LIBRARY OFBROWN UNIVERSITY

IN b5Mollr 01

Axrxo~Moo~ro~ArrrwCus OF 1897

FUND Grvm E.YMR. AND Mrs.

Jolrar D. Roc~~mmu=.J~.'911

Abstract

Shortly after S:OO in the evening, on'November 9, 1965, a faulty relay ina power station in Canada set in motion a chain of events which resulted in amassive power failure over parts of Ontario, much of New England, and most ofNew York State. The blackout may or may not have been a disaster. It clearlywas no serious crisis. But it did represent a situation in which social organi-zation was under moderate strain. Only by investigating reactions to varyingdegrees of dislocation of social organization can we hope to come to an under-standing of the means by which social systems adapt to disaster. Thus, in thisreport, we examine public response to the blackout by means of 1,300 interviewswith a representative sample of residents of the northeastern United States inorder to increase our knowledge of how society copes with disaster.

An outstanding aspect of public response to the blackout was the absenceof widespread fear,. panic, or disorder. .fnere is probabiy iirtie question thatthis absence is largely due to the ability of individuals to interpret theirinitial encounter with the power loss as an ordinary event. Our evidence showsthat those who interpreted the blackout as ordinary and of'limited scope wereleast likely to experience fear or excitement, and most likely to enjoy the sit-

Of equal importance in maintaining order was the rapid disseminationuation.of information about the blackout. Within a half hour of its inception, one-thirdof the respondents knew the extent of the stricken area, and within one-and-one-half hours, four-fifths of our sample had this information. While the importanceof radio,in diffusing this knowledge cannot be gainsaid, a large number of people:learned the facts about the situation by interpersonal communication. Finally,to some extent, the reactions of particular individuals are controlled by theirperception of the response of others. While this contagion effect might act tospread either fear or calm, the ecological fact that many persons were eitherat home or alone when the blackout struck prevented much of the possible con-tagion of ominous definitions of the situation, and the only contagion of emotions

iii

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of communication and leadership developed within the framework of voluntaryassociations provides a latent structure of authority to which individualsmay turn for guidance in crises. The vitality and legitimacy of such an emer-gency social system rests upon the greater knowledge and higher social statusof its moot prominent members.

V

Foreword

Over the past few years, the National Opinion Research Center has under-taken a number of studies dealing with public reactions to national crises. Inthe late afternoon of November 9, 1965, a massive power failure engulfed theeastern seaboard of the United States in darkness. In most areas, the lightswere out for at least several hours and, in many areas, they were not restoreduntil late evening or the early morning of the following day. To several membersof the staff, this event appeared a highly unusual situation which could providea useful contrast to previous studies of public response to President Kennedy'sassassination and the Cuban missile crisis. On the whole, students of collectivebehavior have tended to investigate only those situations which clearly resultedin panic or in which a disaster clearly incapacitated formal agencies of socialcontrol. Our interest in the blackout was, therefore, stimulated by the factthat, although many of the ingredients for panic and consequent disaster were

bprejeut, such a ~aspoase did not materialize. Survey materials concerning theblackout, we reasoned, would provide an important contrast to studies of situa-tions which materialized in panic and other forms of .undirected behavior., Withthese considerations in mind, the National Opinion Research Center initiated asurvey of residents of the areas affected by the power failure. The study wasprimarily viewed as an investment in the future, hopefully providing a baselinefor studies of other events yet to occur.

Although the National Opinion Research Center was able to underwrite thesampling and interviewing costs of the present study, no funds were availablefor coding or tabulating the materials we collected. Interest of civilian de-fense officials in public behavior and reactions during the blackout resultedin a contractual relationship between the National Opinion Research Center and.the Office of Civil Defense. The preparation of this report, including codingand tabulation of the interview schedules, was completed under Contract No.OCD-PS-66-42 of the Office of Civilian Defense.

1. .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FORRWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LISTOFTABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter. .

I

II

1

III

IV

V

! .,

ANATURAL HISTORYOF THE BLACKOUT . . . . .

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION AND THE EMERGENCYsOCIALsYPm . . , . . . , , . . . * *

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO THE 'BLACKOUT . .

INTERPRRSONALCONTACTDURIN~TRE BLACKOUT .

THE BLACKOUT AS A DISASTER . . . . . . . .

ix

Page

iii

Vii

x i

1

.31

49

68

93

Table _ ,, ._ :. _ ,:. ::'.I. -1 :__:a : .;.'A.::A

x.i

I.2

. _ .: 1. 1 ,,,i\-, . ., ~,::. ,i.i

Situation at Time Blackout Occurred by Education and Sex . . .., _. 6 1 (1

Initial'Interpretation of Blackout b~fPr&io& Eippk'r:ience'and Initial Perception of Scope of Blackout. : . . .'.". '1 ;

I!?.

I.4

1.5.

1.6I

I;‘?

I.,8

I.9

1.10

I.11

I.12

, . .-I-; .: T.,#. l:, ,;&i& .Per&tjon'of Blacko& by.&t;a;;o; ;z.T&& ., ._ .-y,--,.Blackout Occurred. . . . . . . . i . i . . : .' . ."-.J'.".."':' .

:I : . i'Firgt ; f I , ..!7 t ,~ Noticed powe; .ijg-s':ofi,.~~..~i;~a;iod"~;' .rime Bla;kc;'

.Occurred . . . '. .' . . . . . . . f .' . . . "."'. ". .. .:' .' ;":"';' .:..:. _ ! ,:i ;:.:.,::j;j' :>. 1

Power Fail&es 'Experienced'by $asL F&ia.in S'~~,,State,-,.,,i;'.-,Blackout Area. ". ': . . ': '. . ; '.'-'.. ;- ': '?.' 'r ". . . :. , . .

,._,.,, >':T: ,! .; .:.: I !..,:I.. 9 ;.., ;i:,., ,. . -t..;-,i ;, ., /,..!.j..y'Source of Information About Scope of Blackout by Time-Learned

Blackout. Was Rot Restricted to'Loca1 'Area. .- . . "i' -. '. ;- 'I'.';' .i.,S,,.,~~ *:- ;:.,i,y.,.

Source of Information-About Length o: B&k&; by Time .,., _'Learned Blackout Would Continue forSome Hour's . '. i ': ':"'i' . 18

>, : :.., I .'rT:.Time'l&&d'About Length of Blackout by 'Time Learued,,Ab,outScope of Blackout.. . . . .' .- . .- . .' . ,. . . .- -. . . . . . '.: . 20

.: .:. ..,, ..,; :Source' of Informition About Expected Duration of Blackout",by Source of Information About Scope of Blackout andRelative Times of Learning About Duration and Scopeof Blackout. . .,. . . .,,. . . ,-. ., ,*. ..-; *. :, * ,...! 7 ', .*: - ,.*. -:. :, . . .

; .., .;Time Learned About Scope and Expected Duration of"Blackout.'by

Ownership and Use of Portable and Car Radios . . . . . . . .

21

2j

Observations of Holiday, 'Public-Spirited and Mercenary )': ,'

Behavior by Length of Exposure to Blackout . . . . . . 1 . . 24

Observation of Holiday; Public-Spirited, 'a&Mercenary ""'.,Behavior by Place of Residence . . .-,.,,,;. :;.: . 1. .,,.i ,,. ' ;., ..c; :i 26

Page

9

10., .',

11

12;: --

15

17

Table

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Page

111.6 Worry About Rioting and Looting and Worry About CriminalsRobbing Home by Observation of Mercenary Behavior . . . . . . .

III.7 Worry About Spouse by Situation at Time Blackout Occurred,Sex, and Employment Status of Women, Currently MarriedP e r s o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

III.8 Worry About Own or Husband's Job by Situation at TimeBlackout Occurred, Sex, and Employment Status of Women. . . . .

IV.1 Percentage of Persons Calling or Visiting SelectedOrganizations and Relatives During the Blackout . . . . . . . .

IV.2 Contact with Relatives by General Fear and Sex. . , . . . . . . .

IV.3 Contact with Relatives During Blackout by General Fear, Sex,and Duration of Blackout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.IV.4 Contact with Relatives During Blackout by General Fear, Sex,

and Education . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . .

‘IV.5 Contact with Relatives During Blackout by General Fear, Sex,arid N-xzbcr Of Rclctivco Living in Community . . . . . . . . . .

IV.6 Contact with Relatives During Blackout by General Fear, Sex,and Number of Contacts with Relatives in Past Two Weeks . . . .

IV.7 Summary of Regression of Contact with Relatives DuringBlackout on Selected Independent Variables. . . . . 1 . . . . .

IV.8 Daily Telephone Chats with Friends by Sex and Education . . . . .

IV.9 Contact with Relatives During Blackout by General Fear,Sex, and Daily Telephone Chats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV.10 Attempts to Contact Spouse During Blackout by Psychological'Feelings and Sex, for Married Men and W&en SeparatedFrom Spouse at Time Blackout Occurred . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V.l Psychological Reactions to the Chicago Air Raid Warning byInterpretation of its Significance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V.2 Selected Feelings During Blackout by Initial Interpretationof the Blackout, Initial Perception of its Scope, and Sex . . .

V.3 Relationship Between Interpretation of Sounding of ChicagoAir Raid Siren by Respondents and Their Companions . . . . . .

. xiii

60

63

66

72

73

7s

77 .

79 .

81

83

87

88

90

96

9 8

100

CEAPTRRI

A NATURAL KISTORY OF THE BLACKOUT

The major transmission lines of the Northeast Power Grid--a pool con-necting private and public electric utilities in portions of Ontario, New York,New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the New England States--sprawl out across New Yorkand New England in the shape of an elongated "T." The crossbar runs from theNiagara Falls--Buffalo Area to Boston, while the stem branches southward atSchnectady to link up with the generating facilities of Consolidated Edison inthe New York City area. The system or grid was formed by the member utilitiesboth to provide greater reliability in consumer service and to effect more econom-ical use of power generating plants. The integrated system allows local utilitiesto cope with power failures by drawing upon the reserves of the entire system,using electricity supplied by member companies when their own generating facilitiesfail. The system is also economical for it circumvents needless duplication ofpower generating capacities and reserves by the member companies. In the ruralareas of upper New York State, the pattern of power consumption is determined bythe milking schedules of dairy farms and crop harvesting cycles. The,periods ofpeak power use are different in the larger metropolitan areas where the patternof power consumption is governed by the daily cycles of work-residence commutation.Exchanges of power between these areas and other places such as tourist spas anduniversity, towns on still different schedules of peak power needs result in the:more economical use of existing facilities. Individual places do not need largereserves of power for potential overloads, since they can draw upon reserves"spinning" freely in the integrated system. The member utilities also avoid the

necessity of maintaining generating capacities sufficient to cover their maximal: peak period loads; in periods of slack use they can export power to the grid,

while at peak periods they may import power from the system to complete the

,l-

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exchange cycle which not only makes efficient use of existing facilities but also

reduces electrical charges to the consumer.

At 5:00 P.M. on Tuesday, November 9, 1965, power Was being transmitted

eastward from Niagara Falls along the major transmission and trunk lines of the

Northeast Power Grid. New York City was drawing heavily upon the system, as it

normally does during the period of peak, metropolitan use when thousands of

housewives are preparing dinner and the electric subways and suburban trains are

whisking thousands of workers home. The flows were regular and the Northeast

Pcwer Grid was operating normally. In Canada, S$r Adam Beck Station No. 2--just

across the U.S. border in Queenston--was feeding some 350 kilowatts of power

west to Hamilton, Ontario. This flow was governed by a relay, a small device

which measures the electric power load on a transmission line and sets load

limits beyond which circuit breakerq will automatically shut off the flow of

electricity. Shortly, after 5:00 P.M. a malfunction in the relay governing the

flow of electricity from Sir Adam Beck Station No. 2 to Hamilton set fn motion

a chain of events which cast parts of Ontario, most of New York State, and much.

of New Bngland into a massive blackout.

The faulty relay at Sir Adam Beck Station No. 2 resulted in an overload

on the line and caused relays on other lines feeding‘througb the plant to

activate circuit breakers which terminated the flow of 1.6 million kilowatts

then passing through the Beck station, N+th nowhere q$se to turn, the electric-

ity flowing into the Beck plant reversed direction and raced back across upper

New York State along the main transmission lines of the grid. The sudden surge

of power overloaded local utilities along the line, causing circuit breakers and

safety equipment to shut down generating facilities from Rochester to Boston.

Only a minute after the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission which operates the

Beck station succumbed, both Rochester and Binghamton shut down. Two minutes

later, at 5:19 P.M., the Orange and Rockland Pover.Company which serves the

west bank of the Hudson River just above New York City, weut down, though part

of the company’s service area was saved by a supervisor who, detecting the sud-

den surge of power, threw the switch that cut his plant from the interlocking

sys tern. Massachusetts and Rhode Island were out at 5:21 P.M., excepting Peabody

-3-

and Holyoke which have their own municipal power plants and are not part of the

grid. Having exhausted the main transmission lines, the excess of power pro-

ceeded to invade trunk lines adjacent to the main belts. Niagara Mohawk Power

which serves Buffalo and the surrounding area was partially shut off at 5:22 P.M.,

while the Central Hudson Gas and Electric Company which provides for the area

above Orange and Rockland Counties went completely out at 5:25 P.M. The sudden

surge of 1.6 million kilowatts through the grid thus had a “cascade” or “domino”

effect, knocking out one utility after anocher in rapid succession and creating

a huge power vactium along the main transmission lines of the interlocking system.

Within the Northeast Power Grid flows of electricity are governed to a

large extent by electronic computers, though individual utilities retain the

ability to remove themselves from the system on relatively short notice. As the

power which had been flowing through the Beck station returned and knocked out

utilities from Rochester to Boston, the self-regulating system responded by

diverting power generated by still operating facilities into the power vacuum

along the main arteries of the system. As early as 5:15 P.M. the lights dimmed

seriously in New York City. But before instrumentation checks indicating Con--, . .solidated Edison should withdraw Krom the system could Lr comyrelad, the o,eetiiaioLs

in New York City automatically shut down, unable to meet the excessive demands

placed upon them by the power vacuum to the north. ‘One minute after New York City

vent out, Long Island was blackened; by 5:30 P.M.-- three minutes after the failure

in New York City--most of Connecticut was out and the entire Northeast was thrown

into a darkness broken only by the glare of’automobile lights, the reflected light

of the moor., and the electric lights of a few establishments--military bases,

hospitals, and modern buildings--with independent sources of backup power. Only

the southern part of the Northeast Power Grid was spared by the operation of

automatic circuit breakers which severed New Jersey and Pennsylvania from the net-

work wher the power de&and became excessive. 1

Tnis is not a science fiction story, but a brief account of an actual

technological breakdown which caused darkness to engulf the Northeast during the

rush hour of November 9, 1965. Newspaper accounts of the event provide illustra-

tions,of the dramatic situations in which many persons were stranded by the power

failure: stories of persons trapped in elevators between floors., reports of

1This account of the technological failures resulting in the blackout isadapted, paraphrased, and otherwise plagiarized from A.M. Rosenthal and Arthur Gelb,editors, The Night the Lights Went Out (New York: New American Library, SignetBooks, 1965). Tinis volume is authored by various members of the staff of the NewYork Times, the only New York City paper which went to press during the blackout.

,I ,

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i

physicians completing emergency treatment by candlelight or the flicker of matches,

accounts of cosnuter trains and their passengers halted betveen stops and under

rivero for many hours, and tales of lighted runways disappearing before approach-

ing aircraft. All of these events--implausible though they may seem--occurred

during the course of the eastern seaboard blackout. However, the reactions of

citizens to the blackout did not appear to be as varied as the situations in

which they found themselves. Although there were occasional reports of robbing,

looting, a riot at the Walpole State Prison in Massachusetts, and some spread of

rumors concerning sabotage and bombing of the Niagara Falls hydroelectric station,

the press reports reveal that public behavior on the whole was orderly and calm.

Purpose and Design of the Study

Despite the publicity given to the blackout by the mass media, a full

portrait of public reactions to the blackout is missing. We have no substantial

evidence concerning how the public’s reactions were conditioned by the situations

in which they found themselves when the blackout occurred and hardly any indics-

tion of post-blackout behavior, including both attempts to explain the phenomenon .

and to make preparations for future emergencies of this kind. Except for a

vague impression that the radio stations (which remained in operation during the

blackout by using auxiliary power generators) were an important channel of conrmuni-

cation, we have little knowledge of how the news of the blackout was diffused and

the rapidity with which it was diffused. Answers to these and related questions

are, understandably, not to be found in press reports, for the media are equipped.

best to describe the variety of behaviors and situations which occurred during

the blackout and not at all equipped to record the statistical frequency of their

occurrence, much less study the relationships between the behaviors, feelings,:

attitudes, and cognitive beliefs of individuals during and after the blackout.

Knowledge of the distribution of public reactions to emergencies and an under-

,standing of the situations which give rise to them or of the syndromes in which

they are embedded can provide clues to the performance of social systems in

periods of unusual stress when routiniaed channels of communication are closed,

common sources of legitimation and authority are incapacitated, and individuals

are forced to cope with novel situations in which appropriate behavior has not

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been well defined by institutionalized social roles. Such information is

useful in the planning of formal strategies for coping with possible, though

improbable and unexpected emergencies. Situations such as the blackout--

though accidental, rather than planned--can also be viewed as experimental

manipulations of the social system, providing the rare opportunity of gaug-

ing the effects of social organization on individual behavior by temporarily

disrupting an established pattern of collective behavior. Quite apart

from the inconvenience and personal tragedies which often accompany

emergencies and disasters, the sociologist can hope to learn more about

the way behavior is normally conditioned by social organization from investi-

gations of adaptations in periods of crisis.

With these broader considerations in mind, the National Opinion Research

Center has recently undertaken a number of studies of public behavior and

attitudes during dramatic breakdowns of or strains on the social system.

Included are investigations of public responses to the assassination of

President Kennedy, 2the Cuban missile crisis, 3 and the Bedford-Stuyvesant

riots in New York during the summer of 1964. 4 The eastern seaboard blackz;t

2See Paul B. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, “A.National Survey onPublic Reactions and Behavior,” in Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker,editors, The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 149-177, and Norman M. Bradburn andJacob J. Feldman, “Public Apathy and Public Grief,” in Greenberg and Parker,editors, z. cit., pp. 273-286.

3Norman M. Bradburn and David Caplovitz, Reports on Happiness

(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 95-127.

4 Paul B. Sheatsley, “Neighborhood Reastions to a Local Riot,” PaperPresented at the Annual Meetings of the American Association for PublicOpinion Research, Swampscott, Massachusetts, 6.May 1966.

-- _l. _ --.. . _ . - _- .-.-.- --_-.-. __ ..--7

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,

of interviews would be conducted in New York City. In addition, a quota was

imposed upon the employment status of women in order to insure that the

proportion of employed women in the sample would approximate that known forthe universe from which the sample was drawn. In sum, the quotas imposed

upon the sample were designed to yield an appropriate fraction of interviews

with employed women and relatively more interviews with men and New York

City residents-- three groups of individuals which were more likely to have

been dramatically affected by the blackout. Consequently, the reader must

remember that the results shown in this report can be affected by the quotas

imposed on the sample if place of residence (New York City vs. other) and

sex have independent effects upon the particular dependent variable under

study. The exceptions to this caution are, of course, those tabulations

in which place or residence and sex are explicitly introduced as controls.

provided another occasion for investigating public responses to failure

of the social system and its technological base. We did not, of course,

expect to glean a thorough understanding of behavior in crises from our

investigation of the blackout or from any one of the studies which preceded

it. Rather, it was our hope that the findings from the blackout would

comprise another small piece useful in solving the jigsaw puzzle’ of col-

lective behavior. Ocly from the accumulated evidence of the investigations

of the Kennedy assassination, the Cuban crisis, the New York riots, the

blackout, and future studies do we hope to piece together some major evidence

on the operation of social systems in distress and the emergence of latent

patterns of authority and legitimation in such periods.

The survey of the eastern seaboard blackout, like most research on

disasters and emergencies, was necessarily planned and executed with

relatively great speed in order to avoid distortions attributable to recall

over prolonged periods. Even 60, several unavoidable delays prevented our

interviewers from snteriag the field until Monday, Wovembor 15, lP65, s i r

days after the blackout occurred. The interviewing, however, proceeded with

reasonable speed: 24 per cent of the interviews were completed during the

first week the study was in the field and another 23 per cent were completed

in the following three days; the interviewing was completed by November 30,

1965, or within three weeks of the blackout. In all, a total of 1,313 inter-

views were completed; of these, 604 were completed in New York City and its

iassediate environs, while the remaining 709 interviews were spread over the

Utica, Albany-Schenectady-Trog Boston, Waterbury (Connecticut), and

Paterson-Clifton-Passaic. (New Jersey) Standard Metropolitan Areas.

The sample was drawn by a two-stage procedure which maintains prob-’

ability sampling to the block level and employs quota sampling within blocks.

Quotas were imposed upon the sex and area1 composition of the sample so that

relatively too many men would be interviewed and a disproportionate number

Situation When the Blackout First Occurred

-In most a&s, the pz;-=r fa”..- rmr..rrrA-...-+ -CI..LL-- ot apprc::iz.-tely 5:30 P.M.during the rush hour when many persons were making their way home from work.

Consequently, one expects men and women to be in’somewhat different circum-

stances when the blackout first occurred, Table 1.1 shows the situations in

which respondents found themselves when the electricity failed according to

sex and socio-economic status. It is readily apparent from the table that

more than half of both men and women were at home when the blackout first

occurred. However, men were on the whole more likely than women to be at

home with their spouses and, as expected, more likely than women to be at

work. . .

The situations in which respondents found themselves vary not only

according to sex, but according to years of school completed. Since lower

status men are frequently engaged in shift work, it is not surprising to find

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TABLE I.1

SITUATION AT TIME BLACKOUT OCCUEBBD BY EDUCATION AND SEXthat higher status men were less likely to be at home with their wives than

lower status men. White collar workers often work from nine to five, while

blue collar workers--on construction jobs or on day shift--are frequently

through somewhat earlier in the afternoon. Thus, it is not surprising thatlllen with higher levels of educational attainment were more likely to be on

public vehicles, in cars, in stations, or on the street (“all other”) thanmen with lower amounts of formal schooling. The socio-economic differen-tials in situation when the blackout struck observed for men are not

duplicated for women. In part this reflects the lower levels of labor force

participation among women and the patterns of sex differentiation in familial,

roles, The table does show that women with higher levels of formal education

were more likely to be at home with only their children, a pattern which

doubtless reflects both (1) the inverse relationship among women between

education and labor force participation and (2) the pattern of assortative.mating. Higher status women are not only less likely to be employed, but they

are pore likely to be married to men employed in white collar occupations who

would have been in transit when the power failed. However, the socio-economicdifferenciais observed in Table 1.1 are not large; when the power failed most

persons were already in the comfortable confines of their own home--a feature

of the timing of the blackout which doubtless helped reduce.confusion and

8 tem anxie ty .

Initial Interpretations of the Blackout

Temporary electrical failures are fairly ccmmon, so when the blackout

first struck residents had no particular reason for alarm over the meaning and

implications of its vast coverage. As one can infer from the marginal totals

of Table 1.2, nearly two-thirds of the respondents report previous power

failures in their neighborhoods. The marginal totals of the table also reveal

that 69.6 per cent of the respondents thought, when it first occurred, that theblackout was restricted to their immediate environment. On first noticing thepower loss, three-fourths of the respondents failed to see anything unusual

1Situation When Blackout

First Occurred

M a l e s , tots1

At home aloneAt home with spouseAt home with other adults on1At home with children onlyAt workOn public vehicleIn carAll other

Females, total

At home aloneAt home with spouseAt home with other adults on1At home with children onlyAt workOn public vehicleIq car *All other

Males

Females

99.9% 99.97- -

99.9% 100.1% 100.0%

9.2 10.6 7.5 10.3 8.639.0 52.0 43.9 39.4 27.05.6 2.2 6.4 7.9 6.02.9 2.2 8.1 1.8 0.7

18.1 17.3 17.9 17.0 19.54.7 1.1 1.7 5.5 8.67.9 5.6 5.2 7.3 11.6

12.5 8.9 9.2 10.9 18.0

99.9% 99.8; 100.0% 100.0%

15.0 20.4 16.526.1 32.7 22.313.8 17.3 13.620.9 12.2 18.47.1 7 .I. 7.83.9 1.0 2.93.6 2.0 4.99.6 7.1 13.6

99.9%

11:624..212.624.28.66.13.59.1

14.82 7 . 013.124.64.1

3 . 34.19.0

Percentage Distributions

Bases for Percentage Distributions

784 179

521 98

Total cases in table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

No answer on years of school completed. . . . . .

Total sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 7 3I

165I

267

103 198 122

. . . . . . . . . . 1,305

. . . . . . . . . . 8

. . . . . . . . . . 1,313

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about the blackout. Although Table I.2 shows that those who had previously

experienced power failures in their neighborhoods and/or who thought the

blackout was localized were initially more likely to regard the blackout as

usual, the table also shows that, with a single exception, the majority of

respondents initially regarded the power failure as ordinary regardless of

their past experience with electric failures and their perception of the

blackout's scope.

TABLE I.2

INITIAL INTERPRRTATION OF BLACKOUT BY PREVIOUS EXPERlEHCEANB IBlTIAL PERCEPTION OF SCOPE OF BLACKOUT

Previous Power Failurein Neighborhood

Total

Yei

No

.Fotal-.Yes

NO

Per Cent Saying Blackout Was Ordinary

I Perceived Scope of Blackout WhenFirst Noticed

Total Just the Block or Whole City,spot County, State

Respondent WaighborhoodArea OX

Was in . Larger AreaI

Case Bases for Percentages

"if

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,311

IA on initial interpretation of blackout . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Totalsample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

The general tendency for respondents initially to regard the power

failure as a usua1 event also holds in a variety of situations. Whether at work,

at home, or in transit, Table I.3 shows that the majority of respondents viewed

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the power failure as a c-on occurence when they first became aware of it.

Although persons in public vehicles (other than trains) and at work tended

to regard the blackout acl somewhat more unusual than others, there is no

evidence that they perceived any real or potential threat in the situation.

-As Table I.4 shows, most respondents, regardless of their situation, became

aware of the power failure through observation of relatively common malfunc-

tions in the electrical system. Those at hwe noticed the power loss by

failure of the lights or appliances; those at work observed the shutdown of

electrically powered equipment, as well as the loss of lights; those in

transit, the malfunction in the street lights. All of these failures fall

within the range of common experience; they may be caused by blown fuses, the

overloading of circuit breakers, and other events less ominous than a region

wide power failure.

TABLE I.3

INITIAL PERCEPTION OF BLACKOUT BY SITUATION AT TIl.BI BLACKOUT IJCCIJRRBB

Situation at Time Blackout Occurred

Per CentSapin-

Blacko:tOrdinary

75.6%

Numbero f

Cases

Total, all respondents

At home 79.0

1,311

842

Alone 76.0 150With spouse 79.4 441With adults other than spouse 75.4 .118With children only 84.2 133

At work 67.8 180 .

Not at work or at home 70.6 289

On public vehicle 74.6 59Train 87.5 32Other .59.3 27

In car 72.8 81All other 67.8 149

Total cases in tab.le. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,311

NA on initial interpretation of blackout. 2. . . . . . . .Total sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

- _ _ _ _. ‘F

.

-12-

TABLB I . 4

BCH FIRST NOTICED POWER WAS OFF BY SITUATION AT TME BLACKOUT OCCURRED

Situation at TimeBlackout Occurred

Total, allrespondent6

At home, total

Alonewith spouseWith children

onlyWith adults

ocher thans p o u s e

At work

In transit inpublic con-veyance

In carAll other

Per Cent Noticed Power Was off Because:a I

ghtsIenr:jut

)pliancesWentOff

lchineryltopped

i

Number

Allo f

cherlCases

16.8

54.0

86.084.9

82.0

80.5

86.7

16.6

23.8

22.024.1

27.1

21.2

1.7

. . .

6.26.0

2.6

0.6

. . .0.7

0.8

0.8

15.6

. . .

. . .0.7

10.0 2.0 5.8 1,313

1.7 . . . 3.6 844

3.3 . . . 3.3 1500.7 . . . 3.2 443

1.5 . . . 3.0 133

3.4 . . . 5.9 118

8.3 . . . 2.8 180

20.3 42.4

.76'.5 . . .18.8 0.7

aCacegories are not mutually exclusive; sum'of any row may exceed100 per cent.

Tie results displayed in Tables I.2 to I.4 reveal that the majorityIn sum, -

of rhe popnlatio: neither found nor had occasion to find anything extraordinary

about their initial encounter with the blackout., Past experience,i n i t i a l

observations of the blackout's scope, and the manner in which the power failure

was initially encountered predisposed individuals.to accept the power failure as

a temporary modification of their immediate environment without portent for

their lives or the future. There is probably little.question that the failure

of the blackout to produce any widespread panic, disorder, or fear is in large

part due to the ability of respondents to interpret their initial encounter with

-13-

the power loss as an ordinary interruption of electric services. Even if thefull scope and ultimate length of the blackout could have been known at the

precise moment the power failed, it is doubtful if any extensive‘panic wouldhave occurred. As Charles E. Fritz has observed,

The tendency to interpret disaster cues within a framework ofnormal expectations has been reported in virtually every disasterstudied. It helps account for people's delay in 'taking precau-tionary and protective measures appropriate to the threat. . .When the threat becomes clearly defined--when the danger isrecognized as imminent and personal--people usually take actionsto protect themselves and o.hers rather than engage in irrationalacts which increase danger. 5

When the electrical system collapsed, no direct threat was posed to majority

of persons; without knowledge of its vast scope , people could incorporate theblackout into their preformed conceptions of permissable permutations in their

situations. Consequently, the blackout posed for most persons neither the

opportunity nor the motives for either "panic" or, as we shall subsequently see,the milder psychological reactions of fright and anxiety.

Diffusicn cf the ??c-wo

Once the blackout occurred, normal channels of cormnunication through

the mass media were partially or wholly closed. On the one hand, radio andtelevision stations themselves experienced power l.osses and, on the other hand,

only persons wirh baccery operated, portable radio and television sets or car

radios had direct access to broadcasts of radio and television stations operat-

ing on emergency power. As Table I.5 shows, nearly all of the television sra-

tions in the six state blackouc area--Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hadlpshire,

New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont --experienced power failures. Nearly two-thirds of the television stations affected by &he utility failure were disabled

for the duration of the blackout. The situation of FM broadcast radio stations

5Charles E. Fritz, "Disasrer," in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet,editors, Contemporary Social Problems (New York: Rarcourt, Brace, and World,Inc., 1961). pp. 670-671.

-14-

was much the same, but the performance of unlimited time, standard broadcast

stations was superior. The general shutdown of television and FM stations

was probably of little consequence, since the number of portable TV or FM

receivers operable during the blackour: is probably not large. However, tran-

sistor radios capable of reception on standard bands are fairly canmon and

enabled many persons to receive news during the course of the blackout.As

Table I.5 shows, standard broadcast radio stations were less prone to power

failures than either the FM or television stations. Even the starions

broadcasting on standard bands which experienced power failures were able to

restore service more quickly than similarly affected FM and TV broadcasters.

Of all standard broadcast stations shut down by the blackout, over a third

were able to resume broadcasting on emergency sources of power within 15 minutes

of the power failure. Consequently, individuals with transistor radios had

nearly continuous access co news coverage during the blackout. If the ability

of persona initially to assimilate the blackout as a normal occurrence con-

tributed to an absence of immediate fear, probably the access to reassuring

information through the radio helped keep any latent fears and worries from

moqunting unduly as the blackout progressed.

Neither the scope nor the eventual length of the blackout were known

to persons when the blackout first occurred. Diffusion of information concern-

ing the scope and probable length of the power failure had to occur through the

radio and other channels of communication after the power failed.These are

most likely the two most important pieces of information which were spread over

the course of the blackout, for knowledge of its scope and probable duration

must have triggered interpretations of the phenomenon and decisions for coping

uir.h it.

Since many persons had transistor radios and radio stations remained in

operation during the course of the blackout, one might be inclined to infer that

a single channel of communication accounted for the spread of information during

the power failure. Actually, our data reveal that several channels of cosrnuni-

cation tended to complement each other in diffusing knowledge about the scope

and duration of the blackout. Table I.6 gives the relationship between the

-15-

TABLE I .5

FIXER FAILURES EXPERIENCED BY MASS H?XlIA IN SIX STATE BULCKODT AREA

Duration of Power Loss

Total, all stations with power failures

Disabled for duration of power failure

Resumed operation with emergency power

Within 15 minutes of power failure

Within -30 minutes of power failure

Within 1 hour of power failure

Within 2 or more hours of power failure

All stations in operation

Total number of stations in area

Responding to questicnnaire

In operation

With power failure

Without power failure

Not in operation

Not responding to questionnaire

i?iigj=FPer Cent Distribution

100.0%

65.2

34.8

26.1

- -

4.3

4.3

Source : Committee on Commerce of the United States Senate, InterimReport’on the Northeast Pcwer Failure “Responses to Inquiries About the North-east Power Failure, No&nber 9 and 10’ 1965 ” 89th Congress, 2nd SessionSenate Report No. 1079 (Washington, D!C.: 6.S. Government Printing Off&e19661, pp. 61-63. ,

Per Cent Reporting PowerFailures

80.2% 87.4% 93.9%

Number of Cases

174 168 51

173 151 49

172 143 49

138 . 125 46

34 18 31 8 -_

1 ‘1 7 2

-16-

time respcodects first learned about the scope of the blackout and the source

of their information about the dimensions of the power failure. From the total

row of the table, one can observe that about half the respondents first learned

of the blackout’s scope through radio programs. However, nearly a third of the

respondents were informed by their friends, neighbors, or relatives that the

power failure was not restricted to a local area, a finding which indicates that

radio conmunications were augmented by second stage communications through

sociometric ties. As one might expect, Table I.6 reveals that the later a person

heard about the scope of the blackout, the more likely he was to be informed by_I

personal cocununicarion and the less likely he was to have learned from the mass

wdia. Diffusion of information through sociometric circles, kinship relations,

and neighborly acquaintances can occur only after knowledge has been placed into

the interpersonal network at one link in the chain. Consequently, it is not

surprising that interpersonal communication of the news about the blackout’s

acope became relatively more effective at later stages in the power failure.

Yhe overall percentage of persons who first learned of the scope of the blackout

thr?+ interpersonal ties seems surprisLngly large and serves to emphasize the

Importance of informal modes of communication in effecring rapid diffusion of

information in times of emergency, crisis, and other statistically infrequent

occasions when it is desirable to transmit messages to the entire population.

By 7roo P.M..’or less than two hours after the blackout occurred,

approximately four-fifths of t.he respondents knew the blackout extended beyond

their local area (see marginal totals in Table 1.6). However, by the same time,

just a liccle more than half the population knew that the blackout would continue

for some hours (See marginal totals in Table 1.7). Clearly, information about

the probable daratio? of the blackout diffused somewhat less rapidly than infor-

mation about 1cs scope. The relative importance of the channels of communica-

tlon rhrocgh which knowledge of the persistence of the blackout was acquired

changes somewhat from that observed in Table I.6 for the sources of knowledge

about the scope of the power loss. *Although Table I.7 shows that the radio and

personal communicat.ions by friends, neighbors, and relatives remained major

sources of information about when restoration of utilities could be expected,

-17-

TABLE I .4

SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOLlT SCOPE OF BLACKOHT BY TIME LEARNEDBLACKOUT WAS NOT RBSTRICTED TO LOCAL AREA

,I Source of Information About Scope of Blackout* I

Time HeardAbout Scopeof Blackout

Personal ToldTold T o l d b y Number

by Official Friend, Heardo f

an,)

Srriiger Neighbor, or It onRadio Cases

Relative

ITotal

5-6 P.M.

6-7 P.M.

7-a P..M.

After 8 P.M.

Per Cent Giving Each Source

4.4% 4.1% 5.2 32.7%

7.9 4.5 4.5 27.9

2.5 3.3 4.7 33.2

3.2 5.1 7.0 39.9

2.7 5.5 a.2 38.2

’ 51.4% 1,287

55.1 419

54.8 600

39.9 158

35.5 110

*Multiple responses permitted; “other” category not shown.

Total cases in table. . . . . . . . . . 1287Don’t know on time !:eard about scope. . 22.Don’.tknow on time heard about scope

and NA on how knew not local. . . . . 3NAonhowknewnotlocal. . . . . . . .-.1

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

the table also indicates that more respondents found out about the length of the

blackout from the radio than found out about the scope of the blackout from the

radio; Conversely, persons were less likely to find out.about the length of the

blackout than about its scope from sociometric ties. This appears to be a wholly

reasonable change in the relative importance of the two channels. On the average,individuals learned about the scope of the blackout prior to acquiring information

about its duration. However, once an individual became aware of the vast area

covered by the power failure, it seems plausible to surmise that he would no

longer define it as a usual event and would seek further information about it by

either keeping his radio on or turning to his radio for further details about the

-19--18-

TABLE I.7

SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT LENGTH OF PLACROUT BY TIME LRARNL?D BLACKOUTWOULD CONTINUE FOR SOMR HOURS

.me Heard About Lenghof Blackout

otal

5-6 P.M.6-7 P.M.7-8 P.M.

8-9 P.M.

After 9 P.M.

Source of Information About Lel

RespondentSurmisedBlackoutWould

Continue

2.5%

6.8

2.0

2.8

1.5

0.7

th of Blackout*r Cent Giving Each :Told by

Official Told(e.g. by

Policeman, StrangerFireman)

2.8% 3.3%

2.6 1.7

1.9 2.6

2.5 3.2

2.2 5.8

8.2 5.2

source

*nultiple responses permitted; “other” category not shown.

NumberOf

Cases

1,206

117

537

281

137

134

T o t a l c a s e s i n t a b l e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Don’t know on time heard about length.

I,‘“,:

Don’t know on time heard about length and NA on source ofinformation on blackout length . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NA on source of information on blackout length . . . . . .t:

_ _

Total sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

evefit. Such a pattern of behavior, in which respondents turn or stay tuned to the

mass media once they become aware of an unusual event, tends to make the media more

important sources of.information as time elapses.

The pattern of responses posited to account for the relatively greater

importance of the radio as a source of information about the duration than about the

scope of the power failure can be studied in greater detail. First, however, it is

necessary to study Table I.8 which shows the relationship between time heard about

scope and time heard about Length of blackout. As one can see from the upper panel

of Table 1.8, the later one learned about the scope of the blackout, the more

Likely one was to Learn about the.length of the blackout at approximately the same

time. (The relevant percentages are those entered along the,.diagonal of the table.)

This, of course, is what one would expect aa more information about the black-

out’s duration, as well as 6cope, was diffused in the population. From thebottom panel of Table 1.8, we can see that only 15 or 1.2 per cent of therespondents learned about the Length of the blackout before the hourly period

in which they learned of its scope. Another 51.8 per cent of the respondents

learned about the scope and the length of the blackout at about the same time

(see diagonal entries of bottw panel of Table 1.8). The remaining respondents

--47.0 per cent--learned about the Length of the blackout after they learned

of its scope. In sum, Table.I.8 confirms our previous inference, from the

distributions of times Learned about the scope and times learned about the

length of the blackout, that people on the average learned about the scope

before they learned about its Length. Table I,8 shows that practically no one

Learned about the probable duration of the blackout before they knew its extent.

In Table 1.9, we examine the relationship between how a person Learned-about the scope of the blackout and E he learned about its length, controlling

for whether he Learned about its length before or about the same time as its

scope. Among respondents who Learned about the scope and length of the blackout

at approximately the same time, those who heard about its scope from either the

radio or socioraetric acquaintances were qditc likclp to hear cbout its Lcngch

from the s source. For example, among those who heard about the scope of the

blackout from their friends, neighbors, or relatives, 71 per cent also heard

about the expected duration of the power failure from’ their acquaintances. How-ever,.in the panel of Table I.9 pertaining to those who heard about the Likely

duration of the blackout after they found out about its scope, we see that per-

sons were not so Likely to hear-about the Length of the blackout from the same

source that they found out’about its scope, unless they had found out about the

scope on the radio. Among those who Learned about the duration of the blackout

after learning its scope, we find that only 35’per cent of those who heard of its

scope from acquaintances first heard of its expected duration from acquaintances.

In sm, it appears that individuals were likely to learn about the scope of the

blackout either first hand from the radio or second hand through friends. If

they did not simultaneously learn about its duration, persons then turned to the

media for additional information, a pattern which made the radio a relatively more

important source of news about the expected duration of the power failure.

-2o- . .L

TABLE I .8

TIME LRARKKDABOUTLENGTH OF BIACKOUT BY TIMRLEARNED ABOUT SCOPE OF BLACKOUT

Time LearnedAbout Scopeof Blackout

Total

5 - 6 P.M.

6 - 7 P.M.

7 - 8 P.M.

8 - 9 P.M.

After 9 P.M.

Total

5 - 6 P.M.

6 - 7 P.M.

7 - 8.P.M.

8 - 9 P.M.

After 9 P.M.

Tire Learned About Length of Blackout

Per Cent Distribution

9.6% 44.2% 23.4% 11.3% 11.6% 100.1%

28.4 46.0 13.8 7.0 4.8 100.00.5 60.2 23.6 8.7 7.0 100.0

0.0 4.1 63.4 15.9 16.6 100.00.0 2.2 0.0 71.1 26.7 100.0

0.0 0.0 2.0 8.0 90.0 lOG.0

Number of Cases

0 1 0 32 12

0 0 1 4 45

Total cases in table . . . . . 1,211

Don't know on time learnedabout Length only . . . . . 77

Don't know on time learnedabout scope only . . . . . . 6

Don't know on time learnedabout Length and scope . . . 19A

Total sample . . . . . . 1,313

1,211

398

573

145

45

50

:. -21-,: ,;:

. ., ,, TABLE I.9

SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT EXPECTED DURATION OF BLACKOUT BYSOlJRCK OF INFORMATION ABOUT SCOPE OF BZACKOUT AND RELATIVE

TIMK.9 OF LEARNING ABODT DDRATION ARD SCOPE OF BLACKOUT

Relative Times of LearningAbout Scope and Duration

and Source ofInformation About

Scope of Blackout

Total

Friends, neighbors, relatives

Radio

'. All other

Learned about duration beforeor about same-time as scope

,Friends, neighbors, relatives

Radio

All other

Learned about duration afterscope

Friends, neighbors, relatives

Radio

All other

ISource of Information About

Length of BlackoutI I I

$E%:,is( Radio/ z&/ Total

Per Cent Distributions

21.6% 67.0% 11.5%

57.7 35.6 6.7

3.0 94.4 2.7

9.9 37.4 52.7

28.2

71.0

1.0

4.8

59.0 12.8

23.3 5.7

95.5 3.5

26.5 68.7

14.1 75.9 10.0

35.0 56.6 8.4

4.9 93.3 1.8

14.1 46.5 39.4

100.0%

100.0

100.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Numberof

Cases

1,211

388

641

182

642

245

314

83

569

143

327

99

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . 1,211

Don't know on relative times oflearning scope and duration . . . . . . . . .102

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

,

-22-

.A sunnsary picture of the importance of the radio in diffusing the news

is provided in Table 1.10 which shows the percentage of respondents learning

about the scope and the expected length of the blackout before 7:00 P.M. by

ownership and use of portable and car radios. ‘As one expects, the table reveals

that those who owned and used portable or car radios during the blackout Learned

of its scope and expected duration somewhat earlier than others. Those withportable radios which can be used in the home or on the street learned the news

more rapidly than those with car radios. Indeed, the marginal totals reveal

that less than half of the respondents possessing & car radios used them

during the blackout, as compared with nearly ninety per cent of those owning

portable radios. Those owning, but not using their radios, of course, Learned

about the scope and the length of the blackout at times more nearly equivalent

to those owning neither portable nor carradios. Even so, well over half of those

not using or not owning portable or car radios learned about the scope of the

blackout within an hour and half of the time it occurred and over two-fifths

learned of its expected duration within the same period. These figures can

only-serve as impressive testimony to the effectiveness of second stage, inter-

persons1 COCVJ~.C~I~~OFI in di f fus ing the IIPWS to those Without direct ccccss TV

the media. . .

Observations of Behavior During the.Blackout

.The power failure allowed individuals to observe their fellow human

beings in an unusual situation which provided motives for both public-spirited

and opportunistic behavior. Reports of citizens helping to direct traffic and

offering food and Lodging to those unable to reach their homes were coupled with

stories of taxi-cab drivers charging exorbitant fares and merchants selling

flashlighrs and candles for excessive profit. On the whole, however, our inter-

views reveal that individuals were more likely to observe helpful than mercenarybehavior. Three questions in the interview schedule inquired if the respondent

had observed anyone making “a kind of holiday occasion out the blackout,” noticed

“that strangers were much more friendly and helpful to each other than usual,“

or witnessed people using “the bLackout to take unfair advantage of others.” In

all, 11.9 per cent of the respondents reported they had observed people making a

holiday occasion of the blackout, a third observed unusual friendliness and

.-23-

TABLE I.10

I TIMS LRARNSD ABOUT SCOPE AND RXPECTSD DURATION OF BLACKOUT BY OWNSRSHIP ANDUSE OF PORTABLE AND CAR RADIOS

-

Ownership and Use of Radios

Total, all respondents

Owned both car andportable radios

Used either oneDid not use

Owned portable radio only

UsedDid not use

Owned car radio only

. UsedDid not use

Cwned neither portable norcar radio

Heard radioDid not hear radio

Per CentLearning

AboutScope by 7:00 P.M.

79.2

-Per CentLearning Aboutlxpected Duration

by 7~00 P.M.

54.2

Numbero f

Cases*

1,277

87.8 60.4 546

89.1 61.3 50771.1 47.2 39

8 1 . 7 50.0 198

81.8 51.4 17880.0 33.3 20

73.1 51.0 286

84.1 60.9 13363.6 41.5 153

64.8 45.9 247

78.0 51.0 11153.5 41.0 1 3 6

*Case bases for percentages vary slightly from reported totals owingto no answers on times found out about length and scope of blackout.

Total cases in table. . . . . . . . . . . - 1,277No answer or ownership or use of radios . 36-

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

helpfulness between strangers, and 3.6 per cent saw cases of mercenary behavior.

Thus, meritorious actions by others were more frequently observed than morally

repugnant ones.

Of course the Length of time the respondent was exposed to the blackout

increases his changes of observing public-spirited, festive, or opportunistic

activities. Table 1.11 shows that the Later the respondent reported that p-r

was restored to his residential area, the more likely he was to have observed

.I

-24-

festive, unusually friendly or helpful, and mercenary behavior on thd ‘part of

others. These findings are not surprising and serve primarily to enhance the

TABLE I.11

OBSRRVAIIONS OF HOLIDAY, PUBLIC-SPIRITED AND MERCENARY BERAVIOR BY LENGTHOF EXPOSURE TO BLACKOUT

.Reported TimeLights Went on

Before 9 P.M.

9-10 P.M.

10 P.W. - 1 A.M.

1 - 4 A.M.

After 4 A.M..-..

Per Cent Observing Behavior

11.9% 33.4% 3.6%

8.1 16.2 0.6

7.2 17.6 1.6

8.4 34.7 2.4

14.5 46.9 6.9

26.3 61.3 8.1

1,313

310

251

288

278

186- -

*Case bases vary slightly owing to “no answers” on observations of

behavior of others.

confidence one can place in the respondents’ reports. If the incidences of

reported friendly, helpful, joyful, and opportunistic behavior did not increase

with the length of time the respondent had to observe them, one might well call

the validity of such.reports into question.

Inter-City Differences in Observed Behavior

Sociologists believe that connnunities are characterized by distinctive

patterns of social organization which reflect their level of sociocultural-

integration with the larger society. In.particular, the form and extent of

social interaction in local subcommunities within cities is often held to vary

with size of place. Whether the affect which infuses social relationships in

TotalNumber

o f:nterviews*

-25-

Gemeinschaft societies loses its vitality in the large metropolitan centers

of modern, industrial regimes is empirically an open question. Consequently,it is of some interest to investigate briefly the relationship between area

of residence and the behavioral observations previously studied in conjunction

with exposure to the blackout. The upper panel of Table I.12 gives the percent-ages of respondents observing festive, unusually friendly, and exploitativeactions for each of.the six metropolitan areas which served as the sampling

points for our investigation. As the reader .ccan easily see from the table,

New York City respondents were slightly more likely to report observing both

festive and mercenary behavior; they were twice as likely as respondents inany other city to report observing unusually helpful or friendly behavior by

strangers. Whatever the instrumental and impersonal qualities of daily inter-

personal exchanges majr be, they clearly are insufficient to prevent New Yorkers

from offering aid and striking up conversations in times of distress.

.The reported levels of joy-making, friendliness, and opportunism may, ho

ever, be higher in New York City than in the other standard metropolitan areas,

was because of the differential exposure of New York City residents to the

blackout. We have already seen in Table I.11 chat lenpth of ex~oeure to the

blackout enhanced the probability of observing each of the kinds of behavior

under scrutiny here. Table I.13 demonstrates that the six metropolitan’areas

in which interviews were conducted are clearly differentiated according to

the ler:gth of time the lights were out. The reader will recall that the lightsactually went out all over the Northeast in a period of roughly fifteen minutes.

Consequently, reports upon the time when the lights were restored amount to

statements of exposure to the blackout. On the whole, the reports of the respon-dents coincide quite closely with official statements of the time power was

returned to the several metropolitan areas, especially if one concedes thatthe observed variability of respondents’ repofts within the communities-maywell reflect the known variability in the time the lights were testored to

different residential sections of the metropolitan areas.

As one can see in Table 1.13, the lights were returned before 9:00 P.M.

to the majority of respondents residing in the Utica, New York, and Paterson-

Clifton-Passaic, New Jersey, Metropolitan Areas. (Although the lights were

.”

;’ :.

TABId! I.12

-27-

TABLE I.13

REPORTED LENGTH OF TIME LIGHTS WERE OUT BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Reported Time Lights Went on

OBSERVATION-OF HOLIDAY, PUBLIC-SPIRITED, AED MERCENARY BEHAVIORBY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Behavior Noticed During Blackout

Before 9 P.M. 10 P.M. 1 A.M.

9 P&l. to to to After10 P.M. 1 A.M. 4 A.M 4 A.M.

Numbero f

Cases(&loo%)

14.2% 1,313

0.5

. . .

30.5

1.7

. . .

. . .

182

120 (

604

60

166

1 8 1

TotalNumber

o fCnterviews*

Place of Residence

Total, all areas

Albany-Schenectady -Troy, N.Y.

Boston, Mass.

New York, N.Y. .

Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, N.J.

Utica, N.Y.

Waterbury, Conn.

Place ofResidence

Per Cent Distribution*

19.1% 21.9% 21.2%

58.2 15.9 . . .

27.5 45.8 7.5

. . . 23.0 44.2

20.0 3.3 3.3

12.0 4.2 . . .

44.2 30.9 . . .

23.6%

25.3

19.2

2.3

71.7

83.7

24.9

ctual Per Cent Observing Behavior

1,313

182

120604

60

166

181

33.4

15.6

.24.2

52.6

3.6

0.6

1.7

6.5

11.2

4.2

17.5

8.3

7.8

4.4

Total, all areas

Albany-schenectady-Troy, New York

Boston, Massachusetts

New York, New York

Paterson-Ciifton-Passaic, New Jersey

Utica, New York

Waterbury, Connecticut

*Each row sums to 100.0 per cent, within rounding error.

Albany-Schenectady-

Per Cent Observina Behavior No Answersnot affected in most of New Jersey, many smaller. cwnities in northern New

Jersey near the New York State line were blacked out. Bany of these places

fall in the Paterson-Clifton-Passaic Metropolitan Area; the interviews from

that area are drawn from these smaller communities and not from the central

cities of Paterson, Clifton, and Passaic which did not experience power

failures.) By 10:00 P.M. the lights were returned to the majority of respon-

dents in the Albany-Schenectady-Troy, New York, and Waterbury, Connecticut,

areas. Shortly aftei 10:00 P.M. power was restored in much of Boston, though:

the groupings effected in Table I.13 conceal the actual time the lights' re-

turned. The majority of New York City respondents, however, had to wait

until after'l:UD A.M. on the morning of Wednesday, November lOth, before theirlights were restored. Because they were exposed to the blackout for a longer

period of time, New Yorkers had an extended opportunity to observe various

kinds of public-spirited and exploitative behavior which occurred during the

'Standardized for-E. xsure on Items*

17.3

5.9

12.6.

11.7

11.6

6.7

1.4

2.8

(3,2,3)(O,O,l)(3,321)

uJ,O,O)

(O,O,O)

(O,O,W

Troy, New York

Boston, Massachusetts

New York, New York

Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, New Jersey

Utica, New York

Waterbury, Connecticut

25.8

29.5

36.8

26.5

2 2 . 2

29.5

3.8

*Case bases vary slightly owing to "no answers" on observations

of behavior of others.

**The three figures in parentheses give, respectively/the number

of "no answers" on observations of (1) people making holiday occasion ofblackout, (2) strangers being more helpful and friendly, and (3) peopletaking unfair advantage of others. These cases are excluded from base ofpercentages in upper panel of table.

t

-28-

blackout. Consequently, the findings shown in the upper panel of Table 1.12 ..

may possibly be due to the differences between cities in the duration of the

blackout.

The extent to which differences between places in reports of observed

public behavior can be accounted for exposure to the blackout is revealed in

the bottom panel of Table 1.12. The figures shown in this lower panel are

the percentages of respondents in each area observing people making a holiday

occasion of the blackout, strangers being unusually helpful and friendly, and

persons taking unfair advantage of standardized for length of exposure to the

blackout. The standardization was effected by the indirect.method and tends

to mitigate the inter-area differences, 6As the reader can see from the lower

panel of Table 1.12, standardizing for exposure brings the reported observations

6Those unfamiliar with procedures of standardization may profit fromstudy of the following brief exposition of indirect standardization and theillustrative calculations accompanying it. Define Ai as, for example, theactual percentage of respondents observing strangers being more helpful andfriendly than usual in the ith city and let T be the corresponding percentagein the total population. So defined, T and the Ai’s are just the percentagesreported in the second ccl*umn and upper panel of Tah!P T,12. Now let p.. bethe proportion of respondents in ith city who are.in the Jth length-of&osurecategory. The p

ij‘8 are just the proportions shown (as percentages) in Table

1.13. Finally, let rj be the percentage of respondents in the jth length-of-exposure category who observed strangers being more’helpful and friendly thanusual 1 Ihe r ‘6 are just the percentages shown in the second column of Table1.11. If we $pply the r ’

js, derived from the total sample, to the distribution

of exposure to the blackout observed in each city, then we have the percentage,

Eis of respondents in the ith city SEted to observe strangers being morehelpful and friendly than usual in the situation where all the observed dif-.ferences in the Ai’s are attributable to differences between cities in exposureto the blackout. The Pi! s are givea by

Ei = hJ = 1 Pijrj' for all fixed values of i.

For example, in New York City, the expected percentage of persons observingstrangers being more helpful and friendly than usual is given by

(.023)(16,2j + (.000)(17.6) + (.230)(34.7) -I- (.442)(46-g) + (.305)(61.3) = 47.8,

a value which indicates nearly half the New York respondents would be e.xpectedto observe strangers being more helpful and friendly than usual solely on thebasis of the distribution of their exposure to the blackout. In other

-29-

of festive, friendly or helpful, and opportunistic behavior by New Yorkers more

nearly into line with the levels observed in other areas. Save for the high

level of festive behavior observed in Albany-Schenectady-Troy, the inter-area

differences are reduced by the standardization, indicating that exposure to

the blackout accounts for many of the observed gross differences. The varia-

tion that still remains after standardizing for exposure can likely be under-

stood only by making detailed studies of the natural history of the blackout

in each of the areas from which our sample is drawn. Such investigations are

at best likely to produce only ad hoc explanations of inter-city differences.

Consequently, we prefer in subsequent analyses to ignore inter-city differences,

controlling whenever plausible for length of exposure to the blackout rather

than place of residence. As the reader can easily see from Table 1.13, length

of exposure to the blackout and place of residence are in fact so closely

related that one cannot separate their independent effects on some third

variable, at least with the usual methods of cross-tabulation. Under these

circumstances, it seems wholly plausible to adopt the strategy of relying

primarily on length of exposure to the blackout when it seems necessary to

control for the respondent’s general environment and situation during the

power failure. Since the interpretation of any inter-city differences which

might be found is likely to be contrived and unmotivated by sound theoretical

perspectives, findings obscured by this strategy would primarily be only of

suggestive value.

communities, where exposure to the blackout was on the average less, theexpected percentages would be lower, a point the reader may verify by makingthe relevant calculations from the materials in Tables 1.11 and 1.12. Inthe indirect standardization, the expected percentages, the E.‘s, are used toadjust the Ai’s for the effects of differences between citiesiin the distribu-tion of rgspondents on length of exposure to the blackout. In general, theindirectly standardized percentages, Si, are given by

si = (Ai/Ei) T .

In the case of New York City, the percentage of responden,ts observing strangersbeing more friendly and helpful than usual, indirectly standardized for lengthof exposure to the blackout, is given by

(52.6/47.8)(33.4) = (1.1004)(33.4) = 36.8,

the value entered for New York City in the second column and lower panel ofTable 1.12. For a review of procedures of standardization, see Evelyn M.Kitagawa, “Standardized Comparisons in Population Research,” Demography, I(1964), pp. 296-315.

-3o-

Sumarv:.

In this chapter we have provided a brief account of the technological

failures which resulted in the eastern seaboard blackout and indicated how the

public's initial information about the blackout provided no occasion for alarm.

Persons prone to regard the blackout as extraordinary in its initial phases--

i.e., those with no previous experience with local power failures and who

knew of the blackout's scope from its inception--constituted only a small mi-

nority of the total population. In addition, we have seen the important roles

of the radio and informal sociometric ties in diffusing news of the blackout

and demonstrated that observations of public-spirited, festive, and mercenary

behavior by others is directly related to length of exposure to the blackout.

Finally, we have indicated hat observed differences in the behavior and

observations of persons living in the six different cities included in this

study are likely to be accounted for by their differential exposure to the

blackout. Indeed, place of residence and exposure to the blackout are so

closely related that it is hardly possible to identify their independent

effects, a point which prompts us to utiiize exposure to the blackout rather

than place of'residence as a basic control varicblc in subsequent analyses.

In sum, the materials presented in this chapter provide a brief historical

overview of the blackout and set the stage for the investigations of individual

reactions and behavior undertaken below.

In chapters to follow we shall look more closely into the public

responses with which we have characterized the blackout. In particular we

shall examine a,! the structure of informal communications about the blackout,

finding therein evidence of an "emergency social system" ordinarily latent

social structure, which can.provide leadership and information in times of

crisis; bj the conditions of arousal of various psychological reactions to the

blackout, and sxse of their implications for unperturbed functions of social

systems in emergencies; and c) one particular behavioral response to the black-

out, interpersonal communication by telephone, as a consequence of psycho-

logical reactions. While these phenomena were relatively insignificant in the

blackout, they may play important roles in public response to more severe dis-

asters. Thus the investigations of individual reactions to and behavior in the

blackout undertaken here can add to our knowledge of social behavior in

disasters of all magnitudes.

--

CHAPTER II

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION AND THE EMERGENCY SOCIAL SYSTEM

The concepts of collective behavior and social disorganization have been

closely linked in many sociological analyses. While formal agencies of socialcontrol are frequently rendered ineffective by natural disasters and crises or

lose their vitality in periods of intense social strain, it may be erroneous

to characterize the behavior and activities associated with panics, riots, andthe aftermath of disasters as disorganized. Breakdown in the formal agenciesof social control is not synonymous with the condition of normlessness. Indeed,there are few, if any, occasions when collective life reverts to "the war of all

against all" in which the pursuit of individual needs is uncontrolled by collec-

tive agreements. Most studies of natural disasters, riots, and panics remark

the rudimentary and informal forms of organization which emerge in these sit-

xations. 1When formal mechanisms of social control fail, there is reason to

believe that responsibility for the maintenance of order is shifted to other

agencies. Very little is known about the social bases of the social system.

which spring to life in times of crisis and disaster. In part, informal pat-terns of leadership and association may assume ascendency when the formal agencies

of social control are incapacitated. In the blackout order was to a large extentmaintained by the dissemination of information about the nature of the adversity.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, informal coannunications were respon-sible for an important part of this dissemination, providing their first jnfor-mation about the blackout for about one-third of our respondents. In this chapterwe pursue the idea that the networks through which these communications flow may

represent a latent agency of social control, examining several features of

1See, for example, Charles E. Fritz, "Disaster," in Robert K. Mortonand Robert A. Nisbet, editors, Contemporary Social Problems (New York: Rarcourt,Brace, and World, Inc., 1961), p. 672.

-31-

t’

-32-

informal leadership and social ties which may make them a viable substitute for..

the defined social roles and formal leadership which may be lost in disasters and

other crisis aituations.

Social Status and Access to Informal Leaders

A well established finding of opinion leadership studies concerns the

status background of "influentials." On the whole, public opinion leaders tend

-0 be drawn disproportionately from the higher socio-economic levels. 2Other

studies have documented that sociometric ties and interpersonal contact tend to:ollow social status lines.

3The conjunction of these two patterns--selective

recruitment of opinion leaders and assortative formation of friendship ties--,leads us to expect that access to public opinion leaders is governed,.in part

ylt not in whole, by socio-economic status. ! :".

In the blackout study, we asked respondants if they personally knew "some-

mre who keeps up with what's going on in your coranunity or neighborhood and who

:an give you the latest information about things in general." Approximately

nre-fifth of the respondents reported knowing such a "public affairs" leader.

"able II.1 shows the percentaSe knowing such an informal leader according-to

.ex and three indicators of socio-economic status: years of school completed by

he respondent, family income, and occupation of-the family's main earner. As

xpeccrd, th- parcsntage of both men and women who know an informal, public

ffairs Ic,ad+r increases with socio-economic status. For example, among re-

pondtnts with iome college,' the proportion knowing such an informal leader is

oughly thrr:s rimes as large as the proportion observed among respondents with

n eighth grad? education or less. In sum, the results shown in Table 11.1

cnfirm th,. prop<.sition.that the known socio-economic background.6 of informal

Uderb, coupled with knawn pattarns of assortative friendship formation, give

ndividusls of higher social status greater access to informal leaders.

2See Elihu Katz and Paul F. Laxerfald, Personal Influence (New York:he Free Press of Glencoe, 19551, pp, 283ff.

3:

See Otis Dudlay Duncan and Jay W. Artis, "Some Problems of Stratifica-'ion Research, " Rural SocioloRy, 16 (March, 1951), pp. 17-29.

-33--

TABLB I I .1

FAUILIARITYWITH INFORMALLFADERBY EDUCATION,INCOME, OCCUPATION OF BBAD AND SEX

Ueasures o fSocial Status

Education8th grade or lessl-3 years of high schoolCompleted high schoolSome college

Family IncomeLess than $5.000$5,000-$6,999$7 ,ooo-$9,999$10,000 or more

Occupation of Bead ofHouseholdProfessionalllanagerialClerical and salesCraftsmanOperetLvesService, laborers, and fara

-Per Cent KnowingInformal Leader

Total

9.415.620.927.6

14.716.820.525.5

28.222.021.020.311.412.6

Hale

8.915.622.425.5

12.318.821.423.4

22.724.616.220.013.216.1

'emale

10.215.519.732.2

18.014.0.19.229.1

39.718.325.920.7.8.36.8

ases for Percentagesa

Total

277276363388

320297312349

227200219222228191

Wale

179173165267

187176187222

154118111135144118

remale

98103198121

133121125127

7382

108878473

'Total number of cases varies slightly from these figures because ofno answers; totals of cases differ from total cases in sample because of noresponses on the measures of social status.

Acquaintance is,.however, a two-way street. Since higher status respon-

dents are more likely to know informal leaders, the range of acquaintances known

to informal leaders will in turn be unrepresentative of the general population,

having a higher average level of socio-economic status than the community as a

whole. If in times of crisis informal leaders,assume responsibility and mobilize

their round of acquaintances as a temporary backstop for formal agencies of socia

-34-

control, then the roles in such an emergency social system should be dispropor-

tionately filled with individuals of higher socio-economic status. Consequently,their actions and assumed authority would be legitimized to some extent'by their

normal positions in the larger society. To the extent that informal patterns of

leadership and interpersonal association supplement or complement formal chains

of cmnd and authority in times of crisis, the usual prerogatives of status maybe exercised to secure their positions and insure conformity to their rule.

Voluntarv Organizations as Foci of Informal Leadership

To soma extent, informal leaders exercise their influence through socio-

metric chains, but they also utilize more formal forums for the spread of opinions

and information. Neighborhood clubs, block groups, and local branches of metro-politan and national voluntary associations can provide the context in which

informal leaders retain and expand their sociometric ties. Consequently, we

expect that members of voluntary organizations are more likely to be acquainted

with informal leaders than persons who do not maintain a variety of ties to such

formal associations.

Table II.2 shows the relationship between acquaintance-with a public

affairs eXpt?Kt and voluuiary organizational memberships, ,controlling for sex

and education of the respondent. Within most sex-education combinations,

Table II.2 reveals the expected positive association between voluntary organi-

ration memberships and acquaintance with informal leaders. As the reader cantell by inspecting the percentage bases in the bottom panel of Table 11.2, the

exceptions to the general pattern tend to occur where the number of sample cases

is relatively small. Thus, not only socio-economic status, but voluntary associ-

ation memberships as well confer access to informal leaders. .

As was the case with socio-economic sratus, one may assume that, sincemembers of voluntary organizations are more likely to be acquainted with public

af fa i rs leaders, these influentials will in turn have a round of acquaintances

mich have a disproportionately large number of voluntary organization memberships.

Chus, an emergency social system which crystallizes around informal leaders should

re able to mobiliee the resources of voluntary organixations to provide, for

example. emergency shelter, auxiliary transportation, and temporary equipment.

QTABLR I I .2

FAMlLIARIIY WITH INFORMAL LeADER BY VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONMEMBERSHIPS, EDUCATION AND SEX

Sex and Education Total

INone

IOne

ITwo orMore

I I

Per Cent Knowing Informal Leader

Total, All Respondents 19.4% 10.9% 17.0% 26.4%

8th grade or less 9.4 7.8 8.1 14.5

l-3 years of high school 15.6 6.6 16.5 23.2

Completed high school 21.1 15.4 20.7 25.3

Some college 27.6 15.4 25.9 31.1

8th grade or less

1-3 years of high school

Completed high school

Some‘college

19.0 11.0

8.9 5.0 _

15.7 4.8

22.6 22.9

25.6 15.9

13.0

6.8

13.7

16.3

18.6

26.0

17.4

22.8

26.3

29.6

Females

8th grade or less

l-3 years of high school

Completed high school

Some college

20.0 10.8 23.4 27.3

10.3 10.9 11.5 6.2

15.5 8;2 20.6 25.0

19.8 11.6 24.2 24.2

32.2 14.3 46.7 34.1

I Number of Voluntary Organizations

I’

-36-i: ‘.: .I ..

._ : TABLe 1X.2--Continued-’

I Wumber of Voluntary Organizations

8ex and Education TotalNone One

I

Twc cmMore

Bases for Percentages

Total, All Respondents 1,299 375 353 5718th grade or less 276 115 99 -621-3 years of high school 275 91 85 99Completed high school 361 104 111 146So* college 387 65 58 264

8th grade or less

l-3 years of high school

Completed high school

Soqae college

. 781

179

172

164

.266

181

6042

35

44

216 384

73 46

51 79

49 80

.43 179

Females

8th grade or iess

l-3 years of high school

Completed high school

some colltge

518 194 137 .187

97 55 26 16

103 49 34 20197 69 6 2 66121 21 1 5 85

- -

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,299No answer on knowing informal leader . . . . . Y . . . . . . . 1No anbWtK on number of voluntary organizati&s . . . . . . . . 5No answer on education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i . . . . 4No answer on education and knowing informal leader . . . . . . . 1

.No answer on educationand number of voluntary organizations 3*-Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,.313

-37-

Hare importantly, however, roles already defined in the context of voluntary

associations could, to some extent, be transferred to the disaster situation,

obviating the necessity of creating a fresh and transitory structure of role

relationships during an emergency.

The Nascent Emergency System of the Blackout

In the preceding section, we indicated how patterns of informal leader-

ship and voluntary organization memberships can serve as the basis for an emer-

gency social system in crises. As we have mentioned previously, the blackout

itself did not call forth the extensive emergency system which swings into action

in the aftermath of floods, tornadoes, and riots. Nevertheless, we have seen

that the blackout did place a large number of persons in unusual situations and

induced fright and other-forms of anxiety among a substantial minority of the

population. As the blackout developed, formal agencies were able to mobilize

sufficient personnel and resources to handle the situation. We can expect to

find during the blackout, therefore, only the rudimentary beginnings of an emer-

gency system incorporating the informal structure of ordinary social relationships

Sample surveys of the total population provide useful information con-

cerning the structure of public reactions to crises. They are, however, seldom

-able to provide comprehensive materials concerning the reactions of specific

agencies or the performance of particular subsystems during crises. This de-

ficiency is not so much one of method per se, as one of conflicting research

interests which must be pursued with limited resources. Typically, one faces

the dilemma of choosing between intensive interviews with authorities and other

individuals closely involved or intensely affected by a crisis and less intensive

interviews with a broader population representing a greater range of involvement

in a crisis. Either choice is usually made at the sacrifice of the other, since

typically one is not free to pursue both strategies. Consequently, our study

of the blackout provides only limited information about the emergency social

system which swung into action during the blackout. We did, however, ask re-

spondents if anyone contacted them or asked them for information about the black-

out, an item which can reveal the gross characteristics of individuals who were

sources of information during the blackout.

-39-

Replies to this inquiry are tabluated in Table II.3 accotding to

sex and a variety of socio-economic characteristics, As the reader can seefrom the table, individuals with higher levels of education and income were

more likely to be contacted for information concerning the blackout than were

individuals of lower status. This is particularly true among female respond-ents, a finding which may be related to differences between men and women in

their situation when the blackout occurred. It is entirely possible thathigher status men were placed in circumstances which made them difficult to

contact during the blackout.

We already know from Chapter I (see Table 1.1) that men-with some

college were less likely to be at home when the blackout occurred than were

men with lower levels of educational attainment. College men were morelikely to be in transit--in cars , public vehicles, stations, and on thestreet--when the blackout first occurred than were those with elementary

school educations. Educational differences in the respondent’s locationwhen the blackout first occurred--an expected pattern in view of the time the

lights first went out--could well have frustrated attempts to contact higher

status men, leaving only u weak,association between socio-economic status and

contact for information during the blackout among male respondents.Such an

interpretation of the findings pertaining to men in Table II.3 is made .plau-

sible by the results shown in Table 11.4, which shows the relationship, con-

trolling for sex, between situation when the blackout first occurred and

contact for information concerning the blackout. Persons at work and in ’cars when the power failure first occurred were less likely to be contacted

for information‘about the blackout throughout its entire course, while those

at home were more likely to be contacted for information.Such a pattern is

consistent with the assumption that situational differences at the time the

blackout occurred account for the unusually low level of informational con-

tacts reported by higher status male respondents. ‘However, indirect standard-

ization, for situation at the time the blackout occurred, of the relationship

between contact for information about the blackout and socio-economic status.

reveals that situation alone does not fully account for the low level of

contact reported by high status male respondents.

TABIZ I I -3

CONTACT WITN BESPONDENT BY EDUCATION, INCCUII,OCCUPATION OF HEAL' ANU SEX

-

Measures ofSocial Status

Education

8th grade or less

l-3 years of high school

Completed high school

Some college

Family Income

Less than $5,000

$5,000-$6,999

$7,000-$9,999

$10,000 or more

Occupation of Head ofHousehold

Professional

Managerial

Clerical and sales

Craftsmen

Operatives

Service, laborers,and farm

zr Cent Contacted or%ked by Others forCnformation About

Blackout

Potal

13.1

15.7

23.4

22.9

11.7

21.6

23.4

20.5

20.9

22.1

17.8

19.9

19.0

tale

13.1

16.9

21.5

19.0

8.2

22;3

24.9

15.0

16.4

18.8

15.9

18.7

17.5

‘emale

13.3

13.7

25.0

31.1

16.5

20.1. -

21.1

29.9

30.1

26.8

19.6

21.8

21.7

ase6 for Percentages

‘otal

274

274

359

385

317

296

308

347

225

199

214

221

226

tile

176

172

163

263

184

175

185

220

male

98

102

196

122

133

121

123

127

73

82

107

87

83

aTotal number of cases varies slightly from these figures be-cause of no answers; totals of cases differ from total cases in samplebecause of no responses on the measures of social status. I

-2 : TABIE I I . 4

CONTACT WITH RlC%ONDENT BY SEX AND SITUATION ATTIME BLACRCUTOCCURRED

1311

Situation at Time BlackoutOccurred

Total, all respondents

At home alone

At home with spouse

At home with other adults on11

At home with children only

At work

On public vehicle

In car

All.other

Total. all respondents

4t hoi alone

At home with spouse

At home with other adults only

At home with children only

At work

On public vehicle

In car

All other

TotalI

Male .FesialeI

Per Cent Contacted or Asked by Othersfor Information.About Blackout

19.3% 17.6% 21.9%

17.1 14.3 19.7

19.8 18.4 22.8

25.4 31.1 2 1 . 9

25.6 26.1 25.5

12.6 12.9 11.1

10.3 10.5 10.0

17.3 16.1 21.1

22.1 19.4 27.5

1,300

146

440

118

133

175

58

81

149

Number of Cases

779 521

70 76

304 136

45 73

23 110

139 36

38 20

62 19

98 51

Total cases in table . . . . . . .No answer on contact about blackout

1,30013

Total sample . . . . . . . 1,313.-

I_

-41-

We have.already shown that voluntary organieational memberships are one

mode of access to public affairs ieaders. As it turns out, organizational mem-

berships were also foci of information exchange concerning the power failure.

Table II.5 shows that, on the whole, individuals belonging to voluntary organi-

sations were more likely to be contacted for information about the blackout.

This relationship holds for both men and women and, while controlling for educa-

tional attainment tends to attenuate the relationship and produce some notable

inversions, the relationship persists within most educational categories. In'

sum, voluntary organizational memberships and socio-economic status not only

govern access to informal leaders, but also provide a context for information

exchange during the blackout. In more extreme situations, we would expect the

importance of extant voluntary organizations to emerge more clearly, but even

during the power failure one can detect traces of their influence. When the

failure of formal agencies of social control creates an organizational vacuum,

the leaders and defined patterns of authority in voluntary groups and informal

sociometric networks can be incorporated into the nascent emergency social system.

The higher social status of voluntary organization members and informal leaders

tends to legitimate their assumption of authority in times of crisis.

TABLE II.5_

CONTACT WITH RESPONDENT BY VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONMRMIH'RSHIPS, EDUCATION, AND SEX

Sex and Education Total

Total, all respondents8th Grade or less1-3 Years of high schoolCompleted high schoolSome college

M a l e s8th Grade or less

l-3 Years of high schoolCompleted high schoolSome college

Females8th Grade or lessl-3 Years of high schoolCompleted high schoolSome college

-No ofa

gone

Per Centfor II

ontactecormatior

19.413.215.823.522.7

17.613.117.021.618.7

14.710.58.9

24..814.3

1 3 . 15.19.5

27.316.7

22.1 16.113.4 16.413.7 8.325.1 23.531.1 9.5

,__, ._. _. . -._ .

Nluntarv Organizations

One Two orMore

lr Asked by Others.bout Blacl t

15.6 i4.99.1 25.0

20.0 18.413.6 30.124.1 24.3

16.2 20.611.0 27.3.23.5 16.78.2 27.5

25.6 17.5

14.73.8

14.718.020.0

A.-

33.518.825.033.338.4

TABLE II.%-Continued

Sex and Education

Total, .a11 respondents 1,287 368 352 567

8th Grade or less 273 114 9 9 60

1-3 Years of high school 273 90 85 98

Completed high school 357 101 110 146

Some college 384 63 58 263

Males 771 176 216 379

8th Grade or less 176 59 73 4 4

l-3 Years of high school 171 42 51 78

Completed high school 162 33 49 8 0

Some college 2 6 2 42 43 177

Females 516 1 9 2 136 188

8th Grade or less 97 55 26 16

l-3 Years of high school 102 48 34 20

Completed high SChCCl 195 68 61 66

Some college 122 21 ' 15 86

No. of Voluntary Organizations

Bases for Percentages

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._. . . 1,287

No answer only on contact about blackout . . . . . . . 13

No answer only on number of voluntary organizations. . 5

No answer only on education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.

No answer on education and number of voluntaryorganizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -3

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

Information and Access to Informal leaders

We have seen that access to informal leaders and patterns of informational

contact during the blackout are governed by social status and voluntary organiza-

tional memberships. Whether or sot individuals with access to informal leaders

or who were contacted for information during the blackout are particuiarly appro-

priate leaders in times of crisis remains, however, an open question. We do know,

however, that those who wbre contacted for information during the blackout thought

they had an opportunity to be.unusually helpful to others. Respondents were

asked, "Did you yourself get a chance to be more helpful to others than usual?"

Replies to this question ‘are tabulated in Table II.6 according to sex and whether

the respondent was contacted for information concerning the blackout and has

access to an informal leader. For both men and women, those who were contacted

for information concerning the blackout were more likely than those who were not

contacted to report that they had an opportunity to be more helpful than usual

to others. In addition, there is some indication that, for those who were con-

tacted for information concerning the blackout, access to an informal leader

enhanced the perceived opportunity for being unusually helpful. In sum, the

results displayed in Table II.6 are consistent with the view that individuals

who are turned to for advice and aid in times of crises and who have access to

informal experts are aware of the demands placed upon them: whether they can

fulfill these demands remains in dispute.

TABLE 11.6

HBLPFULNESS DURING BLACKOUT BY ACCESS TO INFORMAL LRADERS,CONTACT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT BIACROUT ANU SEE

Sex and Contact for InformationConcerning Blackout 1 Total 1 I%&1 1 Rno~~~~~~~l

I Per Cent Saying They Had "a Chance to beMore Helpful Than Usual to Others"

TotalContacted for information

Not contacted for information

MalesContacted for informationNot contacted for information

FemalesContacted for information

Not contacted for information

25.030.823.7

23.831.522.3

26.930.026.0

-44-

TABLlI II.6--Continued

Sex and Contact for InformationConcerning Blackout

@t&

Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

Hales

Contacted for information"

Not contacted for information

Females

Contacted for information -

Not contacted for information

PotalKnows Does Not

Informal Know InformalLeader Leader

Bases for Percentages

1,298 252

251 53

1,047 199

778 149

137 29

641 i20

520 1 0 3

114 24

406 .79

1,046

198

848

629

108

521,

417

90

327

. Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,298No answer on knowing informal leader . . . . . . . . 2No answer on cm-&act for information concerning

blackout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 13

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313_ __-- -________. _

Knowledge is one form of power: this is especially true in times of

distress when those familiar with emergency measures, civilian defense, and re-

lated phanomzna can both calm the-anxious and undertake appropriate remedial

actions. Our questionnaire contains two items dealing with civilian defense

information. The relationship of these items to contact for information during

the blackout is of particular interest, for it can indicate whether or not in-

dividuals who are contacted for information and who have access to informal

leaders have a general store of information which can make them effective:leaders in ptriods of crisis. First, we asked respondents if they knew the

location of any fallout shelters. Replies to this item are shown in Table II.7

according to sex, contact for information concerning the blackout, and access

to an informal, public affairs expert. Among male respondents, those with access

to informal leaders were more.likely to know the location of a fallout shelter

than those who did not have access to an informal leader. Further, Table II.7

-4>-

reveals that, among male respondents with access to an informal leader, those

who were contacted for information concerning the blackout vere more likely to

know the location of'a fallout shelter than those who were not contacted for

information. In sum, the results for males suggest that individuals linked to

informal "public affairs" experts are more likely to have knowledge which would

enhance their effectiveness as leaders in times of crisis. In addition, and

perhaps more importantly, the data suggest that patterns of informal cormamica-

tion are selective; individuals contacted for information are more likely to

possess it. In this sense, informal patterns of sociometric ties and leadership

are one aspect of the latent, emergency social system and operate to select the

most knowledgeable persons as leaders. However, the patterns observed among

male respondents are not observed for women. In any event, female respondents

were much less likely to know the location of fallout shelters; the observed

sex differences may well reflect a lower average level of involvement in commun-

ity affairs by our female respondents.

TABLE II.7

KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATION OF FALLOUT SHELTER BY ACCESS TO INFORMALLEADERS, CONTACT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT BLACKOUT ARU SEX

Sex and Contact for InformationConcerning Blackout

Total- -Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

Males

Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

Females

Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

Per Cent Knowing Location ofFallout Shelter

45.2 53.4 43.2

47.0 59.6 43.7.

44.7 51.8 43.1

50.5 61.1 47.9

55.1 72.4 50.5

49.5 . 58.3' 47.4

37.3 42.2 36.1

37.2 43.5 35.6

37.3 41.8 36.2

.

-46-

TABIg 11.7--Continued.

Sex and Contact for InformationConcerning Blackout Total

KnowsInformal

Does NotKnow Informal

I LeaderI Leader

Ital-Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

.&

Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

males

Contacted for information

Not contacted for information

637

518

113

405

Bases for Percentages

251 1,040

52 197199 843

149 624

29 107120 517102 41623 9079 326

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . .No answer on knowing location of fallout shelter

. . . . . . . . . . . 1 291

No answer on knowing informal leader. ' 7

. . . . .X0 answer on contact for information concerning

. . . . . 2

blackout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

Respondents were also asked if they had heard of the emergency radio system

lled CORBLRAD and if they knew its location on the radio dial.Replies to this

-I are tabulated in Table II.8 by sex, contact for information during the black-:, and access to informal leaders.. In 'all essential details, the pattern r-e- .lled in Table Il.8 duplicates thar observed in Table II.7 for knowledge about

* location of fallout shelters. The interesting thing about Table II.8 is thatindicates that individuals involved in informal structures of communication

only have access to more knowledge, but also retain false information. At the10 the blackout occurred, the emergency radio system--CONEbRAD--had been aban-ed. Nevertheless, both the press and public officials issued somewhat con-

cting information concerning.CONELRAD, including some initial reports that itactually gone on the air. It is, of course, extremely important that informal

-4/-

leaders and persons turned to for aid and information in times of crisis have

current and correct information if they are to act effectively. It may not,

therefore, be remiss to suggest that changes in civil defense procedures and

aspects of the formal emergency system be accompanied by information campaigns

directed especially toward local, informal leaders.

TABLE II.8

KNCWLFDCE ABOUT CONFJRAD BY ACCESS TO INFORMAL LEADERS,CONTACT FOR INFORM4TION ABOUT BLACKOUT At?U SEX

Sex and Contact for InformationConcerning Blackout

TotalContacted for information

Not contacted for information

MalesContacted for information

Not contacted for information

FemalesContacted for info-mat&Not contacted for information

TotalContacted for information

Not contacted for information

MalesContacted for informationNot contacted for information

Females- -Contacted for informationNot contacted for information

1 Knows I Does NotTotal Informal Know Informal

leader LeaderPer Cent Knowing About CONELRAD and Its

19.020.318.7

23.024.122.8

13.115.8i2.3

1,297251

1,046

778137641

519114405

:ation on the

29.832.129.1

36.944.835.0

19.416.720.3

adio Dial

16.517.216.3

19.718.520.0

11.515.610.4

Bases for Percentages

2525 3

199

14929

120

1032479

1,045198847

629108521

41690

326

Tot&l cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,297No answer on knowledge about CORELRAD. . . . . . . . . . . . 1No answer on knowing informal leader . . . . . . . . . . . 2No answer on contact for information concerning blackout . 13

Total sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

-47-

leaders and persons turned to for aid and information in Hares of crisis have. .current and correct information if they are to act effectively. It may not,

therefore, be remiss to suggest that changes in civil defense procedures and

aspects of the formal emergency system be accompanied by information campaigns

directed especially toward local, informal leaders.

TABLE I I . 8

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CORELRAD BY ACCESS TO INFORMAL LEADERS,CONTACT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT BLACKOUT AND SEX

Sex and Contact for InformationConcerning Blackout

TotalContacted for information

Not contacted for information

.wContacted for informationNot contacted for information

FemalesContacted for iuiorludLi0n

Not contacted for information

TotalContacted for information

Not contacted for information

MalesContacted for information

Not contacted for information

Females- -.Contacted for informationNot contacted for information

Knows Does NotTotal Informal Know Informal

Leader LeaderPer Cent Knowing About CONELRAD and Its

Location on the Radio Dial

19.020.318.7

23.024.122.8

13.115.812.3 I

29.8 16.532.1 17.229.1 16.3

36.9 19.744.8 18.535.0 20.0

19.4 11.516.7 15.620.3 10.4

3ases for Percentages

1,297251

1,046

778137641

Il-

252 1,0455 3 198

199 847

149 62929 108

120 521

519 103 416114 24 90405 79 3 2 6

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . $ . . . . . . 1,297No answer on knowledge about CONFLRAD. . . . . . . . . . . 1No answer on knowing informal leader . . . . . . . . . . . 2No answer on contact for information concerning blackout . 13

.,

CHAPTER I I I

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO THE BLACKOUT

In the previous chapters, we have indicated that, on the whole, public

response to the blackout was orderly and calm; festive moods dominated oppor-

tunistic behavior and there was little incentive to panic. Nevertheless, thepopulation may have experienced somewhat milder psychological reactions to the

blackout. The gross level of these feelings and variation in them according

to length of exposure to the blackout, the situations in which individuals foundthemselves when the blackout struck, and the personal characteristics of respon-

dents can provide useful clues both to the kinds of conditions which may give

rise to more extreme reactions in periods of greater stress or perceived threat

and to the kinds of individuals prone to more intense responses. I n t h i s c h a p t e r ,we relate the psychological reactions of individuals to (1) exposure to the black-

out, (2) observations of behavior of others, and (3) the patterns of role occu-pancy normally available to the respondent and/or actually assumed by the respon-

dent during the blackout.

Sex, Exposure, and Reported Feelings

In order to provide an overview of psychological reactions and feelings

during the blackout, we asked respondents if at any.time during the power failure

they felt (1) particularly excited, (2) frightened, (3) so restless they couldn’tsit long in a chair, (4) very lonely or remote from people, (5) annoyed that they

couldn't do the things they wanted to, (6) frightened that other people might.misbehave, (7) bored, (8) they were enjoying the blackout, and (9) depressed or

very unhappy. The percentage of respondents experiencing each of these feelings

is given in Table 111.1, according to sex and length of exposure to the blackout.

Total sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,.313

-49-

. . -so-.

Tuo-fifths of the male respondents were ”annoyed they couldn’t do the things

they wanted to.” This was the dominant feeling among male respondents, although

three-tenths also claimed they “enjoyed” the blackout and about one-fifth re-

called that they were “bored“ and/or “frightened that other people might misbehave.”

As vas the case with male respondents, the dominant feeling among women was “an-

noyance that they couldn’t do the things they wanted to.” However, a third ofthe female respondents reported that they were simply “frightened” at some point

during the blackout; over a fourth also claimed they were “frightened that other

people might misbehave,” ”so restless they couldn’t sit long in a chair,” and/or

“particularly excited.” On the whole, women were more likely to experience all

of the feelings studied here, but were especially more likely than men to report

being frightened, restless, depressed or very unhappy, and particularly excited.

Table III.1 also reveals that the incidence of reported feelings increases

the longer the duration of the blackout. Women especially were more likely to

report being frightened, frightened that other people might misbehave, restless,lepressed or very unhappy, and particularly excited the longer the power failure

asted. They were also more likely to enjoy the blackout the longer it went on.

or men, the associations between feelings and exposure to the blackout are much

he same as those observed foi women, though the prohahility of their occurcnce

ends to be lower among men than women regardless of the blackout’s duration.

ithin the limits of the feelings studied here, it is clear that individuals

<posed to the blackout for longer periods had, on the whole, a greater variety

T psychological reactions to the power failure than those exposed for shorter

riods. This is hardly a surprising conclusion, for increased exposure can

11y be associated with greater opportunity for encountering situations which

iggcr particular psychological reactions.

I

Tightened

01M:

rightened Thai;her Peopleight Misbehave

lnoyed That YCouldn’t Do thesings Youanted TO

D Restless YOJouldn’t Sitong in a Chai,

ery Lonely 01emote Fromeople

lepressed orilery Unhappy

Bored

particularlyExcited

Enjoying It

Total Numberof Casesa

. . -52-

Contagious Effects of the Behavior of Others

Respondents were also asked to recall their thoughts an# feelings at

the tfee they first realized the power was off over a wide area and would re-

msio off for some period of time. One of the specific items inquired whetherthey thought it “seemed like a good time to get together with friends or neigh-

bore and relax and enjoy it.” To this item and others falling in the sameset, respondents were given the following four response alternatives; never

entered my mind; occurred to me; felt, but not very strongly; among strongestfeelings. In Table III.2 responses to the inquiry about the blackout being

a good time to get together with friends and neighbors are tabulated by ob-

servation of people making a holiday occasion out of the blackout and length

of exposure to the blackout. As the reader can see in the table, respondentswere themselves much more likely to think the power failure was a good occasion

to get together with friends and enjoy the blackout if they observed others

making a holiday occasion out of the situation. This finding cannot be ex-plained away by the respondent’s exposure to the blackout, for it holds regard-,

less of the time the lights were restored.

The format of Table II.2 is retained in Table III.3 which shows replies

to an inquiry about whether the respondent thought it would be “pieasanc to

enjoy the peace and quiet” when he first learned of the blackout’s scope andlikely duration. As was the case with feelings about getting.together with

friends and neighbors to enjoy the blackout, we find that individuals who

observsd others making a holiday occasion out of the situation were more

likely to think it would be pleasant to enjoy the peace and quiet of the

blackout. This relationship also holds regardless of the length of time the

lights ware out. In sum, both Tables III.2 and III.3 reveal the contagion of

good feelings during the blackout. One mechanism--though not the only one--which prompted respondents to regard the blackout as an enjoyable occasion

appearstohave been the observation of signs of mirth and joy in the behavior

of others. 1

1Our data do not allow one to rule out definitely an alternative ex-

planation of these results. It is possible that individuals who were themselvesenjoying the blackout attributed their own feelings to others, when’in fact

_. .

-53-

TABLE III.2

FEELINGS ABOUT RELAXING AND ENJOYING BLACKOUT BY OBSERVATIOH OF PEOPLEMAKING HOLIDAY OCCASION OF BLACKOUT AND LENGTH OF ExPosuRE TO ELACKOUT

--

Reported Time LightsWent On and Observa-tion of People Making

Holiday Occasion

Total, all respondentsObserved holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

. b e h a v i o r

P . M .5-9Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

9-10 P.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

10 P.M.-l A.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

l-4 A.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

After 4 A.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

“Good Time to Get Together WithFriends or Neighbors and Relax

and Enjoy.Blackout” Total

itEI::d OccurredFelt, but Among

1 To MeNot Very Strongest

4y Mind Strongly Feelings

Percentage Distributions

75.8

52.9

70.9

81.0

52.0

83.6

77.5

38.9

80.5

75.5

60.9

76.8

70.9

50.0

74.5

73.0

57.1

78.7

12.4

12.3

12.5

7.5

4.0

7.9

11.5

11.1

11.5

16.4

13.0

16.7

16.4

27.5

14.5

9.7

4.1

11.8

4.9

11.6

4.0

3.9

8.0

3.6

4.5

11.1

4.0

4.2

8.7

3.8

5.5:10.0

4.7

7.6

16.3

4.4

6.8

23.2

4.6

7.5

36.0.

5.0

6.6

38.9

4.0

3.8

17.4

2.7

7.3

12.5

6.4

9.7

22.4

5.1

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,295No answer on “getting together with friends

and neighbors” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12No answer on observation of holiday behavior . 6

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

99.9

100.0

100.0

99.9

100.0

100.1

100.1

100.0

100.0

99.9

100.0

100.0

100.1

100.0

100.1

100.0

99.9

100.0

Numbero f

Cases

1,295

155

1,140

3 0 5

25

2 8 0

244

18

226

286

2 3

263

275

40

235

185

49

136

-54-

TABLE III.3

PEELINGS ABOUT ENJOYING PEACE AND QUIET BY OBSERVATIONS OF PEOPLEMAKING HCLIDAY OCCASION OF BLACKOUT AHD LENGTH OF

EXRXURE TO BLACECUT

Reported Time LightsWent On end Observation

of People MakingHoliday Occasion

Total, All RespondentsObserved holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

5-9 P.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

9-10 P.M.Observed holiday

behavior -Did not see holiday

behavior

10 P.M. - 1 A.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not see holiday

behavior

- - -64.0 15.8 10.9 9.2 99.9

49.3 13.8 16.4 20.4 99.9

66.0 16.1 10.2 7.7 100.063.0 13.8 12.5 10.8 100.1

56.0 8.0 8.0 28.0 100.0

63.6 14.3 12.9 9.3 LOO. 161.3 20.2 10.3 8.2 100.0

35.3 17.6 11.8 35.3 LOO.0

63.3 20.4 10.2 6.2 100.168.0 14.4 8.8 8.8 .oo.o

60.9 4.3 13.0 !1.7 99.9

68.6 15.3 8.4 7.7 .oo.o61.0 18.0 11.0 9.9 99.9

52.1 23.7 18.4 5.8 00.0

54.1 17.1 9.8 9.0 00.057.7 12.4 12.4 " 7.5 00.0

i l .0 12.2 22.4 4.39 9 . 9

'3.7 .2.4 8.8 5.1 DO.0- - -

Total cases in table . . . . . 1 290. . . , . . . . . . .No answer on "Pleasant to enjoy the peace and quiet".No answer on-observation ' 17

of holiday behavior . . . . 6_ _

A . M .l - 4Observed holiday

b e h a v i o rDid not see holiday

behavior

After 4 A.M.Observed holiday

behaviorDid not sea holiday

behavior

>"Pleasan t to Enjoy the Peace I

Percentage Distributions

Numberof

Cases

1,290

152

1.138

305

25

.280

243

17

226

284

23

261

272

38

234

186.

49

137

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 313I

-'55-

The contagion of joy during the blackout does not appear to have been

accompanied by a corresponding contagion of fear. Respondents were asked to

recall if they "felt generally afraid, but not sure about what" at the time

they first realized the power was ,off over a wide area and would'be off for

some time. Responses to this question are shown in Table III.4 according to

exposure to the blackout and whether or not the rsspondent observed that

"strangers were much more friendly and helpful to each other than usual."

One would expect that observation of especially friendly and helpful behavior

by strangers would promote a sense of security which would dispel uneasiness

and general fear. However, the gross association, uncontrolled for exposure

to the blackout, between general fear and observation of friendly or helpful

behavior by strangers suggests that just the opposite was the case. Those

who observed especially friendly behavior by strangers were a little less

likely to have never thought to be afraid than those who did not notice that

strangers were particularly friendly. The direction of the association re-

mains unchanged upon controlling for length of exposure to the blackout.

However, the percentage point differences are reduced nearly to zero in three

of the "exposure" groups. Only among those whose lights went on between 9

and 10 P.M. or after 4 A.M. is there a statistically-significant tendency

for those who observed especially friendly or helpful behavior by strangers

to be more afraid than those who did not observe such actions.2

A plausible,

there was no overt behavior by others which could be interpreted as "makinga kind of holiday occasion out of the blackout." The explanation offered inthe text is, however, the one we prefer, though there is no way to establishit definitively. Projection of one‘s own fear on others is a fairly well knownphenomenon which has been experimentally induced. For the particular experi-ment which suggested this alternative explanation of our findings, see BradfordB. Hudson, "Anxiety in Response to the Unfamiliar," Journal of Social Issues,Vol. 10, No. 3 (1964), p. 54.

2Collapsing the measure of general fear into the categories "neverentered my mind" vs. "occurred to me; felt, but

-56-

TABLE III.4

GENERAL FEAR BY OBSERVATION OF FRIENDLINESS OF STRANGERSTo EACHOTHERAND LENGTHOF EXPOSDRE TO BLACROHI

Reported Time LightsHeat On and Perceived

Friendliness of Strangersto Each Other

"Felt Generally Afraid But Not

Entered curred Not Very StrongesT o t a l

I Percentage Distribution

Total. all respondentsObserved strangers morefriendly than usual

Did not observe strangersmore friendly than usual

5-9 P.M.Observed strangers morefriendly than usual

Did not observe strangers'more.friendly than usual

9-10 P.M.Ob6erved strangers more

friendly than usualDid not observe strangersmore friendly than usual

10 P.M. - 1 A.M.Observed strangers more

friendly than usualDid not observe strangersmore friendly than usual

72.4 12.5 8.9 6.3

66.1 16.5 9.9 7.6

75.6 10.5 8.4 5.6

77.5 11.8 7.8 2.9’

74.0 14.0 10.0 2.0

78.1 11.3 7.4 3.1

75.0 9.4 9.8 5.7.

59.1 15.9 - 13.6 11.4

78.5 8.0 9.0 4.5

67.8 16.8 6.6 8 . 7

64.0 23.0 4.0 9.0

69.9 13.4 8.1 8.6

73.3 10.3 11.4 5.1

72.7 9.4 12.5' 5.5,

73.8 11.0 10.3 4.8

66.1 14.5 9.1.. 10.2

59.6 zo.2 '10.5 9.6

76.4 5.6 6.9 11.1

Total cases in tables . . . . . . . . . . . . .No answer on "Generally afraid" . . . : : . . . . .No answer onobservations of unusual friendliness

of strangers . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-4 A.M.Observed strangers morefriendly than usual

Did not observe strangersmore friendly than usual

A f t e r 4 A.MObserved strangers more

friendly than usualDid not observe strangersmore friendly than usual

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Numberof

Cases

1,295

436

859

306

50

256

2 4 4

44

2 0 0

286

100

186

273

1 2 8

145

186

114

72

-57-

though admittedly ad hoc, interpretation of these, patterns might run as fol-

lows. The kinds of situations which provided opportunities for strangers to

be unusually helpful and friendly to each other were-also the types of situa-

tions conducive: to feelings of uneasiness and general fear. Evidence of the

availability of help and friendliness in the interpersonal environment tended,

however, to offset fear-arousing conditions, producing a net level of general

fear common to both situations in which strangers were unusually friendly

and helpful and situations in which they were not.

The Interaction of Fear and JOY

A more complicated portrait of the relationships between exposure to

the blackout, observations of unusual friendliness on the part of strangers,

and the respondent's own feelings of general fear and thoughts about relax-

ing and enjoying the blackout emerges when all four variables are simul-

taneously cross-classified. Table III.5 shows the percentage of persons

;ho thought--regardless of the reported strength of this feeling--the black-

out was "a good time to get together with friends and neighbors,and relax

and enjoy itu by exposure to the blackout, observations of unusual friendli-

ness between strangers, and generai fear. For purposes of constructing

Table III.5 the item about general fear was dichotomized between those who

never thought to be generally afraid and those to whom it at least occurred

to be generally afraid, regardless of the strength of their feeling.

Table III.5 is organized to focus the reader's attention on the

relationship between observation of friendliness among strangers and

thinking the blackout was a good time to get together with friends and

neighbors for relaxation and enjoyment, controlling for length of ex-

posure to the blackout and general fear. On the whole we expect a

sense of security may be derived from the observation of unusually

friendly and helpful behavior between strangers, a phenomenon which should

in turn promote the individual's ability to relax and enjoy the blackout.

However, if we examine Columns A and B of Table III.3 which pertain to per-

sons who report it occurred to them to be generally afraid, we do not find

the expected association between the observation of friendly behavior among

strangers and the individual's own feeling that it would be a good time to

-58--59-

relax and enjoy the blackout with friends and neighbors. This holds for the

exposure groups whose lights went on before 1 A.M. Among the groups whose

lights were returned after 1 A.M., the.expected association between the

observation of friendly behavior among others and one’s own thoughts of

relaxing and enjoying the blackout does emerge. The potential effects of

a sense of security derived from the observed behavior of others on one’s

own ability to relax and enjoy the situation appear, then, to be mitigated

by the arousal of general fear , except in the limiting case where extended

exposure to the blackout has proven one’s general fears to be unrealized

by the actual course of events.

The conclusion drawn in the preceding paragraph receives strong

support from Columns C and D of Table III.5 which pertain to respondents

who did not think to be gene?ally afraid. Among those who did not experi-

ence general fear, observation of friendly and helpful behavior between

strangers is positively associated with feeling the blackout was a good

time to get together with friends and neighbors and relax and enjoy it.

This association holds regardless of length of exposure to the blackout

and is weak in only one of the five exposure categories. The real tests

cf the tendency of generai fear to mitigate the association between the

observation of friendly behavior among others and one’s thoughts of relax-

ing and enjoying the blackout are, of course, the second order differences

reported in the next to the last column of Table 111.5. These differences

are always in the expected direction, regardless of length of exposure to

the blackout. However, the second order differences achieve statistical

significance only for the total row, uncontrolled for length of exposure,

and within two of the five length of exposure categories. But the statis-

tically significant differences appear among respondents whose lights were

out for the shortest Period of time. This is, of course, precisely the:

pattern one expects to observe if the mitigating effect of general fear is

lost when extended exposure proves those fears .to be unfounded. To state

these results in a somewhat more general way, one might say that behavior

is contagious in homogeneous, interpersonal environments. However, the

perceived calm of others is less easily assimilated by individuals in heter-

ogeneous environments which also arouse general fear, at least until the

passage of time proves that fear unwarranted.

. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .

-bU-

TABLE III.6

WORRYABOUTRIOTINGAND LOOTING ANDWORRYABOUT CRIMINALSROBBING HOME BY OBSERVATION OF MERCENARY BEHAVIOR

Observation ofMercenary Behavior

by Others

Total. all respondents

Observed people tak-ing unfair advan-tage of others

Did not observepeople taking un-fair advantage of

. others

Observed people tak-ing unfair advan-tage of others

Did not obstrvepeople taking un-fair advantage ofothers

Response Categories I I

NeverNumber

Occurred Felt, but Among TotalEntered To Me

of

l4y MindNot Very Strongest CasesStrongly Feelings

4. "I was worried about the possibility of

52.0

looting and rioting"

100.0%

100.0

100.0

23.9

53.0

17.4 21.7

22.8 1 13.2 ( 11.0

. "I was afraid that criminals would tryto rob my house"

0. 5

8.5

4.0

3.6

10.6

4:2

iOO.0

lOQ.0

46

1,246

1,293

47

1,246

A. Total cases in table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,292No answer on observation of mercenary behavior. . 5No answer on worry .about looting and robbing. . .A

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . i.. . . 1 313>

B. Total cases in table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,293No answer on observation of mercenary bahavi&. ,No answer on worry about criminals robbing home 5

15 **-Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

4

-61-

Further Correlates of Observed Behavior

In additiontithe itens studied above, respondents were asked if, when

they first realized the power was off over a wide area and would be off for

some while, they were."worried about the possibility of looting and rioting"

or "were afraid that criminals would try to rob my house." Responses to

these questions are tabulated in Table III.6 according to whether or not

the respondent noticed anyone taking "unfair advantage of others" during

the blackout. The results are clear and unambiguous: observation of ex-

ploitative behavior raises the respondent's propensity to worry about dis-

orderly conduct in general and about crimes against his own property.

Unfortunately, the fraction of persons noticing people taking unfair ad-

vantage of others is too small to support more detailed tabulations.

However, these findings--as far as they go--confirm our general impression

gleaned from Tables III.2 and III.5 that psychological reactions to the

blackout ware conditioned by the respondent's exposure to different types

'of interpersonal environments.

Defined Roles and the Killian Effect

The major roles occupied by the majority of adults.are segregated

by the physical separation of their place of work and place of residence.

In addition to their ecological separation, familial and work roles are

also differentiated by the temporal pattern of their occupancy. While the

physical and temporal segregation of these two major role complexes is

rarely complete, especially among higher status workers, it does serve to

avoid manifest conflict between the demands of one's work and the demands

of one's family by limiting the circumstances under which legitimate demands

from both role complexes may be simultaneously placed on the individual.:

In natural disasters and other crises, the typical pattern of role

segregation breaks down. The temporal sequence of role occupancy is often

upset and legitimate, conflicting demands may be placed upon individuals

from several role complexes including those centering on work, home, and

voluntary organizational activities. Speaking of latent conflicts between

familial roles, work roles, and civic responsibilities, Killian observed,

-63--62-

"In crisis induced by disaster, however, these individuals may find that it

1~ impossible to serve two masters, to act in two roles. An immediate choice

la demanded, but it-may be difficult because the demands of the competing

group8 may appear equally urgent.l13 Whether or not these role strains in

tisnzs of disaster give r i s e t o psychological stress is an open question.

Although many field studies of disasters provide some empirical support for

these ideas, the evidence they provide is largely impressionistic and un-

systematic. Unfortunately we are not able to marshal1 direct evidence of

role conflict or of stress resulting from it. We are able to study the

relationship between specific worries during the blackout and situation

when the blackout occurred, controlling for occupancy of familial and

work roles.

The possibility of conflict between work and familial roles emerges

rather clearly in Table 111.7, which shows, for currently married persons,

the relationship between situation at the time the blackout occurred and

worry about one's spouse, controlling for sex and the employment status of

women. Respondents were asked if they were worried that their spouse "was

in dcngcr" wbcc they firat learned thit thi POWii ica3 off over a wide area

.and would be off for some time. The specified response alternatives to this

inquiry were-as follows: never entered my mind; occurred to me; felt, but

not very strongly and among strongest feelings. As one can see from the

total line for all respondents in Table 111.7, persons "at work" or "at home

-alone" when the blackout first occurred were less likely to report they never

worried about their spouse than individuals caught by the blackout in other

circumstances. Those isolated from their familial roles by being at work

when the blackout first occurred were especially prone to worry in some

degree about their spouse. This, of course, is precisely the pattern of

replies which indicates the possibility of role conflict: occupancy of the

work role and its physical segregation from familial roles no longer serves

to insulate individuals from the normally inappropriate demands of alters

not present in the work setting. But crises, natural disasters, and other

3Lewis M. Killian, "The Significance of Multiple-Group Membership inDisaster," American Journal of Sociology, 57 (January, 1952), p. 314.

._,.TABLE III.7

WORRY ABOUT SPOUSE BY SITUATION AT TIMF. BLACKOUT 0CCURRF.D.SEX, ARD MPLOYMENT STATUS OF WOlfEN, CURRRNTLY

MARRIED PERSONS

I Situation At Time Blackout OccurredSex and EmploymentStatus of Women Total

~~~~~\~~l ,",:k ITrLit 10%x

Per Cent Never Thought To Worry About Spouse

Total. All Currently Married 13.9 58.5 85.1 43.9 73.1 64.7

Males 73.3 51.5 92.1 40.5 72.7 60.7

Females 74.9 65.6 77.1 66.7 74.3 72.4

Employed 75.2 66.7 74.7 66.7 76.0 93.3

N o t e m p l o y e d 74.8 65.0 78.2 ..- 70.0 50.0

Number of Cases

Total, All Currently Married 967

Males .600

Females 367

Employed 153

Not employed 214

I

139

121

10

18

. . .

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . 967

Currently married and no answer orworried about spouse . . . . . . . . . 6 7

Total, currently married . . . . . . .'. 1,034

Tota l , not current ly marr ied . . . . . . __279

Total sample . . . , . . . . 1,313

-64-

disruptions of normal social life legitimize simultaneous demands by alters

to the different roles of an individual, regardless of the particular role

the individual occupies at the moment. Table III.7 shows that some degree

of conflict between work and familial roles was likely to arise during the

blackout, since those at work were more likely to worry about their spouses

than those at home. Mere lack of access to one’s familial roles does not

fully account for the worry levels of those at work, for persons in transit

and at home alone were less likely to worry about their spouses than those

at work. To some extent the lower worry rate of those in transit may be

explained by the fact that more than half of them were in private automo-

biles, and could anticipate getting home with only moderate delay to assume

their familial roles. Apparently being at work, where the demands of the

work role are immediate, intensifies the level of one’s worry about one’s

family above and beyond the level of worry generated by simple immediate

inaccessibility of one’s family.

A more detailed inspection of Table III.7 reveals that the findings

discussed in the preceding paragraph hold only for men. The pattern for

woaen, though consistent with the diicussion &O-J;, is much weaker than -that observed for men and does not achieve statistical significance. 4 Onthe whole, these sex differences seem consistent with differences in the

responsibilities of the familial roles of men and women. As the providers,protsctors, and instrumental leaders of families, it seems likely that in

times of crisis men at work would perceive. a conflict between their familial

and work roles. The circumstances call for the performance of familial

duties which cannot be fulfilled because of their occupancy of the work

role. For wown, crisis does not as clearly demand fulfillment of familial

responsibilities as homemaker, cultural expert, and expressive leader and

therefore conflict appears less obvious. Conseque.ntly, one might expect men.at work to be more concerned for their spouses than women at work. 5

This

4 .With four degrees of freedom- tha probability thatc2 > 9.49 ormore is .05; the observed values ofx 2 Table III.7 for males and femalesin(employed and not tmployed combined) are 131.61 and 2.92, respectively.

5 In the 2 X 2 table’ relating sex to worry abour- spouse (dichotomizedaccording whether it occurred or didn’t occur to the respondent to worry abouthis spouse), we find that for employed married women and men at work the valueof 3(’ is 4,36, a value significant at the .05 level.

-65-

interpretation 16, however, admitted& ad hoc and requires validation on- -

other occasions.

Respondents were also asked if they “worried how the power failure

would affect my (husband‘s) job or business.” The specified response alter-

natives were identical to those used in the question about concern for one’s

spouse. Table III.8 shows the percentage of respondents who never thought

to worry about their own or their husband’s job according to sex, situation

at the time the blackout occurred, and the employment status of women. From

the wording of the question one may infer that all male respondents and em-

ployed female respondents (whether married or not) are responding in terms

of their own job. Married, unemployed female respondents are presumably

responding in terms of their husband’s job, while unemployed female re-

spondents who are not currently married can only be responding in terms of

(a) their usual employment or (b) the employment of ex-spouses from whom

they are separated or divorced. (Many unemployed women not currently

living with their husbands did not respond to the question; their replies

are included only in the interest of completeness and will not be inter-

preted since their reference is ambiguous.)

The tension between one’s work and familial obligations under cir-

cumstances demanding the fulfillment of both’commitments is highlighted in

Table III. 8. We have already seen in Table III.7 that married men at work

when the blackout occurred were more likely to be concerned about their spouses

than married men in other situations. Table III.8 shows that they were also

more likely to be concerned about their jobs than men in other situations.

Although men not currently married were a little more likely to worry about

their job if they were at work, the effect is not nearly so large as that

observed for currently married men whose work commitments are augmented by

familial ones.6 As was the case with worry about one’s spouse, the effect

of being at work on worry about one’s job is patterned in the same way for

married, employed women as it is for married men. The differences for employed,

6With four degrees of freedom, the probabilitythe observed values ofx2 in Table III.8 for currentlymarried men are 13.74 and 1.48, respectively.

-66-

TABLE III.8

WORRY ABOUT OWN OR IRJSBAND'S JOB BY SITUATION AT TIME BLACKOUTOCCURRED, SEX, AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WOMEN

Sex, Marital Status,and Employment Status

ofWomen

TotalNales

Currently marriedOther

FemalesCurrently married

EmployedNot employed

CtheiEmployedNot employed

TotalWales

Currently marriedOther

FemalesCurrently married

EmployedNot employed

OtherEmployed.Not employed

Situation at Time Blackout Occurred

Per Cent Never Thought to Worry About Joba

74.073.272.376.5

75:274.475.074.0

78.173.687.9

,185705590115

480375160215

1057233

77.7 74.475.0 73.674.2 73.275.9 76.7

80.3 75.484.4 74.9

l91.71 75.080.0 74.9

75.9 78.6L73.31 67.9[78.6] 1100.01

121603129

61321220

62.961.259.868.2

69.765.065.0

f76.91176.91

Kumber of Cases

4735

88 20 25171 . . . 10

1211

1

77.881.180.9

182.41

70.268.672.0

f60.01

175.01172.71

r 100*01

78.980.379.6

L82.41

76.372.4

[80.01164.31

f88.91[100.0]r75.01

#a.F158111

9 417

.Total cases in table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,185No answer on job worry . . . . . . . , . . . . : . . . . .A

Total sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

I109

715417

38291514

aPercentage shown in brackets when base is less than 20 sample cases.

-67-

married women do not, however, achieve statistical significance and are not

so large as those observed for currently married men. In sum, the results

in T.?bles III.7 and III.8 are generally consistent with the idea that latent

conflicts between work and familial roles may become foci of individual

reactions in natural disasters, crises, and other situations in which the

normal temporal and physical segregation of these roles no longer serves to

define the extent of one's ismediate obligations. Among currently married

men, this latent conflict found manifest expression during the blackout in

higher levels of worry about both their spouses and their jobs among men

at work who could not fulfill their familial role obligations. These effects

were not, however, large; they require continued testing and analysis under

other and more extreme conditions which may produce severe conflicts between

normally consistent social roles. In the next chapter we shall examine the

circumstances which led people to use the telephone during the blackout, and

briefly present further support for our analysis of the situations in which

latent role conflict could become manifest.

.Conclusions

On thz whole, we havt seen in this chapter that persons experienced

only mild psychological reactions to the blackout. The event was, if any-

thing, more annoying than frightening or otherwise psychologically disturbing.

However, while the majority of respondents did not experience extreme reactions,

the milder reactions they did have proved to be systematically related to

features of their environment during the blackout. Persons residing in areas

where th& blackout persisted for a relatively long time had a greater mixture

of psychological reactions, being more likely to become frightened, bored,

excited, restless, and depressed. We were also able to provide evidence

supporting the presence of a contagion of joy during the blackout. There:

was not, however, any corresponding contagion of fear, though general fright

did tend to mitigate the contagious effects of observed mirth making by others.

Finally, we were able to suggest that latent role conflicts may emerge in periods

of crisis, showing that married men at work were both more likely to worry about

their spouses and about their jobs. Such a pattern of worries may reflect the

conflict of work and familial roles which can emerge more severely in extreme

situations.

CHAPTER IV

IWTERPERSONAL CONTACT DURING THE BLACKOUT

Students of collective behavior have often observed that natural

disasters and other crises are either accompanied or followed by a flurry

of interpersonal contact, especially between persons living in the disaster

area and those living outside the impact area. In addition to increased

communication, a flood of curious outsiders may descend on the disaster area

and tons of unsolicited relief parcels be shipped by concerned citizens to

the stricken community. Charles E. Fritz surmsarizes this pattern of con--

verRence behavior as follows: u . ..contrary to the popular image of behavior

in dicastcrs, movcmcnt toward the disactcr arcn is uczally both quantitotivol;

and qualitatively more significant than,flight or-evacuation from it. Within

minutes after most domestic disasters, thousands of persons begin to converge

on the disaster area and on first aid stations,.hospitals, relief centers,

and cosmrunication centers near the area. Along with this physical movement

of persons, incoming messages of anxious inquiry and offers of help from all

parts of the nation and from foreign countries begin to overload existing

telephone, telegraph, and other-communication and information facilities..

Shortly afterward, tons of unsolicited equipment and supplies of clothing,

food, bedding, and other material begin arriving in the disaster area or in

nearby relief centers."1 Social control of this convergence behavior is one

of the.major organizational problems which must be dealt with in the aftermath

1Charles E. Fritz, "Disaster," in Robert K; Errton and Robert A. Nisbet,

eds., Contemporary Social Problems (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc.,1961), pp.678-79.

-69-

-iv- .of disaster. But, while the phenomenon is itself well documented, little

is known about its causes--a point which hinders relief workers and civilian

defense officials from taking appropriate remedial or compensating actions.

The blackout itself, though a disaster by many standards, was not the

kind of calamity which either required or called forth a great influx of

outsiders or unsolicited relief from outside the blackout area. Tele-

phone communication, which remained in operation on emergency power generators

owned and operated by the telephone companies, was, however, intensified dur-

ing the blackout. According to the New York Times, “The New England Telephone

Company reported experiencing slow dial tones for the first few moments of

the blackout but after appealing by radio for customers to avoid all but emer-

gency calls there was a drop in volume. Between 5 and 6 P.M. there was a 10

per cent increase in long distance calls and an 800 per cent increase in local

calls. ‘I* “The New York Telephone Company, which operated at full capacity

on emergency diesel generators during the hours of lightlessness, said that

it had apparently set a record for the number of telephone calls handled.l13

These increasesin interpersonal communication*via telephone can, of course,

jam the lines and switchboards making it difficult to place emergency calls

and trsnsmit critical information in Periods nf crisis. While our dsta do

not allow us to study outsiders phoning into the blackout area, we are able

to examine the motives and incentives of telephone users within the blackout

area. By studying the correlates of telephone use during the blackout, we

hope to generate some plausible hypotheses concerning the etiology of con-

vergence behavior which can be subjected to further refinement and testing

in other studies and on other types of convergence behavior.

Types of Local Telephone Calls

We have already observed that little is known about the causes of

convergence behavior, even though the phenomenon is well known and important

to control in disaster situations. In her suggestive volume, Martha Wolfen-

stein does provide, however, some observations which may serve as a point of

departure for the present analysis;

1A. M. Rosenthal and Arthur Gelb, eds., The Night the Lights Went Out(New York: New American Library, Signet Books, 1965), p. 20.

22.) pp. 56-57.

-71:

In the pathologically depressed person the need for incessantmanifestations of love from the environment is greater thancan be satisfied in ordinary life: frustration and despairare thus unavoidable. In the case of the disaster victim,we have a situation of unusual deprivation in which at thesame time the individual’s needs for outside support become4much greater than usual because of his sudden helplessness.

Though we are-not committed to the validity of the anaIogy between patho-

logical depression and psychological reactions to disasters drawn by Wolfen-

stein, we do find her attribution of an increased interpersonal dependency

among disaster victims a plausible conjecture. One might surmise that the

transformation of one’s immediate environment by a calamity creates a loss

in one’s sense of security. This vacuum in one’s psychological well-being

can be filled by assurances and comforts derived from social interaction.

As Wolfenstein observes, “Contact or lack of contact with others in the

impact of a catastrophe can mitigate or aggravate the feeling of abandon-

merit.”5

Although one must remember that the blackout did not have the de-

structive force and did not engender the degree of personal loss associated

with floods, tornados, explceirnc, fires, end many 0th~ c~t;~r~&,s,

individuals were separated from their spouses, frustrated in pursuing

planned activities, and placed in situations giving rise to mild fright.

These distrubances are not intense enough to create a uniform sense of

insecurity or abandonment in the whole population. Nevertheless, Table IV.1

makes it clear that telephone calls were much more likely to be directed

toward relatives outside one’s irmnediate household rather than toward organ-

izations capable of providing information about the extent and nature of

th;, blackout.. Practically no one called the police department, radio or

TV stations, newspapers, the fire department, City Hall, or Civil Defense

Offices. About 5 per cent of the respondents called the electric company

or a telephone operator. In contrast, nearly one-fourth of the respondents

4Martha Wolfenstein, Disaster: A Psychological Essay (Glencoe, Ill.:The Free Press, 1957), p. 80.

5 .w., p . 5 9 .

-72-

reported they attemptedduring the blackout to call relatives other than

h.ousehold members. Clearly, attempts at interpersonal communication domi-

nated use of the telephone during the blackout. One should remember,

however, that the low volume of information seeking and/or complaining

calls to organizations and official agencies may be partially attributable

to the continued operation of the radio and the relative effectiveness with

which it diffused the news.

,TABLE IV.1

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS CALLING OR VISITING SELECTEDORGANIZATIONS AND RELATIVES DURING THE BLACKOUT

Destination of Callor Visit

Police department

Radio or TV station

Newspaper office

Fire department

n1ly2tyjc cnyl?l.-

Telephone operator

City hall

Civil defense office

Relatives (other thanhousehold members)

Per CentCalling

1.4%

0.7

0 . 4

0.5tit4. *

4.5

0.1

0.3

24.8

Per CentVisiting

0.7%

0.3

0.4

0.8

s.1

0.3

0.3

0.5

Number aof Cases

3.4 1,296

aNburn er of cases varies from total of 1,313 because of no answers,

1,308

1,308

1,309

1,307

i,3or

1,306

1,306

1,301

Fear and Interpersonal Communication

Although any enhanced need for social interaction engendered by the

blackout would seem to require that calls to other persons be an important

component of the total volume of telephone communication, the mere observa-

tion of that phenomenon in Table IV.1 is not sufficient to establish a

connection between psychological reactions to the blackout and attempts at

-73-

interpersonal cosssunication. Cne must also demonstrate.that persons exper-

iencing a sense of insecurity or social isolation were.also the ones who

utilized the telephone to contact others. The relationship between calling

or visiting relatives (excluding other household members) and general fear

at the time respondents first learned of the blackout's scope and probable

duration is shown in Table IV.2 for male and female respondents. As the

reader can easily see from the table, women who felt generally afraid were

more likely to phone or visit their relatives (other than household members)

than those who never thought to be generally afraid. Among male respondents,

however, this relationship deos not hold, a point of some interest which we

discuss in detail below.6

TABLE IV.2

CONTACT WITH RBLATIVES BY GENERAL FEAR AND SEX

Sex Total

"Felt Generally Afraid but NotSure.About What"

Never

I

Felt, but Nbt Ve-;Entered

1 OccurrredTo Me

Strongly, or AmougMy Mind Strongest Feelings

Per Cent Calling or Visiting Relatives(Excluding Household Members)

I ITotal, all rtispondents

MaleFemale

Number of Cases

?otal 1,283 1I

931 I 157 195Male 772 624 75 73Female 511 307 82 122

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . 1 1.2;:No answer on "generally afraid". . . . . . . . . . .No answer on "contact witb relatives". . . . . . . . 17-

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

6With two degrqes of freedom, the probability thatX* = 5.99 is .05;the observed value ofx*. for men does not exceed this value, while theobserved value for woman is 12.14.

ic

-?4--JS-

While Table IV.2 ‘shows that women who were afraid were, in fact, ;

more likely to contact their relatives, our data do not allow us to distin-

guish definitively between three alternative explanations of this association.

While we favor the explanation which traces the activity to the respondent’s

own need for intarpsrsonal contact, the data do not allow us to separate this

explanation of the findings from the alternative suggestions that (1) women

who were themselves afraid were more likely to worry’ibout the situations of

their relatives and contact them to verify their safety and (2) women who

’ were themselves afraid were more likely to perceive that their relatives

would be concerned and contact them to relieve their worries over the re-

spondent’s safety. Of course, the finding itself may prove a spurious one

which is explained by the relationship of both general fear and contact with

relatives during the blackout to some third variable.

Controlling for Exposure and Education

In the preceding chapter, we indicated that the probability of in-

dividuals experiencing various kinds of feelings--fear, excitement, boredom,

and joy---tended to increase with the length of their exposure to the blackout.

Exposure to the blackout stands, therefore, as one variabie which might account-

for the observed association between general fear and contact with relatives

during the blackout. This possibility is made even more plausible when one

ponders the fact that the longer the blackout went on’ the greater the oppor-

tunity of the individual to contact his relatives during its course. Table IV.3

shows the relationship between general fear and contact with relatives during

the blackout, controlling for duration of the power failure and sex. As in

the zero order associations, there is no systematic relationship between con-

tact with relatives and general fear for male respondents. However, the zero

order association observed for women in Table IV.2 is systematically repeated

in Table TV.3 within categories of exposure to the blackout. The only ex-

ception is for female respondents who reported their lights went on between

10 P.M. and 1 A.M.

The failure of exposure to the blackout to account for the relation-

ship between general fear and contact with relatives is at least partially

. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .

. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .

. . .-. . .. . . . . .. . . . . .

mr-mmr-iddd

Im

; ;. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . :.. . . .. . . ..;:. .-2..‘1 . .- z .~ -‘cr; *.u91..$u?i .al$;d’-o*u.%Q>TOM k?cc*zoomttiitz‘EE$;EJiiwigg

.c

a.

-76

akmibutrble to .X.he fact that t&r iadicator of general tight is not itself~~tXca.lly xelxted to the durr&on of the blackont. The item aboutgbg&& fear, the render will recall, asked the respondent .to recollect hislions at the t%are he first Learned ef the blankrat’s scoge and expectedetituef6n. ‘There is, ~~qumtly, a~ rutsma TV tlssmte f.bd xeptmses to this~~&-~&l$k.k;e the ltpms &rich refer to the renpandent“s feelings at anv time

.&&Zing the b&Wsit---6hou-ld be systomatirally related TV the length of the

&R%fek &ilbre . .As the reader roan see by x&xrrLng ir, Table II1.4, general

wr ~3 got sp’tematica-lly r&t&J to axpnsure ‘to the ‘blmnkout, a factorwontr.ibuting tothe failure of &ration of the blackout to account for the&+erved ~saocfation between general fexr xnd contact x&h relatives amongWin&.

.kWi5ther vari&ile ,wiiich might 6uzoun.t for +he rellatiDllship in questioni& ~iS%d rScf&ai st’8tus. Cl&i53 iLiZfST6??EeS in ;th.e ntiazngth of affective

e *&Xh *tal%ves rpulhl -prertizspIJne &di~tiuak ‘In ~nxre, .hu.t not all stratapB ctmsast rh.&r .a-kJa@ue.s 3n ‘times y szr5s.h. B&t, ~kteXurr ibe ultimate

w&m$ng 33fbr -?n.trMng 5s~5istifs as a ccrmtrd :mridAe, fmsh a pro-&......& .& .&.&i& wf,y 31,, Aa gm*& i’.& s” .‘., :1

qq@&idl.ly gav.md aa & z.orr&ansd \ui;th mry %a.?i%l $renomeral The re-

&&imstQ .ktween wtil -fear G& ozontact -.wLth tikt3.~. xnnrtrolling forax zsnd :years rof is&o&l con@leXed, ‘is ahown .kn T4hle TVA. As Liz reader

mn :c&l %raw, ?l&ble IlV.4, .Muc&&rd -Wt &n?s nrat p.~ove Zo be system-wfcal.1~ z&&od to roontact .tih Wtives :duriqg -the .bkdknut. The relation-

&$p between genera3 ifear and zcontact :dth :mues -ti ~&3X1 ribserved for

WUaSn, -W<thfn :c;ic~&orSas of ~ducati&ral.~nmentattaimserrt; ?&a ‘b&nre, ihis relation-.r&rip does not hold %‘or male :wndents.

?gr<or -Association and Opportunttv /for Contact .wfth Rclativec

YE0 Xhfs :juacture, -we.have 4rown that ‘(1) meithcr &iucatLnn nor length

tif ~exp-6sme Rio rthe rblxckout 3s ~ystematiually :xebated rto orontant tith relativrs‘&rfag rthe rparfod rthe St&Its aware :out zand (2) neither .ti rtheae Zwo variables

itilly %xpEafns the (observed .association between:_general ;f-ear rand contact withrrefatives robserved for rfemale z%?spondents. :We rfrave nrat, .Arowever., examined the

).

, -7a-effects of two crucial variables--previous association with relatives andopportunity for contact with relatives --upon the relationship in question.Clearly, respondents who have no relatives living in their cosmmnities orlocal neighborhoods did not have the same opportunities for contacting theirrelatives during the blackout as persons with extended kinship ties in theirimmediate environment. Those with no kinship ties in their communities mustplace long distance phone calls to contact their relatives, a step which mayrequire a higher level of motivation for contact than merely’attempting alocal call. Those with few relatives, of course, have a smaller chance offinding some relative at home should they attempt conrmunication with theirrelatives. Not only the opportunity for contacting relatives, but alsoprevious association with relatives should affect contact with them duringthe blackout. Individuals who do not associate with their relatives undernormal conditions, even though they may have many relatives in their corn-.munities or local neighborhoods, may well be less likely to.attempt contact;ing their relatives in times of crisis. Since they do not interact regularlywith their relatives, they are not so likely to either (1) find that inter-action comforting or (2) worry about their relatives during periods of crisisor personal alarm.

The relationship between general fear and contact with relatives isshown in Table IV.5, controlling for sex and the number of relatives therespondent has living in his own community or area, exclusive of members ofhis innnediate houszhold/ As the reader may infer from Table IV.5, controllingfor opportunity to contact relatives by holding constant the-extent of hislocal kinship ties does not alter the association between general fear andcontact with relatives during the ‘blackout for females. Regardless of the _number of rsiatives they have in the community, women who were generallyafraid w+rr more likely to contact their relatives than those who neverthought ro be afraid. As before, this relationship does not hold for men,though for both mtn and women the probability of phoning.or visiting relativesduring the blackout increases with the number of relatives living in thecommunity.

---

(

,

:

-ao-Previous association with relatives affects contact with kin during

the blackout in much the same way as the extent of one’s local kinship net-work. One can see in Table IV.6 that, for both men and Vomen, the probabilityof contacting one’s relatives during the blackout increases with thefrequencyof association with relatives in the past two weeks. Social involvementwith one’s relatives does not, however , mitigate the association betweengeneral fear and contact with relatives among female respondents. In sum,although both the-extent of one’s local kinship network and the amount ofsocial participation with relatives affects contact with relatives duringthe blackout, controlling for either one of these variables does not elimi-nate the relationship between general fear and contact with relatives amongfemale respondents.

r

Regression Analysis of Contact with Relatives During Blackout

. .Although duration of the blackout, education, extent of local kinship

ties, and frequency of association with kin do not account for the relation-ship among women between general fear and contact with relatives duringblackout when considered serially, one at a time, their joint effects mayGel1 wiplli~l the association in questron. Since our sample is not largeenough to investigate this possibility with the usual procedure of cross-tabulation, we mst have recourse to an alternative strategy of analysis.We may begin by defining the following variables: .Y = 1, if the respondentvisited or contacted his relatives during the blackout, and 0, otherwise;

x1 p length of exposure to the blackout in minutes; X2 = years of schoolcompleted; X3 = number of relatives (other than household members) livingin respondent’s community or area; X4 = number of times respondent hadgotten together with relatives (other than household members) in the pre-ceding two weeks; and X5 = 0, 1, 2, or 3 according to whether being generally.afraid never entered the respondent’s mind, only occurred to him, was amonghis feelings, or was. among his strongest feelings, respectively. We thenwish to consider the model,

Pr(YIXi t ki) = E+ d+

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where Pr(YIXi = ki) is the probability of contacting one’s relatives duringthe blackout given fixed values, kl,‘b2, kg, k4, and kg, of Xl, X2, X9, X4,and X5;E i8.e variable with mean sero representing random disturbances;dis a cmstp*; and the pi ‘s are coefficients of the Xi’s. This model is

known as a linear probability function. A natural procedure for estimatingthe parameters of the model, i.e., the constant term& and the pi's, iS tocalculate the ordinary least squares regression of Y on Xl, X2, X3 , X4, and

x5’This estimation procedure has several weaknesses, among.them being

violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity of the distributions ofthee ‘s. Nevertheless, estimates obtained in this way can provide a fairsummary of the net influence of each of the independent variables uponcontact with relatives during the blackout.. One should, however, rememberthat the coefficients so obtained will be biased and that the standard testsof significance available in ordinary mutliple regression analysis will not

apply.7

Table IV.7 presents, separately.for men and women, the results ofthe regression of contact with relatives during the blackout on length ofexposure to the blackout, education, extent of local kinship ties, fre-quazc-y 0 f cssSil&tL.d ciiii 1el.~;;*~b, -& general fear. in addition tothe coefficients associated with each of the independent variables, Table IV.7also shows the estimated standard errors of the coefficients, the multiplecorrelations associated with the regressions, and the range of the independentvariables. Although the standard tests of significance are not wholly appro-priate, one can achieve a rough impression of the relative importance ofeach of the independent variables by contrasting their coefficients withthe standard errors of the variables. The multiple correlation coefficients-have only a special interpretation in the present case: if one created anindex by weighting the values of each of the independent variables withcoefficients proportional to their regression weights, then the pointbiserial correlation between this index and contactwith relatives during

7 For a discussion of linear probability functions and related models,see Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory (New York: John Wiley and Sons,1964). pp. 248-51.

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-g4-

the blackout would be.exactly equal to the PPrltiple correlations shown inI

Table IV.7. (One would, of course, have to form separate indices for menand women for this relationship to hold.)

A clear impression of the relative importance of the variables en-tered in the linear probability funkions reported in Table IV.7 may beobtained by considering how the probability of contacting one’s relativesmay be expected to vary over the full ranges of each of the independentvariables. For men, we can read from Table IV.7 that the expectedprobability, E [Pr(YIXi)], of contacting one’s relatives during the black-out for alternative values of the Xi’s is given byE [Pr(YIXi)] = 0.0879 + .0002 (X,) - .0027(X,) + .0180(X,) + .0139(X,.) + .0040(X5).Substituting the means of X2. X3:

‘. 3 -fX4, and X5 into this question, we find

that, at the means of these variables E [Pr(YIXi)] varies with X 1 accordingto the following relationship:

E IPr(YIXi)l = .0002(X1) + 0.1770.The minimum and maximum values of Xl are 28 minutes and 1,140 minutes,respectively. Substituting these extremes into the foregoing equation,yields the values .183 and .405. Thus, given average values on the otherindependent variables, ye wogld eypect 18.3 per --..t -f -.-- --:*I-:--1.1 ii** ..A_L.li.. Slnituuexposuie to the blackout and 40.5 per cent of men.with maximum exposure tothe blackout to contact their relatives during the power failure. The dif-ference of 22.2 pzr cent between these extremes seems sufficiently'large tomerit the conelusion that men were more likely to contact their relativesthe longtir r&y were exposed to the blackout. This effect is masked inthe analytic cross-tabulations by the fact that, for the men in this sample,number cf relatives living in the area, which has a fairly strong effect on _the probability of contacting relatives, is negatively related to the dura-tion of the blackout: thus the two effects--of duration and number ofrelatives in the area--tend to cancel each other out in the cross-tabulations,where simulranious controls for exposure to the blackout and number of rela-

-tives in the area are impossible. The corresponding figures for women withminimum and maximum exposure to the power failure are, .respectively, 30.8and 40.7 per cent. The difference between these extremes is only about

half of that observed for men and one might be less likely to conclude thatthe duration of the blackout had any appreciable effect upon the propensityof women to call their relatives.

One can evaluate variation in the probability of contacting one’srelatives during the blackout over the ranges of each of the remaining in-dependent variables in a manner parallel to that just adopted to examine

the effects of exposure to the blackout. For men, we find that differences

in the expected percentage contacting their relatives between persons withminimum and maximum values of each of the variables are as follows: for

years of school completed, -4.6; for number of relatives living in area, 18.0;

for frequency of contact with relatives, 13.9; and for general fear, 1.2.The corresponding differences for women are less than 0.1 per cent for educa-tion, 16.8 per cent for number of relatives, 20.2 per cent for frequency of

contact with relatives, and 17.1 per cent for general fear. As one can tell

from the variation in the expected percentage of persons contacting their

particularly noteworthy only for men and women to whom it at least occurredto be generally afraid. The probability of contacting one”s relativesduring the blackout was more nearly the same for men and women who neverthought to be generally afraid. Consequently, an alternative sunxsary ofthe findings shown in Tables IV.3 to IV.4 is that women are more likelythan men to find release for their anxieties by contacting their relativeswhen they are frightened. Looking at our results in this way suggestsadditional factors which might account for ths findings.

As noted above, telephone service was not affected by the power,failure. A s Table IV.1 demonstrated, by far the largest amount of contactbetween relatives was via telephone communcation. Women, particularlythose who arc not employed, have a much greatrr opportunity for chattingwith friends and relatives on the telsphone than employed men whose jobskeep them away from home during much of the day. As Table IV.8 shows,women report an average frequency of daily telephone conversations withfriends which substantially exceeds that reported by men. While both menand women with higher levels of educational attainment engage in more fre-quent telephone conversations with their friends, women have larger averagenumbers of telephone conversations than men vi.....*kin each cduc~tisnal level.

Since women demonstrably use the telephone more frequently to engagetheir friends in conversation, one might surmise that when frightened theywould be mar= likely than men to relieve their anxiety by using the phoneto contact rheir relatives. Such an argument presumes that stronger habitsare more likely to persist in times of crisis or anxiety and implies thatcontrolling for frequancy of telephone chats would specify the relationship,among fright=nid persons, between sex and contact with relatives duringthe blackout. Howiver , as Table. TV.9 shows, women who wera generallyafraid were. mar, likely to contact their relatives than men who were gen-erally afraid, rigardltss of the number of their daily telephone chats

.with frirnds. Indeed, Table IV.9 also shows that.frequency of telephoneconversations with friends has no systematic relationship to contact withrelatives during the blackout, a point which suggests the persistence of .habit is less than complete in times of crisis.

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TABLE IV. 8

DAILY TELEPHONE CHATS WITH FRIENDS BY SEX AND EDUCATION

Sex and Education

Total, all respondentsMaleFemale

8t.h Grade or lessMaleFemale

Some high schoolMale

Female

Completed high schoolMaleFemale

Some collegeMaleFemale

Frequency of Telephone Chats with Friends

Percentage Distribution

29.137.915.7

42.948.831.4

31.740.916.3

23.137.311.3

23.729.510.8

31.934.428.1

31.733.727.9

32.834.130.6

31.535.428.4

31.834.525.8

18.814.425.3

11.99.0

17.4

17.912.826.5

2U.6’14.325.b

22.118.929.2

20.313.230.9

13.58.4

23.3

17.612.226.5

24.813.034.5

22.417.034.2

Total cases in table . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 1,253No answer on years of school completed . . . . . . 4No answer on frequency of telephone conversations. 3No answer on both education and telephone chats. . 4Reported having no telephone (excluding no answers

on other items). . . . . . . . . . . ; . . . 49*-Total sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313

Numberof

Cases

1,253755498

252166

86

262164

98

355161194

384264120

&

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Contact Between Separated Married Couples

Our discussion to this point has focused only upon the correlatesof contact with relatives during the blackout. However, 47.0 per cent ofthe married men falling in our sample were separated from their wives atthe time the blackout occurred and 55.9 par cent of the married women in oursample were in different places than their husbands when the lights went out.Currently married persons who were not with their spouses when the blackoutfirst occurred were asked if they tried to contact their spouse. Repliesto this question provide an opportunity to both verify our analysis of therelationship between general fear and contact with relatives and corroborate-our argument about potential role conflict in Chapter III.

For married persons who were not with their spouses when the blackoutoccurred, Table IV.10 shows the relationship between attempts to contactone’s spouse and a variety of psychological reactions to the blackout. Asone can see in the table, married men were more likely than married womento attempt to contact their spouses. This difference between the behavior

-of men and women separated by the blackout from their spouses would notappear to call for substantive interpretation. Women were more likely thanmen to be at home when the blackout occurred, while men were more likely to. .be at work or in transit. Consequently, men were more likely than women toknow where their spouses could be contacted. Wc presume, therefore, thatthe sex difference observed in Table IV.10 is wholly circumstantial, re-flecting only the fact that the blackout occurred during the rush hour whenmany men would know where their wives could be located, but many women wouldnot know how to contact their husbands.

Just as the psychological reactions of women--in particular, generalfear--were associated with contact with relatives during the blackout, wefind that the psychological reactions of married men separated from theirwives are associated with attempts to contact their spouses. Men who werebored, restless, or generally afraid were more likely to attempt to contacttheir wives than men who did not experience these feelings. Among womenseparated from their husbands when the blackout occurred, these associations

-YO-

TABLE IV.10

ATIEMPTS TO CONTACT SPOUSE DURING BLACKOUI BY PSYCHOLOGICALFE~ING~ AND sac, FOR MARRIED MHN AND WOMEN SEPARATED

FROM SPOUSE AT TIME BIACXOUT OCCURRED

Total, All Persons I IPsychological Reactions

General fearNever though to be

generally afraidOccurred to be afraidFelt generally afraid

or Among strongestfeelings

Worry about spouseNever thought to worry

that spouse was indanger

Worried that spouse wasin danger

BoredomBoredNot bored

RestlessnessRestlessNot r,stless

Central fearNever though to be

genarally sfraidOccurred to bt: afraid.Felt genrrally afraid or

Among, scrongsstfeelings

Worry abour spouseNever thought to worry

that spouse was indanger

Worried that spouse wasin danger

Separated fromSpouse When

Blackout Occurred I Men I Women

Per Cent Attempting to Contact Spouse

33.136.9

39.8 54.5 31.7

26.0

45.8

41.1 59.6 23.632.6 36.4 26.5

40.0 55.0 30.033.2 38.3 24.3

37.9 23.348.4 26.5

29.6 21.4

53.5 32.5

Bases for Percentagesa

356 240 11665 31 34

. .93

285 159 126

225 142 83

33 60

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TABLE IV.lO--Continued

Psychological Reactions

BoredomBoredNot bored

RestlessnessRestlessNot restless

Total, All PersonsSeparated fromSpouse When

Blackout Occurred

107405

100416

Men

52250

40264

55155

60 '152

aTotal number of cases varies from one psychological item to anotherbecause of non-response.

are either not found or are severely attenuated. Our analysis suggests,

then, that wives played roughly the same role for men who were generallyafraid as relatives outside the immediate'family served for frightenedwomen. Because the blackout occurred at a time when married women wereunlikely to know where their husbands could be located, they turned to theirrelatives to relicvc their general anxiety. Xsrried men, on tlia contrary ,could expect their wives to be home and could turn to them for psychologicalassurance.

Returning briefly to our previous discussion of potential roleconflict aroused by the blackout, we see in the second panel of Table IV.10

that, particularly for men, worry that their spouse might be in danger--our primary indicator of potential role conflict--led to attempts to contactthem. Clearly, in more serious disasters, where communication might be moredifficult (making reassurance more difficult to obtain) this concern couldwell lead to a manifest conflict between work and familial roles which mightseriously impair the smooth functioning of the social system.

..- -.

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Conclusions

In this chapter we have explored some of the correlates of one type

of “convergence ” behavior which frequently occurs in the aftermath of natural

disasters, vis., a heightened level of telephone and other types of.inter-personal communication. The results of the present, preliminary analysis

are consistent with the hypothesis that this behavior is motivated by generalanxiety induced by the disaster and crisis situation. Specifically, we have

shown that women were more likely to contact their relatives if they werefrightened, while married men, separated from their wives by the power fail-

ure, were more likely to attempt contacting their spouses if they experiencedfeelings of general fright, restlessness, or boredom. To the extent thatthese findings may be generalized to other situations and other types ofbehavior, one may presume that any actions by responsible authorities to

reduce general anxiety--such as discounting rumors and providing reliable

and thorough information about the impact of crises and disasters--will

also have the salutary effect of counteracting convergence behavior. How-

eve*, our results also suggest that the actions of no agency, official

or otherwise, can wholly control convergence behavior. The increased

intensity of telephone communcation in the aftermath of disasters andduring other crises appears, at least, to be rooted not only in psycholo-.gical reactions but in the extent and strength of kinship ties, a featureof social life not subject to short run social control. One must, of

course, be wary of generalizing the findings from the blackout study to

other situations and our results require duplication in other settingsbefore their full import can be accurately known.

,CHAPTER v

THE BLACKOUT AS A DISASTER

“A disaster can be defined as a sudden, large, unfavorable change inthe inputs of a s o c i a l system.“1 Under this conception, the blackout fullyqualifiesasadisaster even though its inmediate threat to individual livesseems negligible compared to that posed by tornados, impending floods, andexplosions. While for many individuals the blackout might best described asan inconvenience, its impact upon business and commerce was more severe:

The blackout also struck the city in its breadbasket--commerce and industry. Millions of first class letters, repre-senting about fifteen per cent of the nation’s total mail forthe day, were held up at post offices and train stations. Thedaily clearance of 2.8 million checks by the Federal ReserveBank of New York could not be completed. The Stock Rxchange onWall Street had completed its business by the time the powerfailed, but many staff vorkers and other employees were stillaround. About fifty of them sat out the blackout on the clean-swept floor of the Exchange, where seats usually sell for$250,000 a piece . . .

Throughout the financial district, which employs someseventy-five thousand people in various phases of the securitiesindustry, t h e s t o r y w a s much the same--foraging for food andmatches and waiting for the electric power to return. In theshambles of Wednesday morning, it was estimated that the black-

out in the city had caused up to $100 million in losses tobusiness and industry.2

1Alien H. Barton, “The Emergency Social System,” in George W. Eakerand Dwight W. Chapman, editors, Man and Society in Disaster (New York:Books, Inc. , Basic

1962), p. 222.2A.M.

Out (New York:Rosenthal and Arthur Gelb, editors, The Night the Lights Went

- New American Library, Signet Books, 1965), p. 39.

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Excepting the small fraction of individuals trapped in subways, elevators, and

other unusual conditions too infrequent to merit special analysis in this re-port, the primary impact of the blackout was upon organizations. However,until its cause became known, the power failure could, like a flood, or tornadowarning, be interpreted by individuals as posing a threat of unknown conse-quence to t.heir well being.

The peculiarities of the blackout which sdt it apart from other disas-ters make it difficult to generaliee the findings of this report to ochersituations. By the same token, comparison with behavior in other situationsis of critical interest, since it is only by reference to such comparisonsthat one can fully understand the phenomena which accompany the maladiesof social systems. With only a few notable exceptions, most sociologicalinvestigations of disasters and social crises have been either wholly im-pressionistic or based upon intensive interviews with only a few respondents.Exact comparisons with the findings of the present study are, therefore, ren-dered impossible. Even the few studies which have been based, as is thepresent one, upon relatively large sample surveys have either been metlvatedby different substantive concerns or have been analyzed in such a way as tomake comparisons with the present study impossihln.

To make specific examples, studies. by the National Opinion Research

Center of the Cuban missile crisis and the assassination of President Kennedywere primarily concerned with individual, psycholagical reactions to thesesiruations, rather than actual behavior. While limited comparisons of R~OGJ

psycholbgicl 1 reactions to these events and to the eastern seaboard blackoutare possiblr, they go beyond the confines of the present report which is con-cerned with th: differentiation of individual responses to a specific situa:tion rather than tht. gross psychological impacts of different situations.Thus, neitbc.r the materials in tne study of the Cuban missill crisis nor thoseccllected in the Kennedy assassination study allow us to replicate the findingsreported .in Chapter 11, where individual psychological reactions to the black-out are tied to the interpersonal environments in which individuals foundthemselves. To cite another example., a relatively large survey of a flood

. .

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in the Netherlands provides a number of itemswhich, appropriately tabulated,-could proyide interesting, qualitative comparisons with the findings of theblackout study.3 However, the analysis of the material is’almost wholly con-fined to an investigation of the adaptation of evacuees to their temporary,host families, an important problem in its own right but one wholly irrelevantto the blackout. In view of the difficulties of devising relevant, quanti-tative comparisons to other studies, it seems best to regard the major findingsfrom the blackout study as suggestive hypotheses for future research. In fact,our own interest in the present study was largely in using the blackout as anopportunity for formulating a variety of hypotheses which could be replicatedand expanded in other studies covering a wide variety of disasters and extremesituations. k full understanding of the phenomena discussed in this reportand the extent of their generality can only be established if funds are madeavailable to (1) develop a standard instrument for use in surveys of the presentkind and (2) utilize that instrument- , suitably expanded for the particularevent, in a variety of contexts. Here, we can only suanaarise, with occasionalreference to other studies,

I .,the major findings from the blackout in their most

general form. .‘.. /__,

. :_ : -

c t_ I. i Definiticn of the- Situation-: ,. i _,. .:y ,‘..;.;y

‘.;‘.’

The actual’behavior’of individuals in particular situations reflectsin some measure th!e& definition cf that situation. This proposition hasfound wide acceptance in many disaster studies, especially in explaining

.psychciogical reactions to threatening phenomena. Several empirical examplesare easily gleaned from the literature. One comes from a small sample surveyof public reactions to the sounding of air raid sirens in recognition of thewinning cf rhr baseball pennant by the 1959 Chicago White Sax.’ Table V.1shows the relationship betwr?n interpretations of the unanticipated sounding

.‘See C. J. Lannners, Survey of EvacuationProblems and Disaster Expe-riences, Studies in Holland Flood Disaster: 1953, Vol. II (Amsterdam, Holland:Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek van het Nederiandse- Volk, and Washington,D.C. : Coxuaittee on Disaster Studies of the National Academy of Sciences,National Research Council, 1955), pp. 205ff.

_ _ _ _ .._. .-

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of the air raid warning on this occasion and various psychological reactions.The results are clear and unambiguous: those who thought the sirens were set

off in celebration of the White Sox victory were not scared, excited,' uneasy, orannoyed, while the majority of the respondents who incorrectly interpreted thesounding of the sirens as a legitimate air raid warning experienced all ofthese feelings.

TABLE V.1

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO THE CHICAGO AIR RAID WARNINGBY INTERPRETATION OF ITS SIGNiFICANCE

I Psychological Reacrions I NumberInterpretation of Sirens

1 Scared1 Excited1 Uneasy1 ',Erd ) CazisI I I ! Irritated

Per Cent Experiencing Feeling

Total, all respondent8Legitimate air raid warningOtherCelebration of White SOX

vi.2 tory

-

2 6 7 .4 53

Source: Raymond W. Mack and George W. Baker, The Occasion Instant:The Strusture of Social Responses to Unanticipated Air Raid Warnings (Wash-ington, D.C.: National Academy of Scrences--National Research Council,Disaster Research Group, Disaster Study No. 15, 1961), Table 7, p. 37.

m (Wash-Research Council,

e 7, p. 37.

As in the case of the air raid warning, the blackout was unanticipated

and, while not immediately endangering the respondent, could have been inter-preted as potentially dangerous until its explanation was known to the respon-

dent. In Chapter I, we saw that respondents who had not previously experiencedpower failures in their neighborhood and who perceived the blackout's sccpeas extending beyond their immediate neighborhood were more likely to definethe situation as unusual. In Table V.2, we examine the relationship between

the respondent's initial reaction to the blackout and his reported psychologicalfeelings during it, controlling for sex and perception of its scope.

.

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The basic pattern revealed in Table V.2 is clear: controlling for sexand perceived scope of the blackout, respondents who initially interpreted theblackout a8 an unusual event were mOre likely to be particularly excited orfrightened and less likely to enjoy the blackout than those who initially re-garded the power failure as an ordinary interruption of electrical service.These feelings do not prove, however, to be monotonically related to the re-spondent's first impression of the blackout's scope. However, there is aslight tendency for those who initially preceived its scope as extending overa wide area & who thought the blackout unusual to be more frightened orparticularly exicted and less likely to enjoy it than other respondents. Onthe whole, these results, like those from the study of the false air'raidwarning, testify to the importance of the definition of situation in under-standing emotional reactions to distress.

Emotional Reactions and the Imoact of Disasters.

In Chapter III of the present study, we were able to show that theprobability of experiencing various feelings during the blackout was closelyassociated with its duration. Doubtless the inconvenience and difficultyoccasioned by the blackout were exaggerated the longer it persisted. Conse-quently, it is not surprising that those exposed to it for longer periods weremore likely to be frightened, excited, or otherwise emotionally upset,

Sketchy materials from investigations of other disasters also suggestthat the severity of emotional reactions is conditioned by the relative impactof the situation upon the respondent. For example, one study of a tornadorevealed that post-disaster emotional disturbances in children were associatedwith their experiences during rhe tornado. Children in the hardest hit area,in cars that were damaged, or observing buildings being destroyed were more. .likely to have post-disaster emotional disturbances than those less directlyeffected by the tornado. 4 The actual impact of a,disaster is, of course, oneof the ingredients which determine the respondent's definition of the situation.

4Stewart E. Perry, Earle Silber, and Donald A. Bloch, The Child andHis Family in Disaster: A Study of the 1953 Vicksburg Tornado pashington,D-C.: National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council,.Committee onDisaster Studies, Disaster Study No, 5, 1956). Table III, p. 25.

. T

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TABLB v.2

SELECTED FEELINCSDLRZING BIACKODT By INITIAL INTERPRETATION OFTBE BLACKOUT, INITIAL PERCEPTION OF ITS SCOPE, AND SW

Sex.and InitialInterpretation

of Blackout

Total, all respondentsBlackout usualBlackout unusual

MalesBlackout usual

' Blackout unusual

FemalesBlackout usual-Blackout unusual>'

Total, all respondents 17.8

Blackout usual 16.2

Blackout unusual 22.8

During18.317.421.4

Hales 11.7 10.5Blackout usial 10.1 10.2

Blackout unusual 16.3 11.6

FemalesBlackout usuhlBlackout unusual

otal1kespo__Per C

Perceived Scope of BlackoutWhen First Noticed

the18.216.225.5

6.9 6.1

4.8 5.212.8 9.1

34.0 36.129.7 32.1

48.7 >2.0

Per .nt Parcicu

tlackcut12.611.516.7

4.9 15.94.0 2.78.1 26.7

24.522.930.4

rly Excithe Blackt

13.012.016.7

.ll.O10.313.5

'.16.014.521.7

24.012.335.9

38.325.03I.Y

at Some Time

24.816.932.8

20.78.1 :

31.1

31.928.636.8

.TABLE V.2--Continued

Sex and InitialInterpretation

of Blackout

Total, all respondentsBlackout usualBlackout unusual

MalesBlackout usualBlackout unusual

FemalesBlackout usualBlackout unusual

Total, all respondents 1,311 .913 269 129Blackout usual 991 717 209 65Blackout unusual 320 196 60 64

Males 788 543 163 82Blackout usual 585 422 126 37Blackout unusual 203 121 37 45

Per Cent Enjoying the Blackout at Some Time

26.828.122.8

30.531.428.1

21.323.513.7

27.8 23.8 26.429.0 25.8 26.223.5 16.7 26.6

32.0 24.5 32.933.1 26.2 29.728.1 18.9 35.6

21.7 22.6 14.923.1 25.3 21.416.0 13.0 5.3

Babes for Perceuiages-*

523 370 106 47406 295 83 28117 75 _ 23 19

Females_-Blackout usualBlackout unusual

*Bases vary slightly from panel to panel because of no answers onfeelings; total is less than 1,313 because of no answers on initial inter-pretation of blackout.

._ _..._. --I-..-. --

I

-lOO-

Consequently, it is not surprising that the study cited above also found thatchildren who were aware that an extraordinary storm was taking place were morelikely to experience post-disaster emotional disturbances than those unawareof the full rhreat of the tornado.

Under many circumstances, the full impact of a disaster is conditionedby initial, emotional reactions ro it. Thus, a cont.agion of fear during a

fire can generate the panic which escalates a minor property loss into a fullecale disaeier costing many human lives. ‘In part, the rtactiona of particular

individuals are controlled by their perception of the feelings of others. Inthe present study, for example, we found th&,r individuals perceiving signs of

mirth in the behavior of others were rhemsolves more likely to enjoy the black-out. A parallel finding may be derived from the Chicago air raid siren study.Table V.3 shows the relationship between the respondent’s interpretation ofthe sounding of the air raid siren and their reports on the interpretation oftheir companions.

I 1 Interpretaticn of Sirens

Number of Casts

Source: Compiled from Mack and Baker, z. cjc., Table 9,p. 48.

.As the reader can see from the table, respondents who reported that their com-panions interpreted the sounding of the siren as signifying the White Sox vic-tory were themselves more likely to interpret the siren in that way. Similarly,those whose companions thought the siren was a legitimate air raid warning werethemselves more likely to render this interpretation. Such a consensus on thedefinition of an ambigious situation can , of course, influence emotional re-actions and give rise to a corresponding contagion of emotions producing panic.Processes governing the imputation of emotions and motives to others csndetermine the ultimate impact of a threatening or ambiguous situation. -Atleast one of the ingredients of the blackout which hrlped prevent panic wasthe fact that most respondents were able to assimilate the power failureimmediately as an ordinary temporary interruption of electrical service. Stillfurther, many individuals were either at home or alone, an ecological aspectof the situation which prevented a possible contagion of ominous definitionsof the situation. In any case, the only contagion of emotions we could detect‘in the present study primarily involved positive reactions.

Ccmmunication and Social Roles

The Conflict of Responsibility. Certain types of disasters tend tobring out conflicts between role sets which are normally keptlatent by theirtemporal and/or spatial isolation. Thus, civil defense off,icials, governmentemployees, and others having defined roles in disasters may experience a con-flict between their familial and public responsibilities. In. the blackoutstudy we found that married men at work were more likely to worry about boththeir bpouses and their jobs. Though the evidence on this matter is weak,the data do suggest that a mild conflict between work and familial roles couldhave developed during the blackout.

Interpersonal Contact. The aftermath of.‘many disasters--floods., tor-nados, expiosions , riots, etc.--is marked by an increased level of interpsr-sonal communication not only within the impact zone bur between the effectedarea and more distant points. For example, a heightened level of telephoneccrrununication was observed during the blackout. Evidence garnered in the

-102-

present rurvey reveals that many of these telephone calls were between relativesresiding in different households. While the extent and strength of kinshipties are important factors underlying this behavior, our analysis also revealsthat emoticnlsl reacticns to the biackout were another catalyst for engagingrelatives in telephone conversation. Wcmcn who were frightened during theblackout proved mere likely to phone their relatives than those whc remainedplacid. The same finding does not hold amcng male respondents, an aspect oftheir behavior which may be related to their ecological circumstance when theblackout occurred. Married men who were separated from their wives when theblackout occurred were more likely to contact their spouses if they were thtm-selves frightened cr wcrried.

1nEormaticn-- Sxchanqe. Voluntary organizatisns and informal patternsof leadership can be important components of the emergency social system whichassumes ascendency when official agencies of social control are rendered in-adequate or ineffective. Dur,ing the power failure, for example, we found thatindividuals belonging to voluntary organizations were more likely to be con-tacted for information concerning the blackout than individuals without suchtiea. Members of vr!untary orgnniccticna ire cl;; IGirzi li' 'KL*j Lr, :LPYG ociet.ato informal "public kffairsl' experts. Thus, the patterns of connaunicationand leadership developed within the framework of voiuntary organizations pro-vides P latent 3trucriire cf authority to which individ&als may turn forguidance in crises, The vitality and legitimacy of such an emergency socialsystem rrste upcn ci7e greater knowledge and higher social status cf its mc-sLprominrnr memberti..

Ccnci;zslons---

Amcq tht many elemtinrs adduced cc accounr.for the panic which acccm-parled (rscn Wtiiec' new famcLs radio brcadcasr c.f a script based on H.G. Welis'War of the W$:rId? was the gcrz,ral rccial climate.----- Abroad Hitler was on the moveand Europe was at war, while at home many Americans were still experiencingthe econcmic impact of the Depression. 5 This situation, especially the threat

-5 Hadley Cantril, The Invasio_eErcm Mars. A Study in the Fsycholw

of Panic (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. i63-64.

, of war, iended to raise the level of national anxiety, reducing the thresholdof undirected, panic responses and raising the susceptibility to belief inthe implausible fictions propounded in a realistic and dramatic fashion by theWelles' broadcast. In many ways, similar ingredients were present in the

social milieu when the blackout occurred. The nation had lived in the shadows

of annihilation by atomic war for over a decade, the government's commitmentto the Wet Nam situation was expanding, and at home anti-Viet Nam protests

and the Civil Rights movement filled the headlints. One plausible cutcome of

the power failure was panic; many of the ingredients were present and one canonly speculate why, for example, panic did not materialize during the blackoutbut did materialize in response to the Welles' broadcast.

One of the major factors contributing to the public reaction to theWelles' broadcast was l&k of critical ability. Cantril and his associatesfound that interpretation of the Welles' broadcast as a news report was more

pronounced among respondents with lower levels of educational attainment.6In the quarter century since the Welles' program, the education of the popu-

lation has increased markedly-- a general social trend which may reduce sus-

ceptibility to panic. Two other features of the blackout may help accountfor the mild reaction it engendered cromparcd tc the Wcllco' program. First,the Welles' broadcast--if interpreted as a factual broadcast--posed a directand immediate threat to the respondent's life, while the blackout--even ifinterpreted cminously--posed a more ambiguous threat to the individual. Second,

for most people, the radio provided easy confirmation that the blackout posedno isaa;diare danger; irresponsible spread or initiation of rumors concerningthe power r‘ailure by announcers might well have turned the power failure intoa panic. However, the continued and responsible service of radio stations issurely one important ingredient which nipped in the bud any latent tendencyto panic during the blackout. These speculations have, however, little to

recommend tnem save plausibility. A full, empirically confirmed knowledge of

the conditions promoting panic and of public reac.tions to disasters must awaitthe collection of systematic and comparable information dealing with a widevariety of conditions. Such a fund of data is unlikely to be obtained until

%I&. , Table 5, p. 112.

c,* .kr’ I:

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