the german problem then and now. from the threat of a 'german europe' to the edification of a...

8/8/2019 The German Problem Then and Now. From the Threat of a 'German Europe' to the Edification of a European Germ

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ROMANIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, I, 2, 2009

THE GERMAN PROBLEMTHEN AND NOW: FROM THE

THREAT OF A GERMAN EUROPE TO THE EDIFICATION OF A

EUROPEAN GERMANY

Emanuel Copila*

Abstract

As Thomas Mann argued about postwar Germany, its future depended on its

power to return to its European cultural, economical and political sources. The

desideratum of a German Europe was eradicated from political and military

agendas of its new leaders, but especially from the minds of the ordinary Germans.

The core and also the stake of the Cold War, the German Problem was offered asustained European and international response which eventually transformed the

former unstable and aggressive power into the stability center of the Europeanproject. The new German identity can be understood only in the broader context of

the European Union as an enlarged form of a cultural and political community,

both containing the German Problem and also ensuring and enriching itsdevelopment. Starting with Bismarcks Germany and ending with the post -ColdWar Germany, this study proposes an analysis of the metamorphosis the German

identity was subjected to as a corollary of the German behavior within the

international context.

The source of change trough which the Germans perceived themselves and

the others was, on its turn, internationally induced: as socio- constructivist

theorists argues, states, as communities, extract their identities trough a

* Emanuel Copila, teaching assistant, West University of Timioara, email:copilasemanuel@ yahoo.com. The documentation for this article was partially facilitated by

an AMPOSDRU scholarship, obtained trough the following grant: Investete n oameni!FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN, Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru DezvoltareaResurselor Umane 2007-2013, proiectul STUDIILE DOCTORALE FACTOR MAJOR DEDEZVOLTARE AL CERCETRILOR SOCIO-UMANE SI UMANISTE.


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Emanuel Copila

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peremptory interaction with the international environment. The process is ongoing

and entails gradual transformations both for international actors and their milieu,

which proves that identities are not given, objective, fixed, but permanently

subjected to changes coming from a multitude of directions. The German identity

experienced this kind of change most intensely after the end of the Second World

War, when it renounced its Prussian legacy in favor of its European one.

Key words: German Problem, national identity, Cold War, civilianpower, European Germany

Introduction

From the second half of the 19th century, when it was unified by

Otto von Bismarck, and until the end of the Second World War, when the

Allied forces crushed the Third Reich and freed Europe from the Nazi

reign, Germany represented the central issue of European security.

Conducting an aggressive diplomatic behavior towards its neighbors and

challenging the great powers of the continent (like France or Great Britain),

this state was responsible for the two greatest conflagrations the last

century had witnessed. No wonder that after 1945 its territory was divided

between the four winners of the war, the United States, France, Great

Britain and the Soviet Union. Only the unexpected emergence of the Cold

War led to the building of two German states, placed within antagonistic

ideological camps; in the absence of this unusual confrontation, Germanysfuture as a political entity would have been rather uncertain.

Germanys bellicose behavior was triggered by its authoritarianpolitical leadership, but the larger social layers were not at all hostile to it. 1

After 1945, this disposition will know a radical change. The Federal

Republic of Germany made possible an economic miracle and a sustainable

democracy which impressed not only the West, but also devoted

communists from East Germany.2 However, this success would not have

been possible without a reconfiguration of the German national identity. To

the sense of duty and the sedulousness, the Germans added democracy, a

1 Christian conte von Krockow, Germanii n secolul lor (1890-1990) , Bucureti: All, 1999, pp.33-42.2 Bernard Brigouleix, Zidul Berlinului, 1961-1989, Bucureti: Lucman, 2005.


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The German Problem Then and Now: from the Threat of < 25

peaceful behavior towards other peoples and the belief that every nation

can pursue its interest and achieve its security only within international

communities united by similar values and objectives and permanently

interacting and maintaining friendly relationships with other similar

communities.

Using a socio-constructivist methodology, I intend to prove that

postwar Germany became a respected member of international security

and economical-political organizations such as NATO or the EC (EU) only

after it redefined its identity by embedding it the larger European one and

renouncing the Sonderweg , namely the idea that Germany must becomemodern using its own, unique path, different from the common direction

used by the rest of the European countries. This process started and

advanced trough permanent interactions with other states and cultures,

because every state, constructivists argue, extracts its identity from the

relations it has with the international environment. Furthermore, political,

social and cultural identities are not fixed; they redefine themselves by

interacting with the international environment which, on its turn, changes

for the same reason.3Following this argument, Bismarcks, Wilhelm II andeven Hitlers Germany were influenced in a great extent by the

international environment, but a consistent change in the way Germansperceive themselves and the others occurred only after the Second World

War. This represented the main premise of the Federals Republic and thanof reunited Germanys firm adhesion to European institutions, norm andvalues and to a broaden sense community in general.

Challenging the European order: the Prussian Germany

When writing about the German Problem, John Ieuan underlines

three major factors that should be taken into account in the attempt tounderstand it. The first consists in the countrys geographical location in

3Michael Barnett, Social Constructivism, in John Baylis; Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, TheGlobalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations , New York: Oxford

University Press, 2008, pp. 160-173; Christian Reus-Smit, Constructivism, in Scott Burchill;Richard Devetak; Andrew Linklater; Matthew Paterson; Christian Reus-Smit; Jacqui True,

Theories of International Relations, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 209-230.


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Emanuel Copila

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the very centre of Europe with all its diplomatic and strategic

consequences, while the second one resides in its relative size, incomparison with its neighbors and other European states, and on itshuman and material resources. Beside these, the third factor is ofparticular importance. It is centered on the

political psychology, culture and behavior of *the ruling eliteswho have been charged not only by foreign but also by German historians

and political scientists with lack of a sense of proportion and realism and

a tendency to pursue unlimited goals. Germans have been characterized

and perceived as unstable, restless and obsessed with an acute andmorbid anxiety (angst) bordering at times on hysteria.4

This argument is very important because it offers one key

dimension, often underrated, of the German problem as a whole: besidegeography and demography, psychology is indispensable for a pertinent

approach of the subject. Germans perceived themselves as an encircled and

pressed nation, and tried to overcome this shortcoming by gaining space

and the respect of other nations. Contemporary Germany is still in the

centre of the continent and has a numerous population, but it understands

itself now as a part of the European construction, not as a solitaryinternational actor.

Since the modern era, France benefited form the political

atomization of the Roman-German Empire. Only two German states were

recognized as authentic European powers: Austria and, from the 18 th

century, Prussia, but they were second rank powers in comparison with

France. After Napoleon conquered the centre of the continent in 1806, he

abolished the now symbolic Roman-German Empire and created instead

the Rhine Confederation, which lasted until 1813. After two years, the

Vienna Congress created a new political framework for the German states

and free cities, namely the German Confederation. It represented a veryweak political union, due to the fact that the executive power remained at

the level of local governments, and it was not an international right

subject.5 Dissolved as a consequence of the national and liberal revolutions

4 John Ieuan, The Re-emergence of the German Question: a United Germany andEuropean Security and Stability, in David Armstrong; Erik Goldstein, The End of the ColdWar, London: Franck Cass & CO. LTD, 1990, p. 127.5 Peter Alter, Problema German i Europa, Bucureti: Corint, 2004, pp. 33-63.


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of 1848, it was restored in 1851, but only to prove its fragile and transitorynature.6 Within it, the rivalries between Prussia and Austria grew stronger.After a short war which took place in 1866, Prussia defeated Austria and

became the dominant German power. This result allowed Otto von

Bismarck, the Prussian prime minister, to put an end to the obsolete

Confederation7 and to plan the creation of a unified German state,

dominated by Prussia. As a firs step towards this objective, he created

around the Prussian state the North German Confederation, and reinforced

the relations with the Southern German states.

Bismarcks intensions were disregarded by the French Emperor,Napoleon III, which supported Austria during the 1866 war. After four

years, France and Prussia were engaged in a short military conflict which

was won by the last, with the help of the other German states. Under

Prussias influence, Germany became in 1871 a unified national state.8The unification affected profoundly the European balance of power.

Germany was now the strongest state on the continent, and this fact rose

feelings of unrest among the other European powers. Bismarck was very

much aware of them and the dangers it could entail. In order to prevent

the nightmare of coalitions (an alliance between France, Russia and the

British Empire against Germany) he conceived a very prudent diplomacy,signing , over the course of the years, a number of treaties with Austria,

Italy and Russia. In order to gain the trust of its allies, he pragmatically

rejected the idea of the Reich as a colonial power. The German fleet was

insufficiently developed to manage a logistic capability of this size heargued - and, in case of war, the colonies would prove to be too vulnerable

and expensive to defend.9 His system of alliances was therefore veryflexible, and its primary objective was to balance the existing tensions

between the other powers.10 It was also very complex and fragile, as hessuccessors would later find out.

Although a highly experienced diplomat, Bismarck annexed theFrench provinces Alsace and Loren, a gesture which will affect profoundly

6Ibidem, p. 95.7Ibidem, p. 101.8Ibidem, pp. 103-105; Henry Kissinger, Diplomaia, Bucureti: Bic All, 2003, pp. 100-101; BruceWaller, Bismarck, Bucureti: Historia, 2006, pp. 52 -55.9 Bruce Waller, op. cit., p. 128.10Ibidem, pp. 85-88.


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Emanuel Copila

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the relations between the two countries11 and will also constitute one of the

main reasons for which France fought against Wilhelmian Germany during

the First World War. It appears that he hesitated in doing so, but hesgenerals were eager incorporate these territories into the new Reich.

However, the annexation of Alsace and Loren was one of the main motives

for which the German unification was perceived as a threat by the rest of

the European powers.12

Bismarcks Empire was a very heterogeneous one. It containedmany national minorities, towards which a rather oppressive policy was

carried out. Furthermore, the Germans themselves were divided alongconfessional lines: Protestants in the North and Catholics in the South. This

led to the so-called Kulturkampf, in which Bismarck tried to limit as much as

possible the Catholic influences over education and the parish offices. The

Roman Catholic Church was seen as relay trough which the Papal Chair

could interfere in the internal affairs of the German state.13 Politically, the

socialists were marginalized as Bismarck and his associates feared and

combated the revolutionary tendencies spreading among the workers,

which could entail damaging consequences for the new state. The memory

of the Paris Commune was very disquieting for the conservative Prussian

influenced government, therefore it created a strong social network whichsuccessfully undermined the socialist attempts to seize power.14 The liberal

forces were also discredited as having a disorganizing influence over the

precarious social, cultural and political unity of the Empire. The German

conscience went against the Enlightenment ideals like liberty or equality;

instead, it valued ideas like order, duty or justice and it tried to affirm,

especially after Bismarcks resignation from 1890, its own, special road tomodernization (Sonderweg), different and even hostile in respect with the

rest of Europe. Only after 1945 will Germany finally renounce the powerful

and harmful myth of the Sonderweg and gradually take its place among the

cultural, economical and political leaders of united Europe.

11 Jean-Michel Gaillard; Anthony Rowley, Istoria continentului european. De la 1850 pn lasfritul secolului al XX-lea, Chiinu: Cartier, 2001, p. 74 .12 Peter Alter, op. cit., pp. 104-105.13 Bruce Waller, op. cit., pp. 97-101; Hagen Schulze, Stat i naiune n istoria european , Iai:Polirom, 2003, p. 237.14 Hagen Schulze, op. cit., p. 238; Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., pp. 30-31.


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Although very diverse, Bismarcks Reich contained two powerfulcatalysts. The first one was the Prussian army. Due to the fact that, socially

and politically, the German bourgeoisie never recovered completely after

its destruction which took place during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648)15,

its role as a social and intellectual foundation of democracy had never

materialized. Civil virtues were therefore substituted by military virtues.

The German national conscience was structured to a great extent around

the symbol of the victorious Prussian army. Its prestige was so high that it

consistently penetrated the educational and bureaucratic systems. Hagen

Schulze argues that the teachers and state officials were more found ontheir status as reserve officers than on the status their current jobs provided

and they applied in schools and in offices the norms with which theybecame familiarized in the army.16 Even the children were forced to wearsailor uniforms on Sundays and on holidays.17

The second catalyst was represented by the model of the Prussian

state. In the absence of the bourgeoisie, the authoritarian state assumed the

role of modernizing the social and economic infrastructure. The bourgeois

who wanted to build up its career; it could only do so by becoming a

employee of the state.18 Therefore, Germanys modernity came from

above, not from below, although at the end of the century the developedNorth and its emerging industrial and commercial bourgeoisie fastenedthe process.19 Even the Prussian qualities as the respect for duty,

sedulousness and responsibility did not constitute the results of a social-

cultural legacy; on the contrary, they were gradually induced within the

collective mentality since the times of Frederic the Great by the state,

trough the state and for the state.20

Germany entered the 20th century with this militarized, power

valuing identity, which would become the foundation of its national

conscience. The relative easiness trough which Nazism could be grafted on

it becomes therefore, in this light, a little bit clearer. But until that shamefuland horrifying episode of recent German history, I shall focus my attention

15 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 38.16 Hagen Schulze, op. cit., p. 239.17 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 36.18Ibidem, p. 38.19 Jean-Michel Gaillard; Anthony Rowley, op. cit., pp. 258-259.20 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 25.


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Emanuel Copila

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on the diplomatic drift that characterized post-Bismarck Germany and

prepared the conditions for the First World War.

Unbalancing Bismarcks system of alliances: Wilhelm II and

the failure of Weltpolitik

Wilhelm I, the former Prussian king, was proclaimed Kaiser in the

year Germany became a unitary state. After his death, he was replaced in

1888 by Wilhelm II. The new Kaiser fired Bismarck in 1890, refusing to rulein the shadow of such a dominating figure.21 Young, ambitious andarrogant, he sought to intimidate the other European powers and to affirm

his countrys might. However, he acted so in the absence of a certainpurpose and without following a diplomatic strategy.22 Influenced by the

example of France or the British Empire, the Kaiser wished to transform

Germany into a colonial power, although Bismarck specifically avoided

and warned against this temptation, being aware of its lack of gains and the

anxiety it would have rose among the other colonial powers.

Wilhelms triumphalism created unrest in France, the BritishEmpire and Russia. The nightmare of coalitions that Bismarck feared somuch was beginning to take shape. In the 1890s, France and Russiabecame allies. When Germany tried to break the encirclement by courtingGreat Britain, its colonial ambitions and Londons lack of interest turnedagainst it. Even if the German economy and industry were among the most

developed ones on the continent, the colonial temptation was high due to

the prestige and power it was associated with. The backbone of the KaisersWeltpolitik (global politics) resided in the need of overseas expansion. The

fact that this need was rather a matter of wrongly understood international

prestige, like the Iron Chancellor had proved, remained of little

importance: the impact of the international environment (namely the

British Empire or France) induced the idea that World power is marinepower. In this respect, Wilhelm II proved to be a representative of its

21 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 144.22Ibidem , p. 145.


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epoch, due to the fact that it appeared as the first sailor of the nation and as

a strong promoter of it.23The continuous expansion and improvement of the Reichs fleet

worried the British Empire to the extent that, in 1912, it started discussionsat high military level with France and Russia.24 The nightmare ofcoalitions was now complete: Wilhelm II succeeded in turning all theEuropean powers (except, of course, Austria) against his country.

Despite its catastrophic failure, Weltpolitik benefited from a strong

popular support. Germanys citizens in uniforms25 were appealed by the

romantic ideals of their leader, and they too wanted the Reich to become astrong and respected colonial power. The Prussian social legacy, based on

the image of the army and the authoritarian leadership, assured the

consonance between the society and the geopolitical ambitions of its

leadership. As Modris Eksteins writes,

Weltpolitik was not a foreign policy imposed to the Germans bythe intrigues of a less numerous clique of advisers around the Kaiser. It

reflected a wide spread sentiment, promoted by many eminent intellectuals and

public associations, according to which Germany must either expand itself or be

ruined. This change in politics, accomplished by the start of a naval

construction program and a noisy search of supplementary coloniesprovoked, as it was expected, international anxiety regarding the long

term intentions of Germany (my emphasis).26

Furthermore, Weltpolitik was not even a coherent concept. Geoff

Layton distinguishes, beside the already mentioned geopolitical sense of

the notion, two more complementary approaches. According to the

economical one, the German foreign policy between 1890 and 1914 was

nothing more than a policy destined to contribute to the penetration of theGerman capital on new territories and then to stabilize some influence

zones in as much as possible regions of the world. The second approachplaced Weltpolitik in direct continuity with the Lebensraum policy, arguing

that it had a racist character and searched to create regions of German

23 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 81.24 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 169.25 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 33.26 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring. The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, apud. Peter

Alter, op. cit., pp. 119-120.


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influence both over the seas and in the East.27 In my opinion, the continuitybetween Weltpolitik and Lebensraumis forced; although the first was noisyand aggressive, it certainly lacked the ideological component the second

one possessed. But whatever its meaning was, the Weltpolitiks potentialbenefits were exceeded by far by its political costs.28

In her famous work, The Origins of Totalitarianism , Hannah Arendt

identified two types of imperialism; the shape European foreign policy

took in the last decades of the 19th century and in the first decades of the

20th. The first was classical colonialism, or over the seas` imperialism

practiced by Great Britain, France, Holland, Portugal or Spain, and alreadymentioned above. The second was continental imperialism, based on thegeographic proximity between the ruling center and the peripheries. This

type of imperialism was practiced by the Czarist Empire, but also by

Germany and Austria, and it is also known as PanSlavism or Pan

Germanism. From different reasons, the European powers which did not

possess sufficient colonies over the seas tried to compensate by forging acontinental form of imperialism. But, while classical colonialism was

underlined by economic reasons (the expansion of capitalism), the pan-

isms were much more popular to the mobs because they were lacking

concrete, feasible aims, relying instead on vague objectives (like achievingthe deserved greatness for the German or the Slavic people), and theywere also dynamic due to their refusal to be limited (and valued) by

specific political programs. They were grafted on a general frame of

27 Geoff Layton, De la Bismarck la Hitler: Germania, 1890-1933, Bucureti: All, 2002, p. 55.28 Following Hannah Arendts argumentation, the Marxist geographer and social theoristDavid Harvey sustains that capitalisms expansion at the end of the 19 th century(imperialism, in Lenins terminology) contained a paradox. It emerged from national states,yet it was of global range. Consequently, the philosophy articulating it was bound to

reconcile national identities with international economic expansion. In this way, racism

became the surrogate philosophical legitimating for the global ambitions of Europeanpowers, consistently contributing, after a few decades, to the emergence of Fascism. I

partially agree with the argument. The economical dimension of the colonization process is

undoubtedly the most important, but it is not the only one; non-rational or extra-rational

factors like national pride, prestige or the sense of a groundless cultural superiority and the

competition they entailed are also to be taken into account when trying to understand

European international preeminence in the late 19th century. This kind of attitudes (Francis

Fukuyama refers to them as thymothic) certainly cannot be derived exclusively, as Marxist

theorists argue, from economical explanations. See David Harvey, Noul Imperialism,

Bucureti: BIC ALL, 2004, pp. 48-52.


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mind29 , the same which entailed the popular support for the First WorldWar and also represented the main inspiration source for totalitarian

movements like Bolshevism and Nazism.30

Germany experienced, to different extents, both types of

imperialism. But, although Weltpolitik was doubled by an aggressive

rhetoric, its task of creating a major colonial empire for Germany was never

achieved. Pan Germanism, on the other hand, was much more successful. It

perfectly coped with the Zeitgeist and it prepared the way, as Hannah

Arendt magnificently pointed out, for the Nazi catastrophe.

War, resentments and the totalitarian drift

The Kaisers unrealistic and aggressive foreign policy, combinedwith the unrest of the European powers, resulted into the First World War.

Animated by aspiration to become the hegemonic power of the old

continent, Germany firmly sustained its Austrian ally in its conflict with

Serbia regarding the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the heir of the

Austrian throne, without expecting Russia to intervene for its traditional

Serbian ally. But Czar Nicholas II, pressed by the Ministers and the popular

feelings, ordered the military mobilization. Germany declared war to

Russia and than, searching for a fast neutralization of its western neighbor,

to France. In order to reach Paris, the German army invaded Belgium, a

gesture that would convince Great Britain that Germany must be fought

against.31 In 1917, the United States too entered the war, a fact which, along

with the loss of resources in the unexpected trench warfare, led Germanyto collapse.

The emergence of the war did not disquiet Germans or other

European peoples; on the contrary, it was met with enthusiasm and

perceived as heroic way to break out of the banality of the peacefuleveryday life.32 The war vertigo contaminated political and social reason.Its romantic image, popular support and the easiness trough which it was

29 Hannah Arendt, Originile Totalitarismului, Bucureti: Humanitas, 1994, p. 300.30 Ibidem, p. 296.31 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 180-187.32 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 93.


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unleashed contrasted painfully with its dreadful consequences, which will

echo all along the interwar period.

From 1916, due to political disorganization, the country was de facto

ruled by the General Staff.Following Germanys defeat, Kaiser Wilhelm IIabdicated in November 1918. The popular resentments were extremely

high, fueled by the psychological deception of the defeat, the burdensome

conditions of peace imposed by the victorious powers and the myth that

the war was lost not on the battlefield, but ended by the treacherous

leadership who bargained its privileges with the enemy at the expense of

the country. However, the winners could have proved more pitiless: theycould have dismembered the Reich in the attempt of putting an end to the

German Problem. The motive for which they did not resort to this extremesolution lied in the necessity to preserve a certain balance of power on the

continent. In their opinion, a void of power in the centre of Europe could

have proved to be a transmission belt for the communist revolution which

already took place in Russia, a finality which was to be avoided by all

costs.33 Germany was instead forced to pay huge war compensations and

reduce its army to a great extent.

Social and political turmoil of 1918 led to the appearance of the

Weimer Republic in the following year. Trying to overcome its internaldifficulties, Germany embraced the form of a constitutional republic. In its

first five years, the young republic experienced a period of severe economic

and social crises.34

The lack of capital for investments, a profound commercial deficit and thedifficulties of readapting a war economy to the consequences of peace

were aggravated by claims aiming at the payment of war reparations,

solicited by the allies and by the loss of some important industrial regions

according to the dispositions of the Versailles Treaty. However, the major

difficulty of the precarious economical situation of Germany was the

immense governmental deficit and the decline of the Mark provoked by it,which was reflected in the internal situation by the growth of inflation.35

33 Peter Alter, op. cit., pp. 138-139.34 E.H. Carr, International relations between the two world wars (1919-1939), London: MacMillan,

1947, pp. 135-139.35 Geoff Layton, op. cit., p. 117.


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The republic remained very fragile along its entire existence.

Politically, the right wing and the left wing were involved in endless

disputes and, beside the economical and social reasons mentioned above,

the Germans lacked, as we have seen, a democratic political culture. More

than half of the Republics entire existence was underlined by crisis of allsorts. Only during the Chancellor Gustav Stresemanns leadership (1923-1929) were the signs of improvement beginning to emerge36, but they were

insufficient for legitimizing the short and precarious German democracy.

The Weimar Republics collapse was entailed by the global

economic crisis which emerged in 1929 and ended in 1933, which had adevastating effect over the European economies. Fearing a communist

revolution, Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the president of the Republic,

named after the consummation of the alternative solutions and with strong

hesitation, Adolph Hitler Chancellor in 1933. In the social and political

turmoil from thebeginning of the 1930s unemployment rose dramatically,while the political scene was divided between communists and national-

socialists. Unwanted and distrusted, the fragile and ephemeral German

democracy left way for the cruelest form of political dictatorship: the

national-socialist regime.

The rise of Hitler and its NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeit Partei) is understandable trough a combination of four different

factors. The first one is of economical nature. According to Christian von

Crockow, The take-over of power occurred in the most favorablemomentum, not at the peak, but at the end of the world economic crisis. 37The German rearmament process, which begun secretly during the first

years of the Weimer Republic, coupled with the massive growth ofworking places in the public domain resulted in a considerable reductionof unemployment.38 Next comes the demographical factor. Nazism was

perceived as a young, dynamic movement, and it certainly was so in

comparison with the parties that dominated the political scene during theWeimar Republic. In 1930, over one third of its members and over one

quarter of its leaders were thirty years old or less.39

36 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 231-250.37 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 208.38Ibidem.39Ibidem, p. 212.


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The third factor consists in the political-ideological appeal of the

movement. The firmness of Hitlers declarations and the uncompromisingimage of the Party convinced the political elite that it represented the only

authentic opposition against the growing forces of communism and

manipulated the German militarized society by creating the impression of a

much more capable political leadership in comparison with the former

democratic regime. But probably the most important factor, closely related

to the third one, consists in the ability of the regime to create a double

conscience for the citizen: by making him feel like a hero, he was gradually

enslaved and submissively accepted the xenophobic and racist nature ofthe new leadership. The Prussian legacy, with its cult for the army and the

strong state, was instrumented and distorted by the Nazis in order to give

rise to an obedient and enthusiastic society. Although Bismarcks personaland political qualities exceeded by far Hitlers fanaticism, his shallowrhetoric and lack of geopolitical sense, the fact that the Nazi ideology found

a fertile ground in the social and cultural legacy of Prussianism is

undeniable. Therefore

between 1933 and 1945, the typically ideal German lives a double life,

he has a double personality; exactly those people who rest as respectfulcitizens in their normal apolitical existence are in the same time those who

put on the uniform and march intoxicated by the will of power and

enslaved by it, subjects which rise to power and people of power as

subjects. The power of attraction consists in that the regime serves both

the need of quiet, order and bourgeois safety, but also the conscience of

master and hero.40

The conclusion is that Nazism was not at all an isolated ideology

and political leadership; it had strong social echoes and benefited from

popular support. The unprecedented symbols that it used offered the

movement a specific character and helped explain the success of its

ideological mobilization. The Nazis struggled to build up an ideologicaland fight community, way above a political union of interests. For NorbertFrei, the massive use of symbols and the disrespect of politics as a peaceful

and legally circumscribed confrontation between different ideas and

interests understood as harmful, corrupt and disorganized prove the

40Ibidem, p. 220.


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paradoxical theocratic features of this political regime structured by

modern technique and total mobilization.41 Sadly, the German society

possessed, with minor exceptions, the same understanding of democracy,

referring to it as weak, chaotic and dysfunctional. Ralf Dahrendorf

identifies another, perhaps more important paradox of national-socialism.

He argued that the regime carried out the revolution of modernity forGermany. It did it in a paradoxical contrast of its traditionalist ideology of

blood and soil, actually uprooting people and destroying the inheritedinstitutional structures.42 In this regard, Nazism accomplished, by using a

traditional discourse and by speculating the Prussian symbols (the armyand the state), the social adherence and the prestige they were credited

with a radical change. It created, another paradox (!), a certain form ofmodern citizenship by pouring the foundation of a middle class with a

schizoid conscience, divided, as quoted above, between a rarely

understood enslaved dimension and a heroic dimension the official

propaganda strived to exacerbate. After 1945, this middle class could be

recycled for democratic and civilian uses, and soon became the backboneof the new German identity


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different SS units using members from members of the occupied

populations. Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the SS, tried to convince the

latter to subordinate *their national ideal to the greater racial andhistorical ideal which is that of the German Reich.44

Anti-Semitism in general and even its Nazi orchestration in

particular is a far too complex subject for the dimensions and objective of

the present study. Still, to understand, as much as possible, how and why

the Germans embraced it so profoundly, we must once again turn our

attention to the work of Hannah Arendt.

The roots of European Anti-Semitism are undoubtedly deep, butthey are more powerful anchored in the 19 th century than in every other

century of the Modern Era, or even the Middle Ages. Starting with the

Renaissance, but especially in the age of Absolutism, Jews played a key role

in the European diplomacy and financial affairs. Due to religious motives,

they were, in the past, gradually expelled from certain professions, but not

from commerce or financial affairs, which they came to master. However,

after the French Revolution and the national redefinition of post-

Napoleonic Europe, Jews, (the rich, Court Jews, not the poor majority ofthem, not to mention the intellectuals) gradually lost their diplomatic

position, although not as fast as that of financial advisers around Europeangovernments. They were still wealthy, but were not perceived as strong

anymore, due to their estrangement from the political sphere, and this

amplified social hostility towards them. In fact, Jews were never as strong

as the collective mentalities perceived them: because of an understandable

attitude that can be traced back to Antiquity, members of the Jewish

communities always sought political protection against popular

aggressions they were often subjected to. They were serving the states by

taking care of their financial activities, not dominating them. However, for

the public opinion, their image was closely related to that of states

themselves.When national states made their entrance in the European history,

Jews and their allogeneous character became more obvious than ever.

Moreover, as the economic crises from the second half of the 19 th century

were emerging as rapid industrialization was taking shape, large social

layers from all over the continent were affected by them. They blamed, as

44 Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 535.


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far as their political culture allowed them, theyre own governments andone of the most prominent image of the state was, as we have seen, that of

the Jew who perfidiously dominated it at the expense of the people.45

Therefore, starting with the last years of the First World War, and during

most of the interwar era, when Germany was economically and socially

ruined, a process which culminated with the 1929-1933 crisis - the German

hostility towards the monarchy and, afterwards, the Weimar Republic, was

at its highest. And because the Jews behind the state were thought to beresponsible for its emasculation, it is not hard to understand the easiness

trough which Hitler and his Nazi Party won a considerable part of theirelectorate by manipulating Anti-Semite symbols, and made Anti-Semitism

one of the key components of their social policy.

During the 1930s, the Third Reich launched a massive campaign ofrearmament, simultaneously with an aggressive policy of territorial claims.

It annexed Austria in 1938 (the Anschluss) and large parts of

Czechoslovakia inhabited by ethnic Germans. Czechoslovakia disappeared

as a political entity. Instead, the Bohemia-Moravia protectorate was

created, under the total control of Nazi Germany. France and Great Britain

temporarily accepted these actions, subsuming them to the supreme

objective of maintaining peace.46 But Hitler also aimed to incorporate intohis Reich parts of France, Denmark, Poland and Italy which were too

inhabited by ethnic Germans.47 Although Nazi rhetoric was extremely anti-

Soviet, the two dictatorships signed a peace treaty in 1939, just a few weeks

before the beginning of Second World War.

Hitler was influenced to a great extent by the Italian fascist regime

of Benito Mussolini (although fascism was more an authoritarian then a

totalitarian political regime: it never aimed to achieve complete

administrative or ideological control over its population) and also by

Stalins Soviet Union. Therefore, Nazism was not an exotic regime on the

European political scene, but a radical expression of an internationalideological trend (fascism), which reached its zenith during the interwar

period, and which represented, in the words of Mussolini, a socialist

45Ibidem, pp. 15-168.46 Geoff Layton, Germania: al Treilea Reich, 1933-1945, Bucureti: All, 2001, pp. 121-131; A.J.P.Taylor, Originile celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial, Iai: Polirom, 1999, pp. 109-191.47 Claude David, Hitler i nazismul, Bucureti: Corint, 2004, p. 43.


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40

heresy.48 The common ideological root of right-wing and left-wing politicalextremes was recognized even by the founder of fascism; their catastrophic

effects (understood sooner or later) were also impossible to set apart.

Divided Germany, the epicenter of the Cold War

In 1939, Germany challenged the world once again and once again

was defeated. But this time, the vanquished had to face way more harsher

conditions than they did back in 1918. Germany was occupied and dividedinto four parts, each under direct rule of one of the Allies: the United States,

Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Its capital, Berlin, was also

partitioned, even if it was in the middle of the Soviet controlled territory.

Germany ceased to exist as a political entity until the western powers

united their three regions, four years after the end of the Second World

War, and created the Federal Republic of Germany. In response, Stalin

transformed his share of the former Third Reich into the Democratic

Republic of Germany.

The German Problem represented the core of the future ideological

confrontation between the former Allies.49 Except France, the other powerswere against the dismemberment of their former enemy out of concern for

the feelings of the German people. The lesson of Versailles, namely the

danger of marginalizing and humiliating the former enemy, urged the

western powers to help rebuild Germany and integrate it in their economic

and security perimeters.

However, the split of the Third Reichs territory between the Allieswas not a planned action. It occurred spontaneously, as the Cold War was

beginning to emerge.50 This outcome had very much to do with the

indecision of the Roosevelt Administration regarding the future of postwar

Germany. Initially, the Morgenthau plan was take into account. It foresawa complete neutralization of Germanys industrial power, followed by its

48 Joshua Muravchik, Raiul pe pmnt. Mrirea i decderea socialismului , Timioara: Brumar,2004, p. 161.49 Peter Calvocoressi, Politica mondial dup 1945 , Bucureti: Allfa, 2000, p. 3; Eugen Preda,NATO. Scurt istorie, Bucureti: Silex, 1999, p. 59.50 Peter Alter, op. cit., p. 184. See also Alfred Grosser, Occidentalii. rile Europei i StateleUnite dup rzboi, Bucureti: DU Style, 1999, pp. 74 -81.


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division into several traditional Lands were the main economic activity

was to be agriculture. Although Roosevelt initially supported the project of

his Finance minister, he eventually opted for a peace of integration in thefuture state communities.51 But the plan was a palpable proof of the hatredand animosity Nazi Germany draw upon itself, even from its democratic

opponents.

Morgenthaus plan for the pastoralization of Germany isunderstandable as a reflection of irrational wartime hatred for a cruel and

stubborn enemy. Nor is it surprising that many government officials, not

wanting to appear soft on Germany, at first supported the plan. Uponreflection, however, the impractical and inhumane aspects of the proposal

quickly became clear, causing support for it within the Roosevelt

Administration to crumble even before unwanted publicity brought out

the Presidents disavowal.52

For the rest of the Allies, especially for the Soviets, the American

indecision regarding Germany entailed suspicions which will, combined

with other factors, destabilize their partnership.53The proposal of the State Secretary George Marshall, centered on

the need of economic and infrastructural reconstruction of the European

countries, replaced the Morgenthau plan in 1947. Albeit it was offered to

the USSR and its postwar allies as well, Stalin rejected it as an American

subversive measure aiming to neutralize the Soviet postwar influence upon

Eastern Europe.

In the Western regions of the former Reich, a monetary reform was

implemented as a part of the Marshall plan starting with 1948. The reform

was intended to stabilize the enormous inflation, willingly maintained and

even amplified by the Soviets in order to achieve a better control over their

part of Germany and to destabilize the parts occupied by the French, the

British and the Americans. When the new Deutsche Mark was introduced

into the western sectors, Stalin established in what was to become the

Democratic Republic of Germany a Soviet controlled currency, the Eastern

51 Wilfried Loth, mprirea lumii. Istoria Rzboiului Rece, 1941-1955, Bucureti: SAECULUM I.O., 1997, p. 23.52 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, New York:

Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 121.53 Wilfried Loth, op. cit., pp. 21-23.


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Emanuel Copila

42

Mark (Ostmark). But when the reform was extended to West Berlin,

Moscow had a prompt and radical reaction: taking advantage of West

Berlins which an enclave within the Soviet occupied zone is, it simplyblocked the access of his former allies into the city. The blockade of Berlin

was now in full effect.

Among the reasons which provoked such a harsh response from the

Soviets, one was the humiliating and impossible to control situationwhere their currency is neglected by the Berliners which preferred the

stronger and trustful western currency.54Another one was Stalins extreme

discontent of the American capitalism and its influence over Germany, aswell as the establishment of a military American-European alliance, whichwas becoming more and more visible.55

President Truman offered a simple and ingenious approach to the

issue. Profiting by the fact that air access to the city was not included in the

regulations between the former Allies regarding the traffic in Berlin, he

organized a massive air campaign, providing West Berliners with the food,

medicine and fuel they needed in order to survive the blockade. Although

a military answer was taken into consideration at first, the Americans

opted eventually for this peaceful and simpler solution. After 324 days,

thousands of flights and millions of tons of provisions, Stalin renounced byending the blockade and renormalizing the traffic towards and from the

imperialist part of Berlin. This event represented the first serious clashbetween the former Allies. Moreover, it led to the creation of the military

blocks (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by the western powers and

the Warsaw Pact by the Soviet Union and its allies) and it accelerated the

division of Germany. In 1949, the Iron Curtain was passing through the

middle of the former Reich, as the Federal and the Democratic Republic of

Germany stood now at the heart of the Cold War.56

54

Bernard Brigouleix, op. cit., p. 115.55 Wilfried Loth, op. cit., p. 197.56 Eugen Preda, op. cit., pp-53-64; Martin McCauley, Rusia, America i Rzboiul Rece, 1949-1991 , Iai: Polirom, 1999, pp. 47-49; Tony Judt, Epoca postbelic. O istorie a Europei de dup1945 , Iai: Polirom, 2008, p. 145; Frederick F. Hartmann, The relations of nations , New York:MacMillan, 1978, pp. 495-498; Jii Fidler; Petr Mare, Istoria NATO, Iai: Institutul European,2005, pp. 40-41; Jean Baptiste Duroselle; Andr Kaspi, Istoria relaiilor internaionale, 1948-pn n zilele noastre(vol. II), Bucureti: Editura tiinelor Sociale i Politice, 2006, pp. 11-17;Andr Fontain, Istoria Rzboiului Rece. De la Revoluia din Octombrie la Rzboiul din Coreea,1917-1950(vol. II), Bucureti: Editura Militar, 1992, pp. 141-157.


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But the disagreements between the superpowers over Berlin and the

German Problem in general were far from being over. In 1952, one yearafter its death, Stalin advanced the proposal of a reunified, neutral

Germany, the first Soviet answer to the postwar German Problem. But hewas turned down by the FRGs Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who chose tomaintain his countrys close relationships to the West instead of a doubtfulreunification which was very likely intended to drag West Germany into

the Soviet sphere of influence. A few years after this event and quickened

by the Korean War, the Federal Republic became, despite some powerful

protests, a member of the Western security structure, the North AtlanticAlliance.57 Equally important, its sovereignty was also recognized by the

democratic powers, which means that the FRG begun its de facto existence

only from 1955, when she was finally admitted into NATO.58

This outcome troubled Moscow to a great extent. A decade after the

end of the Berlin blockade, Stalins successor decided that USSR was strongenough to force the United States to put an end to the German Problem inSoviet terms. But there was another reason, of geopolitical nature, which

drove the Soviets to act: the Soviet Union was almost surrounded now by

American military basis, and the superpower talks about disarmament had

reached a dead end.59 Nevertheless, the migration of intellectuals, studentsand workers from East Germany and East Berlin to West Berlin reached

alarming proportions both for Moscow and especially for German

communists, which saw their five-year plan compromised - and needed to

be interrupted using the less humiliating way possible.60

In a gesture of defiance, Khrushchev (


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Emanuel Copila

44

World War, he tried to convince Washington to sign a peace treaty withWest Germany, while the USSR did so with both Germanys.62 Thisoutcome would have made the presence of American troops in the West

Berlin useless and also silenced a very irritating source of Westernpropaganda, especially after the progress made by television, in the hearth

of a socialist country.63Despite the fact that Khrushchevs pressures affected to some extent

the North Atlantic Alliance, they did not achieve their objective. West

Berlin remained the cancerous tumor, as Stalins successor used to refer to

it, of the socialist camp. To contain it, Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, theEast German Communist leader, started constructing in 1961 the infamous

Berlin Wall, a symbol of communisms failure rather than success, asKhrushchev referred to it when he stopped two years latter what is now

called the Berlin crisis.64

Only in 1971 reached the former World War Two Allies an effective

agreement over Berlin. Reaffirming the responsibilities, but also the rights

they have regarding the future of the city and of the German Problem ingeneral, the Quadripartite Agreementloosened traffic from the East to the

West side and also improved the infrastructure of the city. Both German

states were also recognized as sovereign and independent, they recognizedeach others sovereignty (Grundlagenvertrag) and were integrated intoUnited Nations in 1973. It appeared that the German Problem was finallysolved, but the fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989 witnessed its

unexpected and disquieting reoccurrence.

Renouncing the Prussian legacy: the Federal Republic of

Germany or the appearance of a civilian power

The political and geopolitical metamorphosis of the postwar world

offers only a partial image of the metamorphosis the German Problemexperienced during the transition from the 19th to the 20th century. To

62 William Taubman, op. cit., p. 435.63 Bernard Brigouleix, op. cit., p. 141.64 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 515.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadripartite_Agreementhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadripartite_Agreementhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadripartite_Agreement


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complete it, the radical changes of the German psychology and national

identity must be taken into account.

The issue of the so called Denazification is highly important in this

regard. The process certainly took place, but not trough the Nurnberg trial

and the Denazification comities, but trough a gradual change of mentalities

and generations. Skepticism as a survival experience and a new youthculture, which was impregnated by the orientation towards the West, by

the American fascination [as a prosperous, free country replaced in ashort period of time the Prussian army and state cult, and the change was

not at all superficial.65

The traditional Prussian-conservative power elites lost theirmaterial basis and influence. The gravity center of politics moved from

East to West. For the first time, in a very long time, Catholic Germany

obtained a position of leadership. The power of the army crumbled;

although from the rearming the federal army could develop technically

way much more than the Reichs army did during the Weimar Republic, itnever became a state again. Even the prestige of the uniform, so

characteristic in the old days, has gone; it is dressed only at the working

place and nowhere in the rest. The Germans became convinced civilians.66

The German economic miracle stood at the foundation of this newidentity. Experiencing the goodwill and consistent American help,

Germans felt encouraged to confront the difficult task of rebuilding their

country. Furthermore, the massive exodus of qualified working-hand from

Soviet occupied zone contributed substantially to the process.67 But, one the

other hand, one should not forget that this economic miracle was made

possible by former Nazi specialists; their presence in postwar German

economy and administration was very much disregarded by the winners of

Second World War, but everyone knew that their absence would have

proven to be disastrous for the efforts of rebuilding the country.

Pragmatism replaced moral considerations. Even Konrad Adenauer,chancellor between 1949 and 1963 and the most important figure in

German postwar politics condemned in 1946 what he considered to bethe exaggerated zeal of the winners regarding Denazification. He believed

65 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 287.66 Ibidem, pp. 301-302.67 Ibidem, pp. 291-292.


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Emanuel Copila

46

that the process would eventually lead to a revival of nationalism, not to

guilt, shame and obedience. This is how strong Nazism was embedded

within the German minds.68

Of course, this Return of the citizen corresponded logically to thereturn in Europe.69 The Sonderweg was left behind as France and Germanyagreed to a common use of the resources of the Ruhr region, thus putting

the bases of the future European Community. As Peter Calvocoressi writes,

The European Community or Union was conceived as an

antidote for the German power, whichs presence in the centre of Europe,represented a permanent threat for peace and stability. A Community orUnion like this was to include Germany, to create a favorable field for the

German ambitions to the benefit of Europe, not against it and, also, to

maximally increase the importance of common economic actions of its

members and even to create an economic power able to match the United

States or Japan. When these ideas were adopted both by France and by

Germany, they became political reality.70

Indeed, the major postwar gain of both West Germanys neighborsand West Germany itself was the exorcisation of its militaristic spirit71 andits sincere availability to bind its future to that of Europe, to integrate its

identity in its originary European matrix and to build a climate of trust andcooperation with its former enemies within a common cultural,

economical, social and eventually political framework.

Konrad Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the FRG. A

conservative catholic, highly religious (a founding member of the Christian

Democratic Union of Germany, one of the strongest postwar German

political party) he was one of the few anti-Nazis which survived insideGermany, and also the most politically prominent.72 Possessing an

68 Tony Judt, op. cit., p. 65.69 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., p. 303.70 Peter Calvocoressi, Rupei rndurile! Al doilea rzboi mondial i configurarea Europei postbelice,Iai: Polirom, 2000, p. 165.71 Peter Calvocoressi, Europa de la Bismarck la Gorbaciov, Iai: Polirom, 2003, p. 150.72 Ghi Ionescu, Oameni de stat ntr-o lume interdependent. Adenauer, de Gaulle, Tatcher,Reagan i Gorbaciov , Bucureti: Bic All, 1998, p. 41. For a personal profile of der Alte (theold man , as the Germans affectionately nicknamed him), see Richard Nixon, Lideri,Bucureti: Universal Dalsi, 2000, pp. 172-214.


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instinctive antipathy73 towards Prussia, he struggled and succeeded increating a civilian community out of the FRG. Constitutionally, Adenauerstarted by retracting the supremacy of the state or of the community overthe individual, together with its duty to sacrifice itself, which determined,

for so long, fatally, the ideologies of Germanity; liberty, equality and with

them, the responsibility of the individual became central.74In the field of international relations, Adenauer guided his countrys

policy in three major directions. He begun by reassuring France that therewould be no resurgence of the German peril. Next, he tried to reach an

honorable compromise between the constraints imposed by the Allies andthe German aspirations for sovereignty. As a consequence, his entirediplomacy was devoted to transmuting the constraints imposed

unilaterally by the victors into mutual controls shared voluntarily by all.Finally, he figured that both of the objectives were achievable only trough a

substantial political and economic integration that would supersede theancient logic of power politics by the new logic of community and mutual

gain.75Committed to the goal of morally, politically and economically

reconstructing his country, Adenauer obstinately refused the Soviet

proposal of reuniting Germany during the blockade and, respectively, thecrisis of Berlin, referring to it as an unrealistic goal. 76 Although the refusalaffected his popularity, he understood that Germanys future and eventualreunification were guaranteed only by the firm ties with the western

communities.77

The most famous successor of Chancellor Adenauer was Willy

Brandt. His major geopolitical initiative, the Ostpolitik , did not at all

renounce the structural relationships of his country with the West; it was a

result of security needs in the nuclear era, as the Europeans started to fear a

73Ibidem, p. 48.74 Christian conte von Krockow, op. cit., pp. 302-303.75Josef Joffe, The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Roy Macridis (ed.),op. cit., p. 78. See also Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union , New

York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 24.76Ibidem, p. 81.77 Stephen Szabo, The New Germany and Central European Security, in John Lampe ;Daniel Nelson, East European Security Reconsidered , Washington: The Woodrow Wilson

Central Press, 1993, p. 36.


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Emanuel Copila

48

catastrophic war between the superpowers that would be fought on their

continent. When the dtenteperiod appeared at the beginning of the 1970s,due to its geographic position, Germany needed a safe and promising

geopolitical environment, not the rigid isolation into the Western camp.78But most importantly, it aimed to overcome the painful division of the

German nation trough Sisyphuss example: by recognizing, accepting andeventually overcoming it.79 But Ostpolitik was aware of the fact that

reunification was not an operative goal of West German foreign policy inthe short or medium turn. Furthermore, no attempts of destabilizing

Eastern Germany were conducted. The political reunification wasindefinitely postponed by the social, cultural and economical unification,

an activity so determined that it eventually softened the GDR leadershipscircumspection towards it.80 In order to eliminate any possible doubt about

its intentions, Willy Brandt renounced the Hallstein doctrine, which stated

that the FRG would not engage in diplomatic activities with states that

recognize the DRG as a legitimate political entity.

During the Chancellor Helmut Schmidts leadership (1974-1979), themargin of the countrys diplomatic maneuver (


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international tensions. Schmidt tried to moderate the new dissonancebetween the superpowers, but with little success: the Federal Republic wasnot the Bismarck Empire. While an economic giant, the FRG was a political

dwarf when it came to playing in the arena dominated by the super-

powers. As a consequence, Moscow refused to negotiate while continuingto add to its SS-20 arsenal.84

During the 1980s, due to the geopolitical contraction thatcharacterized the final phase of the Cold War, the reunification became a

more and more distant objective. Only after Gorbachev took the leadership

of the Soviet Union visible signs of improvement begun to emerge. Yet,until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification achieved by Chancellor

Helmut Kohl remained an almost utopian goal.

Returning to German identity during the development of the Cold

War, which can be referred to as the most important variable of the

postwar German Problem (albeit its absen*ce from the diplomaticvocabulary85 of the Federals Republic), Lisbeh Aggestam argues that itwas structured along four principal parameters. The first one resides in the

opposition to the Third Reich. Nazism and his legacy of hatred anddestruction were forever excluded from the picture. Next, the FRG strongly

affirmed and assumed its European cultural, economical and geopoliticalidentity. Furthermore, domestic factors like the liberal constitution, the

national currency and, nevertheless, the social market economy led to theappearance of what the German philosopher Jrgen Habermas called

constitutional patriotism. He argued that national identities have entereda phase of evanescence and a new, comprehensive post-national identity

begun its existence. The multicultural communities which started to replace

national states can prosper only if they are assumed and sustained trough

this procedural manner the constitutional patriotism refers to. Without theemotional or historical weight the national patriotism contains,

constitutional patriotism can ensure a common denominator for themultitude of interests, ideas or values existent in a community without

depriving it of its philosophical fundament or its conscience. 86 Finally, the

84Ibidem, p. 110.85Lisbeth Aggestam, Germany, in Ian Manners; Richard Whitman, The Foreign Policies ofEuropean Union Member States, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 66.86 Jrgen Habermas, The Constitutional State, in William Outhawaite (ed.), The HabermasReader, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, pp. 214-216; Andrei Marga, Filosofia lui Habermas, Iai:


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50

last parameter which contributed to the German postwar identity

represents the reconciliation with former enemies and [the] rejection ofmilitary power projection for other purposes than territorial defense trough

NATO.87 This whole process was not, as some authors have referred to it, aself-fulfilling amnesia88, but something way much more: a real and radicalidentitary metamorphosis.

Although engaged in a powerful ideological competition, the two

Germanys were extremely different in terms of economical, social and

cultural prosperity. Therefore, to conclude that the main Germany was

the Federal Republic is not at all exaggerated. After all, the reunitedGermany continues the legacy of the Federal, not of the Democratic

Republic. But, on the other hand, the GDR was one of the strongest andrichest members of its alliance, too. In Josef Joffes words, the two twinstates were both the greatest profiteers and the greatest victims of thepostwar system.89

In search of a nation: the German Democratic Republic

In all of its short and unsecured existence, East Germany wasconfronted with two major intertwined issues. The first and the most

important was that of identity. Along its forty years of permanent and

ideocratic dictatorship, the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands -the Socialist Unity Party of Germany) had never managed to create a

distinct East German national identity, separated of and superior to that of

the Federals Republic. Because this lack of national identity, it was the

Polirom, 2006, pp. 484-485; Olivier Nay, Istoria Ideilor Politice , Iai: Polirom, 2008, pp. 592-594. I tried to offer a presentation and critical approach of some of Habermass concepts in

political philosophy in Emanuel Copila, Dincolo de teoria critic. O posibil inserare afilosofiei politice habermasiene n teoria relaiilor internaionale, in Sfera Politicii , nr. 138,2009, pp. 96-113.87Lisbeth Aggestam, Germany, in Ian Manners; Richard Whitman, op. cit., p. 66.88Uwe Nerlich, Washington and Bonn: Evolutionary patterns in the relations between theUnited States and the Federal Republic of Germany, in Karl Kaiser, Hans -Peter Schwarz, America and Western Europe. Problems and Prospects , Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and

Company Lexington, 1979, p. 369.89Josef Joffe, The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Roy Macridis (ed.),op. cit., p. 117.


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most vulnerable Soviet satellite. Artificially and forcefully created by Stalin,

its existence was justified only as a product of superpower rivalry. It was

conditioned and owed its existence to the circumstances that made the

Cold War possible. Its communist leadership, the only category who truly

benefited from this state of events, was never found of destalinization,

dtente, perestroika or glasnost , because these eroded the precarious

legitimacy of the GDR, the second major challenge which contested its

reason to exist.

The first leader of East Germany, Walter Ulbricht, was very much

aware of these difficulties. But he and his Stalinist acolytes believed thatthey can be eventually overcame trough the power of ideology alone.

However, they forgot the fact that communism represented an ideal only

for them, without being shared by the rest of the population; its moral force

was therefore highly overrated and, after the economical, social and

cultural effects of real socialism became painfully evident, totallydiscredited.

The initial hopes of the founders of the GDR, not to mentiontheir Soviet protectors, had been that ideology alone would provide the

main legitimizing factor for the new state the ideal of, quest for, the firstGerman socialist state. Walter Ulbricht, though in other respects a

pragmatic politician, always retained this ideal, and despite all the rebuffs

of subsequent experience, many older East German communists, schooled

in the struggles for communism and against Nazism, also clung to the

belief that socialism meant legitimacy.90

As a corollary of the lack of adhesion towards communism, East

Berlin authorities faced in June 1953, a few months after Stalins death, amassive and spontaneous workers strike, brutally repressed by Soviet

intervention, and which seriously affected the existence of the new state. 91

17 June became a national holiday for West Germans, a reminder of the

sufferings of their Eastern brethren and a symbol of a, albeit divided,

common identity.

90 J.F. Brown, Surge to Freedom. The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, Durham: Duke

University Press, 1991, p. 133.91 Patrick Brogan, Eastern Europe, 1939-1959. The fifty years war , London: Bloomsbury

Publishing Limited, 1990, pp. 27-30.


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Walter Ulbricht was replaced in 1971 by Erich Honecker. Soviet

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev coordinated the entire action. He took

the decision to remove Ulbricht due to the opposition of the German leader

(for motives mentioned above) towards dtente. His successor came to

terms with the Soviet Unions new approach towards the West and theneed to normalize his countrys relations with the FRG by accepting WillyBrandts Ostpolitik. However, being aware of the risks this strategy couldentail by diminishing the GDRs reasons to exist, he responded byadvancing the Abgrenzung (demarcation)policy. It was intended as a firm

message for West Germany, stating that, although the economical andcultural ties between the two parts were rapidly developing, there could be

no ideological compromise with the capitalist and imperialist forces which

enslaved the FRG. East Germany would perseveringly continue its path to

socialism and thus affirm its much needed separate identity. 92As mentioned, the Party permanently struggled to forge an East

German national identity, separated from that of the Federals Republic. Itfailed, not only for internal reasons like the planned economy the lack of

adherence of the communist ideal, but also because West Germans strived

trough Ostpolitik to do just the opposite. The GDR was, in J.F. Bowns

terms, a penetrated society. The Wests prosperity and freedom hadcontinuously undermined the communist project of constructing an

independent and strong East Germany. West Germany did everything in

its power to destroy the communist regime behind the Berlin Wall using its

main advantage, soft power. The Deutsche Mark (a symbol of social

superiority and the usual bribe used to obtain better services or goods), the

West German travelers (with some exceptions, the best advertisement forthe Western way of life) and the West German television (available for80% of East Germans after 1970 and 100% starting with the 1980s)represented the instruments trough which the Federal Republic was

trying to peacefully bring down the Wall.93Despite these major disadvantages Erich Honecker and the SED had

to confront with while trying to obtain legitimacy trough forging a national

East German identity, they considered to be up to the task. In this sense, a

major provocation appeared during the 1970s, when communist regimes

92 J.F. Brown, op. cit., p. 129.93 Ibidem, pp. 135-138.


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all around Eastern Europe, confronted with the lack of the promised

achievements and with the erosion of the few legitimacy they possessed,

started to resort to what they ferociously combated in the past, nationalism.

Aware of the dilemma, Honecker strived to overcome it with the help of

several factors. One of them was the strong historical tradition ofregionalism in German history. Next, due to the fact that a certain sense ofEast German distinctiveness had emerged since the end of the end of theSecond World War, he hoped that it could constitute the basis of the future

identity. The amazing and meticulously prepared performances of East

German athletes were also believed to contribute to the task. The final andmost important factor was the massive rehabilitationcampaign the Partylaunched, searching into German history for figures to fit into the mold ofa progressive German nationalist outlook after they were publicly rejectedas the epitome of reaction. Therefore, Frederick the Great, Otto vonBismarck and, to some extent, Richard Wagner were recuperated and

ideologically purified to serve the capital task that the Party assumed, that

of creating the East German national identity. But failing it, East Germany

remained the most fragile postwar construction, paradoxically dependent

on both the Soviet Union and the FRG as well94 and, above all, on the Cold

War itself. Even if it achieved, after the Wall was build, a notable economicdevelopment with reference to the other communist states (except the

Soviet Union), taking into account its post 1945 economic and

infrastructural condition and the millions of citizens it lost as they migrated

to West Germany95 - when Gorbachev started the process that will

eventually lead to the end of the superpower confrontation, its fate was

sealed.

Reunited Germany, the central component of the European

project

When Michael Gorbachevs new thinking significantly influencedthe relations between USSR, Eastern Europe and the capitalist world and,as a result, the Cold war was entering its final phase, East Germany

94Ibidem, pp. 133-135.95Ibidem , p. 128.


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Emanuel Copila

54

resorted once again to the Abgrenzung policy. But this time it searched to

isolate itself not from the corruptive effects of West Germans capitalism,but from the new international program of its protector, the Soviet Union.96

As paradoxical as it seems, the new thinking contributed to themelioration of the relations between the two German states while

simultaneously deteriorating the ties between orthodox Stalinist countries

like the GDR or Romania with what Kenneth Jowitt referred to as the

Moscow centre.97When in September 1989 Hungary, one of the most liberal socialist

regimes, declared its borders open, tens of thousand of East Germancitizens used the Hungarian breach to get to Austria and then to West

Germany. Many more appealed the Hungarian and West German

embassies from Warsaw and Prague asking for exit visas.98 Confrontedalso with major demonstrations, Honecker resigned the next month and

was replaced by Egon Krenz. But by now, the situation was already beyond

the control of the Party and its efforts to prevent the further dissolution of

the regime were useless.99 In the first days of November, the

demonstrations reached East Berlin and on the night between 9 and 10 of

the month, the Berlin Wall was officially opened by East German

authorities.100 Reunification was now just a matter of time.Until it finally occurred, one year later, it was conducted through

the 2 + 4 formula. That meant that the two German states agreed first onthe conditions the reunification implied, and than presented the result to

the four winners of the Second World War. In this way the process was

fastened and the renewed Germany proved that it was no longer an object

of negotiation between the four powers,101 but, despite its enormous

historical burden, a powerful, European country able to assume it past, its

present and the construction of its future within the European common

96Ibidem, pp. 140-144.97 Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction , Berkley: University of

California Press, 1992, p. 159.98 Patrick Brogan, op.cit., pp. 37-38.99 Hans-Hermann Hertle, The Fall of the Wall: The Unintended Dissolution of EastGermanys Rulling Regime, in Cold War International History Project (The End of the ColdWar), Issue 12/13, Fall/Winter 2001, pp. 131-164.100 Bernard Brigouleix, op. cit., pp. 233-237.101 Peter Alter, op. cit., pp. 219-220.


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framework. However, the geopolitical implications of reunification, albeit

German enthusiasm and determination, were extremely complex and it

took a rather long time to be adequately dealt with.

No one expected the Soviet Union not to intervene; after all, the

management of the German Problem represented the core and also thestake of the Cold War and none of the superpowers was willing to risk its

image and prestige by renouncing its part of Germany in favor of the other.

But Gorbachevs USSR did. Why? According to Patrick Brogan, bothWashington and Moscow

were dragged along, bewildered and slightly nervous, in thewake of the Germans rush to unity. What would they do with a countrythat was a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact? This, obviously,

was the real sticking point. The question is what price could the Soviet

Union extract from the West for removing its troops from eastern

Germany and accepting that a united Germany would be a member of

NATO alone.102

With other words, in his struggle to modernize the stagnant Soviet

Union and the communist ideology as well, Gorbachev agreed to the

reunification of Germany in exchange of the countrys sustained financialcontribution to its reformist program. Germany was the only strongeconomy with a major reason for doing so, and it also agreed to cover thecosts of repatriating the Soviet troops.103 The total price West Germany hadto pay for the reunification was about 60 billion Deutschmarks.104 OtherWestern countries also contributed to Gorbachevs efforts, but in the backwash of German reunification and Eastern Europes anti-communistrevolutions, the Soviet colossus was unable to survive and it slowly

disintegrated.

After the reunification euphoria had passed, the Germans were

confronted both with external and internal challenges. In the first case, thehistorical experience induced by the German Problem disquieted France,Poland and Great Britain. These states were main victims of past German

102 Patrick Brogan, op.cit., p. 43.103 Timothy Garton Ash, Istoria prezentului. Eseuri, schie i relatri din Europa anilor 90 , Iai:Polirom, 2002, p. 59.104 David Pryce Jones, The War That Never Was. The Fall Of The Soviet Empire, 1985-1991,

London: Phoenix Press, 2001, p. 286.


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Emanuel Copila

56

aggressions and they needed insurances against an eventual resurgence of

German hegemonic tendencies.105 They would receive them in the

discourses and the activities of the reunited country, which renounced all

its potential territorial claims and strongly reaffirmed its Europenity. The

internal challenges were firstly of economical nature. West Germany had to

cover the huge costs of the dysfunctional economy of the east and the weak

Ostmark , whichs valued about 10% of the Western Deutschmark. Thisresulted into enormous financial efforts and a wave of unemployment in

the Western part of the country, triggering social tensions as former West

Germans feared they would lose their jobs in favor of the Ossis. 106In time, both types of challenges were properly addressed.

Economical conditions gradually begun to improve, even if social tensions

were never completely eradicated, and neither the structural disparities

between the former East and West Germany. Although not at all negligible,

social issues raised by the reunification are not strong enough to pose a

present or even a future threat to the German feeling of a common identity,

a sense of community shared both by former Westerners and Easterners.

For the foreseeable future, the German unity is irreversible.

At the international level, the German foreign policy entered a

phase of normalization, which consisted in a firmer articulation ofnational interest, a will to take on greater responsibilities internationally, apeaceful and reassuring approach towards the neighbors and a determined

position regarding the irreversibility of the past.107 However, a more

powerful appropriation of its identity, legitimate interests and role on the

international scene does not mean that Germany planes to separate itself

from the European Union; on the contrary, it represents the awareness of a

certain maturity Germany reached during the last century, especially in its

second half, which justifies its present emancipation, but also its ability to

learn from past mistakes. After all, the European Union, a more integrated

and politicized form of the European Community, emerged basically as aresponse to the post-Cold War German Problem108 , which remains andwill continue to do so in the predictable future its basic component. As

105 Peter Alter, op. cit, p. 228.106 Christin von Krockow, op. cit., pp. 357-369.107Lisbeth Aggestam, Germany, in Ian Manners; Richard Whitman, op. cit., p. 71108 Robert Gilpin, Economia Mondial n Secolul XXI. Provocarea capitalismului global , Iai:Polirom, 2004, p. 152.


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Timothy Garton Ash wrote in a recent book, the true center of Europe isGermany.109

Concluding remarks: the European answer to the post-Cold

War German Problem and the metamorphosis of a national

identity

The post-Cold War European Community renamed the European

Union, represented a fundamental compromise between political and

economical interests of two former historical rivals: France and Germany.

The weaker actor, France, wanted to secure itself with reference to German

economical power. As a consequence, it received an equal control as its

counterpart over the monetary and financial European affairs, and evenan advance regarding the management of European economy in general.However, France was also a traditional advocate of a Europe of nations,opting for a less integrationist approach of the European construction, one

in which it could retain a more independent position. Germany, on the

other hand wanted the European political unity to confirm the return ofthe country towards democratic Europe and to guarantee that it would be a

peaceful country, without nationalist tendencies. Beside these moral-philosophical reasons, Germany was also pragmatic: the more united

Europe becomes the more dominant its position becomes. In the end,

equilibrium was achieved through the willingness of the two parts to

cooperate, alt

the german problem then and now. from the threat of a 'german europe' to the edification of a...

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