\JNlVERSilY OF GEORGIA ltBRARIU

/~OTES ON BOOKS

ETA AND THETA

OF

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

being the record

by

MYLES BURNYEAT and others

of a seminar held in London, 1979-1982

i.

PREFACE

This monograph is a sequel to Notes on Zeta, published in 1979

by the Oxford Philosophy sub-Faculty. The London Group, started by

G.E.L. Owen in 1976, and described by Christopher Kirwan in the preface

to Notes on Zeta, has continued its discussions of the text of Aris­

totle's Metaphysics in the Institute of Classical Studies in Gordon

Square, and we were encouraged, by reviewers of Notes on Zeta among

others, to publish the record of our discussions of Books Eta and Theta.

The form in which the material is presented is much the same as

before. No major revisions have been made; but I have rearranged

some of the material so as to bring together all the discussions of

a given passage of the text (and accordingly deleted references to

the dates on which the sessions occurred), and tried to achieve some

consistency of presentation; but some inconsistencies remain - for

example in the transliteration of Greek words.

The majority of the minutes of sessions are the work of Myles

Burnyeat, and a substantial number of others are by Bob Sharplesi others

were recorded by Lesley Brown and Alan Lacey. Apart from those per-

sons, the meetings were attended fairly regularly by Julia Annas, Bob

Heinaman, Gerald Hughes, Christopher Kirwan, Jonathan Lear, Geoffrey

Lloyd, Malcolm Scholfield, Richard Sorabji, Julius Tomin, Kathleen

Wilkes, and Michael Woodsi and most of them were presided over by Gwilym

Owen.

A focus to our discussions was given by some characteristically

incisive and challenging Introductory Notes on individual chapters

circulated or tabled by Gwilym Owen. These have been included in

this Monograph in the appropriate place, as have been contributions

by Bob Heinaman, Richard Sorabji and Bob Sharples. There is also

included a paper read to one session by Sarah Waterlow, though, of

course, the full development of her ideas on the subject of the paper

can now be found in her Passage and Possibility (Oxford, 1982).

The meetings of the Group that discussed these two books of the

Metaphysics took place between May

our discussions of Book Theta were

1979 and November 1982. Thus,

almost complete when Gwilym Owen

died in July 1982. We should like to dedicate this Monograph to his

memory. The debt to him, as the person who established the London

Group and presided over it for seven years is only one of many that

we, like so many other Aristotelian scholars, owe to him.

clay 1984 MICHAEL WOODS

ii.

ABBREVIATIONS

The works of Aristotle are sometimes referred to by the following

abbreviations:

An. Post. or A. PQ.

An. Prior

Cat.

De Gen. An. or GA

De Gen. et Corr. or G&C

De Int.

DMA

De Mem.

E.E.

E.N.

Met.

neteor.

PA

Parv. Nat.

Phys.

Rhet.

So ph. El. or SE

Top.

Posterior Analytics

Prior Analytics

Categories

De Generatione Animalium

De Generatione et Corruptione

De Interpretatione

De Motu Animalium

De Memoria

Eudemian Ethics

Nicomachean Ethics

Metaphysics

Meteorologic a

De Partibus Animalium

Parva Naturalia

Physics

Rhetoric

De Sophisticis Elenchis

Topics

Capital Greek letters refer to books of the Metaphysics unless

otherwise specified.

Unprefixed page numbers, as in 'l019a 10' refer to the Metaphysics.

Other references:

Ackrill

Apostle

Bonitz

Aristotle's Categories and De­Interpretatione, translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill, Oxford, 1963.

Aristotle's Metaphysics, trans­lated with commentaries by Hippo­crates G. Apostle, Indiana, 1966.

Index Aristotelicus, H. Bonitz, Berlin 1870.

•lr

Aristotelis netaphysica, H. Bo­nitz, Bonn 1848-9.

D.K.

Jaeger

Kirwan

Oxford translation

Ps. Alexander

Reale

Ross

The convention has usually been Greek words without inverted commas.

111.

Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz, Berlin. 1903.

Aristotelis Metaphysica, W.Jaeger, Oxford Classical Texts, 1957.

Aristotle, Metaphysics translated with notes by Christo­pher Kirwan, Oxford 1970.

Volume VIII (Metaphysica, trans­lated W.D. Ross) in The Works of Aristotle translated into English, Oxford 1928.

Commentary on Z (in fact by a later hand) in Alexander of Aphro­disias, In Aristotelis Metaphy­sica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin 1891.

Aristotelis, la Metafisica, tra­duzione, introduzione e commento, Giovanni Reale, Loffredo 1968.

Aristotle's Metaphysics, text and commentary, W.D. Ross, Oxford 1924.

followed of writing mentioned

CHAPTER

l042a 3-24 The first sentence as placed strongly suggests we are

to have a summary of Z, but the next jolts our expectations. Where

was it e[pT'J'ta.l. that the object of enquiry is the causes and principles

and elements of substance? Not Zl (~ Ross). Not El (Apostle),

which seeks principles and causes of 'tciiv Ov-rwv as including not just

substances but everything. r l-2 (cf. l003b 18)? A 1-2 fits better

still, offering several parallels to what is to come in Hl.

Further difficulties: (1) 1C42a 6-10 goes against Zl6 on parts

and the elements ('agreed by all' might mean 'agreed by all but the

speaker' but l042a 24 resumes talk of agr~ed substances as if the list

had not contained controversial items). (2) It seems remarkably

bland to set 'tC fiv eTvcu. and b1toxeC~evov side by side as cases of sub­

stance which are established by argument I which are arrived at by

consideration of what people will say under dialectical pressure.

It is going back to where we started out at the beginning of Z3, before

the hard work of Z was done. Still worse (3) to conjoin these with

genus and universal. If the latter also are cases of substance esta­

blished by argument ( a:x:~.wQ' it is not by Ar I 5 arguments in z, nor

even by his opponents 1 arguments in Z. For these do not urge that

genus is more substance than £roo,, universal more than particular

( 1038b 7 is the nearest parallel but not ~ood enough). You really

have to go back to B for that line of argument.

sible to take xa.e6Xou "= yfvo,, 1:Wv xa.e'~,QC"'t'a.

15 advance just one case of substance, not two.

[It was thought pos­

c!6wv so that 14-

If, however, two

cases are intended, there is a problem as to how a single argument

can yield both: e.g. definability selects universal over particular,

plus Forms (1. 16), but not genus over eT6o<;. Further, the two case

reading would break with the narrower use of x.ae6Aou as found in Zl3.]

More generally, (4) nothing is said to recall the challenge to Uxox£(­

f..l.£vov as substance (27-8 blandly accepts UXn with a justification

in terms of the actual/potential distinction to which again nothing

in Z corresponds). Nothing recalls Z 7-9. The hard work on essence

h"as disappeared from memory. The conclusion of Zl7 has gone for nought.

! 042a 3

But now, having got to tile point of being ready to consider chat

1042a 3-24 may not be a summary of Z (we even tried, without plausible

success, to make 1042a J-4 look ahead rather than back), one meets

the unmistakable backreferences L!.WpL<T't"aL (1. 18), 7!;Ept )J.lpout;; ?iv

!6etv (l. 20 ) . The second is especially telling because nowhere

else in the corpus is there anything like the discussion in Zl0-11.

Again, 21-2, denying that universal or genus is substance, fits 213.

So what we seem to have is (a) a summary of Z which (b) is not

the sort of summary that a careful reader of Z would expect. Possible

conclusions: (1) the summary is an ~ditor's connecting work (Andro-

nicus is known to have indulged in such). (2) There was a proto-

z without e.g. the critique of b~toxeC~evov, which adhered more closely

than our z to the 'keep all candidates but universal in play' line

'../hich predominates in H 1 (cp. the Hay 24 starts as if essence was

merely the next candidate on a list of equals, without recognition

of Z3's elimination of b1toxECI-1£VOv/\SAT')). Problem: '.Yhat is then left

for proto-Z to C'1ntain? (3) Proto-Z = H: the editor got H and Z

in the -wrong order, put the hard work before the soft, and spliced

in the patchwork connection. ( 4) Z 'NBS essentially designed to remove

onesided overemphasizing of various candidates for substance, and that

done Ar leads off again on a positive note, not so much summarizing

z as reformulating the position he wants to start from after Z.

Note that some of these suggestions would have the consequence

that l042a 3-24 is no longer available as evidence for the 'be fair

to all candidates' interpretation of Z.

l042a 31-b 8 The argument is: ~).T] is olxYCa. because it is ~1toXeCJ.1evov­

as shown by a ~l!.z..:!. I type examination of change. (Phys. I type be­

cause tiXXoCu.x:r1.<; is the model, not Ar's alternative model of motion,

which concentrates on the continuity of xCvT')CTt.~ and is free of the

existential worries pressed by Elea.) Note that broxEC~evov Wt;; xn~a

<./>tE'p11(Y~v is not redundant: the subject in question is not the bronze

as such but the bronze as unshaped.

r"heir previous roles.

vUv - ~dALv in 1042b 2-3 switch

fhe thesis at 1042 b 3-4 is not that substantial change is presup-

posed by the others, which would contradict 5-6, but that it entails

the others, i.e. any substance which comes to be is liable to the other

3 types of change. Surprisingly perhaps, this thesis looked to be true.

Attention was called to M 1076a 8-10, where Ar says that the sub­

stance of perceptible things has been explained in two stages: matter

in the Physics, substance as actuality later ( OOn:pov ). Rose~

refers later to ZH9, but wl}ile a concern with substance as actuality

is the mark of H, it is conspicuously not a mark of z. On the other

hand, Ml fits well as looking back to Hl (which itself refers forward

to M at 1042a 22-3), while HI in turn looks back to ~. (1042b 8).

Could there have been at some time a course which went from (some of)

~- via H (±e) to M? The difficulty we had in relating Hl to z would then be due to Z having been grafted on to H, with the help of

the one bit of decent Z-summary provided in Hl, viz. 1042a 17-22. (Fur­

ther evidence that Hl is patched together might be seen in the fact

that within the space of a few lines we are in effect twice (a 11-

12, 23-4) given the information that some people hold that Forms and

mathematicals are substances.) The objection that H3 1043b 16-18

refers back to Z7-9 was met with the reply (a)

occurs in a passage usually thought to be highly

that the reference

parenthetical, (b)

that Z 1-9 are anyway to be regarded as having been pressed into z from

another context (see Notes on Zeta p.54). The question was also raised

whether the fact that 'substance as actuality' is not part of the wor­

king vocabulary of Z would prevent Ar using it to refer to his dis­

cussions in z. The suggestion was noted rather than accepted, but it seemed to

raise interesting questions about how an Aristotelian 'course' should

be conceived. For the more patching together of material we find,

the stronger the presumption that Ar is his own tailor.

1042b 5 6uot'v : what other change is such that yEverrL<:;;/tpBopci. tloes not

follow it? None in Ar's scheme of things, but the rarefaction and

condensation of Anaximenes' air would serve.

b 7-8 The reference to ~· V. I may be editorial, but perhaps a

I 042a Jl

1!)42b 7 ;!OfES ·)N ETA

linking to the f._!!.~. might alleviate some of the pro h) ems of linking

Ht to Z.

CHAPTER II

l042b 9-25 The long list of differentiae at 15 ff. is structured as

follows: under which are subsumed xp~ L

(rhough xpC<rLc; usually contrasts •..Jith O""l>v6e:cn.c; - see Ross' note), 6e:cr)..liil

,,, J<).dcx:n 'to6'twv (concluding the subsection) (b) et<rEL, (c) xp6v<Jl•

(d) 't6"'J'• (e) the last section on xae'Tl 21-s summed up by Ohulc; b-xe:p·-

ox;;'!/ lA.\e:C+£L,which last therefore refers to the note and the less

(rather than excess defect) in qualities (cf. differentiation by the

~ore and the less in Ar 1 s biology).

This open-ended list compares with Democritus 1 three geometrical

d.tfferentiae (unlike Plutarch, Ar makes no mention of the weight of

aroms). dS illustrated by the letters of the alphabet in Met. A4.

These distinguish kinds of atom and atomic .:trrangments, so only indi­

rectly microscopic types of thing, ~1t this ~auld he entirely relevant

to Ar 1 s discussion if he is concerned with something closer to real

rhan to nominal (linguistic) definition. ~ow, is it part of the ordi-

nary speaker's notion of a book that it is constituted by gluing p~pyrus

sheets to one another to make a roll? If not, a more theoretical

rype of definition is indeed to the point. Democritus can tell you

of the atomic constitution which makes stone, or which makes something

soft enough to eat, but his story cannot differentiate hetween threshold

and lintel, breakfast and dinner, nor presumably between other, scienti­

~-ic 'lll y more significant, examples.

l'l42b 25-l043a l Is a6't6 in l7 an objection to the account offered

hy •)•..;en in 'Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', to r;he effect that

~he passage is giving an explanation of existence claims for specimen

.ingular subjects (a particular threshold. etc.)? It is an objection

if, oU66c;; being masculine, o6't6 introduces a different subject, viz.

r he \)).11 . But r:t6~6 can pick up a masculine subject, and if Ar ~'aS

<:HAPTER 2 1042b 25

analyzing what it means to say of a stone that it is a threshold, of

some water that it is ice, etc., he would not need a different

in each case ('Snares' p. 81).

Owen's story requires not only singular subjects but also a tens,ed

e~~, to avoid the charge that the analysis makes 'X Err~~· tautological

(for if 'The ice on the pond is no longer solidified' is not self­

contradictory, 'The ice on the pond is {now] solidified' is not a tau to-

logical analyzans for 'The ice on the pond exists'). Some qualms

were felt about Ar giving no explicit indications either of his subjects'

singularity or of his relying on the present tense. However, the

perfect tense 7t£1tuxvUxr6a.L• etc., goes some way to ease both difficul-

ties. Ar is generalizing over singular statements such as 'The ice

on the pond exists', not analyzing the general statement 'Some ice

exists'. Thus ~xa.crtov at l043a 3 is specimen particulars, not species.

At the generalizing level there remains the problem that 'no ice exists 1

should be contingent, while 'No ice is ice 1 would appear to be self-

contradictory in a logic which has 'All A is A' as a theorem. But

NB it was a main thesis of 'Snares' that in the present context neither

'The ice on the pond exists' nor the generalization 'Ice exists' is

to be rendered, tenselessly, by the existential quantifier.

l043a 2-7 These lines encapsulate the difficulties of the chapter,

difficulties which come to a head when one inquires into the reference

of ~v ~o6'toL~ (a 3), 1:o61:wv (a 3), o66~v 'tOU'tWV (a 4).

Ross translated: 'We must seek in these differentiae (lv ~ol>~oLc;;)

what is the cause of the being of each of these things (-rol>-roov = thres-

hold, etc.). Now none of these differentiae ( ob5£v "tol>-rwv is sub-

stance 1 • In the end we preferred this to the alternative of trying

to 'llake all three references to be to the threshold and other examples

of things differentiated by the differentiae. For on the latter rea-

ding abo-Ca. (a 4) means substance in the Cat. sense of primary substance.

and it is hard then to make sense of <Juv6ua1:,61J,£vov or -tO &.vtiXoyov

lv tx60""'ttp.

The attempt to_ find an alternative reading to Ross' had been moti­

vated by a worry about its being implausible to have Ar recommend that

we look for substance tbc;; lvtpye:La lv ~oU~o&.c;; = among the type of dif-

l04Ja 2

~crentiae listed ~arlier. ' 1hat c11ance 11..1s -~ven a tarted-up version

of Democritus of explaining real Aristotelian substances (living organic

things), not merely artefacts and such thin;s as the ice on the pond?

(~ate that at l042b 31 hand and foot, which hut for their incompleteness

would be proper substances, only get ln on an abstract promise of 'other

differentiae'.) What would it take to redo the argument of 1042b

ll-43a 1 in terms of proper substances? For Ar to turn round in a

4 and say that o66Ev -to6-rwv is substance only seemed to make matters

worse. What, in that case, is the point of 1042b ll-43a l, '>Jhich

must appear something of a digression if all it leads to is a lame

admission that we're still a good way off our goal of discovering the

o~o-Ca c:,, lvtpyELC1 of sensible things (1042b 10-11)?

These worries can be alleviated conjointly by a closer under­

standing of the sequence of thought tn l043a 2-7, read in accordance

with the Ross translation. The limitations of the threshold type

of example are already acknowledged by1:~6~wy a 3: in these differentiae

(tv 't'OU-tat.C:) seek the a.f'tt.OV 'tOU erva.c. of these examples, although

of course (a 4) finding the ~t'tt.ov 'ton eTv~L of these examples is not

finding substance proper (for these examples are not - in the other

sense nf 'substance' - proper substances). Nevertheless, given that

substance is at-eCa. 1'oU eTvaL (a 2), finding the a.r-e1.ov 'toU e:!va.L of

these examples is finding what in them is anaJogous to substance (a

5). It is laying bare a structure which, when transferred to real

substances, will put us on the track, not of these illustrative dif­

ferentiae, but of the differentiae which are the object of our search.

The steps towards this general interpretation go as follows. l042b

l1-43a 1 i.s an essay on <ipx11l ~oil o!vC1L (b 32-3), one of its chief

lessons being that there are a good deal more of these than Dernocritus'

three (on the importance of nnmbers, see below). This turns out to

be closely relevant to the theme-question of the chapter, 'What is

f)Ua-Co &>c;; tvtpye:Ln of sens~ble things?', when we are reminded (a 2) rhat substance ~s a('tCa. 't'OU e:lva.t. (cf. Zl7). !';ranted that (e;Lx.e:p),

it is clear from the earlier remarks (a 2) that it is to differentiae

!_hat we must look: to these differentiae for the crJ1:1. OV 'tOU erva.L

Jf these examples, to others for that of other examples.

~ext (a 4) the saving qualification: none of these differentiae

are properly substance. 0~;6£ tJ'1lv6~6j.!£vov (a) 'nor /nor even is

CHAPTER 2

~ny coupling of them', or (b) 'nor/nor even when coupled ~ith matter'

(Ross), this latter to be understood either (i) in terms of a particu­

lar bit of matter, or (11) in terms of a sort of matter such as gets

into the definitions of Zl0-11 and those here at 7-11.

does function as a technical term for 'T60e l.v 'tii>Oe at ZS 1030b 16,

3la 6, but it also applies to coupling generally. Against (a} (with

or without 'even') is the consideration that it is hard to see how cou-

pling the illustrative differentiae might be thought to improve the

chance of achieving substance proper. Against (b) (i) is the conside-

ration that it would involve switching mid-sentence to another sense

of o~uCa. to get in a denial that the concrete whole is o60""Ca.. Con-

tinuing then with (b) (ii) (which could, if necessary, bear 'nor even':

water thickened does look somewhat more substantial than thickening

by itself), how do we construe ~b <ivdXoyov !v hdo-~'1' (a 5)? The sub-

ject is easily got from o()Otv 't'OU't'oov: the differentia in some specimen

case. This is not substance but it is nevertheless, says Ar, what

is analogous to substance (weakened by Bonitz to 'etwas ana loges',

tempting Jaeger to write 1:1. for 1:6, but Ale enforces 't6- see Jaeger's

apparatus).

Next (a 5-7) the analogy is spelled out (no need to be disturbed

by the fact that the case of proper substances is placed first): 'as

in substance that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality

itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full

actuality'. So Ross, but how does he get the idea of approximation

out of (not W~ eLd'XL<r'tC1 but) .-1'XL<r'tC1? It won't do to leave j.jd.'A..L<T"t'a

unsupplemented, for then Ar would be saying that you get the best cases

of actuality in the examples which are not proper substances. So

supplement as follows: in the other definitions (that which is predi­

cated of the matter is) J,!d:Ac.crta. (the actuality itself) ,i.e. as compared

with other elements in the definition it is what is predicated of the

matter which is most of all the actuality. In context this implies

that the item in question is the closest you will get to actuality

without the idea of approximation having to come into the meaning of

eLd'XLcrra..

To sum up: '"e won't dignify every differentia with the title

0f substance or actuality (the et'?tep clause of a 2 is not convertible),

l04Ja

Jl'C::-J :N t.TA

but since the differentia is the a.r·uov tuU el'.la.L , as is shown suffi­

ciently clearly by the threshold type of example, and since the of>crCa.

are seeking, vtz. o6aCa. We;, S.vtpye:~a., is a.l"tCa. "taU eTva.L• we must

look for of>o-Ca. We; lvE'pyeLa. in the differentia which a definition dis­

plays as predicate of the matter.

1043a 7-11 This doctrine is then exemplified in some specimen defini­

tions, three of which (threshold, house, ice) reaffirm the relevance

of 1042b 11-lda 1. That being so, methodologically no doubt the chap-

ter is an example of Ar progressing from things yvWpqJ.a. +n.itV to things

Proper substances are what we want to understand,

but the structure whereby to understand them is more accessible to

us in familiar, not to say homely, examples like the threshold of our

house and the ice on the road outside.

1043a 12-14 So we come to the main conclusion of the chapter. There

is no one answer to the question 'What is substance as actuality?'

(nor a mere three answers as Democritus supposed), but as many as the

differentiae which our definitions connect with the equally various

types of matter. On the variety of the types of matter, note that

a lO-ll includes the high-low range of sound as matter in the definition

of <J"U~<pWV Ca. But presumably we do not want to stop the same matter

connecting with different differentiae, as e.g. a stone can become

either a threshold or a lintel (l042b 19). Likewise, a given ~

0f actuality, such as o-6v9£cnc; or 1-1t~t.' (a 13), will admit of different

realizations (cf. a 10-11: .'te?tuxv~tvov ~- 1-1n;t.c; ~ ). liA.AT1

5,),.'X.n<;;: at a 12 is thus vague, but 1042b 31-6 shows Ar interested in

a systematic classification of differentiae under their most general

'(~VT1.

·~\\n <i.").hll<: is vague in another •,o~ay again. The interpretation

so far defended would not like Ar to state his conclusion in terms

Lmplyin~ that every definition, including those of proper substances,

·<Jill rely on a differentia drawn from the sensible contrarieties and

modes 11f arran~ement, etc., \Ve have been working with. Does 5.\A.o 'tl.

tWv e:lon1Jtvwv (a 14) imply that? [t need not. a l3's yd.p shows

C:HAPTER l 1tJ43a l2

that 13-14 serve to recap the grounds for the main conclusion of 12-

13, and the grounds are indeed to be found in the preceding analysis

of the illustrative examples. We can suppose that ~wv ~tv ... 'tWv 6' ..•

~wv 6l gives a summary coverage of all the illustrative examples without

having to suppose that it thereby covers all the examples there are.

General points

side one takes

( 1) All this can be said without prejudice to which

on the question whether the essay on d.pxa.C "tOU eTva.Lat

l042b ll-43a 1 is about existence or the copula. We noted, however,

that the shift to the notion of what something is at 7-11 need be no

embarrassment to Owen's existence story. The conn2:ction between what

it is for a patch of ice to exist and what sort of thing ice as such

is is explicitly drawn at a 2: the olxTC« displayed in a definition

of ice precisely is the o('tCa. -ro1'S e!va.L, what you get when you say

what it is for a patch of ice to exist (so 'Snares', p. 82). This

is a substantive thesis, and moreover it is a thesis that has to be

understood, as Ar would understand it, with some appropriate restriction

on the range of terms for which it is claimed true. For it is not

the case that the definition of bachelor tells you what it is for a

bachelor to exist; a bachelor does not cease to exist when he ceases

to be an unmarried man.

(2) The chapter began by throwing the emphasis

on the potentiality-actuality distinction, picking up on H1 1042a 27-

8. If this is to be the route whereby we will make some advance on

Z, or at least, more neutrally, if it is in terms of potentiality and

actuality that H is to make its contribution, one might expect the

distinction to do some work in H2. But does it?

We start off promisingly enough, with out thoughts focussed on

the recipe for honey-water, or what you have to do to bits of papyrus

to make an actual book, or such natural processes as the formation

of ice. We seem to be thinking, by and large, in t~rms of the physical

affections or operations which are needed to make matter into a deter-

minate something. Which both makes it reasonable to start from Demo-

critus and holds out the promise that we shall find work for the con-

ll)41a 12

r:ept of actuality which could not be done just as well by the notion

of form or shape. But it was not clear to us, at the end of the day,

that he couldn't have said it all with the matter-form distinction.

The more dynamic aspect of the potentiality-actual! ty distinction has

not - as yet - come into play.

l043a 14-26 A coda to the chapter. That there are two elements is

a definition, one on the side of potentiality and the other on the

side of actuality, is illustrated by the way some people emphasize

one at the expense of the other when defining and others find a place

for both. 6•6 • which is why: it is because there are these two

elements that people define as they do (cf. 19-21).

at 12-13 explains this, and is thereby confirmed.

The conclusion

l043a 21-2 Archytas He is not credited with a theory of definition

(an early theory of definition which recognized both matter and form

would surely have featured prominently in Ar' s surveys of his prede­

cessors). but with accepting certain definitions which had both elements

in them. Are subsequent examples of still weather and a calm Archytan

(so Ross, Commentary p. 229 and DK 47A2)? Or should we think of some-

thing more mathematical such as 'a line is twoness in length' (cf.

1043a 34), which might be represented as an improvement on the traditio-

nal Pythagorean habit of defining things by numbers alone? It is

hard to believe that. if the cited definitions are his, they were of

interest to him for their own sake and not for their connection with

some wider thesis. ( .;,pe:~Ca. as olxrCa. (a 24) is no worse than many

another Aristotelian casualness, though Ps.-Alex. took the precaution

•Jf writing E!Oo~ instead. A different sort of casualness is seen

in the duplicated ~'tL of 1043a 2-3 - if we leave both in, with Ross,

tather than excise the second with Jaeger.)

Attent1on was called to DK 23A 23 (sequel in 58B 32 - cf. Burkart,

Lore dnd Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, 47 n. 106) where Eudemus

reports that Archytas made 'tO &.6pLO"''t'ov, 'tb &_v~a:~oy 9 and the like

J.l'tCa. XLvfp-eu.u;: which was better than Plato's identifying xCv"'")'"Lc; with

l0

these. This might indicate Archyta.s · <)tiginal interest lO d<.:!fining

VTJVE~-tCa. and yaA.fJvn. If calm is due to st lllness and evenness (cp.

6~-taA.6-rTJs 1043a 24 Hith -rO d.v~hov ~n Eudemus), then conversely uneven­

ness or indefiniteness of shape will '0xplain' motion - and the explana­

tion of motion was a subject nn •<~hich earlier Pythagoreans had had

embarrassingly little to say (990a 8-12). fhere would not, on this

suggestion, be any need for Archytas himself to have aimed at distin­

guishing matter and form (contra Burkart, 47), even embryonically.

It would even suit Ar's context better to have a pair of theory-innocent

definitions which ~~ theory of definition can explain.

lU43a 21

l043a 26-8 The search is over. AWe;; (a 27) corresponds to We; ox11 , etc.,

meaning 'in how many senses/ways it exists'.

CHAPTER [Il

1043a 29-b 4 Ar records that an a1nbiguity may lurk in words like 'house'

and 'line': :r"rl!-la.CvEL (29-30) is r:teaning, not reference, since the

evidence adduced is alternative definitions - 'A house is a shelter

of bricks and stones thusly arranged' vs. 'A house is a shelter'.

'A line is two in length' vs. 'A line is two'. So far dS H3 is con­cerned, it is a question whether in a given case this ambiguity lurks

(cp. Zll l037a 8 and the discussion in 211 of the definition 'A line

is two'), but where it does, something needs to be said about the rela-

tion between the two meanings. On the supposition (possibly counter-

36) that 'animal' is ambiguous between 'soul'

dnd 'soul in a body', the two kinds of thing ~alled animal are so called

not in virtue of a single definition but Ws "'tpbc;; ~v. The two kinds

are so called in relation to a single thing. ~ost of us agreed that

this was best construed without importing a third thing besides the

two kinds of ':tnimal'. Rather, one of the two definitions presupposes

ur makes reference to the other. ;.~hich is which?

(A) 'Soul' is included

be thought to imply that the

in 'soul in a body' , and 1043b 3-4 might

use of '::lan' to mean just 'soul' is some-

ll

,,-·iir:ary use of nan' to r:".t:!d.n h-'3

c-an only understand j'}St 'soul' if ,.,-e under-

-;tand this as secondary to <t,l,j der i'.''-~d (by ~oubtrdClion) from its use

::.o mean 'soul in a body'. -whiCll las~ ;__;;, t.her•:!iore che ~v in '0t; 1tpbc ~v.

(B) The claim that you do n·Jt ttnderstdnd c0mposite man = 'flesh

dlld bnnes animate in J. cerLain '.Hay' un1';3S _/Otl understand 'animate

in a certaln •..Jay', so that the prt•Jr :1.eantng of 'man' is just 'soul'.

r)bjection: that claim is the l.Jirn t~vn yuu .lo not undecstand composite

:tan unless you understand 'sou~, not che ..:ldim that you do nut under-

stand composite 'man' unless you ~tnd~cstand compos it!..'! 'man'. Reply:

if fiJU must understand 'soul'. chat precisely shows that you must under-

stand nonct)mposite 'man', th011gh IOU ,;,~ed not of co;1rse understand

it as the meaning of th1.t ·..;orr:l.. F1\L-ther tJroblem: ~vtll nut thi.i line

11f thought give us, '..lith ~qual validity, ..1 third :-:teaning of ';nan' ~

'flesh dnd bqnes'? Well, look dt 1'l_~ J2lh 20 ff.: flesh and bones

1nd ,~ach ,;!.' snch parts i.s 6vt-c0Y, :;ATlt:Ep 't,l.L tiUv O':f...\w\1 ·rWv tv bf..~ eT6o~

f:xOv-rwv· xa.l yO.p J, \))._., \.ty£'t"O.\. XC' ... ~ tO Er(sos lrd.p~ n ~cnoUv. Can we decide tetween (,\) il.i\l ( 8) by the in.}ependently puzzling

:-;tato2ment "l.t l~)43a 37-b i •bat Lhe ~henv~.nenon of ambi~uity (·ta:n'ta., 37)

lS fact irreif':vant to the -Lnquiry into ~;ensible substance? The

reason t;tven is that essence or 't·r,c: ·~)clongs to', ,.,r\uch :rtusc. here ;;1ean

'is identical \.J'ith 1, form and actuality. Does that indicate (a) that

because we are asking about ~ensiole substance we shall only be con-

C{~rned <Yith 'man' as •neanin~ tne •:Jmposite?

J.re .1sklng about :.>Ubstance as actuality ,_,,e

',,.ri~h 'man' as mt!aning form or soul? lhere

Or (b) that because we

shall ·1~1ly he concerned

was some Lnclination to

·narry (d) •r~ith (.-\),(b) with (B). ~o decision here.

\ ; hird no~sibility not ;:,)nsLiered is hat ·1hat W'e Uo not 'leed

LO settle for ')resent purposes l3 ·.;her:. her 'C~.nimal' 0r any oLher Hord

is 1.:1 tdCt J.!Ubi~UOUS l_fl tne r,tarmer ,;<etcned. ~~ad LU~Jb 2-4 as explai-

·~in~ that '..Je have a !Jerfectly .J,OIJd · . .;ccd for r:he form, \'iZ.. ',:;oul',

. ,nd '·-:an' for the composite, ·;o :Lc dnes :lot r:~att':r ·~-=- .Jn occasion 'man'

ts that 1C: 1db 6 presupposes che

C:(,JTL!-'1;:-,i~e definltion of 'house' "' ':;ht:lr-,er nf bricl<.s'.

r,(h,;'S Ar himself Lhin:t r-ilar 1n 1 rnal L> ,l.'lbi guous ~ La L.ll 1 ,-, 3 ?a 7

it is Sf)!Tie ~leople' ;vho r:hink 1 h,Jt SJLH\.'!S is his ">oul ,md import

an ambiguity into the name 'Socr:tces' (~B _::~ h Wuxf)again, l. 6). At

ZlO l036a 16-17 lt is Ar himself wno 2ntertai~s the thought that 'dnimal'

is .J.mbiguous, but dS a hypothetical supposj t inn (NB xa.(, 1.7 - these

xa.~'s support (A)).

with this problem:

The ~ passage remains to be considered, together

on the face of it the .1mbiguity thesis is simply

false, so v.•hy is it believed, 'vhether !Jy Ar or another? Or is it

less a thesis actually espoused than a consequence deducible (on Aris­

totelian principles) from the type of Platonist definition discussed

in Zll. Here, as elsewhere in the chapter, ,,..,e face questions about

the relation between H3 and ZlO-ll. Yet .1nother reading would be

that what is doubtful is which is the right definition, not whether

the term is ambiguous. (But then what would be the point of 36-7?)

The ambiguity thesis would commit one to ~he view Lha.t 'There's a man

in the house' is 4-ways ambiguous - ttnless it can happen that a given

sentential context ~t:l_ect~ one of the t::"NO meanings of the term. This

possiiJility is int~re"itingly '2xploitell in a p!lper by ~1.J. Lo•lx in !'!_ind,

.Jan. 1979.

1~43b 4-14 We approached this with some dismdy, but eventually con-

eluded that perhaps its bark was uorse than its bite. Ar's general

purpose seemed reasonably clear; the ctifftculties were those of detailed

lnterpretation. Ar seems to 11ake two main points: (a) Neither a

::r6v8EO'"I.C,: nor a iJ,tl;1.<; is simply a r:onjunction of the ingredients con­

cerned; when we have listed the ingredients, ·,..re have still to specify

·..;hat sort of a cr6v8e:rrt!; or )J.t'f;i.c; is tntended, e.g, in ~.;hat ratio.

(b) fhe crUv8£crLt; or tJ.L~"c; ;nust not he treated as itself an ingredient,

either in the mh:tt:re •,,rhicb it itself i.s or i~1 a sort of second-order

mixture whose in~redients are the first-order mixture and the original

ingredients. 7he point is s:lmildr ~o ;:hal '1lade 'lear the end of Z1.7

(l041.b 11 ff.), though ~e did not 9urs1te this in detatl, nor ~sk whether

it bore on the relations between L. <~nd H .

The ;Ttain questions of r!etail that puzzled us were these:

([) Does l:x have the sdme meaning throughout the passage, 0r

~loes it first '"'lean 'crHlsist 0f' (h 5) Jnd then 'h~ adequately defined

c3

1043b 4

in terms of (b 1 )? 'fhis Litter view enables che yd.p c2lause to g~ve

a reason for the one before it. Again at b~ Ar is presumably saying

,10 t that either a threshold or a iJOSition 1 COt1515tS in 1 the Other 1

but that reference to position is more important for understanding

threshold than reference to a threshold is Eor understanding position.

(104lb 23, incidentally, says that something could:1.'t be !:.x ( = consist

in?) jt1st one thing without being identical ~ith it.)

(2) Does 6~oCw' (b8) imply that all the ~ases that fail to do

so for the same reason? If we are right under ( 1) we can presumably

say yes, at any rate so far as the ensuing threshold example goes.

't'Wv O:XN..uv presumably refers to the cases mentioned at 1042b 15 f f ·

(cf. 1043a 7-12). o!,O!: Ot} introduces yet a not her kind of case, where

a genus and differentia are brou~ht in; but this sentence and the next

need a section to themselves.

(3) bl0-4 raises textual issues. Jaeger drops n olxrCo. at

bl2 (Christ dropped &xx• as r..;ell, but Jaeger thinks the oU'te: clause

requires ~XX'); he also reads abo-Ca.,, "tOU'to at bl3 (with Bonitz), and

drops o6 at b14, with some mss.; Alexander seems to support Jaeger

in the last two cases. (Jaeger's apparatus seems to attribute contra-

dietary readings to x; thoughx is a conjunction of two mss., E and

J, we wondered whether the first nccurrence of '-x' in the apparatus

was a misprint. J has ob unambiguously; E's position is less clear.)

Ross follows Jaeger's text in his translation. hut in his commentary

(and in his translation as revised for the l-::cKeon volume) he returns

to the traditional text.

from Alexander 1 s support,

All '"'e could find in Jaeger 1 s favour, apart

was the awkwardness of iS referring back to

an immediate preceding -11 o6o-Ca. • Alexander takes l:l;a~opoUv'te::c; with

-rt)v \5\:nv, but Ross thinks it irrelevant to br1ng in a reference to

people who ignore the matter; we agreed, and thought that if tt;nt.poUv't'e:c;

referred to a new group of people, as Alexander's view suggests, it

• ... mulct need ot before it. We therefore interpreted as follows: 'nor

is man animal - two-footed, but [if people 3hould think he is, they

~wuld find that] something else Ls needed, if these (animal and two-

footed) are matter - somethin~ which neither 1s nor consists of an

element, but substance, which such peonle would be ignoring, mentioning

unly the matter. So if this (additional element:.) is responsible for

b~ing, and this is 511bstance, they would not be stating the substance

itself'. Since Ar himself does not think of animal + two-footed as

the matter, we wanted to make the sentence, from AX\.d. 1'1. onwards, coun­

terfactual, despite the indicative 6e:t; the solution given would be

not Ar' s but one forced on anyone who thought man was dnimal ... two-

footed. We thought e:( 'taU6'\SXTJ perhaps justified such an interpreta-

tion.

1043b 14-23 The ground for treating these lines as parenthetical is

that Wo"te in 23 related to 4-14 (so Ross ad 23-5); but there may be

questions to raise about this in due course.

The context of the passage was discussed in the light of R. Heina­

man' s paper 1 Aristotle

1 s Tenth Aporia'. Two main theses of that paper

were taken up: ( 1) If the E !Oo, is perishable, at least in the case

of artefacts and other cases not excluded, then it is not the species

but the substantial form which is referred to; for Aristotelian species

are eternal. (2) If the el6o~ is pecishable, it is individual, not

11niversal (general, shareable, etc.),

There· was some question, first, as to whether Ar in the present

passage does actually assert the perishability of the forms of arte-

facts. What he asserts is that these forms are not xwpLCT"t'a.( and not

Heinaman argues that this means they do not survive

the destruction of the composite, i.e. they are perishable. His chief grounds are (i) cp. with K2 l060b 23-8; to which it can be objected

that strictly speaking that passage says only that perishability is

a consequence of not being xwp~crt"a.C or 'M.p& -rb CJ6voXou not that the

two things are one and the same; (ii) the claim that the target here

could not be Platonic separation (existing apart) since after ZB (cf.

esp. l033b 20-1) and Zl3-16 Ar could not say it is 'not at all clear

yet' (1. 19) whether there are Platonic forms of perishable things.

(ii) was challenged by ·reference to HI, • . ..;hich does not regard the

'{Uestion of Platonism as wholly settled. One could suggest that a

reference to Platonism could be quite in keeping with Ar 's present

agnosticim on whether forms are eternal or perishable without process

l)f perishing. If forms are eternal, they can ~xist separately ~ap~

-::-0. 'Uvd., as the Platonist Hants, hence (contraposition) if ~vith arte­

facts it is clear that they do not exist separately Jtnp6. "tt\ 't'Lvd., in

15

1 041b 10

l 'J4Jh 1 4

Lhose cases they must be perishab1,_!, ·lOt ·~tecnal (the same inference

as K2). ( [ f the ~= clause in l. 20

be xwpLcr-"ta.(, it looks to be tautological:

specifies which forms cannot

those forms cannot be sepa-

rate '~·hich cannot exist besides the particulars. Better. therefore,

to construe 15ou not as specifying lvCwv but as epexegetical to xwp ~crt"a.C:

'except that it is clear that the substance of some perishables cannot

be separate, that is to say, cannot exist besides the particulars,

e.g. house'.)

But the antecedent of (l) and (2) can stand as Ar's own Hithout

this passage. So what of the theses themselves?

In connection with ( 1) it was emphasized that the eternity of

an Aristotelian species is Heraclitean rather than Platonic: one man

succeeds another without any single entity enduring. Is this the kind

of eternity which Ar here denies for artefacts and leaves open for

other perishable things? It may be doubted, yet to doubt it is not

to dispute the truth of (1) but to agree that Ar's topic is forms rather

than kinds of species.

Discussion of (2) took us i.n two directions. First, can the

opponents of individual forms f .lnd :1 satisfactory sense for this and

other passages (e.g. ZlS 1039b 20-7, A3 l070a 15-17) where forms are

and are not or come to be and perish in a 5pecial way? Second, we

looked at one of the key passages that have been adduced on behalf

of individual forms.

As to the first, some at least of the opponents were anxious not

to be stuck with defending, on Ar's behalf, a tame version of Platonism.

The Aristotelian principle 'A universal exists if something instantiates

it' should not be taken to assert a mysterious biconditional connection

between two indistinguishable states of affairs, the existence of the

universal and its instantiation. The existence of a universal just

is its instantiation, it exists just insofar as it is instantiated

somewhere. From this point of view its ceasing to be instantiated

in a particular thing ~ its ceasing to exist there - though it may,

of course, still exist as instantiated somewhere else. lhe opponents

nf individual forms should not be required to explain how Ar can both

propound the above principle for the existence of nni.versals and, compa­

r_ibly with that, say that (universal) forms are and are not -as t:hou~h

there were two separate tasks difficult to reconcile. Talk of the

being and not being of forms is part and parcel with Ar • s dedication

to the proposition that universals do not exist except as realized

in this particular individual or that. Consequently, the perishability

of the forms of perishable things is not a difficulty for those who

would view these forms as universal (in that they are predicable of

multiple parcels of matter), but belongs with a committed Aristotelian

understanding of that view. If the instance is perishable, that is

the end of that realization of the form, and the form is nothing 7ta.pd.

its realizations here and there. This, of course, is compatible with

Heraclitean eternity, but perhaps it will be thought an objection to

the above that it allows for eternity and being/not being to hold of

the same thing.

As to the second, AS 107la 27-29 is a favourable text for indivi-

forms: 'The causes of different indi victuals [ sc. of the same

3pecies] are different, ~ ~€ ~ ~~~ x~\ ~o e!oo~ xa\ ~0 x<o~~ xa\ ~

dual

~~n, while in their universal definition they are the same'. Opponents

must press hard the objection that you and I may be siblings from the

same x LvT')a'ov and insist that Ar does not actually assert that ~ach

of the various causes (as opposed to the total causal story) is diffe­

rent, so as to leave themselves room to insinuate that the form may

he the same so long as there is a different matter (note the feminine

a-ft, l)J.ft :: different x~vi;cm.v to supply the required causal difference.

Alternatively, talk of your form and mine may be admitted on condition

that it is construed as 'the form of you as a composite being', i.e.

as identificationally posterior to the composite, not as prior to and

explanatory of it. To the objection that form as universal is not

needed to explain coming to be, since another concrete individual is

all that is required, the reply was made that the same argument would

apply to form as individual.

Another passage considered was A 3 l070a 13-17, but we deadlocked

,Jn whether the items such as 'house without matter', which are and

;tre not, were to be taken as individual or as universal. So no help

here on the preceding statement that the form of ho115e does not exist

~np~ the composite.

[7

-----------------------l(ll!!i'Ol:;-------:--------:---------------.... -.. h·:S.otJ#'!I_.,.!;;'e~Z!fit:.~~·,"'·

l04lb 23

l0_43~2_l_~~----~r~tisthenes In 23-32 qnly 2.J -d >.:~ertaln r_o ,\ntlSthenes.

28-32, which was once commonly used to father the L~a_t3tetus Dream

theory on to Ant., is Aristotelian in language and content and its

allowing definition for composites could not be the consequence (ilx;-r',

28) of an d.JtopCa. about defining anything. This 1vas accepted from

Burnyeat 's paper in ?hronesis 1970, together with (i) a disinclination

to think it necessary to follow Jaeger's emending of 26-l [xa.C] •••

<6p(<TCl.CT6CLL 6' o6), (ii) Ross' translation for xaLp6v, 'timeliness'

as against 'point' or 'plausibility', so that Ar should not himself

endorse the d.xopCa. or the grounds for it. Less dpproved was Burnyeat' s

understanding of xotov ~lv ~c x~X. as part of the ~~opCa. (deriving

from the Socratic -r(-Jto'tov contrast), not a concession of some sort.

The objection here was that 'Silver is like tin'seems a striking example

which should have some part to play. whereas (m 8urnyeat 's reading

any non-definitional descriptive statement would serve. 'Silver is

like tin' does not say -r( l:cru, but unlike, say, 'Silver is found plen­

tifully in Cyprus', it could be an (imperfect) instrument for getting

someone to attach the name 'silver' to the right thing (note 6 Liidl;a.L,

27). In this sense it might be the nearest one can get to definition.

The next question was how l043b 23-8 fits with tJ.29 l024h 32-4,

which specifically names Ant. where H3 has the more diffuse reference

'the Antisthenians and similarly uneducated persons'. Perhaps Ant.

was enough of a paradox-monger for there to be no call to make a con­

sistent position out of the two passages, but if one does try, two

problems arise at once: (1) A 29 can be read as saying that (so far

from definition being impossible) only a thing's proper definition

can be said of it, nothing else; (ii) even if X6yoc:; is broader than

definition, only one X6yo.; is admitted for each thing, so: in the silver

case, either that "X.6yo< is 'It is like tin', which would mean excluding

a.ll other comparisons, or it is not, which would mean that &29 disallows

the very thing that H3 allows. Any solution must be such as to explain

further, 'Nhy in consequence of his thesis Ant. was committed to the

impossibility of contradicting and practically to the impossibility

0f falsehood ( 1024b 33-4). The suggested solutions we discussed can

be distinguished by what they take to be the 11nit in ~v f.<P' lv6<; ( 1024b

J 3).

'.-\t- ft:;R ,

(A) The units are e.g. silver, Socrates, 8: roughly, su bj ec t s

for description, about loihich the thesis is that only one description

"lpplies. This fits Ant. into the context in 629, t~·here 'double' is

2's own \6yo«;, hence something else's X..6yo<; \vhen you say '8 is double'

(b 35-a l).

'8 is double'.

Thus understood, Ant. allows '2 is double' and rejects

The impossibility of &.v-n.).tyeLv would then follow

either because 'not double' is not the ).6yo~ of 2 (would negative de­

scriptions be the X6yot; of anything?) or because e.g. 'treble' is the

X..6yo~ of 3, not 2, so that 'not double'/'treble' cannot be meaningfully

applied to 2.

is that this

And if not meaningfully, nor falsely. The trouble

coherence with the rest of .629 spells incoherence with

H3. For 'Silver is silverish' (or something of the sort) should be

an acceptable Myo~ of silver by (A) and 'Silver is like tin' should

fail to say anything about silver.

(B) The units are states of affairs (cf. nho 1t£1tove6~, 10),

e.g. silver's being like tin. dv-rLX€yEav would involve saying silver

i.s not like tin, which fails to describe that state of affairs at all,

even falsely. This makes the remarks about Ant. somehwat digressive

to A29, cued by the thought (31-2, where perhaps the parentheses should

be removed) that a false X6yo~ is not the '\6yo<; of anything. Ar 's point

is that if you take that thought the wrong way, Ant's olxet'oc;; A6yo~ the-

sis results. Consistency between !129 and H3 is achieved because while

~29 excludes all false statements, leaving true ones intact, H3 excludes

a subclass of the latter, viz. definitional truths. One objection

is that (B) allows an acceptable otxe'to~ X6yot; to be as long as you

',.Jish, which was thought not to be a natural reading of the rubric ev t<p' tv6£;~

(C) The units are essences (cf. l024b 29) and the thesis is that

there is no room for ~v·nX..tyELV between rival definitions, nor such

a thing as a false definition. This is outr_ight inconsistent with

113, fits less well than (A) with 629, and does not yield the general

rlenial of Av~LAtyeLvand falsehood indicated prima facie in the text.

Note that it would be compatible with (A), supposing (A) ran cope

-vith H3 at all (see above), to take \6yov ua.xp6v (l043b 26) as any

\ . .5yo<; longer than one word, rather than in the specialized proverbial

:-teaning (cf. Ross ad 109la 7, Burnyeat p. 113, 115) 'evasive verbiage

such as slaves tell to cover up failure to rio the job assigned to them'.

'· 9

I ~"1.:0 Jh 2 3

l.Ydb L8

l043b 28-32 28's Uxrt.' has to be understood in conjunction -..;ith the

Wo--te: of 23 and its reference to 4-14. Burnyeat's account was accep-

ted: the trick is to relate ii.xrt' to the preceding sentence's main

clause Bxe:L 't~v& xat.p6v, not to the subordinate d.Jtop'a.• and to see

that the e:r~ep clause 30-3 (which shares the same consequent with We--t'

for which reason Burnyeat punctuates with

after ~ in 30) clarifies the connection.

comma rather than a colon

Thus: the moral of .4-14

is that we must recognize a certain complexity or predicative structure

in a definiens. Just this complexity or predicative structure is

what puzzles the Antisthenians and makes them say a definition cannot

achieve 1ts goal. Their ~~opCB is timely as focussing the very struc-

ture Ar wishes to affirm. The consequence - the consequence, that

is ( £r7!:e:p X'tX., 30-3), of this predicative structure in which one ele­

ment stands to another as matter to form - is that only complex items

can be defined. If this is right. it confirms that 14-23 is parenthetical. The

only difficulty is that 14-23 is mentioned in the terminal summary

to the chapter, 1044a 11-14. But the summary (puzzlingly enough)

refers 9_tg_y to 14-23 and to 104 3b 32ff., not to 1043b 4-14, 23-32,

so it remains that 14-23 is parenthetical to the chunk of the text

into which it is sandwiched.

What are the Kpoi't<t (cf. <tOLCl(pE'<<t, 35)? Perhaps all we

can say (as with Wittgenstein) is that there must be some. Definition

comes to an end somewhere (and not usually with a category) - cf. 35-

6. Of this we can be certain even if we cannot give examples of inde-

finables.

l043b 32-44a 11 The points of analogy between ob<rC<tL and d.pL8~oC are:

(1) Both are divisible until you come to indivisibles; (2) Neither

will suffer subtraction or addition without loss of identity; (3)

Both stand in need of a principle of unity, something in virtue of

which it is Ev l.-x. -n:oA.XWv (text of 1044a 3 hard hut sense clear); (4)

:ieither admit of more/less. We are speakin~ of +J xa"t'i\ -rO eTboc; abo-Ca.

20

l04Jb 32

(l0-1) or ~b 't( ~Y e!vnL (44a 1): in what sense of &pL9J..1,6.:; is this

being compared to ~pL9J..~,6.:;? Jaeger worries about the text of 34. Ross

p. 231 mistranslates 33-4 as 'If numbers are substances, it is in this

way and not as assemblages of units'. Keep J..i.Ovdbwv and translate:

'If substances are in a certain way 6.pL61J.oC, it is in this way, viz.

as (numbered or numerable) complexes of elements, not as some say as

collections of abstract units.

are what we call numbers, and this (~ the Platonists) substance/es-

sence is not (cf. 8). But substance/essence is, as has been seen

(~avtp6v and o~~w' referring back) in a certain way a number of elements

which is one common use of the Greek <tpL8~6~ (cp. <tpL9~6~ 'tL~ in 34

with the same phrase famously in the definition of time, ~· 219b

5). So we are not to ask 'Is one of the substances, for instance,

8?' nor to seek analogies between substance/essence and e.g. 8, but

to appreciate that one may, with some justice, say that o~Ca is &pL9~6~

- provided one takes it in the right sense of &.pc.6~6,, not in the

Platonists' sense of '(abstract) number'. For the preceding discussion

has made it clear why (q>a.vEpov 6~ xn\ OLo'tL 32-3) substance is in

a certain way a number of elements.

We further discussed Burnyeat 's contention that Aristotle is here

maintaining that substance is a numbered collection of elements, rather

than that by which we number. Against this it was argued that Aris-

totle is concerned to draw an analogy between substance and number

as that by which we number.

(i) Of the four analogies he states (ibid. p. 4), (3), that a principle

of unity is required (1044a 1-9) l! something which he asserts elsewhere

of !!umber, not in the sense of a numbered collection (Metaph. A 9 992a

l; M 1082a 15 ff., 20 ff.). We agreed that we found it paradoxical

that he should assert this even of number-by-which-we-number (see be­

low); but he apparently did, and, it was maintained, there is no evi­

dence that he asserted it of numbered collections (where also we found

it difficult to see in •.1hat way a principle of unity could plausibly

he required).

(ii) Analogies (2) (l043b 3ft.1044a l) and (4) (l044a 9-11) are applied

elsewhere to number rather than to numbered collections. at Metaph.

t.27 1024a 12 ff. and Cat. 6a 21 ff, respectively. It was agreed that

2l

l043b 32 .e;TES ON ETA

this point was weaker, in that these analogies '.vould apply also to

numbered collections (and indeed the point was raised: if the threes

of which one is no more three than another (C~t. 6a 22) are not numbered

collections, what are they?). But

(iii) in the context of the dicussion in H3 as a whole, the point

that a principle of unity is needed for substances is of more importance

than the distinction between numbers and numbered coll~ctions. The

important point about the analogy between substances and numbers is

not the ~ber of elements in a given essence, but the fact that there

is something that unifies them.

Difficulties were r<'lised against this interpretation. It was

felt awkward that the first analogy (1043b 34-36) applies "!!re easily

to numbered collections than to numbers. The analogies between sub-

stance and number were felt to be rather weak to justify the assertion

that substances ~ numbers in 1043b 33-34, even though this is quali­

fied by ·i'l'.oH; and ·nc:. e:r-xep in 33 was not felt to express much of

a qualification, especially as it is followed up by the non-hypothetical

statement in 34.

1043b ~ it was argued that q>a.ve:p6v in 32 and oU~wc; in 33 referred

forward rather than back, l044a 7 being advanced as a parallel in the

case of the latter.

1044a 2-9 The sense given by the various corrections in a 3 is con-

firmed by 1044a 7. It would in any case be odd to say that the number

seven (e.g.) was a principle of unity among the things it numbered.

Ihe Platonists referred to in l043b 34 have a different under-

standing of number, and so can't, in Aristotle's view, meet his demand

for a principle of unity (cf. M7 l082a 20 ff.); but does he himself

have an answer to this demand, and does he have to have an answer of

his own in order to make the objection against the Platonists? H6

l045a 7f. refers to the problem again, but the discussion that follows

is concerned with substances rather than numbers, and it was suggested

that xa.t .~~:e:pt ~oi;c; dpL8uo6<;; might even be gloss inspired by the

22

present passage. At !17 l 1V~2a l5ff. the •)nly possible <:lllswers the

Platonists are allowed are ~.J.~8£E;~c;. -'r·pf], uC~LS and ?to-Le;, none of '.>~hich

•;eems 11uch help.

unity could be derived from the operation of counting; Aristotle may

hold that, as time could not exist if there were 110 souls, so other

numbered things could not exist (as numbered things) unless there tvere

souls that could do the counting (Hhether they ever actually count

this particuJ ar set of numbered things 0r not). But this is no help

\.Jhere a principle of unity is needed for numbers themselves, as the

act oi counting presupposes the number-series. [s the number seven

a unity in virtue of itself or in virtue of something else? The first

of these alternatives is not paradoxical, for Aristotelian forms, too,

are not unities in virtue of anything outside t hemse 1 ves. lt was

pointed out that, since numbers .::tre, i.n any case, ,1bstractions, the

question 1..rhat unifies them co11ld not be discussed in the same terms

as ~auld apply to concrete things.

1044a -~-=-!.1. The composite substance may admit nf the more and less,

although substance xa~& ~b El&o~ cannot. This appears to contradict

':'a...'::... 3b 33 ff., ,,....hich si.mply :t.sserts that ~ubs~-~~-~ does not admit

of more and less. fhe suggestion was made that the present passage

might be explained by the doctrine of tl1e 1mperfect mastering of matter

hy form (de Gen. An. 4. 767b 8ff.); i..s the suggestion that woman

is no less Clv8pW7to<; in form than man is, though less so as a o-UvoAov.

It was objected that the distinction between male and female scarcely

constitutes a scale; but IJ.aXXov ".<a.t 11't-rov need not imply that. For

1\ristotle (lac. cit.) a lesser degree still of mastery of matter by

form produces •.;hat is ~nimal, but not J]uman at all. [Alex. Aphr. man­

tissa 168 f. argues 'that 'llale and female 1o not differ in e!Ooc; -

which means species, but also form, since it is contrasted with acciden-

tal differences due to matter, 168. 33 f.l Alternatively, it was

o:;uggested that e:r:rte:p should not be pressed, and tnat this clause was

d passing reference to snme minor obiection to the doctribe of ~·

3b 33 ff .• an objection which Aristotle fe-t need not be spelled out

here.

l!l44a 2

l044a 13 ~OTES ON ETA

1044a 13 l"fi(,; E(t; 'tbv &.p~e!-J.,~>V d.vayUJYi'lc: refers to the view of Aristotle's

opponents (1043a 33 f., cf. Zll 1036b 12); Aristotle is not claiming

that he himself has achieved, or even proposed, such an d.vny~.

List of passages supplied by R. Heinaman

fwo definitions: Meta. l033a l-5, b24-26, Z lO-ll, l025b 30-l026a

6, l043a 14-18, l064a 19-28; ~·

6, 23-25, De Anima 403a 29-b 16.

A term can refer to form or composite.

194a 1-7, De Caelo 277b 30-278a

De Gen. et Corr. 321b 19-22; !1eta. I035a 6-9, 1035b l-3, l043a 29-

b 4, l076a 13-25, l037a 7-10, l033b 17-18, l035a l0-17 (cru:l.:l.aj)-f) );

De Caelo 278a 13-15.

A term refers to form alone:

l033a 29, b 9, l033a 33, l034b ll, l035a ll (cf. 14-16), l036a 17,

18, l032a 18, 23, l037a 7-8, l033a 27-28, l035a 9 (>.hl>.ou), 1035a

10 (<rV:I.).apf)), l036a l (x61tl>.o~), De Caelo 278a 13-15; cf. De Gen. et

Corr. 32lb 22-23, 33.

Further discussion of beginning of H3

We returned to the issue of the ambiguity of certain terms that can

indicate either the form or the composite and Heinaman' s contention

that this is parallel to Aristotle's usage elsewhere and not in itself

anything unusual. It was suggested that Aristotle had arrived at

this position through concern that substance should be the subject

of predication, and the difficulty of applying this to the form.

Aristotle's point at the beginning of H3 is not the difficulty of dis­

tinguishing the cases where there is ambiguity from those where there

is not, but rather the need not to be misled by the ambiguity in the

many cases where it exists - the only counter-examples that occurred

to us being 'soul' and, in a non-substance category, 'hollow' as opposed

to 'snub'. But in the context of first philosophy the problem does

not arise ( l043a 37) as we are clearly concerned with form rather than

with the composite (i.e. (b) on p.l2).

24

Reservations were expressed about a sharp distinction between

meaning and reference in a 29 ff., on the grounds that. even if in

both usages 'house' (e.g.) is referring to the house, the difference

in meaning indicated by concern with definitions does involve a refe­

rence in the one case to the form, in the other to the composite.

Discussion concentrated on the claim in 1043a 37 that the two

which is primary. It was conceded on all sides usages are ~Ot; ~v

that understanding (e.g.) house included understanding its form,

i.e., in this case, what it is for (though there were problems as to

whether this did not, in some cases (e.g. soul) involve understanding

the matter too; see below). But, it was contended, this scarecly

justifies Aristotle even in saying that the term 'house' can mean the

form as opposed to the composite - which he certainly does say, and

we took him to be expressing his own view; still less, therefore, would

it justify his regarding this meaning as the primary one.

Is Aristotle saying (I) that a shelter made of bricks and stones

is a house because a shelter (a permanent shelter, to exclude cloaks?)

is; or (II) that a shelter is a house because a shelter made of bricks

and stones is? (1) seemed excessively Platonist to some, though not

involving any suggestion of transcendent forms existing apart from

individuals. The point was made that in ordinary usage 'house' cer-

tainly applies to the composite, rather than to the form; but is Aris­

totle necessarily bound by the order of priority implied by normal

usage? It was suggested that the point of 7tp0<;; Ev might simply be

that 'shelter' appears in the definitions both of the form and of the

composite, while the matter appears o~ly in that of the latter. The

form of house in any case differs from soul in that the latter can

exist only in one sort of matter, the former in several - though we

debated how far this ~as Aristotle's view; does xaC in l043a 32 express

an alternative, or does a house generally, for Aristotle, involve stone

(for the foundations) and bricks (for the walls)? Is a structure

made entirely of wood a house for him? If the form of house c~ exist

in several alternative sorts of matter, it seemed doubtful whether

<me could ~efine the composite 'house' at all, as opposed to defining

a brick house or a stone housei such a definition would perhaps take

~he form 'a shelter made of suitable matter', but 'suitable' is redun-

15

l044a 29 :JOIES iJN ~TA

ctant as otherwise it wouldn't be a shelter, so we're left with a shel­

ter made of matter'.

The difficulty was raised that, in the case of soul, the form

(not only had to exist in a particular sort of matter, flesh and bones,

but) could not be defined without reference to matter; the definitions

of perception and most of the other soul-faculties would involve refe­

rence to matter, as for example in the case of anger (de Anima 1. 1

403a l6 ff.). Aristotle, it was maintained, was concerned not only

to resist undue emphasis on matter to the exclusion of form, but also

vice-versa. We differed in our view as to how great a difficulty

this was for (I) above; the reference to matter is indirect, it does

not have to be the matter of the same individual, and flesh, bone,

etc. have a formal as well as a material element (de Gen. et Corr.

32lb 20 f.).

Forms in Aristotle - Universal or Individual? (Note by R.W. Sharples)

l. What follows is an attempt to clarify some points relating to the

claim that we may represent Aristotle 1 s thought more accurately by

speaking not of form as universal, possessed by all members of a given

natural kind, but rather of individual forms in each member of a natural

kind 1 forms identical in kind and differing only numerically. It

may appear from what follows that the difference between this and the

opposed view is one of terminology rather than of substance; in which

case the question becomes one of which terminology is the more true

to Aristotle's thought. My primary concern is with the interpretation

of Aristotle, rather than with the philosophical merits or demerits

~ of the view which I am attributing to him; ~ a Stoic type

of nominalism, for example, may well be more satisfactory than Aris­

totle's position however interpreted.

2. ~othing in what follows is intended to suggest that the forms of

individual men (for example) differ other than numer~cally; their pecu­

liar characteristics, such as Socrates' snub-nosedness, are accidental

rather than essential, attributable to matter rather than to form,

and outside the scope of (scienti.fic) knowledge. L n t_!!_i_~ sense one

26

might indeed speak of the specific form 0r ~SS•:!nce of man as 'l!niversal'

(henceforth: universal*), .:Is opposed to speaking of forms that 1.<1ere

individual* in the sense uf including peculiar characteristics (and

hence differing not only numerically). It is not with the universal*

- individual* contrast that I will be concerned. The question must

remain open for the moment whether there is any other meaningful sense

that can also be given to the universal -individual contrast.

3. In view of (2), while the view for which I shall be arguing may

derive support from the identification of the form of a living creature

with its soul and the fact that we speak of a number of souls where

a number of creatures is concerned, it would not seem to provide un­

problematic support for any doctrine of the survival of individual

souls when their bodies have perished.

4. Individual forms (which are however universal* rather than indivi-

dual*, since they differ only numerically) will, it is argued, be poste­

rior to matter, in that they can only be individuated by reference

to the matter in which they are embodied. To refer to individuation

here, however, seems misleading. The forms of concrete things are

precisely themselves principles of individuation; it is only by refe­

rence to the form of man that we can say that a certain amount of matter

here constitutes three, rather than two or four men (and hence, of

course, Aristotle's concern that it should be things which are real

unities that are substances and have essences in the primary sense

- Metaph. Z4, Zl6). The role of matter is not so much to individuate

as to pluralize. However, it may be argued that it is by reference

to universal form, rather than to individual forms, that we count indi-

viduals: so that, while universal form will be prior to the concrete

individuals, individual forms will be posterior to them and to matter.

5. I his however seems to suggest that universal form is something

else over and above the collection of individual f0rms, which is cer-

tainly not Aristotle's posit ion. We do not need both universal forms

and individual forms; the question remains whether it would not be

r.~ore Aristotelian to dispense tYith universal (not universal*) forms,

and simply say that there are three men here because there are three

instances of the form 'man' in Lhis matter.

'7

1044a 29 NOTES UN C:TA

6. Specific

universal*,

forms or essences, it may be argued, while admittedly

are not in themselves universal rather than individual.

The definition of 'man' states the essence that an individual man pos­

sesses, and it would not be any the less applicable if only one man

existed. It is purely accidental, and dependent on matter, wheter

the form is exemplified in more than one instance (though it must be

exemplified in at least one if it is to exist at all. Of course.

in the case of perishable individuals others of the same species must

have existed in the past for this individual to exist; but this is

still a dodo even if it is the only one left.) This is the position

argued for by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Quaest o lo 3), and it seems

accurately to represent Aristotle 1 s thoughts; one reason why we cannot

define individuals as such is that a definition may equally well be

exemplified on one or many occasions (Zl5 l040a 33 ff.). But this

state of affairs seems best represented, not by speaking of a universal

form 1 but by saying that there is an individual form of man which may

or may not be repeated in an indefinite number of instances· Does

Aristotle ever refer to forms, in his own view, as 'universal' (rather

than 'universal*')?

7. Knowledge, for Aristotle 1 is potentially of the universal, but

always actually of an individual (Metapho MID l087a 15 ff o) o This

suggests

mind of

that, even before a house is built 1 the form of house in the

the builder, if he is already actually planning the building

of the house, is ~ the universal form of house, but an instance of

the form of house - not indeed brought to actuality by being embodied

in matter, but individual nonetheless in that it is the form of house

that he is considering at this time. Universal form, this line of

thought would suggest, exists only potentially, not actually.

8. At Z7 l032a 24 Aristotle speaks of the efficient cause, case of begetting, as -/i <'L'tll. 'tb eTboc; l>.eyO!JlVT] <p(xnc; -IJ ~IJOELOf)<;o

in the

<j>(xnc;

here must refer to the form, rather than to the concrete individual,

t 0 r he continues a.\S-rn Ot lv ~"''Mf· Consequently this seems to be a

reference to a form which is identical in kind with that of the off­

spring; but to refer to it as identical (only) in kind suggests that

it is different in another respect, namely, numerically.

that ~~Epa in AS l071a 27 should be taken in a strnng

This suggests

sense, rts indi-

eating that all the causes - material, formal and efficient - are (gene-

28

rally speaking) numerically different i.n the <:ase qf different indivi-

duals (even

accidens, be

though the efficient causes of

one and the same individual).

two individuals ~. ~

lt certainly seems more

natural to read 107ta 27 in this way, rather than as saying 'the causes

of members of a single species are different (numerically though not

in kind), in that one and possibly two of them are different numerically

even though the third, the form, is the same'.

9 0 But will the individual forms not be posterior to matter, dependent on it for their being (above [4])? Here it seems necessary to examine

the sense of being: to talk about being, simply, is misleading and

was Parmenides 1

mistake (~. 1. 3 186a 24 ff.), and talk of mere

existence, rather than of being-something, may be anachronistic. The

individual form in this man certainly will not be dependent on matter

for its being an instance of the form man, rather than horse; nor yet

for its being the form of Socrates in the sense of including his indivi-

dual peculiarities, for it is not individual* in that sense. It de-

pends on matter for its being the form in this individual rather than

that, though identical in kind; but since it is purely accidental to

any instance of the form man that it ~ the form of this individual

rather than that, is this problematic? It is true that, if there

were no matter here suitable to form a man, there would be no form

of man here; but (i) this is to speak as if spatial distinctions were

more fundamental characterisations of matter than are the forms that

occupy it, which I take is not Aristotle's position; and (ii) it is

equally true, on any view, that if there were ~~ matter anywhere suit­

able to form a man, the form man would not exist at all, which does

not seem to be felt as problematic.

!Oo In conclusion, it should be stressed that nothing in what has

preceded implies any form of nominalism; the distinction between essence

(form) and accident is a real one~ and is present even in the case

of a species with only one member. This is Alexander's position (cf.

Quaest. l. 3, already cited) and Aristotle's too (cf. ;-1etaph. 215 1040a

29-320

Tony Long suggested I consult A.C. Lloyd's 'Aristotle's principle

of individuation', Mind 79 ( 1970) 519 ff., which I did not previously

29

know. Professor Lloyd expresses approval of speaking of the forms

in individuals of the same species as the same in species but differing

numerically - 'it L; a useful as well as a plausible way of speaking'­

!lnd holds that Aristotle jg indeed speaking ln this way at AS 107la

27 ff. ()21-523). But he brings two nbjections against this approach

as not strictly accurate (522): firstly, it involves confusing the

form and the ~~ universal, and, secondly, the matter that J.iffe-

rent forms are in is either the matter of man taken universally, in

which case it is always the same - flesh and bones ·· or else it is

the particular matter of each individual, in whtch case it is identical

with the form, the distinction between form and mdtter in ~~~ indivi­

dual being secondary to the existence of this individual as a composite

and the result of abstraction.

'3oth objections can I think be met if we assert that the distinc­

tion between form which is universal* and accidents which are d~e to

matter is .!__!!_~, even if the universal (t:J.Ot the universal*) is post

1.=._~!!!_; accidents which differentiate this matter, ~~~_!lence this instance

of the form man from any vther, Jre to be contrasted with the form.

(This presumably commitG Aristotle to the indiscernibility o£ two in­

stances of the same 3pecific form without even any accidental diffe-

rem.es; but that is not perhaps so implausible, if accidents include,

~.g., spatial and temporal relations.)

If your essence, the cause of your being what you are, does not

include any of the accidents due to matter, your being, in the sense

of what you are, presumably does not do so either; in other words,

what you ~re, for Aristotle, is simply human, not snub-nosed human,

or even (cf. above p. 2) male or female human. This may not be so

Lmplausible: it is the essential characteristics, not the accidental

nnes, which are involved in the doctrine of the production of one indi­

'lidual h·r i'lnother of the same species, and it is the form, not the

~tccidents, •..Jhich the individual':; growth and development endeavours

to realise. (Alex. Aphr. uses the argument that mar1 and woman come

from chc same seed to argue that they do r..ot difier 1.-n form, ~n._antiss~

168. 24 ff.; though Aristotle's doctrine of heredity does take account

·,f --De ueculiar characteristics of individuals, too, ~~~~· 4,

:6/b 24 ff.)

HJ l043a 31 ff. distinguishes between the xo~v6v and the frwm.

suspect that in cases where a form h_as to be in a certain t.vpe of

matter - as is the case with human soul, ,1nd ::~ay mav not he the

case with house, cf. above - the universal* form, ',..:hich is the being

of the individual, of which I've spoken Clbove earlier in this note,

is to be identified with the former rather than the latter. Flesh

and bones after all have a formal as well dS a material eLement (~

Gen. et Carr. 321b 20 f., cf. above), and though they are material

by contrast with the purpose they serve, they can stiLl be distinguished

from their actual material embodiment, involving accidents. After

all, when we think of 'man' the concept •,;hich enters our intellect,

the form, may - must? - include the flesh and bone, but not actual

material flesh and bone. And if the 'form' of which I've spoken here

and earlier in this note is equated with Aristotle's ~ot.v6v here, this

leaves me free to support (II) of the alternatives stated in the minutes,

rather than (I) for which I actually argued, in cases where a thing

necessarily involves a certain type of matter, the distinction between

the formal and the material element in the xot.v6v (which still excludes

the actual matter of an individual, and the accidents) will still be

of use for purposes of analysis - particularly for showing w~__y 1t has

to be this type of matter if this purpose is to be fulfilled - but

only for this purpose. That the importance of soul, as opposed to

universal* man, should be reduced to this ls not perhaps very surprising

in the context of Aristotle's view of it.

l044a 15-25 We were dis inc 1 ined to follow Ross in seeing a reference

to prime matter, as traditionally cc,ncelved , 1n tx 't'oU a.O't'o\3 ••. :rtpW-rou

( 16) or Tf!V <pW"tTJV ~\Tjv ( 2 3) . First, la··n :rtpW-tTJ U\11 in 18 should

undoubtedly be excised for the reason .LH~ger ~ives, that 1tptirtT) would

here have to mean olxE(a., the neclrest not the furthest 1.-n the series.

Second, Ar leaves it open whether what you would find at the furtl1est

point in the series is one or several (several h~cause the disjunction

'> 14-l l 0) 10 Lt:S ()l'J :TA

.:cttdd he tdutological if rhe ~:pt:O'ta. could be as many as you il.kc):

rhtts in 16 ~tpW'tou must have L:te same sense as in '!Wv a.b'tWv We: n;;t:nU'twV.

t'•ut there cannot be several prime matters dS prime matter is traditio-

LLall·! conceived. Ar is saying: suppose evBrything derives in the

end frr1m some one originative 'first' stuff, e.g. water, or from several

such, e.g. ~arth air fire and water, still the Lmportant thing for

explanation (cf. 32 ff.) is the oCxe(a.. UAn ~xtio-rou. He does not commit

himself to either version of the ultimate derivation story, since his

cr,ncern is to insist that you should not answer the question 't( lcJ'tL

xo":ri 1n Presocratic style by 'Like everything else, it's earth, ,.;rater,

~tc. , but should give the specific or proximate matter (cf. 1044b

)-]), The Presocratic style of reply is not sufficiently explanatory.

;'ht> sense of Jtptlrnw \J\.nv in 23 is then determined Ly 16, as Ls Lo·w<:

t rnU-ra. lx 'taU cd.noU 19-2(1.

Phlt~gm and bile start off ( l~-19) as parallel exampl:::s, on the

>fl.m>-.• l(~vel as it were. And they remain such, despite the suggestion

\!.1~·2) that phlegm might Jerive from bile, becdU3e that 1s Lube under-

.. uJ{·d in the light uf CaxWt:; yO.p x-rA.., 23-5. Th~re are two sense in

·.vlnch :\ m,JV derive from Y 15 l•13tter. ln the ftrst sense Y is situaled

',)n u1e rudd to' X - whether !.t ts the immedi.ately preceding olxt:Ca.

1',\n, one level d'.Jwn (the .~<;reasy in the case of phlegm), 1)r a lower

il:'Vel (the sweet in the case of phlegm). In the seco11d s~nse Y. has

to be resolved into its elements, which are then reconstituted as X.

r t-'lJssibly \Ve n•~ed >?;O no lower for the xpUn11 UXTJ or &pxTi here than the

sw~~t-anJ-che-~itter- cf. 18-20.)

I3 this a promise of alchemy? Can anything be got from anything?

~ell, cveryth1ng comes from the four elements on Ar's scheme, and con­

, rihutes to the whole when resolved back into Lhem (1075a 23-5).

:·ut no Jl)uht he 15 nor !<now talking practical chemistry.

:, 44a !5-Jl. having (!mphasized the need to g;o f<~r the 0Cx£Ca. Ut..TJ, Ar

,lJ\o.' L<dnparcs three cases: ( 1) same :llatter ciitferent products; (2)

1:tr-•rent l'li:ttter necessitating different products; (.J) different matter-

ln ~ase ~1) (.25-7) the differencA is due to the effi·-

<lue to the tor:n'!

CHAPTER 4

does, for as 31 shows he is thinking of the form as the efficient cause,

and properly so, because of course the same carpenter could he the

maker of both box and bed.) In case (3) (29-32) the sameness also

is due to the efficient cause. We searched in vain for a type ( l)

example in the sphere of natural things. Natural things would seem

all to come under case (2) (27-9), where some specific matter is neces­

sary for the product in question, as e.g. metal for a saw, and so limits

what the efficient cause can do. Even here, but most evidently in

cases (1) and (3), the olxe:Ca. \S).Tl is not sufficient on its own to

determine (explain) the product.

l044a 32-b 5 Explanation illustrated. The XO.'ta.f.J."f!vl.a. are given as

the material cause of a man, but no help is offered with the problem

of how that can be the same as or continue as a part of the flesh and

bones composing the final product.

l044b 5-8 The 'kinetic' matter of the heavenly bodies has come up

earlier at Hl l042b 6, cf. also l069b 26, It is ob -roL0.6'tT!V, not

earth, etc., as in the cases we have been talking about, but it is

of course still a (special) kind of stuff (not ~ a potentiality

for change), with properties such as visibility. Perhaps the heavenly

bodies have to be made of a special kind of stuff if their potentiality

for change is to be restricted just to local movement. Powers do

not define or determine a kind of stuff (since we all possess the capa­

city for local movement), but they limit what it can be, as tn case

( 2) above.

This led to a digression on what Ar means by saying that Socrates

and Cal lias differ in the matter. For surely ~b initio they have

the same potentialities for change just as they have the same form.

Admittedly, not all the potentialities can be realized by a single

thing, which means Socrates and Callias must realize them differently.

But here the unavoidable reference to 'by a single thing' :nakes the

proposed explanation circular. What 'difference in matter' precisely

has to explain is how Socrates and Callias are two rather than one.

13

:044a 25

: .44b )

So the problem is not solved by taking matter as potentiality for change,

:1ence difference in matter as difference in potentiality for change.

Is it solved by taking difference in matter as the distinctness of

two parcels of matter, given that each of them is living a human life?

[f this parcel here is human and that parcel there is human, you have

r.wo humans if the parcels are distinct. Objection: ~ difference

~vould perform that trick, why fixate on material composition? E.g.

if this parcel knows French and that doesn't, they are two persons,

not one. Partial reply: many distinguishing characteristics that

one might think to cite (e.g. this is red-haired/ snubnosed/ 5' tall/

a carpenter, that one os not) presuppose for their ascription that

we have already picked out the subject as one whole human being.

'.i'~ere we left it, but NB this whole discussion presupposes the use

:1 f criteria on the side of form to identify the parcels of matter dbout

·.;hich we are wondering whether they are one man or two. So it is

•1 nt 0 questi..on of matter deciding what is a man and what is not.

.!._Q_~b 8-20 We move to (what we would call) natural events, such as

an eclipse. There is no matter which i.s the matter of 3.n eclipse.

There is a ~~O'XEC!-1.£Vov, but it is a full substance, viz. the moon which

:3uffers the eclipse. (Elsehwere Ar prefers to let substance count

us \JXT} to the attributes.) There is an efficient cause, the Earth.

rawc; (Ross: presumably) there is no final cause (an important text

for the limits ofAristotelian teleology). With the formal cause there

is a complication. You can say 'An eclipse is a deprivation of light'

( sc. by the moon - did Ar notice that this is an instance of the 'snub'

phenomenon, where the subject must be specified but not put into the

i~fining formula?), but it is unclear unless you add the efficient

cause 'hy the interposition of the Earth'. Why unclear? That it

·4as not sufficiently illuminating for explanatory purposes seemed more

likely thanthatit issimplyincomplete. With sleep the unclarity to

he dispelled concerns which is the first bit of the animal to undergo

~leep. Or rather, which is the first bit of the animal (perhaps the

heart) to under~o something - what? ( 't'C 't'O xd.8oc; 18-19), perhaps a

~~rtain stillness - in virtue of which the whole animal undergoes sleep?

l4

U'44b R

But the efficient cause has to be sought as well, presumably to be

incorporated into the formal.

9eneral contribution of chap, 4 H2 began by saying that there was

no dispute about :Jfxr-(a. J>~ 'b1toxe::C1-1.E\1Tl xa.t ill<:;. \S),:n. so that it remained

to analyze ob<JCa. We; lvlpye::l.a. So why go back to \5ATJ in H4? H3 and H4 both begin by telling us not to forget something, as if to intro­

duce a PS, which in the case of H3 is explicitly said not to be relevant

to the main project ( l043a 38-b l). Perhaps some relevant connections

will emerge by the end of H6, but it cannot be said that Ar does any-

thing to alert us to them. E.g. he fails to say, as he so easily

could have done, that the matter we are comparing with actuality has

to be the correctly specified ol"XeCa \SAT). We had the now familiar

feeling that Ar is patching in material originally put together for

another context. We also thought it noteworthy that the brightly

conversational express.ion va.(• dX\6. occurs twice here (16-17, 19) but

otherwise according to Bonitz only in the ~gna Moralia three times,

and that such examples of va.C as Bonitz 1 ists are all from early works

plus Z9 10J4a 17.

CHAPTER FIVE

l044b 21-29 'Since some things, such as points and forms, are and

are not without genesis and phthora ... '. Comparison with earlier passages, especially 85 1002a 32-5 Tn~ b~ ~~y~O~ xat ~nc; ypa~c; xat

<IL~ {~•<pO.vdet~ obx lvl>f')(Het• OU'<E y(yvwBa• OU'rE q>8E!pEcr8a•. o<e ~l:v OWn~ O<e Oe obx OUOU.<;.

EJ l027a 29-30 ~,. o' d<rtv &pxaC xal OLHCt YEYT]'riL xa.l <j>8etp'riL CtVEU '<OU

yCyvEcr8et• xal q>8E(pE<T8a•, q>etVEp6v.

H3 l043b 14-16 dvd.yxT] 07) <ahT]v [sc. tTlY oroCa.vj n <:Lt0.ov Elva• i\ ·,p8a.p-rt]v tlve:u -ro'U !J16E Cpe:rr8a.L xa.t ye::yov~va" 5:veu -roU yCyve:ai3a.L

'Tiakes it clear that wjth 'are and are not' we must understand 'at nne

time ... at dnother time'. Aristotle is not denying that the rhings

l5

... , c '! d'' . • D[0 f'SS

. ~ . >11'.1! t .. !·d'

') "'"T ~ '• ' '

.Jl ,, . ., ,.hC'm

~~ r tho• ·~ . .\m<i.: " 1 <11•1' 1_<; .nade ln 135 f•\[

; j ~ ..

1, 1_ "''

l I ! '\ , "· , 'f l , t !) (~ ~- t' ·ntr •! t..'Il'.itlc.:s v..•itt tt· ~<lt1::er,

' - • ' i. ~ ,' i_ ~ ' fl I K. t ~ i I '

· •Hl\1\

' '11 1 ' '· v ·~ ,- •':\'/0 1::\,)':~~hr <·~ll''''t ot~'''' ·:d~ns. e . .,. the

-, ' · r ~ r, , lL • ·.' f -1 ._ t ~ •

:·r·.

•i,

l..:r '\ i._.

•; r •in ;·f regress

'l'-1'1 ··;rl<••ii:--; fn: .-pAopd).

he

lnt tl-tl .111 ,m,__,

\_\'

. . .. ~ t- ,-, •• J

1'\fl',·-1

l·:;trlier r IH; (_()1\'.<::rse

has been

no douht Ar. held it to he a tw·o-',¥<ty Implication.

about matter Ls i.ntr(Jduced as ct cornll3cl, it i.:~ :>urclv :tn lnt"gra.l

part of the posHion sketched in ~h!': prect;riin)'!; linPS.

2 dp11ri.1i about rnalrer, IJotentiality dnd upposites. The theme of oppnsitcschauging into une ttt<Jt'ber pruvidcs

the - s.Jmewhat tenuous- cor.nection wit~ the first half <lf the chapter.

!..::~!::___~~.~ If X is Ou\IO.j..LE~ A, and B L_; the kva.v1:Cov ot -\, l'> '{ there-

foro &uvn~E" as well as 5uvd.fJ-E4 A?

2 examples: X ht1dy, A healthy, :;ic k

:..JZJ.ter, wine. vi 1~e~a r. l'he 'lti 1.'Il in

li.ne:•s 12~4 whcrn a dist.inction is dr<Jwn i.n the wa)·._, ln •.hiLh X 1s •he

~lattt=!T ot ('l:~rl therefor.~ dso Ouvfi~EI.) /\ and l) t<.:-;pe( tLvely: x.a.8'

~~Lv xut xntU 'tO E[&oc, and ::ta.'tO. O"'tEprl(nv v.at ~enpCtv ·riw nnpO. ~6crt.v. So X is potenti.ally B, but onlv with rhe quaL.fi.ctr ion given.

l.n?~ap~J_r_~'!_· 1()44b v .. -4~a 5 C'Jntinues with the X-A-R '3Clll!!ne, hut the

~lC"<'l.lth example ts dropp€!d i.n f::1vnur of X--li•;i.JJW: thita~-c,npse (presumably

because this, like wine~vinegcir but t·•l ke hPalthy sick. is an Lrre-

f!TSihle process, a point to be made, V.'i.th<•ut qudllficatton, later).

The apori.a i.s: Why do we not say that A i:.; the md.tter 'Jf, r;r potcn-

L \.ally, B, given that

\¥e do nol Sdy this en vU rJ36) l' xa.-ta. (fUu(:h:~nxOc, nl ~tlopnC. Th;~

1c; stri.ctl·; spedking .1 rpBor)n nDr 1,t -IS·) tioe '.-,'lll<', '·Ill d tht~ water

ich t·Ji,:- :~:inc ()Ui--J.SE~T1XE, h·~n-

nt f rhe L_·'i.lnilr1 ,(Jn is !Jt"Psum-

t h<"lt

:045a 2 NOTES ON ETA

night is potentially day? And what is the UAT} (X) here? O.f}p presumably).

_1~)-~~a 3-·6 We took the point here to be, not, as per Ross, that both

changes A-B and B-A, require a 'return to \SA:n', but that only the B­

A change does (i.e. vinegar to wine, corpse to living thing).

XQ\ Bou o~ o~~w ~e~~~XXeL eC~ ~XXnX~: we agreed that eC~ [XXnX~ could

mean 'one into the other' but what does oU-tw mean? It can't refer

back to the day-night example, since that .!:._! symmetrical. It must

refer back to Xa."tlz. cp6opd.Y changes, and the point would be that when

A's change to B is Xa.'t'& ,eopd.v B' s change to A, if at all possible,

must be via the \f~'TJ.

General comments on HS A bitty and unstatifactory chapter containing

no new material of any great interest. The first half could be said

;:o continue H4' s discussion of bXLx-t, of>c--ea. or to connect with H3 via

the discussion of things which are and are not without genesis. On

whether :i.t presupposed Z, we thought yes; at least that it presupposed

28 on form not being generated.

CHAPTER SIX

1045a 7-8 The backreference: HJ l044a 3-6 suffices for both the unity

of numbers and that of definition. No need to bring in 212 as well

(Ross). However, Zl2 l038a 34-5 concludes a 'first' answer to the

llllity of definition problem, implying that there will be a second:

:wt because the first is tentative but because it deals only with de-

finition by division ( l037b 28, 34, Notes on Zeta ad lac.). Possible

responses: (1) look for the second answer within Z (e.g. second half

,,f Z17 following on the puzzles of Zl3 1039a 3-23); (2) H6 is the

~econd answer and ZH are after all a unity; (3) H6 can have this role

•,;ithout impugning the chronological hypothesis discussed earlier (cf.

:1ote on l042a 31-b 8 ad fin.: z could be written with an eye to H

if H pre-existed and Ar thought H6 a satisfactory enough solution to

the problem outstanding at the end of Zl2.

18

i U~'5a 7

104~::11. Does the xa.C in l. 11 say even in hodies' (Ross Ox. tr.,

implying that bodies are the wedkest examples of unity), 'in bodies

too' (Apostle), or simply that the cause of unity in bodies is e.g.

contact (Ross ed., p. 237)? Perhaps better is thdt it should emphasize

a particularly evident instance of the general thesis. Honeywater

was offered as an example of something unified by stickiness. For

~• ~d6o~ ~~epov ~oLou~ov, cf. ~· 227a 15·17.

~045a 12-14 Definition now enters as a species of unitary thing, the

explanation of its unity being that it is the definition Q_f something

unitary. Does Ar always run the explanation this way round or does

he sometimes explain the unity of the definiendum by that of the defini-

tion? Zll l037a 18-20 is indeterminate on the issue. Z12 1037b 24-7

looks more threatening, but can be read as stating that the unity of

the definiendum is a necessary requirement for the unity of the defini­

tion (cf. Notes on Zeta ad loc.), lvhich would not reverse the order

of explanation.

l045a 14-20 Ar then asks for the explanation of the unity of ~bv !vBpw-

1tov. Is this (a) man (the form) or (b) a man (the individual)?

Ross has (a), Apostle (b). The first clue is that the unity of the

thing in question will be especially jeopardized if one posits Forms

Animal and Twofooted ( 15-20). Admittedly B6 1003a 9-12 does argue

that the Theory of Forms makes Socrates many things, viz. himself +

man + animal, but that consequence is drawn from the explicit premise

that on the Theory of Forms the general terms 'man' and 'animal' each

Whereas the H6 problem is supposed to arise si~nify 't'66E ~L xa\ ~v~ especially if (15-16), not only if, there are Forms. c.Jote also the

reading a.6'tod.vSpW7t.oc; for a!>'tb. 0' &:v6puntoc; in 17: someone decided that

the right answer is (a). 17-19 makes better sense with (a): if Man,

the thing that individual men are supposed to participate in, is the

t• .. m things Animal and Twofooted, it will be these two things, not a

single thing Man, that individual men participate in. 19-20 simply

generalizes this: Man will not be one thing but more than one. Perhaps

J ·, i 1. \ '•

(as >•lme hoped both here dr,.J l.1cer J r::ne dtL::>wer co Lhe quc::.t1on Hhat

nakes man a unity will also -;hm; ,,;hat makes ..1n individual man a unity,

but that aspiration ~eed not rely on ~hu:.sing lb) o~er la) here.

I,.Jhy is it so nnfortunate that man should fall fipart into a conjunc-

t l._Vfi? This chapter assumes the unity dnd louks co account for it.

~lo doubt a full j'lstificdtion of the 'lssun-.ption would take us deep

into Ar's belh:fs about essence. What ;.;auld he J;,tike of the idea

that the essential predicates of a thing might be independent one of

another? 1,.,1 0 uld he wonder whether that ~eai.t, absurdly, that one essen-

tlal predicate would cease to huld ~hile anoth~r did not?

~~~a -~0-9 [he criticism ul the way people tl$Ually Jo definitions

3eems 1 ~ss charitable than H2 1041a 14 tf. The second ~b ~tv ... ~b bt

,_,f 23-4 <auld be read either '•)ne vf these is 6u~.Hij.J.£L, viz. the i5A., •••

is Suvd1-1E1. ••• ', marking a separate (bttt of course equivalent)

d.Lstinction or t".·.JO cutllpon::!nts WLtlli.n a definition. But· does everything

1·,::oally bt::co,·~e dS clear :\s .-\r c laj_ms unce the distinction is made?

:-\ll i.s we,ll so long as we ~·tick, as this chapter does, to the simple

~.:l~del ~enus plus one differentia. Gut H2 t042b 24, 28-9, envisaged

•1 plural1.ty •)f differentiae tor sor1e cdses. fhe four 'dements are

.Jef1-ned each by 'l f)3ir nf 4'Jallt~es. ?or more discussion see Note~

on Ze~ ad Zl2.

l o 4 5 a -.lQ::J_

(~~specially

At first sight a ~nove to a ·1uestion '..ltlich is irrelevant

-with a choice earlier uf (d) over ~b)) to the foregoing,

,lbnul potentiality und actuality not in a definition but ~n individuals

1 hat c...o·\e to be, Continu1ty lS rescued, however, by playing down

l~iven tne potentiality/ cJr rl.eleting the comma arter Jtod'taa.v in 3l.

lctuality .1nalysis of rtefinit:ion, the aext question is, 0r better per­

ltaps, nur original question as to the cdu.se of L:nity becomes, What

; 5 , he. ~xplanation of what is potentially something be1.ng so actually?

JlPrfectly general ~uestion, applying to the components of definition

'ell "lS to an·1 other pair rela7:.ed as potent1al to actual. Which

1'.l..:st 1on 'a,ide f!'nm the .nonng cause in Lhe

';()

case of things that come to he' (so Ross Ox. tr., Apostle).

only in the case of generable individuals that there is a moving cause It is

to be set aside. This case is then illustrated (31-3): there is no other cause (sc. than moving cause) of a potential sphere/ball being an actual one.

Sc. and not even a moving cause in the sort of case we are interested in.

Cp. I045b 22 '<l..Tjv e[ "tL <h~ XLvT\<mv. No further explanation of unity is required than the potential-actual relation itself.

This is clearly the moral, though the construing of 1. 33 presented problems:-

-ro'ih' seems to pick up a.L't'I.0\1: no cause is needed for the cause

(explanatory factor) is just the essence of each. Ross offers two references for 'each':

( 1) the potential ball and the potential man

(so Alexander), to which he objects that the example of man occurs

too ·far back (in any case the example was man, not a potential man); ( 2) the potential ball and the actual ball, i.e. to be a potential sphere

just is to be potentially an actual sphere and to be an actual

sphere just is to be the actualization of a potential one. Should

we have qualms about both these items having an essence, it is perhaps

just another way of putting Ar 's point to say that in the end there

is really only one essence, that of ball.

The above treatment of 31-3 as slightly digressive was challenged

by reference to 1075b 34-7. There the unity of the compound of matter

and form is as much in the centre of focus as the unity of numbers,

and the efficient cause may seem less detachable. But we still do

not want an efficient cause of the unity of numbers. So I075b 36-

7 can be read: nor is it possible to say (sc. what makes these one),

unless you say, as we do (sc. in the appropriate cases), that it is

the moving cause. There ~ nothing to say in the other cases, and

nothing more to say in the case of examples with a moving cause.

Still, perhaps 'digressive' is the wrong label for l045a 31-3.

It might be better to regard the ball/sphere as a nicely perspicuous

concrete illustration from which to extract (by setting aside the moving

cause) a general answer to the general question of 30. For this pur-

pose a ball or bronze sphere (suggested by 0 O'tpoyyul,.o~ xacl..x6~of 26)

would be better than a mathematical sphere.

l(J 1~5a 3U

1045a o3

iG~'5~ If lJATJ von't'Tt is ~he genus (S(J Ross) these lines spell out

the moral just mentioned, transferring the role of potentiality from

the UX.n a.la6Tl't'ft in the generable compound to the generic element in

the definition.

other component.

hut so far no more.

Each \S'~:n plays potentiality to the actuality of the

There is an analogy between genus and matter,

Alternatively, \SXTl 'VOT)'t'fJ is mathematical dimensionality (as at

1036a 9). o!ov 6 X1ix).o<; <TXiiiJCL t?<CJ<&Oov, if Jaeger is right in deleting

it, may be a gloss by someone who took this view. In that case a

stronger thesis could be in the offing: the generic element in a de­

finition is the kind of matter 0£ which instances of the definiendum

are composed, whether it be vo~~~ (as a circle is such and such a plane

figure) or a.[aihJ'tfJ (as ice is frozen water or a ball a spherical piece

of bronze). The genus on this view (christened the B-1-R thesis by

:·larjorie Grene in Synthes~ 1974, after Messrs Balme, A.C. Lloyd and

Rorty) really is (a kind of) matter, not just analogous to it. H2

1043a 14-16 reads nicely on this view, but will all the examples in

H2 come to heel? Biological examples are another issue. It may be

that Ar thought that embryo horses and embryo donkeys start from one

;;md the same generic equine matter, but can we suppose all that to

lie behind the present text?

1045a 36-U There is even less of a problem about the unity of items

which do not have a material component to be unified with an actuality.

They are immediately one. <S1tep lv is the number 1, so ~-xep lv ·u

is 'exactly what some unitary thing is'. Perhaps also: essentially,

as opposed to accidentally, one thing (cf. ~· l86b 17, 31-4).

1-~bich are these items? Not just the categories if b 1 reads 'each

is one, iust as the categories are 0-xEp Ov ·u (no comma after ·a se-

cundum). Just the categories if b 1 reads 'each is one, just as it

is also !'5xep Ov ·n The second option seems to be required by

the fact that the sequel maintains a close parallel between ~v and

r'Sv .. S0 o(,ee:v\. -t06'twV in 5 is 'none of the categories'. The only

~lace where the scope ~i!Y broaden is the 0L6 sentence in b 2-3. This

need not refer just to defining the categories (Ross says really they

~ave no definitions, but cf. Notes on Zeta, p. 6). It could be, rather,

chat the fact that the categorie-s nre immediately €v and Ov explains

:~ny tnese latter are not part of any definititln: they are not ultimate

~enera heynnd the categories (1.6).

L\P l'FR A

1045b 7-17 The <hopCa. (cf. 7-8) at the beginning of the chapter and

at 1045a 25, 29 is an d.xopCn about the unity of definition. What

question about unity does participation answer? Zl2 considers and

rejects participation by genus in differentia as an answer to the unity

of definition, but the issue there is whether, having used participation

to explain how a white man is one thing, you ca11 extend it to the pro-

blematic case of two-footed animal. Similarly, we thought, in H6

participation, a'UvoucrCa. and the rest come up not initially as answers

to Ar's question about the unity of definition, but as answers to ques­

tions of the form 'What is it for there to be a 0 (a case of knowledge/

health/a bronze triangle, etc.)?'. Thus the question to which Lyco-

phren answers <:ruvoU<TCa. 'to\5 l1tCc:rra.oea.L. xa.\ tuxi'lt; is 'What is l7tL.CJ"tftiJ.TJ ? '

(9-11). Cp. 'what is "<O l:;'i'jv I byLa.(v&Lv?

xa.l 6yLdn.; (11-14). Especially revealing formulations are ~( ~b Tbv

xa.).xov eTva.L -<p(ywvov;- ~vee~L<; xa.).xon xa.l "<p<ywuov and TC "<o 'eu-

xov eTva.q - ~6v6e~L<; hL'I><:wda..; xa.l ).eux6"tTJ"to<; (14-17). To the

question, 'What is it for there to be something white?' the participa­

tion of something in white is recognisably an answer, using participa­

tion in the ordinary Platonic way, as earlier at 1045a 18, as a relation

between particular and universal. Ar 's point is diagnostic: it is

because people don't think about the unity of definition in the right

way that their answer to the stated question is participation. It

is an unsatifactory answer to the question it is intended for because

it simply raises, and the Platonists cannot solve, the further questions

'Well, but what is the explanation of participation? What is participa-

tion?' (8-9). As at the end of H2, Ar 's diagnosis of other people's

responses confirms his own. lcrt'a.L. at 13 shows he is elucidating not

reporting.)

Thus what people don't see is that you do not need an explanation

for the. unity of potentiality and actuality (b 16-17). not seeing

this, they postulate, for the cases they are asking about, a bond to

hold the two together (participation, rruvo~C~ , etc.). The inadequacy

of their answers confirms the Aristotelian thesis that the unity of

potentiality and actuality needs no explanation. Which in turn con-

firms that no explanation is needed for the unity of definition (the

case Ar is asking about), once definition is seen in terms of actuality

and potentiality.

43

l 1J45b 7

l(l45b 1 , 1 r::s tii~ (·:TA

Whereas participation is u1;missed on the ~rounds that its propo­

nents have a problem to explain it. implying a philo~ophical debate

)TI the issue, nothing ts said by "t-Jay of critici.sm of rrUvde::cn.c; , oi>v-

6e:O).I.oc;, cruvoiJO"Ca. eLc, ~o doubt they are thou,sht r.o display their

own inadequacy. !~B crUv9e:cYI. c; and 6lO).I.oc; in t£2 were th~rnsclves differen-

tiae/actualities (cp. 1045a 13), not hands betT~~~~en actuality and poten­

tiality. Lycophr0n is further discussed at f~· l85b 25 ff.: his

proposal to eliminate the copula lcrt&. in favour of e.g. 0 ~v6pwxoc; ).e-

'X.e:6xurra.1. fits well enough the idea that his worry ~as about the bond

between subject and predicate, whjch from Ar's present point of view

ts just one case of the ~eneral issue about the unity of potentiality

~nd actuality.

i045b 17-23: textual problems The grounds Ja~ger gives in his appara­

tus crit.icus for enclosing €<J"'ts.. •• ~v 'tl. in the special brackets which

signal 'added by Aristotle' ~how no more than that the end of the papy-

rus roll suffered tattering. Much more puzzling is A.6you tvoxo1.bv

( a tl_~ in Ar but cf. 'I<OLE! ~. 1045a 14ha,\ 6 Lo.cpopd.• (/>Lo.cpo~• ~.

E2 Ab). Suggestions included: (i) xal I>Laq>op6.• means 'i.e. the

differentia', this being what Ar hi.rnself uses in H2 and so Hhat would

in fact satisfy their search for a way of unifying potentiality and

actuality. (ii) The words were added in text or margin by someone

Hho thought that X.6you tvcnto(ov si~nifies the genus. lv1:£Xtxe1.a. (17)

is no problem, as it occurs already H3 i044a 9.

l(J!~Sb 17-23: C"0ntent On 21 ~z, see note (ln l!J45a 30-3; on 25 <5ee note

<m l04'5i1 30-b 7. [hese are straight summa:ry of Hhrtt the chapter has

established. dpTJ1:ClL ([8): it h~s i,een said~ but not in the terms

used hi?re and provided we understand 'ta.6"tb ~al. ~v to mean that form

-'l.nd matter are one and the same thing, i.e. thC'Y constitute a unity.

~<.r'(<i'tl1 ~'XT'I occurs in the sens~ 'proximate mattert at 1035b 30 and

1 in the view of Ross ad lac.) l069b 36, while H4 115ed :!:pW't'Tt for non-

pt<)X.imate 11atter (see note on 1044a 15-2~). So no serious problem

,:ere. 1'.:1-20 compares asklng t1Jr an explanation of 'Nhy pot~ntiality

'.~lAP fF.R r,

and actuality are one with asking for an explanation of why anything

is one. No answer is needed, no separate account of the unity of

a thing has to be added to the account of the thing itself, because

the explanation of the thing is at the same time an explanation of

its being one.

~~onclusion We concluded with a brief discussion of Jaeger's thesis

that H6 as a whole is a later addition by Ar (cf. Aristotle p. 199

n. 2, apparatus criticus ad Met. 1037a 20; cp. Notes on Zeta p. 95).

Our feeling was that without chapter 6 H would amount to very little.

This is the chapter where the distinction between potentiality and

actuality does the work we have been expecting it to do since H2 (See

note on 1043a 12-14 ad fin.).

45

l045b l/

300K THETA

CHAPTER

Note by G.E.L. Owen

Metaphysics

6uva:r6vt56va;n~ in 6 12

As in some other chapters of 6 (4. 1015a 13-17, 11. 1019a 11-14, 16.

1022a 1-3), so in 612 (l019b 35-20a 6) focal meaning makes an express

appearance late and almost as a postscript in the account of 06vet~Lt;/

5 uva/t6v, and here too does not provide complete coverage of uses mar­

shalled in 1019a 32-b 14 (cf. Kirwan ad locc.). But the model seems clear:

Dunamis1

- source of change in another or (in the same thing) qua other

Hence

(l019a 15-16: ll£-tal>oA-t'i

34-35)

includes stopping something, 1019a

Dunaton1

- having dunamis1

(implied at l020a 2; cf. 1019a 33-35, 1046a

20-21)

punaton2

- subject to something else having dunamis1

( 1020a 2-3)

over the first

Dunaton3

- not dunaton1

or 2

( 1020a 3, developed earlier in 1019a 26-

33 and 1019b 5-10, 10-11, where homonymy is threatened in

b 6-10 if a steresis cannot be a positive hexis; hexis apa­

theias at 1046a 13; 1046a 31-35 on stereseis; and 1003b

8-10 for introduction of stereseis, apophaseis and ~

in focal analysis of onta)

(1020a 3-4. He can Dunaton4

- having dunamis1

in some special way

inspire us, but only on Fridays? No, the prime example

is 'well', 1019b 13, 1046a 16-19: see below on 9 1)

It may seem that, while dunamis1

(or its formula) turns up intact in

all the dunaton-definitions when spelt out, dunat~ 1 does not, viz.

not in dunaton4

where the having of dunamis1

is subject to unspecified

'llodifications. But the case is parallel to the analysis of philia

tn EE VII, esp. 1236a 7-33:

'\L ,,

'r.'~lil..Ld·l - \J!Sh/desire for the 50uJ ,;:>d tile j.Jl!:dsant \1Zr1b lrl-19)

~0~2 wish/desire for the ~60d E_,:~r the ,t.:,ent (.:~.nd 30 conditionally

pleasant? l235b 25-26, i2 -15)

l'_hl.~g 3 - wish/desire for the pleasunt for the_il_8_~ (and so seemingly

/lOOd, 1235b 26 -29)

The formula of r._hilia 1 r-e..tppears tn the other (1..;'0 (l236a 20-21, reading

e_as~~ with Bz. Sus. et omn. post.; cf. l046a 15-16, 18-19, 1077b 3-

1~). but •..;ith dlrect qualifications. (TfJ ..::omponent expressions, to

be ..;ure, t<~hereas the qualification in ~naton is to the whole expres­

sion 'having ~unamis 1 ' i but in neither cas~ js it an cxtenlal governing

phra~;e as tn ~naton2 _ 3 or the definitions of ~ in subordinate catego­

ries.) Wi.thout such 'lUalifications 'good' and 'pleasant' are to be

understood haplOs (1236a 7-10), but 'h.~LO's' does not appear in the

recurring formula of phili~ 1 .

66v«;H<;(Ouvo.-t6v in 9 1

There is no sequence of ~namis 2 _4 corresponding to dunaton

2._

4 in !J. 12,

hut it is on ~-namis 1 _ 4 that 91 builds its account (l046a 4-19).

;ource of change in another or (in the same thing) qua

other (l046a 10-11)

P.t!.~~2 - source in patient of change effected by another or (by it-

qua other ( 1046a 11-13. Hut wh·~re is riunamis1

in

We are not to extract, monkeying with an inflection,

'source ... of change ... another or( ... itself) qua vther' .

Rather, as in dunamis3

(1046a 14·-15), after 'by another

or (by itself) qua other' supply 'viz. by a source of change

(something which is/has dunamis 1)'.)

Dun<:~mis 3 -settled state of not being affected for the worse or dest­

royed by another or (by itself) qua other, viz. by what

Ls/has ~unamis 1 (1046a 13-15:

ts >!xplicit)

here the last complement

~unamis 4 _ 6 As in dunamis 1_3

bllt adding 'well' (in some grammatically

·1ppropr1ate form) to exPresslon5 of acting/being acted on

( l046a 16-19. 'These dunameis'

Lo .dl the precedin~ three: but

;,e introduced wtthotlt :J.bsurdity

.1tfected well for the worse',

in 1046a 16 seems to refer

h1)W can the qualification

tn riunamis ? -"---3 'Not being

affected for the worse or

l<:stnJyed by a ·,o\lrc~ or v,o0d ·:hange'? The k.1i in l046a

~~ refers back to l046a 15-16. 1.Jhere the 1_~_!_ ev1dently

,·,)vBrs ~!2~.1,c1mis 1 _ 3 . Perhaps rewrjte €~~.; 'taU l(a,).c]c:; IJ.il 1td.cr­

:(ELV 'X""t\.r0 mark a SpP.cial1y ;;<lmirilble rr.!SJ3!ance to harm.)

104'Sb ~I l>jOT r:S UN fH ETA

fl~namisl~4 (5, 6) correspond .., 11 ffi,:ic;ntly tn the :.,horthand ~un~ton 1 _ 4 of 1::.12. 1046a 6-9 insists that the relation between derivative and

primary cases is more than m:J:re similarity, which '.-muld produce homo-

nymy. (Contrast EE VII l236a 7-33 '.~hich explains p_~ilia by focal

meaning without invoking similarity and EN \'Ill 1156b 19-21, 35-1157a

J, which invokes similarity without using focal meaning; and explain

as you will.)

vative?

What is the str0nger relation bP.tween primary and deri-

(1) A case of ~ in a derivative sense coincides directly with

one of ~~ 1 , viz. ousia. (ii) A case of iatrikon in a derivative

sense seemingly requires but need not coincide wi.th one of !~1 '

viz. iatros. (iii) A case of hugieinvn in one derivative sense ('pre-

servative of h.') requires and may coincide with one of hugieinon1 ,

in others (e.g. 'sign of h.') rloubtful. (iv) A case of philia_ in

a derivative sense does not expressly require one of philia 1 . (v)

cases of dunaton and dunamis in derivative senses seemingly require

.\~d may coincide with some of dunar:on1

, dunamis 1 ~save with dunaton4

if the qualification 'partly' or inadequately is allowed). So here

is no regular requirement, logical priority does not entail natural

priority.

1045b 27-32 The backreference: e:tpma.r.

xpcirtor.c;; "X.6yor.t; to Zl in particular.

to ZH in general, lv "tott;

z 1 asserted ( 1028a 35-6), as

rz did not (pace Notes on Zeta, p. 6) 1 that the account of substance

will enter into the account of the derivative cases, as is implied

here at 31-2 (cp. 46a 15-16). Other backreferences to ZH in 8: (i)

1049b 27--9 'It was said lv -rO.~ 1t€p\ -ri'\~ o!xrCn.; }.t\yoL~ [cf. •ep\ -roil

l'l:p<irt(o' Ov-toc:. I+Sb 271 that everything that becomes {is becoming)

becomes ( i.s becoming) something from ~omethlng and by the agency of

something, and that this l..s the same in form', referring to ZB l033a

24-8, b 29-34a 5; (ii) back in 1 i045b 35-46a 1, "'hat is most useful

for the business ~ in hand is evidently the notion of dunamis - paten-

tiality taken from H6, esp. l045a 20-33: that ~s what we expect to

have discussed, which is why Ar warns us the discussion is to be post­

tJ<JOed until 6. All this suggests that ZH existed as a unit, "uegin­

ni.ng with Zl (tv "tat'~ 1(p!j.rto~c; A6yo~Q, l7-9 be in~ already a proper

part of Z; which is compa(ible Y-'ith the hypothesis of H's pre-existence,

us discussed earlier.

~045b 34-1~6a <.+:

in the strictest

~E..:.~"l_!"!!~· .-\[" j)!"\ T'llses Llrsl 'I) di::;cnss riu~"!_mis

sense, viz. ~""hat which l,as reference to l<inesi~; at

l048a 25-6 he says he has done this. !046a 2-4 promises, secondly,

to treat nther sorts of dt1n_~~-··t!.!~ in distinctions r .. o be m<1de about ener­

geia; 6 1048a 26-7 uses the same expression for '"hat he is about to

do, In general the contrast is mar-kerl by the dominance of dunamis

in the earlier chapters and of '!2:1namei later (thus i.n ~16 dunamei at

l048a 32 (2), b 10, 14, 16, and in 87 at l048b 37, 49a 1, 5, 6, 8-

9. 11. 16. 17. 21, 2 l, 49b 2). In both sections dunaton occurs:

in the first in connection with dunamis, in the second (e.g. 1048a

27, 34, b 6, 14, 16, 49a 4) in connection with ~E~~-~- In '.:18 ~'._lnamts

But in the r akes over as a general ter-m ( 1049b 5, 0, l050a 3, 9).

first section at 93 l047a 24-47b 2 (note 0-~namei 1047b l) and the con­

sequent 94 he enlarges the scope of ~~_naton in anticipation nf the

second section.

We

had before us Owen's comparison of 6 12 and 91. li 12 is fairly straight~

forward. It offers a focal analysis of dunaton, with dunamis occur-

ring in each derivative case. One could p;o on to define ?~amis?_4 on the basis of ~l..ln~-~!!2-4• but Ar does not actually do so, even though

he had distinguished the corresponding senses 0f dunamis earlier in

the chapter (1019a 15-33) and had defined senses of Q~naton therefrom

(33 ff.). In 8t, by contrast, he proceeds from the noun dunamis,

allowing the verb ~unasthai ( l046a 5) and the adjective to tag along.

A new development is the suggestion ( 16-17) that the xa\Wc;; modification

applies to all of ~unami~i-~ and is not j11st a case on its own as at

6 12 1020a 3-4. fh..i.s gave rise to some discussion:-

He are first introduced to the case as the sense of 'can' in which

rme may deny that a ·lrunk man staggering and slurring can wa~k and

calk ll\12 1019a 24-6), Ihe rhoHght lS that ther-e is a sense in which

it may be said that he can do these thin!<;s (for there he is doing them)

<tnd therefore, i..f it is also correct to denv that h8 can, lt must be

Ln a different sense of can , viz. 'can properly' nr something of

the sort. rhus the adverbial aodifier xa.AWc;, xa.-tl\ ~poaCpEO"'Lv, etc. 1

~I)~ )h 14

1046a 4 ,~OILS 1:N THETA

occur in analyzanst not in the ordinary language analyzandum. The

drunk's walking and talking is an example of a denial of dunamis1

modi­

fied. /J. 12 1019a 26 .already indicates that dl1namis2

can be similarly

modified, e.g. perhaps 'This land can be cultivated [sc. with a fair

level of success I'. But '"'heredS 1:!.12 deals with this before going

on to ~.; .. , &.xa.eeCa.c; at 1019a 26, 91 reverses the order in such a way

that it is hard not to think that ~~1.c; &.xa.BeCao::; is included among these

buvd.J..!£1.<.; at 16 and covered by ll.Od'}OU.I. f} ·1ta.8e!v at 17.

an example be of an adverbially modified ~~"c; O.m6e;(a.~?

What would

Start, as

before, with a denial: 'this plant can't stand feast' - it is not

that it is dead in the morning but that it does not look at all happy;

thus in one sense it can stand frost (it does not die), but not in

the sense in which we say of a plant which still looks fresh and bloo-

ming that it can stand frost. We also thought of the distinction

between 'combustible' (can be burned) and 'tnflammable' (can easily

be burned).

Nevertheless, it is a question whether, for any of these cases

(dunamis4

_6

), an adverb in the paraphr.:tse is sufficient proof of a

distinct sense of 'can'. Perhaps they belong with 'There's a man

for you [ sc. a real man]' and should be explained in terms of what

a speaker can do with the ordinary sense.

Another doubt abnut Ar' s present project was whether adding a

reference to dunamis 1

or, if need be. the account of dunami~·t actually

helped to elucidate dunamis2

or dunamis3

. Being changed is of neces­

sity being changed by some agent, but why put that into the definition

of the capacity to undergo or to resist change?

1046a 6-9 fhe cases 'Which are excluded to avoid homonymy can scarcely

be understood except by reference to 4 12, just alluded to. Two cases

seem to be envisaged. (a) the geometer's :se of 66vau~c; for 'square',

explained 0!-10<6-rmC nv< (46a 7) or xa.-riJ. L<ETO.q>op<iv 1612 10l9b 33-4)

[Alex. ~n liet. 394, 34-6: it is 0 66va.'fal. f1 11::\.eupd., similarly Anon.

in Plat. Theaet. 27, 31 ff .}. (b) certain things we say are Ouvo't&

"<.'l.t a.OUva.'ta. 'tif e:Tva.t ?tWc; 11 ).Jh e:Tva.l., which seems Lo refer t0 what

l:.l2 1019b 14 calls Ouva:tl'L o6 xn'tO. 06vn.~Hv: C<o!tt.::lin thjn~s ar"} possible

and imposslble not 1n

not being the case in

'Tletry - at t::. 12 l019b

virtue of a capacity but in virtue ot being or

the manner discussed - with an example from geo-

22-33. But the discussion itself is full of difficulty: see Kirwan ~-----!:.2.£. On (a), note that the likeness in

terms of which it is explained rests on the ~thematical use of 6Uva.crea.,;

the mathematical sense is not derived via likeness or metaphor from

a non-mathematical one.

1046a 19-29 On the question tvhether the dunamis of poiein and cor-

related paschein is the same or different, cf. ~· III 3 on the ques-

tion whether the kinesis in teaching-being taught is the same or diffe-rent. The latter, after familiar paradoxes, is solved by arguing

~hat the change is the same but under different descriptions appropriate

to the two parties involved (202b 19-22: i..e. not identical kuriO's).

This change • however, is located in the patient, whereas the active

dunamis 0f our present chapter remains in the agent.

\S\11 as O.px-ri 't'~C:: (23) does not mean it is an

is a passivity. agent but that it

at 216 l040b 15, in view ofA 3 1070a 10-11,

we first thought it better to transpose~ O""Uf.1q>6<n:~ afterq>6a'et. , as

heLonging to natural formations (Aquinas supplies complantatio, grafting,

which seems neutral); but editors recur toGA 773a 2, where 0"1.)J.!~Eq>1JX 6'ta are connected with 't'tpa.'ta (773a 3-4) and with some non-evident as well

JS evident <iv<b:11pa. ( 77 3a 13). This would lead us to believe that

ilt l040b 15-16 ailuq>IJO"'I.c; could be taken as xT!poxnt:. (But we were not

moved to excise )Jl] at 1070a 10). Here ln 8 there is no suggestion

of malformation, and this with A may make the transposition at l0 40b

15 (nnt recorded in the Notes on Zeta) persuasive.

!G46a 19-35 Incapacity. To be compared with i.\ 12 l019b 15-21.

'tL-\i'iER i l

l046a 36-46b Ross does not annotate the lines, Lut two pages on

them will introduce the chapter.

of logvs/ logon echon: (a) EN

Cumpare some familiar 0ccurrences

13 also contrasts ~~ (1102a 30,

h 14-15, 17, 24-28) and to logon ech•Jn (1102a 28, apparently identified

with .!..Q_g_~ l102b 14-15) with another element in the soul, to alogon

(1102a 26-28).

11) and orektiko~ (lt02b 28-31) of which the first is a dunamis and

marion of the soul (1102a 34, b 4-5). To logon echon, both in its

prime sense and in its derivative use of the obedient ~r-~ktikon ( 1103a

1-3), is considered in terms not of gunamis but of h~xis and a rete

(!lOla 9-10). So there is no consideration here of l~ as providing

a dunamis tOn enantiOn, as there is in ~let. 8 2 (l.OI16b 4-24). The

enkrates and akrat€s are equally praised for the it: ~~gos ( 1102h 14-

16); what provides the opposition is ~~~~. t.he horma.!_ which

defeat prohairesis (1102b 16-21).

(b) It may lJe reflection on this lumping of all logos under good logos

that prompts EN VI 13 to stress orLhos log(JS (1144b 23-28). V 1 ll29a

ll-13 has already pointed out that ~~name is and ~pistemai, unlike hexeis,

are of opposites (just as in Met. 9 2 1046b 7-14 ~pisteme is the !..0~

of opposites); so EN VI 13 insists on the orthos which turns the ~ogos

into a hexis (or at least a well-directed piece of rPasoning) confined

to producing one opposite (e.g. health. for the doctor). This does

not of course imply two types or parts of a logos, any more than the

·:;kill in hurting-or-healing is a different sk.ill from that of the depen-

dable healer: the dunam.:i_~ of the first can be channelled into the

hexis of the second.

(;:) If this ts so, the logos which is embodied in c!_~nameis meta logou

,:1 ~2 is the unrestricted tmchannel1·~d !._g~ implied by the contrast

wtth orthos in r:N VI 13 ll44b :~3-21~, 27-28. 9 2 does not indeed speak

oi J:l~xeis; but later in 95 1048a 13-15 Ar. proposes qrexis or prohai­

C?Sis as factors which determine che rational ~~~amis in one of its

t '.~·o direct ions. EN VI LJ on the other hand does n("_ "'-peak of h_1_2_8.Q§_

dunamis tOn enantion; but earlier in VI 12 1144a 6-11 Ar says

t!"lat phronesis and ethik€! arete respectively make the means and the

dim (}rtha, and then says that of the fo'J.rth part of the soul. the tJ1rep­

-:_!--ls:_O_f.!.• there iS !10 such a._!"~-~. for this part has nothing Which it iS

:2

in its power to do or not to Jo. The other three parts in this con-

text - epistemonikon, 12..s.ist iko_!! and o~~~ikon - are therefore by con-

t rast rational dunameis in the sense given in 92. So EN VI 12-13

and Net. 8 2 are compatible and imply the same scheme, and both are

more sophisticated in their account of ~~ than EN I 13.

But at one point 82 may seem less sophisticated than EN VI 13:

meta logou This recalls the insistence of EN VI 13 that

<1~ is a ~xis not merely kat a ton orthon logon but meta tou or thou

l.OJ>.211 (ll44b 26-27, 30). It does not merely conform to, it C!mbodies,

the right logos.

component. But

So in 8 2 rational dunameis have logos as an essential

subsequently at A2 l046b 22-23 Ar reverts to kata

logon; and similarly in AS he uses kata logon as well as meta logou

(l048a 2, 13; l048a 3) in discussing the operation of rational dunameis.

But this does not mark the greater sophistication of EN VI 13. For

Ln both 02 and Rs Ar is careful to use ~eta logou of the dunameis but

i_.;_ata logon of the dunata possessed of such dunameis. The logos is

a defining component of the rational dunamis but not so, or not directly

so, of what has the ~unamis. This may be because •.-Jhat is now dunaton

:nay subsequently l<)Se the_dunamis and therewith the logos, or vice

versa ('by forgetting, or some accident, or the lapse of time', 93

l047a 1); but the ~unamis cannot lose the logos. Alternatively, con­

->ider the examples of kath' ho given in 6 18 1022a 14-17: that in virtue

qf '...rhich a man is good is the good itself (here called the eidos and

:>usia: ps. Alex. supplies handier examples, statue and man, 414. 31-

32); that in virtue of which a thing is coloured is the natural primary

possessor of colour, the surface. Thus that in virtue of which a

thing is dunaton enantiOn is the logos or logon echon which primarily

houses the dunamis tOn enantiOn. It may he objected that the l_~

is not the primary_ dunaton, since it Ls rather than has the dunamis.

But this may be met by (a) referring to the good-itself in 1022a 14-

16 (property an<! prime possessor?), or (b) observing that the ~unameis

'lre themselves described in language appropriate to agents, e.g. at

.q5 1048a 5-10, or (c) recalling the interchangeability of \~ and

_logon echon, the latter hein.g evidently a possessor 0f the relevant

(~namis.

_!:__Q_~6b 1-2., etc.: _1~~ Ln EN I 13 Ross consistently translates ~ogos

':-"ltional princlple', doubt dVotding 'reason' <:~s part of the old

o3

l\J46b 1 '10TES ON THETA

debate he cites in his note on the tr. ·Jf EN J '3 1U95a 10. In EN

VI 13 he translates it 'rule or r<J.tional principle' (l144b 29-30),

and orthos logos 'right rule' (l141•b 23, 26-28). In VI 13 logos is

indeed put into the plural, 1 i.ke episteme, in reporting Socrates' views

(1144b 29), but Ar. keeps to Lhe singular hims~lf, e.g. in identifying

phronesis with ortho~ at 1144b 27-2&. In ~let. 9 2 and 95 Ross

tr. logos 'rational formula', though he lr. loe>on echon at 1046b 1

as simply 'rational'.

If logos is put on a footing with threptikon-phutikon-orektikon

in EN I 13 and with phronesis in EN VI 13, it is natural to translate

it 'reason' or '(power of) reasoning', with the possible addition of

'about ... ' for a dependent g~nitive, e.g. in 92 1046b 8-13. It is

not a 'formula' (or 'rule' or 'principle') which uses denial and removal

to exhibit the opposite; it is reasoning about e.g. health which must

mark it off from its enantion or ~teres is, though health must remain

the basic idea (92 l046b 10-15).

l046a 36-b}_ What does X6yo~ mean? Thert?: are two main views, that

it means rational principle or rule (Ross), and that it means reasoning

or power of reasoning, sometimes

subject (see end of Owen's note).

specified as being about a certain

We preferred the 1 at ter. One

might ask how a power of reasoning about something could &TJA.oiiv things

(1046b 8, 14): doesn't Ross have the advantage here, since a formula

could already 'exhibit' something, without needing to be put into words?

But to exhibit opposites seems to need rather a bunch of formulas,

and tt seems better to say the power of reasoning exhibits them via

such a bunch. Similarly reasoning about health could exhibit both

health and disease, which a single formula couldn't, as it rioesn't,

so to speak, carry its negation in its pocket. Nor need we be troubled

by the thought that, with \.6yot; as 'reasoning'. A6yoc; 6 a.i>'"r6t;; at b 8

ought to be replaceable by something like rpp6vry:nc; 1'1 a.b't""ft which would

sound odd: b 7-8 shows a shift from reasoning as a power to reasoning

about something, i.e. a specific exercise of the power. How could

knowledge have a power of reasoning (b 17)? Well, it could 'have'

(in an etiolated sense) powers of reasonin~ about a giv~n subject.

llAPTF:R 1.

In fact, since A.Oyo~ is often interchangeable \.Jith \6yov Exov, b 17

could have had --rijl \6yot:; Eiva.c. as easily as -rq, A6yov £'X£LVa Of course

we are not saying A.Oyoc; never means formula (at 1032b 2-6, where it

is again associated with opposites, it seems to mean form); but •..;hen

it does mean formula an 61t6(pcunc; gives a different formula, which it

doesn't here (b 13: incidentally we saw no significant distinction

between t:7t6q:Kl.O'LC: and d.1tocpopd.).

At b Alexander reads 1tOLll'Hxa.t xa.l 11t t'tLO"'ti';~<H (xat without

a!: recc.), which separates the crafts from the sciences. We preferred

the standard 7t:Jt..TJTLxat l:7tc.cr"t1;~a.L, with the preceding xnC being epexege­

tic. We thought Ar didn't bring in 7tpax-rc.xat l7tLO"'t"-r,)..la.c. here because

he was concerned with 0:\Ao lv U\Xql cases, and also the 7tpax-r~xcd. txc.<Tt-r,­

f.lO..L are concerned to oppose doing to not doing, not to oppose doing

something to doing its opposite.

On the xa.-rn \.Oyov I ~e-rO. A6you question (b 2: j..l£-rd, , b 22: xa-cd )

agreed in the main with Owen's note, though we thought the point

mj_ght be simply the one about Xct-rd, unlike 1-lE'td., not applying to a

defining component, so that 618 wasn't needed. We noted noncommittally

the view of Hardie (Ar's Eth. Theory, pp. 236-9, preceded by J.A. Smith

[CQ, 1920]) that Nic. Eth. says not that j..J.E't"d.. gives a stronger condition

than x.a.-cd.,

one which

but the reverse, and that there are two types of virtue,

is both -.:a.'td and iJ.E"td , and one which i.s merely ;...i£'t<i, the

\l_rthos logos.

1046b 3-24

1046b 13: 'PO~ov ''va X~,& rru~e~~x6, signifies the way in which

knowledge of, say, health also involves knowledge of diseases.

1046b 15 The premise introduced by lxe:( doesn't seem to be used in

this chapter. But it is relevant in 9 5, where the thread is taken

up again from after a diversion in 93 and A4, and it is effectively repeated at 1048a 9. The point there is that somet.hing is needed

to decide which way the rational potencies act. and 5p£;;L c; and JtpoaCpe::-

are offered. This could have been said in q 2, and could per-

'5

i D4fla 36

------------------~----------------------~~~--~~~

lQip')b l:) 'WTES IJ~ THETA

1aps have been 11sed against tl)e '1egarians in 9 3, Lhough they might

just deny that any deciding had to be rl.one. The C.pxh x L v'licrf;wc;; of

b 17 and b 21 doesn't seem L') do the trlck, and seems to be simply

the A.6yoc; itself, if <ipx1'! at b 24 has the same reference. A" 2 also

doesn't raise the analogous quest1on about the nonrational potencies:

•,;hat triggers them off? - though here the trigger may be something

external, as ~,.:hen something is heated by being pushed towards a fire.

{Indeed the nonrational potencies too can be potencies of opposites,

though only per accidens, as in the rather unfair example of hot gas

working a refrigerator, or as when healing, especially Greek healing,

involves hurting.) Anyway when the heating 5'6vn)JLC:: is triggered it

produces heat. Analogously a cational potency when triggered should

produce both the relevant opposites, which, as b 15 says, is absurd.

Something more is needed, which doesn't come till 95, while 82 turns

to elaborating rational potenci~s at b 20 ff. One suggestion was

that b 20 itself provides a role for the l1teC clause by answering it:

the opposites are united by a single A6'(oc:: which shows how powers

for opposites are pvssible despite the l1teC clause. But it was pointed

out that if the l:xsC clause is relevant at all it should affect the

nonrational potencies too, in so far as the heating 66vnf .. Hc; covers

cold as well as hot, albeit per accidens. b 15 f f. would anyway be

awkwardly expressed if the above suggestion lay behind it.

What does 1tpbc; 'tO nb't6 refer to? Two suggestions: ( i)

1\n object we are operating on, e.g. a piece of paper we are making

black or white. The soul, starting from one and the same ~px-fJ, i.e.

\6yoc;, sets both the opposite processes in motion, connecting them

ro~ether with a view to putting now one now another (or: putting one

or the 0ther) of the alternatives (black and white) into the same piece

,1f paper. (ii) The same thing as aJ<o ~i'io <Lb-rijc; <ipxn<: refers to (cf.

':he equivalence of 1tp0c; ttv and d~'tvdc; in focal meaning, and other

,·onnections between 1tp6' and &~6). The soul, starting from the \6yoc;

(.as above) sets the opposite processes in motion, -:::onnecting them with

r~spect to that same d.p):'..,C, or )..6yot; only not symmetri~ally (o6x 6J....l.o(wc;:

~t c\1oo<>es nne :Jlternative rathr!r than the other). ( i) seems to

)6

cHAPTER 2

involve taking o~x ~1-1oCwc:: as obx t'f!-la, which would seem to require some-

thing like l:v )JfpEL rather than o-uv<i+aou. Also (i) doesn't explain

how the asymmetry ( o~x 6jJ.oCwc; applies to the A.6yoc; itself (b 20),

even granting that there is an asymmetry in the sense of a difference

between 'the processes themselves (blackening and whitening). ( i)

also reads a lot into 7tp6<;;, and one would expect rather the dative

(t~ n6't~ for 1tp0c; -,;0 a~-r6). We therefore inclined towards (ii), re­

ferring for o6x 6~oCw<; to b 9-10 (f.'ll"l-"l.ov) and b 12-3 (~p61<ov HVIL ••• );

the asymmetry there will be that, whatever it may be, which is involved

in cr>tlpr~nc;;. ( (ii) might read more easily if CL)J<PUJ is taken only with

a-uvd.+-a..aa., xLvf,o-eL having no expressed object; but this would give

the clause an awkward structure.)

EJAb read 'pb<; 0-6~6 for "Pb <; ~b 0-6~6.

We noted en passant that at b 22

l046b 22-3 similarly evoked two views. (a), in the spirit of (i)

above, says the rational Ouva.'td. do opposite things to the nonrational

Ouva:td. (taking 'totc; ••• Ouva:totc; with 1tOLEt'), while (b) says the rational

6uva't0. do the opposite to what the nonrational 5uva'td. do (taking 'tote;; ...

Ouva:toi:'t:; with 'td.vav'tCa.). (a) treats the object of rational action

as passive Ouva'td. and seems committed to calling all passive Ouva'td.

nonrational (if not indeed vice-versa); it deals with this by saying

that passive powers that seem to be rational (e.g. the ability to be

taught by one method in preference to another) are really active powers.

(a) perhaps has the advantage that the fJL9- clause follows on more

naturally, the subject of 1tEpLfxe:'tac. being the nonrational Ouva.'td.,

if we can think of them as being encompassed in their capacity as pas­

sive 5uva.'t({ by the ).6yoc; (the power of being whitened is, being non­

rational, a different power from that of being blackened, but they

are united by being both subject to a A.6yoc; which decides whether to

whiten or to blacken). Also 1tO~Ei: 'td.vnv't'Ca seems a rather strong

phrase for (b) - though perhaps it is just a stock phrase meaning 'acts

differently'. For (b) the subject of 1{£pLtXE'tal. is the rational

Ouva'tci, which is awkward unless one can taken the 6 L6 clause as paren-

thetical with the yd.p referring back across it. On the other hand

(b) fits the chapter as a whole better for the nonrational powers must

~urely be being thought of as active because of uta tv6' at b 6: this

57

l046b 2l

l_l)'t6b 22 :;JTES ON THETA

won't apply to the passive powers if paper can be blackened as well

as whitened, (We did not discuss thE: nominative reading of AbJ:

,...Cn y~ d.pxt].) We all agreed, however, that Ar is showing that in

s()me sense there is the same <ipxf! of opposites.

l046b 24-28 In the first clause (24-26) d.xo)...ov8E! can be taken

in the sense of 'is implied by' , but in the following clause ('ta.U't";J 6'

~xe:Cvn obx &.e:C, 26) this seems difficult - in most cases it isn't just

that the ability to do something doesn't always imply the ability to

do it well; it doesn't ~ it at all, though it may sometimes be

accompanied by it. We considered four possibilities:

a) .:ixo~ou8£! = 'accompanies' throughout, and ri£ C is to be understood

in the first clause.

b) &.xaA.ouBe:;t "" 'is implied by' in the first clause, but is understood

only as meaning 'accompanies' in the second.

(c) Aristotle is thinking of cases where to be able to do something

at all does imply being able to do it well. But in such cases the

qualification 'well' is redundant.

(d) It was pointed out that, in ordinary speech, 'isn't always implied'

might be natural enough, though inexact, for 'isn't ever implied, but

sometimes is the case'.

But what are these remarks doing at this point in any case? They seem

to relate to e1 l046a 16-19, but not, apparently, to anything earlier

in 92. We concluded that they are a note which had been placed here

for want of a more appropriate place; or, perhaps 1 an answer to a point

made by one of Aristotle's audience?

CHAPTER THREE

Note by G.E.L. Owen

The Megarians:

(to ·~hich school it now appears that Diodorus Cronus did not belong:

Sedley, Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc. cciii (1977) 74-120; so Sorabji,

I N_~cessi!:._y_, Cause and=-__t

58

I) Q

11)46b 29

64, 106. But Diodorus may rear a head on one interpretation elf 1047a 13-14 sub ~ infra,

l046b 29-30 X can F only when X does F; when X does not F X cannot

f. (i) For values of verb 'F' cf. 1047a 28-29: they include not

only kineseis and staseis but einai and gignesthai and their negations,

and these were introduced at l047a 11~13 together with the quite general

kinesis kai genesis at l047a 14. In other words 1 although 93 begins

with examples (building, seeing) that would suit the account of dunamis

in R 1-2, as a whole it covers all forms of ~/energeia and so

belongs with A4. As takes up from 92.

(ii) Notice that Ar is interested only in the form 'cal>'jdoes',

not in 'does"'*-an', which is not in question.

(iii) X can F at time t ...... X does F at time t: this brings out

a possible ambiguity, between can jump-at-t and can-at-t jump. (a)

The arguments in l046b 33-47a 10 about house building and seeing etc.

seem to need only the second formula: X is not now a housebuilder because he cannot-now house build. (b) The comparable construction

with pephukenai (see under !. below) seems rather to want the first

formula, is naturally apt to F-at-t. (c) At l047a 12-17 Ar uses

against the Megarians the idea of can-now F-in-the-future; given the

choice between ~ and can-now F, this is more naturally an appli-

cation of the

distinction:

X can F-at-t:

second, But the Megarians can surely not allow the

for them X can-at-t F stands in mutual implication with

when X has the power, it is the power of doing what

X does at that time. Confusing the two may be one source of their

thesis, and the confusion is not met by amending 'doing what X does

at that time' to 'doing what X could do (sc. has the power to do) at

that time', which threatens circularity or regress,

activity is entailed by capacity . So concurrent

l046b 34-36 • ~i~s~a~h~o~u~s~e~b~u=i=ld~e~r~--~X~ca~n~~ho~u~s~e~b2u~i~l~d (and so for all

~)

l046b33-34, from !'. and g: building

X is a housebuilder only when X is house-

l046b 36-47a 2: (i) X has an art; X has learnt and acquired that art

59

l '::tob \f)

[[)

[][)

(ll) X does not ~2'~~~-t (sc. aheady a.v{uir<::d)

~ X has lost the art, bv forgetfulne"?_~_::>r some

pathos ~~.l.9J~ .. :~ ... ~---2.!_ time, the obJeCt surviving

bi:!caus~~s eternal_

'.·.'hat ubject? The art of building? But i•;r the Hegar·ians this, even

if t:-:ey concede g_!.. j s temporary and particular.

The troubles of Z 7-9 are upon us.

The !!c·use in house­

Ross proposes 'the

form ot the house', but will the l1egarians accept the theory? Ps.-

Alex. 571. 6-11 proposes the brick~~. but these are not eternal (and

a_<:_~~ cannot be reduced to 'st~ll survive' v.:ithout reduplication)·

~~~.:_.-~ from ~ and ?._: ',Jheneve..£_~ stops housebuildi~ he does not

1~a_v_~.:_-~h8 art; whenever he starts ;:,gair~ he (~~il·

How Lhen does he (re)acquire it? Viz., from ~ ( i), •,..1here does the

l,:arning occur? (The ~·1egarians, unl.-~ss they jib at g_, 1.vill presumably

reiect ~_.)

.~i-~t_!:letr-m = what can be perceivr.>d)

L!}_!~J_~. from~: There_~e perceptibles, e.g. cold, ht?.~weet,

only when perceiving is going on. (Presumably accepted by the Megarians.)

(A)-~thesis echein e.g. ~.!!_=can perceive, e.g. see)

10~7~-~: X Joes not have sight, thol~S natu~gy_ apt_to have

it, .1nd •Nhen it is naturallY apt to have it, and in th~~~~

tut ~X is blind.

(i) For hon t r~ in 104 7a 9 J.1eger- cites 104 7b 29, l048a 1, and

CJ.i.>;ht have Lited 1022b JO, 1046 a 13-34.

··: still ~xists'.

Othepvise the banal 'and

~ Li) fnr hate pephuke cf. [llZ 10l9b 17-18, 12 l012b Zl-29, 9[ l046a

\1~31; rhe second passage explains that to lack 3ight is not blindness

1 t c:ery d~e, though in general l.t is natural for the dnimal to have

:t. tiere tht! r~mporal qualification seems to attach rather r,o the

I"~~ t:han to the !)_~2.:..~.-t~ (cf. the ~J.e at L01.9h 18); the ·.mqualified

·'·~-e~':!~~n-~~~- belongs <lt all (Jges; what does not belong is e_<::2__hukenai

;)c~!"_1. .. ~~.:rephos-on.

:·~~7_-:~ 1 from P and U: The same man will __ .S:_ill_,~d rnany times a

:l.~y. lThe Xegarians may re1ect 1_: as ill-formed or false.)

l~J_·::J.G!__lg__::J.J_: ~ack:!-ng capacity ( P.ster;menon dUl}-ameOs) -) adunaton

C.~~ 1 l046a 29-10. ?erhaps needlec;s, but see 1,n L•J47a 13-14 below.

w l~~L:ia 12-14 What is udunaton genesthai nclt:her is nor ' . .Jill be - for

this is what 'adunaton' ;neant

\~hat and where? (a) Perhaps • . .;hat 1s intcnd~d is that tdunaton genes-

thai either (i) implies ur ( i i)

( ii) gives us Dindorus; ( i) seems sufficient. But,

firstly, where has Ar said either? ;.lot e.g. in !J. 12 0 r 81 l046a 29-

35. Secondlyt why should the Hegarians accept either, when they Hant

only present performance or non-performance to have Logical connections

\.Jith ~QI13I~ton or adunaton? (b) Perhaps then it is that adunaton :

<J_u_~~r:_~.9_!!, implied at 1047a ll~l2, cf. l047a 16~17; 50 far the argu­

ment has Leen conducted wholly in terms of Q.'.:!. and ~. apart from a

different ~ at 1046b 36. Or (c) it is that ~unato~ -== estere­

menon duname'Os, taking '!_ as a two-way implication: cf. ~ 12 1019b15-

22, ~ 1 l046a 29-35. Cut neither (b) nor (c) is important to the argu~

ment, 1Jnless either s_tere"sis or a"?.:!!!amia is illicit 1 v 1 mported as im-

In any event \.Jhere will Aristotle

then tird his ~. 1;1hich ~legarians :Jill reject on grounds given under

(an

_!_047a ll=J_?_.L_ll_J._?_, from~ and\'!: What -~-S _ ___!2_?_':_~~1.~~!__!) __ ~?.!~

112_":?_~ !ien~ __ there is no __ chan~.

The Hegarians. We had before us Owen's notes; '"hat follows should

be read in conjunction with them. The thesis under discussion is

stated at 1047a 29 f.: x can only 1p if* he is .:p-ing, and (the equi-

valent), if* x is not <p-ing x cannot 'P. (The quest ion was raised

\.Jhether the position of )..L6vov in 30 was not rather odd, hut the sense

w;~s in any case clear.)

l.

Six possible interpretations of this thesis were distinguished:

X dnesn't have the ability to (I{) while not r.p-ing),

Contradiction.)

<The Law of

2. If x is not '-ing at time t he has thrown away the 11pportunity

,)f ~-ing at t. (the 'irrevocability of the l'r8~>ent'; ,_f, perhaps

'1e Interpretatione 9 19a 23. Perhaps:

n0t, at t, able to i.p at t.)

~,\rlstotle has not 'tf' hut '•..Jhenever: ')!1 11)4/a 10~14.

Lf x does not 4' at t, x is

ct. f"Jrther h·~low, und

'\ l a 1-'• ,;!-'fA

L [f x '.PS at cerca~n times, :"" L1cks :-h·~ abl J it) Lo .;> ·n 0ther times.

~Or : if x does not '='at certa1n tir'les, he ~":.~_£ held ttw abillty to

IJ) dL those ~imes. The tlwsis nC d·~t·::rr:unism.)

4. ff xis nr)C •,;.-jng nmv, he 1ar_ks r:he al)11i.:--y :'l ·; (u~:il 'ne recr)verq

the ability- in r_he way in · . .Jhich someo!le '.~'h:; i:H1 t a builder can't

h•..1ild a house until he learns <-o b:Jild, r)r .1: blind man c,m't s~e until

lns ab~l1ty t-J se:: is restorer!),

lf x is not tp-i.ng rhJ:.·, he

a man is sitting now, h•:o. can't ~et up here ~nd now), [':'his seems

at first sight W'~aker chan :., C11t is d·-::rually stronger. s~mt:~lY infers

U1e absence of the ability at present from !"rqrperformance of the .:1cti8n

at present. 1-Jut ledves 1nr:ac.:t the aor'Tlal ;iew tf];;1t abilitif:'s 'lldY he

d'.:qu 1 red (jf lo.::;t. 5 hrJ'•iev<:!r implies (bel o•.,.J';

;_mplies that I can't get 1.1p 'th(o!re ,1nrt ._ht:!n' (? in Ll.e 'rwxt 'f!G:nent',

1...f there were such a thing) I musL t:l~~n be sitting at- the, '11<.~Xt moment',

U' •..Jhich case I c.Jn't p;et up dt th~ one Rtter tilat, ,:nd ~:;o rrn. Given

rhe infinite rlivi~ibiL.ty cf time c~.nd the sonsequenL absence ot 'next

moments', one mi~ht Lndeed ar~ue th:;,.',_ 6 i3 av0ided hecduse, starting

But

this simply shows that the expression 'h~re and now' ~~equires further

ana 1 ys is .

fi. f£ x: js notf.P--ing now,

( L. e.: he now lacks the

it 1.<:: not ncJssible that ll·~ r:-·-er wil.l ~·

ahility l_q T·, and dl_~Y.2_~~..!..!_ lack that

1.bili ty. C E • t)e 1 ow on 1 U ~ 14 • )

)[ these, 1--2 ':tppe-'l.r to l:Je tr.uLsms, and 3 ts <1 1 _st a thesis

':.hat many have maintaj ned. \ri.'-itotle in this chapter first of all

~r'.tel pr.et the ;-.tegrtrian thesls i_:l ">'-"t\Se !,, and th~n (fr,Jm l047a 10)

lmulying 1:1. fhe lll!tidl sLdlement sEems ,:cm.r':F.lble <.!ith a11y c)[

·, t ( h'Jt r•or- vit h '',

'if' does olOr-, that DFi t h':' Hegarians

;1•:-mselves lntend 4, or is it '1n i.ntecpr, :A.ru:n LliJ:- Arisrotle has

lorced on to th,em in order to d~..:mol.L·.h i.-?

lmbiguit? ·Jf t!le r:hesis may reflect confusion Llett...'een

:f 'Plitt, not-p05Sible not-tp-;:;!;t-r (1-i above).

; f 'D at t, not-p:nsible-at.··t not-ltl (4-6 above),

~ rs, tf Lts tmplic.dti.on:; are ,,.-Jt SJ:'Pll~d 'l'lt 1 •

o2

the

But did the Megarians themselves - whoever they were - make this

confusion, or has Aristotle foisted it on them? If they did only

themselves intend the former (1-3), it was noted that 1 and are so

obvious that there seems little interest in stating them; \vhich leaves

3 · It was also remarked that Aristotle discusses the distinction

between 'if you are sitting, you cannot stand/be standing' and the

truism 'you cannot be-standing-if-you-are-sitting' at ~· 4 166a

24, as an example of the fallacy of composition (and cf. ibid. 20 177b

22 ff ·) • without suggesting that it makes a special point about possi­

bility, or that it derives from a particular school; he is alive to

the ambiguity both there and in ~ 1. 12 281 b a. [This ambi­

guity is slightly different from the one above; for here it is 1-2

that are most naturally covered by the latter formulation, leaving

3 as well as 4-6 to be covered by the formulation 'if you are sitting,

you cannot stand/be standing.]

The Megarians' point, it was suggested, was that at any one moment

there are only two states of affairs that may obtain; either you are

<p-ing, or you aren't. So no room is left for 'possibility'. This

is reminiscent of the 'Reaper' paradox, given by Ammonius in de Int.

131. 24 ff., with no statement as to its origin, and also mentioned

by Diog. Laert. 7. 25, 44 (interest of Zeno and Stoics generally in

it; also Lucian, SvF 2. 287. Sedley links it with Diodorus' Dialectical

school; PCPS no. 23 (1977) 98 and n. 135).

l-3 are most naturally stated in terms of possibility, rather

than of potentiality or ability, unlike 4; cf. further below.

It was remarked that, if 3 was intended in the thesis rather than

or 2, this could have been made explicit if we had had 5uvT)8~va.c.

rather than 6uva.m><tL in 1046b 29-31.

1046b 29-33 can be taken in any of senses 1-5 (though it may be

felt that the example at b 30-32 is already tilting the balance towards

4, because of the most natural way of taking 'cannot build a house';

has Aristotle added his own, loaded, example to the initial Me gar ian

the sense of ability, rather than possibility, which

already implied by 66va.m>cu in b 29-30?). A definite

thesis? Or is

leads towards 4,

shift to sense 4 comes at 33 ff., ·..,ith the additional premiss 'being

a builder is being able to build' ("' 'if one is not able to build one

b3

,1't a builder') where 'ability' foas the force it has in ~~.

b 34 (ur .. lltl"t

; ,""j be Cl:l.Swer•;d in •.o~hat follows).

preferred oUO' as ou't doesn't

N. B.

seem

(i) xp6v~ refers to 'i species

)f \f!Ehl , which may also he immediate; <_ii) )..flAT) forgetfulness

,'IS a characteristic of some individuals, xp6vql refers to an inrerval

"t time 'lfter which anyone mi'Sht tr~ expected to l!avR forgotten; (iil.)

vo6v~ loss of capacities with old age; (iv) xp6v!f refers to loss

1f 3.n art by failure to practise j t, where it ,,1ight not always be natu-·

··.1i. (in Greek'!) to refer to .f.9..E_gett.l!!ai (·,·) tbe loss of arts thrClugh

n·Jtural disasters - but this is not relevant her~, where it is loss

hy the individual that is in questl.on.

~4_?.2 __ ?: The point of this is clearly to ~xclude some other way in

,.1hich one might no longer have an drt: but '.vhat is the ·;n;piiyua.?

~ ~) The form of house (quite generally). No probl~m wRs felt over

Aristotle introducing his o...,-n b~liefs in argument l'!.gatnst the t1egarians.

:1tere t:tight be difficulties if the only forms that there are are indivi­

·hal forms which pass in and out of existence; but there is also the

Hfficultv nf n"tl~ral r!i.s:~sters (•:f. (ii) below).

r 1.) the art nf building; the form of house ln the mind of this builder,

.r. in the mind of builders. The Me~ar'ians mtght \..rel 1 A.ccept that

! he -1rt nf building tn general, as opposed to ~'!!_!..§_ man's possession

it, ts eternal. But what of Aristotle's belief in the loss of

1• ts in natural disasters and their subsequ0nt rediscovery. so that,

tnr a. t.ime. t:here wo11ld be n~ fnrm of h0use in the mind of nnv builder

•'r. anywhere else)? 'Need-for-shelter' might still exist, even if

'l)t ri-te tnr~ of 'shelter-made-of-stonec;-and bricks'. But we inclined

1ther to the v1.ew that such loss of the art:=.; is irrelevant here. the

dint hei.ng nnly to contrast the relative permanence nf the art with

ilL.~ "lao's loss of it; d.£C is cl.n exa,Q;~eration for 81:~.

1 .~~-~~~_!_ !he P.Xtra premiss is required 'if ·-=ometh.i.ng is ho-c Lt j s

1naoie nf being perre1ved dS not'.

•' 11r' hIe - ct. !>S~w·: 1 n a ').

perceived as hot is hot, or equivalently (II) if a thing is hot, it

is perceived as hot. But Prot agoras' position seems to require the

converse of (II), (III) if a thing is perceived as hot, it is hot.

Howevert, if 'cold'= 'not-hot', and 'not perceiving as hot' 'per-

ceiving as not-hot', then it follows from (II) that, (IV) if a thing

is perceived as cold, it ~ cold. We noted, though, that ~_!lis reduc-

tic-argument does not have its conclusion spelt out clearly, the refe­

rence to Protagoras apparently being thought sufficient without further

explanation, and we contrasted it in this respect with the subsequent

argument at a 7-10. At de Anima 3. 2 426a 20 Aristotle argues that

it is not correct to say that a thing is not perceptible if it is not

being perceived; but that turns on the distinction between potentiality

and actuality, which is what is being denied in the Megarian position

as represented here.

~047a 7-10 Why blind many times a day? whenever one blinks, we

decided. But there is no analogous process in the case of deafness;

so one will be deaf, perhaps 1 whenever there are no sounds to hear.

We agreed in preferring Ov <1:p6'xov> in a 9.

How would the Megarians reply? Their position can only be defen-

ded either (i) by claiming that they never intended pnsition 4 in

the first place (cf. above), or (ii) by defining 'blind' in such a

way that not all 'incapacity' to see involves blindness (and analogously,

in a 33 ff., defining 'builder' in such a way that not all 'incapacity'

to build involves not being a builder). Some qualifications are al-

ready ruled out, however, in a 9. A blind person will be 'a person

' . .Jho wouldn't see even if ... and if ... and if .... but ·.o~ho isn't a mole

(f.22 l022b 26), etc. etc.'. We agreed that it would be legitimate

for people who maintained position 3 to employ counterfactuals in this

way, and even for those who maintained position 6.

L047a 10-14 This introduces a new point, the denial of change (position

0 above). It wasn't envisaged in a 7-10 that the men would always

be blind; and N.B. l:S'ta.v in 1046b 29-JJ. 6 is implausible if stated

65

104 7a 4

:, 10 NOTES ON THETA

in !:erms of ability - it would be required that a man who isn't <P-

1 ng now

why not?

doesn't have the ability to and 'Hill never recover it; but

But it is implausible enough tf stated in terms of impossi-

bility; tf p is impossible, it ,.jill never happen. And the shift from

ahility, or rather its absence, to impossibility is expressed at 10-

ll. Aristotle's conclusion here, it was suggested, results from his

illegitimately importing a tenseless type of impossibility (it is impos­

sible, tenselessly, that x will • at any time) into an argument which

·negan with a tensed statement about potentiality or ability (if x is

not •-ing ~' x does not ~ have the ability to q>) •

In 11, we preferred "(Lyv6)J£\IOV the argument requiring 'what is

not (now) in process of coming to he'. In 12-13, that what cannot

c0me to be is isn't obviously false - it might be that it cannot

now come to be because it ~ already. 'is' is therefore being taken

as equivalent to 'has come to be' (eternal existents not being in ques­

tion), and 'cannot come to be' means 'cannot come to be at any time'·

The reference to 'being or being-about-to-be', excluding any refe­

rence to the past, in 13 recalls Diodorus' definition of the possible·

There are three possibilites: (i) Aristotle has Diodorus' in mind

here - unlikely on grounds of chronology, though not, we thought, to

be entirely excluded on those grounds alone. But there is no reason

t 0 identify Diodorus as a Megarian ( c f. Owen's notes). ( i i) Diodorus

had this passage of Aristotle in mind in formulating his definition.

(iii) The similarity is not a matter of influence in either direction,

but simply reflects the fact that the past is in a sense necessary

.1nd unchangeable. It would be implausible, in some contexts at least,

say that a thing was possible because it had happened in the past,

1f it '.Jas certain it would never happen again.

_· 'c::)4'-'7'-'a'-=.c13,_--'1c:.4 The tense of lofu.;.a.LYEV we felt, doesn't indicate a refe-

renee back, but is analogous to that of "tO "t'C ~v erva.L. It must mean

'implies', rather than expressing an equivalence, if 1:ve are to escape

tr.e position that whatever doesn't and won't happen is ipso facto impos-

~Lhle. Could this be avoided if "t'OU'to = not 'what neither is nor

·~tll be', but rather 'that of which it is false to say that it is or

66

\.:i 11 I H~ ' ? lt is false to say that the diagonal will lle measured, but, one interpretation of ~· ') it isn't true ro say of a C<.)n-

li ngerlL Sl'u-hattle that it >von't occur tomorrow. But this won't work,

pr~cisel:v because, with such a view of truth-v.'llues, 'not true' doesn't

ir•lply 'LJlse'. (Boethius, in d~. 2 215. 6 ff., refers to people

\.Jhn tr,uk Aristotle to be saying that both 'there will be a sea-battle

t•nnorruw' and 'there won't be a sea-battle tomorrow' -1re false, but

r<-:J<:>.cts this interpretation.)

lr was pointed out that the imperfect lmiJJnLvt:v indicating a gene­

t tlly nccepted truth would have been easier if Aristotle were not,

at this very point, introducing dO implication of d:.06va."t'ov that had

~~ been in question in what preceded.

1~4_7~ Compare the second premiss of Diodorus 1~ronus' Master

:\t gument, 6uva."!~ d.OUva/tOY IJ.i-1 &xo\:.lu9c:t'v; the sense of rixo'A'Jt7e:tv is

here expressed hy the combination of lQ,_, and S'o""'tUL - the latter being

.JH infr~tential, rather than a temporal future. Having stressed that

t -;\. is different tram ~v Aristotle has to ind1cate what ::.u.;u':6v L:.,. Rut ls this meant as a definition of 'possible'? If so, it simply

\ei:ld5 immediately to the need for a definition of 'impossible', and

u1 looking tor this we are in danger of being forced down a Hintikka-

type road, the impossible being what never happens. However. in the

next chapter we have an example of the impossible, that which can be

proved to be impossible because it leads to a logical contradiction

(104/b 9-12; cf. ps.-Alexander 575. 4 ff.). Not there just a matter

\lt what never happens. Anxiety was never expressed about the extreme

;:enerality of 1047a 25-26; but we decided that this was quite right

the possible cannot have ~..!!.}:'_ impossible consequences, hm.;ever remote.

The general question '.vas raised, how far Aristotle's protests

against the !1egarians in this chapter (and N.B. that it is only a vague

,r J'' in l046b 29) were motivated by anxiety about possible deterministic

Lmplications of his own position; cf. 'necessary' in l01~8a 6, 14.

n:; separates the possible from the actual by introducing qualifications

(a fJ-7, a 14-21); there is a similar concern to separate the potential

.1nd the actual in A3, [s (he Megarian thesis interpreted in the ex-

0 7

i !)4/a 1 J

} I )4

tt·me lorms (/-~.) and (6) (cf. p.hL <Wove LO ~ake it easier to dis-

.e.' ~ristotle may relnforce his own view that potentiality

Ls distinct tram actuality, t)y implying (in (6)) that denial of this

1n·.0lves the denial of all change.

l~~?a 20-h2 Explanatiun nf how term tvfpye~a. connected ({)UV't't6E!llv'Tl)

·.nth lv-re:)..lx_~=:~a., ur1_ginates; link hetween tv!.I)YELa. and xCvwtc;. N.B.

.c;•1l. (= o~lso) in 3li implies that there are other examples of XLv1)crE.tc:

,_hat are 8v£pye: ~a.L (perhaps in non-technical sense?) but not lv'te:)..txe: La.t

Tt '..tas r~marked that 1047a 34 ~ .... fluld have given Brentano a

hetter example of intensional objects in Aristotle than does the doc­

~rine of perception; cf. also 'the house this man is now building~

l n Z7-9. If 32-33, by givLng a consequence of 32, is intended to

·~upport it as a reason for 31 - i.e. if the force of yO.p in 32 extends

Lhe 6~7> cla11se aS well- the implication might be that motion _h!!

r'd~_~cular is not predicated on non-existent things; 1.16\LO"'t'a. being

carried nver from 32-33. But why should motion ~.particular not

l>e predicated of the non-existent? Readiness on Aristotle's part

r-o ::~ccept that the Centaur in this picture is brown, but not that it

is. galloping? But the implications for other art-forms will be diffe-

:1-:nt; this man playing Oedipus is walking, but he isn't blind. And

"1 B. "tt.\lat; in 33; are the predicates that ~ admissible for non-exis­

' ·~nts in fact ~-:onfined to mental predicates, like those that follow

t n 1'd If so, the connection of thought in 30-35 as a whole seems

rather loose. (Is J0-31 explaining, not just the origin of the term

·\,~r;yELa, hut ~ it is linked to lv-c.s\EXEta because SvtpyELo is

'~..nked to xCvr~nr,, x(vT)(Tt.t; {~~icular?) to Ov""tu, and Ov'tct to l:v-re-

If so, the more necessary v.·e suppose 'in particular' to be

n r his line of argument, the more awkward would be a concession in

2-33 that there are many other predicates, as well as motion, that

.to not apply to non-existents.)

it ~ds pu1nted out that the examples in 34 are of thinking, rather

l!an of perceiving, only real objects being perceptible. Hon-existents

de not the only things that c3.n 't move (change): points and forms

an t ', han~o~;e, find nor can the !:nmoved Hover, which is in fact the :;u-

I llAPTER 3

preme example of ~vEpyet.n (Ross thinks Coxe:t in 32 is intended to

take care of this last point ) The argument, in any case, turns on

popular usage; N B. the 3rd person plural &~o6~&6nrr~ in a 33.

1~~ Only some of the things that are not, are potentially: explai­

ning ~ill be in actuality' in the previous sentence. (But note,

in connection with the Principle of Plenitude, that only two cases

are recognised here; things that are not and cannot be, and things

that can be and will be - in this case, or in some case?)

THIE AND MODALITY IN DE CAELO I 12

by Sarah Waterlow

'What always is cannot not be' This is one of Aristotle's stran-

ger positions, as is the associated doctrine that nothing is possible

that is not actual at some time. In !_Je Caelo I 12 he purports to

demonstrate the first of these, and that there can be no doubt that

he is entirely satisfied with the proof. He unfolds it there with

an air of total assurance, and there is no sign elsewhere that he ever

came to doubt its force.

not to say embarrassing.

but ludicrously inept.

To modern eyes this is incomprehensible,

The reasoning seems not merely inconclusive

it appears to turn on one or another puerile

fallacy. I shall argue here that this is a false impression. If

I am right, the De Caelo argument is more subtle and also more cogent

than is generally supposed.

Comment has mostly centred on the passage 28lb 2-32, with parti-

cular criticism directed at lines 18-23. Aristotle is regularly ac-

cused of a fallacy here of division, to wit of illicitly transferring

the modal operator so as to convert 'It is impossible that X should

always be and ever not be' into 'If X always is, it is impossible that

X should ever not be'. This simple diagnosis is unconvincing. It

is true (as I shall argue) that he does here perform a move that is

easy to misconstrue as a fallacy of the above pattern; but it can hardly

69

l04/b 2

te tne fallacy ttseif. ror in the lillmeuiately preceding passage ( 15-

17), in connection w~Lh a different example, ,\ristotle's avoidance

of pr::::cisely this lype of mistake Is so deliberate as to .o~.mount almost

to an explicit warning. It is impossible that a man should ,.;hen sit-

ring be standing, but this rioes not entail that ' . .Jhen he sits it is

L'Tlpossible that he should be standing. Fttrthermore, if anything in

this part of the text is clear, it is that for Aristotle the crucial

difference between the two cases turns on the terms 'always' and 'for

an infinite time' (here treated as equivalent), whose absence somehow

leaves rofJm for an assertion of possibility which their presence seems

The fact that for him the omnitemporality .. 1f a state

of ~ffairs presents a special bar against the possibility of 1ts oppo­

:.ite is left unexplained by the hypothesis that the trouble here is

1 simple fallacy of division.

To speak, as I just did, of '~ trouble' with the argument will

turn out to have been rtui.te inappropriate on the view to be proposed

here; although it is perhaps not altogether inapproprtately ambiguous

15 to whether Aristotle here is the one j_n trouble, rather than some

·1f his critics. He for one (:.:~s I hope to make plausible) knows what

he ls dning, at least to the extent 0f avotrling any text-book fallacy

And the fallacy of division is not the only lapse of that sort that

a quick glance at this oassage seems to discern. Hy point is that

..;hat he is here qu1te knowingly engaged in is a somewhat elaborate

performance governed by principles not only different but logically

Lndependent. however much the smoothness of Ar.istotle 1 s execution may

\.u:!ep us from attending to them singly. Of these, the one most properly

~ntitled a formal nr analytic (as opposed t0 a met~physical) principle,

is che r 11 1~ hy ...,Mch he tells 115 he applies nnd withholds the term

'~l0<>c; 1 hl e': Lhe rurP"nt r::eaning of '.;hlch T shall (for L1ck of other

_ l c<:>.s) assume to b~ ftxei by its use in accordance with the rule.

With one important f11Jalification, this rule is the nne frlmiliat

13, 34a 25 ff., which reappears at e.g. !1etaph. 9 3,

i~47a 24-28 and J, 104/h l0-11. 'The possible is that '.Vhich is not

•nrus-;ary, but iVhich if we supp0se it the case has no impossible con-

c>equences'. (In the An. Fr. passage Aristotle '3peaks of 't'O lv6sx6-

l1:vov, tn ~_aelo I 12 •)f -r'> 6uvr:t"t6v, and in 93 he uses the terms

70

interchangeably. It will be clear later that 6uva:t6v is more suitable

for the De Caelo context, although not for reasons of logic. The

proof in I 12 depends on a mataphysical principle concerning 5uv~L<;,

and the wording of the formal rule for 'posssible' simply facilitates

the assembly of these two elements of the argument.) It is more useful

to regard the Prior Analytics statement as a criterion rather than

a definition, not only because the circularity does not then matter,

but because it is as a criterion that Aristotle needs it in a number

of passages where it figures. These (which include Metaph. 9 3 and

De Caelo I 12) are passages where he is concerned to distinguish and

support the distinction between what is impossible and what is merely

false. A definition of possibility (whatever that might look like)

would be useless for that end unless it were also a criterion, and

a criterion that fails to be a proper definition will still do what

is required in the context. However, for the criterion to be effective,

we have to be able to recognise some impossibilities (the impossible

consequences) straight off without a criterion. We also have to be

able to tell straightaway in at least some cases whether something

'follows 1 from something else. In De Caelo I 12 the self-evident

touchstone of non-self-evident impossibility is the entailment of an

explicit self-contradiction: the same thing both is and is not dt

the same time (cf. 28lb 22-23) . Whether Aristotle means his rule

always (or even ideally) to take just this form is a question I shall

leave aside. Nor shall I here consider what sort of modalities are

involved in the statement of the rule itself (as opposed to those esta-

blished by use of the rule). This is an important question for any

overall account of Aristotelain modality, but it will not affect the

present task of identifying the man ingredients in the proof of 'What

always is, cannot not be'.

The special feature of the rule for 'possible' as it appears in

that proof is an explicit reference to 'another time' (281b 17-19;

cf. That is, a false statement, that X (actually sitting)

is standing, is possible iff nothing impossible follows from supposing

it true at another time. We may find this addition perplexing; but

this, I suggest, is because we are accustomed to thinking of possibility

and its modal fellows as absolute. The contrast is with 'relative',

71

t.-:(1 'rh-· ::i~fcrence is not ~.hat i.Jetween 'categorically asserted' and

',,n-,ln-hypothesis'. Aristotle !Tlakes the latter distinction at 3-

IJI3' -1ls0 makes Lt clear 1.n 9 ff. that his rule i.s primarily intended

lO just tiy categorical (ci~\Wc:) assertions of possibility and impos-

,;; 1 hili r y*.

rnrJdality.

But what is thus justified is, t believe, a relativized

There is not soace to develop in full the case for this

lnterpretation. Briefly, this ts the argument: ~refer the supposed

truth of 'r~· (false at .r:_) to a time other than !]_ (For if nothing

impossible •.Jere found to follow from counterfactually supposing 'E'

Lrue at :_ itself, surely that would prove 'e' possible just as effec­

t:vely - and in that case one need not mention any time rather than

.Jny othet".) Answer: The 'other-time' reference ~s not otiose if

1..and, think, only if) we take it that Aristotle is telling us to

r;xa1n1ne the consequences not of 'E' alone, but of 'E' co sidered to­

~ether 1Nith the situation in which '.e.' is false: in other words, of

the conjHnct.ion of 'g' with 'g_', where 'g' describes the state of af­

fairs in which we are prompted to ask whether 'e_' is possible or im-

passiblP.. That, of course, is when 'E.' is false (or taken to be so),

since if we rhink it true we don't need to ask that question. The

p0int is, that unless different time-references are assigned to '.e.' ,J.nd 9.', rhe conjunction just mentioned would inevitably entail an

iiJlpossibility, no ~atter what 'E' may be. The test has no chance

0f proving any 'e.' possible (given that it is false) unless 'E.' is

::;JJnonsPct ~"rue at another time: assuming, that is, that the relevant

,:~>nsequences are not those of '.e.' alone but of ·~·. On that as-

sumpt1on. the test is not a test (the game is lost in advance) unless

~he times at"e differentiated. That is one way of putting the matter,

".Jhtch is especially relevant when what we want is a real criterion

f<)r !01Jbtful possibilities. Rut the essential logical point could

:tlsn he pUt <lS foll.Ol..IS: SiVen that 1 E_ 1 iS false at _.r:., it iS impOSSible

:-hat E 1le true at t (impossible, that is, given, or relativelyto,

r.he actual state of things at !:_). That holds for any '.e_'. and is

· ... ·nat o\ristotle has in mind when he says at De Int. 9, 19a 23-24: 'What-

r.>ver ts not. !wcessarily is not ~~ it is not'.

rn rhe last quotation I take (claiming no originality) 'necessarily'

~} qo':ern rhe first 'is not', and the phrase '!lhen it is not 1 says

•Fnr ~~Am, dS such used in another relevant contrast, see below.

'2

CHAPTER 3

when the necessity obtains What we have is: given that -e/~. it

is necessary at !_ that -E./!. This makes sense if the consequences

to be vetted in the suppositional test are deduced from a conjunction

in which one conjunct says how things are at !_, when '_e' is false

For if the necessity of '-e/~' (or the impossibility of 'e/~') is rela­

tive to that state of affairs, it is reasonable to assign to the neces-

sity itself a time: that of the state of affairs relative-to-which.

Now it is not the case for all 'E' false at ~ that some absurdity fol­

lows from conjoining a description of things at ~ with the supposition

'E.i!.*' ,provided that !* • ~· When there is no absurdity, it is pos-

sible relative to the way things are at ! that E.l~.*. Hence if, for

instance, !_ is the present, it is possible now that E./!.*. E.g., it

is (present tense) possible that X (now sitting) should be standing

at some other time. But if there is the possibility of his standing

at some other time, there is the possibility of his standing as such

(not only of his realizing that general possibility now). Aristotle

says at 281b 15-16 that X h.•• 'tt)v 66v<J.I.LLV of standing, and according

to this interpretation he means the present tensed quite literally.

The literal sense is appropriate if the modality is relative to a his-

torical state of affairs. Moreover, what is possible/impossible rela-

tive to, or at, one time may not be so at another. Thus at !_ is is

impossible that the man in our example be standing at !_ (though not

that he be standing or at some time or another). Thus at !_ it is im­

possible that the man in our example be standing at !. (though not that

he be standing at some time or other); but at some other time !_+ (it

is most natural to think of it as prior to !_) it may have been possible

that he should stand at !_ (whether or not he actually does so then).

There is more to be said about the concept of possibility as rela-

tive to fact and temporalized. But here I shall only call attention

to the light immediately thrown on the accusation that the argument

of De Caelo I 12 rests on the fallacy of division. In terms of this

sort of modality a move is in general admissible which verbally re­

sembles a case of that fallacy, but which in those terms is valid.

We have Sl: 'It is impossible that E.l!. and -E_/!_'. In any system

Sl entails S2: 'If E./.!. then not -E./!'· But in terms of relative

possibility Sl also entails what we cannot get in jllSt any system,

73

· ~TT~:) (}N THETA

namely S3: 'If e/t then it is impossible at !:_that -e.J~'. The appea-

ranee ;_n S3 of an impossibility-operator as part of the consequent

is exactly what ..... e should expect the logic of temporalized relative

modality to generate from the premiss Sl. But what is not thereby

generated is the transference of the operator that introduces Sl itself.

For the one which appears in the middle of 53 is a different though

resembling operator. It says 'impossible at !:. ', while the one in

S1 says simply 'impossible', i.e. 'impossible without temporal restric-

tion', or 'impossible cbtA.Wc:;' (cf. De Int. 9, 19a 26). Whether in the

Aristotelian context it is better to think of this strong operator

as timeless or as omnitemporal I shan't consider here. The point

i.s that if by fallacious division it were being transferred, then from

S1 we should have not S3 but S4: 'If .E_/!_ then it i.s impossible without

restriction that -e/~'· This entails (if it does not actually mean)

Lhat there is no time when '-.e./!.' is possible. Thus, e.g., it is

not nnly impossible at~ (given that £/l), but always was impossible.

Aristotle warns against confusing S3 with S4 at De Int. 9, 19a

26 (except that there he makes the point with 'necessary'). His alert-

ness to the fallacy in that passage does not of course prove that he

did not commit it in De Caelo I 12 while trying to demonstrate that

·Nhat always is, cannot not he. There are independent reasons why

we cannot take it for granted that the thinking of the two passages

harmonizes (see below). However, it is difficult to see how, if he

had been in a mood to commit it in t2e Caelo I 12, he could have been

so confident there as in fact he is that logic supports common sense

in allowing us to say that X' s actually sitting at !_ is consistent

•.;ith the possibility at t of his standing (sc. at some other time).

ro explain. A person who overlooks the difference between S3 and

S4, ahd who reveals his carelessness by, for instance, inferring 54

from 51 'Nhen he is only l!ntitled to 53, is guilty of an error that

falls under the general heading: failure to distinguish the use of

~· simeliciter from its use qualified by some restriction (where'a.' is

any term). One special (although still quite general) case of this

"':rror occurs when the restriction and non-restriction are ~emporal,

L.e. when 'a.'/!:. is confused with'a' without temporal restriction'.

This temporal case in turn has various possible instances: e.g. 'a,'

·~ -\PTF.R

may be the operator 'it is impossible that', and it may be a non-modal

proposition 'E' or '-E'. I make the asumption that someone who avoids

the temporal restricted/unrestricted confusion in one instance is likely

(although not of course bound) to avoid it in another in the same con-

text.

sion.

Now the wrong move from 51 to S4 is not only a fallacy of clivi­

To diagnose it as such requires no particular awareness on

the critic's part of the logic of temporalized relative modality.

But that move is also (and given that awareness can be seen to be)

an example of confusing 'it is impossible at ;' with 'it is impossible

without temporal restriction'. Seen that way, the move is not from

S1 to S4 direct, but goes via S3, which is wrongly replaced by S4.

Another wrong substitute for 53 would be SS: 'If e./~_. then it is im-

possible at _t. that -.e. without temporal restriction (or: impossible

at !:. that -.E_ ever). For 'e' read 'X is sitting' and for '-.e.', 'X is

standing'; and it is clear that in De Caelo I 12 Aristotle is denying

that Sl yields S5. Hence I conclude that he is unlikely, in the same

chapter, to have made the parallel mistake od moving from Sl to S4.

(We can see that it is parallel only when we realize that relative

modality is at work here, It is not parallel if regarded simply as

a fallacy of division, as is usually done.)

One of Aristotle's objections to the Megarians in Met~. 9 3 re­

inforces the view that for him the inference from Sl to 54 is wrong

in the same way as an inference from S1 to SS would be. When both

are seen as mediated by S3 (innocuously reached from 51), then they

can be viewed as presenting analytically distinguishable effects of

what would in fact have been a block refusal to bother about the dif-

ference between the temporally restricted and unrestricted. Under

this block refusal, Sl (via S3) yields S6:

(and never has been) possible that --e_ ever'.

'If e./!:_, then it never

S4 and SS are merely

different aspects of this. Thus, e.g., if X is sitting now, it is

for ever excluded that he should ever do other than sit. Hence change

is impossible. This is one of the paradoxes Aristotle derives from

the Megarian view that only the actual is possible ( l047a 10 ff.),

a fact which has often seemed puzzling; the modern determinist holds

that whatever happens has to be as it is, but he does not deny the

fact of change. But Aristotle's criticism is apt if the Megarians,

7 5

like n 1 m, are think.tng 1 n terms of relatlve modality (hence, like him,

the inference tram Sl to S2) but, unlike t1im, refuse to care

ab0ut temporal rcstr .tctiuns. ln that case they then get straight

to S6. l<.'hether or not thls is <iCt'_.~allv hnw they proceeded, it seems

that Aristotle thought it ~as.

I must return to the main argument. Aristotle's rule is: Given

that e!~. it is pos.:>ible 3t !:_ that -.e_ iff nothing impossible follows

from 'q/~ & -E./!:_*' (where 'q' represents the facts at ~and!.=!_*).

I have argued that with this governing his reasoning, that reasoning

is unlikely to be marred by the so-called fallacy of division usually

alleged. lt is, however, another ~uestion whether the rule can sustain

his desired conclusion. By itself the rule certainly does not entail

it. any more than it entails that '-E' is possible at ~ only if it

i~ tr..te at some other Lime. In fact, it is not at all clear how it

even ilpplies to the case in which Aristotle is interested· The ques-

t LOTI now to be answered by means of the above crj.terion is: Given

that r. always. is it possible that -E_ (ever)? But the criterion as

1 t1dve stated it. on the basis of Aristotle's treatment of the sitting/

3 tanding illustration, is concerned only with poss~bilities relative

(') facts g~ven at ·Jne or another time. It seems that Aristotle is

hoping to extend it to a case •..1here the given is (and is given as)

It also seems that in proceeding thus he pays no atten-

t 100 to the lor;!;ical complexities introduced by the term 'always' that

'Here absent in the original example. ',.Je may •..1ell feel that he might

have been a little more helpfully explanatory on the legitimacy of

extending the rule to cover this apparently very different sort of

.r.ows

Hut without demur he declares that the suppositional test which

;-he sttting man's possibility of standing also shows the omni-

t~mpor.:-~1 being's !..._fi!.pOssibility uf not heing (or ceasing).

tt may seem that in terms of relative possibility this

For a moment

works. For

(-...-rhere '(l' '->tates the tacts as Lhev are - facts ·..;hich ~othesi

'llilke it talse the -~) the conjunct1on of 'q ah1a.ys' with the supposi-

~J')fl 'Ji '-p_' c~rtainly implies an i:npossibility.

i~; referred to 'another time', this can lmly mean

If the supposition

a time not included

•:nrl.er ''allvays"'. which is absurd; if it is not thus referred, then

1n ·~ffect referred to a r-1me within "J.Lways", which case the

7()

. \F fER 3

conjunction entails a straightforward contradiciton. This at any

rate is Aristotle's argument (2Blb 18-25).

Even if we allow that the modality here is relative to fact, not

ahsolute, we sense a trick. This feeling begins to take shape as

soon as we recall that the relativity entails that the modalities are

dated. We are entitled to ask: ~~en is it impossible that -e. (given

that always :e)? The question shows what is wrong. The answer has

to be: when the given is given. That is to say, to reach his conclu-

sian Aristotle has to treat the omnitemporal fact as if it were, so

to speak, actually given all at a blow. For only so can he argue

that there is no time beyond the time of the given to which the supposi-

tion of its opposite may coherently be referred. But, by the same

token, there is not time at which the omnitemporal given, considered

thus en bloc, is given. When all time is over, then it is given,

i.e. no-when at all. But it is only when it is given that the impos-

sibility obtains which his logic seeks to prove, Hence that logic's

true result seems to be that it is never (no-when) impossible that

-E· given that always £! What he wants, but (as it now appears) is

totally unable to justify, is the relative impossibility of '-.e' at

each and every moment Qi time, as distinct from its pseudo-impossibility

(likewise relative). In any case, if such a pseudo-moment were not

absurd, '-.e' could be shown possible now by coherently referring its

truth to the pseudo-moment.

Even pseudo-moments beyond time cannot help Aristotle here.

Forgetting these now and considering only moments, or, if we prefer,

finite periods, Q.f time, we can say this: For every moment or period

!:_, (a) it is the case that E/!:. and (b) there is a t* -= t such that

the supposition that -pJ'-* together with a description of the facts

at t entails nothing impossible. That is to say: it is always the

case that .e. anq always possible that -E· Aristotle's logic cannot

show that this might not be true. One 'the given' is taken bit by

successive bit, there can be seen to be an infinite abundance of 'other

times' to which to refer the negative supposition without incurring

contradiction or any other apparent absurdity.

Thus the argument of I 12 proceeds as if the author sees in 'al­

·,;ays' none but a collective, or perhaps [ should say holistic sense.

77

But how could anyone be oblivinus of che rlJ:stribut ive sense in terms

of which the proof gets nowhere? Or if for his reasons Aristotle

chose to ignore this, how could he expect readers to connive? (Remem-

ber that his immediate audience would have come to this passage undis-

tracted by morages of the fallacy of division.) Soon I shall begin

to develop that aspect of Aristotle's position ~.;hich provides him (so

I shall argue) with a respectable, even if to us not particularly agree-

able, answer to this question. But let me first prepare the ground

with a general observation relevant to any diagnosis that locates the

mechanism of the argument in some fallacy or confusion occurring within

the passage we have so far considered, namely 28lb 2-25. Sheer thought-

less equivocation over 'always' would fall under this head, as would

the muddle alleged by Prof. Hintikka, whose explanation has not yet

been mentioned. Briefly, it is this.* Hintikka is rightly dissatis-

field with the 'fallacy of division' verdict. It is not that he denies

that the fallacy occurs, but he sees it as symptomatic of something

else. The underlying problem, he suggests, lies in the suppositional

criterion for possibility as used in the context of Aristotle's view

of time. Hintikka does not say with any precision what aspect of

this view gives rise to difficulty. He holds simply that an obscure

metaphysical pressure emanating from this quarter inhibits Aristotle

from supposing '-E.' true at some moment 'in the actual history of the

universe' (Hintikka's phrase) when he knows or believes that the actual

facts at that moment would render '-.e.' false. Thus inhibited, Aris-

totle cannot even entertain as possible what he takes to be never true,

not because his criterion proves it impossible, but because he cannot

rationallY. frame the supposition to be tested. sha 11 not try to

reconstruct the sort of thinking that might conceivably land someone

in the position of denying himself the use of the very criterion that

he himself recommends. For if one holds that '-e' is possible only

if it is eventually true, one must wait to know of the truth before

asserting the possibility; thus supposing it true and seeing what fol-

lows is a waste of time: it is an insufficient guide to possibility

before the truth is known, and an unnecessary one afterwards. However,

it is enough to say here that only a very confused thinker could have

heen Lerl to this position from Aristotle's publicly expressed views

78

'!!APTER 1

about the nature of time. This is not intended as an objection to

Hintikka, who ts very far from maintaining that Aristotle's thought

about time and modality are wholly clear and coherent. Perhaps indeed we should expect from him rather more than Hintikka seems to,

At any rate' Hintikka 's account of Aristotle's inference from

'always' to 'not possibly not' faces a common difficulty. If it is due to confusion about such topic-neutral matters as his own criterion

for 'possible' i or the difference between supposing something to be

the case and asserting it to be so; or, for that matter the varying

forces of the word 'all' - then Aristotle ought by right~ to draw his

crazy conclusion

which it holds. universally, without restriction on the field for

Thus, for instance, we should reject the existential

interpretation of 'what is, cannot not be', favoured by Guthrie (Loeb

tr.) and Stocks (Oxford), since this is far too narrow. We need:

'For all E_, if always E. then not possibly -_e'. But this formulation,

which for convenience I have several times used in the preceding para­

graphs, is open to a serious difficulty. The proposition entails

that for all _E, if it is possible that -.e. then -eat some time. Thus,

e.g., if it is possible that --9. (i.e. that g) then --9. (or g) at some

time, for any q. But this conflicts with one of Aristotle's plainest

views expressed elsewhere (e.g. ~· 9, 19a 9 ff.), to the o::!ffect

that some possibilities may go for ever unrealized. This is not only

it is also logic, since in some cases if one of a set common sense,

of contraries is true no other member of the set can ever be. Thus, for instance. it is possible that this coat be cut to pieces, but in

fact I mean to keep it until it wears out: and even if I don't, it 1s still possible that I shall. Hintikka hopes to resolve the conflict

(inevitable on his account of the modal-temporal connections) with

the idea that it is only general possibilities that have to be realized

in one. or another instance, but not in any particular. Thus, the

possibility of my being murdered fortunately requires not that I shall

be, but only that some creature somewhere meets with a sticky end.

But this cannot be reconciled with pJ':._ Caelo I 12. since Aristotle is

clearly arguing that if any individual always is, g_ cannot be (see,

e g • 28lb 32-33): which entails that if the individual's not-being

is poss1ble, the possibility is realized in that \'ery same case.

79

Til ETA

Jhall <~r~ne below chat this l3 not JHt ,Jf ltne wlch statements such

:s that i.n D~. 9 (see also Metaph 3), s1nce there is indeed

1 r~striction "" the qr.ope of the proof in De Caelo I 12. But the

P'Ji.nc of inmediate tmportance is that in the passage ·.,·e have so far

c~nsidered (28lb 2 ff,) no grounds for restriction appear.

This, if nothing else, justifies ns in steptJin)l; aside from what

... 1ne might call the logical nucleus nf Aristotle's argument in the hope

of a hetter v~ew. The answer to this and other problems is near at

hand: ~~e have only to go to the preceding Lhapter. Here Aristotle

has a lot to .say about the possibillty that is entirely ignored by

iHnt ikka. Perhaps this is because he is at the same time, and in

r.he ~arne terms, talking about what we should call'capacities': which,

it may be, are at present of no great interest to the formal l\)gician.

:\t :1ny rate, Aristotle stJrt'3 by introducing various senses of 'in­

v,enerable' and 'imperishable', ending up with a pair of master-senses

·iefined in terms of the impossibilitY of beginning and ceasing. These

t.n turn he "immediately spells out as :neaning the impossibility of not

being and then being, and vjc~ versa (28la 1··6). After this, being

-lnd not being, and the possibility and impossibility thereof, are not

ment toned again until the beginning of Chapter 12 ( 28la 28 ff.).

'1eanwhile, Aristotle takes an apvarently sideways look at certain other

.Suvriu.£~<;, such as for lifting and for ·.;alking, where for any given

:::ubject there is an inherent limit to thP. exercise. fhe essent tal

p<1 int as far as Aristotle is concerned, is that such possibilities

1r caiJacities ought to be defined with reference to the limit or maximum

)r fullest realization (28la 8; 10-12; 11+-15; 18-19). This is not

"O much concept•1al analysis as concept-cr.nstruction, although not un-

~'lpportPd hy cnmmon intuit~uns. The man who can lift up to two hun-

·ired pounds is tu be thought of :ts exercising a specifically different

apacity from the man who can lift unly a hundred and fifty - even

·,'hen they each lift the same '.Jei.ght. We might say that the millie-

•aire's rlonation of a mite is indeed a c;pecifically different act from

r- hat nf the pauper •.Yidow, and i.t is worth observing that this does

'lOt 'iepend on a difference in the agents' intentions, which after all

nig~t he the same. So it is not on that account unreasonable of Aris-

t Jt1e :-o nrrJcPed, as he does, tn ipply his ,.,)nstrurtion to cases \>Jhere

intention and volition play no part. What he is concerned with is

the extent of power, of whatever kind and whatever the agent, but in

particular with one general sort of power, namely for 'being' and 'not

being'.

Now one might well ask 'Why this sudden interest in maximal perfor­

mances?' - seeing that he is engaged in a general discussion of possi­

bility or capacity, and for many capacities the question of a maximum

logically cannot arise. Aristotle, however, has no reason to disagree

with this point. For he says here not that all capacities, but capa-

city in the principal sense ('tO xuplws 6uva.'t6v. 28la 19), must be de-

fined with reference to the maximal exercise. Now, capacity in the

principal sense is for him, presumably, capacity for being, where being

is also being in the principal sense, i.e. being q:> for some value of

tp falling under one of the Categories. Accordingly, when at the start

of Chapter 12 he resumes the discussion of possibilities and impossi­

bilities of being and not being, he takes care to say that he means

possibilities or capacities (and their opposites) for being 1l or not

'!' for some categorizable '!' (28la 30-33). Nor does he signal any diver-

gence from this in the rest of the chapter. Hence 'is' and 'is not'

must be understood as copulative throughout, with the omission of the

complement functioning positively as a complement-variable • Thus

the existential translation is wrong; but so also is the propositional

translation which equates 'being' with 'being the case' or 'being true',

since not everything that is the case can be expressed by a predication

in an Aristotelian Category. Here, then, is the restriction sought

earlier on the scope of the doctrine that what always is, cannot not

be; and it fits perfectly with the De Interpretatione example of a

possibility never realized (and also with the remarks in Metaphysics

E 3). Possibilities for coming to be and ceasing to be (as being

cut up for a coat) presuppose possibilities of being and not being

(or being not), but are not to be classed amongst them, since coming

to be and ceasing are themselves not ways of categorizable heing (al­

though, again, they presuppose them).

Thus it is those capacities or possibilities that are primary

and central for Aristotle's logic and his metaphysics that require

to be specified Ln terms of a maximal exercise. The plausibility

81 _____ -.; ___ .. ______________________________________ .,.,_

.IOTES ON THETA

of this position depends 1n ~laJ:"t (Jn wh.-1t he is nere prepared to count

as a Category, and this we are not .:.old. At Jl-33 he tails off (as

so often) with 'etcetera' after mentioning che traditicnal first three.

At any rate, by now the discussion has moved to a high level of abstrac-

tion where these primary cases are gathered together under a single

logical pattern. '..Je are no longer to be concerned with different

types of limit such as he was at pains to point out in the preliminary

illustrative passage 28la 7-27, where, for instance, he explains that

in some cases (e.g. vis.i.on) it is the degree of minuteness of objects

that measures the magnitude of capacity, If, now, we consider all

and only categorizable being, the only dimension so universal as to

apply in every case is, of course, time. Thus his primary possibili-

ties are for being q> for some maximum duration. In other words, it

belongs to the very essence of what it is for a given thing to be cate­

gorizably q> that it should be so for some definite period which can

at least in principle be specified: and this temporally determinate

<.p-ness is what it is the essence of the corresponding possibility to

be a possibility ~- (For the linguistic viability of taking the

duration terms to qualify not Ouva.'t6v but tts complement, refer to

C.J.F. Williams, Religious Studies I, 1965, pp. 95 ff. and 203 ff.).

shall not dwell on the 'Iletaphysical considerations that for

Aristotle make this a solid starting-point. It is enough r.o $3Y that

despite his sometimes almost obsessive insistence on the eternity of

the universe and of natural kinds, as well as of s0me particular enti­

ties and processes, Aristotle is as far removed as it is possible to

be from those who would explain these and any other phenomena by what

we may call 'metaphysical inertia'. \.Jhate"er substantially is, is

for J1im governed throughout its spatial and temporal beings and doings

by an lnternal princtple of unity that finds expression not in :1ny

repetitive 3ameness going on .Jnd on indefinitely until suppressed or

redirected from without, but in an inherently hounded pattern of acti­

vity whose continuity is more than simply freedom from interruption.

Indeed one might say that the absence of interruption is not even its

necessary condition either, since there is nothing of a definite nature

to ~~ interrupted unless there has already emerged some project whose

identity was intact despite ~he sudden removal of the conditions suit-

CHAPTER J

able for it to be fully displayed. In most though pe~:haps not all

cases such natural patterns develop through series or cycles of empiri­

cally distinguishable stages. The diversity of these is consistent

with the overall unity precisely because it is more than mei"ely consis-

tent: it is actually necessary, if that pattern, whatever it may be,

is to succeed in being produced. It follows that each stage, no less

than the whole sequence, is inherently bounded as to its duration.

For if the raison d •etre of any one condition is its contribution to

some necessarily successive whole, then that condition must be so to

speak spontaneously ready to bow out to its successor after whatever

is the appropriate time. The actual mount of time, whether for stages

or whole sequences, will depend on the object concerned (cf. De Gen.

et Corr., II 10, 336b 9 ff).

All this sets the scene; but for his current purpose Aristotle

needs one prop which even the most arrantly teleological metaphysics

cannot really provide, and all he can do is mime it into being by what

is indeed a kind of logical mime. His argument requires, and its

premiss claims (28la 28-31), capacities for negatives as well as for

positives, and that both alike be defined by reference to a maximum.

(Throughout, not being ~ and being not-cp are treated as identical.)

Here if anywhere would locate the sophistry of the argument. In

this respect it is secured by nothing more than the verbal appeal of

a totally schematic symmetry.

weight-lifting cannot help here:

The original analogies of walking and

indeed, it is best to forget about

them.

lifting?

For what on earth could be the limit of my capacity for not­

What does it even mean to speak of ?___ capacity for this,

as distinct from the various capacities for positives whose exercise

is excluded when I am engaged in lifting? This, we have to say, is

only paper-concept-construction. Teleology will not make intelligible

the proposition that ~omething is intrinsically times as to the duration

of its not-tp-ness irrespective of what that positive characteristic

might be from which it eventually returns to being not-not-~.

But it is on just this eventual return either way from one limited

contradictory to the other that Aristotle's proof depends. That as-

sumed, it follows that whatever has the possibility of being tp and

also of being not-11 will inevitably realize whichever of these is cur-

83

rently unrealized. That presupposes that it ~2tains oorh its possi-

bilities, but this is never questioned. Another question on which

Aristotle has nothing to say here concerns the status of the 'it'.

Where ~ is a predicate 1n a Category uther than substance we may think

ot" the subject of change as an individual substance, and the alternation

may be supposed to continue for as long as the substance exists as

locus of the contradictory phases. Thus the alternation need not

be endless, since not all substantial individuals are eternal. But

where ~ is a substance-predicate whose instances are not eternal, it

must be thought of as applying to something other than the individual

q>-thing as such- presumably, therefore, to the matter. The reason

is that, by Aristotle's construction, the subject can cease to be e.g.

a man (so that the individual man would perish simpliciter) only if

it can not-be a man (or be a not-man); but the possibility of not being

il man here means a capacity, and actually not being a man means exerci-

sing that capacity. We therefore need a subject of which it makes

sense to say that it wi 11 eventually exercise its capacity for being

other than a man; and evidently Callias as distinct from his matter

is not such a subject. Where the substance concerned is a portion

of one of the four elements, then since these are subject to transfor­

mation the corresponding substance-predicate pr~sumably holds of some­

thing possessed of the capacity to be first fire, then not-fire, etc.

That 's0mething' would be no empirically knowable stuff. Thus it

-:.eems that the position of pe Caelo I 12 commits Aristotle to the postu-

late of 'prime matter' in somethin~ like the scholastic sense. At

rtny rate the cyclic transformations of the four 2mpirical elements

provides him with a rare example where lt Ls not absurd to ·:iew negative

'-;tates as intrinsically timed ln parallel wi.th theJ.r contradictories.

-:..1.nce the mutational sequence is regular~ it is presumably roughly

true for him that the 'something' not-fire • .. mulct be not-fire for an

<tll.otted period: this being the >~lm of its periods of being the other

elements in turn. But even so r-he negative period is only timed ~

s•1m of positives, not per-~.'-

dut now what about the aimed-for conclusion that what alHays is,

':annot not be?

-1s tt stands.

It may seem that this does not fallow from the position

For 'llthou~h e_~hY..P?_1J.:.~si something al-wavs (I) rines not

i{ \fTI':R 3

cease to be on account of being intrinsically geared to cease within

a given time, this hardly entails that it might not cease through some

other cause, Nothing has been said to rule out interruption ab extra,

or so it seems. The question of interference is one that Aristotle

has not handled as effectively as he might from his present position.

However, what we have now to notice as contained in that position is

a claim yet more extraordinary than anything so far uncovered.

possibilities for being (sc. categorizable) ~ are, he says, essentially

for a maximum. But if something is always q>, then it is tp: hence

it has and exercises a ,-capacity. Hence in its case too there must

be a temporal maximum. But it cannot be a finite period, since then

the object must become not-cp, which contradicts the assumption. It

must then be an infinite maximal period - 'greater than any that might

be suggested and lesser than none' (28la 33-b 1). Since time is in-

finite, 'for always' entails 'for an infinity of time'. Since anything

that is tp exercises a capacity for a temporally determinate exercise,

anything that is always q> is ~ in a mode both temporally infinite and

temporally determinate. The exercise fills a period, whose peculiar

property is that neither the whole nor any part of it can be repeated.

It is not merely that Aristotle's argument will require this ama-

zing concept; the very text proves it indisputably present. have

inferred its presence from 28la 33-b 2 taken in conjunction with 28la

10-12 and 18-19. But even more decisive evidence occurs later, at

283a 4 ff. Here Aristotle is arguing against the possible view that

something might be <P or not-<P for a time infinite in one direction

only (in which case even if it has always been and always will be !p

there is at least the possibility of its not being so as from some

moment of time). Aristotle rejects this on the ground that a time

infinite in one direction is not rleterminate, hence not a suitable

stage for anything's <P-ness to occupy, since t.n every case being ~

is for a determinate time.

'Each thing has the capacity to do or to suffer, to be or not be, for a determi­nate time, either infinite or of a speci­fiable amount. In the case of infinite [in the strict sense, i.e. both ways] time there is such a capacity because infinite time is in a sense determinate, 'lS being that than which none is greater. But the nne-way infinite is neither in­finite nor determinate.'

'TOTES ON THETA

The last sentence shows that he is not altogether· happy about

calling the infinite 'determinate'; the second to last, that he is

even more unwilling to withhold this title altogether; and the first

shows why: if the first is true, then the second too must be true

and meaningful, since otherwise nothing could be said to be or to do

etc. for always.

Logically, what supports Aristotle here is the fact that 'Always'

provides an answer to the question 'For how long?' that is no less

definite that 'For a minute', 'For a decade', etc. By contrast, 'For

a time infinite in one direction' covers any number of different lengths

of time, inasmuch as more time will elapse counting, say, forward for

ever from the Battle of Marathon than from the death of Socrates, and

less time stretches from the infinite past to the former event than

the latter. If it were not so, how could one happening to be earlier

or later than another in the infinity of time? (It is true that 'from

the battle of Marathon onwards' unambiguously specifies one particular

1.ndefinite length, and 'from the death of Socrates' another: but these

phrases cannot begin to be considered as names of periods, any more

than 'the week beginning last Thursday' names one (as distinct from

'a week').

His metaphysics too allows a foothold for the notion of Always

as a period of totality in time. The basis of this lies, I suspect,

in the fact that he is not in this context concerned with time in the

abstract 9 'universal' time, but, as he says, with the time of some-

thing's doing or suffering, being or not being. Aristotle is certainly

not clear about the distinction, and I shall not try to explore its

significance here. But something that can be briefly said is this:

if in general the period of a state's duration is prescribed by an

inner principle, an Aristotleian 'nature', then that state has a certain

temporal bounded ness independent of external circumstances. Under

'external' include the temporal 'environment' of a finite state,

consisting of states that precede and states that follow. The point

is that it is not simply because something else comes after it that

an inherently bounded state finishes when it finishes. After a given

stretch its time is up, whether or not the time is not yet up for other

things. A symphony finishes because !_! finishes, not because other

\P fi:R 1

chln~s happen afterwards, although of course they do. Some things.

~ut perhaps not all things, depend causally on pre-existing conditions

c.J.nd on lJToceses bound to outlast them. But where there is no such

causal dependence, so that what occurs requires no temporal environment,

the absence of such an environment would not in itself affect the inner

determinacy of the temporally uncontained condition, whose time can therefore be seen as the time it takes to ~_f?_!!lplete itself, This is

.1 time which, when compared against the periods of transient conditions,

can nnly be said to be 'greater than any and lesser than none'. This,

it might be objected, does not make it a ~, which is what Aris­

totle's argument requires, True, it is not a quantitative maximum

(which would be meaningless); but it is still the maximum necessary

for the complete realizat.ion of the capacity concerned. (Cf, 281a

11~12: Mov 6p(~w1la.< ~pbc; ~ xctl 'tTJV hEpoxT)v TTjv 56v"'J.i'v; see also 18-19.)

t:oherent or not, this is Aristotle's position. We may now spell it (;Ut as follows. Since capacities and their exercises are specified

by the maximum, ~.;re should not say simply that x is '4> (or not--<+') for

a certain time, but that X is for-that-time-r.p, or for-that-time-not-,,

thus, e.g., it is always -r.p or finitely-r.p (I use 'finite' as a variable

for specific units). 'Finitely' and 'always' qualify first and

ioremost the predicate (the complement of 'possible'), and only deri­

vatively govern sentences constructed with unqualified predicates.

It might even be better to say that the duration-adverbs occur in the

first instances as parts of predicates or complements otherwise incom-

plete, thus in the sense in which an expression containing an unbound '/ariable is incomplete, (But this is a misleading comparison if it

Sllggests that 'always' functions like a universal quantifier. Rather,

it is logically on the same leve] as variable-fillers ltke 'month-

long' and the rest.) Now, for X to be al•..1ays. -r.p takes time: all time. Throughout, the same capacity is heing exercised, just as the

man lifting a hundred pounds exercises his one limited capacity on every

pound he lifts, Hence throughout e'Jer:y finite period of time, and

J.t every moment, it ls true of X not merely that it is <p, but that

it is always-(fl, It is always engaged in doing what is defined as

t._:eding the whole of time to do. fhis is a v~ry Jpecial kind of always

:_;t~~S nN THETA

:!ling the same thing, and its special properties are what legitimize

,\ristotle' s refusal to acknowledge the distributive sense of 'always'

n'.ned earlier. For if it is true for 3ny one short time that X is

then how could it be consistent with this to suppose X ever not­

Formally, one might put the point by saying that since 'always'

is part of the predicate (as distinct from a temporal quantifier on

a sentence with the variable '~') one cannot bring to bear the appara­

tus of quantification theory that portrays so beautifully the varying

scopes of 'all' which the word 'distributive' warns us not to confuse.

However, the temporal quantifier 'always' does also have a place, since

we 3 re entitled to say that at .!:n, and at ~n+l, and indeed at every

~· X is always -~. The omnitemporally given is itself (although not

in the same way) omnitemporal. Thus even if ~ole take it bit by bit,

• ... ±_a._~ is thus successively given is a truth that covers in a sweep the

'..Jhole of time. Hence it covers also those parts of time that lie

uutside whatever finite bit we momentarily consider as given. For

;_hat reason, the situation at every moment is such that relatively

to it, an absurdity follows from supposing that what is given then

ls not given at some other. Hence 'what always is, cannot not be'.

This take to be the mainspring of Aristotle's proof, in which

case the formal charges against it must be dropped. But a challenge

arises when we consider in concrete terms the analogical basis from

which this reasoning was launched. As we know, a capacity need not

be realized to the full, from which it would not follow that it is

:<ot exercised at all. A man who walks ten miles when he can walk

thirty ~s still, we may suppose, doing (so far as he does it) the kind

nf walking a thirty-miler can do. Why then should "-"€ not suppose

, hat X is for a while always -q> in the sense explained, but then has

its state interrupted? After all 9 not even everything finitely-cp

is actually permitted to reach its natural limit. Logically, .it •.Jould

~eem that the longer the natural span, the mere vulnerable to premature

'-'xtinction. (It is generally agreed that Aris cot le would not want

1 ~1e cone lusion of I 12, which is presen~ed as an ar8ument from universal

first principles, to depend on implicit special considerations concer­

~ing the physical objects which he in fact believes are eternally doing

_..;hat they do, i.e. the heavenly spheres whose position and substdnce

·'riAPTER J

puts them beyond disruption.*) So it seems that being always-q:~, even

if in fact for always, is not inconsistent with the possibility of

becoming not-q>.

have not been able in the densely packed later pages of Chapter

12 to find Aristotle meeting precisely this objection: but think he can. A man who does not walk to his limit on one occasion still

has the capacity to exercise in full, on another. If his walking

only fifteen miles somehow meant that we could no longer regard him

as having the capacity for thirty, then if capacities are assumed to

be constant we should have to admit that thirty was never his maximum.

Now suppose that X is interrupted while always-q> so that it ceases

to be q> altogether. It becomes not-~; but this being not-q> must be

for a determinate time, either finite or for always. It cannot be

for always, because nothing could begin to be always-11: if it begins,

U is too late to exercise to the full the capacity of which that would

be the exercise. Hence we cannot say that it has or ever did have

the capacity for being always-not-cp.

For a capacity in the abstract sense does not really exist if

the circumstances are such as to entail that 1t cannot be fully reali­

,~ed; and if capacities are constant, our grounds for saying that it

does not exist are grounds for saying that it never did. Hence if

X becomes not-<p, this must be finitely determined. In that case it

will return again to being <p . But not to being always -cp, by the

preceding argument. Nor 9 by the same argument. could it be thought

then to have the capacity for always -q>. Hence it never did have

or exercise it, even for a short time; which contradicts the assumption.

The coherence in some important respects of the position in ~

Ci!_elo I l2 with Aristotle's statements elsewhere only serves to throw

into relief one extraordinary discrepancy which has not so far been

mentioned. His account of the infinite in Physics III is in direct

.-:onfl let with the idea governing the De Caelo argument. Indeed, our

•H·m resistance to the notion of the infinite as a totality owes much

to Aristotle's classic disposal of it in the Physics.

*Thus Aquinas' appeal (Comm. ad lac.) to '.omnia natura appetunt esse' is inadequate. He derives from it 'unumquodque tantum est quantum f2.2Sest esse', but this depends on non-interference, which in general is a contingent matter. He does not, I think. show how the terms .,f the current argument alone (as distinct from cosmological require­·::ents) exclude interference in the case of 'what al~~ ts'.

89

:luTES UN 1HETA

'It turns out that the infinte is the opposite of what people say, for it is not that which has nothing beyond it. No, the infinite is that which has always something of itself beyond it ... that of which, in taking a specific amount (l(O."t<i ?too-Ov ~n~duo~Lv) we leave always something more to take. Whereas that of which there is nothing beyond is complete and whole.' (206b 33 ff.)

This is as much as to say that any infinity of time, one-way or both­

ways, is as such incapable of functioning as the field of a temporally

determinate exercise. Is Aristotle's past self among the 'people'

of the first sentence? This belongs with a bag of questions about

relative datings of different parts of the Physics and different parts

of De Caelo. But on any view of the chronology there is a problem

of reconciliation; for Aristotle appears never to have withdrawn the

conclusion of De Caelo I 12. If, as seems more likely, Physic~ III

6 •,yas composed later, how could the earlier findings still stand?

If Physics III 6 came first, how in De Caelo I 12 could he have failed

to defend explicitly the conception of a determinate infinite (which

would have made things easier for the interpreter)?

not defend it, how give the argument we have?

And if he could

Perhaps, however, a reversion to 'what people say' needs no public

justification. And as for a change from that holistic notion of the

infinite, this too perhaps would have left Aristotle still in possession

of adequate grounds for the essential position of De Caelo I 12 ·

For the argument does not need to he couched in terms of 'infinite

time' at all.

between what

The phrase is a natural one to use to point the contrast

holds for a measurable period and what holds for always·

~ut provided he retains this contrast, he has all the premisses he

needs, and the naive equivalence of 'always', with 'for an infinity

•Jf time' can be quietly dropped - as indeed perhaps it ~vas. The as-

sumption must

•Jf a whole.

of course still stand that 'always' denotes some k.ind

To call this 'infinite' in the sense of ~~~ III 6

i.s to emphasize the impossibility of assigning a specific quantity;

but that impossibility was never in question. However, the impossi-

bil1ty does not, I think, make it absurd to regard as a whole what

is also in that sense infinite. Only it is not ~ whole that it

is infinte, nor ~ infinite a whole. If this represents Aristotle's

'JO

:HAPTcR l

more considered vtew, then we should expect to find no mention of 'infi­

nite time' in his later statements of the De Cae~ position, but 1mly

~d and <i(o,ov. And thts is exactly what we do find, so far as I

have been able to verify. (See e.g. ~· Ill 4, 203b 30 (where the

reference to infinite body does not affect the present point); De Gen.

~Carr. II 9, 335a 33-14 and ll, 338a l-3; Metaph. !18, l050b 7 ff.

(cf. ibid. 6, 1048b 9 ff. for a statement of conclusions reached in

~· III 6; Metaph. N 2, 1088b 23-25; and, for good measure, E 2,

l026b 27-28; K 8, l064b 32; and De Int. 9, l9a 9 and 35-36.)

To conclude. Aristotle has not shown or tried to show that what

is always cp might not have been otherwise in some sense of 'm1ght'

that we at any rate seem to understand. The possibility which this

t.;ord conveys is, so to speak, unavailable except from a standpoint

extraneous to the entire history of the actual universe, given that

it is a fact of that universe that X is always <.p. The contradictory

is an option perhaps for God, although not even for him on some concep­

tions of divinity, but certainly not for anything embedded in the actual

order of nature. So if X's not betng cp is in some sense a possibility,

it is not in any sense a capacity of an actual subject: unless we

regard it as representing a divine capacity. But in that case it

would hardly make sense to test it by referring the corresponding sup­

position to 'another time'.

In itself, Aristotle's time-relative idea of possibility seems

perfectly coherent, especially since in itself it does not entail that

possibilities (particular or general) are in fact realized. For that

he needs the additional notion of properttes defined by inherent tempo-

ral spans. His handling of this in De Caelo I

us as strained to the point of absurdity. The

12 may well strike

consequent holistic

treatment of 'always' is an obvious target of suspicion. At the same

time, though, a clear understanding of the way in which temporal maxima

enter into the argument certainly helps to salvage Aristotle's reputa-

tion for logical sanity. Hintikka has maintained that in connecting

as he does the omnitemporal with the necessary, Aristotle is dominated

hy a 'statistical model of modality' (Time and Necessity, pp. 102-)). The difference, then, between 'necessary' and 'possible' would

he simply the difference of 'always' from 'at some time'. Thus 'neces-

·)[

sary' :.lairns no more than the continuance ad iHfinitum of some state

of affairs which had it been interrupted would properly have been called

'contingent'. It is not ·.;r~at it is that makes whatevr:-r is necessary

neccr,sary, but the fact that ,,..,hate';er it is, it simply goes on and

on. But pe Caelo 1 12 :.>hmJS Aristotle as far from holding this gro-

tesque position as any of his admirers could hope to find him. The

difference (in the central cases) between the necessary and the possibly

otherwise reflects the difference between specifically different ways

of being <;> • The limit of duration is the differentia. being Ill is

s~mply the genus. To suggest that they are to each other as shorter

and longer (much longer) occui"rt:!nces of the same attribute matches

the suggestion that the lion dUd the mouse, being both of them animals,

<1re essentially larger and smaller versions of the same creature. No

doubt the De Caelo argument will cCJnt inue to seem as a lien to us as

ever it did; but perhaps by now we can see that it is the thrust of

his metaphysics, not the failure of his logic, that takes Aristotle

beyond our company in this chaptei".

Discussion of paper by Sarah Waterlow

In connection with the argument that infinity unbounded in both

directions is in a sense defin-Lt~ (de Caelo I 12 283a 9) it was pointed

out that in the case of an infinity bounded in one direction only (the

starting (or [in1shing) point has to be specified if it is to be defined

at al.l; on the othet: hand a finite period of (e.g.) five years is de­

!:ined as to its length at l\~ast, even if the starting point is not

known. But does it :nake any difference uhen an infinite period bounded

1nly at the beginning starts, provided t:hat it is infinite thereafter?

L.. was pointed out that Aristotl~ is reluctdnt to accept the inclusion

')f one inf 1 n1ty in another (~. lll. 5 204a 20 ff.; where t.he assump­

tion that the parts of an infinite must themselves be infinite results,

:t ~as t!bserved, from the fact that lt is the infinite as a substance

1_:-tat is under discussion, the infinite characterised precisely by its

· e~ng 1.nfinite; 204a 26. It follows that an act•1al infinite substance

-.ust oe indivisible, as in the pos.~._tivn o£ :-•ali_··.-~'iS.)

·, md, Ji.nce a proof of n1e infinity of the ~erics of prime numbers

.-as available in i\ristotle's t1.me, he :-;hnuld 1:':i'·'e aJlcno1ed f·n tl1 e i.n

CHAPTER 3

elusion of the infinite series of t->rime numbers in the infinite series

of integers.

Would time exist if there was simply one rotating heavenly sphere

(that of the fixed stars), and no stationary earth at the centre?

As it is, time is indicated by the relative motions of the different

spheres, in any case; but the main argument of Physics VIII is conducted

in terms of the motion of the first heaven. .!.! there is no absolute

frame of spatial reference, the existence of motion, and hence of time,

seems to require at least two motions differing from one another.

But an absolute frame of reference is suggested by the argument for

the earth's being at the centre of the universe; the centre would be

the centre even if the earth was not there (de Caelo 2. 14 296b 6 ff.,

cf. 297a 9 ff.).

It was suggested in the paper that the requirement that a possi­

bility be realised at some time applies to being in the various cate­

gories, but not to the case of the cloak which can be cut up, because

being cut up is not itself a case of being that falls under one or

another of the categories; rather it is a ~ of passing from categorial

being (in this case, being a cloak - a substance?) to the corresponding

not -being. It was observed that this applied well enough to the first

few categories; but there might be problems with the category of e.g.,

paschein, and certainly with that of time.

Aristotle is not so much concerned to make the logical point,

'every possibility must be actualised at some time', as to make the

metaphysical point that any unexercised capacity will be exercised;

and in any case more directly concerned here with the corresponding

implication, 'whatever is always is necessary'. Hintikka 's use of

the expression 'Principle of Plenitude' is doubly misleading; for (a)

it relates more to metaphysical and theological issues than to the

purely logical ones in terms of which Hintikka tends to interpret Aris­

totle; and (b) Aristotle's concern too is metaphysical rather than

logical, ~ Hintikka.

There is a difficulty in finding plausible examples of something

that has the potential for two opposed states and alternates between

them. Possible cases include the changes connected with the seasons;

but there is then the problem of identifying the subject (which will,

93

::QTES ON THETA

moreover, it was pointed out, be a general problem in all cases of

being something and not-being something in the category of substance).

Perhaps it is the earth that is alternately hot and cold, in summer

and winter? (Another possible example would be 1 this water 1

alterna­

t ing between hot and cold - cf. Boethius, in de Int. ed. sec. 238.

15 ff. Meiser _ except for difficulties over 'this water'. Alexander

of Aphrodisias, Quaest · 1. 19 - and cf. also 2. 15 - discusses the

notion of alternating possibilities, but with a marked absence of ex­

amples. In ibid. 2. 20 he suggests that it applies (i) to prime matter

taking on the forms of the elements in succession, and (ii) to the

formation of homoeomerous compound bodies from those elements, and

their subsequent dissolution again, but not at any higher level.)

Perhaps Aristotle's thought is rather that the matter of which a man

is composed has different potentialities at different stages of his

life; cf. ~· VIII. 1 252a 11 - there is always order and proportion

in what is natural. It was also felt that it would be rather implau-

sible to suppose that predicates come in families of incompatibles;

is a picture of men spending their lives in alternating between standing

and sitting a very appropriate one?

Further, it was pointed out that potentialities like those for

standing and sitting do not fit very well into the framework of the

discussion of maximal capacities in ch. 11, which it had been argued

was the context that should be borne in mind in assessing the argument

of ch. 12. In answer to this it was suggested that the basic argument

has already been stated by 28lb 2; what follows is Aristotle's explana-

tion of the argument, and in the course of this he employs stock ex-

amples of possibility without concerning himself unduly as to whether

they are suited to the context of the argument as a whole.

It had been argued in the paper that, if a thing with the capacity

to-always-cp ceases to~. i.t must either always-not- cp (which is already

e.xcluded) or not-cp for a finite time (in which case it would then have

to h again, and (by the same argument), to do that for a finite time).

The

its

flUestion was raised, why is

for-all-future-time not-<Ping?

does not allow such capacities.

there not the third possibility of

The answer, that Aristotle simply

In connection with 'maximal capacities'' i.t was asked whether

94

· iiAP fER _I

a man w.th the capacity to lift 500 lb also has the capacity to lift

400 lb? Answer, on this doctrine, no; for to have a (maximal) c~pacity

of lifting 400 lb excludes having the capacity to lift 500 lb. So

if this man lifts 400 lb, he is not exercising a capacity to lift 400

lb, but partially exercising his capacity to lift 500 lb. Is it neces-

sary that each such capacity should be maximally exercised at some

time? - no, except in the case of a capacity to always~, which is

exercised in full the only time (i.e. all time) that it is exercised.

Interest in maximal capacities, it was argued, leads Aristotle

to talk about the capacity to always-q~, but in ch. 12 he makes the

further claim that a thing that has the capacity to always-cp, always

has the capacity to always-cp. (What would he make of a myth about

a being who in principle possessed immortal life, but was told that,

if he transgressed, this immortality would be taken away? Probably

that, in real life- or in nature- things don't happen like that.

But note too that such a story inevitably involves the possibility

of an infinite bounded only at one end; at the end, if the being had

always existed but lost its immortality; at the beginning, if the begin­

ning has not always existed, but retained immortality.)

At 28lb 5 Aristotle distinguishes between what is possible or

impossible or true or false, hypothetically on the one hand and haplos

on the other. The examples given for what is hypothetically impossible

are things which, on usual assumptions, are mathematically necessary.

With the example of the triangle compare, perhaps, Physics II. 9 200a

16; the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles since the

straight line is such-and-such. The Euclidean proof of the point

depends on assumptions about parallels. So, if we make differing

suppositions, the angles will not add up to two right angles. What

is the corresponding supposition in the case of the diagonal? Perhaps,

that the same number can be both odd and even.

But what, then, will be examples of things which are impossible

~aplos, if even mathematical examples are related to assumptions? Per­

haps, the things which are in fact impossible - such as the diagonal

being commensurable; so that 'hypothetically' will mean. not 'cteriva­

t·ively', but 'on an unreal assumption', and hapl;s will mean, not 'sim­

ply', 'underivatively', but 'relative to something else which is itself

assumed to be true' . Does Aristotle then recognise a.E_I underived

necessities? The principles of the sciences? - hut perhaps they are only

·~;_"rES ON THETA

Hll1l • ·~r1 relative to our assumptions about space· lAnd, it was n0ted,

,, .,1 t~Lotle our inability to form intuitions which do not correspond

lilt.. '''dY LILI.ngs really are would not be a limitation; the correspun-

dence between our cognitive capacit Les and the way things really are

l J tl•Jt a.n arbitrary matter.)

l'he motive suggested in the paper for the relativisation of possi-

11iUty 1.;a 5 the fact that what is true is ipso facto possible, so that

vf whdt

of whdt is false is the only interesting one, and in the ca3e

ts false the test by supposition must apply to a situation

ut_!wL tho~n the present. Do similar motives apply in the case of the

~possitle? rhey presumably do, if the necessary is that of which

1.he ,_onl Ladictory is impossible; it is by taking something that is

true, and of which the contradictory is therefore false, and considering

what the implications would be is the contradictory ~ere true that

~e P~t~hlish whether a thing is necessary or not. Just as some things

,1 ro ;"tlways impos.<>ible, so, presumably, some things are always possible;

tr i 3 1 r 11 r Aristotle) always possible that some human being or other

>hnultl be standing.

Ts 'dlways' itself a modal notion, for- Aristotle? It is true

1 !lut. [.,r him, the capacity to-always-cp is a sort of capacity whlch

annot he possessed by something accidentally; there is a possible

·iJ.nl'!;tt 1•f ,_ilcularity here. tn some cases, the impossibility of some-

lhing derives, fur Aristotle, from things which themselves cannot change,

irl thp whole of 1·eal time - which is the only time he concerns hims~lf

'.'i\!1.

!L 1~as observed that, on this interpretation of Aristotle, there

,,., 1 11 hP 111 any things that are necessary for him but nnly universal au .. i-·

•inni S f 'll 'IS that there are no golden mountains, for instance. (But

•l. '•mithl!t'H, '!lume on Existence and Possibility', Proc. A~Snc.

I•.;HO 17~37). But it was emphasised that this is not how A.ristrotle

f"<>S rhe rnatter; he would no~ accept the suggestion that modal state"-

:nf>nt~ FIT~ simply functions of assertoric ones, a thing being ne~...essary

"irnnlv l·~r:ause it is always, as a matter of fact, true.

·f)

t.tt

.hist\Jtle•s modal notions may seem weak; it does not [Qll•lW

he w<\•Jld have shared this view of them or regarded them, in cnn-

96

Translation by R.W. Sharples of part of Ps.-Alex:ander's comments on 4.

2. [AlexanderJ 292 in metaph. 5 74. 6-575. 17 (on 9 4 1047b 3); ed.

M. Hayduck, CAG 1, Berlin 1891.

574. 6 Having said that those things are possible which

are not, but are able to come to be, [Aristotle}

says that 'if what has been said is possible in that

it follows•293

-that is, if something is said to

be possible, in that it is possible for it to come

to be and being actual follows for it 294 - it is

not true to say that something is possible, indeed,

10 but will not be I and will not be able to come to

actuality. For those things are said to be possible

which are able to come to the actuality of that for

possibility. But if someone which they have the

says that something is possible, indeed, but is not

able to come to be and result in actuality, the impos­

sible escapes us and it is unclear what it is.

For we say that a thing is possible [if}, ·when it

is not but is posited as being, nothing impossible

15 results; and [that a thing is] impossible [if],

when it is not but is posited as being, something

impossible results. 295

But if someone says that

something is indeed possible, but will not be or

result in actuality, how are we to know the difference

between what is possible and what is impossible?

For example, when it is said to be possible for the

log to be burned, if someone says that it is indeed

possible for it to be burned, but it will not be

burned, and the same person says also that it is

indeed possible for the diagonal to he measured,

20 I but it will not he measured - how will this differ

from that, when both are said to be possible [though}

they will not be [the case]? Accordingly, the log

J7

25

10

'Hl!'ES UN THEtA

is combustible and the dL.tgonal .neasurable equally;

but if this is so, it escapes us what the impossible

lS, Hhether it is the diagonal's being measured or

the log's being burned. So, [Aristotle] says, the

person who does not reck,1n or discern what the i!Tlpos­

sible is, and [what] the I difference {is) between

it and the possible, that man would say that 'nothing

prevents it that something, for which it is possible

to be or come to be, should not be, now or in the

future'. 296

But if he knew the nature of what is

i.mposssible, he would not have said so uncautiously

and readily, [both in the case ofJ the diagonal and

[in that of] the log, that it is po5sible for the

0ne to be measured and it will not be measured, and

for the other to be burned and it will not be burned.

Rather, he would have proclaimed }in the case of}

the other that it is possible for it to be burned

and it will be

of statements J

:!_')7 burned. But

are what would be

[the

said

former pair

by the man

who is ignorant of the impossible; this however is

cLear from what has been laid down (and it has been

laid down that what is able to come to be will come

to be), namely, that if we IJOsit that what is not,

hut is able to come to be, is the case, nothing im-

35 possible will result. I For jf, when you are sitting

but are able to walk around, we suppose, when you

Jre sitting, that you are walking around, nothing

impossible will result from the supposition.

5 75. I i Suppose, however, that this is true, but some­

one says that this man. who is sitting, is indeed

.1ble tn •..Jalk around, but t .. ;ill not walk around, and,

similarly, that the diagonal too is able to be mea-

->dred, but will not Oe measured. lf, then, the

latter case is not different from the former, just

.Js in the former case nothing impossible resulted,

so ne~ther (will it J i.n the latter. - _!3ut, if 1

1 it

'icl

10

15

292.

is granted that the diagonal !.~ measured, it follows

that

which

an odd number is equivalent to an even one,

is utterly impossible. 299 And this results

from not seeing the nature of the impossible and

the difference between it and the possible, and,

as a result of this, saying of the impossible that

it is indeed possible, but will not be the case.

So it is clear from this that, if something is pos­

sible, it will indeed be the case. 300 And this

impossibility I - I mean an even number being equal

to an odd one - is not [a matter of) being contrary

to the supposition that says 'let it be granted that

the diagonal is measured'. For if it were cant-

rary to the supposition, something impossible would

follow also in the case of the man who is sitting

but is said to walk around. [But] there the conclu-

sian is false, but not impossible, while here it

is both

and the

false and impossible.

I impossible were the

So, if the false

same, there would be

no difference between the two suppositions, that

which supposes that the man who is sitting is walking

around, and that which says that the diagonal is

measured. But since }the false and the impossible J

are different, the suppositions are different too.

The commentary on books E-N of the Metaphysics attri­

buted to Alexander is certainly not authentic in

its present form, although it is uncertain how much

material from the original commentary is incorporated.

Cf. Hayduck's preface to CAG 1; K. Praechter in GOt­

tingen Gelehrte Anzeiger 168 ( 1906) 882-896; Meraux,

Alexandre d 1 Aphrodise (1942) 14-19, and id. 'Aris­

toteles, der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias',

AGPh 49 (1967), 181 f.

99

.Jetd~. 9 4 l047b J.

t ead

',,r

in that', with Al~xander; J howe,,er has 11, rurther A'u has -rh .Juva."tbV 'if the imp•JSSible

is '..Jhat has been said'. Zeller quggested buvn-rbv

~~&.6uva.·d'JvtJ.)i"\d.xoXouOet, 'if, [a::.j has been said,

l that [ i.:3 possible un which nothing impossible fol­

Ln .. 's'; cf. below n. 2Y5, Ross (above n. 264) ad lac.

and Hintikka, Time and Necessity 107.

0::94. It seems very unlikely that this interpretation accu­

iately t·eflects the intention of Arislotle's words

i'.l s.

:.·J()'

"!7.

- whatever exactly they were (cf. last note. Ross

~rgues that ~ 4xoAou6£t can 0nly mean 'in so far

~s it is convertible',~ dxo~oueet 'or is convertible

•.;ith itj, comparing ~ 32a 24; Hintikka 107

~Jupts the latter). But [Alexander's} interpretation

dues commit him to what would appear to be a strong

... ersion of the principle of plenitude, the principle

that every possibility must eventually be realised;

ind this has a bearing on certain features of his

911bsequent discussion.

Fct this definition ot the possible cf. ;\ristotle

A_!!.:___!'_r_,_ l. 13 32a 19 ff., l:i_etaph. 9 3 1047 a 23 Ef.,

q 4 l047b ff. Cf. Hintikka, ib1.d. 30 E., 154

ii. 12, 22 ff.

:leta ph. 94 1047b 8 E.

this Llearl:; asserts that Lhe principle of plenitude

01ppl1es to individual cases (cf. above nn. 13 f.).

;'he c•.Jntrast with the diagonal would have been ade-

llJateiy expressed by 'it is possib.ie for it to be

298.

299.

300.

burned, even ii it is not' . It. might therefore

be thought that this was simply a 3lip. But c f.

below, 574. 33 ('it has been laid down that what

is able to come to be will ..:orne to be 1), and nn.

294, 300.

<0~> seems to be required after 61-JoCw~ in 575. 2;

alternatively, one might add O'tt. before W~; in 575. l

('that, as this man ••. , so similarly the diagonal,

too .•• 1).

CE. Aristotle ~~· l. 23 41a 26 f.; T. Heath,

A History of Greek Hathematics, Oxford 1921, 91.

The proof is given by Euclid 10 app. 27; summarising,

lf a/b is the ratio of the diagonal to the side in

its lowest terms, a2

= 2b2

, so that a2

and a are

even. If the ratio is in its lowest terms, b is

therefore odd.

Then a2 = Zb

2 But,

::::1 4c2 ,

if a is even, let a = 2c.

so that b2 = 2c

2 • But in that

case b2

• and b are even, b is therefore both odd

and even, which is impossible. Therefore it is

impossible to express the ratio of the diagonal to

the side on its lowest terms.

This does not of course follow; all that is clear

is that some of the things, which will never be the

case, are not possible either. The present statement

could indeed be interpreted only as saying that what

is possible for a type of thing will happen to some

one of the type in question; but cf. above, nn. 294,

297, and the summary of this discussion in the sequel

(575. 20) - 'having shown that what can come to be

something will also come to be that for '..Jhich it

has the potentiality ..• '.

I'll

l047b l

~ate by G.~.L. uwen

i'1etaphysics 84: potentiality and actuality. with not a hlnt of power

or potency

!U4lb 3: ~ E & A; .J ('earliest extant ms. of the Metaphysics', Ross

Intra. clv) 'appears to preserve the true reading', viz. 11 (Ross ib.).

~ dxo\ou6EL suggests a lacuna, and ps. Alex (57~. 8) supplied ~o tvep­

yT)c"a.L. 'Nhich is not to be had from 8 3; Zeller supplied <~ d.E>Uva't'OV iJ.>TJ

JxoA.ouBe!, which shows due disregard for the accenting of TJ in r: A .

Ti seems far likelier: if the impossibility of some consequence of

negating p is what constitutes the possibility of p, or at least (if

we find a less apparently circular definition of 'possible') follows

from the definition, we must presernve Lnpossibles against the sugges-

tion that they are possible but will not occur, if this is a general

move vs. tmpossibles.

!04/h 5: Not '!.f the (intended) result is that' (but): 'to

the intent that', standard with verbs of speaking-to-a-purpose, e.g.

oracles and

his motive:

Lt won't be;

votes, requests and persuadings. The inter locutor has

in any case of alleged impossibility he insists 'No doubt

but (since we entertain the possibility even in denying

it) it could be'. He might have continued 'After all, arguments can

be upset'. but he does not:

which standardly means 'not taking into account' and not 'not accepting

the proof'. He is a simple, to be inv<-'nted. 81.a.cpe\rye:Lv: escape,

run away: his prime object is not to kill them but to eliminate them

from any suggested case. He is perhaps invented as the extreme anti-

(le~arian, 'can never entails realization, non-realization never entails

-on not'.

On the necessity of past, present and future cf.

:a) EN VI 2 1139b 5-11, where what cannot be deliberated about is

3lmply

t hin.Q,;S

past

that

vs. future; (b) De Int. l8a 28-34, .. ;nich distinguishes

are and (?) have come about from future cases (and if it

for the YEVo~J.tvwv one might still thlnk of quantified vs.

11 nquantified universals); (c) Rhet. 1418a 2-5: Ov'ta. f1 ~lh Ov'ta. coupled

·.nth Y€-v6ueva. as v, the future, and as r.ecessary; (d) De 1:nelo 283b

lCZ

inP rr:R 4

12-14 which couples the present with the future as agalnst the past

as the field of dunamis. Our 1047b 13-14 belong with (d).

l047b 13-14: on the allocation of time-connectives which exercised

us in 9 3 cf. SE 166a 24-32 on fallacies of rrUvBEuL' (here distinguished

In conjunction 'The non-writing can

write' may signify ' ••. can write-when-not-writing' or ' ... when not

writing, can write'. The argument of l047b 8-14 requires

a present possibility which is not realized; the present has not become

necessary.

104 7b 17: 'There is nothing to prevent its not being capable of being' .

Dunaton einai has gone together in e.g. 1047b 15.

1047b 14-26: (A~ B) - (poss. A ~poss. B)

104/b 26-30: (poss. A_,poss. B) ~(A -+B) II

On II: There are two parliamentary seats in Kilmarnock. If a Conser-

vative is allowed to stand for one, there must be a Socialist standing

for the other. Pass. A .... pass. B. But if the Conservative is elected

to the one this does not entail the election of the Socialist to the

other. More generally, of two alternatives the possibility of one

entails the possibility of the other; but the realization of one pre-

eludes the realization of the other. The 'exactly when and how' of

1047b 29-30 do not affect this. What has Aristotle in mind? I can

drive my car out because I can open the garage door; this depends on

driving - opening, but this is I.

The defence of I is a direct application of the axiom that possibles

cannot imply impossibles; it relies on the assumption (A~ B). Here,

then, alternatives and Scotch voting are ruled out. How would Ar

deal with alternatives? De Int. 9 19a 9-22: In general, in what

is 'not always actual you find what can be and not-be (not cannot),

and consequently what can come to be or not come to be; and there are

plenty of plain cases of this. For instance,

into bits; and it won't; it will wear out first.

this coat can be cut

On these same terms

it was capable of not being cut into bits; for there would not have

been the possibility of its wearing out first if it hadn't been able

~q! to be cut into hits ...

103

i 04 7b 10

lJ47b l

1_~ .Y,. the reading !)f rr.e oldest MS J, seemed preferable to ~

'.,Thich was felt to require a :-;upplement - eith.cr lAlexander j 's 'tO £vEp­

ril;:ra.L (574. 8i but not (.0 be had frcm d 1) or Zeller's <..~ &.E>6va.'tOV f-L)i,.

n could indicate that Aristotle · .... as worried about the circularity of

nis 'definition' of possibility in 9 3, dnd so TNas keeping open the

possibility ·'lf a better definition, if one could be found. 'tb e:Cp11~-

'JQV will be understood as subject of Axo-x.au6e't: or if (what has

been stated) (at any rate) follows (from the definition of the possible)'

- though this was felt to be S()mewhat elliptical.

'that, the actuality of which entails no impossibility' (cf. 9 3 L047a

<4-26).

~~_!:__:.§. Werre:: Owen and Kneale "" 'if the (intended) result is that';

Hintikka (and pseudo-Alexanaet·, and the Loeb), 'the result 'i.Wuld be

that'. On the latter view. the argument is that anyone who denies

plenitt1de, who says 'this is possible but will not be', has no criterion

for distinguishing the possible from the i.mpossible; once you allow

chat one thing that won't happen is possible, there can't be any im-

possibilities. But Aristotle does provide such a criterion in what

Eollows; the fact that something impossible is implied (l047b 9-12).

On the Owen view, it was suggested that, since Aristotle i.s ~~

11 ow supposed to be asserting that 'this is possible but will not be'

1s not true in any case, it is odd that we have 'it isn't true to say

:) with the intended result that q'. rather than 'it isn't true to say

(p and q)'. or 'it isn't true to say (p implies q)'. For p, 'this

Ls possible but will not be'. isn't, itself, false in every case.

Lt was suggested that EC1tetv might be followed by an accusative and

infinitive, ~"tt. meaning 'beca,tse' .1ud Wc:rte: 'therefore'; but the •'AxrtE

:.>P.emed odd, and duplicated -roU1:-r;1. Perhaps t'Ix:rte ~..ras not in the original

~ext, but someone added it b~cause they failed to see that O·ta. meant

':"e.cause rather than 'that'? .:Jut the cor!"uption would have to be

··arlier rnan ps.-Algxander.

Ahy, in any case, should anyone suppose that sayin~ 'this is pos­

t,le but will not be' ~auld i:nply that there are no impossibilities?

t'n the Hintikka view of (':(J"te. this is a belief Aristotle himself holds;

1n the Owen v1~w, it is an imputation he is concerned to ~uard a~ainst.)

')4

l047h 4

rlecause of a supposition that whatever can be significantly stated

is possible? Or, is it that, as Aristotle in 9 reduced the Megarian

position to absurdity, so here he is resisting a i'legarian attempt to

reduce his own position - that there ~ a difference between the pas-

sible and the actual - to absurdity by exaggeration? (Note though

that Aristotle in A had only argued for the possibility of 1 this

is possible and ~ not happening', not of 'this is possible and will

not happen; e:Iva.a. in l047a 21 is present; so such a Megarian attack

on Aristotle would involve an extension of his position, as he had

exaggerated theirs.)

What is the sense of &t.a.cpe:Uye:Lv in l047b 5; 'disappear altogether',

or 'slip through', 'get away with it 1 , 'successfully masquerade as pas-

sible'? The latter, weaker, sense seemed to suit the general sense

of the word better, but we felt that the former, stronger sense is

at any rate implied. e:Yvcu. depends on d.OGva:ta.. It may seem odd

that someone should assert that a thing is possible, but will not be,

with the intention that the impossible 'should get away with it'; less

so if what we have here is Aristotle's report of, and react ion to,

the attempt of an actual or fictional opponent to reduce his (Aris­

totle's) position to absurdity.

i1ansion suggests that the Owen interpretation of Ox.Tte not only

means that the passage doesn't support Plenitude, but actually means

that it opposes it. We felt that this was questionable; it isn't

actually ruled out that it might as a matter of fact be the case that

the only things that never happen (in any case?) are those that are

impossible. (Hintikka himself elsewhere does not seem to assert more

than that what is possible will happen in some case, not that it will

happen in this case; Time and Necessity 100.)

It was also suggested that the point of the denial that one can

say (in some sense, at least?) .'this is possible but will not be' might

be that it is a contradiction in terms. a denial of the very notion

,,f the possible; note that it is 'this is possible but will not happen',

not 'this is possible ~ven if it doesn't happen'.

(l047b 3. Zeller's CuvCL't"ov <~ M6v<11:ov ;~>n cho;>.ou6et is attrac-

tive at first sight, as the consequences of postulating the occurrence

of '..rhat ls possible seem more to the point. in view of l047a 24 ff.,

LOS

b 9 tf., than the (o•,ercautious?) statemeilt that ,.;hat has been satd

may be an implication of the possible, be co;1vertible with it. rather

than being identical with it. (So Ross r)n the MSS readings, and Hin-

tikka). But - cf. above on 9 3 - A."X.o\,)1Jdetv is Diodorus' term in

this context, not Aristotle's; has Zeller been led .1st ray by the appa­

rent parallel with the Master Argument'q formulation here?)

i1ight the point not be, it was .::~.sked, that to allow ~.!!Y assertion

of the form 'this is possible, but 1vill nnt be', does away with the

impossible, i.n that it removes what Aristotle's opponent regards as

the ~ criterion for distinguishing between the impossible and the

possible - namely, the non-nccurreuce of the former? flut the trouble

~vith this, •..;hich amounts to taking Uxrte in the Him:ikka rather than

in the Owen sense, is that the conseqnence in 5-6 is clearly one which

Aristotle himself sees as following from the assertion uf 'this is

possible but will not be' - on the Owen view. from some assertions

of it, not from_~ assertion.

It was also suggested that Aristotle's point might be that we

cannot simultaneously assert of a thing (i) that it is possible and

(ii) that it will not be, because this involves a contradiction; to

say truly that a thing will not be implies - cf. the Sea-Battle - that

it is impossible. And this might be felt to lead to the disappearance

0f the impossible in the (rather Pickwickian) sense that everything

that did not happen would be impossible, so that the impossible could

lonlil;er be distinguished from the possible hut counterfactual.

"1ut this seems rather tortuous. ro take acco,Jnt nf the point about

the Sea-Battle, it might be suggested that Aristotle's posJ.tion is

that, \.Jhile we can't say 'this is possible but will not be' of cases

1 ike the commensurability of the diagonal, we can say j t in general

of cases llke coats which can be cut up but won't he, though we can't

assert it of any ,e_articula:r:_ coat, :Jince J t is stilJ 0pen whether it

·..;i.ll be cut up or not. 0n r-he other hand (i) we do ha'Je -ro6C here;

and (ii) in d~~ 9 l9a 14 Aristotle actual.J.~, .... ays 'i.t is possible

~hat t.his coat will he cut up, and ("" .<ind yet; hut he uses xa.C, simply)

1.t won'r he'.

'not trtking it into

106

account', rather than 'not accepting the proof'. The opponent asserts

of any case that, even if it may well never happen, it is possible

(? since we entertain the possibility even in denying that it will

ever happen); he isn't making the sophisticated claim that arguments

to prove impossibility can always be upset, but simply doesn't consider

Lhe arguments at all; a simple-minded character, invented perhaps as

the extreme oppos1te to the Megarian of 93 who held that not_~ that

didn't happen was possible. (Or perhaps he is the Megarian of e 3

going to the other extremes to show that, even if Aristotle can ridicule

his position, he can ridicule Aristotle's as well.)

can be construed in three ways: (a) 'that the impossible (in general,

as the concept) exists', with 'tO ci66va."tov as subject of Elva.&.; (b)

'what is unable to exist', with e:lva.L depending on &.E>6va:rov - cf. "tO.

~66vo:ra. e!va.s., 1047b 5; or (c) 'that (the commensurability of the

diagonal) is impossible', with d.66va:tov as complement after elva'- ,

111d 'tO going with the whole clause (in which ca.::;e it is redundant,

as was pointed out). (a) and (b) indicate that it is a general point

about the impossible that is ;}t issue, while in (c) it is a specific

point about the diagonal; in an attempt to salvage our respect for

the opponent, it was pointed out that the argument 'the fact that vou

~ever reach a rational value for 2 by the method of successive approxi­

mations doesn't in itself prove that there isn't a rational value'

has force against an attempted proof of the incommensurability of the

Jiagonal by the method of exhaustion, even though it doesn't against

the ~uclidean reductio, which the opponent will then be disregarding.

But it was felt that there was little evidence for such a specific

point in the context; and, however -rO &.E>6va.'t'ov elva.L is taken, the

·~ontext shows that the issue between Aristotle and his opponent is

CC)!JCerned with impossibilities in general, not just with the tncommen-

surability of the diagonal. The opponent is right to real1se that

·wn-occurrence does not of itself lndtcate impossibility; but he is

wrong to refuse to allow any other criterion.

'_f_1_47b 9~ In de Int. ':1 18a 28-34 and ~het. 3. 17 1418a 2·-5 Aristotle

:.dsses the present with the past, distinguishing it from the future

·-;hich is still open (Eth. Nic. VI. 2 ll39b 5-ll doesn't mention the

~.07

41b 4

~o'resent in this connect1.on dt <Ill, simply contrasting the past ::tnd

the future.) In st_e Caelo I t2 2d3b 12-14, on the oLher hand, he seems

tu regard the present as •Jell as the future as the fielJ of possibllity,

unlike the past; and 13-14 here seems LO Sl.tggest rhe same, what is

not now the case not r_herefore be1.ng impossible. Admittedly is

dmbiguous; the point could he either {i) 'it 1.s false that you will

get up here and now, but not impossible 1 , or ( ii) 'it's false that

ynu re standing now, but you could have been'. But, against (i),

on ·..:hat grounds can •..;re say 'it is false that you will get up here

and now'? :-toreover, the fuller version in de Cae!~ I 12 28lb 9-11,

~ 0 yap ~E ~h l~w~~ ~v~• t~dv~• fEUCo4 ~tv, obx d6uv~~ov &t, suggests

that here too 1t is the possi~ility of present counterfactuals (ii)

that is in question; and l047b 8-9, too, indicates that it ts the non­

realisation of a present possibility that is Ln question, as well as

that of a future one.

fhere l$ thus an apparent discrepancy between this passage and

Q~ Cae~ l 12 on the oue hand, and ~e~E_!..· and Rhet. on the other,

on the question of the possibility of the present· (It was noted

that Diodorus Cronus relates possibility to the present and the fut\lre~

and that he may have been influenced in this by this chapter.) lt

was pointed out that the present, when considered closely, tends to

d~sappear into either the future of the past, and that Aristotle may

have been influenced by different, equally natural ways 0f looking

at the matter on different occasions. But, more convincingly, the

sense in which the present counterfactual is not impossible here may

be different from that in which the present dctual is necessary (and

the present counter factual imposs.Lble) ln de int. 9 (cf. L9 a 24) and

P:l~~· ln ~~-~~lo I 12 28lb 8-9, though not in 9-ll itself, the con-

trast that is drawn is one hetween d:Jt.\W<; falsehood and 6.7tXWc; impossi-­

it ooen that what is j~~W< false may be impossible hi l i.ty; which leaves

''"', some qualified sense. [f so, 1.t ·..;as felt that Aristotle in 13-

l4 her·e should not just have contrasted 'false' and 'impossihle 1

, but

>hOlild have spelled out wna~~sort of i:npossl.Ollity he was reierring

C() 0 It was f1'.Jinted out, too, that the possilnlity, in some sense,

r h 2 counterfactual should extend to past counterfactuals as '·1ell

ro present ones: past ~vents <iS well as present ones could be de-

<'JlAPTF;R 4

~cribed as accidental rather than as nP.cessary.

th'lt the perfect yeyovtvnL in 1047b 10 could indicr~te possihil ity

in the past; however, it was felt that the past implications of the

p~rfect tense were not clear, and that the pairing of ETvcu and ye:­

y')v€vcu was intended rather to accommodate the distinction between

permanent, omnitemporal truths (like the incommensurability of the

di.agonal) and those relating to things subject to change. (But are

there any omnitemporal unrealised possibilities?)

We also disc,lssed the relation of this discussion to tlte 1ilstinc-

t:ion heU-leP.n powers and possibi1ities. It was f":'lt that more was

r"'!~"tuired for the assertion of a present possi.bi1ity than [or that of

a power; one might have the power of standing without its being possible

f0r nne to be standing - if, for instance one was tied to the chair.

But in the present passage, at least, it is clearly n_~!- held that the

~ere fact that the opposite of one 1 s standing is the ~asp removes the

poc;.qibility of one's standing. The contrast between powP.r and possi-

hili tv thus did not seem relevant to the discrepancy betw£>en 1 hi.s pas­

sage and ~-~.!.· and Rhet.; and there was no need to j nt roduce powers,

as opposed to possibilities, here or anywhere else in q 4.

[t W<'\S further noted that the point at l047b IJ-14 I• trP.ated

in terms of the positioning of temporal adverbs, and of th-=- fall<Hy

0f composition, at Soph. El. l66a 24-32.

l_0_47b l_l~::~· Aristotle here argues that

(I) (A~B) ~(~A "*B)

ThP argument takes the form of a !'_eductio; assuming that B is_!!?_.!:. pos­

sihle, it is deduced from this, by means of the converse of 'nothing

impossihle follows from what is possible' - viz., 'that from which

snmethin~ i.mposstble follows ls itc;elf impossible' - that A is not

possi.hl e either. Bnt why, in 20, is the suggestion th~·t 8 is tmpos-

sible put in the past tense, as if referring back? It was suggested

!-hat lrrrw Or, &.6Uva:'tov (sc. -tO B) in 20 should he tr~nsferred to 17,

)!l indePd hetnp; somewhat repetitive; but the double f(J"'tw in 17 would

t hr-:-n hA awkward. So it was suggested that lc;-r;o Erh tO A E>~va:tov in

17 IR might be a corruption (in capitals) of an original lc:rr:,,l OT,

~E>6vc:tov i and that EcJ'tw 01, &.56va:tov in 20 mtght be an Intended correc-

109

~~ 7b 1.:0

tion of 17-18 that had been misplaced.

Even so, it was pointed out. that Aristotle has all the ingredients

of a direct proof by 20, without needing to employ a ~!-luctio (for,

fromO A and 'nothing impossible follows from what is possible',<> B

is already implied). And the whole argument is of little value as

a 2roof of 'what follows from the possible is itself possible', since

~11 it does is to derive the truth of this from the principle 'nothing

impossible follows from what is possible' (cf. e J l047a 24-26).

yllp in l047b 16 indicates the start of the proof.

third E r ua.l. depends on Ouva-tbv ; cf. e.g. b. 15.

B, ·~o 6E~~Epov = A.

In b 22,

In bl7, the

-rO 1tpW-tou =

l047b 26-30 Aristotle here asserts the converse of (I), namely (II)

(C,A -l'CB) ..-(A~)

An attempt was made to save him from this by suggesting that in 26-

27, as in 22-24, the (complex) apodosis precedes the (complex) protasis;

but it was generally felt that this was grammatically impossible.

in 27 introduces not che protasis of the entire sentence, but the

protasis of the conditional which, as a whole, forms the apodosis of

the entire sentence.

The trouble is that (II) is plainly false, as can be seen by con­

sidering cases (like that of the coat which can be cut up or burned

in de Int. 9) where the realisation of one possible alternative pre-

eludes that of the other. The possibility of a Labour candidate being

elected may imply the possibility of "l Conservative candidate being

elected at the same election, but it is certainly not the case that

~he actual election of the one implies the actual election of the other.

Nor do the qualifications in 29-30 help. In the case of the election

it is a matter of the possibility of each being elected in the same

time and in the same way; and the only ·way in which the qualification

could help, would be if the only way in •.-;hich a thing were possible

• . .;ere that in which it actually happens, t>,1hich involves identifying

the possible and the actual and saves (II) only by making it a tau to-

logy. Furthermore, with regard to the problem created for (II) by

-1lternative possibilities, it was pointed out that Aristotle himself

in the very next chapter refers to potencies which may bring about

llO

o:::ither of two opposed results ( e 5 1048a 10). It ,...,as pointed out

that the mere fact that there can be a potency for healing which is

dlso a potency for harming does not of itself entail that ~ potency

for healing implies a potency for harming; but Aristotle clearly holds

that the potency for healing by the use of reason, at least, also im­

plies that for harming in a similar way.

i.Jhat then are the cases in which (II) does apply? It was sug-

.;;ested that they are those in which B is a necessary prerequisite for

A, and in which that is the reason for asserting() A~¢ B; if for example

A = house, B = foundation. This amounts to saying that ~A_,¢- B)

implies (A ..... B) in precisely those cases where (OoA ~<>B) has itself

been derived from (A ... B); which is hardly surprising. And indeed

<TntJ,a.!ue:L in 29 may indicate that Aristotle has in mind precisely such

cases; CT'r'jj.J.aCvE&. = 'this is how I got to it'?

(t was pointed out that &.vd.yxT} appears in 26, while it does not

appear in the corresponding clause in 22-23. However, it t.;as felt

that &.ud.yxn throughout 14-30 applies to the relation of implication,

rather than qualifying the terms involved (unlike 6uva-r6v and d66va:tov);

3nd it was not clear that any contrast was intended between implications

qualified by <ivd.yxn and those not.

I[]

i il4 7h 16

5 PHILOSOPHICAL I SSUZS _ ARIS_ING FROM METAPH. 8 1 & 5

l. ~l]l_ng 'Jisible at times •..;hQn sum~thing prev~nts it __ being seen?

wonder if l0413a 15-20 is relevant r.:o a '.:ertain debate on the

nature of possibility. It Hill t.:•, i.f it is to Le rearl as saying

that a thing has its 6Gva.J.H' or.ly at times when external preventing

factors are absent. If this is 3pplied to 6uvd.J..LE~c; like visibility,

r1r. ccmbustibilLty, then Aristotle \·:ill in effect be siding with the

Stoics against Philo 1n the ensuing debate. :\<;cording to Philo, it

is possibLe for a piece of wood at the bottom of the ocean to be burned,

n~d similarly a shell at the bottom of ~he sea is perceptible, in virtue

of the 'bare fitness' (psile epitedeiotes) of the subject. Most Stoics

disagreed, and said that a second condition must

·,-1e hcve a •possibility: the absence of external

be fulfilled before

nhstacles.1

Taurus

in eff•~cr- allows Philo's view, '"hile Al8xand~r in effect sides with

r:he Stoics.2

[n fact, both sides are ~rong, for there is no one answer to the

qne-:;tion, The answer can vary according to whether we are talking

0f a possibility of being q> 'd or q>-abi..lity, according to what ~ is,

,\nd according to the context of discussion. F.xample: a piece of

·.;ood hundreds of feet underground: the intervening earth would normally

.,_Je thought of as removing equally lhe possibilities of s~~cing it and

Uu.rning it. On the other t~and, it •,.,rould more often be called combus-

tible than visible. '..Thether it was called visible would depend on

!:he context of discussion. Lf the context were distlngui.;hing between

_ •1tell Lglbles and visibles, it ·.wuld rank as visible. If the context

~~re one of a slght-seeing holiday, it would rank a:; i.11~isible.

~. r>.ridence in Necessity, Cause dnd Blame 78-9. Philonian examples: )hiloponus ~n An. Pr. i69, 20 f.; Alexander in An. Pr. 184, 12 :~f.; ::~mpLicius i~~· 196, 1. ~:Q1.tedei_?tes, a~; u:3ed in later mti1uity, is interpreted by Gwil Owen in an a1T!lost oppoaite sense 1:s t:ne absence of interfering ccnditions. I should be interested ~·) ~ee whether it could not be interpreted as still having the ")hilon:i.an sense. (A.C. Crombie, ~d., ~_.:: __ ~nti.f~~'!!_~ N.Y. 1963, )] . )

L. l'1urus .2..E· Philoponum, De ,\~::I_t:l:..:!:.!:3_~_e :1'..l!lcU:_ (Rabe) 146, 10-13; \lPxander (?) Quaest1.ones 18, p. ·n, ll r.--:.cknowl<:."dg;ements t:.o

,:,arnLos and ~.!!~.:.... tar~, 12 ff.

1 j l

2. ~s a thing vis.1ble dt c. Litle~ ·n~hen there dre not beings who can

;ee?

,\nother crmtroversy, 1 . ..rhich very much interested Aristotle, might

perhaps be seen as a special case of the first one. Would !:here be

knowables, perceptibles, or countables, 1f there were no ensouled beings

to do the knowing, perceiving, or counting? (The absence of such

beings mi~ht be seen as a special case of an external obstacle.)

Aristotle has at least 4 discussi.ons, in probable chronological

order:

(i) Cat. 7 7b 33-Sa 6: YBs, there would <>till be knowables and

perc~ptlbles without animals.

(ii) ~· IV 14, 22 3a 21-9: Reverse verdict: nothing would be

ccuntable (so there'd be no time), if

rhere were no souls.

(iii) ~etaph. 0. 5, l010b l0-10lla 2: Agrees: perhaps (i:aw<;) no a is-

!_:h,eta, if no ensouled beings, but there

,;oulr! 3till be the substrata, '.-Jhich give

rise to perception.

(iv) !Je Anima III 2, 426a 15--26: :-lore complex: perceptibles in

their active qtate exist only during

-1ctual perceptlon, but insofar as merely

pntent:Lally active, exist \.Jhen perception

is not actually going on .

People have been so amazed hy the claim about ti.me in (ii), that

they have sought to put other constructions on Ar's words.1

But Ar's

mistake here becomes more intelligible when the difficulty of the issue

about possibility is recalled.

His successors could not agree on the issue.

(a) Roethus Jisagrees ,.,ith (ii) and (iii) on countable and perceptiblJ

(b) Alexander agrees with (ii) 3

(c) Slmplic.1us agrees with (ii) 1+

dnd disagrees with the rival view in (i)5

1. Details in P.F. Conen, Die leittheorie des Aristoteles, Munich 1964. 156-69.

2. Boethus, a__E. Si.mplicium t!!.._f..~~- 766, 17-19 (= Ihemistius, i!!..__!'_b_y_§_. 163, S-7), and 759, 18-20.

1. Alexander, ~.£· Simplicium in Phys. 759, 20-760, J. 4. :;Lrnplicius in Ph....Y2. 760, 33·-"161, 5. 5. :JimolicilJS (acknowled~ements to R.W. Sharples) i__!!_J~ii..!:.· 196, 12 and

27-l).

llJ

"l()TF:S n~J Ti-iETA

3. If so, visibility (the passive power) CJn exist without sight (the

(]Ctive power).

Might not something, in suitable contexts, be r~garded as a count­

able, or quantifiable, or visible entity, even thOltgh everyone had

permanently lost the power of counting, quantifying, or seeing? If

so, it constitutes a warning about tne close connexion that Aristotle

makes in e 1 between the power to 1> dnd the power to be cp'd, although

doubt if it actually contradicts anything he says in 8 1.

rhomas Aquinas tries to off~r an anaLogous example. 1 Does God

suffer a change and a loss of power when somerme loses her virginity?

For he is unable thereafter to prevent her having lost it; yet before-

hand he had the power to prevent the loss. Thomas' reply is that

both before and after the loss God has the power of prevention. It

is the retention of virginity which has become impossible, not God

'NhO has lost a power. Once again, on Thomas' view, there is a lack

of correlation hetween a power to prevent and a possibility of being

prevented.

I don't think this can be right. Admittedly, when the virginity

is lost, the change does not take place :!:_.!! God, but still something

about God has changed: he has lost a power. would compare a lethal

virus.

to lt.

Surely, it does not remain lethal, if we have all become immune

Admittedly, the change does not take place !.!!_ the virus, but

something ~bout the virus has changed: it has lost its power to kill,

because we have lost our power to he killed. In this example, unlike

the first ones, we have the close correlation between active and passive

powers that 9 1 leads us to expect.

D0es it help that the last change took place in the passive parties

(the vulnerable humans), whereas in the earlier PXamples it took place

in the ~_ctive parties (the counting, quantifying., or s~eing humans)?

I don't know, but there are examples of the npposite sort. E.g. if

'Ve (the active parties) permanently lose the power of surmounting some

nbstacle, that obstacle (the e_assive party) ceas>2s to be surmountable.

2lo the question when active and passive powers are correlated is com-

plex. >1y point is: not always.

l. fhomas Aqninas, ~l!_n:!~f_~€_E.l.Q.g__~~ I, q. 25, a. 4.

t )_4

0:.. L2 c.~s LtlS~_Eing~-~--~~~~~~:_:r:_~~·_:::__~.::reat~·l_t'~~t_____:__:~J"~-J:....!! (-~~-

Juspect, pending correction, that -.: c '•<-~Y in ·~hich ,q '5 rrn\'ed

influent1al was in inspiri.n~ a cc:rtutn TsL1mic

<reated the w-0rld with a 1·~!'1pural lwP,inning.

':lrgument for 1-;nd's having

At '.iny T'Jte, the fir:n

';tep nf that argument is that, where there are .JlternJtive possibili­

ties, dS it is ~~ed that tht=:>re are tor rhP location of the physical

'-'orld, there must be a ~_Ul whil..h decidP.S wh1ch possibility is realised.

Thi.s pattern of argument i.s PlUch discussed by fslamic scholars. Is

it not very close to l048a 10-11 '? Where there is a capacity to produce

opposite results, for exdmple, the ctoctor 's capacity to kill or cure,

there mu~t be some other factor which dec1des (~ .. inai to kurion), and

this fact•n is desire or choice.

5.

ltlS

Does 5 L~El:Y determin!_~ . .:~

~ 5 has been, dnd may easily be, taken ta imply determtnlsm.

the analysts r>f 'can' 'ls 'will, if .. ' i1as been reinvented by modt.:rn

.3oft determinists. ,\ga:in, Jadkko Hintikka has, for different reasons,

cited q 5 along 1.Jith 0ther p.-1ssages, .JS .;ho1ving that 'in one of his

moods ar least he rAr1 thus comes fatrly close •o Diodorean cteterminism.' 2

Finally, Elizabeth Anscombe Clt'2S a 5, to . how that ,\ristot:le beli.eves

lhat what lS caused is necessitatect. 3

-;hall 'lerely summarise here the arguments u_~ed in NCB 52-3;

136-1. ,~J9, to show that determi ni ·;m , '3 not implied by ~ 5. Ar is

t_alking about c.;pecial cases, when h~ says AvO.yxn ( HH8a 6 and a 14).

He ls not, for example, talking about e•.rerything ~.;e should call action,

but dbout actions springing from a rational <.::apacity like medicine. Hin­

tikka certainly allows that Aristotle Ls talklng dhout soecial cases.

In 97, 1048b 37-1049a 18, ,\r dist-inguishes the -1bility of a seed,

'lnce implanted in t_h0 'VOmb, to f)ecume a !luman r.etng from the mere possi­

bility !:hat ::>orne pJece of elt:mental "arth ·..;ill one day turn into d

bronze statue. Surely 85 does rtnt. ·:0_l~~. 1;nply that, if that

o:arth does indeed t11rn into CJ: SLitU€, ever:; ">t"li!e in the process will

IJe necessitdted?

l.

,: .

L,wayni a..E_. >~aimonidem, ,-;.\!_~-~-~~t~-:~fplex~. I /4, 5th argument -1nd ae_ .. \verroem 0:a:>~ (' r. H.:\. Lfson, The Philosophy ')f rhe ~~ . .:i~· -U7-8). -----"

~~~kko Hintikka, r"cme and Ne~~sitz, Oxford t973, 2Gl-2; A_jat~ l957,

·~.E. :t • .-\nsc0mbe. r1·L;C! l'Jll, 2.

15

fnJ..t~ural l.>2cture, C:tm-

.;n fES u:.--.1 THETA

I expect that Aristotle would have imagined he was well clear

,__)f determinism inter alia because of his clause 'when the conditions

are right'. ~o doubt, he would think that coincidences often play

a oart tn whether conditions are right, and in Meta ph. E 3 he believes

he can prove that coincidences are not necessitated.

To get Ar looking more deterministic we would need to put 9 5

together with some of his other ideas. Thus an efficient cause is

that whence comes the origin of a change (~. II 3 and 7), and change

is defined (~. III l) as involving the activation of a O~VCLf!L~. If

we put all rhese ideas together, it looks as if all efficient causation

involves the activation of a &Gva.~L' while ( 95) &uv~eL~ are activated

of necessity, once the conditions are right.

~ow we are closer to Anscombe 's formula, that what is caused is

necessitated. But I am sure from his other remarks that Ar had not

put all these other ideas together. And, even if he had, it is still

aot logically implied that whatever is caused is necessitated. For

it 1s not ruled out that Ou~L' may sometimes be activated and produce

an effect before the conditions have actually become necessitating.

The effect would then be caused, but not necessitated.

ll6

1Q_47b_l_l-_-35 Jl-33 dtstinguishes rt'rr~e t_-;pr~s · 1 t [l•JLenl.y, (a) 1_t1e tnnate

(uuyy£vt'Ov), \b) tnose resulr.ing fro.n habir.uatil1n, (c) r_hnse resulting

frl)rn learni.Dg. 31·-15 assert t:1..1t (b) ·ind (c) em ()nlv he possessed

.JS the result of previous activity, \.Jhile this doc!S not apply to (a)

or to rasstve powers (not mentioned in the i.r~itial classification).

\Oytf in 34 picks up u.aef]m._ in 13. :1ay ther~ 110t he ':J()TUe other ex-

3mples too, not falling under (b) or (c), ·-.~here previous activity is

required? -those under (a) indeed are innate, hut 15 the classification

in 11-33 exhaustive as far as active powers are cc>ncerned?

ample, the power of begetting is natural, but is not possessed ~t birth,

if C""l)YYE:'JWV has that strong sense.

Further, what is the previous activity ref~rred t0 in JJ-34? Is

it a previo'JS occurrence Pf the 2dme activity as that for which the

resulting potency is a potency, or not? Anal·l~Y cvith the treatment

nf t.:;Et.S in ~_!:! II. 1 would su~gest: that it is (and cf_ 9 9 lU49b

33);

lity

case

Vity.

on the other h,1nd, the l').gical c~latinn of 1ctualtty co potentia­

su~gests that actual:Lv ~-ing presupposes th1:;> power to t.p, in wnich

r:he activity that pr\3cedes the power ro c.p must be 5(1 me other acti-

Alternatively, we m1ght dppeal to the contrast h~tween doing

something and doing it : ... ell; it 1...s :,y _;i_ngin~ that we d<:!·J~lup the power

t:o sing well.

l047b l5-l048a 15 The point of t~e reference to soul at • 5-6 ls clea­

rer if this is rE>ad in conjunction w1th A z - which is relevant to

the suggest1on that A 3-4 are i.n some st~nse dn L11 terruption.

is in a soul ilnd is of opposites. Btlt what is the force of tvav~Cwv

Ul 3 J: is it :;imply 'opposites; like health J.nd ~>ickness (A 2 1046b

7), or does the expression cover 'lll contradict11ries, all cases nf

1c- t ng -or -·not- qr ing? 'there are rwo dr14uments t:h(lt Ar~stotle could

:·1ave used. correspomHn\S t0 those n.Jo '-.lays >Jf r -~~in~ tva.v-rCwv. (A)

rational potencies are ~or ~'oposit~.§_. CIS ~joctoring- can _r1r()duce either

nckness or health, \lecause. Ln cl •vay, une ~-~~yoc; ·-:,~·:ers hothi and so

r3tional potencies

· L·-,n ·.;nuld result.

cannot. ne a....:tualised aut•;matically, <'!S a contradic-

1 B) 1t lS an •;bserved f~ature 0f rational behaviour

1 r',,~ /h j5 :!'·rES ;N ~HETA

1L .• o has the power not-to-cp. It was senerally agreed that (A) is

t:he argument Aristotle uses here; cf. the contrast with tvOc; ltOLT'J't't.XT)

in 8. Worries were expressed over the ddequacy of (A) to cover all

rational potencies; but it is claimed that it does in 9 2 1046b 5,

1nd 7-8 here suggest that the conclusion is intended to apply to all

rational potencies. In r 4 Aristotle expresses contradictories, as

i.n (B) by € rva.C 't'E xa.t ) .. n; rather than by lvd.v"t~a. though Ev6.v't'La. could

rover (B) in the sense of 'incompatibles'. (It might also be remarked

that (B) would involve a more obvious begging of the question against

determinism - though for Aristotle, presupposing that human actions

are not predetermined, there would be no question here to be begged.)

Rather stmilarly, in 11-12, it was asked tvhether a distinction

..... hould not be drawn between, e.g., (i) the decision whther to do some

ioctoring or not at all (corresponding to (B)), and (ii) the decision

'...rhether to use one's medical skill to cure the patient or kill him

(corresponding to (A)). But it was observed that, while we might

_;peak of a decision not to do any doctoring at all on this occasion,

Lt was doubtful whether we could speak of a decision to do some docto­

ring independent of a decision to cure-by-doctoring or else a decision

lo kil l-by-doctorin~. (ii), corresponding to (A), has the advantage

For ~ristotle's argument that it throws greater emphasis on the decisive

role of ope~'' and ~po~Cpe~'' than does (i}.

cO<; 66vnv-ra.~ in 6 picks us the qualifications in 1047b 35-1048a

2, these in turn picking up 9 4 1047b 29-30 (which has a bearing on

the relation of e 5 to 94); tc W~ 66va.v-ra.~ in a 6 corresponds We;; OUva.-

ca.~ at a 12, and this in turn is expanded in a 14. So in 6 we should

~ ranslate 'in the manner in which they possess the potentialities',

lr rerhaps 'in accordance with the qualification which apply co the

!1ot::o:ntialities which they possess'.

Does this discussion have deterministic implications (cf. (5)

'Jr Sorabj i 's notes)? It was agreed that d.vO.yxT'J in a 6 must express

necessitas consequentiae rather than consequentis (cf. dvd.yxT) in a

~);so extra premisses are required, and Aristotle might not have rea-

lised the deterministic implications. Sorabji outlines a positive

ar-"!ument; it can be further strengthened by an appeal to the necessity

,,f the past as Irrevocable. One :-n.Jy compare. in the case of rational

1] 8

potencies, EN VII. 3 1147a 25-28; there the existence ut d setti..t:d

"'tpoa.Cpe:cn<; seems to play a similar part to that which ~ight be played

hy the necessity of the past in the more general an'!;ument cuncerning

irrational potencies too.

Even if the deterministic implications J.l·e realised, Sorabji sug­

gests an escape route; from the fact that X's capacity to <p will be

actualized given condition a, b and c, it does not follow that it may

not <p sooner, when only a and b apply. Against this it might he Stig-

gested that this only shows that X had the capacity to q:l given merely

a and b; and in that case it follows from 5-7, where irrational paten-

cies are concerned, that it must as soon as a and b (only) apply.

So far, however, we only have 'whatever happens is nece~sary', not

'only what happens (at each given moment) is possible'; see further

below. It was observed that 13-15, too, do suggest that, whenever

potency is actualized, there must be something that necessitates

its actualization. For otherwise, if we could suppose that an irratio-

nal potency may somtimes arbitrarily be actualized before its actualiza-

tion is necessitated, why should we not suppose that a rational potency

too may sometimes arbitrarily be actualized in one 1c.;ay rather than

dnother, even without the presence of desire to 11ecessitate its acttiali­

zation in one particular way?

-\nd, more generally, it seems a rather Heak objection to deter-

min ism if Aristotle had realised the deterministic implications,

'Nhich he probably did not - just to suggest that things may sometimes

happen sooner than they have to; one may compare Hintikka's suggestion

(i.n 'Aristotle on Modality and Determinism') that Aristotle tries to

~scape deterministic equation of the possible and the actual merely

by pointing out that the realization nf some possibilities is inter­

rupted (in a predetermined way, for all that the argume11t says?) before

it is completed. ('Aristotle on Modality and Determinism', 59-79.)

,(upCwc; in 1048a 12 refers to x6p~ov in 10 (1.;hich raises the old

problem of whether the strongest impulse is that most strongly feltor,

rautologously, that which in fact prevails).. xupCw<; ·night suggest

'',,lit hout any misapprehension about the circumstances (etc.)', but even

iesires accompanied by misapprehension lead to action. fhe reference

in Eudemian Ethics II. 6 1222b 21 to )(()p~at. d.px_aC which are fi.rst sour-

cr:~s of motion was compared.

l i 9

-':2~~_____!._2_~ Sorabji (.l) :ju5gests Ln.tt Lhis expre;:.ses a vLew of possibi­

L1tv (I) sLmilar to tnat held by the Sloic.s~ if ~~LHnething is prevented

oy ~!xternal factors, the possibility uf its c,ccurrence is removed.

nf cJlHSe, the way in which this Ls inteL·pLeted by the Stoics will

•1e different from that in whi·..:h it is interpreted by Aristotle, since

'.hey assert universal causal determinism as an explicit thesis, and

'·e does not.) We inclined, ho,.,ever, to interpret these lines rather

lS expressing (II) a view of possibility like that of Philo as long

,15 -1 thing is prevented, it does not happen, but that does not mean

hat the possibility of its doing so, too, ~s removed. This means

·Jldt the commentators who attribute a view of type (I) to Aristotle

CAlexander in An. Pr. 184. 10-18, Philoponus in An. Pr. 169. 21-23,

Lf. also Philophonus in de Gen. et Gorr. 302. JO ti.) are in error -

' f at least they have this passage in mind; they are speaking about

nasaive possibilities, whereas the present passage is concerned with

1ctive poLencies.

In support of (11), it was a~g~ed that 18 dues suggest that (e.g.)

'\)ower of burning' is being restricted to 'power of burning dry stuff',

__;o that the power of fire to burn wood is Hot removed just because

his piece of wood happens to be wet, rather than that (I) the power

LS only present if the wood is not wet.

·uly should Aristotle make such a point?

The question was raised,

Answer, toresist those, real

Jr imagined, who try to argue away possibility by pointing to impedi-

rr~nts, and so tend, in the extreme case, to restrict possibility to

vhat actually happens when it happens, like the Megarians.

This, indeed, was the second main argument in support of (II)

•nd against (I); the combination of (I) with the implication of 1047b

LO-'I·~a t5, that possjbilities are actualised when and only when all

;,.~ .·ondltions for their realisation are fulfilled- that, as soon

·s t.Je have all the necessary conditions (including absence of preven­

~un, and, tn the case of rational potencies, presence of desire to

· r1ng about the particular result), we also have sufficient conditions-

vl tl tend to push Aristotle into the Megarian position. (Indeed,

1nl•.:>:r to push him into it, Hintlkka, (Time and Necessity 201 f.)

"llpiwls 1. wo premisses; \a) possibilities realize lhemselves ~~

:1nt orever,ted from doing so (dcri'Jed from ':) 5 l048a 6-

\:-', .L.I. '

; and g 7 l049a 5-9, 13-1'5), ·-~~12. (b) that tt .. 1 ~,u->stDll.L'? i.::> ,,,Jt rea­

lised there must be some external f.1Ctnrs preventing it frnm being

realised (so far equivalent to (a)) 'or, ~s ~e m~~~~~~~·

making it impossible for it to be realised'. (;-tv italics throughout).

On the other hand, ~! '..Je >?;rant th;:lt 'necessary' ~ 'not possibly

not', it at once follows from 'whenever a potency ls actualized, there

must be something that necessitates its actualization' (above) that

'whatever happens could not possibly happen', and hence that 'nothing

other than what happens is possible'. In 'Aristotle on Modality and

Determinism' Hintikka clarifies his position on (b)~ the presence of

preventing factors does not remove J~-~rti.al possibilities, hut it is

the question •Nhther there are any total possibilities other than those

that are actualised which is relevant to the issue of determinism;

18 ff. In de Motu Animalium 4 699b 17 ff. Aristotle is prepared to

c;ay that 1.t is impossible (in one sense of 'impossible') for us tn

see the men on the moon, even though they are not <Jf nrcessity invi­

~1hle; which might seem to suggest (l) rather than (II).

f<>.ren with (I) \·le might find an escape Loute fnr Aristotle by in­

sisting that the absence of any dctual pr~~·enting tact~rs is not equi­

'Jalent to the presence of sufficient conditions fnr the realisation

(and the Stoics may well have used some Sl\Ch nr~ument). Bnt it ' . .Ja"i

pointed out that, even so, there are certainly m1ny occastons 1.Jhen

a builder is prevented by something from builrti11g; so ,~veT! if we escape

t:he implication that he loses his <::1pacity to build whenever he is

not actually building, we are still forced t•) hn1cl that he may gain

and lose his capacity to build many times a Jay (whever it rains, for

example).

furning to (II) then, it was pointed cut thdt Lhis requires Jt0t£'i:v

'~xpressed or understood in 15-l6i i.t is l:HleP.d in the ~1SS. ( Hor..Jever,

if it is retained, Exet &e <~~c. dw 6Uva{JLv) 't'oU '11"a.p6v-roc; -rr1U ~a.fu]·HxoU

xot WOt lx6v'toc:;: 1tOLELv might have been clearer.) Further, lll) requires

caking ob Ouvfroe;'ta.L in 16 as 'he w1.ll 110( he~ able, altho11gh he retains

the capacity'. (One might try to ~scape U:i.s ;,y :.-tyc11g that, while

prevention by external factors does not remov~ rne '~ilpacltV, the ah­

--;crce of other necessary conditions- ~.g those 1.nternal to the pa­

t ~.ent - rioes; but la) this is implausible and lb) 18-20 snggests that

r he absence of e.xternal preventing fact<Jrs is i:1cJudcd L!t 1he other

1'lalifications, rather \han being cr1nrraJted '>Jith tbtm.)

' '0 '!l

:··.-sa ')

~048a 15

[Alexander} in Metaph. 577. 33 f .. 1eLt.nitely takes 16-21 in the

Philonian way: E C ya.p £'xe: ~ 6UvafJ.~V -roU 1tod')01U, xwA.UE'ta.~ Ot tl?t6 'tt.vo<;

~~;civ-cwc; ob JtOLfJaEL. fn 16 he expands EC Ot l.ifl as e;t 6€ ~t, Exet. 'ti)v

06voi-!LY, however, ; and he does interpret 15-16 as expressing condi­

t icns on which even the potency is no longer present; one doesn • t have

the power to cure a man if he isn't ill (577. 27 f.).

16-21 presumably applies to rational potencies too, though it

is in the context of the rational ones that it is introduced.

(2))

Are things visible if there are no beings who can see? (Sorabji

It was doubted whether Lhis ~ in fact a special case of the

first issue about possibility in Sorabji' s notes; is it entirely natural

•:o regard the absence of anyone who can see as a hindrance to a thing's

heing seen? (We must now be talking of passive powers.) The discus-

si.on in (iii) is in terms of a.Ccr&rr":6v rather than of &uva.'t6v; the con­

nection may not be as strongly felt as that between 'perceptible' and

'possible' in English, and the point in (iii) may be one about the

systematic ambiguity of ·words in -'t6v rather than about possibility.

Might a.Cafhyt6v in (iii) not be taken as 'perceived • rather than as

'perceptible'?

If (iii) is not therefore a str3ight assertion that there can

b~: no perceptibles without perceivers, we are left with (11) as the

only assertion of this - and (b) and the first passage in (c) are com­

ments on this. We cannot argue in the case of (ii) that d.p~8f.!T'}'t"6v

,rJeans 'r.ounted' !"ather than 'countable', because of the contrast ii "tb

But may the

point not be a special one about 'counting' rather than about percep­

t ion? - we may have five trees, as a matter of fact, even if there

1re no men to say that there are five, but we ..:annat have a quintet

'Ji trP.:Ps HI t.he absence of someLone to .:aunt them, just as, it might

be claimed, if there were no rational beings nothing could be 'late'

'lr a 'weed' (though we were not all happy with this).

<10 men, '.olould anything last for exactly one year?

If there were

But Aristotle's

rlaim is stronger than this; it is not just that notlling would be coun-

ted, but that nothing could be. We observed that the contrast in

~'hades of meaning between 'has the possibility of being counted' and

'has the capability of belng counted 1 may enable English L.O express

subtle distinctions which tile Greek Cdllnot. Je ctlso not-:'d that there

is no suggestion of a distinctiGJlbctween rhe 3ppl~c~bi1itv \li different

predicates, like the suggestion dbove ~hat '(nuntctble' •nL~ht be d ·3 pe­

cial case, in our discussion about !Jossibiljty 1n l04Ha 15-21.

Can an active power exist Hith~~__r:_~2E£'::..?_E~!~.~~~~ii_P_~~tve __ E.'~~~I

Sorabji (2) (paras. 2-3). What is Lhe pm;er i~(•d is supposed to have

lost, in para. 3? 'The pn~Ver of preventi:I~ X from losing her vir~

ginity'; or, more strictly, 'the pnwer ilf hi:"inging it <Jbout that it

is not the case that (tenselessly) X lnses i1er virginity'. But did

he ever have this power, or did he only have 1 the power of preventing

X from losing her virginity, provided she lla$n't already done so''?-

Hhich power he retains. (To avoid the t0mporalqualiftcarton 'already'

,lne 1flight suggest rather 'the power to prevent A losin~ her virginity

as long as she has it'i but that Ls either e'luivalent or tantologous.)

God has the power. at each time, to ·~nsure that chv; table alwdys re­

tains the colour it has at that tinte (he n~edn't t~~~_!_cise the power,

Hhich is :.;hy ·.,;e can paint a table ct different coloc1r, but that doesn't

mean he doesn't have it). Has he lost -"!HV power lf, once we paint

~he brown table green, he no lon5er tFJs the fli~··w.er ld keep it brown

for evermore, but only the power (1Jhich ile ,:ltJn't h.'!Ve her•Jie) to _k_eep

it ~£~ for evermore?

Against this it was objected that, if ·...,·e are too Late, we do feel

we have lost a power - or is it rather that 1ve l1.1Vf! rnissed an opportu-

nity? God will then suffer no Loss of pmo~er in the case of X's vir-

ginity, but he will have missed his opportunity df preserving it.

What about Sorabji 's example of the vlrus? Can '-•'e ::1rgue that the

0nly power it ever had was the power t') kill peopie \,"hO 1.vere susceptible

1 1) it (which need not be tautologous, if • . .;e c.Jn ;;i·.'e a speci.fication

of •.vhat made people susceptible), tlnd that it n:>taius r-hat power, even.

thou~h, as a matter of fact, thece has heen a (rlecisive .-tnd permrPJent)

change in our make-upwhich :rreans th<-It

fvreseeable future be, susceptible 1 o it!

1 s ll•JW, •,Jr Hill Ln t ~1e

olr ;S Ultr dttentlon not

rather directed, in such a case, lo the f.Jct rhat t1te .,iJns previously

l1;ls the power to kill rnany ar most tJ'-"!nple, and nmv rlo"'s nut? ~'Prhaps

'!~thal' in any 1:ase denotes a u::ndencv, r1.ther : !mn a capacity;

·:ir•:s may retain the capacity to ~·.ill ":f r•v•rr:- 1•:; person who i ~

·.-1 l

• } ~I) a l J

_;usceptible to it, Out we :night not rilercfore be prepared to say it

is iethal. True,

:an no lcmo;;er kill

even if the make-up of us all changes so that it

any of us, we might say that it has the potency

· o kill i.n the

1gain soo as to

sense that it could killus if our structure changed

make us susceptible to it again; but in that case any

virus might be lethal, if we rould specify the change in us (however

improbable) that '..Jould give it the power to kill.

i048a 20-ll Is &.<pa.LpEi''tnl. middle or passive? One would expect the

,Jassive (cf. 1048a 33); there are parallels for cicpa,l.pe'toiKu in the

middle in Aristotle, Lut not in such a use. Nor is the use of ~vLa.

~dsy to parallel in Aristotle. So delete £'v1.n, and take "t'Wv - 1tp00"6v-

twv as genitive absolute? But the general sense is not affected in

J. ~1y case.

l.:_)_~~~ .!..2-24 This, being concerned with limitations of that of which

1 power is a power, may provide further support for interpretation

(II), rather than(l), of l04Ra 15-21 (the 'Philonian' rather than the

')toic; see notes ad. lac.). Un either (I) or (II), it was argued,

there is a problem over how we can know what a man's capacity is -

the Megarian position of 9 3 csLapes this by limiting capacity to

,~hat is actually happening. But Aristotle would no doubt reply that

'le can have a t,eneral understandin~S of ~;.Jhat the relevant conditions

;r(!, dnd can thus know ~o.'hether or not particular men have particular

apacities ~n particular circumstances. We; l~t ~o ,~~;o~U at anv rate.

•·HAi'IER VI

l048a 25-JO 86 is conce-rned not wi rh C)l.JvdLLEI.c; to i.'S x1.vry::ra.1. and simildr

potencies, as in 9 t-2 and

to what is lve:pye:Ccr. This

9 5, but

passt1ge

with \-Jhat is btJv6.ue:l. as upposed

picks llp e l l045b 35-l046a 4;

1048a 28-30 apologise, as it were, for the rhgression. -rp6xov 't'l.v<i

in 1048a 29 takes up the 'lC.a.N]c; of 8 1 1046a 17, rather than the qual if!­

cation of A 5 1048a 17-18.

1048a 30-1048b 3 Aristotle gives examples ot the potential and actual.

The argument is one by analogy (36-37; read -r.q; in 37, comparing l048b

7, with Jaeger), which is a type of l1ta.ywy-ti (35-36); but not all l,~~;a.y(JJ"'('fl

is a matter of analogy - not that from species to genus. for example.

'Analogy' in Aristotle is always a pr·oportional relation, A:B:C:D (or

\:H:B:C). In 13 [Alexander l - but it might be from the genuine Alexan-

der supplies 6~.a~E'tpq.J; this seems right (the feminine shows that

the r-eference must be to a line, ypa.~l-'li ), t:hou~h ilayduck, the C_IA.G

editor of Alexander, was Hrong to print 6~rxue-.:p~ as it it •;ere an actual

quotation from a text diffC>ring from rJurs. ( lAlexr~.nder} i!' ~letaph.

579. 6).

One case of the potential-actual disti11ction is th~t !Jetween matter

and the torm-matter compound (a 32-.33, b2-3). It '"'as noted that the

distinction here is only d relative one; Lhere lS no ·j\lggestion, as

there is in 23, of the removal of a_"!:._l_ det~rminations of the substrate,

leaving only 'prime matter'. The reference to 1'\.Va. \S\11v in l048b

9, too, fits with this.

',!hat is it, then, that i1ll th examples have in cu1nmont fhe '.·mod

is r;otentially a Hermes, but the whole line is not potent idlly a half.

P~rhaps, then, t:he point is Lhat the Hermes ts ~-r:!. the '-"Or:ld potentially,

dnd the halfllne ~ the Hho1e? l3ut one can hardly ~jay that the actual

knower is ~ the potential knower potentially, thou~h one might :;ay

c. hat the actual knowledge was. So perhaps the cu:nrnon feature is that

in each case the way in which A is f) ;nust he -lUaiified:

'V)W, but it cnn1rl cc,me tu be B (cf. Ci.v Ouva.'tO<; ry, a 34).

A isn't B

rhar_ • .. mod

lS a H~-rmes (in i'l way), that whole has a half in it (in a way), that

~an has knowledge (in a wav). .:£. l(J48h 12--13.

l048a 30 'tlTES ON THETA

Worries were expressed about the exampl~ of knowledge (a 34-35);

is Aristotle right to suggest that a man who knows something, but isn't

considering it at present, knows it is a different way from one who

is?

tenses

'I hate

It was remarked that with 'know' we don't use the continuous

like 'I am knowing', while with 'hate' for example, we can say

Mrs. Thatcher, and I w~s hating her from ten till ten-thirty'

if that is when I saw her on the television so that my hate was fully

actualised. Would Aristotle's point be more acceptable if we render

l1tCO'"'fa.aea.~ by 'understand'? One may understand something, but yet

r.ot understand a particular exposition of it if one is distracted.

True, if a man is asleep and we expound Pythagoras' theorem to him,

we wouldn't say 'he understands it, but he isn't understanding it now';

but that is because, when he is so obviously not listening, to say

he isn 1 t understanding is superfluous.

l048b 4-9 Jaeger argues that d.l.fiWpLO'}.llvTJ in 5 cannot mean 1distin-

guished, as one member of the division' with ~cProo (that would rather

require 6 ~wpHllJ.lliTl), and hence reads <+!> d.qxup~CJ}..1lvn and takes the term

to refer to the production of the actuality by its being separated off

from the potential (cf. l048a 33, and B 5 l002a 24). But, (i), <-/)>

'3uggests

actuality,

that &q>wp~O'}.ltVll is a restriction to one particular type of

rather than an explanation of actuality in general which

is 1.,rhat is wanted here; and (ii). it is indeed the case that not all

cases 0 f actualization are cases of separation (cf. the knower in a

34-5; though it was pointed out that there might always be the tempta­

tion to stretch the language so as to say that the actual, in general,

is 1 in' the potential), but • ..,hat we want here is a reference to actua­

tity in general. So c:Lpwp~outvT} without<+!> must mean, not indeed

· Jistinguished in the division 1 , but 1 marked off in the division'.

Jaeger Is interpretation required the nominative ed:tEpov J..16pLOV ; .even

on the alternative interpretation the nominative seems much more natu-

ral. What would the sense of the dative oe: '~ one part 1 , 'in the

•Jther'?)

Trt h 7 Hermes ts not said to be in actuality by being in the wood,

but rather by l)~~!...!!.Lbeen. If the first alternative, lv 't'06't~, is

,_aken in this way it can be restricted to those cases •Nhere 'in 1

is

l26

really appropriate, loeavin~~; the other alternative, "tCO<; "'t'oiJ'to to <:uver

the rest.

l048b 9-17 Ross supplies 11 in ll, Jaeger a whole clause, e.g. €'tL 6~

rhe

an anacolouthon, the construction switching from

Jaeger's

former involves

'tb d:u ~poll \~y,:;-ra.~

supplement avoids

this. If ~o~~or~ with no addition were tolerable as a dative depen-

ding on Cl.AM.oc; the following datives could he explained by attraction.

The sense is in any case clear; Lhere is a contrast between, on the

one hand, cases like those in ll-12, vhere what is said to be poten­

tially is at some time unqualifiedly so, and, on the other, cases like

those of the infinite and the void to v.;rhich this does not apply.

·ra\ha. in 12 = ~pWv,0a.OCl;wv, etc.

In 13 understand, with 6p~evov 1 not lv6~xe--ra.~ xa.t d1tAW<; d.A:r,8e:6e:o--

8a.t. 7tO'tE but tc:rt't. ; for the former would .:~J so have to be understood

in the second cL1use, i.n 13-14, and ~hat is not an example of d.11:AWc;

It is, in nther t.wrds, the tirst (d the two clauses

in 13-l4 that is the operative rme; in the case nf ~vhat is seen the

first sense as well as the second one is ,wa1lable, but in the case

of the infinite and the void this is not .'>o.

the statement in 14-15 that the lnfinite What is the force of

exists potentially yv1.&oe:1.? That we knc'w that further division will

always be possible; not that we know that 'there is a possibility of

.. my number of divisions', but rather that we know that 'for any number

of divisions, there is always a possibility ·Jf more' - and presumably

for better reasons than that '~e have always found it so tn practice

11p to the point •.Je have now reached

then is the corresponding claim about

i.n rhe dividing process.

the \'uid? Perhaps that

What

we can

always (at least in theory) reduce the amount of air in a container

heyond the point to ·c~hich He have ii.lready reduced it, but never produce

a perfect void. It t.Jas remarked tha.t A,ristotle rejects the void,

in P..bY§J:_~~ IV, on physical grounds, whereas the point c1hnut the infinite

livisibility is a mathematic une; but, does Aristotle distinguish these

types of reasons in the way ~.;e do, and is the infinite divisibility

of ~atter not a physical AS well 38 a C11nceptual pol11tl

'U

.l~b '

',:4Sb g

With 14-15 on~ may compare tite contrast between what is separable

SpYtp and what is separable only A.6Y<tJ· In 15-17 'tO 6€ xwpC~a6a.~oo9 is

to be taken as a ::;econd ~ect, p.Jrallel to -tO i.J.TJ {llto"-.E:CJte::Lv 'ti"jv Ot.aC­

rJEULv; the structure is chiastic, in 14-15 'potential not in way A

rut in way B•, in 15-17 (the .,explanation) 'warranted (Hope's transla­

tion) as potential by B, not by A'.

1048b 18-35 These lines are bracketed by Jaeger as a later addition

by Aristotle himself. Jaeger's Qrgument that 35-36 refer to the first,

rather than to the second half of the chapter seemed weak to us as

a reason for supposing a later addition, and we weren't happy about

the relation between the theory that 18-35 were a later addition ~

Aristotle himself and their umission in EJ; if there were really two

recensions going back to Aristotle himself, we would expect signs of

this elsewhere. But, on the other hand, if the omission in EJ were

purely mechanical (due to the loss of a page, for example) it is odd

that it corresponds so exactly with a section of the argument.

'are among things concerned

with the end', though one might have expected 7tp0c; rather than 1te:pt.

J ae~er reads -cb (O""X.va.C vE «. v and deletes f) lo-xvCl.()Ca. because otherwise

it would be implied that £<J"Xya.crCa.is the end of lcrxva.Cve«.v, whereas

in 29 Ca"';(vCl.()Ca. is described as a xlvT)c:n.c;. [IJ""'X.va.!vE!.v is transitive

in force. Bywater reads i1 [<TX.vCl.()(a.; but that seemed to us too obvious.

-r:a.U'ta. in 21 == -rWv ~tpti.!;e:wv Jv E'rr'tL ~tpa.«; in 18, a.i,..ra. in 20 being

-1n example of these. There is a shift in the use of "Jtpa.;u;, which

cTlCludeS actions directed tOWards ends in 18, but iS limited tO those

·.:nl~h .1rt~ ·~nds in 21 (with a qualification - but see below) and in

'l (without a qualification). This u3e of the same term both for

1 ~enus and for one of its species, however, 1s characteristic of Aris-

rotle. ~ore difficulty was felt over the claim in 18-19 that no action

•vtth J. ~~:Epnc is itself an end; contrast the argument that one end may

~c subordinate to another, being desired bo~ for itself and for the

1Jrther ·::nd. in Nicomachean Ethics I. 7 . Is this, rather than a worry

. bout t ~e shift in the application to 1r.:pli.!;u; the reason for the qualifi-

·--uon in 21-?.2? ft was noted. though, that the idea that lvtp-

t' ~.R n

are more valuaole Lhan x~ vi)O"E Lt; is found elsewhere in Aris-

totle, as in the treatment of ')E:I,L,lp(a. in racomachean Ethics X. Does

,-,:lpa.c; in 18 have the sense of 1LX.oc;. or is there a distinction, 1(tpa.<;

referring to the ~ of the action rather than to that for the <>ake

of which it is done, in the sense of what is most valuable about it?

For - although Aristotle's argument here would not allow it -the gcJal

of an action is not always the most valuable; if one plays chess at

all one must play to win, but that does not mean that one must value

the winning more than the playing. In other words, 'for the sake

of' is ambiguous, though Aristotle does not realise this here. We

compared the later Stoic distinction between the skopos (aim or goal)

of a virtuous action, and the telos which is the action itself (Long,

Phronesis 12 ( 196 7) 78 f.).

Does Aristotle have the notion of a mathematical limit (cf. his

remarks on the squaring of the circle in Physics I. 2 and §.9~.

11)? Yes, he does, but the limit is not part of the sequence. A1-

though we cJ.nnot reach B by completing an infinite number of intervening

~ivisions, we cdn still reach B; but B is not any point in the series

0f infinite repeated divisions of the remaini.ng intervening space,

and similarly a circle is not any rectilinear figure, however many sides

the rectilinear figure might have.

l048b 23-35 Jdeger's supplements in 23-24 are not needed. 26: lf

the perfect were not compatible with the present, the actuality would

have an end - once it had taken place it could not st i 11 be taking

place. X!.vfp-e:Lc;, unlike lvtpye:La.L, can be done incompletely; and

(Ethics) they can be done quickly or slowly. Is Aristotle's point

just that the present is <;;ompatible with the perfect for tvtpyELa.L,

or that the present ~mplie~ the perfect? The former would avoid diffi-

culties over the fact that one cdn assert xe::xCvrrtoL at the first moment

of a change, too (~ysics VI. 6 ); but 'has moved' (simply) is different

from 'has walked from A to B' or 'has built a house'.

'is walking

fr\lm A trJ B' doesn't rule out 'has ' . ..Jalked from A to B' (at some other

time), hut we can't infer this, and he certainly hasn't completed this

·.Ja lk. 32-J/.j.: ·...;e preferred to take l'ttpov and 't·,_, a.U't6 as objects,

with Penner, r,lther t:han as subjects; Clnother possibilitY, 'are not/

1L9

; li.:OHh ! A

l048b 23 '10 l'ES ON THETA

are the same thing' would be easier with infinitives in 33-34, and

• are the same thing' is weak. for 'one implies the other' (the relation

is not reciprocal, for 'has seen' doesn't imply 'is seeing'). ~"t'Epov

as object in 32-33 answers the objection that you can't be walking

(from B to C) and have walked (lrom A to B).

CHAPTER VII

1048b 37-49a 18 It was thought that e 7 Is discussion of when one thing

is potentially another might shed light on the issue we debated earlier

(see on 1048a 15-21) as to whether or not the circumstances on which

the actualization of a capacity depends belong inside or outside the

specification of the capacity. Thus, is a piece of wood at the bottom

of the sea (a) visible (because 'visible' means 'can be seen if circum­

stances c obtain') or 'b) not visible (because 'visible' means 'can

be seen' and at the bottom of the sea circumstances C do not obtain)?

If this is the question, 87's answer seems to be (b). Neither a

quantity of earth nor a seed is such that it can be(come) a man (49a

1_3 ), so 'can be(come) a man' must mean not (a) 'can be(come) a man

if circumstances c obtain' but (b) 'can in present circumstances be­

(come) a man', with 'in present circumstances' elucidated in 49a 5-

18 as the obtaining of all the required bar the efficient cause (exter­

nal in the case of artistic production, internal in the case of natural

production). Given these circumstances, nothing prevents the efficient

cause (the artist's wish, if he has it, the seed's inherent nature)

initiating the process of actualization, in the way it would be preven­

ted if some further change was required before that process could start,

as e.g. earth must be changed to bronze before it is ready to be(come)

a statue.

Note that it could be true in this way that nothing prevents the

bronze being made into a statue if the artist wishes (all is ready).

even though in fact it won't be - won't be either because the artist

doesn't wish it or because

interferes to prevent it.

some outside agency (earthquake, sabotage)

The !at ter is not what Aristotle means

to exclude by 'nothing prevents it', or else he lapses into the thesis

ilO

that nothing can be unless it will be!,

Second thoughts suggested, however. that the above exposition

is attached to the wrong question. The talk in this chapter is not

of having a SUva.IJ.I.c; to be F but of being 6uv<i1-1e:L F. The quest ion

is not 'When does something have a capactty to he(come) a man?', but

''..Jhen is something potentially a man/a potential man?'. lf there

is a distinction between these questions, it t:ould presumably be true

0f earth that it has the capacity to be(come) a man (Ar is not denying

that the earth has the capacity it has), tmt false that it is 6uv~EI.

r!vBpw~o<;. In which case the chapter offers no guidance on the general

issue of how much goes into the specification of a 66va.!-LI.t;· The thesis

is still not that a thing is Suv~e:" F only if it T..Ji!l he F, but rather

that if something is 6uvd.tJ,e:1. F it will be pr.Qvided that things go

r)n from here as normal and (in the case of artistic production) provided

also that the artist wishes. Ar assumes that we can say that things

are set up to proceed to a certain outcome Ln the normal course of

events. Even if we cannot spell out the proviso in detail, we know

in a common sense way what sorts of thing would count legitimately

as an abnormal interference with the normal ~·,urse 11f events.

l049a 18-b 2 lxe:Cv1.vov is a lexical device for picking out the tE; o~

(in one sense of that term:

lhis chapter (cp.Z l033a 7 ff,) identifies as what is potentially the

subject \ve describe as lxe:Cv1.vov. Thus y is x-en if x is potentially

y. It follows that if there is a y which is not x-en, for any value

of x, then for that y there is no x which is potentially y, i.e. no

x which is the matter of y. In that precise sense y is prime or first

matter (49a 24-7): first in an ascending series such as fire-air-

earth-wood-box, last in the same (purely illustrative) series going

down.

stuff.

is not

This is not the traditional prime matter nr tntally neutral

Nor do the conditions given require that y he unique: if y

reducible to anything else, it does not fr;J1,Jw that everything

is reducible to y; the terminus of one <;eries nef.:d not he the terminus

nf all. The only 'traditional' use of iS\T] in ,\r is tvhen he <;peaks

of Plato's xWpa. as \)\.,.

Accordingly, to say that prime matter, e.g. fire, is not 't66e: -n is

131

~!,_rTES •J:i l'HETA

not to say that it is a stuff without qualities or attributes, but

that it is not a reidentifiable something. Is this compatible with

the talk at 49a 24 of 'toOt 'f0 >;6Aov or does Ar mean that it is only

at the terminus of a series that you no longer have ~6be ~L? i.Je pre-

ferred the first alternative. 49a 27-36 is a quite general contrast

between subjects which are 't66e: n and subject as matter. What 23-

4 offers is a proportion: this wood is to this box as wood ~xhW~ to

We took ~~XW~ here to mean: without the sort of qualifica-

tion (concerning intermediate changes) that ~auld be required is 'earth'

stood in place of 'wood'; this results directly from the information

that a box is ~UA1.vov (22L given that a statement of the form 'y is

x-en' is equivalent to 'x is potentially y' and the conditions already

laid down for the latter. Now, this box is not 't6Se:. ~L, reidentifiable

as the same box, because it is this; rather, because it is a box it

is reidientifiable as this again. Correspondingly, then, if this

wood were "t60e:. ·tL, it would have to be so because it was wood, not

because it was this wood. But it is certainly not the case that it

is 't60e ~L because it is wood - that is the point of 49a 27-36. There-

fore, it is not -t60e: "tl. It can only be called this wood because

it is the wood of this box, which is ~60E "t'- in its own right. In

other words, the notion of 'this wood' is derivative from that of 'this

box'.

In connection with tnis it

fire is described as the most form-like

was remarked that elsewhere

of the elements (De Ge~

,-:;orr. 2. 8 335a 19; Meteor. 4. 1 379a 16, the other elements are matter

fur fire).

liJ49b 2-.3 dnnounces the completion of the topic introduced at the

beginning of the chapter.

l 32

CHAPTER VII I

Note by G.E.L. Owen

Priority in 9 8

1049b 4: such refs. are generally taken as pointing

is not in Bz. Ind. 626b 30-31). 6 11 distinguishes

to 6 (but ours

Qualified priorities (cf. 1018b 29-31), 1018b 9-29, (a) in place

(nearer), (b) in time (earlier, where the contrast with spatial priority

is stressed, b 15-19), (c) in change (nearer to 'prime mover' in sense

of e.g. ~· 242a 53, 242b 72, cf. Met. 1050 b 4-6, not the proximate

mover of 243a 32, 1049b 26), (d) in dunamis (more powerful), (e) in

order (which could be but is not generalised to cover the preceding

cases as III is in 1019a 11-12).

II Unqualified priorities, 1018b 30-1019a 2, (a) for knowledge, viz.

(a.l) by logos, e.g. universals over particulars or a sumbebekos over

the composite (cf. Z 1030b 12-13), (a.2) for perception; (b) as proper­

ties of such prior things (pathe, corrected to intrinsic properties,

1019a 1).

III (not expressly connected with the qualified-unqualified distinc­

tion, but apparently given focal application to I as well as II in

1019a 11-14): Priority by nature and ousia, viz. where A can exist

without B but not B without A.

as parenthesis.)

(Ross,Jaeger, Reale take 1019a 4-11

Z 1 l028a 31-b2 distinguishes priority in logos, knowledge, time;

but it apparently identifies the third (I (b) above) with III; and

although it prima facie distinguishes II (a) from II (a.1), it is effect

conflates them by connecting II (a) with ti esti.

and not taken up in e. g argues that energeia is prior to dunamis

Not a neat r~sume',

A In logos (1049b 10-17) and hence for knowledge (1049b 17), thus

recognizing connection in II (a) -(a .1) as formally z 1 did not, and

ignorning (II) (a.2) and (b). Examples are the logoi of oikodomikon,

horatikon, horaton, though at ~· III 1 20la 9-b 15 oikodomein-oikodo­

mesis is a kinesis requiring definition by dunamis (as even horan is

in such causal explanations as De Sensu 438b 2-5); no doubt Ar is thin­

king here of building as an achievement, not the process whose com-

133

llQTES nN THETA

pletion cancels the oikodometo'!_ C.~Y!· 20lb ll-12).

(ii)-(iii) below.

Contrast on B

In time (1049b 17-IOSOa J), sophisticating on I (b) by distinguishing

hetween numerical and specific identity in the temporal items:

(i) actual indtvidual is preceded by (same) potential individual

but this by (other, but specifically same) actual individual which

is the proximate agent of change (ctr. I (b) on proton);

(ii) ~ ( l049b 29) 'x can build' entails 'x has built'. First,

'hence' has nothing to do with B (i) or A, and must be an independent

application of B. Secondly is building an achievement here (implying

that when building his first house the builder does not have the abi­

lity) or an ongoing activity any part of which is building (as kithari­

~!!!. and the proximity of B (iii) would suggest)? Neither exactly

suits ~· III 1;

(iii) further (alla) if a process is going on some process must have

been completed, e.g. if x is learning x has learnt (something): if

building is an analogue, this takes the second option under B (ii),

conflicting with~~· 201b 11-13.

C In ousia (l050a 4-b 34)

(i)

(La)

'less strictly' (cf. 1050b 6):

by having form which through coming later in time is prior

to the potential (no more than a conjunction of A and B (i)?),

(1. b) ( ~!!i hoti, l050a 7) the ~E.£.1)~ of ~~esis is its end or purpose,

viz. the form, even when the end is realized some kinesis/ergon or

some product (cf. (i.e));

(i.e) (eti) matter is potentially the form to which it tens (conjunc-

tion or generalization of (i.a) and (i.b)?).

Nothing yet which specifically takes up A III; but now

(ii) 'more strictly• (lOSOb 6), in that '../'hat ts possible is capable

of either being or not-being, and what is ecernal must exist without

this possibility. (On the extension of all dunameis to a capacity

for opposites, ctr. e.g. e 5, see the half-defence at 1050b 33-34:

does an irrational power include the power to be absent?). By applica-

tion of III there cannot be potentiality/ contingency without actuality,

hut this need not entail Plenitude; merely that there cannot be contin­

,;;ent beings without non-contingent heings.

lJ4

Analysis of De Anima II. • 'd7a :SO~b 16 by R. i!elnJrn.1n

After distinguishing betw·een the first level potentiality. first

level actuality and second level actuality of knowledge, Aristotle

says:

417a 30 Both of the first are potentially knowing

i-J.l7b

31 but the one <becomes actually knowing) by (a] being changed through learning and often

32 changing from a contrary state [Ot.c\ ua&ftm;wc; d.~~ot.w8e:L<; xcrt .~to':\Mxu;; l~ ~vav't(at:;; p.E't~o~Wv it~e:w~] but the other < becomes actually knowirig) [b] from possession of sensation

or grammatical knowledge, .~tt tve:pye:tv &•e:t<: 'tO ~ve:pye:tv 0\~ov 'tp6nov

Being affected (-rb "Jtd.cry_et.v) is not simple either, but [l] the

nne is the destruction by the contrary, [2] the other rather the preservation of the

potential by the actual and the like, in the way

potentiality is related to actuality; for what has

the l?tt.<r't'fJ!-J.TJ becomes 8e:wpoUv, which either is not 0\A.ot.o'ikrea.c. (for the advance is into itself

and into actuality), or it is another kind of alteration (<iA.­Ao L Wcr.:w~).

So it is not right to say that what thinks is altered when it thinks

just as (it is not right to say that) the house builder< is ,1ltered >when he house builds. Now

10 (I] l~ading into actuality from potentiality xaTa 'tO voaUv xat

11 ~povonv is not correctly called teaching but something else.

12 But {II] that whlch from potentiality is learning and taking knowledge (TO 6 'lx Oui.IOIJ.e: L Ov'toc; IJ.ai.l8d.vov xa.t f..<J+lad.vov l"Jtc.O'T'ft • f.LTW)

13 by the agency of the actual and the capable of teaching

14 either should not be called affected (;td.cJxe:~v). as was said, or there should be said to be two kinds of alter-

15 ation [A] ~qv << l~\ ~~~ JTEp~<Lx~' &<a8lrr<L~ f.LE<apo)..~v

\6 xal[B] TT]v h:\ <~~ e~;E•' xa\ thv 'p(xnv.

: l)

Dlscussion began with Hein~Hnan introducing his ,Janer analysing the

rreatment of transitions from potential to actual in De Anima I. 5

4l7a 30-b 16. (His r~nalysi.s nf t-~~ !-'assa~e L:; attached. as are also

Owen's nntes on e 8 which He had hefort:! US,)

After much discussion of the !..~e Anima passage we arrived at the

following views. The contrast between (l) and (2) is not the same

as that between (a) and (b). That (•mtrast hetween {a) and (b) is

the fam1liar contrast between ~:.ransition frvm first potentiality to

first actuality (a) and from first .1c.tuality to second actuality (b).

The contrast betwen (1) and (2) then makes the further point, which

ts the central concern of the rest of the passage, that in the context

l1f sensation and thought we have to understand 'being affected' not

in the sense of being destroyed by the contrary (1) but rather ln terms

-1f preset"vation (2); both (a) and (b) falt under (2) rather than (1).

That (2) rtoes t"elate to (b) as well as to (a) is shown by the fact

that at 5-7 it is the tr~nsition from first actuality to second actua­

l:.ty that is used to lllustrate (2); note that hnth (2), at S-7, and

(B), at 14-16, ctre descrLbed as a1terat~on not in the strict sense

t~ecause of the force of <i~~oCux:r~<;; c.nange to ~omethi~~ (cf. 'into

l t self' in 6, 3.nd also 16). Compare Aristotle's remarks about the

acquisition of knowledge at ~~· VII. 247b 14. It is true that at

'1llb 2-1 the contrast is between two H<ly<; of 'being affected', only

IH1e of ·.;hich is alteration in the strict ~;~nR~. while at 14 it is not

'being affected' in the ~trict ·3ense ·:ither; but this is not a real

riifficulty. (II) picks up (a), and (I) presumably (b).

',.J!_l_y is ( L) not an a.pt descriptio:1 of (a)? Arter all, in (a)

itself le.Jrning is 1iescribed as c.h2nge frum :-t cuntrary state; and at

P~~--~~!_. 465a 22 learning Ls ,i_escri.bed as the rl0str~tction of ignorance

~;y knowledge. lt is true that {a) ls qualified tv -n:oA."\6.XLt;. But

t:he central roint is that ln en.:: case ul learning noth~ng actual i.s

b~ing destroye~ - as for exampole, the ~r~en colour Ls in the case

,f a change from green to red. The ...:han~e from water tf) wine ls not

t,:.:1tT'JCt1.ve in the same way as :-.hat trom '.•nne t_,l vinegar (H 5 1044b

29-35); Out learning ts an even more positi'Je chans.!;e than that, since

realises his nature most fully when he has understanding. The cant rast

with 'preservation' in (2) shows that it is 'destruction' that is the

important word in (l). The point is not so much that ( 1) is incompa-

tible with (a) as it stands; rather ( 1) warns against a particular

misinterpretation of (a).

It is not the potential that is destroyed in (1), but it is the

potential that is preserved in (2). Is it preserved by being actua-

lised? Or is Aristotle claiming that the general potential for lear-

ning is enhanced by each particular act of learning? For the potential

for learning a particular piece of knowledge is not preserved by its

actualisation; on the contrary, once I have learned this theorem I

no longer have the potential for learning it. On the other hand,

it seems rather odd to refer to the actualisation of a (particular)

potential as destroying it.

The contrast between l((VTl<H~ and ~vtpye\a. in e 6 1048b 18 ff.

is not directly relevant to the present passage, in spite of De Anima

3. 43la 5-7. Housebuilding and contemplating are linked in 417b

5-7 i the fact that it is not an alteration of the house builder (9)

does not mean that the building of a house is not a xCvT)CTLf.: which cannot

simultaneously be happening and have happened. For what has knowledge

to become 6e:wpo;sv (417b 6) does not involve an alteration, because

it becomes, precisely, knowing through the fact that it contemplates

(Hicks).

There is, it was suggested, a parallel between Aristotle's concern

in this De Anima passage and in the beginning of 9 8, in that here

he is concerned to show that 'alteration' in a sense also covers cases

where a thing's own nature is fulfilled, and there he is concerned

to shown that 'potentiality' also covers what changes itself ( 1049b

5-10).

l049b 4-12 The initial reference is to 6 11 (cf. Owen's notes). The

txEt clause in 4 serves to indicate that a previous discussion is being

presupposed. Is there a problem over the contrast between (i) paten-

tiality for changing or being changed and (ii) potentiality for being

X? 1049b 4-12 in isolation suggests we are dealing with (i), but

examples of (ii) appear at l049b 19 ff. On the other hand, ylvEcn.'

l37

is a type of xCv'T)Cf"l.t;; and is there any difference between the capacity

of becoming a man a'1d thP.: capacity of being a man? It is true that

a house doesn't have the capacity r:o become ·1 hn11se; but that difference

do~!':~ not seem relevant here.

l049b 12-17 The priority of the actual to the potential in ~!~f~nitio~.

The &\ivC!lJ.L c; of

7tp<i.l'tc.u<;; & uv11:t6v

10491) 5 is

in 13-14?

here replaced by -rb C uva:t6v. What is TO

The p(Jwer to cause change (~ 1 l04Sb 35;

Ross); the power to change something else (1(J49b 6-7), contrasted with

other types of potentiality in b 16; or, equivalent to -rb xup(wt; &uva­

't6v for example visible things qua invisible ( 1 5), not qua dogs or

houses.

Is the point that the A6yot; 0f 'visible', for exa1aple, presupposes

~-h-e :\,,jyoc; Q!_ 'seeing', nr just that the A.6yor; of 'visible' includes

a reference to 'seeing', includes the term 'seeing'? The former;

cf. tov l\Oyov tn b 16.

1· ion or more loosely?

Jhould t...Oyo<; then be translated by 'defini­

And does ~poU~dpx£~V in 17 indicate temporal

priority? The order in which we come to Know things may not he the

same as that of the logical dependence ot one thing on another in fact;

hut here X.6yo<; and yviilO"'-<: are linked - ~n 6 tl the former is a sub­

cl"'..ss 0f the latter, "'tnd in Z 1 they are apparently conflated (cf.

Owen's notes). But r.eed there

quiring knowledge of seeing and

:an the-y not l:e 9imultaneous?

be any temporal priority between ac-

acq,J::._ring Knowled~e of visibility ~

( lf)!.9b 17 ff. of course argues that

the actual i.s prior to the potential in tiMe. not that the knowledge

of the actual is prior to the J<nowledge of the potential, which would

be the point here.) If 1tpo"MpxE~v dc:es not ,~xpress re.mporal prio­

rity, 16-17 is not a new point but the repetjtion nf what has preceded,

'Nith the addition of yvWcn.t;; the structure of the section is p (12-

13) because q (13-16), therefore p (16-17), an ARA structure, thrmgh

t-1-)i.s fs tJbscured by .Jaeger's and ~'lSs's pareucheses.

The next section. trom b 1/, draws a contr~st bet·~een the specific

1nd the individual; to which does 12-17 'loply? To ..;pecific not~ntiali­

ties, certainly; and to tndividuals, in 90 far ·1s there -1re ~.6yoc. of

indivi!]11-'lls as such at all.

llB

L\nc'R H

l049b 17-lOSOa 3 The priority of the actual to the potential in time.

Again, it is the potential and the actual that are discussed, rather

than potentiality and actuality. Aristotle is concerned by the fact

that the priority of actuality in substance would seem to imply priority

in time too, but this does not seem to be the case for the individual.

Two distinct arguments, at least, are advanced, at l049b 18-29 and

1049b 29-lOSOa (cf. lOSOa 2-3), though the latter may in turn be

subdivided (see below); only the first argument, at 1049b 18-29, really

fits I049b 11-12.

I049b 18-29 19-23 illustrate d.pL8fl(j> 0'0~ in 19; things the same

in species (l8) are not illustrated until 23 ff.

is the eye of the embryo; the first actuality is already present

at birth (and for some time before). 6 6pWv in 20 is the second actua-

lity, the actual seeing; but also the eye itself when seeing - the

thing and the activity should not be distinguished too sharply. The

need for a cause the same in species is stated twice, at 24-7 and 27-

9. Does it rule out the evolution of species? Not if 'goat', e.g.,

1s a vague term, so that the problem will essentially be that of the

:writes; from 'the parent of any goat is a goat' it need not follow

that 'every ancestor of this goat was a goat'. In Z 9 l034b 16-19

it is a peculiarity of substance that it has to be brought about by

another substance existing in actuality beforehand; cf. the reference

to o~crCa in 28 here. Whiteness, on the other hand, can be produced

without the pre-existence of something else white as its cause. Health

in Z 7 1032b 23 ff. can be produced spontaneously because of heat which

is, or produces, a part of it. Health is not a substance; what about

the spontaneous generation of grubs? Z 7 unfortunately doesn't say.

i049b 29 - 1050a 1 A new argument, from examples. involving learning,

'<~here the ability is only produced by the activityi so in this case

actuality does precede potentiality in time, and not only 'in a way

but in a way not' (cf. 1049b 11-12). We might object ~but Aristotle

does not - that in some sense the ability to housebuild must precede

the first act of housebuilding, though.) &~.-b in b 29 picks up not

the previous argument, but the general point that the actuality is

139

'!)49h 17

'lOTES 1JN 1 Ht::TA

pr 1.or in time; we now have a new po.tnt illustrating this, though the

Or ls it that 27-9 genera-qualification of 11-12 has been dropped.

lises the claim of 24-7, and 29 ff. does plc.k this up, the ~oiat being

that the previous acts of hl"~"'"eb•Jtld.i:1g .1.cc the ~arne in species but

.. ~ ;umet i ·.al 1_y? This however doeq rnt fit the reference to prodt!Ction

from ~ctr:.ethi.ng tn ?.7--9, or the analysis of coming-to-be 1..11 Z 7-9.

~.B. &o-.:et in 29; general princi!Jle of priority of the actual only

1lleged reason fur what follows, real 12-Xplanation in 31 ff.; fore~

With ~rinciple of JS-6 compare

~~- ._,;__ 6 236b 32. Clearly not 'anyone who is building a house

must already have compl~ted a house'; activity of housebuilding, rather

than of building (complete) houses? Or, rather, 35 ff. a}:lplles point

of _f?~. VI. 6 not to housebuilding, but to : ~ar nlng to build. 29-

\4 .;J.ys you <:::~.n' t. be a builder (capable of building) without having

built sumethlng; 35 ff. th~n gtlpports this by applying theory of Physics

vr. 6 not to building, or to being a btlilder, but explicitly to learning

to build.

1050a l2-t4 l-l£X£'tciY'tE:' do not '3EWfH::tv except in some reduced sense:

the seems to make against the immediately pret:..eding l049b 29-·50a 2,

·J[Z. B (iii). May WOC mean that at any ~tage of acquiring knowledge

ot X .,_~ pari:. of X is a1 ready atr ainP.d? The woLd does not typically

rcfeL back in Ar.; and this wrJuld cmoarrass ti1e IJresent r:laim, which

is that ·~he actuality is the intended ~:mtcum~ of Lite process. The

t~mporal Pliority argued for in B (ii) and B (iii) ts not in play here.

Suggestions: (a) on one reading on 4'JO 29-50a J tl1E:- mai.J. th;·ust

nf the argument was to the effect that what precedr:s J.ctual possession

r)'[ the E6va~1.c; is a bit of the corresponding activity, not a bit of

l049b 35-SOa 3, which .. loes requiTe bit of the 66vrq.u.c

·~ he 1lready present at any stage uf the process of uc..;.uiLLng the

.),-)vt'LIJ.~c; was an aberrat1..or elit..itB:.t l.r; the .:H·r:histj_c ar'il;ument of 33-

' 0l) Even so, even with 1049b 35-50a 2 set aside, \Ve face a ~uali-

"icatlon Lo the earlier claim that · r,e 6~ivauLc; must be f!cquired. ·uv

~ ngag1ng in the activity. ':?·n now it ~s <m1; ,L6C ~hat th,__,. 1 ::arner

if this in turn implies ~"hat he ":~:; d .1;_r ,, the ·"p"ul·,,-·

L'.;{)

hut t.hat tuo nnly in a reduv'ri '.-.'ay, then '.../f! (an "ffer Ar t!18 following

rccunciling gloss on the •.vhule ,Jf tr}49b 29-50a 14: you have to have

:·~ome icerns from geometry Hr;der control tu do ,;xercise on Pytndgoras'

'i'}Jeoremi :lour exercise 1s theretore tiE:wpe:t:v, Uut not as the master

t.;ould do it, and likewise 1 having svme items n:~der control' is havlnl2;

n tT;.; lJtLJ'tf1U11S but not in the "'a·1 the !:Jast~r l1.1.s the whole of it.

1:c~plcte ~astery of the whole remains a neces~ary condition for B£wp£tv

1. n the t ull sense. Consequently, and thi.s is the main point Ar has

tn ·~st:1blish, the 8£wp£'Cv of ~!£'X.E:'tWv'te:<; ls not the counter-example

1 t might 3eem to be to the thes1s that 'Jt BEo;poOO'lY Lva Bt:wprruxflv

:E-xux::nv but the uther way round.

This :;nggestion relies ,-,n t:1e thought that the difference heu.;een

:1aving some and having the whole of a ·:>ubject is not just a difference

Ln how much is l.::n0vm but invr)lves 3 lii [terence in the manner of knowing,

:'he thought ls sur~ly Aristnt_elian, hut it ls not explicitly announced

11,..,1"':;, wirh ':he tesult lh-3.t l1)!~9h ?9-';0a 14 remains in a state of tension

l>etwf~en the c-latr:l t.hat in the proc:~.s.:, nf l1:;..;.rning actuality is tempo­

rellly prior (1CJ!+9b 2Q-50a 1) and t::e clalrn that it 1s temporally pos­

t~rior because prior in o6rrCa (1050a 4 ~ .trld ff.).

Ross says t·hat Alex.' s lemma

1us B't~ but not his interpr~tation, but t.his is misleading: the quota-

r- i_r,n i.s embedded in the comment. '.1r L~cause they don't need to',

viz. because this :1£'X..E-rdv is the mere mechanical practice of the expert?

P~rhdps the nearest tn this use lS lhe practisin~ of speeches at Phdr.

228h. But this is irrelevant to the claim •..;hic.h 1::> being met, that

t::X.e:-rtOv-ce:c; theori.ze to get knowledge? Rc.>s \•.laS sympathetic to Diels'

r_rnposal to treat thjs clattse ac; a r~loss, hut a ~loss (JH Hhat?

none tl1at st:nnd 11p. (1) ;.~e did not think that

·'.lld :r.ean 't.h;:o•,r do not c1ave to theorize',

-JS required for R0ss' secrmd and third !.nt•.!rpn~tattuns, nor that it

·.,uuld lwlp if it could, ~->ince the ·~ase 1s 'lupposed to be one where

,_he'.' do 1 neorize, ,wd '>O jo ~va. AF'~')PTJ'tc.xhv Sxwcnv, but not in a way

; hat .,;ont radicts rhe :~atn l_hesis ,Jf l·J·-l L \ ii) if, on the other

··lrHi, rn~y :Jo 't"~t (reallv) l,heorl.?.e LI-'C,tuse th0y dn not :1,::~:::d tr1, they

1 J ii) The '";ilme ohjection

l ft

'0 ';Oa 14 'Jnn:s ON THr.TA

applies if there are particular [upi.cs CJ c~ ~or O't~ about which they

do not need to theorize, and ~gain (iv) if there are 3Ubjects or parts

r)f subjects such that they can be acquired without the student needing

to practice in the activity. (v) Apelt suggested &:u'i\ wet, ~~' o6

6Uva.v'taL Aewpetv (sc. d7t:\Wc;). We also thought, tvithout enthusiasm,

of (vi) &:x.A'T; W&e Yl 0'tL. ob 6Uvav'ta.~ Bewpet'v (sc. at all) - intro-

riucing group of dunce ,ue).e'TWv,;ec; who oU Ber..opv\Xn.v ~va 8EwprrnxTw

Exoxnv because they are not even up to doing the exercises. There

r~mains (vii) Ross' first suggestion: ~xx•n WOe, n (O~L] obOEv &tov~aL

Oewpet'v, 'They are not theorizing, except in a quaified sense of that

word' (theorizing in the proper sense being for the sake nf theorizing

or for the sake of the truth), 'otherwise en -""' el 6€ j ... rr;, i.e. if they

are theorizing in the proper sense) they have no need to theorize'

(sc. t'va. 6Ewp11~Lxt]v Exux:nv, because in that case they must already

have it). For some reasons this interpretation was left out .in our

discussion.* And since we could not believe that 11 B'tL x'tA.. could

be even an unintelligent gloss on r, woe, or on anything else, and we

could not find a spot from which the words could have been displaced,

we remained in a state of dissatisfied &.1top £a..

1050a 15 n .. eo, O:v: not 'may come' (Ross, Reale), nor 'might come'

(Apostle). For the optative as 'would normally except in odd cases',

cf. the treatment of tuche and ~utomat~ at ~· 196b 22, 197a 35,

l97b 32, l98a 6: 'what would usually be purposed', e.g. going to a

place and collecting, At 197b 26 the phrase is equated with TO ~epuxbc;

---lA.).ou ~vexa..

There was some dispute as to whether the Physi~ parallels were

1arallcl, but the use of ~X9€LV (implying no need of an external agent)

.1nd of -r6 confirms the reading here: the case is n0t that of e.g.

a table which could be painted green, or r~d. or any other colour,

b11t rather that of the apple '~hich will tn che Hormal course of events

turn red. There is a definite form which the U\11 is programmed to

acq11ire, so that one can say that a pntential F is •..;hat it is in a

,-ense much stronger than that in which one says •Jf the table that it

'-,--1.n (might) be green. The stron~er sense is •..;hat is required for

the argument to show that actuality is prior obrrCa., not just A6Ytp.

*save for the credentials of [o~~J

1050a 16-19 Ihe argument is extended to cases where the potentiality

is a potentiality for a certain x(vry:nc; instead of for having a certain

form. '(a.e in 17 should be explicative. The cases envisaged include

both 8uvU~eLc; that come from teaching (17-19) and the natural tendencies

for motion (19; cf. lOSOb 29-30) - both of which are &uv~eL' needing

no external agent.

1050a 19-21 Inside/outside: is the contrast between the inside po-

tential and the oputside activity, or (Ross) between the absorbed know-

ledge inside and the still unattained knowledge without? The teacher

wants to show the pupils' knowledge in overt practice and thereby demon­

strate the telos: surely outside.

Objection: on the Ross reading el y&p ~~ oU~w yeyv~~aLis straight­

forward: if the pupils cannot be seen in action, it is unclear whether

the knowledge you are teaching them has been successfully internalized.

But what do the words mean on the alternative understanding of the

inside/outside comparison? Perhaps this: if you do not distinguish

between inside and outside, 6Uva.j.JLc; and l.vlpyeLq. when giving the 't~'X.o<;

of teaching, it will be unclear in which sense of l?tLO""r-fu.i.TJ t7tL<T"t"'fliJTl is

But the text sounds more concerned with a question of

fact than a question of meaning.

lOSOa 21 Epyov, covering both characteristic activity and, where appro-

priate (34), the end product. No attempt to connect the uses: cf.

'work' and 'job'. See, for a fuller version of 23~27, EE 1219a 13-

18, which also uses x.piicnc;:; (popular in~ in this use: cf. here 30,

24).

lOSOa 28 Why f'il.l\l\ov? Rather than the activity, in such cases: ex-

plained by the following ydp: the lv€pyELa. must be found in the pro­

duct, the house, so that the o£xo06j.Jry:TLc; is (only) more the 't~'X.oc; than

the 66v<J.f'<~ is. But then how is the housebuilding simultaneous with

the house (29)? Ross says, 'that in which it (the ~oer11:nc;:;) most pro­

perly and directly resides is that which exactly answers to it, which

c,Jmes into being with it and exists simultaneously with it. This

is obv~ously the house rather than the builder'. This does not face

143

10\lla 16

b.1illiing.

\.<ihen ,,,e have the house we •10 ~anger have tr,e r.uHk'­

A clue may be the present participles olxoOoiJ.OUfJlVq.J 29,

32, cf. 31, 33, 34: the building coincides with the house-that-is-

being-bu~lt .. But what house is this? The troubles of Z 7-9 are

upon us, and seem to be ignored.

the subjects of the changes/ activities, e.g. the

seeing man; not therefore taking up the Oawv in 34 answering to that

in 30, 'in those actualizings of a 6Uva1-1"c;'.

105Gb 6 <iE ( 'eternal' according to Alexander, Ross, Reale, Apostle,

but better 'in each case'. See l049b 26 for the exact parallel.

This removes the supposedreference to the Prime Mover, whose activity

should in any case not be temporally prior.

lOSOb 2-4 We could not find a satisfactory answer to the question

why, in advance of the xvp!.w'tlpwc; argument of 6 ff., it is already

clear that actuality ts prior Tfl o6o-C9- to potentiality. No doubt,

as Ross says, what makes it clear is the whole section a 4-b 2. The

trouble is that the emphasis of the section is on ways in which form

as 'tl:\.oc; is prior in explanation, not prior ~ ofx:rCq. in the sense at

; ssue 6 ff. y viz. that X must exist if Y is to exist but not vice-

versa (SOb i9, Ross ad loc.)

L050h 8-l.Q Is this out of style with Ar' s usual thesis that only ra­

tional 6nvd.~e1.c:; are 'ti'Ov lva.v'tCwv, i.e. does it retract the distinction

between 2-track and 1-track &uvd.j.let.<:? An argument for thinking that

i.t r.ne.s not would be that d.v'tC~I.c:; refers to contradictories, not

1.nntrartes, and the point is simply that a possibility is by definition

;nm8thing that can be (realized) and also not be (realized), which

J.pplies to any potentiality, rational or irrational (cf. esp. ll-i2).

:hwqever, 30-4 both insists on the 1 track/2-track distinction and

·:;haws how to reconcile it with the claim that every &6vnf..1Lt; is "ti')t; civ'tt.­

prio-e::wc;: irrational 6uv<4tet.c; produce the opposite of their proper effect

':JJ ~~.eir absence. Parallels to this point at ~· 195a 11-14, Het .

. dl }b li 16 with the presence or absence of the pilot in place of the

;1resence of absence of the &Uva.u~c; here. Cf. Ross ad l05la 3.

144

Elsewhere he

is alive to the a.nti-Eleatic advantages llf not 3llm.;oing locomotion

to count 1s ~Bopd, but here he ~JJr\ts to admlt some not being for dC6La;

Lhe variant classification '3hnuld be seen dS tailored to present pur-

p0ses. l'he argument is that, in a universe of changeable things,

there must be some unchangeable ones, el~e the universe would stop

( 23): the Aristotelian of>pn.v6~ is the true unswer to the fears of

earlier physicists (22-4). But '.vhy? 1.19 is assertion, not argument.

:nthin the Aristotelian system the sun is needed for the genesis of

finite beings. but we are asking '..Jhy the system must be such as to

include some eternal things. One might argue: suppose there was

noLhing eternal, why should anything have come into being or why should

Lt not all stop? Rut equally, why shouldn't the eternal thing be

) 1tst the sequence of non-eternal ones? One could ngree with Ar that

~very event must have a sequel and yet deny that this entails the exis­

r0nce of any 8ternal, continuously ~xisting thing.

l ()SOb ~ f-l~~J.t:t'ta.l. in the properly Pldtonic sense that they ure and

are not 5r.p8a.p'ta. (immortal by ':onstantly changing into one another -

'if 337a 1-l), not .'iS an explanation of t:heir heha'liour, 'Nhich stems

fr11m their own nature (30).

lOSOb 34-Sla 2

l?latonic forms~

applies the 1-~rinciple of tlte preceding argument to

The Piatonists do not 1aake the actuality-potentiality

distinction, so the arguments which are s•1pposed to give them something

which is e.g. ~XLD"'tl\.twv in the best possible way do not insist that

;. hE. txLrr'tlif..l0\.1 be exercising knowledge. The forms are thus no more

'han t'JVd.fJ.E!.c;, 1Vith the result that there ou)<',ht robe something more

~TtL<Y"'rf!!J.OV than uU'tO l7tL(J"tfl~TJ. '/iz. the corrl'!spondin~ activity.

i.J()h 15

~late by G.E.L. Owen

lOSla 5-10: dunamis ton enantiOn dgain. Tn l050b 30-34 Ar uses anti­

phasis not enantion to bring irrational dunameis under the generali-

zation: an irrational ~unamis is responsible for the absence of some

effect by its own absence. At ~· l95a 11-14 and 1'1"!· I013b II-

16 he uses enantia for such cases, and in the second passage (repeating

the example of the steersman) adds that the presence and absence are

equally aitia h6s kinounta, which would need to be reconciled with

Ross's explanation that our present passage uses looser language because

in l046b 5 and l048a 8 'he was thinking of dunameis kat a ten kinesin,

positive powers or forces, while here he is thinking of mere potential!-

ties'. Certainly Ar' s examples here take no special notice of cases

,)f responsibility by absence: all are coveredby the poiein-paschein

of 1U48a 7, and note the positive oikodomein/katabalein of l05la 9-

10. Nor is he preoccupied with rational dunameis: eremein/kineisthai

are too wide, oikodomeisthai too indirect. In short our passage seems

to have no direct connection with the previous texts in 9 2, 5 and

8. It might be argued that it takes up the general argument of l050b

8-34, that what can be guaranteed to be always so and never not-s0

cannot be assigned the mere dunamis of

dunameis this depended on the argument

carried the weight. Not in our passage.

being so; but for irrational

from absence, and antiphasis

~1051a 10:

down)?

what is it that can either be built or be demolished (fall

To be sure, a house: but, on the first option (but not the

3econd), what house? Z 7-9 is 0n us ,1gain. ~· 201a 29-34 taken

>'ith e.g. 188a 15-16 might suggest that what can be built up and knocked

down is t-he plinthoi, but one does not oikodomein plinthous, nor I

think kataballein. Are we to say that the built house, tode toionde,

0nce could he built though now it cannot? No: the past without a

!:>rev1ous present is bizarre, and in Z 8 l033b 22-26 \vhat is being and

st1ll can be built is not a tode toionde but a toionde. It is what

i ~; pulled dmvn rhat is the ~de t:o_inde.

~re not even congeners.

; ,~6

Building and pulling down

lOJla Ll

l05la 17-19: see notes of last session, dnd ~...ompare e,g, P~. II

8, esp. 1 Q9a 33-b 7.

misplaced from e.g. l050b 2-3? or (as Ross su~gests)

from l050a 3? or a fresh argument for l05la 4-5? If the last, \.,!hat

is the good dunamis involved? fhe capacity of being 'divided' in

mathematical constructions (21-24)? But mathematical objects are

not susceptible of change (DMA 698a 25-26, ~· 19Jb 34, Met. 989b

32-33, etc.), though this is suggested by 23, 29-30, The potentiality

must rather be the inquirer's capacity for noesis (30), with the deri­

vative (kata sumbebekos) capacity in the objects for being discovered:

'.·lith dunamei ant a in 29 supply no eta. The argument still seems to

be one for priority in ousia, not in value. On the question whether

being or coming to be understood requires a dunamis for poiein or ~

~~ein in the intellectual object recall (of course) Soph. 248a-49d.

the first geometrical example is strajghtforward, though

the moral is less clear. The angles about one point (24-25) are evi-

dently those on one side of a straight line, and this implies the ex­

tension of the triangle's base BCE:

the other addition is the line parallel

to the side (26), viz. CD oarallel

~D c E

i.s immediately clear to one

to AB. Then ~ABC is 'seen' to be

equal to LncE and QAc to ~CD; hence,

like their counterparts, LABC and bAG

together

angles.

who sees

with 'ACB make up two right­

- What is the 9ia ti which

the construction (26)? (a) A

proof employing a theorem about the angles formed by a straight line

:vhich intersects two parallel straight lines? Or (b) something more

intuitive, as perhaps with Thales' device for calculating the distance

of a ship at sea (pace Eudemus. who ascribed to T.

'must have used' to prove the construction valid)?

theorem that he

Alex. seems to

have it both ways (deixomen, 596. 15, 'It's a house' on seeing a house,

j96. 20); recent edd. opt for the first.

14/

~._hld Ll~t.'.;; l.ne second 5eornctricat example is debatable. Bvnitz,

~ass. Heath, a11d Reale complicate i~ needlessly by supposing that Arts~

:-,;t L~ pr,,ves che theorem first for an isoc<2lt:!s triangle in the semi­

circle (viz. one whose apex is vertically ahove the centre of the circle)

rtnd then generalizes this to other triangles in the semi-circle by invo­

king a theorem (e.g. Eucl. iii. 21) to the effect that all,angles having

~he diameter as base in the semi-circle are equal (or. more generally

as in EucLid, all angles in the same segment). Aristotle makes no

mention of this further theorem; the ekeino in a 29 is surely the theo­

rem just mentioned, that the angles of a triangle are equal to two

right angles; and its introduction spoils the picture of simple recogni-

t ton at a 28-29. Orth~ in a 28 does not mean 'perpendicular', as

Ross Reale and Apostle translate it (and as Heath supplies in brackets);

used of a line (not an angle) it means 'straight', and the whole phrase

,straight line erected from the centre' applies to any radius within

the semi-circle. Then:

l.et ACD be any triangle in a semi-circle

~ith diameter as base and apex on the

circumference, and let BD be erected from

the centre of the circle to the apex.

BA, BC and BD are all radii and hence

equal. So the triangles ABD, CBD are

both isoceles. Hence ii:J>s is equal to

LoAB and LCDB is equal to j,pcB. Hence

in the trian$1;le ACD the total angle ADC

is equal to the sum of the remaining an-

p,les DAC, DCA. But the angles of a tri-

1ngle are equal to two right angles; hence

L .\DC is equal to a half of this, viz.

·1ne right angle.

~·Jclld (iii 3l) extends AD to ADE and 3.rgues (from i 32)that the

_:.::t-=rna l .lm"';le CDE is equal to the sum 'lf two c-.pposite and internaJ

;.,~les DAC. DCA. But. given the internal isoceles triangles DAB,

;1:B. the angle ADC is also equal to the sum of those angles. So LcDE '"'~ua L to lAne j and since these lie on a straight line they amount

'l L', •) rL~nt ungles. So ADC is une r~~ht angle.

I.HAPTER 9 ln5ta 27

Biancano* also uses (as I construe him below) the same theorem about

external angles but in conformity with Aristotle's suggestion keeps

the construction internal to the semi-circle.

to our diagram.)

(1 adapt the lettering

In figura tres lineae sunt aequales,

duae nimirum in quas basis AC

dividitur, quae sunt CB, BA, et

tertia, quae ex medic basis eri­

gitur. estque BD, cum omnes sint

semidia metri eiusdem circuli.

Educta itaque linea BD de potentia

in actum, si cuipiam trium harum

linearum aequalitas innotescat,

continuo ei etiam manifestum erit

angulum ADC in semicirculo esse

rectum, quia statim apparent duo

isoscelia CBD, ABD, qorum anguli

ad bases CD, AD, sunt aequales

invicem; et anguli duo ad B sunt

dupli duorum angulorum ADB, BDC,

ex quibus conflatur totus angulus

ADC. Ergo duo anguli ad B sunt

dupli anguli ADC; sed duo anguli

ad B sunt aequales duobus rectis ••.

(How does he reach this? I suggest

arguing that the angle CBD external

to the triangle ABD is equal to the

two opposite internal angles and

therefore, given that the triangle

is isosceles, to twice either

of them; similarly with the angle

ABD and the triangle BDC.

he does not spell it out.)

But

Why do Euclid and (on my reading) Biancano base the proof on a theorem

about the external angle and not more directly on the theorem that

the angles of a triangle equal two right angles, as Ar's ekeino in

1051a 29 would suggest? Because, I take it, Euclid • s proof of this

last theorem takes the theorem about the external angles as one step

which is established in the course of the proof, and the economy of

the system then makes him use the prior and more general theorem in

our case without drawing the particular unnecessary corollary about

the angles of a triangle. Ar. by contrast is following a narrower path.

*Loca mathematica Aristotelis (1615)

149

lOSla !5 :lOTES ON THETA

t05la 15 1') d:pa. ~v~pyeLo ~E:\'tCwv The actuality is better because

the potentiality could be realized in either way. It is not that

a musician plays in actuality better than he is able to play paten-

tially. Rather, it is better that he should be playing actually than

t.hat he should just have the potentiality. Hence ~, .. ,w""<lp<t ( Sla 4):

it is something more worth having. _!lli maintains that activity is

better than the corresponding ~~Lt;;, so the possibility of exercising

a &6v~L~ for the worse is not crucial.

!OS!a !7-!9 It is not clear "why the bad actuality is llo-cepov 1:~ q>6a"£<

As Ross, p. 268 points aut, all we have settled so

far is that it is less desirable than the latter. Perhaps we should

supply some thoughts about the need to understand the bad as a deviation

from the good. This would connect with the view we were inclined

to take of the claim that there is no evil xa.p& 'tO. 1tpd.YJ.l«l.'fa. there

is an &yaabv ~pit 1:1t xp4y .. a~a, viz. that which things strive for, i.e.

the nature they are set to achieve, but there is not in the same way

something that things run from - they merely fail to strive success-

fully. We notes the absolute 'cosmic' (not kind-relative) use of

'good' in this passage, comparable to the remark in ~ VI that there

are things better than man. Compare also Physics II. 8 esp. l99a

33-b7.

rn~_!!r~!_9~2~!!!!£~l-~~~~~!! 'QHL~~~~~

~!!9.9!~.!.12!!_.ill.:.. __ 2~!-Q!!!!!!~~-t!2!!

Suggestion (ii) where {i) uses

one set of alternate and one of

corresponding angles, (ii) uses

two sets of alternate angles.

Thus, according to Eudemus ~

Proculs, in Euc. I, p. 379, 2-15, the Pythagorean proof of the theorem.

(ii) squares with Ar's mentioning only one line to be drawn and with

his not using exterior angle·s in the second example either, in contrast

to Euc. III 3!. Heath (Euclid's Elements I, p. 320-l) following Hei­

berg, claims that our passage proves that (i) rather than (ii) is the

construction Ar has in mind in his many references to this theorem,

because &.viix"to (25) means the line is drawn up. It was also objected

!50

I ' [ ! ; I{ ~

to (ii) that one might have expected !tapO:, -thv ~cUnv rather than ~a.p<l

Both objections could he met hy redrawing (ii) as (iii):

Text of !OS!a 26-7 Ross reads 6~\ov 6•n 1:C. tv ~ .. ,xux\C~ 6p6~ xa66\ou

6,a 1:C; tav ••• Jaeger 6~\ov. li<lt 1:C tv -l! .. •ux\C'f' 6p61i xa86\ou; 6,6H

tttv... The asyndeton in Ross's version is dwkward; Ross objects to

&~6't't that it makes the explanation of the theorem dependent on our

understanding of it (28): the theorem does not hold because it is

clear to one who knows i:xEtvo. But we thought this was pedantry:

Ar could well so express himself and the point comes across clearly

enough. We did not think there were any differences of substance

hetween the two texts. On the second geometrical example, see Owen's

note.

The geometrical moral What is the 6 ~6. ·d which is immediately apparent

to one who sees the construction (26)? What is seen is at least some-

thing of the form 'E because 9.', not just the fact that E.· This seems

clear from 24-6 and from the way the second example uses the theorem

of the first. And it must be seen from the construction (6Ldyp~~a:

cp. ~ on vo\3<; of the Eqa"tov in mathematics).

that every step of a Euclid-type proof is seen.

It would not follow

Thus it is further

grounds for rejecting Ross' story about the second example that his

two-stage procedure is too cumbrous for •seeing'. There are 'seeings'

.:1nd 'graspings' of connections intermediate in articulateness between

a proof using a theorem and something more intuitive.

It is another question whether Ar thinks that what is seen in these

examples is the 6 L~ "tC in the full APo. sense. The writing is compa-

tible with this, but he is surely not here addressin~ Euclid's problem

of which thorem to bring in where in the finished organization of the

science. (And if not, neither is he correcting APo., pace Ross, p.

273.)

l 51

1)Ja J/

"! 9, 1051a 21 "JJ

\4r>'l1d draw attention to c_he ~;ery int~resting published article

by ]r)rwthan Lear (~ .-\pril 1982) •)fl Aristotle's philosophyof mathe-

As against m11ch thdt l agree with, there is one point of

rietail on '..i'hich 9 9 su~gests to me an alternative im:.erpretation.

Lear's suggestion 1s that Aristotle's theory requires the existence

in the sensible world of at least one perfect specimen of each elemen-

tary geometrical shape. lOSla 21-33 suggests to me that all Aristotle

~weds in connexion, say, with a sphere is that there should be an imper­

fectly spherical orange, dnd that the geometer should by a mental act

actuali_~ perfect sphericity in the orange. His mental act would

involve attending to the features of the orange relevant to sphericity,

,vhile ignoring the tmperfcction in a manner l<~hich is described for

-'l different kind of case in De Hemoria 449b 30-450a 7 (q.v.).

l05la 29-33 and its relevance to Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics

The suggestion was advanced that our passage could be the basis

for an interpretation of Ar 's overall IJhilosophy of maths alternative

to that presented by Jonathan Lear in Phil. Rev. 1982. The Lear thesis

ts (I) that mathematics, in Ar's view, requires the existence of at

least one actual perfect sphere and one actual straight line (other

geometrical figures can be found by construction). To this might

be opposed the strong view (a) that there are no actual perfect spheres

•}r straight Lines in the physical world for Ar, or the weaker view

(b) that there may be but the truth of mathematics does not depend

1n it. [(a) is disproved, as far as the spheres are concerned, by

~ ne example of the heavens; the case of straight lines is more per-

plexin~ - the natural motions of the sublunary elements, perhaps? But

._ne these stra1.ght lines existing in actuality?] The role of our

1'ldssa.Q;e in support of (a) or (b) ·,wuld be to suggest that what guaran­

tees the truth of geometrical theorems is not (I) the actual existence

:__n the physical Horld of the primitive geometrical elements but (II)

·_heir .JOtential existence, actualizable by the mathematician's v6r,<rloC:.

T~.,e scometer can take an imperfectly spherical orange and actualize

'eru:::cr. •;(Jheric~ty in it hy v-5T)<JL~. His mental act would involve

,1f tendin1.1; to r:he teatures •.Jt' r:he Pran<J;e relevA-nt to sphericity while

ignoring the imperfection, in a manner which is rlescribed for a diffe-

rent kind of case in De Hem. 449b 30-450a 7. Further support for

(II) (b) might be found at Xet. M 3 1078a 29-31: the ov"a. stated by

geometry can be lv-re\e:xe:Cc; or b)..t.xWc:;.

Objections: (i) the meaning of this last passage could be that

bronze in itself does have the potential of hecomin~ a perfect material

sphere even if the bronze-smith cannot ensure its coming out just right

- a thesis about physical matter, not intelligible matter. (ii)

On (II) (b) it would be true to say that every book is a sphere, albeit

the sphere actualizable in it by v&-rp-c.c:; may be psychologically difficult

to realize. (iii) If Ar agreed that no physical object was an actual

perfect sphere or the like (Met. B 997b 35-8a 6, K 1 1059b 10-12,

commonly cited for this agreement, are statements of the Platonist

view that Ar is worrying over - Lear, p. 175-9), this would be an impor­

tant problem for him, and one would expect to find texts discussing

it and discussing the thinking away of imperfections in spherical oran-

ges. Ar talks often of thinking away the colour, motion, etc., of

the orange, i.e. properties other than its sphericity, but not of thin-

king away dents and imperfections .!.£ its sphericity.

account is of the former rather than the latter.

The De Mem.

Against (I) one objection is (i) that if the last physical straight

line were to perish, geometry would fall false. It seems, however,

quite Aristotelian to reply, reversing the objection, that since geome-

try is true there will always be straight lines in the world. (ii)

An alternative interpretation was put up of De An. 403a 13, cited by

Lear (p. 180-1) as proof that Ar did think there are physical objects

with perfectly straight edges capable of touching a hronze sphere at

a point. Namely, the claim could be that the straight line if en-

mattered touches the sphere at a point if we perform the abstraction,

but cannot touch the sphere at all if separated from its matter, on

the grounds that it cannot even be separated from the matter in the

first place. This, it was suggested, fitted better with the context

and the point about the soul; but it does require the reference to

ab5traction to be supplied in the first clause.

On the whole, however, we doubted that 9 9 •..Jas the place to decide

these larger issues. Our passage makes no suggestion that all mathe-

153

1051d 29 clOTES ON THETA

matical objects are actualized by v6ncn.c;. The potentiality under

discussion is a potentiality of something which is already a mathe­

matical object, and the point made here about the priority of lv~pyet.a.

is special to constructions. Wherever it is best placed (see above),

the passage is what it purports to he, a footnote to the chapter which

proves that actuality is first.

CHAPTER X

Note by G.E.L. Owen

Structure After a proem ( lOSla 34-b2) the chapter divides broadly

into three, and it is a question whether the third part attaches more

directly to the first or the second.

(i) 1051b 2-17 (with back-ref. in (ii) at 1051b 34-35): truth invol­

ving combination and separation in the pragmata thought/spoken of.

Truth/falsehood are treated as properties of thought or speech, not

of their objective correlates: cf. E 4 1027b 25-33 and contrast 6

29 1024b 17-1025a 1. Combination/separation are treated as properties

of pragmata not explicitly of their spoken thought correlates: contrast

De Int_. 16a 9-18, De Anima 432a 11-12, Cat. 2a 4-10 (?-Here Ackrill's

tr. abandons his principle that 'the Cat. is not ... explicitly about

ndmes, but about the things that names signify'). The spoken/thought

correlates of combination and separation in pragmata seem to be respec­

tively true positive and true negative predications: ancestry in ~·

253c 1-3, cf. Met. E 4 1027b 20-23. But the pragmata ground the truth/

falsehood, not vice-versa, 1051b 6-9, cf. Cat. 14b 13-22.

have being/not being (lOSlb 11-13), not truth/falsehood.

The first

The conclusion, that concerning things that cannot be otherwise

1n opinion/statement cannot be true at one time but not ·another (lOSlb

15-17), seems to lead naturally to (iii), maintaining that with things

that are understood to be unchangeable there cannot. be the error of

supposing a description of them true at one time but not at another.

The ~eometrical example seems to echo the type (i) truth of 1051b 18-

21. So apparently ps.-Alex. 601. 16 ff., Ross ('From the treatment

i.54

·;~APTt:R lO

of asuntheta Ar now recurs to ct:rtain ~ntheta'). flut others have

read (iii) as an extension of (ii): S. Maurus apud Reale Li 94 ('Circa

simplicia cognita ut immobilia ... '), Rz., Reale, most recently Aubenque

(Etudes sur la Met., 86-87, 'leur cas est comparable a celui de 1a

simplicit~ logique ••. ').

(ii) lOSlb 17-1052a 2, with backward glances at (i) in 1051b 18-24,

34-35: being and truth with respect to incomposites. 1.Jhat are these?

Specifically, do they include the definable essences whose unity was

an interest in Z and H? (Cf. on unity "' indivisibility Met. 1052b

15-16, 1041a 18-19.)

(a) H 3 1043b 28-32 seems to contrast the definable which is composite

with the indefinable incomposites which make it up; and at Z 1039a

14-23 Ar argues that if ousia is asunetheton it is indefinable - or

definable only in some way still to be explained. (l..Jhere?) Similarly

in 105lb 25-28 Ar seems to distinguish the ti esti from incomposite

substances, while still claiming something in common for them (see

below).

((b) But at 105lb 30 the hoper einai ti is given as the subject of

the whole preceding argument about incomposites. In view of this,

what is claimed to be common to the ti estin and incomposite substances

at 1051b 25-30? That they cannot come to be and cease to be is not

enough, for this is true of the composites at 1051b 15-17. Concerning

incomposite substances, error is simply not possible ( 1051b 26-28);

concerning the ti estin, it is possible only kata sumbebekos (25-26).

This may suggest (using the familiar contrast from ~Po B 10) that in

producing a faulty definition one cannot be speaking of the intended

object but at best (erroneously) of a name. (Met. 1026b 13-14?) Still

there is a distinction. 'Incomposite substances' can hardly be those

identified by a definition by contrast with those introduced by acciden­

tal description, for do not the first fall under the suntheta of 1051b

l5-17?

(iii) 1052a 4-11, introducing a pate from ( ii) but otherwise apparently

developing (i) 1051b 9-16, unless it is assumed that (ii) has reduced

eternal verities to expressions of what is asuntheton and left synthesis

to accidental time-bound truths.

On simplicity-plus-definability cf. ~· VI 4 141b 3-9 on priority

of points to lines and letters to syllables, the former not to be de­

fined via the latter but definable (Bz. 701b 25-29).

155

[ I \ ) L ..l J ~~

(~_t_~~!_c!.uction ( l05la 3~_:U

Why are rruth and fals~hood apparently described here as )(UpLW'tcl.'ta. Ov

(dnd, presumably, r-1h 0v respectiv·~ly)? Contrast Z 1028a 13, E

It l.021b 31. Ross proposed deleting xupLtirta:ta. or transferring it to

a 34; he also mentioned the possibility of taking it wi!:h &:>..T)EI€<; rather

than with Ov. t)ne objection to t-his is that no non-xupCwc; sense of

truth has been mentioned; however, lt was suggested that the contrast

could be with the application of truth to incomposites in (II) below

- rhougn it is not expressly stated there that that is an inferior

appl1cation of truth, and as will be seen there m1.ght he problems if

Lt were. It is indeed stated in ([I) that being deceived about the

-<: C ~(}"t L v can only occur ~cidens ( 1051 b 26); but that needn 1 t imply

that truth too is only ~accidens in such cases.

lf xup~oOytCL'ta. is taken with d.XT)Ob; the structure of the sentence

,.iLl lJe -rO Ov \l:':ye:'t/'l.C. ••• (3) tO ••• xupLUrta:ta. Ov d:XT)6£c;, with the second

:)v being predicative. \Je felt that this was awkward but not impos-

sibJ.e t_and indeed the second Ov will have to he predicative if xupt.Urra.-ra.

Ls Jcleted or trdnsferred, too), but the fact that Ov is a key term

in the S"!ntence makes it very difficult to take xup Ll.lrta:ta. and A-x..,etc; t.o~ether. Jaeger postulates, and fills, a lacuna; it was also sug-

gested rhat xupt.W-ra.-ra. could be a marginal gloss :nisplaced from 34-

5.

~-·-~hand composites (104lb 2-17)

fruth and fa tsehood depend on the combination and separation of things

t"'tptiy~a:to.); cf. Plato ~ophist 253c l-2, Netaph. E 4 l027b 20-3. Truth

tnd falsehood are here located in spei'lking dnd thinking, rather than

<I I tte 1.11i ngs Lhought or spoken of 1 as in E 4 l027b 25-33; whereas

1n 1:::. 19 l'!L4b l7-1025a l they r.~re carried over to the things themselves.

rrtJth nnd fal.sehood depend on the 1tpdy).1a.'ta, not vice versa; l05lb 6-

'~, cf. ·~~· l4b 13-22. .;ombination and .'3eparat ion are treated as

~~retties ot the ~p6.y~..l.a:ta. (lOSlb 11-13); Lhey are r10t 8Xplicitly trea­

' •"d .Ls ~'Utpo:rties of the thought, by cnntTast ltJir::h !-1.'::.__~~· [ l6a 9-

18, L~~nim~ J. 8 432a tl-12, Cat. 4 2a 4-10.

l 1J)ih 15-17 form a sort of ap!Jendix; for things that don't change,

't1e ;;unE' (tpiniuns are always either cr'.JE' or false. This pn,vides

a hridge to section II 1 where also there is no change; but there is

also a contrast (0~ lOSlb 17) - see further below.

II. Truth and incomposites (1051b 17 1052a 4)

l,.Jhat are these incomposites? Not just things that are always so;

these were described as composites in b 15-17, and N.B. the dia)?,onal

being incommensurable as an example of a composite in b 20-1. fhere

are explicit contrasts in this section with the composites dealt with

in (I): 1051b 18-24, 34-5.

Are the incomposites perfectly simple concepts, the irreducible

elements of definitions, or are they definable essences? fhe unity

of the latter was a theme of ZH (and on the link between unity and

indivisibility cf.

23. However, H

1 1052b 15-16 and Z 17 1041a 18-19); cf. H 6 1045b

1043b28-32 and Z 13 1039a 14-23 argued (dia1ecti-

cally?) that what is definable is composite; the latter st1ggesting

that if substance is incomposite it is indefinable, or definable only

in a way still to be explained (where?), One possible course would

be an appeal to the argument of Z 12, where the entire definition is

contained in the last differentia; but that did not remain Aristotle's

settled view of definition.

lOSlb 25-28 seems to distinguish essences from incomposites; but

30-31 seems to suggest that what has been said relates to whatever

The distinction is made that one can be mistaken

about the 't( ~CT'tLV per accidens , but about incornposites not at all

(b 25-6).

On one view put forward, the incomposites are a sub-class of things

defined (so that 6~oCwc; 6t x~l in b 26-7 is restrictive); namely, forms

defined without reference to their matter, so that the riefinition is

dn identity statement (cf. De Anima 3. 6 430b 27 ff., intellect con­

cerned with the -rC l()"t'LV is true and does not say one thing xa'tO. an-

other; Sorabji in Language and Logos, 296-9). On this view a plurality

of elements in the definition does not imply that the object defined

is composite; and there is no need to appeal to the argument of Z 12.

The claim that one cannot be in error about a detinition of an

P.Ssence '..Jill rest on the fact that if one has the wrong definition

·:::>ne simply fails to refer to the essence at all. If the -r( trr-r~v

as opposed to the incomposite 1 is the essence, the reference to bei.ng

l57

,\!db 2

l05lb 17 /JTE3 DN tHETA

deceived per accidens (b 26) may suggest that one will refer to the

name, though not the essence (cf. r:~~st. 2. 10, Metaph. E 2 1026b

l3-14)i if however forms defined without reference to their matter

are incomposites, and those defined •..,rith such reference are not, the

point might be that in the case of the latter (only) one can at least

refer to the matter, even if one does not grasp the essence. If incom-

posites are the objects of definitions, it clearly cannot be the case

that the truth discussed in (II) 1-:i inferior to that relating to com­

posites in (I) (see above, on lOSla 34-b 2).

It was objected, against the interpretation of incomposites as

forms defined without reference to their matter, that there were rather

few plausible examples, and none that ~wuld give the essences of natural

kinds. 'Righteousness' was suggested as an example, but it was pointed

out that that was not a substance. It was also suggested that, if

it was human souls that Aristotle had tn mind here, it was odd that

they were said not to come-to-be or pass away (b 28-9); but this could

be taken as a denial that they undergo t~rocesses of coming-to-be and

passing away, rather than as assertions of immortality. And Aristotle

does discuss forms considered apart from their matter at the end of

11.

Another suggestion was that incomposites are predicate expressions

without their subjects, e.g. 'two-footed animal'. There would then

be no possibility of falsehood, as there could be no false combination,

tnere being no combination of subject and predicate at all. For the

description of a string of words not forming a sentence as a definition,

reference was made to De In~ 5 17a 10. However, there were two objec-

tions:

!) How can such an incomposite be true? If the answer is 'because

there is an implicit reference in the context to the thing it is being

.:1dvanced as a definition of', it would seem that by the same token

it could be false as well. There are two possible solutions:

( i) an appeal to the suggestion above, that wrong definitions

are not so much false as simply failures to refer to

~he definiendum at all.

( ii) the point is not just that 'two-footed' animal is not

true in the context where it Ls a horse that is being

j_ 58

,.!!APTER lfl

defined, but rather that 'seventeen-footed animal'

is not true in any context. It ',.,laS noted, though,

that it is very tempting to analyse this point in terms

of composition by saying that 'seventeen-footed'

does not combine with 'animal', or, perhaps, that

venteen' does not combine with 'footed'.

se-

2) If the basic point is that a simple term, as opposed to a complete

proposition, cannot be false, why is the point made as if it were a

special one about definitions, which obscures it? It was argued that

't( l<T'ti.V need not refer to definition; it could refer to classification

as well, and one MS, A , omits 't( in b 32; but N.B. o6crCa.<; in 27.

6~oCw' 6t X4~ in 26-7 could indicate a restriction (as suggested above),

a generalising, or the introduction of a second, separate group of

cases; if the last, the reference to 1S1tep e!va.c. 'tL in b 30 is odd,

unless one reads lvfpyec.a.1. with the MSS in 31 and takes xa.i. not as

epexegetic.

But is there, in fact, a contrast intended in lOSlb 25-28, so

that one can be deceived about the 't( lcrtc. per accidens but not be

deceived about the incomposites at all 1 How much force should be

attached to bj.i.oCw'? If being deceived per accidens is not really

being deceived at all, but failing to make contact with the subject,

Aristotle might not have felt it necessary to add the point that we

can be deceived per accidens in 26-8 as well as in 25-6.

Two suggestions had been put forward previously as to how one might

be deceived about something per accidens: ( 1) by using the name but

failing to refer to the thing, (2) by referring to the matter but not

to the essence. It was now suggested ( 3) that the point might be

that one could refer by an ace idental description ( c f. An Post. 1.

22 83a 6, 2. 8 93a 21 ff.)i for example, if we were talking about the

human soul yesterday, by saying 'the thing we were talking about yester­

day is a forked radish' - which doesn't completely fail to make contact

with the subject in the way the simple statement 'the soul is a forked

radish' would. It was pointed out that in An. Post. 2. 8 93a 21 a

contrast is drawn between cases where our knowledge of a thing is acci­

dental and those where we have some knowledge of the thing itself,

e.g. if we do know that thunder is a noise in the clouds, though not

•,;hat causes it.

159

iJ5lh 17

'n51 b ! I

An application of ( 2) to a composite being would be our saying

'the oeing whose matter is f1esh and bone of a certain sort (i.e. man)

is a forked radish'. It was su~gested that where incomposites are

concerned - if we are now supposing that 26-28 does not rule out error

:~::1ccidens where these are concerned as well - a part analogous to

that played by the matter in the case of composites might here be played

by the genus. I.e., if we say 'the human soul has the faculties of

J lion's suul 1, we are referring to soul, though our statement shows

that we are wrong if we think we are referring to human soul. That

tJne can talk about soul in general, rather than the souls of particular

species, is suggested by De Anima L. l 412a 3 ff.; on the other hand.

1. 1 402b 7 suggests that soul may not be a genus (cf. Alexander, Quaest.

l. lla -b).

If the incomposites are forms, as opposed to forms plus matter

- and 1t was pointed out that LU5Lb 28 supports this, .!...!_ it is taken

t~J refer to coming into being without a process (see p. 158

- what are the wider class of things described as -rC lcrtL?

in categories other than that of substance, it was suggested.

Essences

In b 33. should we read tO J.Jc:; or We; -rO !he latter fits the

pattern of being in things corresponding to truth in propositions and

•,-ice versa (cf. above on (£)).

l05lb 33-l052a (Because the line numbers of different editions may

vary, it seems useful to set out this passage, numbering the clauses:)

10 0~ e[v~• w~ ~0 ~~~et,, ·~t ~b ~~ eTv~• ~0 w, ~0 teuoo~. (1) EV ~lv

• :crnv, d cr(,yxe.~~·. <i\·~et,, (2) ~0 o'd ~~ <J'Uyxe•~~·. +euoo,· (3) ·to 0~ ~v, F.:L~ep Ov, o\hwc;: l<Y"tCv, (4) e:£ 6E. f-'"h oU'twt;, obx Ecrnv.

rhe quest.1on mark at the end of (4) in early editions of Ross is a

"lis print.

1 n part

( l) 1- ( l) c 1 early take up again the discuss ton of O""Oyxe::taBa.t.

of the chapter (lOSlb 2-17): tt1ey do not relate directly

'",J the discussion of a-Uv9e;'ta. and drr6v8e;--ra. .in part II (105lb 7-33i :~ee

_,E'low), except in so far as CT\.)"'("lte:t'cr13a.L is something that ~esn~_! apply

t'J .u\composites (105lb 18-22).

,eem to he taken up by (3) + (4).

The &..cr-uvee-ra., on the t:..ther hand, do

takes ltv f-L~V in (1) to be answered by -rO 6E ~\1 in (J), each

't tn.ese (J"Lt:ki.ng out a different rype of heinJ?; - composite and incom-

t60

R 1 .J I •J :51 b jj

;Josite respectively - and each b~1ng lti€ .3uhject of its clause and

of the following one. -r.? 6t in (2) ·..lill then b.:: aJ.verbial, answering

a second f.-Lkv understood dfter £~Tt~ in ( l). ~-!e are not to understand

an EJ't~ in the introductory words at bJ3-4 ('being (i.s) like truth');

rather, the sense is 'being like truth .•. ', this being the subject

subsequently divided between Ev J.l~V and -rO 6€: ~v. Or rather (see

below) the sense is 'that being (that is) like cruth'); this. it may

be noted. suits -rb Wt; -rO in b 34. and indeed one might have expected

a similar construction in b 33 as well. It was pointed out that,

with Ross's interpretation, one might have expected -rb 6~ l-rEpov rather

than ~o 6~ ~v in (3); Ross's parallel from Politics l285b 38-l286a

only has ~v o~.

Alternatively to Ross, it 'vas suggested that Ev ~~v in 34 could

be predicative, 'it is a single cruth' (cf. 105lb 12, in the first

part of the chapter). €v will not of course then be carried over

to ,~lause (2) as well as (1). But in this case, what is the subject

'' f (1 ) d nd ( 2 ) '! It could be 33-34, taken as referring ~ or prima-

~.·ily to composite being, Hith tO 6~ in (3) introducing composite being;

hut this is awkward. And, what are we then to tadke of (J) and (4)?

{f ev is predicative in (1), it is presumably so in (3) as well.

And indeed. 'the other sort of thing (--rQ 6!: ), if it is (~..£· at all),

is one just like that' does make sense, though the reference to unity

doesn't seem particularly to the point here; but (4) '.Vill have to be

taken as 'but if (it is) not like this, it is not (2.!_1~)', which is

not lhe sense required .

The general significance of lOSlb 33-l052a 4 and its place in the struc­

ture of the chapter as a t~hole.

What do these lines add to what has preceded? They extend to

i.1"~ the force of the observations made in the earlier parts of the

chapter concerning t:_ruth. Being was referred to in 105Lb 23; even

if ,;.Ev in chat line is ilOt answered by 0£ in b 13 (dnd we noted that

· .. Jith one reading in b 23 it is answered at once bY -tO Ot: +e:U6ot;). never­

~heless b 22-23 does lead us to expect a subsequent ceference to being.

'J,1 the other hand, b 33 refers both the ccmposite and to incomposite

hein~ (see above), whereas b 23 refers only to Llle truth of incomposites;

on that of composites in (105lb 2-17) and that of the incomposites

L0l

05lb .lJ . !JJES 1/N THETA

in II (starting at lOSlb 17 and really ending at b 33). It was poin­

t~d out that this makes it '!ven h<Hder t0 suppose that 1052a 4 ff.

takes up only (II). With regard to b 34-5, it was remarked that there

r:an al;so be truth in separation t1nd falsehood in combination, if one

truly asserts that things which are separated are separated; so b 34-

5 are a compressed statement which can only rf'ally be understood in

the light of what has gone before.

It was r~marked that since the object of discussion in 9 10, accor­

ding to the view that ZH9 carry out the progralllme of E, is concerned

with being in the sense of truth and falsity. lt is odd that it should

be felt necessary, after discussing truth in sections I and II, to

refer back to being again at b 33 ff. But it ·.vas pointed out that

'"hat is under rliscussion is the type of being in things (cf. 1051b

2; and the incomposites are things which are lvepye:CCf, 1051b 28; and

•.:f. A 29) that corresponds to truth or falsity in statements; and it

is in place, after truth and falsehood have been discussed, to point

out how this type of being corresponds to them.

III. Deception and the changeless (1052a 4-1~2

This picks up the idea of heing deceived from (II), but otherwise

seems to be a development of the last part of (I) (10Slb 15-17), ~l~ss

(II) in t:he interimhas shown that timeless truths are incomposite.

That (III) picks up (I) is the view of ps. ·Alexander 601. 16 ff. and

Rossi that it continues (II) the vi.ew of S. Maurus ~J2.· Reale i.i. 94,

of Reale himself, Bonitz, .<Ind Aubenque ( Etu~~.!~~· R6-7).

a 7-11; quantification is possible in the case of a class, but not

l)f an i.ndividual.

'lur discussion centred around some nine questions, of varying

importance. treated here in roughly textual order:

( 1) D0es a 4 ff. belong with what immediately precedes ( "t"b 6~ lv ••••

at b 35, introducing composite being), or wi.th the general problem

at the opening of the chapter? If the former, if must be givin~

a different reason for absence ,,f deception than that given (so

f3r as one is ~iven) at b 15-7 (';o.Thich belon~ed in the composites

;f:'c t ion).

<:IIAPTRR 10

(2) Does &xCvn1'a. refer to the Unmoved Mover etc. or to mathematical

objects? It seems more intelligible to hesitate about the former,

but the ensuing examples are mathematical, and when Ar does express

hesitation about the UM at 1026a 29 he uses obo-Ca. of it. (Could

it refer to 'Platonic' intermediates? But the point of the sen-

tence doesn't seem to require such a metaphysical potulate, on

any interpretation.) Perhaps e:L ·uc; ... is simply to emphasise

that one won't then be tempted to attribute properties at one

time to what results and not at another.

(3} What is the force of xo"tb. 'tO 1to't'f (indefinite; not 1t6"t£. Cf.

Jto~t ~v ••• Jto~!: oe below)? Does it suggest there ~an be decep-

tion in other respects? (See below). Could Jto-rf mean loosely

'in some cases' rather than strictly 1 at some times' (cf. &.el. at

II)? Only if we are willing to give a parallel interpretation

(4) Is "tb -rpCywv0\1 universal or particular? A particular triangle

would be the sort of thing that might change its properties, if

anything did, but Ar could mean the triangle as such, or any tri-

angle. The universal would be needed if ~£"taadAX£LV meant 'vary'

or 'be different in different cases'; we would still get a false

belief as long as necessary properties were taken, but the contrast

with what follows would be spoilt.

( 5) How does "tt j.JkV... relate to Xo"tt ~ev ... ? Are we still talking

about triangles, the false belief being that some are of one kind

and some of another (or that the triangle in general appears now

in one g~;~ise and now in another, if 't'\ is predicate)? This would

make good sense, but makes very abrupt the change of subject in

the ensuing examples. More likely '<L f.LEv ~· o'o6 is a vague

and general representation of the form an error might take, the

governing verb still being ol-f)ae-ra.L of course. But why is it

Lmmediately illustrated by an example where one doesn 1 t wrongly

163

t052a

think some are of one kind and some of another, but wrongly thinks

all are of one kind? We had no very clear answer, though Ar 1 s

main point seemed clear enough.

(6) Is -cl subject or predicate?

still be either.

On the vague interpretation it could

( 7) How does T, -cLvb.c: ••• relate to the preceding ~..;ords? Again we

had no clear answer. Could Ar mean (with Tr epexegetic) that

thinking no evens are prime is a 'Nay one could go wrong in speci­

fyl.ng one's belief that some numbers are prime and some not?

(8) Does &.pL8~4 ••• tva. mean the number one, or any single number?

It seems easier to think of the number one as something one cannot

make mistakes about. But on the whole we preferred 1 any single

number 1• One could not there hold beliefs (and a fortiori not

false beliefs) of the form 'some are of one kind and some of an­

other'.

(9) Are 'tLvfl ••• -c~ov& masculine singulars or neuter plurals?

seems to hang on this.

Nothing

T__Q~~of 8 10 in 9 as a whole

Truth and falsity change where there is potentiality for change

in the i!:p6.y)..J.o.-ca. (l051b 10-15); incomposites, about which we cannot

be cleceived, exist in actuality only and not potentially (l05lb 28,

31). But it was felt that to try and link 9 10 as a whole to the

·heme of potentiality and actuality was implausible, involving picking

·->ut particular passages and phrases. Rather, it was noted that 9

l refers back to being in substance and the other categories, the theme

of ::H, before proceeding to being in potentiality and actuality; this

having been dealt with by the end of l3 9, 8 10 wi.llthen ~o on to the

further sense of truth and falsity (cf. lOSla 34-b 2). Moreover E

2 l026a 33-l026b 2 lists these three uses (the categories, truth and

falsity, potentiality and actuality), together with the accidental;

: ;1e accidental is discussed in E 2-J, and E 4 then t.ntroduces being

l64

as truth and falsehood, with a reference forward to the discussion

of simples and the 1:'( lO"'tt.Y in 9 10 (E 4 l027b 27; where, it may be

noted, the reference to -r<'i. d.~Xd 'X.o.\ 't'h -cC ~rr-tLY does not seem to suggest

that the former are a sub-class of the latter). The conclusion was

hard to resist that the l.Jhole of EZH9 form a systematically arranged

discussion of the senses of being - at whatever stage in their develop­

ment the arrangement took place.

General considerations on EZH9

Despite our previous discussions on it we remained not entirely

satisfied about how far EZHA formed a unified whole. E 2 starts with

a list of senses of 'being', and after saying that 'being 1 is said

in many ways continues with a discussion of accidental being. E 4

takes up being as truth from the list 1 and after a brief discussion

says we must consider later those questions in this area which are

relevant ( l027b 28-9), but adds that since neither accidental being

nor being as truth is being in the proper sense (xupCwc;;: b 31) we must

dismiss them (~eCrr6w 1028a 3) and look at the causes and principles

of being qua being. Ar does go on to do this of course. but we cannot

assume without futher ado that ZH9 forms a single connected whole car­

rying this programme out, let alone that Ar envisaged the whole of

t:H8 in detail when writing the end of E, which presumably no-one would

say.

It may be true that ZH8 form a rough whole, however loose and

scrappy in places, but we still have the difficulties for the unifi-

catlon thesis that we noted earlier (see above, yp. l-3). H

l in particular refers back copiously, but not apparently to z as we

noH have it. It does not refer back on this topic of the matter,

and anyway the unity of Z itself is by no means unproblematic.

a 1-9 doesn It dO mUCh piCking Up from !Jlhat. precedes,

9 10 itself does pick up from E 4, but there are problems.

Also

Why

does it come where it does? There is no obviously better place for

it to come in e, but it does not seem to rely on the rest of 8, so

why didn 1 t Ar get it out of the way at the start in E, as he did with

~ccidental being? What connexion has it with the preceding discussion

ot actuality and potentiality? x.up~Utta.,;a. ( l05lb 1) is embarrassing

)1)5

on any view (cf. ·.(upCw«; at 1027b 31, mentioned above), but perhaps

cc,uld be dealt with as misplac~d or interpolated. On the other hand

some defence •..,;oas put up for tne unificati0n thesis as regards e 10.

If we assume (but should we?) that the programme sketched at 1028a

3 takes till 9 9 to complete, there would be no room for 9 10 earlier,

and if Ar had something to say about truth and falsity 810 seems as

good a place as any for him to sa7 it. · t?t~·· reference to !!wtpye~a. and

6Uvni-J.&.t; at lOSlb 28 might gi\·e a positive reason for putting 9 10 after

the rest of 8; 10 does, in part, focus on truth concerning the ~xCv~~~

as compared with composites, which gi·1es 11s a focussing that wouldn't

have arisen without the rest of A, especially 9 8. \.Je even briefly

flirted with the idea that 9 10 was written by someone warming to the

idea of being as truth presupposing being and actuality/potentiality,

and so ~nding up as xup\.<irta.'t'a. being - but we did not seriously think

9 10 was not by Aristotle, and ended by reaffirming that we couldn't

say definitely what 8 10 presupposed, and that the unification thesis

had not Oeen freed from all its difficulties.

l66