millennialism, theravada buddhism, and thai society

Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai SocietyAuthor(s): Charles F. KeyesSource: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Feb., 1977), pp. 283-302Published by: Association for Asian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053724 .

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VOL. XXXVI, NO. 2 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES FEBRUARY I977

Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai Society

CHARLES F. KEYES

Theoretical Considerations In this paper I am concerned with the explanation of a type of religious phenomenon I shall refer to as millennialism. I would, at the outset, underline the religious character of this phenomenon, since millennialism (also known under a variety of other names) is often viewed as a projection of psychological, economic, or political crisis experiences. I do not view religion merely as a projective system; rather I hold with Clifford Geertz that it is a "cultural system" which serves as both a "model of" and a "model for" reality.' That is to say, I see religion serving both as a set of symbols that makes human experience ultimately meaningful, and as a set of symbols that provides an ultimate basis for human action.

We should begin a definition of millennialism, as a religious phenomenon, by identifying the essential beliefs associated with it. Generalizing from the original Christian sense (a new order on earth which would be established by Christ), the millennium is a new order on earth which will be established by a supernatural agency, i.e., by a force that is transcendental to man. Millennialism is distinguished from other eschatological belief systems in that the millennium is believed to be imminent, and in that it will be located in this world rather than on some other plane of existence. As a corollary to the belief in the imminent establishment of the new order, there is also a belief that the present order will be destroyed; in other words, the present order is radically devalued. Finally, millennialism makes a sharp distinction between the "elect" and the "damned," between those who will survive the destruction of the old order and be able to enjoy the benefits of the millennium and those who will perish in the holocaust.

The actual form these beliefs take in any particular case will be shaped, I maintain, by the religious formulations already known to at least a significant segment of the population swept up in the movement. In other words, millennial beliefs do not emerge de novo. Empirically, there appear to be two major ways whereby they are formulated: First, as exemplified by medieval Europe and pre-modern China, millennial beliefs can be reinterpretations or formulations of prevailing religious ideologies. Secondly, as exemplified by certain African and Oceanic peoples, millennial beliefs can be syncretic formulations combining elements of indigenous beliefs with elements of an outside religion (for example, Christianity) that is susceptible to millennial interpretation and that has become known to the people in question. Thus, one major question to be answered by those who study particular manifestations of millennialism is whether a

Charles F. Keyes is Associate Professor of An- thropology at the University of Washington.

In I972, Ford Foundation support enabled me to carry out archival research in Bangkok on northeastern Thai history, including the uprising discussed in this paper. In I972-I974, while serving as a

Fulbright exchange lecturer at Chiang Mai Univer- sity, I was able to gather additional information on millennialism in Thailand.

1' Religion as a Cultural System" in M. Banton (ed.), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (London: Tavistock, I966), pp. I-46.

283



284 CHARLES F. KEYES

specific millennial formulation is an interpretation of prevailing religious ideas or is a syncreticism of indigenous and borrowed beliefs.2

Knowing the source of millennial beliefs, we can then turn to the second critical question raised by millennialism-namely, what are the conditions that trigger a millennial movement? The term movement requires a moment's consideration. Millen- nialism is a collective phenomenon, the collectivity being the "elect." This collectivity differs from other types of religious collectivities associated with established religions in that it is always transitory-for the very good reason that the millennium will never come. Victor Turner3 has noted, perceptively, that millennial movements share some of the aspects of liminality of the tribal rituals he has analyzed so well.

Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the many societies that ritualize social and cultural transitions.'

If a millennial movement survives long enough in this liminal state, new symbolic formulations may emerge, and a new religion is born. Such was the case, for example, of the Mormons.5 More generally, for reasons we shall discuss later, millennial movements are not permitted to survive for very long. And even if they do survive, there is a strong tendency for "aggregation," i.e., for return to the religious status quo ante.

It is my contention that millennial movements are caused primarily by a crisis centering around political power. I do not deny that other factors are also important. Psychological factors, for example, are important when one is concerned with who joins a millennial movement and who does not. Moreover, it may be, as Norman Cohn has suggested, "that there is in many, perhaps in all, human psyches, a latent yearning for total salvation from suffering"'6 or, as Melford Spiro has claimed, that "the dream of achieving immortality and eternal youth is a universal human dream."' However, this line of argument will not help us much in explaining why particular movements have appeared at particular times in particular places. Natural catastrophes that play havoc with the productive system (crop failures, epidemics that decimate the animal work force, etc.) or cut a wide swath in human populations (plagues, etc.) may have been the immediate causes of a few millennial movements. However, I would suggest that those societies where millennial movements have been significant are the same societies that would interpret "natural" catastrophes as "acts of God" and thus hardly subject to rectification by divine intervention. Empirically, if not logically, millennialism appears to be most associated with crises in human relationships; and the most central of these relationships is the distribution of power within society.

The distinction between the "elect" and the "damned" is the idiom within which the power struggle inherent in millennialism is expressed. The damned are those who are, primo facie, most committed to the preservation of the established order. Given this view, it is hardly surprising that millennial movements that achieve any sizable propor-

2 Once a millennialism has been established, others with religious background different from the original adherents may be attracted to it. This process, whereby a millennial movement is expanded, leads us away from a focus on millennialism per se and into a consideration of conversion, which is by no means limited to millennial movements.

The Ritual Process (Chicago: Aldine, I969), p. III.

4Ibid., p. 95. 'See Thomas F. O'Dea, The Mormons, Chicago:

Univ. of Chicago Press, I957. 6 "Medieval Millenarism: Its Bearing on the

Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements" in S. L. Thrupp (ed.), Millennial Dreams in Action (New York: Schocken, I970), p. 32.

'Buddhism and Society [hereafter B&S], (New York: Harper and Row, I970), p. I82.



MILLENNIALISM AND THERAVADA BUDDHISM 285

tions are greeted with hostility on the part of the powers-that-be. This hostility, which is often-if not invariably-reciprocated by the adherents of the millennialism, is all too often translated into violence, usually resulting in the suppression of the millennial movement by a superior military force. The aftermath of a violent suppression of a millennial movement turns on the degree to which an ideological accommodation can be made for and by those who participated in the movement. If such an accommodation is made, there will be an "aggregation" into the prevailing order. Insofar as such an accommodation is not effected, millennialism may remain a latent force that erupts periodically; this has been the situation for much of the colonial period in Melanesia. Alternatively, the millennialism may become a "secret doctrine" which, in the under- ground, slowly evolves into a new religion with sufficient adherents to triumph in the end, Christianity providing us with the best-known example of this outcome. Finally, and probably limited to modern times, the millennialism may give way to a secular revolutionary ideology.

Having briefly sketched my theoretical orientation to the study of millennialism, I now wish to examine a particular case drawn from Thai history. Given that Thailand has long been a country whose populace adheres primarily to Theravada Buddhism, it will be necessary first to consider how Theravada Buddhist beliefs lend themselves to millennial interpretations. Then I shall consider, more specifically, the basis of millennial belief within Thai society, and examine in some detail millennial activities that occurred in northeastern Thailand in I899-I902. I shall argue that this case of millennialism among the northeastern Thai population erupted as a consequence of a sudden and radical shift in conceptions of power, resulting from the threat of an expansionist French colonialism and from the implementation of provincial reforms instituted by King Chulalongkorn at the end of the nineteenth century. Finally, I shall briefly consider the aftermath of that millennial movement.

Millennial Beliefs and Theravada Buddhism A number of students of millennialism have argued that Buddhist beliefs do not lend

themselves to millennial interpretations. Some have seen the belief in nirvdqa,8 which is central to Buddhist doctrine, as inhibiting millennial aspirations. Since the quest for nirvdaa has as an essential concomitant the rejection of all worldly concerns, it follows that Buddhist beliefs cannot be called upon in support of this-worldly millennial aspirations. Talmon has put the argument thus:

Religions with a radical other-worldly orientation which puts all of the emphasis on the hereafter or a purely spiritual and totally non-terrestrial salvation do not give rise to the vision of the kingdom of God on earth. This explains why there is apparently no apocalyptic tradition in Hinduism and why it has not occupied an important place in Buddhism.9

8 I shall use the better-known Sanskrit forms nir- vata, karma, and dharma rather than the Pali forms niiibbada, kamma, and dhamnna. In transliterating Thai words, I have indicated vowel length, but not tone. The consonants used for transcription are: -p-, -t-, c-, -k-, ph-, th-, ch-, kh-, b-, d-, f-, s-, h-, -m-, -n-, -ng-, 1-, r-, w-, y-. Vowels are: i, e, ae, u, o, 9, ou, oe, and a.

'Y. Talmon, "Pursuit of the Millennium: The

Relation between Religious and Social Change," Archives Europe'enes de Sociologie, III (i962), pp. I25-48; quote taken from abridged version in N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (eds.), Sociology and Reli- gion. A Book of Readings (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, i962), p. 246. Also compare Cohn (n.6 above), pp. 42-43; and P. Worsley, The Trum- pet Shall Sound, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Schocken, I968), p. 223.




This argument cannot be sustained, since the assumption that nirvdaa-quest is central to Buddhism is not tenable for the vast majority of peoples who claim adherence to Buddhism. What A. T. Kirsch has said of Thai Buddhism is confirmed by observers of Theravada Buddhist practice in all Theravada Buddhist societies:

Seeking for nirvana or "extinction" is primarily a religious goal of the sophisticated Buddhist, more particularly the monk [and then, only a few monks-cfk]. Unsophisti- cated Buddhists and laymen are more likely to see their religious goal as "paradise" or "heaven" (sawan) and/or enhanced rebirth status in future existences.10

In practical terms, karma-not nirvdaa-is the central concept among Theravada Buddhists. Yet it too seems to preclude millennial aspirations. Max Weber has argued that Hinduism and Buddhism

lack virtually any kind of social-revolutionary ethics [a fact which] can be explained by reference to their theodicy of rebirth, according to which the caste system itself is eternal and absolutely just. The virtues or sins of a former life determine birth into a particular caste, and one's behavior in the present life determines one's chances of improvement in the next rebirth. Those living under this theodicy experienced no trace of the conflict experienced by the Jews between the social claims of God's promises and the actual conditions of dishonor under which they lived.11

Weber advances two conceptions of karmic theory that we need to consider here. In the first instance, karmic theory is viewed as fixing one's position in the social order in an absolute way; karma serves to explain and legitimate the fixed inequalities obtaining among those who adhere to the doctrine. Secondly, karmic theory is viewed as deter- mining an action system oriented exclusively to a next-worldly salvation. Either of these conceptions, insofar as they are empirically valid, would appear to establish the argument that karmic theory strongly inhibits the emergence of millennial movements.

The argument that one's karmic heritage from past lives fixes one in a permanent position in the social order founders on the fact that this heritage is, as Gananath Obeyesekere has suggested, psychologically indeterminate.

In Buddhism ... I cannot know what the future holds in store because I do not know what my past sins and good actions have been. Anything could happen to me; sudden changes or alterations of fortune are to be expected, for my present existence is determined by past karma (regarding which I know nothing). I may be a pauper today, tomorrow a prince. Today I am in perfect health, but tomorrow I may suddenly be struck down by fatal disease.'2

The apparent contradiction between Weber's and Obeyesekere's arguments can be resolved by the recognition that Weber singled out caste as the social phenomenon explain- able by karma. Caste is ascribed at birth and cannot be changed; social differences can be rationalized with reference to karmic theory insofar as such differences are ascribed. However, while certain ascriptive differences do exist in Southeast Asian Theravada Buddhist societies, none has the complex distinctions present in the Indian caste system. Who will occupy non-ascribed statuses cannot be predicated on the basis of karmic theory, since there is no way to know what karmic potential one has been born with.

Thai society provides an excellent case in point, since all observers are agreed that it is characterized by few ascriptive differences. However, some students of Thai society have pushed the argument too far by postulating a total lack of ascription in Thai society,

1 "Phu Thai Religious Syncretism," (Harvard Ph.D. diss., I967), pp. I22-23.

T The Sociology of Religion, E. Fischoff trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, I963), pp. II3-I4.

12 Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism," in E. R. Leach (ed.), Dialectic in Practical Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, I968), p. 2I.




both past and present, and then finding in karmic theory a justification for this "open" or "loosely structured" social system. Lucien Hanks, for example, has stood Weber on his head in arguing that "as with the cosmic hierarchy [based on karmic-determined degree of effectiveness in action and freedom from suffering], the Thai social order roots individuals in no permanent rank."'3 For Thai society, while ascriptive differences do exist (e.g., traditional differences between "lords" and "peasants," contemporary differences between males and females) and are explained ex post facto with reference to karma, there also exists a body of non-ascriptive statuses whose attainment can be rationalized with reference to karmic theory only by recognizing that "one never knows when the effects of one's karma may emerge, it is unpredictable."'4 It follows that it is possible, within the context of such a society, to improve the conditions of one's this- worldly existence without rejecting karmic theory. Only the success or failure of such striving determines whether one had a sufficient karmic potential.

Given the indeterminacy of karmic theory in societies in which social position is not absolutely ascribed, there is-contra Weber-a tension between social experience and religious expectations. One's actions to improve the conditions of one's existence are fully sanctioned by the recognition that one's karmic potential is unknowable. Thus, while the empirical data strongly support the contention that a karmic-based action system is oriented towards the attainment of a higher karmic status in a future existence, it is also true that karmic theory provides, in addition, a basis for action directed towards improving one's conditions in the here-and-now. Insofar as one attempts to sustain one's claim to improved social status on the basis of karmic theory, one must possess attributes that are outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace. For example, the man who has spent a number of years in the monkhood obviously is a "meritorious" person (a person with a good karmic potential) since he has been able to subject himself to the discipline of the monastic order. Similarly, the man who devotes significant portions of his wealth to the construction of religious artifices not only accumulates merit that will improve his future karmic status, but also demonstrates that his wealth was gained as the result of past merit. In addition, the ability to perform supernormal acts-what might be called "miracles" -has also often been viewed as evincing a high karmic heritage, since the ability to perform such acts bespeaks the greater detachment of the performer from the sanzsdra world. True, not all attributes of statuses, or all statuses, are karmic-based; some are also profane manifestations of a "power" that "blurs the clear edges of cosmic justice.""'' Yet, even those who achieve worldly goals through powers achieved from spirits, special knowledge, weapons, etc., can never escape the overriding considerations of karma.

While we have thus far established that there is a tension between karmic theory and this-worldly existence, we have not yet isolated those Buddhist beliefs that-under certain conditions-provide the basis for millennial actions, which seek to mediate the tension. The crucial belief is that "merit" generated through positive karma (i.e., through good actions) can be shared with or transferred to others. Though it runs counter to a fully logical understanding of karmic theory, this conception is found in all Theravada Buddhist societies and finds sanction in the scriptures themselves.'6 For most

3 "Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order," American Anthropologist, LXIV (I962), p. I248.

14 H. P. Phillips, "Social Contract vs. Social Promise in a Siamese Village," in J. M. Potter, M. N. Diaz, and G. M. Foster (eds.), Peasant

Society. A Reader (Boston: Little, Brown, I967), p. 364.

15 Hanks (n. I3 above), p. I256. 16 Cf. Spiro, B & S, pp. I24-28.




Theravada Buddhists, the ability to share one's merit with others or to transfer the "proceeds" of merit-making to another being is limited strictly to certain ritual contexts. However, in all Theravada Buddhist societies, there are also rare individuals who, to use the Thai phrase, "have merit" (mi bun); these individuals are believed to have vast reservoirs of merit accumulated in past lives, which can be translated into the improvement of this-worldly conditions of those who are linked with them. This conception of the "person-who-has-merit" is obviously closely related to the idea of the Bodhisattva, the being who, although having achieved Enlightenment, has chosen to postpone his entrance into nirvdaa in order to alleviate the suffering of other men through his "great compassion. "

In contrast to Mahayana Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism sanctions the belief in only two Bodhisattvas: Gotama Buddha, who taught the Dharma followed by Thera- vada Buddhists today; and (Ariya) Maitreya or Mettaya, who is the Buddha to come. There are varying theories extant among Theravada Buddhists as to when Maitreya will appear in the world. The doctrinal position, contained in the Cakkavatti-sihandda- suttanta of the DTgha-nikaya, places the coming in the far distant future when there has been serious decay of human conditions, including the reduction of the human life span to less than the age of maturation.'7 An old and widespread belief among Theravadins holds that Maitreya "would appear soon, or even immediately after, the 5,ooo-year span of Gotama's religion, a time unconnected originally with any future Buddha."'8 Yet other views have posited his coming to be more immediate, with contemporary persons being identified with Maitreya, or with his embryo form.'9

Both the belief in the Bodhisattva Maitreya and the belief in "persons-who-have- merit" obviously lend themselves to millennial interpretation. Historically, this possibility has been strongly muted by the preemption of these ideas as buttresses for Buddhist monarchy. Kings of Ceylon-and later of Burma and of Thailand-periodically made claims to being embryonic Buddhas or Maitreya, as well as claiming to be cakravartin (universal rulers).20 How far such claims were recognized by the populace in general, and to what extent such claims precluded millennialism among the peasantry, remain questions that cannot be answered (if at all) without further historical research. More clear is the status of the conception of the king as the most "meritorious" person in a Buddhist kingdom. In nineteenth-century Thailand (and probably in earlier periods as well), the position of the king was conceived of "as the highest in the realm to be filled by the person with the greatest past merit (bun).... The welfare of the kingdom was tied up with the merit of the king."'2 This claim finds vital support in the two Buddhist myths best known to the populace: that of the Buddha himself, who was Prince Siddhattha before becoming the Buddha; and that of Vessantara, who, as the future Buddha, was also a king. Moreover, villagers in Thailand today still think of the present constitutional monarch as being the person having the most past merit.22

17 Cf. Edward Conze, Buddhism. Its Essence and Development (New York: Harper, I959), pp. II6-I7; he asserts (mistakenly, I believe) that the doctrine of the coming of Maitreya never held a great place among Theravadins.

18 E. M. Mendelson, "A Messianic Buddhist As- sociation in Upper Burma" [hereafter "MBA"], Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIV (I96I), p. 575.

19 Ibid. 20 See E. Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of

the Burmese Revolution (The Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, I965), pp. 43-48 passim. 21 Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai

Society in the Early Bangkok Period, I782-I873 (Ithaca: Cornell SE Asia Program, Data Paper #74, I969), pp. 46-47.

22 These comments on popular acceptance of the king as the person with the greatest karmic legacy are based on research carried out I962-I964 in villages in Mahasarakham province, NE Thailand; see my "Peasant and Nation: A Thai-Lao Village in a Thai State" (Cornell Ph.D. diss., I966).




In Buddhist society, kingship is not the only position whose qualities are interpreted as signifying that the incumbent is a "person-who-has-merit." As mentioned before, those who have demonstrated the ability to perform miraculous acts may also be recognized as beings having great merit. In Burma, for instance, there are the weikza, whose secret cabalistic and alchemic knowledge enables them to perform supernormal deeds and to prolong life.23 In Thailand, phui wisJt (literally, "men with extraordinary powers") are able to transcend "natural" law by means of some inherited quality or through some special knowledge. The equivalents of weikza or phu wisJt are also found in some tribal societies that have long lived in the shadow of the Buddhist societies. For example, among Karen-speaking people living in the interstices between the Buddhist societies of Burma and Thailand, some religious practitioners (the bu kho) combined the role of priests to the indigenous god Ywa with the elements of Buddhist roles, to make good their claims to "extraordinary" status.24 Indeed, at least one such man, who became the leader of the Karen millennial movement in the I85os, "had gained the knowledge of alchemy and the 'conjuring arts' which so frequently characterize the weikza of millenarian Buddhist movements in Burma";25 and another emerging millennial leader of the Karen in NW Thailand in the late I96os had the attributes of a Thai phu wiset. "

Weikza, phui wiset, and similar types in other Buddhist and Buddhist-influenced societies are not rare; but only a few ever attain any prominence. For the most part, these men employ their extraordinary powers in the attainment of very specific ends, and for the benefit of only a few people. Occasionally, however, one of these men (often, one who is a monk) will gain a reputation as being able to help all who seek him out; thus, a larger following begins to collect about him. It is these few who are recognized as "persons-who-have-merit" and-more rarely-even as Maitreya.

Thus we have a Buddhist basis for millennial belief. Certain men, recognizable by their miraculous acts, are believed to be "persons-who-have-merit" or Maitreya; as such, they are believed to be able to effect immediate improvements in the conditions of existence of those who become followers. While these beliefs are endemic in Theravada Buddhist societies and Buddhist-influenced societies like the Karen, explanations of millennial uprisings cannot be concluded at this point. Rather, we must also seek further to discover those social conditions that lead men to attach themselves to a Buddhist "savior," and to challenge the legitimacy of the existing political order. For Burma and Ceylon, the colonial experience-which saw the elimination of the Buddhist monarchy-has provided the crucible within which millennial dispositions have been forged. Both of these societies have known significant chiliastic movements in the twentieth century.27 For the Karen, and other tribal societies, the critical conditions that foster millennialism are to be sought, I would suggest, in the ambiguities of their relationship

23 Cf. Mendelson, "MBA," p. 564. Also Spiro, B & S, pp. I63-64; and Burmese Supernaturalism (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, I967), p. 24. I am also indebted to F. K. Lehman (personal communi- cation) for elucidating the meaning and etymology of this word for me.

24 Theodore Stern, "Ariya and the Golden Book: A Millenarian Buddhist Sect among the Karen," JAS, XXVII (I968), pp. 297-328.

25 Ibid., p. 307. 26This observation is drawn from field notes I

compiled while engaged in research in Mae Sariang district, NW Thailand in I967-I968.

27 See E. M. Mendelson, "MBA"; "Religion and

Authority in Modern Burma," The World Today, XVI (6), I960, pp. iio-i8; "The King of the Weaving Mountain," Journal of Royal Central Asiatic Society, XLVIII, 3-4 (i96I), pp. 229-37;

"Buddhism and Politics in Burma," New Society, XXXVIII (I963), pp. 8-io; "Observations on a Tour in the Region of Mount Popa, Central Burma," France-Asie, XIX, I79 (I963), pp. 780-807; "The Uses of Religious Scepticism in Modern Burma," Diogenes, XLI (I963), pp. 94-II6; "Buddhism and the Burmese Estab- lishment," Archives de Sociologie des Religions, IX, I7 (I964), pp. 85-95. Also Sarkisyanz, (n. 20

above); Spiro, B & S, pp. I62-87; and Kitsiri




to the power of the surrounding Buddhist societies.28 But let us consider the case of Thailand, which has had a long history of kingship unbroken by the intrusion of colonial rule.

Millennial Activities within Thai Society Although the idea of the coming of Maitreya is not unknown among Tai-speaking

peoples in Thailand,29 it is certainly less important than it is in Burma. In Thai society, it appears that the more significant basis for millennial expectations is belief inph& mibun, the "persons-who-have-merit" discussed above. As we have already observed, although the king of Thailand traditionally was (and, for much of the population, still is) recognized as the person possessing the greatest karmic heritage, phr7 wisJt (persons capable of performing miracles) could be recognized as the legatees of great merit, if this ability were effectively used in a relatively unlimited way. Monks (or ex-monks) appear to be particularly likely candidates to be phu7 wisJt who become phz mi bun, since they are primo facie religious virtuosos. However, not all phz7 wisjt are monks or ex-monks, nor are all monks or ex-monks phui wisJt. The recognition of a phzi wiset as a phu mF bun is no simple function of innate mystical qualities of any individual. What Worsley has said of charismatic prophets is also true of phui mi bun: "Charisma, . . . sociologically viewed, is a social relationship, not an attribute of individual personality or a mystical quality."30

In Thailand, it appears that those ordinarily attracted to people who have reputations as phu wiset are motivated by personal, rather than social, concerns. For example, the abbot of a temple I visited in NakhQn Pathom province in I967 had a major reputation for his knowledge of yantras (magical formulas), which he wrote with a special pen on the palms of persons afflicted with diseases and infirmities. While this monk does have a small permanent following, his reputation as a phu wiset is based primarily on his effectiveness with individual clients. To transform such a relationship into one in which followers are the collective recipients of benefits generated from the past merit of the phui wisJt requires that the followers experience a common threat to their present position. Another example will illustrate, I believe, how such a collective movement emerges.

In I898, Prince Damrong-the famous half-brother of King Chulalongkorn, and then the Minister of Interior-made a visit to the island of Phuket in Southern Thailand. There he discovered a monk who was honored by many people in the area, who ritually affixed gold leaf to his person in much the same manner as gold leaf was affixed to Buddha images.3' Intrigued, Prince Damrong asked the monk why he was so

Malalgoda, "Millennialism in Relation to Bud- dhism," Comparative Studies of Society and History, XII, 4 (I970), pp. 424-4I.

28 See Stern (n. 24 above), and Peter Hinton, "The Karen, Millenarism, and the Politics of Ac- commodation to Lowland States," in C. F. Keyes (ed.), Ethnic Adaptation and Identity.' The Karen on the Thai Frontier with Burma (Philadelphia: ISHI, forthcoming).

29 In I968, during my research in Mae Sariang, NW Thailand, the district Buddhist abbot showed me a tract which told of the imminent coming of Phra ST An-i.e., Ariya Maitreya. In I973 I obtained several pamphlets describing a Maitreya cult in ThonburT, the twin city of Bangkok. Newspaper accounts in I974 (Thai Rat, 9 & io Feb; The Bangkok Post, io Feb; Sayam Rat, ii Feb) carried a

story about a husband and wife living in Kumpha- w5pT, District, UdQn Province, NE Thailand, who claimed that Phra ST An had already been born. In Sept 1976, I received (from Edward Fallon, a gradu- ate student from the Univ. of Wisconsin, engaged in research on NE Thai history) a booklet entitled Ph--a SfAriya Mettraiya (Phra StFAn), comp. by Un Mahachokchai (KhAnkaen, I976); it describes a woman in Chiang Khan District, Lo5ei Province, NE Thailand, who has been accepted by numerous villagers in adjacent areas as being an incarnation of the Maitreya Buddha.

30Worsley (n. 9 above), p. xii. 31 While I have not pursued the question, it may

be that gold leaf serves as a medium whereby the "merit" of persons and the Buddha himself can be tapped. Interestingly, the abbot of the temple in




honored by his followers. The monk told Prince Damrong that in I876 there had been an uprising of Chinese miners in Phuket. The monk, then abbot of a village temple, was approached by several men who strongly encouraged him to flee to the hills as the other villagers had done. The monk refused to leave, saying that he had never known any home but the temple. Those who had come to persuade him to leave consulted among themselves, and finally decided to stay by the monk. The monk then provided each of these men with a magical cloth (phd praciat)-a white cloth on which he had written yantras. Shortly afterwards, a band of Chinese attacked the village and, expecting no resistance, were unprepared when they were counterattacked by the monk's followers. The Chinese fled. When villagers heard of the successful resistance, they returned to the village; the monk provided each of the men with magical cloth to protect them against bullets. Again the Chinese (now a larger group) attacked; again they were repulsed, and the monk's reputation was made. After peace had returned (the Siamese government having suppressed the uprising), the monk's reputation continued to grow, as amulets he had distributed were reported to accomplish many different types of miraculous ends.32

In this case, the monk had attracted a collective following because of the common threat the followers had experienced from the Chinese rebels. Significantly, the millennial possibilities of this movement were short-circuited by the Siamese government; by recognizing the monk in question as the senior abbot of the local Sangha, the government was able to institutionalize the charisma of the monk. I believe that such efforts to channel the charismatic appeal of phzu mF bun into established institutions (and especially the Sangha) have been successful in reducing the incidence of millennial uprisings within the kingdom.33 Not all such efforts have been successful, however. Reports of millennial uprisings can be found even in pre-modern Thai history. For example, at the end of the seventeenth century, a Lao claiming to be a phu wiset led twenty-eight men in an attack on the city of Nakhin Ratchasima.34 A close study of historical documents would, I believe, reveal many such incidents. But the most significant millennial uprising in Thailand, to my knowledge, is one that began in the northeastern region of the country about I899-I900, swept through much of the region, and reached a climax in I902, when it was forcibly suppressed by the Thai government. It is this movement, and its aftermath, that we shall now consider.

Millennial Uprising in NE Thailand, 1900-1902, and Its Aftermath35 A few salient facts about the history of NE Thailand must be set out before we can

examine the millennialism that occurred in the area. Coterminous with the Kh6rat

Nakhon Pathom province mentioned above im- pressed gold leaf on the palms of his clients before writing his yantras.

32The story is taken from "Ryang Phra Khru Wat Chal9ng," (Concerning the Phra Khru of Wat Chal9ng), which is contained in Prince Damrong, NithI,n bhorWnkbadli (Historical anecdotes), (Bang- kok: Phrae Phitthaya, I96I [orig. published I935c), pp. I2-21.

33See, for example, my discussion of the pro- longed efforts (which finally succeeded) on the part of the Siamese government to bring the most famous monk of recent northern Thai history, Khru Ba STwichai, into the Sangha hierarchy ("Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand,' JAS, XXX (1971), pp. 55I-68; also Amara Bhumiratana, "Four

Charismatic Monks in Thailand," Univ. of Wash- ington M.A. thesis, i969).

34 Prince Damrong, Thiao tdm thing rotfai ("Travels along the Railway") (Bangkok: Volume Distributed for the Cremation of Nai Samruat Phanphriya, I954), pp. II9-20.

3 The major primary source for this uprising is the set of documents collected in a file kept by the Thai Ministry of Interior, and now available for study through the Nat'l Archives in Bangkok [hereafter NA-BI-catalogued as M.2.I8, "ruang phi bun" (Concerning the phi bun), under the Ministry of Interior (krasuang mahatthai) records of the 5th reign (reign of King Chulalongkorn). A short account of the uprising, by Prince Damrong Rajanub- hab (who was Minister of Interior at the time and




Plateau, this area had originally been brought under the control of the Siamese government in the reign of King Taksin (I767-I782). During the next century, the region, which had previously been rather underpopulated, was filled up primarily by Lao migrants and their descendents. During the period prior to the end of the nineteenth century, the region had been organized into political domains (muang) ruled by Lao (and a few Khmer) nobles who were feudal-like dependents of the Siamese throne.36 The Siamese court had created similar muang in what is today central and southern Laos and northern Cambodia. This feudal-like model contrasted with the bureaucratic model of political control that obtained, at least in theory, in Siam proper. It also contrasted with

who figures prominently in the archival records) appeared in his book Nithdn ... (n. 32 above), pp. 352-58. Toem Wiphakphacanakit, whose father was a Siamese official in the Northeast at the time of the uprising, has given a detailed account in his Prawatsdt Isan (History of the NE) [hereafter PI], (Bangkok: Samakhom sangkhomsat haeng prathet thai, I970), vol. II, pp. 557-87. Some additional details can also be found in two local histories compiled by northeasterners: Bunchuai AtthgkQn, (comp.), Prawatsit hkaeng phak itdn lae mahasara- khc7mi bang ton (Some aspects of the history of the NE and Mahasarakham) [hereafter PIMV], (Mahasa- rakham: Cremation Vol. for Nang Pathuma Attha- kQn, I962), pp. 76-77; and Phra Thep Ratana M5lT (comp. & ed.), Urangkha nithan: tamnan phra that phanom phitsadan (Legend of the breast-bone [relic]: Chronicle of the That Phanom Shrine, expanded), (NakhQn Phanom, I965), pp. IOI-I02. It is quite likely that further research will uncover yet other local chronicles containing accounts of the uprising.

Phaithun M-ikison's study, Kdnpathirup kdn- pokkhr(&ng nmonthon &in samai thtphracao borom- w ongthoe krondluang sanphasitthiprasong song pen khdluangyai (Ph.S.2436-2453) (Provincial reforms in Monthon Isan during the period when Prince Sanphasitthiprasong was High Commissioner) [hereafter KKM I], by far the best secondary source, has made extensive use of the archival materials, as well as some other primary sources; first published as a thesis (Bangkok: M.A. thesis, College of Edu- cation, Prasamitr, I972), it has subsequently been published in two other versions: (Bangkok: Banna- kit Thredding, I974) and (Bangkok: Ministry of Education, Instruct'l Unit, Dept. of Teacher Train- ing, Instruct'l Documents #I49, I974). References cited herein are to the original version. Tej Bunnag, Khabot phu mT bun phak Tsan r.s. I2I,' (Millena-

rian revolt in NE Thailand, I902) [hereafter KPI], Sangkhomsat p9rithat (Social science review) [Bangkok], V (I967), pp. 78-87 is a stimulating article which draws upon archival data and on Toem's and Prince Damrong's accounts. Tej's "The Provincial Administration of Siam from I892 to

I9I5" [hereafter "PA"], (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford Univ., I968) also contains some discussion of the uprising (see pp. 27I-73, 276, 280), as well as providing an excellent detailed analysis of the political changes that provided the context within which the uprising took place.

In "The I90I-I902 'Holy Man's' Rebellion," Journal of the Siam Society, LXII (I974), pp. 47-66, John B. Murdoch has provided an analysis of the uprising based on Tej's article and on an earlier version of my study presented here. He has also taken into account some published French sources that treat the uprising as it occurred in French- controlled territory: Bernard Bourotte, "Essai d'histoire des populations montagnards du Sud-In- dochinois jusqu'a I945," Bulletin de Socite't des Etudes Indochinoises, XXX (I955), pp. I-I33; J.J. Dauplay, Les Terres rouges du plateau des Bolovens (Saigon, I929); Paul le Boulanger, Histoire du Laos Francais (Paris: Librairie Plon, I93'). To date, no one has examined any French archival source for possible data on the uprising in either Thailand or Indochina. Yoneo Ishii, in his brief paper "A Note on Buddhist Millenarian Revolts in Northeastern Siam," Journal of SE Asian Studies, VI (I975), pp. I2I-26, has focused on the cultural ideas underlying the uprising; and I have taken up a similar theme in my "Power of Merit," Visakha Pula B.E. 25I6 (Annual publication of the Buddhist Assoc. of Thai- land, I973), pp. 95-I02, as well as in this present study. I am also aware that a doctoral dissertation by Kennon Brazeale at Oxford contains an analysis of the uprising, but I have not had access to this study.

36 For further discussion of the traditional political structure of society in pre-modern NE Thailand, see Toem, PI, vol. II, pp. 387-40I; my Isan.' Re- gionalism in Northeastern Thailand (Ithaca: Cor- nell SE Asia Program, Data Paper #65, I967), pp. I4-I7; my "Domain, Kinship, and Political Control on the Khorat Plateau," (Seattle, I972, mimeo); and my "In Search of Land: Village Formation in the Central Chi River Valley, Northeastern Thai- land," Contributions to Asian Studies, IX (1976), pp. 45-63.




the type of tributary relationship that existed between the Siamese court and such polities as Luang Prabang and the kingdom of Cambodia.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the political order in NE Thailand and neighboring areas in Laos and Cambodia was radically changed. This change can be said to have begun in I867, when the Siamese court was forced by France to relinquish its tributary authority over the Kingdom of Cambodia. The threat of French expansion (together with the threat of British expansion from the west) provided a strong stimulus to King Chulalongkorn (who ascended to the throne in i868) to strengthen Siam's control over the peripheral areas of the realm. Beginning in the I870s, the Siamese court began to evolve a new system of provincial administration. In I882, Siamese high commissioners (khd luang yai) were sent to Campasak, Ubon, N9ngkh5i, and Khorat, to begin instituting a new political system in NE Thailand and neighboring areas of Laos.37 These high commissioners, whose authority was increased in I890 and again in I89I, occupied a new position intermediate between the Siamese court and the local hereditary elite of the region. In I892, the position of this elite was directly challenged by the appointment of Siamese officials as permanent administrative commissioners (khdluang kamkap rdtchakdn) with certain powers, especially with regard to taxation, that had previously been held by the local "lords" (cao) of the muang.38

While the Siamese court was carrying out these changes in provincial administration, it was also being subjected to increased pressure by the French. After France had consolidated its authority over the whole of Vietnam in the late i88os, it began to move into territory in present-day Laos that was claimed to be under Siamese control. In March I893, in what is today southern Laos, war broke out between France and Siam. The military force Siam sent to the front was made up, in large part, of levies raised in NE Thailand.39 In July I893, the French sent gunboats up the Cao Phraya River; under threat of attack on Bangkok, the Siamese government agreed to sign a treaty dictated by the French. The Franco-Siamese treaty of I893 gave the French all territory on the left bank of the Mekong River. Siamese officials and troops (including the levies from the northeastern provinces) were forced to withdraw across the Mekong. The treaty created a zone twenty-five kilometers wide in which no Siamese officials, policemen, or soldiers could enter without specific permission from the French. As a consequence, political authority in this zone became very confused.

Following the war, the situation in NE Thailand grew increasingly tense. The French established consulates at Ubon and Kh5rat; and French merchants, missionaries, and others began to operate in NE Thailand. Disputes emerged, regarding the status of the many refugees who fled from French Laos to resettle in Siamese territory. There is no question but that certain Frenchmen hoped to use the pretext of these disputes as a rationale for French advance into NE Thailand and, perhaps, into the whole of Siam. The Siamese court, for its part, accelerated its efforts to increase its control over the threatened northeastern region.

3 MQm AmQrawong Wicit (M.R.W. Phatom KhanEc&n, comp.), "Phongsdwaddn huamuang montthon fv&an- (Chronicle of the provinces in the NE circle) in Prachum phongsdwaddn phdk 4 idJe prati at th5ngthIu cangwat mnahvdrakhadm (Col- lected chronicles, Part IV; and local history of Mahasarakham Province), (Mahasarakham: Cre- mation Vol. for Phra SdrakhgmmunT, I963), p. I02.

MQm AmQrawong, a Siamese official posted to Ubon, compiled his chronicles in I904; they were first published in I9I5. Also see Tej, "PA," pp. I02-03, and Phaithun, KKMI, p. 20.

38 MQm AmQrawong (n. 37 above), pp. I36ff.; Phaithun, KKMI, pp. 40-43.

" Bunchuai, PIM, pp. 72-73; Phaithun, KKMI, pp. 53-55; Tej, PA," pp. I38-40.




The importance the Siamese court attached to the northeastern border provinces was manifest in the appointment of the high-ranking and highly respected Prince Sanphasit- tiprasong as the royal commissioner plenipotentiary (khdluang yai tang phra ong samret ratchakan) for the "circle" (monthon) of Lao Kao (later Monthon Isdn), the jurisdiction that included the northeastern provinces in the drainage of the central and lower Chi River.40 In I894, the court began implementing in NE Thailand a plan of centralized provincial administration, the system later known under the name thJtsaphibdn. Rather than in terms of the subject population, as had been the case in the existing system, the units of this system were defined primarily in terms of territory. In I894, a mapping expedition was sent out to determine the boundaries; in I897 a royal "Edict Concerning Local Administration" created a hierarchy of political units into which the populace was administratively organized.41 When this edict was implemented in the Northeast, only a few of the old "domains" (muang) were recognized as "provinces" (cangwat); most were made into "districts" (amph5oe) under the provinces, and a significant number were demoted to the status of tambon or "commune" and made subordinate to the districts. This political restructuring resulted in the downgrading of many of the local gentry, and even those who remained as "lords" (cao) now "governors" (phuwdrdtchakdn)-of provinces were left with little real power; the power had been arrogated by the Siamese commissioners placed over them.

Of the powers of the traditional "lords," the most important preempted by the Siam- ese commissioners were those of taxation levied against the populace. Acting on orders from the court, the commissioners undertook to systematize all types of taxes. In I899, Prince Sanphasit, the high commissioner at Ubon, issued a proclamation that fixed the head tax at 3.50 baht per eligible male (chdi chakan)-a category excluding those under eighteen and over sixty years of age, the disabled, those serving in government service, local gentry and their families, Siamese officials, foreigners, ascetics and monks, artisans, and rich persons.42 In I90I-02, the poll tax was raised to 4.oo baht per taxable person.43 Taxes on production were also made more efficient. The overall effect of the ration- alization of taxation was to increase the tax burden on the peasantry.44 The Siamese commissioners also introduced other changes that directly affected the peasantry. In I899, for example, Prince Sanphasit ordered that all sales of large animals be done in the pres- ence of officials. Ostensibly this requirement was designed to reduce theft; in fact, it had the effect of giving local officials the opportunity to take part of the sale price of buffaloes, cattle, horses, and elephants.45 Prince Sanphasit also attempted to change those local customs (such as tattooing) that the Siamese regarded as uncivilized.46 In short, the peasantry in NE Thailand found their freedom of action increasingly restricted by Siamese officials.

The economic restrictions and the tax burden placed upon northeastern peasants fell heaviest on those who were finding it difficult to produce enough for their needs. The harvests in the Chi River basin in I890 and I89I had been extremely poor because of too little rain one year, and too much flooding in the following year.47 Moreover, the

40Toem, PI, vol. II, p. 47'; Phaithun, KKMI, PP. 55, 57-58.

41 Tej, PA," pp. I9I, I95-206; Toem, PI, vol. II, pp. 463-65; Phaithun, KKMI, p. 67.

42 Phaithun, KKM1, PP. 75-76; he observes that Prince Sanphasit especially excluded "artisans" and rich persons" in order to stimulate economic devel-

opment. "Rich persons" were determined by the

number of large animals (cattle, buffaloes, horses, elephants) owned.

4 Ibid., p. 94. "Ibid., pp. 95-96.

Ibid., pp. 77-78. 46 Ibid., p. 75. 4 Bunchuai, PIM, p. 69; Phaithun, KKMI, pp.

43-44.




population of the region had grown to such an extent that many peasants were cultivating marginal lands on which good harvests could not be expected unless conditions were optimal.48 In I902, Phra Yanarakkhit, the ranking monk in Isan circle (himself a northeasterner) wrote the following about the combined effects of natural and political conditions on the life of the peasants in the area:

The populace is impoverished because they lack economic progress. If they have good yields, there is no market. If they cannot (farm), they must starve. . . . The trade in beasts of burden is difficult in several respects. Buyers and sellers exist, but they lack the legal papers. When elephants and horses which have gone astray are caught and taken to administrative offices (sdld k/ang), they are confiscated for the crown. . . . It is impossible for the populace to find work (for wages) in their own land. The cost of labor is cheap to a degree. . . . Since (the populace) lives far away from the commissioners (khdluang), there are crooked people who collect head taxes before the government is able to do so. Because (those who have been cheated) have nothing left, they are ruined. (If they bring the crooks to court), they have no evidence and are defeated.49

Given the conditions changing for the worse, some peasants turned to banditry.50 By the end of the nineteenth century, the attraction of banditry gave way in importance to the expectation that politico-religious leaders were about to emerge from among the people, and that these leaders would eliminate the causes of suffering of the peasantry.

By I899, Siamese officials began to receive reports about men claiming to be "miracle men" (phii wiset), who were providing peasants with sacralized water (ndm mon), "medicine" (ya), and modes of worship.5' At the same time, troubadour singers- apparently from French Laos were traveling about the region singing, in a popular form known as kham phayd, about the coming of phzu mibun.52 Troubadour singing was probably the major way whereby the phu- mi bun message was spread from village to village. In addition, handwritten manuscripts were also circulated, and at least four different written versions of the message are known to exist."

While different versions of the message are reported from several parts of the region,54 the content was very similar everywhere. All versions begin with the prediction of an imminent dramatic catastrophe. For example, in a version obtained in villages in

48See my "In Search . . ." (n. 36 above). 4 NA-B, V, M. 57/I5.

- Ruang phra yanarakkhit wa duai ratchakan nai monthon isan" (Concerning Phra Yanarakkhit speaking about administration in Monthon Isan), iO Feb-3 Sep I902.

50 Phaithun, KKMI, pp. 47-49. 51 Ibid., p. I07. 52NA-B, V,M.2.18/II, letter from Prince San-

phasit to Prince Damrong, II July I903; also see Phaithun, KKMI, p. 98. Prince Damrong-in a letter to Prince Watthana, High Commissioner of Monthon UdQn (NA-B, V,M.2.i8/3, 28 Apr I902)-was of the opinion that those who first spread the message about the coming of the phu- mi bun were followers of Ong Kaeo, a claimant to the status of phu- mi bun who lived in French Laos. Murdoch (n. 35 above, p. 55), who has drawn on French sources, identifies Ong Kaeo as an Alak tribesman from southern Laos. Phaithun, KKMI, p. 79, drawing on Siamese sources, identifies him as a local Lao official of Sarawane who had a Siamese

title. While Ong Kaeo was certainly a major figure in the uprising in both French Laos and in NE Thailand, he does not appear to emerge until about two years after the first indications of the millennial ideas have begun to be reported in NE Thailand.

53 Phaithuin, KKMI, p. Ioo gives the titles of the four documents as: (i) nangsu phrayd in (Lord Indra's book), (2) nangs.j thdm7 phraya thammikardt (Book of Lord Dharmikaraja), (3) nangsuj phui ml bun (Book of the meritful persons), and (4) tamndn phunmqang kr;ing (Local accounts of the capital).

54I have consulted versions of the message as reported in the following: a letter from Phraya Suriyadetwiset Rvutthasathiwichai, a Siamese special commissioner sent to investigate the causes of the uprising, to Prince Damrong (NA-B, V,M.2.i8/ II, 30 Aug I902); excerpts from and sum- maries of documentary sources reported by Phai- thun, KKMI, pp. I00-02, and Tej, KPI, p. 78; composite versions reported by Toem, PI, vol. II, p. 559; and Bunchuai, PIM, p. 76.




the vicinity of Selaphum (today in R5i-et province), it was predicted that a terrible wind would initiate a series of horrific events:

On Sunday, the day of the full moon in the 4th month of the year of the Ox, third of the decade, Culasakarat [Era] I263 [23 March I902], a windstorm so powerful that it can blow people about will begin and it will be dark for 7 days and 7 nights. One should burn the wood of the Oroxylum indicum (Lao, mai linfa; Thai, mai pheka) for light and plant lemon grass at all stairways to houses. During the windstorm, if one seizes a handful of lemon grass, one will not be blown away.55

During this catastrophe, many normal things were to be radically transformed: pebbles would become gold and silver, while gold and silver would become pebbles, lead, or iron; gourds and pumpkins would become elephants and horses; pigs and buffaloes (especially albino or short-horned buffaloes) would become man-eating yaksas;56 silkworms would become snakes or vicious dugongs; the fibers from the roots of trees from along the Mekong would become silk; flowers of the flame-of-the-forest tree (Butea frondosa; Lao, mai can; Thai, mai thing kwao) would become red dye for coloring silk.

The message continues with the prediction that associated with the holocaust will be the coming of a savior, variously termed Thao or Cao or Phraya Thammikarat (Lord Righteous Ruler), the "meritful lord" (cao ton bun), or "meritful person" (phu- mFbun). In one of the written versions, it said of Phraya Thammikarat that "in the past he ruled Mujang N5ng Son [identified as Ayutthaya or old Siam] and then he ruled Mulang Lang Chang [old Laos].... In the year of the pig [I899/I900] the face of Cao Thammikarat was seen in our own time."57 In another written version, Phraya Thammikarat is identified as a villager from Ban Nalao, Selaphum District, R5i-et Province, a man who had taken the title and name of Phra Ketsatthawiha Cao Fa.58 (This man was by no means the only one who claimed to be a phi mibun, as we shall see.) Those who follow the savior(s) and undertake the actions prescribed by them or in the messages will not only escape disaster but will prosper:

Whoever wishes to remain free from these evil happenings should copy or retell this story and make it generally known. If one is pure and has not performed any evil or bad karmic59 deeds (or, if one wishes to become rich), one should collect pebbles so that Thao Thammikarat can transform them into gold and silver. If one has performed various evil deeds, then in order to become a pure person one should perform the ritual of tat kam wdng win60 whereby one arranges to invite monks to come sprinkle sacralized water.61 If one is afraid of death, one should kill albino buffaloes and pigs before the middle of the 6th month to prevent them being transformed into yaksas. If one is still a maiden or a married woman who has not yet consummated her marriage, one should quickly take a husband. Otherwise the yaksas will catch you and eat you.62

5 Phraya Suriyadetwiset (NA-B, V, M.2.A8/II). Other dates given include the 8th day of the waning of the 8th month, year unspecified (Phaithun, KKMI, p. iOO) and the middle of the 6th month, year of the Ox [2 May I90I] (Toem, PI, vol. II, p. 559).

56 Yaksa (Thai, yak), "giant demons." 5 Phaithun, KKMI, p. iOi.

Ibid., pp. iOo-Oi. " Bad karmic deeds (bdp) refers to acts defined

by the Buddhist dharma as producing ill con- sequences.

60 Tat kam uwang wun, lit., ''to cut (oneself) loose from karma and free (oneself) from anger."

61 Sacralized water (ndm mon) consists of water over which ritual mantras have been chanted.

62 Toem, PI, P. 559. In another version of the message it is said that "Maidens who still have no husband should go about to find a husband. The bride price will be figured at one at and one salot only. If a maiden is unable to find a man who is unmarried, then it is permissible to become the wife of a man who is already married. But (in this case, one) must pay four at to the original wife as the price of buying her husband. If (maidens do not take husbands), the yaksas will eat them." (Phraya Suriyadetwiset in letter to Prince Damrong, 30 Aug I902; NA-B, V, M.2.I8/II).




The millennialism of this message could not be more classic. First, there is a set date for the radical destruction of the existing social order. At that time, natural conditions will be inverted (gold and silver will become pebbles, pebbles will become gold and silver, and so on). A savior will come; he will be a returning king, a king of righteousness, and, in Buddhist terms, the legatee of great merit, which will enable him to alleviate the suffering of the just and punish the wicked. Those who have demonstrated themselves to be believers by disposing of their gold and silver, killing off buffalo and swine, collecting pebbles, and performing ritual acts (like the tat kam wang wen) will be saved and will prosper. Even a sexual element is added in that all maidens or women who have not yet consummated marriage should "take husbands" (the Thai phrase suggests having intercourse as well as entering into marriage). Those who do not follow these prescriptions and proscriptions will suffer a horrible death being eaten by yaksas.

The message of the imminent holocaust and the establishment of a new order under a righteous and meritful ruler spread throughout much of NE Thailand, as well as across the Mekong in French Laos. Siamese officials dismissed initial reports about the effects of the message, viewing it as mere superstition. However, by early I902, the government could no longer ignore the fact that very disturbing events were taking place in NE Thailand. In February I902, Phra Yanarakkhit, the ranking monk in Monthon Isan, reported that from Ubon to Sangkha in Surin province, no one from villager to official could talk of anything but the phui mibun. In some places, the monk reported, "rice in the fields remains unharvested and cattle and buffaloes are allowed to eat it; garden plots and sugar cane (fields) have often been discarded."63 The first direct official Siamese action took place when three ranking monks in Yas5th5n province were reprimanded for having performed the "cleansing" ceremony.64 Still, the movement continued to grow, and it began to organize around several men claiming to be phu- mi bun.

Early in I902, there were at least three major leaders of the movement in NE Thailand. A man from French Laos, by the name of Man (or Man), established himself in a village in Khemmarat district in what is today Ubon province, claiming to be Cao (or Ong) Prasdtth5ng (Lord Golden Serenity), "a divine being who had descended from heaven to be reborn as a favor to mankind."65 A local official wrote of Man that "he claims to be a phu wiset and has gone about [demonstrating his powers] by keeping the [eight] precepts, meditating in caves and in the hills, and making sacralized water. He deceives the populace that he is a phu wiset who can cure various illnesses with magic (rut), sacralized water, and enchanted medicine (khunyd)."66 Man attracted an initial following of about two hundred, and was responsible for several disaffected local gentry from the downgraded muang of Khongciam going to French Laos, where they claimed to be phu- mi bun. 67

Another disaffected local noble, Thao Buncan, was the leader of another sector of the phzu mF bun movement, located in the vicinity of Khukhan in what is today STsaket province. When a new governor of Khukhan was appointed, Thao Buncan, who felt that he should be governor and yet was not appointed, left the town together with two other

63NA-B V, M.57/I5, letter from Phra Yana- rakkhit to Prince Damrong, dated 20 Feb I902;

Phaithun, KKMI, p. I05. "To6em, PI, vol. II, pp. 56o-6i. 65 Ibid., p. 564; also see Phaithun, KKMI, p.

io6. 66 KKMVI, p. I08; Phaithun speculates that in-

stead of meditating while in caves and in the hills, he was actually plotting rebellion with others.

67 Ibid., p. 93.




disappointed local gentry and established themselves as phi mi bun in a village nearby.68 Prince Sanphasit, the high commissioner at Ubon, estimated that Thao Buncan had a following of 6,ooo in February I902.69

The third most important leader in NE Thailand was a villager by the name of Lek, who was apparently the same as the man mentioned in one of the written forms of the message as being from Ban Nalao, Selaphum District, in R6i-et province. He and several other villagers, all with pretentious titles, established themselves in Phayakkhaphum- phisai district (in today's Mahasarakham province). No estimates are available on the size of Lek's following, but it is known that they were from several provinces in the central Chi River valley.70

It is not entirely clear how much prior coordination there was among the leaders of the movement in NE Thailand, and between them and the ones in French Laos. One minor leader, interviewed after the uprising had been put down, claimed that all the leaders shared the same objective: "to establish a kingdom which was not under either the Siamese or the French."71 To obtain this objective, the movement was to destroy, by force, Siamese and French power in the area. Once this was accomplished, four of the phui mi-bun would rule at Vientiane, Ubon, That Phanom, and N6ng Son (Ayutthay5).72 Whether or not such a grandiose plan existed, several of the phut ml bun leaders did undertake to wrest power from the Siamese by force of arms.

It appears that the hand of the phuz mi bun was forced in late February and early March I902 when several patrols, consisting of a few Siamese officers and soldiers and some local irregulars, were sent out to arrest those responsible for the growing unrest. One of these patrols succeeded in killing Thao Buncan, the leader in Khukhan, and in dispersing his followers. However, the other patrols were less successful; in one case, the irregulars were persuaded to join the rebels. Meanwhile, Man and Lek had joined together and "led a force of about 2,500 or more in an attack (on the Mekong River city) of Mujang Khemmarat."73 The rebels killed two of the chief nobles, captured the governor of the province, and burned and looted the town. The success of the rebels at Khemmarat attracted the support of many more people; it also spurred strong government response.

The rebels under Man and Lek started toward the city of Ubon, then the major city in the area. They established themselves at the village of Ban Saphi5, fifty kilometers or so northwest of Ubon in the district of Trak5nphuitphon. Here they were joined by some of Buncan's followers from Khukhan. Before the rebel force could move towards Ubon, they were attacked at Ban Saphui by a Siamese force numbering perhaps as many as 2,000. 74

On 4 April [ I902] the Siamese force, armed with repeating rifles and cannons, attacked the rebel force. The rebels were ill-armed, having knives, swords, spears, and old flintlock rifles. As the government troops approached, they were warned by the rebels: "Don't anybody shoot or do anything at all. Sit in meditation and our side will shoot but a single shot." The government troops did attack and a battle raged for four hours. Seeing their forces in defeat, the leaders of the rebels escaped before the battle was over. When it was over, more than 200 rebels had died, more than 500 had been injured, and another I20 had been captured. Not a single government soldier was even injured.75

6 Ibid., pp. 93, io6. 69NA-B, V, M.2.I8/3, telegram from Prince

Sanphasit to Prince Damrong, 26 Feb 1902. 70 Phaithun, KKMVI, p. io6. 71 Ibid., p. I07. 72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., p. II2; see also Toem, PI, vol. II, p. 565. 74 Phaithun, KKiMI, pp. II4-I5, I86-89. 75 Ibid., pp. II5-i6; elsewhere (p. I20), he says

that 288 men were captured at B. Saphu. Toem (P1, vol. II, p. 564) says that 300 men were killed and 400 captured there.




Following this decisive battle, government troops were sent to several other locations, to eliminate any remaining rebel resistance. In this mopping-up operation, a number of rebels were killed including six minor leaders in Khongciam district and mnany more were captured. The total number of rebels captured in all encounters was estimated to be about 400.76 Lek was captured; but Man escaped to French Laos, where he joined up with Ong Kaeo, and was associated with him in an unsuccessful attack on Savannakhet on 2I April I902. "

Of the 400 or so rebels whom the Siamese captured, all but nine major leaders and a few minor leaders were released. One of the nine major leaders was a monk; another, a local noble; the others, villagers.78 With the exception of the monk, the leaders were executed in their home communities, as examples to the people of what happens to rebels. The monk, along with the three monks who had been involved prior to the rebellion, were ordered to remain in the monkhood for life; if they left the monkhood, they would be jailed instead. A number of the minor leaders were given prison sentences. As for the ordinary people who had become followers of the phu- mi bun, they were ordered to participate in ceremonies at which they drank the water oath of allegiance and pledged themselves to believe strongly in the king of Siam.79

These events had not gone unnoticed by the French. In putting down the rebellion, Siamese forces entered the 25-kilometer zone along the border with French Laos, contravening the Treaty of i893. The French vice-consul at Ubon, M. Paul Patte, warned that such infractions might lead to French forces crossing into Siamese territory. Through negotiations carried on between Siamese officials and representatives of the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, it was agreed that Siamese forces could enter the zone in pursuit of the rebels, but they couldn't stay there.80 M. Lorgeon, who had been French consul in Bangkok and was in I902 legal advisor to the Siamese government, had gone to Ubon at the time of the execution of the rebel leaders. He had challenged Prince Sanphasit, the Siamese high commissioner, as to whether he had the authority to carry out the executions. On his return to Bangkok, M. Lorgeon asked the king about this and was reassured that Prince Sanphasit had been given the authority to act as he did.81 The potential for French intervention remained a threat to Siam for some years to come. Nonetheless, for reasons having to do with French foreign policy, the French did not exploit the phu- mF bun uprising, nor the disaffection of many local gentry in the region, as pretexts for annexing NE Thailand to French Laos. French expansion to the west ended with the treaty of I907, whereby Siam ceded to France the right bank territories of Sayaboury (across the Mekong from Luang Prabang) and Campasak, as well as provinces in what is today northern Cambodia.

Insofar as the thousands of northeasterners who had been followers or sympathizers of the phu- mi bun were concerned, the Siamese government through the use of superior military force and the subsequent punishment meted out to the captured phu- mi bun leaders proved itself to be the dominant political element in the region. Yet Prince Damrong, Prince Sanphasit, and other high-ranking Siamese officials recognized that force alone would not ensure that the authority of the Bangkok government would be accepted by the local populace, local gentry as well as peasants, in the northeastern region. Following the uprising, the Siamese government undertook investigations into its causes. Phra Yanarakkhit, the ranking monk in Monthon Isan, who was called upon for

76 Phaithun, KKMAI, p. I20. 7 Ibid. Ong Kaeo continued to give the French

trouble until I910, when he was finally killed by trickery (Murdoch, n. 35 above, p. 6o).

78 Toem, PI, vol. II, pp. 574-75. 79 Phaithun, KKMAI, p. 67. 80Ibid., pp. II8-I9. 81 Toem, PI, vol. II, p. 577.




his opinion regarding the causes, argued that the poverty of the region served to stimulate unrest among the populace.82

In saying this, he was sounding a theme that would be repeated by nearly every leading northeasterner from then on to the present. The Siamese government did begin, in the years following the uprising, to initiate projects (such as railway construction) designed to spur the economic development of the region.83 Yet, while the economic conditions of the peasantry exacerbated the discontent of the people of the region, the radically changed political order instituted by the Siamese government was more important as a cause of the uprising. A number of investigators pointed out that the rapid introduction of politico-administrative reforms served to create a whole class of potential dissident leaders out of displaced local gentry, and a large body of followers among the peasantry who were subjected to new tax demands and legal restrictions.84 In the decade or so following the uprising, the government slowed down the implementation of the provincial administrative reforms and, in particular, made efforts to recruit many of the local gentry into the new civil service or else retain them in advisory positions.

The causes of the rebellion were not to be found only in the new political conditions and in the underlying poverty; in addition there was an ideological cause. In the various communiques circulated among Siamese officials particularly between Prince Damrong (Minister of Interior) and Prince Sanphasit (the high commissioner of Monthon Isan)- there was constant reference to the "stupidity" and "ignorance" of the northeastern populace. Phaithun, in his analysis of these documents, sagaciously observes that what was behind these statements was the fact that the northeastern populace had not yet come to appreciate the meaning of the new ways for ordering behavior which the Siamese officials were attempting to introduce;85 in other words, the Siamese officials and northeasterners understood power in quite different cultural terms. Perceiving this cultural gap, King Chulalongkorn, Prince Damrong, and others of the king's advisors, spurred the promotion of programs (such as the integration of the Buddhist Sangha and the institution of compulsory primary education) that would bring the Siamese cultural view to the populace at large, including the northeastern peasantry.

To a truly remarkable extent, the Siamese government succeeded in its task to implant a new cultural outlook among the rural people of the northeast, although it took at least until the mid to late I930S before this goal was accomplished. This new ideology conveyed to villagers primarily through primary school texts emphasizing the connections between Buddhism, nation, and monarchy; and through rituals in which symbols of the king and the Buddha are linked centers around the idea that the only "person-who-has-merit" who has the power to share the benefits of this merit with others is the King of Siam (or Thailand, as the country came to be called during World War II). All legitimate authority is conceived of as flowing from the monarchy, even though since I932 the king has been a constitutional rather than an absolute monarch. In short, the centralization of power became not only a fact in the experience of northeasterners; it also became a fact in the way in which they conceived of the nature of political power.

The old idea that powerful men known by their religious charisma could emerge from among the people, in places far from Bangkok, did not completely disappear. The

82Tej, "PA," p. 273. 83 Tej, KPI, makes too much, I believe, of the

poverty of the northeastern populace being the major cause of the uprising, and also of the importance of economic aid being the major successful effort in

effecting a reduction of millennial tendencies. 84 Phaithun, KKMVI, pp. 93, 95, I22; Tej, PA, "

pp. 272-73. 8 KKMAI, pp. 96-97.




lack of adequate health care for villagers in NE Thailand (as for villagers elsewhere in the kingdom) has served to keep the idea of phu wiset very much alive. To this day, there are curing cults in the region, focused on those who claim to have extraordinary powers. Thus, when political crises have occurred in Thailand, there has continued to exist the potential of the emergence of a phui wiset claiming to be able to alleviate suffering caused by political action. A number of cases from NE Thailand demonstrate the continuing viability of the idea that local persons with merit can effect radical political changes in the lives of their followers.86 In I924, for example, there was a man in Loei province, located in the far northwestern corner of the Khorat plateau, who claimed "himself to be a representative of heaven who had received the task of coming to protect men from the calamity of man-eating yaksas."87 He acquired a following, which he led in a quixotic attack on the local district office. A government force quickly put down this small uprising and the leader wound up in jail.88 This affair can probably be seen as a final reaction, in an isolated district, to the implementation of King Chulalongkorn's provincial administrative reforms.

In 1933, a troubadour singer in Mahasarakham province claimed to have extraordinary powers he would put to use in overthrowing Siamese power and establishing a new, independent Lao kingdom. Again, this man gained a small following; but before anything could happen, he was arrested and given a jail sentence.89 I believe that it is not coincidence that this man emerged at a time when the structure of political authority had been radically changed by what is known to the Thai as the Revolution of I932 (when a group of civil servants and military officers forced the king to proclaim a constitution under which the king would be the symbolic head while real power was to be vested in "representatives of the people"). As late as I959,

a minor incident in the phu- ml bun style took place in Korat which cost several lives including that of a Thai district officer. Even more extraordinary, its leader laid claims to being a reincarnation of the revered and much more recent monarch, Chulalong- korn. 9

This incident took place during a period when Prime Minister Sarit was attempting to consolidate his dictatorial powers following a long rule by Prime Minister Phibun Songkram. And I know of at least two incidents that have occurred in NE Thailand since the October Revolution of I973 (when the military dictatorship was replaced by a parliamentary system of government). In both cases, people claiming to be incarnations of Ariya Maitreya have acquired followings, one in Ud6n province and the other Loei province." These incidents notwithstanding (and despite the persistence of a small, secular, insurrectionary movement that has existed since the late I950s), for most northeasterners during the past several decades, politics have been construed with reference to a system of centralized power legitimated by the monarchy.

Conclusions The theory of millennial movements with which I began this paper is based on two

fundamental premises: (i) that millennial movements emerge during a crisis centering

86 The connection between curing cults and political movements needs much more attention generally than it has received to date.

87 To-em, PI, vol. II, p. 55I. 88 Ibid., pp. 579-87. 89 Bunchuai, PIM, pp. 94, 96-98. 90Ishii (n. 35 above), p. I26; he has taken his

information from Thai Npi, NJyokratthamontrf khon thE ii kap 2 phu7nam patiwat ("The iith Prime Minister and three leaders of the coup d'etat") (Bangkok: Phrae Phitthaya, i964), pp. 546-49.

91 See note 29 above.




around conceptions of power, and (2) that such movements represent an ideological response formulated in the cultural terms with which that population is most familiar. I believe the question, raised by some, as to whether Theravada Buddhist beliefs are susceptible to millennial interpretation, is a false issue; not only can Buddhist beliefs be given millennial interpretations, they have in fact been thus interpreted in a number of Theravada Buddhist societies. The real importance of the discussion regarding the millennial interpretations of Buddhist beliefs, I feel, is that these interpretations throw into sharp relief a concern about power.

The case materials I chose for close scrutiny were drawn from the history of NE Thailand during the last years of the nineteenth century particularly, the years I90I-I902. There is little question, I believe, but that there was a crisis of power in the Thai northeast, which reached a climax in I902. This crisis had emerged, in part, because of the threat the expansion of French colonialism posed for Thailand, and, even more importantly, because of the reforms King Chulalongkorn had initiated to effect political centralization in Thailand. While economic concerns were not irrelevant to northeastern villagers in the early part of this century, these were, I maintain, secondary to political concerns. The reactions on the part of both the government and the peasantry were couched very much in political terms. Where economic concerns surfaced, they were mainly those centering around the economic demands placed by the government on the peasantry-that is, linked to the political economy rather than to the peasantry's system of production.

In the context of an acute political crisis, the peasantry of NE Thailand turned to ideas with which they were intimately familiar i.e., ideas derived from their Buddhist beliefs. These ideas provided the basis for a millennial movement of classical dimensions. The violent end of the millennial revolt of I90I-I902, and the subsequent slower pace of political change, did not lead to the elimination of millennial dispositions among the northeastern peasantry; incidents of millennialism have continued to occur. However, there was certainly a cultural change underway among the northeastern peasantry during the period between I902 and the late I930S. While a consideration of this cultural change lies beyond the scope of this paper, I would suggest that it was effected, at least in part, through the effective elimination of the power of the traditional elite by the I930s, through the full assimilation of the monks of the region into the Thai Sangha, and through the spread of mass education via curriculum constructed in the Thai Ministry of Education. For our purposes, we need only note that cultural change had occurred; by the late I930s, a significant segment of the peasantry-that is, some of its leaders-had available to them explanations other than those that could be derived from traditionally held Buddhist beliefs.

Millennialism is often viewed as being religious change. This view finds support in the fact that many millennial movements have assimilated, from diverse sources, beliefs that were not part of the religion that prevailed prior to the emergence of the movement, and in the fact that some millennial movements are transformed into new religions. These facts notwithstanding, I would insist that, by its very nature, millennialism can never itself be religious change; rather, millennialism as a religion is invariably a transitory phenomenon. Having said this, we cannot, however, simply dismiss millennialism as a pathological aberration. Millennialism is a symptom of profound social crisis that must be resolved if a society is to persist.

