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Local policing and transnationalorganized crimeStan Gilmour a & Robert France aa Thames Valley Police , Kidlington, UKPublished online: 09 Sep 2011.

To cite this article: Stan Gilmour & Robert France (2011) Local policing and transnationalorganized crime, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 25:1-2, 17-26, DOI:10.1080/13600869.2011.594644

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Local policing and transnational organized crime

Stan Gilmour∗ and Robert France

Thames Valley Police, Kidlington, UK

This paper discusses the problems associated with a crime management model that isunderpinned by the geographical reach of the investigating agencies, and the meritsof different models of policing that work to counter transnational organized crime. Itanalyzes the different policing approaches to this level of criminality from threeorganizing frameworks; intelligence led policing, problem-solving policing, and goal-oriented policing. It suggests that there is a puzzle at the heart of any policingsolution, based on the principle of subsidiarity – how to link local policing activitywith the efforts to tackle national and transnational organized criminality whilstmaintaining a democratic mandate that privileges a mutual structure over theconglomerate model. It concludes with a suggestion to look towards an IntelligentProblem Solving solution that prioritizes the grassroots by focusing on threat, harm,and risk within a crime continuum.

Keywords: National Intelligence Model; intelligence led policing; transnationalorganized crime

The National Intelligence Model and policing in England and Wales

During the late 1980s, there was a move within British policing to establish a new method-ology to inform the effective deployment of policing resources – a methodology that hasevolved into what the police service now refers to as ‘Intelligence Led Policing’ (ILP).1

This approach was standardized in England and Wales through the implementation ofthe ‘National Intelligence Model’ (NIM), developed by the National Criminal IntelligenceService.2 The model became the policy of the Association of Chief Constables (ACPO) in2000, with a requirement for all forces to implement specified minimum standards by April2004.3 Since its implementation, the NIM has become embedded in the national policingstructure, with its concepts and processes underpinning the business of policing acrossthe country.4

The evolution of the model can be traced back to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and, interalia,5 the growing pressure on the police service during that period to focus on efficiency,effectiveness and economy – epitomized by the 1983 Home Office Circular 114 of 1983(HOC 114/1983) ‘Manpower [sic], Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service’6

and from the earlier HOC 249/1964 that speaks of the ‘growing complexity of crime’.7

HOC 114/1983 emphasized the need for police forces to clearly identify their prioritiesand objectives and to target available resources effectively, including partnership resources,towards those priorities and objectives. This follows on from the earlier HOC 11/1967 and

ISSN 1360-0869 print/ISSN 1364-6885 online

# 2011 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13600869.2011.594644

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∗Corresponding author. Email: stan.gilmour@thamesvalley.pnn.police.uk

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its constituent reports.8 These themes were picked up in a later Audit Commission report9

and by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.10 Whilst policing teams tasked withtackling crime at an inter-force, national and international level had always made use ofintelligence information11,12 policing at a local level had more often relied on a reactiveapproach to its work – waiting for an incident to occur, and then responding to it.13

However if police commanders were to address the issues of efficiency they neededsome mechanism to understand the demand on their resources and to allow effectivedecisions to be made to deploy resources in line with their force’s priorities and objectives.With Kent police taking a lead, such a mechanism emerged through their structuredapproach to the collection and evaluation of criminal intelligence.14

The Kent model, then referred to as the Crime Management Model,14 was built around anumber of key concepts that can be seen reflected in the current version of the NIM.4 It setsout a structure in which the commander of a Basic Command Unit (BCU) takes responsi-bility for the deployment of policing resources on the basis of intelligence material, target-ing individuals known to be criminality active, and specific problem areas. BCUs varywidely across the country (in scope and in name), but a working definition given by SirRonnie Flanagan in his final report of February 2008 is: ‘A territorial division of apolice force, which typically coincides with one or more local authority boundaries. It isusually organized under the command of a chief superintendent.’15 As well as makinguse of information that becomes available in the normal course of policing, the commanderalso outlines an Intelligence Requirement (a NIM product explained in Note 4) – setting outareas in which information is to be specifically sought in order to support the set prioritiesand objectives. Central to this structure is the ‘Tasking and Co-ordination Group’ consistingof local senior management whose role it is to review the available information and decideupon the day-to-day deployment of resources in line with the local strategy.

This relatively simple process was developed into the NIM as it is used today anddescribed as: ‘a cornerstone for the management of law and enforcement operations inEngland and Wales’.4 The NIM process sets out a system for the collection and evaluationof information, taking a much broader view of the information that should be consideredthan simply intelligence material. That information, having been developed and analysed,is made available to two key meetings: The ‘Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group’,which sets the strategic direction and priorities for policing on a long term basis (typically asix-month or one-year period) including the requirement to develop further intelligence andthe ‘Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination group’, which operates on a much more short termbasis by making decisions on immediate action to be taken. In doing so it relies on currentintelligence, and uses the strategic direction and priorities set by the ‘Strategic Tasking andCo-ordination Group’ to determine what level of resource is appropriate for any givenproblem.

These meetings are central to the success of the NIM business model. It is here that thedecisions are made on the deployment of resources and on where efforts should be made togather information to inform future decisions. If this part of the process fails then, regardlessof how effective the organization is at collecting and evaluating information, the systemfails (the NIM is not alone here, other crime models have experienced similar problems,e.g. Problem Oriented Policing).16 Without significant effort, decision makers can fallinto the trap of being process driven, turning the handle of the National IntelligenceModel’s information collection and tactical resolution tools without actually engagingwith the problems that need to be addressed. Without careful management the NIM canbecome very good at describing the police and not so efficient at describing the policingenvironment. More subtly there is a danger of verification bias when inexperienced

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police managers ‘rubber stamp’ earlier decisions. The meeting is responsible for decidingwhich problems to address, agreeing targeted outcomes, setting the mechanisms in place toaddress those problems, directing future information gathering and evaluating the successof any intervention – it is a high risk environment where managers can easily fall foul tobeing upwardly managed by seasoned practitioners who have their own agenda to follow.This allows the model to be manipulated, a vulnerability that is augmented by its rathertechnical language that can privilege those with specialist knowledge:

A not uncommon observation amongst those who had become familiar with the Model was thatit . . . required substantial reading and re-reading before even the basic principles becameclear.17

People who know their way around the model can use it for their own ends because of thelack of a good general understanding of what it is trying to achieve. To mangle a quote fromChurchill; specialists should be on tap, not on top. The NIM can put specialists on topbecause of the influence they have on decision-making.

When considering the decision-making process it is important to understand the furthercomplications caused by the fact that the National Intelligence Model is not just applied at aBCU level, but is used to address resourcing issues that expand from the local to thenational and international level. The National Intelligence Model seeks to cope with thisrange of policing activity by matching it to one of three levels of activity, and it is tothese that we now turn our attention.

The National Intelligence Model and levels of criminality

The National Intelligence Model is applied across the police service, and its aim is toprovide a holistic business process that can be applied to the policing of crime from neigh-bourhood issues through to national and international criminality. In order to achieve this,The Model defines three levels of activity:

Level 1 is defined as local crime and disorder, including anti-social behaviour, capable of beingmanaged by local resources, e.g. crimes affecting a BCU or small force area.

Level 2 is defined as cross-border issues affecting more than one BCU within a force or affect-ing another force or regional crime activity and usually requiring additional resources.

Level 3 is defined as serious and organized crime usually operating on a national and inter-national scale, requiring identification by proactive means and a response primarily through tar-geted operations by dedicated units. It is also likely to require a preventative response on anational basis.4

This has provided a framework for discussions about the structure of policing in Englandand Wales. Following the government White Paper ‘One Step Ahead’ in 2004 the SeriousOrganised Crime Agency, which merged a number of national law enforcement bodies totackle Level 3 activity, was brought into existence.18 At around the same time the govern-ment set out its vision for twenty-first century policing, putting a heavy emphasis on com-munity partnership and Neighbourhood Policing.19 This continues to be an importanttheme, with the current emphasis at the local level being firmly on local accountability.20,21

The challenges presented by Level 2 issues were well described by Denis O’Connor in his2005 report ‘Closing the Gap’, which highlights the difficulties forces face in addressing

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this level of activity22 when they have no regional policing capability that can be taskedindependently from local resources.

The risk of a silo culture

The National Intelligence Model, as briefly outlined above, has had much success in focus-ing the work of policing since its inception.23,24

However, the three-tier structure has brought new challenges. It has, for some time now,been appreciated that there is a gap in forces’ ability to deal with criminals who traversegeographic boundaries.22,25,26 Others have also commented:

There’s a whole raft of crime that’s now not even being looked at. It is not local enough to betreated by the local police force and not serious enough to be dealt with by SOCA. To a certainextent, the criminals are benefiting from the lines drawn on maps. (Jan Berry, reported in TheTimes)27

This is a natural consequence of tasking an agency (in this case the Serious Organised CrimeAgency, SOCA) with tackling the most serious crime (i.e. transnational organized crime).Inevitably their efforts will be drawn towards the top end of the scale.28 At the same timethere is push at the other end of the spectrum towards Neighbourhood Policing, and addres-sing problems from a (bottom-up) community basis. With resources stretched across thespectrum of policing, the NIM Levels allow teams to point to the model and say ‘that isnot activity occurring at the Level my team works at – it is someone else’s remit’. Whatappears to be a semantic issue can cause a real problem, with significant time and effortbeing spent deciding whose remit a particular issue fits into. This is exacerbated by a per-formance culture where teams will look to ignore issues that do not impact on their perform-ance statistics,29 and the NIM levels provide simple justification for such behaviour. Inreality, this can result in the issue not being dealt with, or not being dealt with effectively.

This is clearly the case at the high end of policing transnational organized crime, whereorganizing30 criminals committing serious crime across national boundaries are beingignored (supra Note. 29). In sum, any three-tier system has, at its core, a fatal flaw –those dealing with either end can ignore-and-deny crime problems to avoid committingtheir scarce resources to the task and they can justify their position with reference to theNIM and its geographic bias. They can adopt a policy that the criminals are Not In MyBack Yard, or ‘nimby-ism’, and refer the problem off to specialist units to tackle (if theychoose to) with a simple statement that it is ‘not my level of criminality’ (described interms as ‘invisible yet powerful constraints’, by Gottschalk and Gudmundsen31). Theresult in the case of the NIM is the ‘Level 2 Gap’ and the latest policy offering from thenew government seems destined to increase this gap. The NIM’s focus on local issuesfor local police commanders added to the latest government policy to increase the strengthof local governance of the police, linked once again to local crime figures, will act as a forcemultiplier for nimbyism.32 The official rhetoric is clear on this:

There are levels of activity beyond the reach of an individual BCU. These include criminalgangs operating over a wider territory, professional criminals involved in highly organisedcrimes and enquiries of national or international significance all which should be addressedat local force level.

Each police force must also support a local BCU by providing facilities and resources that aBCU does not hold, e.g. surveillance teams and complex technical intrusion. Each police

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force’s T&CG policy should detail the mechanisms required for access to such facilities andresources. This may involve personal BCU representation at local force level TT&CG, or a cor-porate tasking application process.33

BCU managers have an unambiguous steer that some levels of criminal activity, includingTransnational Organized Crime (TOC), are beyond their reach.

This difficulty has already started to be recognized, with Sir Denis O’Connor (HerMajesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary) outlining the shortfall in protective services(the Level 2 Gap) which his survey of policing in England and Wales identified.22

However, his solution of more rigorous performance measures at this level runs the riskof further exacerbating the polarization of policing teams, and the proposal to mergeforces to increase resilience has itself become stalled.22 An alternative perspective hasalready begun to emerge in which sectors within the policing spectrum accept that theyneed to look outside the boundaries of work that the NIM would prescribe as being theirremit (for example SOCA making commitments to look ‘downhill’ at Level 2 criminality,34

and forces becoming more actively engaged in co-operation and collaboration.28,35

There are multiple ways in which organized crime cuts across The Levels of criminality,more so than others simply because of its reach. What may appear to be a local problem(and therefore a Level 1 crime) may be driven by a much wider network of offending(which would be considered Level 2 or Level 3 criminality). For example an increase in nui-sance behaviour on the streets and an increase in petty theft may be the result of a streetlevel drug dealer moving into an area, who is going to be relying on transnational organizedcrime for his supply (even if at that level of dealing he could not himself be considered to bean organized criminal).

So what level of response is appropriate, and how are resources allocated to the harmsfrom TOC in communities across the country? This is exactly the sort of scenario suggestedabove where it is more than likely that some time will be spent by police commandersdebating which tier the offending fits into, and therefore whose time, resources and ofcourse budget should be spent addressing it. As described above in the context of Level3 criminality, including TOC, the tendency is for those units within a particular policearea tasked with tackling Level 2 crime to be drawn towards the higher end of that scale,that is those offenders who clearly operate on a transnational and organized basis,leaving officers at the neighbourhood level to tackle the symptoms rather than the causeof the emerging problem. From an intelligence base and with a problem-solving perspectivelocal officers should be encouraged to coordinate a much richer response to the harms ofTOC within their communities, in terms that Goldstein reported:16

[. . .] proactively addressing problems and the factors contributing to them made more sensethan repeatedly responding reactively to the incidents that were the most overt manifestationsof those problems.

In other words, local officers should grip problems and commit to dealing with their rootcauses – clearly in partnership with other units, but should demonstrate leadership in com-bating the big issues, even if they are principally not in their backyard.

There are, however, several impacts of what can be seen as a silo culture – teams ofpolice officers operating within their own sphere without effectively sharing informationinto or out of that sphere and where issues are addressed as if they are contained (andcan be resolved) without reference to anything occurring outside that sphere.

For example, the local team, explicitly tasked with dealing with Level 1 crime, see theproblem of drug dealing as a Level 2 problem, which is not within their remit to tackle.

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It may well be that drug dealing does not feature as a neighbourhood concern or priority,reinforcing the view that this is someone else’s problem. This, however, misses much ofthe subtly of cause and effect, and may result in the most effective method for dealingwith both the local and more widely spread issues being missed or deliberately ignored.Equally, under pressure from local targets, a Level 1 problem can be denied and recast asa Level 2 issue to avoid spending money on a problem that will not win favour from thecommunity.

This is not a matter of semantics or local interpretation of the NIM, but is a natural andfundamental consequence of a particular organization, policing area, or team being alignedwith one of the Levels of the NIM. Considering the example given above, the presence of astreet level drug dealer is most likely to become apparent during the information gatheringphase of the NIM process of the local police area in which the offending is occurring. Thatinformation, fed through the development and analytical systems, will eventually require adecision to be made by the senior management for that area (in line with their priorities andobjectives). Even if an Intelligence Requirement4 is set to gather further information inrelation to this dealer the local area may not have access to details held by other areas ofthe organization, by strategic partners (e.g. Health or Education Services) or by otherlaw enforcement organizations.

In considering how, by building on the success of the National Intelligence Model incollecting and evaluating the information available to the police, an alternative to thethree tier structure of criminality might be developed; it becomes clear that making useof the effective intelligence gathering mechanism but applying a bottom-up andproblem-solving approach to the effective use of resources can suggest an alternative para-digm: Intelligent Problem Solving, i.e. using intelligence to solve problems, rather thancategorize them.

Problem solving is now common parlance within police,16,36,37 especially within thecontext of Neighbourhood Policing. However, there is a tendency to see the National Intel-ligence Model as a process that only supports enforcement activity.

Tilley says ‘It is certainly the case that the details of the NIM allow some space for workwhich is simply not within the domain of ILP (Intelligence Led Policing) . . . though theaccounts of this other work are brief and underdeveloped.’38

Tilley then argues that ‘The National Intelligence Model may be a useful businessmodel for delivering POP (Problem Oriented Policing) and the ILP (Intelligence Led Poli-cing) that it may sometimes require.’38

It is this refocusing of the National Intelligence Model, to more readily accommodate aproblem solving approach, which requires a new approach to the way the model looks atcrime. This can be achieved by putting the emphasis on finding effective interventionsfor the problem that presents itself – rather than pigeon-holing the crime into a NIMLevel and then expecting a specific team to tackle that problem because it has been charac-terized in that way. The recent emphasis on performance, instantiated as ‘Sanctioned Detec-tions’, has also led to a focus on a criminal justice outcome from NIM policing activity andhas pushed other problem solving outcomes into the shadows.39

A conclusion – a new settlement?

For the Home Secretary to get a better grip over serious and organised crime, she needs to relin-quish interference and targeting in the minutiae of local policing issues such as burglary andstreet crime. She also needs to pass responsibility for issues such as interoperability to the pro-fessionals in the police force.40

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The point should not be lost that the current (at time of writing) UK Police Minister waspreviously the Director (and co-founder) of the policy think tank Reform, cited above.The UK General Election of 6 May 2010 brought in a change in Government and with ita new political emphasis based on a coalition understanding of the problems faced bythe police and other public services. This Coalition, of majority Conservative and minorityLiberal Democrat hues, has yet to publish its detailed thoughts on police reform but, inter-estingly, the Conservative mid-term policy review for the police Policing for the People,written by the current Police Minister has disappeared from view only to be replaced bya much more gently phrased White Paper.21

In general, the new Political emphasis is framed in Public Value terms41,42 with citizensempowered as consumers and tax payers prioritized as funders. This has been operationa-lized through the Coalition promise to bring in directly elected officials to oversee the policeand to reinforce the link between effectiveness and recorded local crime figures.21,43 Thisplays once more towards a very ‘backyard’ view and disadvantages the prioritization ofTOC as a problem for the police to solve.44

A view of TOC as principally of ‘grass roots’ concern,45 which is being treated as a stra-tegic issue raises the analogue with the banking crisis of 2007–10. The investment in con-glomerate banking and the effective extinction of high street building societies (from over2000 in 1900 to just 50 in 2010)46,47 seems an apposite comparison to solutions beingsuggested to the problems associated with the local policing of TOC. Taking the stancethat privileges TOC as a security problem, which requires a strategic response,48 the recur-ring solution seems to be focused on a demutualization of local policing structures (directlyaccountable to local people – customer owned) in favour of more distant conglomerates inthe guise of regional or national policing structures (directly accountable to governmentministers or some other ‘shareholder’). The potential gains from such a programme are con-tinually heralded (‘increase police capacity and capability’)49 but the downside is rarelyexplained.

By underpinning the decision making process with Intelligent Problem Solving basedon the concept of threat and harm, rather than geography, we provide a vision for policing– one that fits comfortably alongside the national drive to modernize the way police officerswork by giving them greater flexibility to address the needs and expectations of thepublic.21,28 It asks the questions of every level of the organization: How can I contributeto addressing this problem? Rather than: whose problem is this? It challenges specialistteams to question their approach, not only to look at different ways of working but alsoto see whether they could or should be contributing to problems that are not seen to bewithin their remit. Clearly, specialist and other scare resources cannot be expected to con-tribute to every problem that arises – but where the threat or harm justify it (regardless ofthe perceived seriousness of the offending or the place where it occurs) they have an impor-tant role to play in dealing with the local problems of Transnational Organized Crime.

AcknowledgementsThis article is a summary of the author’s chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Transnational Orga-nized Crime, due for publication in November 2011. The opinions expressed in this article are theauthors’ own and not those of Thames Valley Police.

Notes1. M. Innes and J. Sheptycki, ‘From Detection to Disruption: Intelligence and the Changing Logic of

Police Crime Control in the United Kingdom’, International Criminal Justice Review 14 (2004).

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2. NCIS, The National Intelligence Model (London: National Criminal Intelligence Service,2000).

3. T. John and M. Maguire, ‘Rolling out the National Intelligence Model: Key Challenges’, inCrime Reduction and Problem-Oriented Policing, ed. K. Bullock and N. Tilley (Cullompton:Willan, 2003).

4. ACPO, Guidance on the National Intelligence Model, National Policing Improvement Agencyon behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers, (London: ACPO, 2005).

5. C. Harfield, Defining and Defying Organized Crime: Discourse, Perceptions and Reality,ed. F. Allum and F. Longa (Routledge, London, 2009).

6. Home Office, Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service. HOC 114/1983(London: Home Office, 1983).

7. Home Office, Regional Crime Squads, HOC 249/1964 (London: Home Office, 1964).8. Home Office, Police Manpower, Equipment and Efficiency. HOC 11/1967 (London: Home

Office, 1967).9. Audit Commission (1991) ‘Reviewing the Organisation of Provincial Police Forces’, Audit

Commission Police Paper No 9 (London: Audit Commission, 1991).10. HMIC, What Price Policing?: A Study of Efficiency and Value for Money in the Police Service

(London: HMIC, 1998).11. ACPO, Third Report of the Working Party on a Structure of Criminal Intelligence above Force

Level (The Pearce Report) (London: ACPO, 1978).12. ACPO, Second Report of the Working Party on Operational Intelligence (The Ratcliffe Report)

(London: ACPO, 1986).13. House of Commons, Policing in the 21st Century (Home Affairs Select Committee 7th Report,

Parliament (London: House of Commons, 2008).14. P. Amey, C. Hale and S. Uglow, ‘Development and Evaluation of a Crime Management Model’,

Police Research Paper Series, Paper 18 (London: Home Office, 1996).15. R. Flanagan, The Review of Policing Final Report, 2008. police.homeoffice.gov.uk/public

ations/police-reform/Review_of_policing_final_report (accessed 24 February 2009).16. H. Goldstein, ‘On Further Developing Problem-Orientated Policing: The Most Critical Need,

the Major Impediments and a Proposal’, in Problem-Orientated Policing: From Innovationto Mainstream. Crime Prevention Studies vol. 15 (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press,2003) 13–47.

17. T. John and M. Magurie, ‘The National Intelligence Model: Early Implementation Experience inThree Police Force Areas’ (Working Paper Series no. 50 (School of Social Sciences, CardiffUniversity, Cardiff, 2004)), 18.

18. Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (London:Home Office, 2004).

19. Home Office, Building Communities Beating Crime: A Better Police Service for the 21stCentury, Home Office Policing White Paper (London: Home Office, 2004).

20. Cabinet Office, The Coalition: our Programme for Government. Cabinet Office, London, 2010.http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf

21. Home Office, Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting the Police and the People, HomeOffice White Paper (London: Home Office, 2010).

22. HMIC, Closing the Gap: A Review of the ‘Fitness for Purpose’ of the Current Structure of Poli-cing in England and Wales, Denis O’Connor (London: HMI, 2005).

23. T. John and M. Maguire, The National Intelligence Model: Key Lessons from Early Research.Home Office Online Report 30/04. (Home Office: London, 2004).

24. T. John and M. Maguire, ‘The National Intelligence Model: Early Implementation Experience inThree Police Force Areas’, Paper no. 50, Working Paper Series, School of Social Sciences(Cardiff: Cardiff University, 2004).

25. HMSO, Royal Commission on the Police. Final Report Cmnd 1728 (London: HMSO, 1962).26. ACPO, Report of Sub Committee on Criminal Intelligence (The Baumber Report) (London:

ACPO, 1975).27. The Times, ‘SOCA Performance Slammed’, January 24, 2007.28. Home Office, From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing our Communities Together,

Home Office Policing Green Paper (London: Home Office, 2008).29. S. Gilmour, Understanding Organized Crime: A Local Perspective, Policing 2/1. (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2008), 18–27.

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30. P.C. van Duyne, ‘Crime – Enterprises and the Legitimate Industry in the Netherlands’, inOrganized Crime and its Containment. A Transatlantic Initiative, eds Cyrille Fijnaut andJames Jacobs (Deventer: Kluwer, 1991).

31. P. Gottschalk and Y.S. Gudmundsen, ‘Police Culture as a Determinant of Intelligence StrategyImplementation’, International Journal of Police Science and Management 11, no. 2 (2009):170–182.

32. P. Neyroud and S. Gilmour, ‘Through a Glass Darkly – Some Future Influences on ProfessionalStandards in Policing?’ in The Handbook of Police Ethics and Professional Standards, ed.A. MacVean and P. Spindler (London: New Police Bookshop, 2011).

33. See Note 4, p. 82.34. SOCA Annual Report 2007 / 08: 14.35. HMIC, Valuing the Police: Policing in an Age of Austerity (London: HMIC, 2010).36. H. Goldstein, ‘Improving Policing: A Crime and Delinquency Problem – Orientated

Approach’, Crime and Delinquency 25 (1979): 236–58.37. H. Goldstein, Problem-Orientated Policing (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990).38. N. Tilley, Problem-Oriented Policing, Intelligence-Led Policing and the National Intelligence

Model, Crime Science: Short Report Series, Jill Dando (London: Institute of Crime Science,2003), http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/publications/crime_science_short_reports/problem_oriented_policing.pdf (accessed 20 July 2010).

39. T. Bateman, ‘Further Increases in the Number of Children Processed by the Youth JusticeSystem in England and Wales’, Youth Justice News (London: Sage, 2008).

40. Reform, A New Force (London: Reform, 2009).41. G. Kelly and S. Muers, Creating Public Value: An Analytical Framework for Public Service

Reform (Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office, 2002).42. M. Moore, Creating Public Value (Princeton, NJ: Harvard University Press, 1995).43. See Note 21, p. 13.44. J. Sheptycki, ‘High Policing in the Security Control Society’, Policing 1, no. 1 (2007): 70–79.45. See Note 27, p. 5.46. J. Cook, S. Deakin and A. Hughes, ‘Mutuality and Corporate Governance: The Evolution of UK

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47. Building Society Association (2010). Membership details website: http://www.bsa.org.uk/aboutus/buildsocmember.htm (accessed 20 July 2010).

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