leadership and political compromise

Leadership and Political Compromise: Presidents Reagan and Obama, Speakers O’Neill and Boehner

University of Colorado School of Public AffairsLeadership and Professional EthicsProf. Aden Hogan

December 2, 2011

Alice BartonIain HydeAndrew Lindstad

Introduction

Leaders at the pinnacle of American politics, namely the president and members of the

U.S. Congress, drive the nation’s agenda and have the authority and responsibility to enact

change to improve the lives of the American people. At a number of junctures throughout

American history, these leaders have been forced to confront daunting and complex challenges.

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill found themselves

at the center of such a juncture, as soaring inflation and interest rates, rising unemployment,

increased costs of entitlement programs, and the cold war required creative and collaborative

problem solving across party lines. Likewise, President Barack Obama and Speaker John

Boehner, along with Congress are currently faced with a severe economic crisis, rising

unemployment, two wars and an unprecedented rise in federal deficits.

This paper will examine the leadership employed by Presidents Reagan and Obama, and

House Speakers Tip O’Neill and John Boehner. In particular, it will evaluate the political and

policy environments surrounding these men, analyze the leadership traits they employed, and

describe the resulting solutions (or lack thereof) that resulted from their leadership. It will

Barton, Hyde, Lindstad 1

consider the visions of those leaders, as well as the viewpoints of those who disagreed with their

vision as a solution for the difficult problems at hand. As will become evident through these case

studies, change leaders often face stiff resistance when trying to implement their vision. Mario

Cuomo said that engaging debate was to, “state the claim of a 'more perfect union' against the

demand for 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' once again” (Cuomo, 2001). How Reagan,

O’Neill, Obama and Boehner approach resistance and dissention from their vision ultimately

plays a significant role in their success as leaders and their achievement of the goal of a more

perfect union.

Leadership Through Change

The President and Congress are entrusted with positional power but are simultaneously

tempered by the checks and balances included in the American political system. In the context

of this political system, successful leaders have demonstrated that they posses a portfolio of traits

that give them the credibility needed to lead. John Maxwell points to two essential traits needed

to bring about change: “knowing the technical requirements of the change, and understanding the

attitude and motivational demands for bringing it about” (Maxwell, 1993, p. 52). In the context

of policy, this means that leaders must be able to clearly identify and articulate the problem to be

solved, identify solutions that are politically acceptable and technically feasible, and then possess

the interpersonal traits to motivate others to work for that change. Cawsey, Deszca and Ingols

describe the necessity that leaders possess, “a dogged determination to succeed in the face of

significant odds and the resilience to respond to setbacks in a reasoned and appropriate manner”

(Cawsey et al., p. 264). Employing these traits inspires public trust and confidence and provides

the needed foundation for change initiatives to take hold.


Clear vision is a required first step in successfully leading through times of crisis or

change and managing against potential resistance. John C. Maxwell states that, “…all effective

leaders have a vision of what they must accomplish. That vision becomes the energy behind

every effort and the force that pushes through all the problems” (Maxwell, 1993, p. 139). A

compelling vision from a change initiator enlists support from stakeholders, who in turn can

advocate for, facilitate and implement the change. Inevitably, however the change process will

run into resistance from those that either disagree or are skeptical that the vision is in their best

interest. Maxwell points to multiple factors for resistance to change: Routines might be

disrupted; change can catalyze a fear of unknown outcomes; change can create fear of failure,

and; the rewards associated with change may not match the effort required to institute the

change. (Maxwell, 1993, pp. 56-58). Furthermore, Maxwell points out that negative thinking

can significantly inhibit motivation for change (Maxwell, 1993, p. 59). Cawsey et al. state that,

“If the change leader hopes to enlist [stakeholder] support, or at least minimize their resistance,

the leader needs to capture and consider their perspectives and the underlying rational.” As such,

collaborative, bipartisanship leadership is not simply letting resistors express their viewpoint. As

Maxwell says, “The leader’s attitude helps determine the attitudes of the followers.” ,(1993, p.

106) Leadership, in the spirit of true bipartisanship, entails deliberately and deliberatively

working to understand and consider the reasons for resistance and therefore respecting and

including those opinions in the process of translating vision into policy solutions.

Once a vision has been established and stakeholders have been engaged, solutions to

address the identified problems will emerge. Successful change solutions need to appeal to a

broad enough constituency to reach critical mass. Critical mass can mean that stakeholders with


fundamentally diverging viewpoints need to find common ground. As such, Maxwell points to a

series of questions that the leader must ask in order to successfully prioritize solutions:

Which solution has the greatest potential to be right? ( In the context of politics - what solution is both politically acceptable and most effective at addressing the problem)

Which solution is in the best interests of the organization? (What solution is in the best interests of the country and not the political party)

Which solution has momentum and timing on its side, and; Which solution has the greatest chance for success?

(1993, p. 93)

Should leaders, both through the evaluation of the merits of their vision, and an understanding

of the viewpoints of supporting, undecided or resistant stakeholders, Maxwell believes the

prospect for success of implementing the vision is more likely.

The Political Environment, 1983

The legacies of Democratic Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill and Republican President

Ronald Reagan can in part be defined by their relationship and leadership styles, which both

strongly influenced the legislative outcomes of their concurrent time in office. Each man’s

leadership style and means of persuasion differed greatly. The telegenic Reagan capitalized on

his comfort with and ability to use television media to speak directly to the American people and

communicate his position clearly. O’Neill, on the other hand was known for his cultivation of

relationships and the impact those relationships had on his ability to manage the Democratic

agenda. Ultimately the outcomes of major policy battles between the two parties often rested on

the ability of each leader to persuade their fellow party members and the American public to

support their policy goals.

Thomas “Tip” O’Neill was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the son of a civil servant.

His father, as well as the previous two generations of his family, had worked hard to claim


“respectability.” His father taught him the virtues of “loyalty to one’s own, integrity and charity

towards the unfortunate.” (Farrell, 2001) O’Neill’s worldview was further codified watching the

impacts of the Great Depression on himself and those around him. Farrell notes that “The

intensity of the experience, coming as the boys became men, worked like a bellows on their fears

and insecurities, and tested their character.” (Farrell, 2001)

The culmination of the lessons of his childhood and adolescence led O’Neill to a career

in politics, first in the Massachusetts Legislature and then to the United States House of

Representatives. Farrell describes O’Neill as “[T]he quintessential New Deal Democrat –

unrepentant, un-reconstructed and determined to follow the Franklin D. Roosevelt philosophy of

tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect.” (Farrell, 2001) Mario Cuomo notes that

“O’Neill’s strongest weapons in battle were his political skills and the depth of his personal

commitment to the rational for government assistance to the needy.” (Cuomo, 2001). O’Neill

was a master tactician and his likability and ability to cultivate strong relationships were some of

his greatest assets. Furthermore, O’Neill did not shy away from making deals and rewarding

allies. Cuomo notes that O’Neill engaged in quid pro-quo deals and at times would intercede for

both lobbyists as well as his constituents (Cuomo, 2001).

Ronald Reagan came from humble roots. He was born in Tampco, Illinois, and grew up

in the small town of Dixon. (The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Library) He

moved to Hollywood, California in 1937, to begin a career as a movie actor where he acted in

numerous films before and after serving in World War II. Following his military service, he

began to focus more of his energy on political causes, including speaking out strongly against

communism in America. In 1947, he became the president of the Screen Actors Guild, where he,


“…proved himself to be a capable leader, a skillful negotiator and an adept problem solver”

(Reagan Foundation and Library).

Reagan’s participation in political causes eventually led to his election as California’s

Governor in 1966, on a conservative platform. He believed in a limited role of government

where markets and an unencumbered public could find the path to prosperity. While Governor,

Reagan learned that his most effective path to implementing his agenda was to, “not go through”

a hostile legislature, but rather to, “go over their heads right to the constituents” (Reagan

Foundation and Library). His talent for speaking directly to constituents continued to serve him

through the 1980 election, when he defeated incumbent Jimmy Carter. While president, Reagan

effectively engaged in dialogue and negotiation in addition to taking his message directly to the

public. Peterson writes that, “Once in office (with some exceptions), he proved willing and able

to engage in the give-and-take of the political process” (Peterson, 1990, p. 263). As such, he was

effective at persuading Congressional action on a number of policy initiatives, particularly,

“when his proposals involved small policy changes or altered existing programs“ (Peterson,

1990, p. 261).

At the time of Reagan’s election, the country was beleaguered by “a calamitous

combination of political disasters, including double digit inflation and interest rates, increased

unemployment and the inability to orchestrate a return of the hostages from Iran.” Reagan and

O’Neill’s visions for the role of government and how the country might emerge from these

challenges fundamentally differed. Cuomo says, “Theirs was no sophistic debate: these were

world views clashing, hat lava meeting thundering surf.” (Cuomo, 2001) At times, this led to

fierce battles over issues such as tax cuts and social programs such as Social Security, Medicare

and Medicaid. However, as Chris Matthews, O’Neill’s aide while he was Speaker, notes that the


two men had a genuine mutual respect. Matthews pointed out that the two men occasionally

shared lunches and met annually on St. Patrick’s Day in celebration of their mutual Irish

heritage. After one of those lunches, Reagan wrote, “He can really like you personally and be a

friend while politically trying to beat your head in” (Matthews, 2011). Ultimately, while the men

maintained a fierce political rivalry, they were able to set differences aside to work together and

pass major pieces of legislation reforming Social Security as well as the tax code. At the time of

O’Neill’s retirement from Congress, President Reagan said, “Mr. Speaker, I'm grateful you have

permitted me in the past and I hope in the future that singular honor - the honor of calling you

my friend” (Matthews, 2011).

Reforming Social Security

The compromise between President Ronald Reagan and House Speaker Tip O’Neill on

Social Security was the culmination of a long process that began when Reagan entered office in

1981. The Democratic Party had experienced a disastrous four years under the Carter

Administration and the 1981 election ushered in not only a Republican President, but also the

loss of the U. S. Senate and the loss of 33 seats in the House of Representatives. (Farrell, 2001).

Needing to re-group and out of respect for the electoral process, O’Neill “decided to give

Reagan a chance to offer his legislation and not play games with it, and do it in a very public

way so that [Democrats would not] become the scapegoat, and would not take the blame”

(Farell, 2001, p. 545). Even though, he had the power to delay, O’Neill chose to give the Reagan

tax and budget programs the opportunity to go forward. While the intent may have been to let

the Republicans fail on their own accord, one result was the formation of the cordial and

communicative relationship between the two men. Reagan’s advisors also wanted a mutually


respectful relationship with Congress and worked to foster communication as well. When

Reagan was shot on March 30, 1981, O’Neill “was the first outsider to visit [him] in the

hospital” (Farrell, 2001, p. 553). This positive foundation in the relationship between the two

would serve them well in spite of their great differences in political ideology.

Ronald Reagan campaigned on and was dedicated to reducing taxes and balancing the

budget while increasing defense spending to counter the Soviet threat. He promised to achieve

this by cutting back on government spending – although without being very specific on what

would be cut back. David Stockman was Reagan’s budget director – he was a man “dedicated to

the task of dismantling as much as he could of the [Roosevelt’s] New Deal and [Johnson’s] Great

Society, to liberate people and financial capital from oppressive bureaucracy” (Farrell, 2001, p.

549). He crafted an itemized budget plan of $467 billion in spending reductions over 6 yeas but

did not specify cuts to programs like social security and Medicare. As a result, Reagan

announced that these programs would remain intact. However the budget did account for what

became known as “the magic asterisk” – a $44 billion dollar amount that was classified as

“future savings to be proposed” (Hayward, 2009, p. 89). It should be noted that Stockman’s

budget also relied on an overly optimistic real annual growth rate of 5% (Farrell, 2001, p. 549).

In spite of this, by lobbying conservative House Democrats, Reagan was successful in getting the

1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act and the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981 passed. These

two bills were the tax reduction, domestic spending reduction and military spending increase that

were the cornerstones of Reagan’s economic polices (The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act retrieved from http://bancroft.berkeley.edu).

While this was a huge defeat for Democrats, O’Neill contacted Reagan and congratulated

him on his success saying “no hard feelings, ol’ pal, it’s a great two party system we have. We


gave our best and you outdid us…” Reagan responded; “We’re stunned too” (Farrell, 2001, p.

561). But the Republicans made a miss-step. There was still the unaccounted for $44 billion

dollars in reductions paired with the unrealistic growth rate projections that made the budget

feasible. Against the advice of his party, Reagan supported going after Social Security,

unemployment insurance and Medicare – this was Stockman’s original intent, leaving the door

open for O’Neill and his team to step in. The Social Security program alone was costing $200

billion a year and the proposal was to cut back benefits for early retirees. This was roundly

criticized by O’Neill and was met with public outcry (Farrell, 2001). Republicans were in

control of the Senate, which voted 96 to 0 against “any solution that would precipitously and

unfairly penalize early retirees” (Farrell, 2001, p. 572).

O’Neill realized he needed to be able to compete with Reagan, the skilled communicator,

in the media arena and serve as the public spokesman for the Democratic Party. O’Neill had the

ability to attract and hire exceptional people and leverage their talent and wisdom to the best

advantage. Al Hunt, reporter and bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal stated; “I have never

seen a staff like Tip O’Neill’s, there is not even a close second. It said a lot about O’Neill, that

he was an incredibly secure man” (Farrell, 2001, p. 566). O’Neill utilized the skills of people like

Chris Matthews – who was hired by the Speaker to help with media relations. Leveraging the

threat to Social Security, O’Neill began to work publicly to influence popular opinion.

Influencing popular opinion was critical to maintaining democratic leadership in the

house during the 1982 election cycle. The economy continued to falter and the recession would

not end until 1983 – which worked to O’Neill’s advantage as “it savaged Republicans in the fall

election season” (Farrell, 2001, p. 593). After months of encouragement from O’Neill, the press

began to openly criticize Reagan for his “selective use of facts, his gaffes and apocryphal


anecdotes” (Farrell, 2001, p. 594). The Republicans also made a tactical error by sending out a

pre-election fundraising letter proposing switching Social Security to a voluntary pension

system. O’Neill used this to the full advantage and on November 2, the Democrats picked up an

unprecedented 26 seats in the House (Farrell, 2001, p. 597).

O’Neill then took the opportunity to strike a deal with Reagan to ensure Social Security

would remain in place. Both the Speaker and the President knew that under the existing

structure, Social Security was headed for insolvency (Farrell, 2001 p. 601). A bi-partisan

commission, headed by Alan Greenspan, was appointed. The committee “arrived at a formula:

any bailout plan would consist of both benefit cuts and tax hikes on a 50-50 basis” (Farrell, 2001,

p. 602) and Federal income tax would be applied to the benefits of wealthier people. Cost of

living adjustments were also postponed and previously scheduled payroll taxes were accelerated.

A gradual increase in the retirement age was also established. O’Neill was present the day the

President signed the bill amending Social Security into law on April 20, 1983. Reagan made the

following observation during his comments: “None of us here today would pretend that this bill

is perfect. Each of us had to compromise one way or another. But the essence of bipartisanship is

to give up a little in order to get a lot. And, my fellow Americans, I think we've gotten a very

great deal.” (Reagan, 1983)

The Political Environment 2011

The political landscape in 2011 can be readily defined by intransigence and gridlock.

The Federal government almost shut down over the fiscal year 2011 budget in April of 2011

(Knickerbocker, 2011) and again in September 2011 over the Federal Emergency Management

Agency’s Disaster Relief Fund (Kirchgaessner, 2011). This gridlock can be traced in part back


to conflicting ideology between Democrats and in particular the burgeoning Tea Party

movement, which saw a significant number of representatives affiliated with its worldview

elected to Congress during the midterm 2010 elections. This political environment has created

significant leadership challenges for both President Obama and the Speaker of the House, John

Boehner who have not been able to persuade congress to find significant bipartisan solutions in

the manner that Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan were able to.

John Boehner was sworn in as the Speaker of the House on January 5th, 2011 following

the 2010 midterm election that saw the balance of power switch from Democratic to Republican

control in the House. Boehner has been described as, “a politician’s politician” whose

background more closely resembles that of a manager than a political ideologue. (Garrett, 2011)

Garret states that Boehner is “…constantly taking the temperature of his members, balancing

their interests against each other, checking the polls and coordinating a unified message. (Garret,

2011). Boehner’s priority is to get legislation passed and to avoid jeopardizing that goal by

sensationalizing issues unnecessarily. It is noted that Boehner’s rise in the leadership ranks of

the Republican Party were related in part to his, “…knack for understanding how to maneuver

around virtually any political obstacle” (Garret, 2011).

New Republican members who are tied to pushing agendas inextricably linked to

political ideology have challenged Boehner’s goal of instituting an orderly process for

conducting the House’s business. During the debt debate, it was noted that Boehner was dealing

with two Republican factions who, “in exchange for raising the debt ceiling, want[ed] either a

substantial deficit reduction, come hell or high water, or some level of deficit reduction, as long

as it makes President Obama look bad” (McGregor, 2011). Boehner likely had to resort to tactics


such as, “shame, embarrassment and pride” as well as telling Republican lawmakers to “get your

ass in line” in order to maintain cohesiveness of his Party’s message (McGregor, 2011). At

times during the debt debate, members of Tea Party groups were calling for a change in

Republican leadership due to dissatisfaction with Boehner’s leadership approach.

President Obama was elected in 2008 on a platform based largely on the broad concepts

of “Hope” and “Change”. Obama’s charisma and rhetorical strengths have often been credited in

his successful bid for the Presidency. Bligh and Coles, in an effort to analyze how Obama’s

charisma played into his eventual election, state that “Charismatic leadership emphasizes the

importance of symbolic behaviors, emotional appeals and making events meaningful for

followers” (Bligh and Coles, 2009, p. 485). Similar to Reagan, Obama is comfortable making

speeches on television or in front of large crowds and communicated a message that resonated

with his supporters. Bligh and Coles say that, “The Obama campaign also employed the

symbolism of greatness and Presidential leadership” (Bligh and Coles, 2009, p. 486.). He was

able to convince a majority of the electorate that he had the vision, skills and ultimately the

greatness to implement his ambitious platform.

Obama’s leadership stylstyle in office contrasts from the one he projected during the

campaign. Rather than proactively shaping the political agenda in Washington, Obama has often

taken a cautious approach setting goals and letting members of Congress develop specific pieces

of legislation. Brownstein says that, “He has identified broad goals but has generally allowed

others to take the public lead, waited until the debate has substantially coalesced, and only then

announced a clear, visible stand meant to solidify consensus” (Brownstein, 2011). Furthermore,

Obama has shown, “unswerving resistance to absolutist public pronouncements and grand


theories.” Obama’s approach to governing has afforded the president flexibility, when

negotiating ultimate policy outcomes. At the same time, it has left him, “reacting to events

rather than shaping them” (Brownstein, 2011). Obama relies on his position and rhetorical

abilities when trying to prod Congress into passing legislation, however, Feldmann notes that,

“no amount of public jawboning by the president is going to move opinion on Capitol Hill,

especially among the newly elected House hard liners from the Tea Party Movement”

(Feldmann, 2011). Coupled with the fact that Boehner, “has effectively boxed himself in trying

to satisfy his most conservative Republican Party members,” neither Obama nor Boehner have

been able to come to agreement on bipartisan solutions for the struggling economy or

comprehensive debt reduction.

The Debt Ceiling Debate

The summer of 2011 proved challenging for President Obama and the Republican House

Speaker, John Boehner, who struggled against resistance from their respective parties as the

United States faced an August 2 deadline for a vote to increase the federal debt ceiling. The fight

over the debt ceiling turned into a leadership test for the president and the speaker, who are often

pitted as opponents in a divided government (Min Kim, 2011). Both men were trying to agree on

matters such as how much new revenue would be raised, how much would go to deficit

reduction, how much to lower tax rates and, how to enforce the requirement for new tax revenue

(Hulse & Calmes, 2011). The stakes were high in this standoff. If they didn’t pull it off, the

president could go down as the president who lost the country's triple-A credit rating, and

Boehner as the house speaker who let it happen (Min Kim, 2011). The numbers they were facing

were sobering: a $1.5 trillion budget deficit and a national debt that exceeded the $14.3 trillion


set by Congress, and a jobless figure at 9.2 percent (Associated Press, 2011). The president and

speaker have forged a relationship, although they have a long way to go before they form a

relationship to rival President Ronald Reagan and Speaker Tip O'Neill.

President Obama and Speaker Boehner face many obstacles in their effort to work

together and reach a compromise. Boehner must contendicontend with a caucus focused on no

tax increases, while Obama is concerned with his own re-electability in the 2012 presidential

election and pressure from the left who want to preserve Social Security and Medicare

(Associated Press, 2011). Tensions reached a climax when President Obama delivered a prime-

time address on the issue, and Boehner requested and got television time to follow him. This

dueling effort presented a spectacle usually seen only on the evening of the State of the Union

address (Min Kim, 2011).

During the negotiation process, the president worked to ease concerns from members of

his party, inviting Democratic leaders to the White House. But, the pushback continued from

senior Congressional Democrats, who were upset about some of the president’s concessions, and

about being excluded from the talks altogether. Congressional Democrats expressed concern

publicly that the proposal included too many spending cuts compared to new revenue. Many

Democrats feared a bargain would undercut their party’s ability to use Republicans’ support of

deep cuts in Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security against them. Congressional Democrats

feared the deal was tilted more toward Republican priorities than a bipartisan plan (Hulse &

Calmes, 2011). The president warned that he would veto any final deficit reduction package that

made cuts to Medicare that did not also include a tax increases on the wealthy and corporations

(Mascaro, 2011). However, for large numbers of Republican House members, any kind of tax


increase was off the table (Associated Press, 2011). Republicans claimed the president’s plan

would raise taxes on small businesses and private capital, and by declining to change the

structure of entitlements, the president was leaving the U.S. vulnerable to credit downgrades

(Mascaro, 2011). Boehner did try to find common ground by stating the two sides could work

together on jobs proposals, free-trade agreements, tax deductions for small businesses and

funding infrastructure projects. President Obama had public opinion on his side. According to

the Pew Research Center, a majority of those polled approve of making high earners’ income

subject to Social Security tax, raising taxes on incomes of over $250,000, reducing military

commitments overseas and limiting tax deductions for large corporations. Republicans were as

likely as Democrats to approve of limiting corporate tax deductions (Associated Press, 2011).

In the end, the negotiations unraveled when Boehner withdrew from the talks. Boehner

blamed the breakdown on Obama's insistence that any deal include new revenues as well as

spending cuts. Boehner met with his party leaders and circulated a letter explaining his decision

to walk away from the talks to the entire House GOP membership,. Obama held a news

conference in which he scolded Republicans, complaining that leaders were unwilling to take on

the party to reach a deficit reduction deal that voters favor (Knickerbocker, 2011).

Analysis

The parties involved in both these situations were and are accomplished politicians in

their own right. Each had a working knowledge of the technical requirements of the change.

Speaker Boehner’s issue is specifically cited as Thean inability to identify solutions that are

politically acceptable. President Reagan and Speaker O’Neill were adept at taking the fight

directly to the American people, while also engaging in dialogue and negotiations with


lawmakers. President Obama and Speaker Boehner are adept at speaking to the American

people, however they both lack the ability to rally their respective parties to engage and negotiate

with each other. Both seem to lack the interpersonal traits to motivate others to work for that

change. Speaker O’Neill was especially known for his ability to cultivate relationships and

persuade his fellow party members and the American public to support policy ideas. He had the

ability to cultivate strong relationships and had many friends.

President Obama exhibits a lack of leadership in his inability to demonstrate a “dogged

determination” to succeed in the face of significant odds and a resilience to respond to setbacks

in a reasoned and appropriate manner. President Obama is cited as cautiously setting goals and

allowing others to take the public lead, waited until the debate has substantially coalesced to

announce a clear, visible stand meant to solidify consensus.

Reagan and O’Neill understood the attitudes and motivational demands for bringing

change about as well as the rewards associated with change. They also respected and included

other opinions in the process of translating vision into policy solutions. Speaker O’Neill was a

master at making deals and rewarding allies through quid pro-quo deals and would intercede for

both lobbyists as well as his constituents. He was a leader that understood the process and what

motivated key stakeholders while much of the Obama/Boehner negotiations were held in secret.

Conclusion

Times of crisis require leadership that can bring stakeholders with diverging worldviews

together in order to debate and ultimately devise solutions to solve the pressing problem. John

Maxwell outlines a series of steps leaders take in order to solve problems. These steps include:

Identifying, prioritizing and clearly defining the problem; selecting the right people to help in the


problem solving process; collecting multiple problem solving solutions, and; prioritizing,

implementing and evaluating the best solution. (Maxwell, 1993, PP 86-94) At the end of that

process, it is important to set up a process or devise policies that keep the problem from recurring

in the future.

What separates effective leadership from ineffective leadership will depend on many

factors. To lead through a defensible process such as the one described by Maxwell above,

leaders first and foremost need a strong, clear vision that inspires trust and cooperation. They

must possesses an attitude that inspires confidence. They need to know how to bring people

together to solve problems. Finally, they need “dogged determination” and resilience in the face

of problems that inevitably emerge throughout the process. Neither Obama nor Boehner’s

leadership has been able to command the cooperation of their caucuses or drive the agenda. As a

result, the government almost shut down and the country was on the brink of defaulting on its

debt. Conversely through fierce debate and mutual respect, O’Neill and Reagan were able to lead

their caucuses to devise an acceptable solution to ensure Social Security’s solvency for decades

to come.


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