(191),45,intheindividualsoul;similarlywithoutargument,alas,Aquinas,in Ar. DALectioX.ThepointiswellarguedbyCaston(1999),205-.

49 Itaketheparticipialcausetobeexplanatoryothethreeeaturesjustlisted:eachrulesoutsometypeopotentiality(whichinturnrequiresthat

mustmeanseparate,notseparable!).Thisspeaksor

actualityastherighttranslationoirstinstanceor(c.Met.,1071b19-20).Whetherthatactualityisbestglossedasactivityisanissuethatcannotbedecidedjustonthebasisotheexiguoustextbeoreushere.ItiswelltobearinmindENVII14,1154b:Ithereissomebeingwhosenatureissimple,thesamemodeoactionwillbecontinuously

andinthehighestdegreepleasurabletoit.HenceGodenjoyseverlastinglyonepurepleasure.Forthereisactualitynotonlyochangebutalsoorest,andpleasureconsistsratherintranquillitythaninchange( , ).(Tr.aterGrant.)

50 Itishardtoread43018sasareasonwhythisnoushasthecharacteristicsjustlisted,butitcouldinsteadgivetheauthorsreasonortellingusaboutthecharacteristicsithas:Denniston0-1.


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51 isexpresslyaxiological;Wedinssupe-rior(p.182)isinsuicient.52 Iproposethatiswellchosentosuggest

,intheuniverseatlarge,therebylendingpointinthiscontextto ... at430a19-22,whichRosseditio maior(notminor)insistsonbracketing.HisgroundsaregiveninhisnoteadIII5,430a19-22,andtheollow-upnote adIII7,431a1-3:thewordsinterruptthediscussionotheActiveintellectinIII5,whereasIII7,where ...recurwithadierentsequel,isanywayacol-lectionoscrapsandthereisnocontinuoussequenceothoughttointerrupt.TheobjectionailsithesamewordscanbeoundrelevanttoIII5aswell.Isuggestthat430a22 ...ispreciselywhat

doesmakethemrelevanttotheActiveIntellect.53 Isupplyassubjectheretheonlythingowhich

Aristotlecouldthinkthepredicatetrue.54 Theaoristparticipleneednomoreimplyapast

actoseparatingthandoesthestatementMarseillesisseparatedromParisbyagreatdistance;Caston(1999),208,aptlycitesI1,403a145,asaparallel

whereapastseparationreadingowouldmakenonsense.Giventheollowingexclusionoall but essential properties, the everything elsethedivine nousisseparatedrommustinclude,appropriatelyenough,separationromaccidentalproperties.

55 Caston(1999),213-5,proposestotranslate

asthat,notbecause,therebydiusingcenturiesocontroversy.Ingenious,buthow,evenintheheatodebate,couldanycompetentstudentoAristotleorgetthatanythingwhichisisthereby andvice versa?Thelackomemorytesti-


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54 M.F.Burnyeat

iestoanimportantsenseinwhichthelieotheintellectisnot ours,notpartoourpersonallie.MetaphysicsL9rathersuggeststhat,totheextentthatwebecameGodorawhile,wewerethedivineintellectunderstandingitselfasthatwhichunder-standsall.

5 Here Smith and Barnesagreeon without this,nothingthinks,whichimpliesthatno-onecandrawupashoppinglistwithouttheaidoaneternalintellect.

57 ThedamagedonebyblindinglightisotenurgedagainstmyclaimthatorAristotlenormalseeingrequiresnomaterialchangeintheorgan(e.g.Lear,114-115).TheobjectionisanalogoustoBerkeleysnotoriousargumentthat,becauseblindinglight

producespaininthemind,ordinarycoloursarealsointhemind.

58 Brentano,p.24,ulminatingagainstZeller.59 Kuressisauseul,manageablybrieaccountothe

longhistoryointerpretationsoDA III5.0 Thanksareowed(a)totheaudienceswithwhom

overtheyearsIhavesharedthoughtsandstrugglesonthetopicothislecture,atAnnArbor,Berkeley,Budapest,Cambridge,Fribourg,Pittsburgh,Prague,andPrinceton,(b)toMichaelFrede(inhis199aandelsewhere)andVictorCaston(inhis1999paper)ortheirencouragementtojoininthetaskoresurrectingalongneglectedinterpretationoDA III5.


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BibliographyBarbotin,E.SeeJannone,A.Barnes,J.SeeSmith,J.A.Brentano,Franz.The Psychology of Aristotle.InParticular

HisDoctrineotheActiveIntellect.WithanAppendixConcerningtheActivityoAristotlesGod.EditedandtranslatedbyRolGeorge.Berkeley,LosAngeles

&London:UniversityoCaliorniaPress,1977Burnyeat,M.F.HowmuchhappenswhenAristotle

seesredandhearsmiddleC?RemarksonDe Anima2,78,inpaperbackeditionoEssays on AristotlesDe Anima,edd.MarthaC.Nussbaum&AmlieOksenbergRorty(Oxord:ClarendonPress,1995),42134

.A Map of Metaphysics Zeta.Pittsburgh:MathesisPublications,2001a.AquinasonSpiritualChangeinPerception,

inDominikPerlered.,Ancient and Medieval Theoriesof Intentionality(Leiden,BostonandCologne:Brill2001b),129153

.De AnimaII5.Phronesis47(2002),14.OntheSourceoBurnetsConstrualoApology

30b2-4:ACorrection.Journal of Hellenic Studies125(2005),139-142

Caston, Victor. AristotlesTwo Intellects: A ModestProposal.Phronesis44(1999),199-227

.TheSpiritandtheLetter:AristotleonPer-ception.InRicardoSallesed.,Metaphysics, Soul andEthics: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji(Oxord

UniversityPress,2004),245-320Denniston,J.D.The Greek Particles.Oxord:Clarendon

Press,1934


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Frede,Michael(199a).Lathoriearistotliciennedelintellectagent.InRomeyer-Dherbey&Vianoedd.(1999b),377-390

. Aristotles Rationalism. In Michael Frede&GiselaStrikeredd.,Rationality in Greek Thought(ClarendonPress:Oxord,199b),157-173.

Grant,SirAlexander.The Ethics of Aristotle.Illustratedwith Essays and Notes. 2 vols. 4th edn., revised.

London:Longman,Green&Co.,1885Hadot,Pierre.Laconceptionplotiniennedelidentit

entrelintellectetsonobjet:PlotinetleDe AnimadAristote. In Romeyer-Dherbey & Viano edd.,37-37

Hamlyn,D.W.Aristotles De Anima Books II and III.TranslatedwithIntroductionandNotes.Clarendon

Press:Oxord,198Hicks, R.D.Aristotle De Animawith Translation,Introduction and Notes. Cambridge UniversityPress,1907

Jannone,A.Aristote. De lme.TextetabliparA.Jan-none;TraductionetNotesdeE.Barbotin.Paris:LesBellesLettres,19

Kuress,Hans.Zur Geschichte der Erklrung der aristo-telischen Lehre vom sog. und.Diss.Tbingen,1911.ReprintedinGreek and Roman Philosophy: A Fifty-Two VolumeReprint Set,ed.LeonardoTarn.NewYork&London:GarlandPublishing,1987

Lear,Jonathan.Aristotle: the desire to understand.Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1988

Nightingale,Andrea.Spectacles of Truth in Classical GreekPhilosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context.CambridgeUniversityPress,2004


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Ritter, B. Die Grundprincipien der arist. Seelenlehre.Diss.Jena1880Rodis-Lewis, Genevive. Descartes: Meditationes de

Prima Philosophia/ Mditations Mtaphysiques.TextelatinettraductionduDucdeLuynes.Introductionetnotes.Paris:Vrin,197

Romeyer-Dherbey,Gilbert&Viano,Cristina,edd.,Corps et me: sur le De Anima dAristote.Paris:Vrin,199

Ross,W.D.Smith,JohnAlexander(183-1939).InL.G.Wickhamed., Dictionary of National Biogra-

phy 1931-1940 (Oxord University Press, 1949),819-20

.Aristotelis De Anima. Recognovit breviqueadnotationeinstruxit.OxordUniversityPress,195

[Rosseditio minor].AristotleDe Anima.Edited,withIntroductionand Commentary. Oxord University Press, 191[Ross,editio maior]

.Aristotle,Metaphysica. The Works of AristotleTranslated into English under the Editorship of W.D.Ross.Oxord:ClarendonPress,1928.

Siwek,Paulus.Aristotelis Tractatus De Anima.Edidit,ver-sionelatinaauxit,commentarioillustravit.Collectiophilosophicalateranensis.Rome:Descle,195

Smith,J.A. OnGeneralRelative Clauses inGreek.Classical Review31(1917),9-71

. De Anima.TheWorksoAristotletranslatedunderthegeneraleditorshipoW.D.Ross.Vol.III.Oxord:ClarendonPress,1931

Smith,J.A.&JonathanBarnes.Aristotle on the Soul.TheCompleteWorksoAristotle.TherevisedOxordTranslation.2vols.PrincetonUniversityPress,1984.[BasedontheGreektextoRoss,editio minor]


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Theiler, Willy.Aristoteles. ber die Seele. bersetzt.Berlin:AkademieVerlag,1959Tricot, J.Aristote De Lme. Traduction nouvelle et

notes.Paris:Vrin,1947Wedin,Michael.V.Mind and Imagination in Aristo-

tle.NewHaven &London:Yale University Press,1988


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The Aquinas LecturesPublishedbytheMarquetteUniversityPressMilwaukeeWI53201-3141

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2 The Aquinas Lectures 1937-2008

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The Aquinas Lectures 1937-2008 3

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TheAnnualSt.ThomasAquinasLectureSeriesbeganat Marquette University in the spring o1937.Idealorclassroomuse,libraryadditions,orprivatecollections,theAquinasLectureSerieshasreceivedinternationalacceptancebyscholars,

universities,andlibraries.Hardboundinmaroonclothwithgoldstampedcovers.Uniormstyle.Some reprints with sot covers. Complete set(ISBN0-8742-150-X)receivesa40%discount.New standing orders receive a 30% discount.Regularreprintingkeepsallvolumesavailable.

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