Managing Integration: German and British PolicyResponses to the “Threat from Within” Post-2001

Anika Haverig

Published online: 19 June 2012# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract The involvement of European Muslims in violent events since 2001 hasconfronted European states with their alleged failure to adequately integrate migrant andethnic minority populations. More specifically, these events increased cultural andsecurity concerns associated with growing diversity and created a climate in which theissues of breaking up parallel societies, and, more explicitly, integrating Muslim minor-ity populations have become particularly pressing. As previous approaches aimed atincorporating migrants have been branded as a failure, many European governmentshave begun re-developing their policies on migrant incorporation, not least to mitigatethe potential "threat" posed by a lack of integration. This article focuses on German andBritish policy developments in the area of integration post-2001 and compares how thetwo states have responded to the alleged "threat from within".

Keywords Migrant integration policies . Community cohesion . De-radicalisation .

Comparative policy analysis . Germany . UK

The “Threat from Within”

Since 2001, various violent events involving Muslim minorities have confrontedWestern European governments with their alleged failure to adequately integratemigrant and minority populations. As a consequence of these events, previousapproaches to migrant incorporation, particularly the idea of multiculturalism, havebeen fundamentally criticised. With various announcements about the failure ofmulticulturalism (by key political figures such as German Chancellor Merkel, FrenchPresident Sarkozy and British PM, Cameron, among others) and conflicts involvingMuslim migrants in, for instance, France, The Netherlands, Denmark and the UK, the

Int. Migration & Integration (2013) 14:345–362DOI 10.1007/s12134-012-0245-5

A. Haverig (*)University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UKe-mail: ah313@kentforlife.net

issues of integrating this specific minority and promoting shared values and cohesionhave become particularly pressing for many governments in Western Europe.

The violent attacks of the last decade are not unprecedented: Al Qaeda’s lethal attackson US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998 offer examples of Islamic fundamen-talist terrorist activity before 2001. However, the involvement of European Muslims insuch acts of terror was, in fact, new and has triggered an increasing awareness of thepresence of a radical (albeit very small) Muslim minority in Western European states.The recognition that radical forms of Islam can be found “inside” rather than just“outside” European countries has prompted serious concern about religious diversityand, more specifically, home-grown violence or the “enemy within” (see Time Europe,31.10.2005). Subsequently, Muslim minorities have increasingly been problematisedas posing serious challenges to the cultural and social coherence of liberal Europeanstates. Political and public authorities are especially concerned that a lack of integra-tion and a sense of alienation may leave some Muslims more vulnerable to extremistideologies. These concerns have been nurtured by the significant rise in the attractionto Islamic fundamentalism currently evident among some second- and third-generation, native-language-speaking Muslim migrants (see Kepel 2004; Roy 2004).

In light of this trend, how do governments currently address issues surrounding“parallel societies” and the integration of (Muslim) minority populations? This articlecentres on the German and British policy landscapes and investigates how the two stateshaveresponded to recentallegations that theirmigrant incorporationstrategieshavefailed.It discusses changes toGerman andBritish policies surrounding integration and cohesionaswellasdeliberate statemeasuresdesignedtomanagediversity implementedsince2001.Ultimately, the article illustrates that, despite similar concern about cultural diversity, thetwo states differ significantly in their approaches to dealingwith the “threat fromwithin”.

A German–British Comparison

In response to the violent events post-2001 and given the perceived need for astronger sense of unity (Parekh 2008), some European governments have redefinedtheir policies on managing diverse populations to achieve more cohesive societies,which are allegedly less prone to anti-modern, anti-Western ways of thought.1 Theseobjectives have also dominated public and political discourses in Germany and theUK during the last decade. With explicit involvement of Muslim residents or citizensin recent acts of terrorism, officials in both states have been grappling with the issueof improving the levels of integration, especially in relation to their Muslim popula-tions. Mohammad Atta, for instance, a key figure in planning the 9/11 attacks, hadlived in Hamburg, Germany, for several years, where he developed the “Hamburgcell”, a group of radical Islamists that included several 9/11 key operatives. Subse-quently, violent events in other European states and attempted train bombings inGermany in July 2006 intensified security concerns and heightened the debate aboutintegration, with a specific focus on Muslims. In the UK, concerns about Muslim

1 Notably, The Netherlands pioneered with a change in policies in the 1990s: They reversed theirmulticultural policies into an official monoculturalism via the policy of ‘obligatory integration’ (Joppkeand Morawska 2003: 15).

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extremism have already been in the public eye since the “Rushdie Affair” in 1989. Yet,the country’s more alarming experiencewithMuslim violence is linked to the urban riotsin Northern cities in 2001, which triggered immense debate about marginalised minoritygroups. Existing concern associated with British Muslims was then heightened by theLondon bombings in 2005 and the realisation that the perpetrators were Muslimextremists who had lived, and grown up, in the UK; they were “home-grown” terrorists.

In both states, current discourses about integration are fundamentally intertwinedwith policies addressing citizenship. On a national level, the integrative value offormal citizenship has been recognised, and both states have recently reframed theirnaturalisation regulations to include requirements that allegedly foster feelings ofbelonging: In addition to a number of formal requirements, such as minimumresidence time, aspiring German and British citizens (and permanent residents) nowalso have to meet “civic integration requirements” and demonstrate sufficient knowl-edge of the national language and life in the respective country.2 But recent govern-ment efforts aimed at managing diversity significantly move beyond formalcitizenship and also focus on cultural integration.

Why compare policy changes inGermany and theUK?The two states are very similarin some respects—they are highly industrialised, democratic states, which display manysimilaritieswith regards to political, economic, social and cultural characteristics. In otherrespects, theyare sharply different:Despite somesimilarities in termsof large-scale ethnicminority immigration in the post-war period, both countries have generated differentapproaches addressing the incorporation of migrants. These differences are conditionedby the specific historical contexts in which immigration took place, distinct citizenshipregimes and particularmodes of handlingmulticultural diversity (Joppke 1999). It is theideological variation in their previous approaches to migrant incorporation that formsan important criterion for a comparison of these two cases.

Foreign labour recruitment and policies ensuring family reunification in the secondhalf of the twentieth century have laid important foundations for the growth ofminority communities in Germany and the UK. Post-WWII, both states encouragedimmigration in order to tackle labour shortages during times of economic recovery. Inthe UK, this development was marked by an inflow of colonial migrants, who heldthe status of ‘subjects of the Crown’ (which was very similar to citizenship) and wereentitled to live and work in the UK permanently (Joppke 1999). Germany, bycomparison, was characterised by a guest-worker regime that recruited labourmigrants to temporarily contribute to the German economy. A dominant sourcecountry of these guest-workers was Turkey, and many of them were Muslims.Although the logic of the guest-worker regime did not envisage the permanent stayof migrant workers, many of them did settle permanently; today, they form the basisof a large share of Germany’s foreign—and Muslim—population.

Compared with the UK, Germany provides a contrasting case of a non-colonialpower and a nation in which membership has long (and predominantly) been definedby common blood. Despite being one of the world’s largest immigrant-receivingcountries (Joppke 1999), Germany has been reluctant to accept the reality of perma-nent immigration and did not view itself as a country of immigration until the late

2 These changes to the naturalisation requirements are discussed in more depth elsewhere (e.g. Etzioni2007; van Oers 2010).

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1990s—while, in fact, the country’s foreign population steadily increased since the1950s (Brubaker 1992). Yet, the return of approximately 12 million war expellees andtheir descendants mainly from Eastern Europe after 1945 was explicitly not perceivedas immigration, but as return migration of ethnic Germans. This perception was inline with the political self-understanding as not a country of immigration. Similarly,the guest-workers who came from the mid-1950s onwards were not considered to bepermanent migrants, but temporary guests; the emphasis on the temporariness of thisform of migration made the continuation of the scheme possible. This denial ofGermany’s migration reality effectively led to the absence of a coherent integrationpolicy. Notably, however, conscious of its Nazi history, the state did not requiremigrants to shed any cultural distinctiveness by assimilating to German culture. Inaddition, they were granted extensive civil and social, yet no political, rights, as mostmigrants were denied German citizenship. Following a change in government in1998, though, Germany accepted its immigration reality and started to address theintegration of permanent migrants and their descendants.

Britain, by comparison, historically espoused a form of multiculturalism as anofficial political doctrine and adopted a ‘live and let live’ view of its post-colonialmigrants. It enabled them to formally become members of British society, whilemaintaining their distinct ethnic identities. To achieve this, the British governmentenacted a series of group-differentiated rights and race relations legislations, whichwere committed to the principle of anti-discrimination and the protection ethnic andcultural difference (see Solomos 2003).3 Now, however, Britain is questioning thepotential ills of its political multiculturalism. In light of recent events, widespreadnational discourses suggest that this political ideology has gone too far, to thedetriment of a ‘core’ British culture (Mirza et al. 2007; Phillips 2005).

Despite their previous ideological variations in managing diversity, Germany andthe UK currently share their concern about the marginalisation of Muslim migrantpopulations. They have recognised the failure to appropriately accommodate migrantcommunities and encourage their inclusion into the mainstream. This failure mani-fests itself, for instance, in the disadvantaged socio-economic status of a large shareof the two countries’ Muslim populations.

Britain’s Muslim population is a lot more diverse than Germany’s; the membershave their roots in various former UK colonies. Yet, as the majority of BritishMuslims is comprised of Muslims with a Pakistani (43%) and Bangladeshi back-ground (16%) (Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2004), information about theiroverall socio-economic situation can be derived from figures relating to these twogroups. Britain’s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities face serious socio-economic disadvantages: They are characterised by disproportionately lower ratesof participation in higher and further education and constitute the largest group ofyoung people without any educational qualification (ONS 2006). This underachieve-ment leaves them with poor conditions for their participation in the labour market:Britain’s Muslims are, by far, the most disadvantaged faith group in the British labourmarket, as they have disproportionately higher unemployment rates than any othergroup (men, 13%; women, 18% (ONS 2004)). A particular concern in the context of

3 This approach to managing diversity via legal recognition of racial, religious and cultural needs verymuch aligns itself with multiculturalism as theorised by Kymlicka (1995) and Taylor (1994).

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an increasing alienation amongst young Muslims is the alarmingly high unemploy-ment rate of those aged 16 to 24 years: at 28%, they were twice as likely to beunemployed than Christians of this age group (ONS 2004). These figures areindicative of young Muslims’ risk of social exclusion, as education and employmentremain key to integration and participation in society.

A similar picture can be painted for Muslims in Germany: They are gener-ally characterised by lower levels of education and higher rates of unemploy-ment (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007). This overall disadvantage is fundamentallyshaped by the socio-economic situation of Muslims of Turkish origin, the largestgroup among Germany’s Muslim population. While Muslim migrants originatingfrom Iran, Central Asia and Southeast Asia reveal, for instance, relatively good levelsof school-leaving qualifications (Haug et al. 2009), those of Turkish origin dispro-portionately often take positions on the “edge” of society; they have the lowest levelsof education and income and higher unemployment rates (19%) than any other group(Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). Recently, a study on the state of integration inGermany by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2009a) confirmedthat Turkish migrants (and especially the second and third generation) constitute themost disadvantaged group of all migrants in Germany, with school drop-outs, lowereducational achievement, and higher unemployment rates. In light of these ‘dramatic’results, Integration Minister Böhmer called for a redefinition of integration policies(Spiegel Online 26.01.2009).

Before detailing to what extent Böhmer’s call found concrete implementation inGermany, the article discusses two major government initiatives that have restruc-tured the British policy environment: The development of the British cohesion-agenda and the “Preventing Violent Extremism” programme (PVE).

New British Policy Agendas: Community Cohesion and De-radicalisation

The UK had adopted multiculturalism as the political solution to migrant incorpora-tion more than four decades ago and, since then, portrayed itself as a society that haspositively embraced respect for diversity. As noted, there were no assumptions thatcultural affiliations had to be dropped as minorities settled in the UK, and there hasbeen substantial legal accommodation of various religious and ethnic requirements.In 2001, however, Britain experienced a shift away from its “celebration of diversity”following the urban unrests, in which young men, predominantly Muslims of Pak-istani and Bangladeshi origin, played a central role.

These riots threw a different light on Britain’s multicultural race relations.They triggered a series of official reports investigating the nature of therelationship between British majority and minority populations, the most prom-inent of which was the Cantle Report on Community Cohesion (Home Office2001), a government-commissioned investigation chaired by Ted Cantle. In theirreport, the Cantle team portrayed a situation of extreme racial segregation, which ledthem to conclude that ‘many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallellives’ (Home Office 2001: 9). The lack of cohesion was traced back to multiculturalpolicies, which had allegedly encouraged separateness rather than a common sense ofbelonging. Consequently, Cantle stressed the urgent need to promote community

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cohesion, which then became the government’s new and practical approach to dealingwith diversity.

Community Cohesion—the “New” Multiculturalism?

The idea of “community cohesion” currently dominates British discourses on integra-tion and diversity and seems to have replaced Britain’s multicultural ideology, at leastrhetorically. Following the publication of the Cantle report, there has been an increasingemphasis on how to promote more cohesive communities, based upon shared values,through national policies. Against the backdrop of its increasing relevance post-2001,there have been several attempts to formally define the term “community cohesion”.While it still remains a somewhat vague concept, various definitions draw on the keyelements of a shared sense of belonging, unity and respect for liberal democratic values.Furthermore, the concept also entails a ‘common vision’ and the development of ‘strongand positive relationships’ within and between communities (Local GovernmentAssociation 2002: 6), which had not been strongly emphasised in Britain’s multi-cultural past. At the early stages, however, official recommendations for practicalaction were loose, and it was the responsibility of local cohesion units to developspecific strategies to improve the situation in their localities. It was only after theLondon bombings in 2005 that the government significantly stepped up efforts topromote cohesion. As the 07/07 attacks intensified existing concern about (manyMuslims’) segregation, political reactions to these events mark a more obvious turn instate initiatives, and rhetoric, away from the celebration of diversity.

Most notably, following 07/07, when the distinctiveness of British commu-nities was predominantly constructed in terms of faith, community cohesionwas an attempt to bridge different faiths and create a situation in whichminorities are loyal to the UK and British norms and values, independent of,or in addition to, their religious identities. This intention guided the implemen-tation of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) in 2006, a fixedterm independent advisory body, set up to explore how to successfully promotea shared sense of belonging, while respecting differences. This objective echoesthe idea of communities, which have developed the form of ‘social capital’ thatPutnam (1995, 2007) considers to be essential for cohesion, mutual trust andsolidarity amongst ethnically diverse groups.

Although the establishment of the CIC was very much a response to the events of07/07, its members take an approach to cohesion as pertinent to the entire Britishpopulation. They stress the need to make integration and cohesion ‘everybody’sbusiness’ (CIC 2007: 39) and take into account the increasing complexity of Britishcommunities, rather than focusing on one problematically perceived (minority)group. By emphasising Britain’s increasing complexity as a reason for furtherdeveloping the concept of community cohesion, they diminish the relevance of eventssuch as 07/07 for these changes—at least in official discourses.

Notably, the CIC (2007) introduced a clear distinction between integration andcohesion but simultaneously acknowledged that the two processes are fundamentallyintertwined, as integration allegedly contributes to cohesion by ensuring that allmembers of society adjust to one another. This understanding clearly marks a stepaway from the UK’s political multiculturalism, which did not require any adjustments

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from distinct cultural groups. In 2008, the Department for Communities and LocalGovernment (DCGL) (2008: 10) reinforced this relationship between integration andcohesion and stated that integration was a key contributor to social cohesion. TheDCLG then conceptualised community cohesion as the successful development of ashared feeling of belonging amongst both the settled majority and migrant commu-nities and the adherence to common values, moral principles and codes of behaviour.It is the increasing emphasis on integration, commonality and shared citizenship thatdistinguishes the core concept of community cohesion from Britain’s multiculturalideology. In this way, community cohesion can be interpreted as a further develop-ment of Britain’s multiculturalism.

In its final report ‘Our shared future’, the CIC proposes a range of practical actionsto improve integration and cohesion in Britain. In general, the cohesion agendastrongly focuses on local level action, the need to take into account distinct localchallenges and build empowered local communities. Accordingly, the CIC’s recom-mendations focus on providing ‘practical approaches to building communities' owncapacity to reduce tensions and create opportunities for more integrated and cohesivesocieties’ (CIC 2007). The CIC suggests that local authorities should identify local(integration) issues and then develop targeted interventions, rather than followingnational policy guidelines, which may be irrelevant to their specific needs. Localgovernments are also encouraged to “reach out” to their communities, offer oppor-tunities for people to establish connections to their locality and, ultimately, develop alocal sense of belonging or citizenship. Here, rather than viewing citizenship asmerely a formal form of national membership, the Commission (2007) particularlyemphasises the local sense of it. According to the CIC, the sense of citizenship both atnational and local levels and the understanding of corresponding rights and respon-sibilities need to be strengthened—and this objective shapes their practicalrecommendations.

Some of the CIC’s recommendations are of very practical nature, such as the proposalfor a ‘nationally sponsored ‘Community Week’, with a focus on celebrating all com-munities’ (CIC 2007: 110). This is presented as an opportunity for ‘individual faithand other groups to open their doors to each other. Alternatively, the Commission(2007: 114) suggests running ‘inexpensive neighbours’ events such as street parties,garden fetes or jumble sales’ or implementing a ‘national school twinningprogramme’. However, these suggestions are only recommendations for action tobe developed at local authorities’ discretion. Local councils need to develop concreteinitiatives and, most importantly, fund their implementation. Therefore, not all therecommendations made by the CIC have been implemented in practice—and thecohesion agenda has sometimes remained a rhetorical concept.4

Extending the Cohesion-Agenda: Preventing Violent Extremism

The events of 07/07 were arguably the point when the British cohesion agenda wasextended by an anti-extremism and de-radicalisation dimension. Following the

4 Since the publication of “Our shared future”, the government has taken some action in the area ofcommunity cohesion on a national level: The Education and Inspections Act of 2006, for example,introduced the duty for schools to promote cohesion and a sense of shared values amongst all pupils.

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bombings, the government increasingly communicated concerns about the lack ofcohesion in relation to the radicalisation of young people. Due to a more severe threatlevel post-07/07, the government revised its counter terrorism strategy CONTEST,which was initially established in 2003 in response to the 9/11 attacks. In theirrevision, they placed a strong emphasis on the Prevent-strand of the strategy and,more specifically, the PVE or “Prevent” programme.

The development of PVE over the last years indicates the importance the govern-ment ascribes to the prevention of extremism. Having recognised the importance of acommunity based approach to countering violent extremism, the government utilisesPrevent to respond directly to the factors that draw people to violent extremism (HMGovernment 2009). More specifically, PVE was designed to counter the threat ofIslamic extremism and promote the development of moderate Muslim communities.In light of its explicit focus on Muslims, Kundnani (2009: 8) critically labelled PVEthe government’s new ‘Islam-policy’.

As part of Prevent, the government liaises with local Muslim partners to challengeextremist ideologies and support individuals that are prone to being targeted by violentextremists. Accordingly, PVE contains a range of practical measures to improve com-munity resilience to extremism and to counter the radicalisation of young people. Theidea of building more resilient communities clearly echoes some objectives of thecohesion agenda. This suggests that Prevent is part of an emerging set of discoursesthat move beyond isolated community cohesion and security agendas and aim to reducethe risk of home-grown terrorism and extremism, while also improving cohesion. As percohesion programmes, PVE stresses the integral part that local communities play intackling extremist views. As radicalisation is thought to take place at the local level (Roy2008), local public services and practitioners play a key role in delivering PVEprogrammes designed to empower local communities, increase their resilience toextremism and enable them to unite around ‘shared values’.

Totalling a budget of £140 million in 2008/09 (HM Government 2009), PVE isone of the government’s largest funding streams. The main strand of funding isadministered by the DCLG, which provides money for local authorities, who thendecide on the allocation to local groups for the delivery of concrete measures. Theprogramme’s explicit focus on Muslims is very evident in the distribution of funding,which is directly ‘based on the size of local Muslim communities’ (HM Government2008: 49). This rationale for funding allocations offers huge potential to be criticised:On the one hand, the distribution of resources may be perceived as unfair by non-Muslim communities; on the other hand, many Muslim communities feel unfairlystigmatised. In light of funding allocation in direct proportion to the size of a region’sMuslim population, but independent of any difficulties experienced with local Mus-lims, Kundnani (2009: 6) harshly criticises PVE for its construction of Britain’sMuslim population as a ‘suspect community’. Similar criticism is voiced by a numberof Islamic groups, such as the An-Nisa Society (Khan 2009), as well as in media andacademic discourses.5

Due to this stigmatisation, some Muslim communities and organisations refusePVE funding and reject the programme altogether. By focusing de-radicalisation

5 Due to limitations set by an article-length piece of work, criticisms levelled at PVE are only sketchedhere. For a detailed discussion, see Kundnani (2009), Khan (2009), Stevens (2009).

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measures primarily on Muslim communities, PVE reinforces and actively encouragesprejudice towards Muslims; furthermore, it may (and does) effectively contribute to asense of alienation amongst some Muslims. Thus, what was initially designed as away of “reaching out” to Muslim communities does not have the desired, but evenopposing, effects, as PVE ‘fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves andbetween Muslims and others’ (Kundnani 2009: 8). In fact, by emphasising thedichotomy between “them” and “us”, rather than the idea of an integrated society,Prevent does not support, but undermine, the cohesion agenda. It also contradicts therecommendations made by the CIC and runs counter cohesion-policies’ non-ethnic,but generic focus. In this sense, Prevent does more harm than good to the relationshipit seeks to strengthen.

Officially, Prevent and community cohesion are two different strategies, withoverlapping, but distinct agendas. While community cohesion is about bringingcommunities together, Prevent is a targeted approach to building resilience to ex-tremist messages at a community level. However, due to the considerable commonground between the PVE and cohesion agendas, the two strategies cannot always beclearly separated. In practice, for instance, they are often blended together, as localcohesion units are responsible for implementing PVE locally. Moreover, in officialdiscourses, they are presented as mutually dependent, as, allegedly, a ‘community inwhich extremism is challenged builds relationships that increase community cohesionand racial equality. Equally, a community that is cohesive is likely to be more resilientto extremists who seek to divide it’ (Leicester Partnership Team 2010). In light of thecriticism levelled at PVE, however, it is uncertain whether the two initiatives alwayssupport one another. By merging the two strategies, programmes aimed at buildingcohesion obtain a securitisation dimension, which may result in their rejection. Toavoid this, then-shadow Communities Secretary Caroline Spelman called for acomplete review of Prevent in 2010, ‘with an emphasis on removing the confusionbetween counter-terrorism and cohesion work’ (in BBC News 30.03.2010). Indeed,the coalition government published a review of the Prevent Strategy in June 2011;however, the revised version does not seem to address the criticisms levelled at PVEand, in essence, the focus on Muslims, securitisation, and de-radicalisation remained.

In sum, the policies discussed here suggest a major change in British governmentrhetoric surrounding cultural diversity. They indicate that the British government nowfeels the need to shape the development of their communities to achieve morecohesion and break up the structures of parallel societies. These objectives alsodominate the integration debate in Germany. Yet, the ways in which the need tointegrate migrant communities is conceptualised in Germany differ significantly.

Germany: A New Country of Integration

Following decades of its official denial, the newly elected Schröder-governmentfinally acknowledged Germany’s immigration reality in 1998 and initiated a reformof the country’s immigration and integration regime, which was finalised with theCitizenship Act of 2000. Concurrently, the government installed the independentCommission on Migration (chaired by Rita Süssmuth) to develop some direction forfuture immigration and integration policies. In comparison to the UK, where changes

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to the integration regime were initially triggered by the “negative” experience of thenorthern riots, the launch of this Commission had positive connotations: In light ofthe acceptance of the country’s immigration reality, the Commission was tasked withaddressing previous integration shortcomings. Despite this distinct context, the Com-mission echoed British officials when they declared the ultimate goal to combatsegregation and ‘improve the co-existence of Germans and immigrants to Germany’(Independent Commission on Migration to Germany 2001: 1)—yet, the securitydimension, central to British discourses, was absent at this stage. While Britishofficials were motivated by a sense of urgency to address the conditions that led tothe northern riots, the Süßmuth-Commission merely made theoretical recommenda-tions, stressing the need to “manage” immigration and integration to Germany. Whilethey set the new integration agenda in Germany, practical measures were notimplemented until 2005.

Subsequently, a practical step towards improving migrant integration was madethrough the redefinition of Germany’s legal residence and citizenship requirementsvia the Immigration Act of 2005, which contains several provisions for integrationmeasures—such as the implementation of “integration courses”. These courses arebased on the assumption that speaking the national language is key for successful(structural and social) integration—and, in the long run, social cohesion. They consistof two elements, with language instruction playing a dominant role: Applicants forpermanent residence and citizenship are required to take up to 900 h of Germanlanguage and 45 h of civics instruction to become familiar with basic values such astolerance, equal rights and freedom of speech or worship.6 By providing suchintensive language and civics instruction for migrants, the government aims to enablethem ‘to make themselves understood in everyday situations and to become morefamiliar with German society’ (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2010). Theimportance of this objective is reflected in the amount of funding made available forthese courses: In 2005, the government invested €208 million in integration courses,while this was reduced to approximately €175 million in 2009, the financial supportis still substantial (Die Bundesregierung 2009). The strong emphasis on the acquisi-tion of language skills aligns itself with the more general focus of Germany’sintegration agenda on education. Also, it seems to be targeted to the problemsexperienced by a substantial share of Germany’s migrant population.

Securitisation of the German Integration Agenda?

After 2005, German integration discourses obtained a new dimension through thecentral task of fighting extremism and terrorism and promoting adherence to liberaldemocratic norms and values. Similar to British officials, the German Office forMigration and Refugees stressed the need to counteract extremism and radicalisationthrough prevention. Yet, while they do not specify the sort of extremism that needs tobe prevented, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für

6 Initially, the new legislation only required applicants for permanent residence to take up to 600 h oflanguage and 30 h of civics instruction. Following a substantial review of the integration courses in 2006,the hours for both elements were increased; the government also introduced a financial incentive forpassing the final test of the course within 2 years (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2010).Furthermore, the legislation was extended to also include aspiring citizens.

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Verfassungsschutz (BfV) 2007) is more explicit about the need to tackle Islamistextremism. The Office (2007: 4) considers the existence of Muslim in parallelsocieties to be especially alarming, as this sort of ethnic-religious seclusion may‘cause the development of countercultures opposing the concept of an open society’.The fear of countercultures calls for the need to combat parallel societies via betterintegration, as integration deficits can be seen as motivational factors for radical-isation. The assumed link between successful integration and the prevention ofextremism echoes official British concerns. However, even though Muslims areimplicitly constructed as the focal point of the current integration debate, the BfV(2007: 3) strongly emphasises that it is not possible to draw ‘(a) simple causal chainof “integration deficiencies—parallel society—Islamist/Islamist terrorism”’.

It is important to note, that, while the BfV clearly identifies the importance ofintegration in light of a potential radicalisation, the Office is essentially concernedwith security and not the development of integration policies. While there is someindication that the government needs to establish effective laws to prevent extremismthrough integration, the security dimension does not dominate German integrationdiscourses and, at least in official rhetoric, these agendas remain largely separate.Instead, a key element of the German integration agenda is the idea of empowermentthrough education.

Integration: Empowerment and Participation

German integration discourses significantly centre on the importance of educa-tion, which is considered to be a key requirement for successful participation insocial, political and economic life. Accordingly, integration policies seem to bebased on the premise that migrants need to be empowered to equally participatein society. Defining education and professional training as central elements ofthe integration agenda very much aligns itself with the structural disadvantagesexperienced by many of Germany’s (Muslim) migrants (and the second andthird generation). Furthermore, the importance of education for the integrationprocess was recently reinforced by the Berlin Institute for Population andDevelopment (2009b: 5), which studied the current state of integration in Germanyand concluded that ‘(w)ithout sufficient education, integration is virtually ruled out’.This conclusion aligns itself with the SINUS-Sociovision migrant milieu study of2009 (Sinus Institut 2009) and the 2000-PISA study (Stanat et al. 2002). In particular,the results of the PISA study imply that German language deficits and a low socio-economic status are decisive factors contributing to Turkish children’s below averageeducational performance, which, then, continues through their professional lives andendangers their social integration. In these respects, the background of the guest-worker regime is still relevant, as it specifically focused on the recruitment of low orunskilled workers. For some, their low socio-economic status still has repercussionson their children’s (and grandchildren’s) lives. This suggests that the fundamentalproblems of Turkish migrants in Germany are (cumulatively) rooted in social dis-crimination, disenfranchisement and a lack of economic and structural integration—not religion. The government specifically aims to tackle these structural deficits anddisadvantages, not least to prevent the development of social and emotional segmen-tation amongst Turks, which may leave them vulnerable to radical ideologies. In this

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sense, the desire for security can be interpreted as one aspect shaping integrationpolicy. Yet, the security dimension is less overtly articulated than in the UK.

Since the need for more deliberate and proactive integration measures has beenrecognised and the situation of migrants was made a top political concern, intensify-ing and establishing dialogue with (Muslim) minorities has been given priority.Particularly noteworthy for the development of German integration policies are the“Integration Summits” and the National Integration Plan (NIP). These measuresillustrate that Germany’s new “era of integration” is characterised by dialogue and‘speaking with’ rather than about migrants.

Making an “Integration Plan”

The first Integration Summit, held in July 2006, can be seen as a symbolic event,signalling the changing integration paradigm in Germany and the need for moreintegration efforts. The Summit was the result of Merkel’s call for more concreteintegration measures and formed the kick-off for the development of the NIP, whicharticulates clear goals and specific measures to improve migrant integration inGermany.

As integration was defined as an interdisciplinary task, the participants of the firstSummit comprised of a number of integration experts as well as a diverse range ofrepresentatives of official federal and local administration offices, political, migrant,welfare and sports organisations, industry and religious associations and the media.This composition very much aligned itself with the basic principle of Germany’sintegration approach, according to which integration cannot be imposed from above,but must be negotiated in cooperation with migrants. Following a general stocktakingof the integration situation in Germany, which highlighted existing deficits, theSummit’s participants developed the NIP, which was presented at the second Summitin 2007. To improve the levels of integration in the future, the Plan calls for acollaboration of the federal government, the 16 state governments, local authorities,foundations and different umbrella organisations in migrant communities. Fundedwith an annual amount of roughly €750 million, it represents Germany’s firstdialogue-oriented integration strategy.

The recommendations for action compiled in the NIP predominantly centreon the four thematic areas of ‘language support’, ‘integration into the work-place’, ‘education’ and ‘social integration’ (Federal Office for Migration andRefugees 2007). Accordingly, many initiatives outlined in the NIP specificallyattempt to address educational deficits and enhance migrants’ capacities, in particularwith respect to language. This special focus is very much influenced by studiesindicating the key role of language skills for successful (structural) integration.According to German Sociologist Esser (2006), for example, language is crucial forthe integration process, as it enables mutual understanding, participation in societyand educational success. Similarly, Dustmann (1997) and Haug (2006) have providedevidence for the strong links between language skills and other dimensions of theintegration process, such as the educational system, the labour market and socialnetworks.

The strong focus on language provision manifests itself in a range of programmesthat promote German language acquisition and offer support to do so. Many of these

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programmes specifically focus on children, as it is considered to be crucial to supportlanguage acquisition ‘right from the start’ (The Federal Government 2007: 47). Thus,as part of the NIP, language programmes were successfully implemented in child carecentres, pre-schools and schools to also enable those children who do not speakGerman at home ‘to have intense interaction with the German language’ (The FederalGovernment 2007: 48). In light of the vital importance of language skills foreducational and professional success, speaking German empowers these children toshape their educational and professional careers. Yet, such language programmes arenot only designed for migrant children; some initiatives also specifically target theirparents. The programme “Mama lernt deutsch” (Mum is learning German), forinstance, which was successfully established in various German cities, explicitlytargets migrant mothers. Learning German does not only enable them to supporttheir children, it simultaneously empowers these women, offers opportunities tointeract and socialise with others and increases their chances for participation insociety. Through the lens of Smith (2001) and Anderson (1991), improving migrants’language skills can be seen as a way to remove markers of difference and encouragefeelings of commonality as well as national identity. In this sense, initiatives offeringlanguage support both empower individual migrants and support the development ofstronger, cohesive nations.

The specific initiatives outlined in the NIP very well illustrate that integration isapproached on all levels of society, with a number of different actors. In addition tothe commitments made by the federal and state governments, the NIP also containscommitments made by welfare organisations and foundations, which implementededucational programmes offering various forms of tuition to support children with amigration background. Other programmes initiated through the NIP move away fromthe aspect of education and focus on migrants’ social integration, such as the initiative“integration through sports”, which is run by the German Olympic Sports Confeder-ation. As part of this programme, various sports associations and clubs offer activitiesspecifically designed to counteract ethnic isolation. This specific strand of the NIPreflects the understanding of sport as an important catalyst for integration, as it bringspeople together and breaks up language and social barriers as well as culturalprejudice. In addition, it is thought to create long-term integration structures andincrease the acceptance of values such as tolerance and respect, both of which areessential in diverse societies.

Yet, not all of the NIP’s recommendations are as tangible and well devel-oped; in fact, many of the recommendations made in the NIP have not beenimplemented in practice, mainly because questions as to how they can befinanced remain open. The lack of actual achievements and concrete plans forfunding are important criticisms levelled at Germany’s new integration policy.Furthermore, even though the Integration Summits and the NIP are officiallycommunicated as ways of reaching out to migrants, they have been criticisedby various Turkish and Muslim associations as a form of top-down govern-mental control. This perception is in stark opposition to the sort of dialoguethat is presented in government discourses.

Although these initiatives mark a new era of German integration policy, it isquestionable—especially in light of the insecure funding situation—whether theyresult in significant changes to the “integration reality” or whether they are mainly a

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symbolic demonstration of the willingness to integrate migrants. Unfortunately,neither the NIP nor the representatives of the Integration Summit suggest any waysof measuring the success of these initiatives.

Conclusion: Two Ways of Tackling a Threat

Post-2001, amid growing concern about ethnic marginalisation and radicalisation, theGerman and British governments initiated a number of measures aimed at breakingup parallel societies and integrating (Muslim) migrant communities. As an importantcongruence, both governments now increasingly regard the cultural integration oftheir migrant populations as of real importance and prioritise achieving an “integrat-ed” or “cohesive” society. This re-conceptualisation can be interpreted as a responseto the “threat from within”, as it was shaped by the explicit involvement of EuropeanMuslim residents or citizens in violent events since 2001. Yet, as illustrated above, thetwo states’ proactive measures to promote integration and cohesion differ sharply.

While German authorities stepped up programmes to improve migrant integrationvia, for instance, compulsory “integration courses” and other strategies aimed atfacilitating a better structural integration of their migrants, improving the levels of“community cohesion” has become an overtly articulated political priority in the UK.As an important change in British policies and government rhetoric, the dominantmulticultural discourses were quickly replaced with an increasing emphasis onmanaging diversity and developing commonality and a shared sense of belonging.Yet, while the framework of community cohesion has been gradually developed since2001, practical policy formulations have not been as concrete. Instead, the Britishgovernment placed substantial emphasis on local level action (to be developed atlocal authorities’ discretion) to knit the social fabric crucial for cohesive localcommunities.

Following 07/07, the British government extended the cohesion-agenda andplaced increasing emphasis on the need to prevent extremism, in particular, amongstBritain’s Muslim population. Policy efforts in the UK have since become successive-ly infused with a strong notion of de-radicalisation, whereas the focus in Germanyremained on developing workable integration programmes and empowering migrantsvia education. However, in light of the actual experience of home-grown violence (inthe form of the northern riots) and terrorism by second generation Muslim migrantson British soil, security concerns are, in fact, more pressing in the UK than inGermany, which has not experienced the same sort of domestic problems with itsMuslim population. These distinct experiences legitimise differences in their politicalapproaches—at least to some extent.

When assessing the two states’ perception of threat and fear of extremism thathave guided policy developments, it is also important to take into account the differ-ences of their Muslim populations. The profile of the majority of Germany’s Muslimpopulation is very different to that of those young Muslims that have been radicalisedin the UK. As Jasch (2007: 367) notes, ‘(t)he majority of Germany’s Muslims areconsidered as religious moderates, since the majority of the Turkish and YugoslavMuslims have traditionally not been drawn to radical forms of Islam’. Furthermore,most terrorist suspects in Germany tended to be either of Arab origin or German

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converts. Thus, unlike British Muslims, German Muslims are not problematised aslatent extremists and a potential radicalisation of Muslims is not the primary chal-lenge in Germany. Against the British experience, where mixing the cohesion and de-radicalisation agendas was essentially counter-productive, this clear separation seemsbeneficial, especially for the perception of integration strategies by migrants.

The differences in the German and British approaches to integrating migrantpopulations indicate that the two governments focus on distinct sorts of “capital”:British initiatives and programmes are strongly infused with notions of Putnam’s(1995) social capital. In line with Putnam’s understanding, the British governmenthas initiated programmes that allegedly support the development of forms of capital,which enable local communities to benefit from diversity and manage any tensions itmay cause. This particular focus of British policies stems directly from the difficultiesthe state has experienced with (Muslim) migrant populations since 2001, the con-clusions of the Cantle Commission, and the recognition that the 07/07 bombers were“home-grown”. It seems, however, as though increasing concern about radicalisationand the prevailing problematisation of Muslims as potentially dangerous havedeflected attention from actual problems with respect to their educational and struc-tural integration (which is in keeping with the depoliticisation of political problems).

While British initiatives prioritise aspects related to de-radicalisation over theimprovement of existing educational and professional deficits amongst Britain’sMuslim population, German initiatives seem to specifically address the pressing issueof many Muslims’ socio-economic exclusion. The policy focus on empowermentthrough education and training suggests a greater alignment with Bourdieu’s ideasabout educational qualifications as a form of institutionalised cultural capital essentialfor determining (and improving) one’s life chances (Bourdieu 1984). Against thisbackdrop, enhancing migrants’ capacities (supported by the government) seems to bea reasonable strategy to improve structural integration, break up ethnic isolation and,ultimately, achieve a more integrated society. The focus on this sort of capital can beexplained with the country’s failure to adequately address migrant incorporation inthe past and the legacy of the guest-worker regime. As noted, guest-workers werelargely low-skilled, and there was great class homogeneity among them. With itsemphasis on education, the German approach to integration is, thus, geared towardsthe needs of a great share of the country’s migrant (as well as second- and third-generation) population. The specific emphasis on language as part of German inte-gration efforts can also be explained with its central importance for the nation-building process. Unlike in Germany, language acquisition is of comparatively littlerelevance in the UK, as most post-war migrants came from former colonies, whichgave them a language advantage.

While the political structure in the UK allows for a nationwide approach tointegration and community cohesion, Germany’s national government is constrainedon this matter due to its federal structure. Policies on, for instance, education areimplemented on the Länder, and not the federal state level. Thus, national policiessuch as the NIP offer guidance and a framework for what is decided within individualLänder, but they are not binding for all of Germany. Therefore, what is implementedon the local level does not, as in the UK, mainly depend on local councils and acentral government department but also on individual Länder governments, whichmay vary significantly in their political. As all Länder were involved in the

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development of the NIP, however, we can expect relative convergence in the ways inwhich integration strategies based on the NIP are implemented locally.

Despite what seem to be similar problems at the outset, the two countries devel-oped distinct approaches to dealing with the alleged crisis of integration. Even thoughinitiatives aimed at developing migrants’ educational capacities are not stronglyemphasised in the UK, they could possibly offer plausible alternatives to tacklingthe de facto marginalisation, disengagement and disenfranchisement of some Britishmigrant populations, as they are still affected by barriers to successful structuralintegration. As social exclusion in the form of higher levels of poverty and unem-ployment is thought to be a contributing factor to making people vulnerable toextremist ideologies, it seems relevant to also address these issues, rather than de-coupling the extremism element from integration problems. Nevertheless, this sug-gestion is only derived from reactions to policies in Germany and the UK. “Bestpractice” strategies, however, cannot be shared yet, as, so far, neither country hasdeveloped strategies to assess the effectiveness of their initiatives. It is, therefore, nowa key challenge for both states—as well as other European nations that are experi-encing similar problems—to develop such strategies, which, ultimately, allow for thedevelopment of well-grounded integration programmes.

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