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Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian studyDerbe, S.T.
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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
79
Chapter Four: Institutionalisation of the
Global Information Order
This chapter attempts to explain the role of
international organisations in coordinating the material and
discursive power of the dominant social forces in the global
information order. The ITU and the WSIS are selected for
analysis in this chapter due to their relevance for ICAIS.
The first section deals with ITU‘s transformation in
terms of objective, organisational model and membership
following the changes in the pattern of production of ICT. The
ITU tackled the ICAIS dispute was as part of its new mission
of supporting liberalisation and deregulation of the
international telecommunications market.
The second section discusses the articulation of the
information society and communication society visions and
strategies at the World Summit on Information Society.
The ITU and the Global Information Order
The first sub-section highlights the original mandate of
the ITU and how it accommodated the concerns of its developing
country members. The second sub-section traces the changes in
political philosophy and organisational mission introduced in
the 1980s and 1990s. The third sub-section elaborates the
change in ITU‘s telecommunication settlement rates and its
impact on ICAIS.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
80
Origins of the ITU development mandate
The ITU has regulatory, distributive, and developmental
functions. In particular, it is responsible for
standardisation of telecommunications services and equipment,
allocation of radio spectrum and orbital slots, setting tariff
rates for international telecommunications services, and
development assistance to third world countries (ITU, 2005;
Cowhey and Aronson, 1991).
Members of the ITU include states and private operating
agencies. The former are represented in the highest organ of
the ITU, the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is held every
four years. Recognised Private Operating Agencies (RPOAs) i.e.
operators endorsed by their respective governments, were
allowed to have a non-voting membership since 1976. These
bodies together with International Standard Organisations
(ISOs), which were brought on board since 1989, play a central
role in the standard making process of the ITU. The conference
draws up the Union's general policies, strategic and financial
plans, and elects the senior management team (ITU, 2005).
The members of the ITU embraced two central values.
Firstly, they viewed telecommunications activities as services
provided by single designated national operators. The only
exceptions were the US, UK and Japan which had multiple
providers of telecommunications services. ITU's role was to
facilitate cooperation between these designated Post,
Telephone, and Telegraph (PTTs) providers for the exchange of
international telecommunications traffic. The idea of joint
ownership of telecommunications facilities between the
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
81
national monopolies justified this cooperation (Rutkowski,
1991, p.292).
Secondly, telecommunications services were agreed to be
public services, not tradable items. The ITU, unlike the GATT
or WTO, did not aim to provide a multilateral framework of a
global telecommunication market. There was no direct
relationship between users in the originating country and the
telecommunications operator in the destination country.
Besides, each national operator had sovereign right to
regulate its local telecommunications services (Woodrow,
1991).
The ITU incorporated a development assistance role to
respond to the needs of its developing country members. In the
1970s, the North-South conflict occupied the organisation like
the other UN specialised agencies. The developing country
members demanded abolition of inequities in international
tariffs, access to radio frequency spectrum and geostationary
satellite orbit, and transfer of technology, equipment, and
systems (Segal, 1983, p.330)
The Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference of 1982
entertained the North-South conflict in the ITU. At the time
this conference, the movement for the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) was an international agenda. The cause
of disagreement in the ITU related to access to funds for
technical assistance to the developing countries. The ITU's
major source of funds for its development activities was the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As multilateral
aid was declining and UNDP financing was insufficient, many
developing countries requested for diversion of the regular
budget of the ITU to fund technical assistance. The developed
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
82
country members, on the other hand, insisted that aid should
be provided only through the UNDP.
As a compromise, the Conference participants agreed to
establish a special voluntary programme for technical
cooperation that would solicit finance and other forms of
assistance. In addition, an International Commission for
Worldwide Telecommunications Development, commonly known as
the Maitland Commission, was set up to identify mechanisms of
resource transfer to the poor countries (Näslund, 1983).
The Conference resolution to establish this commission
referred to the MacBride report. The latter was also based on
a similar study to address the communication imbalances
between the North and the South. One of the measures
recommended by MacBride report was the establishment of an
International Programme for the Development of Communication
(IPDC). This organ was later established under UNESCO.
However, funding problems faced by the IPDC led to its failure
to address the needs of developing countries (Carlsson, 2003,
p.25).
The Maitland Commission also made a number of specific
recommendations to address the problem of "financing the
development of telecommunications" in the third world. One of
the observations made by the commission was that opening up
the telecommunications equipment market on a competitive basis
would ensure access to technology. The finding of the
Commission about this market was that it had excess capacity
while, at the same time, developing countries had a lot of
unmet demand for telecommunications. In view of this, the
Commission surmised that developing countries have a strong
bargaining position and that they can demand open tendering,
international bid on prices and repayment terms (The
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
83
Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications
Development, 1984, p.57).
Apart from the market solution, the Maitland Commission
explored such mechanisms like a revolving fund and
Telecommunications Investment Trust to finance development in
the third world23. However, the most practical source of fund
for modernisation of third world telecommunications was the
cash receipt from international calls. Third world
telecommunications agencies derived their revenue mainly from
termination of long distance calls from developed countries.
Generally, there is more incoming call from developed
countries to developing countries than vice versa. This
traffic imbalance worked to the advantage of developing
countries24.
The accounting rate system implements the principle of
joint ownership of facilities by member states by allocating
the cost of provision of this service among the carriers
involved in a transaction. The accounting rate is a
bilaterally negotiated rate for average cost per minute of a
23 A Centre for Telecommunications Development was set up by the ITU
as recommended by the Maitland Commission. The function of the centre was
to consult developing countries on matters of organization, planning,
maintenance, tariff policy, etc. The centre, which came into existence in
1987, was financed by the private sector and the World Bank (Cowhey &
Aronson, 1991, p.309). As its budget was inadequate, however, the centre
could provide only a limited consultancy service.
24 Accounting for international telecommunications between and among
countries was carried out within an international framework of standards
known as Recommendations, developed and approved by members of the ITU. The
specific body entrusted with this task was the International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), now known as the
Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T) (Stern & Kelly, 1997, pp
3-4).
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
84
call between countries A and B. It is usually stated in U.S.
dollars or Special Drawing Rights per minute of traffic
(Thuswaldner, 2000). Afterwards, the originating carrier shall
share the revenue it acquired from the caller in its
jurisdiction with the destination carrier. In other words, the
latter shall be reimbursed by the call-originating carrier for
the cost of termination. The amount of this reimbursement is
fixed in a separate rate known as the settlement rate.
In principle, the settlement rate is 50/50.Though there
are a variety of settlement methods, the equal sharing of the
accounting revenue is the most commonly used one. Accordingly,
if the accounting rate between A and B is $1.00 per minute,
then one pays to the other $0.50 per minute to deliver each
call to its destination. Therefore, if more calls have been
terminated in a country than originating in it, the telephone
company of that country receives a net settlement.
Consequently, the direction of the traffic determines which
operator has to pay the settlement (Minges, Kelly & Staple,
1996, p. 16).
Developing countries have been beneficiaries of the
accounting rate system. For example, Ethiopia had 60% of its
telecommunications revenue derived from international calls,
most of it from net settlement payments. However, the largest
recipients of the benefit were still countries like Mexico,
Canada, Japan, China, India and South Korea. Sub- Saharan
Africa received only 2% of the total in 1996/7. Socio-
political factors like immigration, population size, proximity
with trading partners also influence volume of traffic, and
hence receipt of settlement payments (Deane, 1998, pp.6-7).
In spite of this limitation, for the poorest countries,
the revenue derived from the settlement payment is the single
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
85
most important source of finance. Firstly, many developing
countries do not have access to credit, or if they receive
credit, it is at a high interest rate. Hence, the foreign
exchange earnings from the accounting rate system are even
irreplaceable. Secondly, the cost of equipment and lease of
cable and satellite system demand upfront payment for which
these countries lack the financial resources. Thirdly, least
developed countries cannot afford to open direct telephone
links with many countries. Thus, they have to pay for transit.
As a result, the cost of telephone call from these countries
is higher than from developed countries. More importantly,
providing access to people living in the rural areas is
expensive in these countries, as it requires huge
infrastructure investment (Deane, 1998, p.10). The Maitland
Commission recommended creation of a special fund for
accumulation of a fixed part of the receipt from the net
settlement. Thus, the ITU would be able to make disbursement
for telecommunications development projects from this fund.
The development mandate of the ITU was revamped following
the transformation of the telecommunication industry in the
1990s. A case in point is the freezing of the ITU initiative
to introduce subsidy scheme for infrastructure construction in
developing countries25.
25 The value of a network increases for previous customers when new
customers join a network. Thus, as per the request of developing country
members of ITU, a study was conducted to determine the positive
externalities accruing to developed country networks due to new customers
in developing countries joining their national networks. According to a
study conducted by Neu (2004), a 1% increase in fixed and mobile
subscription in a developing country leads to a 0.66% increase in calls
from and to USA. In the new telecommunication environment, subsidies from
developed countries to finance infrastructure construction in developing
countries could be justified on such grounds only. The externality premium
paid by the rich telcos is conditional. It should a) be used exclusively
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
86
In the discussion of this initiative at the ITU, the
principal participants were Vodafone, MCI, FCC, and KDDI (Neu,
2003). The main objection raised by these transnational
corporations was that this subsidisation scheme entails
additional burdens on their clients26. Hence, 22 developed
country members rejected the final recommendation.
The next sub-section discusses the nature and scope of
the changes in the ITU and the implications of these changes
to developing countries. It also explains how these changes
affected the approach adopted to address the issue of ICAIS.
ITU in a changing business environment
International telecommunications as a non-tradable
service run by national monopolies faced a challenge in the
momentum of international trade liberalisation in the 1980s.
At the 1986 Punta del Este multilateral round of trade
negotiations, a step was taken to incorporate these components
into the existing GATT regime (Drake & Noam, 1997).The push
came from large corporations such as American Express,
Citicorp and Reuters, which are major telecommunications user
groups in developed countries. These transnational
corporations had opened up branches and subsidiaries or sales
outlets in far-flung areas in search of cheap labour, tax
for extending networks and awareness campaigns and b) have a positive
effect on the number of customers (ITU-T Study Group 3,2008(a)).
26 The ITU has made it clear that ―Membership to ITU-T is a means to
actively take part in the Sector‘s standardization work and thus secure an
influence of a company's business goals and policies on the development of
standards within its business sphere‖ (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/membership/Pages/why.aspx ) .
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
87
haven and profit repatriation. This meant that their
telecommunications fees constituted a significant portion of
their cost of production. As a result, telecommunications,
both as a service sector and a mode of delivery for other
services, became key issue of trade liberalisation
negotiations led by the US27 (Woodrow, 1991).
The ITU, as the organisation responsible for regulation
of international telecommunications, had to handle these
changes. Most member states and monopoly telecommunications
providers in the ITU were initially cautious and concerned
about this takeover of the mandate of the organisation by
trade officials. Besides, though ITU had also some members
with competitive service providers, it never had a drive to
promote progressive liberalisation of international
telecommunications.
In addition to the organisational philosophy of the ITU,
its voting procedure also allowed active participation by
developing countries. The equal vote system gave full rights
to each member, at least formally. However, the preponderance
of developing countries in ITU has a limited significance
since the organisation relied on financial support from the
developed countries. Yet, developing countries could exercise
their voting rights to block some decisions (Woodrow, 1991;
Rutkowski, 1991).
At the World Administration of Telegraph and Telephone
Conference of 1988 in Melbourne, the ITU's long held view
about the nature of telecommunications services was challenged
from within its membership. The Conference attempted to
27 This is comparable to the process that led to the privatization of
the U.S. backbone network discussed in chapter 2.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
88
include the new telecommunications services known as leased
line and value added services. The USA and the UK argued that
such incorporation would subject the providers of these new
services to regulation against the current trend of free
competition. Developing countries and European PTTs demanded
that these activities must be included in the ambit of the ITU
regulations as part of international telecommunications
services. Eventually, a special arrangement to allow for
exceptions to these new services was introduced (Woodrow,
1991).
The next step in coming to terms with the WTO regime was
taken at the Nice Plenipotentiary Conference of 1989. The
Conference set up a High Level Committee to study the reform
needs of the ITU. The dominant concern behind this study was
that ITU's role would be increasingly marginal due to the
changes happening in global telecommunications. The entry of
new global carriers that could provide an end-to-end
telecommunications service touched the core of the ITU. Thus,
members had to take a stand on how the ITU should accommodate
private, competitive international carriers (Codding, 1991).
The question itself anticipated far reaching changes of
the ITU and its relationship with the emerging global
telecommunications industry. Savage (1991) drew a parallel
with the adjustments made in the Commonwealth
Telecommunications Organisations (CTO). In the 1990s, this
organisation had already been administering telecommunications
development programmes for 40 years. The report of the
Maitland Commission commended the CTO as a model for
telecommunications development assistance, particularly for
its preferential tariff scheme. However, in the 1980s and
1990s, the telecommunications carriers of some of the CTO
members were privatised and ready for competition. These
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
89
carriers were, therefore, unwilling to continue their treaty
obligations to provide preferential treatment to any other
carrier. They rejected the relevance of the CTO and its
‗altruistic‘ development projects. Obviously, in order to
compete in the liberalised market effectively, they had to
seek profitable commercial arrangements.
In a similar vein, the High Level Committee concluded
that if the ITU is to remain a relevant institution in the
changing telecommunications world, it has to serve the
interests of privatised operators. Otherwise, these will
increasingly rely on other flexible regional or bilateral
arrangements, and thus effectively marginalise the Union. One
mechanism suggested to avoid this scenario was to maximise the
participation of private industry and RPOAs standardisation
activity of the union. In short, the ITU decided to move away
from the "old guard of state owned PTTs" (Savage, 1991,
p.370).
The new secretary General of the ITU, Tarjanne (1999)
outlined the basic changes brought about by the ―new
governance of telecommunications‖. According to Tarjanne, in
the ancien regime, international end-to-end service was
provided by connecting the half-circuits of one national
carrier with that of another. With the recent change in
technology and market structure, however, a carrier from one
country can build or lease its own circuits in another country
and provide the same end-to-end service by itself. Hence,
there will be no need of joint ownership, compensation and
bilateral settlement agreement, which were the foundation
elements of the old telecommunications order of the ITU.
Tarjanne also expounded the impact of this "revolution"
on third world telecommunications development. The chronic
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
90
lack of capital the poor countries have suffered will be
addressed by introduction of foreign investment. Besides, the
accounting rate system has "outlived its usefulness‖. Thus, it
shall be replaced by a new cost-based arrangement. In this
regard, the WTO will set down the rules for entry of new
operators and service providers into previously closed
markets. The commitment to liberalise in the context of the
WTO will have an impact on the revenue system of the national
monopolies. However, according to Tarjanne, "undoubtedly there
will be winners and losers"(p.57).
As regards the organisation and role of the ITU, the
anticipated changes were significant. Firstly, the ITU shall
provide a forum for adapting the revenue-sharing mechanism in
line with the new ownership structure of telecommunications.
Tarjanne cited the task of study Group 3 in reforming the
existing bilateral accounting rate agreements as a case in
point.
Secondly, the ITU would work to incorporate developing
countries into the new international telecommunications order.
We are conscious that many of the ITU's 188 Member States are not
members of the WTO. Many developing countries -including those who
did not take part in the negotiations on basic telecommunications-
need to be convinced that the benefits that trade in
telecommunications can bring will actually materialize for them, and
the measures to protect their national interest will be effective.
The ITU Development Sector has a role to play in providing this
information and in helping governments to use the process of
progressive liberalization under the GATS to strengthen
telecommunications reforms in their countries...Marketplace ideology
which sees commercial trade and other general schemes as a
replacement for the old regime has much to commend it, and has
produced spectacular results in many countries in a very short period
of time (Tarjanne, 1999, pp.60-61).
The accounting rate system and ICAIS
The ITU Study Group 3, which is responsible for
developing recommendations for tariff and accounting rate
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
91
agreements between telecommunications operators, became a
subject of criticism in the 1990s28.
The U.S. government put pressure for reduction of the
absolute level of the accounting rate i.e. the calculation of
cost of termination of calls by destination countries. The
U.S. Federal Commission for Communication alleged that since
the accounting rate was high above cost, U.S. net settlement
payment was exorbitant. The OECD also affirmed that the
traffic imbalance between developing and developed countries
has cost the latter exorbitant sums of money in the form of
settlement payment (Walker, 1996). Consequently, the U.S.
Federal Commission for Communication took a unilateral measure
to fix the ceilings of accounting rates that U.S.
telecommunications operators should negotiate with their
foreign counterparts (Cave & Waverman, 1999)29.
28 A series of articles in early 1990 in the Financial Times accused
this organ as "an anti-competitive cartel of the 'old order' of PTTs and
international monopoly carriers". The newspaper alleged that this body
orchestrated a '10 billion a year rip off‘ through its instruments that
enable international telecommunications providers to garner substantial
profit (Cited in Savage, 1991, p.366; Woodrow, 1991, p.333).
29 This unilateral measure has, however, been criticized for
different reasons. Tarjanne deplored the unilateralism of the act as a
flagrant violation of the multilateralism of the new international
telecommunications order. Walker (1996), on the other hand, underlined that
the crux of the matter is not reduction of the absolute level of the
accounting rate. It is the division of the revenue from the accounting rate
which is the commercial bone of contention. The unilateral measure has
still embraced the 50:50 divisions. Hence, it merely introduces a reduction
of the absolute amount to be shared. If a cost-based accounting rate is to
be followed, third world countries would not be worse off because of the
higher cost of termination of international calls in these countries. If
such cost is higher, then these countries are entitled to a bigger share of
the revenue. Thuswaldner (2000), in contrast, concluded that the equal
sharing of revenues between carriers with disparate costs is detrimental to
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
92
The ITU Study Group responded by carrying out a series of
revision of the accounting rate system to "better reflect the
new telecommunications environment‖. A member of the WTO
secretariat participated as an observer in the meetings of the
Study Group. The recommended procedures for remunerating the
destination carrier included a cost-orientated, asymmetric
settlement rate. However, any bilaterally negotiated
commercial arrangement was approved. The Study Group also
proposed transitional arrangements to help developing
countries graduate to a cost-orientated remuneration system
(ITU-T Study Group 3,2000a).
It was against this background that the Study Group was
called on to make a recommendation on the ICAIS issue upon
complaints made by some Asia-Pacific countries. The Study
Group recognised that when two providers set up an Internet
circuit, they have a choice between peering /sender- keeps-
all or an asymmetrical system whereby the traffic-initiating
provider pays the full-circuit cost. As mentioned earlier in
this paper, Recommendation D.50, 2008 leaves the final
determination of remuneration to the bargaining power of the
providers.
The ITU suggested that a world summit on information
society be convened to debate all issues related to the new
media30. The UN endorsed this recommendation and assigned the
the high cost carrier due to the non-disclosure of the cost of termination
of calls. In the absence of a means of knowing such cost, a resort to the
50:50 sharing rule might be better for the high cost carriers.
30 UNESCO was also interested in organizing a WSIS kind of
conference. O'Siochru cites informal reports that the ITU refused to "share
the summit" with UNESCO. According to O‘Siochru, UNESCO might have treated
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
93
ITU to take a "leading managerial role" in preparation of the
summit. The purpose of the Summit was to develop a common
vision among governments, international organisations and
civil society actors on the direction of the ―information
society‖ (http://www.itu.int/itu-wsis/).
The World Summit on Information Society: Debating the
Global Information Order
The first sub-section assesses the processes and outputs
of UN summits with the view to demonstrating the political
significance of the WSIS. The second sub-section summarises
the issues discussed in the WSIS and how the ICAIS issue was
framed during the debate. The last sub-section evaluates the
participation of civil society during this summit.
The profile of UN summits
A world summit is a UN institution, which takes the form
of a conference on global issues held on a non-routine basis.
The UN had held at least one summit per year since the 1992
Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro. These summits covered such
issues as human rights, housing, food, racism, etc.
UN summits have a similar organisational format. The
official world summit is preceded by a long preparatory
process. Thus, prior to the summit, the ITU conducted
Preparatory Committee Meetings (Prepcoms I, II, and III) and
regional meetings. The input for the final documents of the
summit is gathered in these meetings. The summit itself is
the issues of culture and communication in a more favourable way .Civil
society would also have more leverage (2004b, p.212).
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
94
attended by high-level delegates who ceremoniously ratify
these documents within the few days of the conference (Klein,
2004).
Summits are attended by thousands of delegates. The UN
being an intergovernmental organisation, state
plenipotentiaries take the centre stage at summits, flanked by
civil society and private sector participants. Each country
has only one vote. Hence, both developing and developed
countries have a formal status of equality. Civil society
organisations usually attend the summit process itself and
hold parallel conferences on a separate agenda (Clark,
Friedman & Hochstetler, 1998)
The WSIS had, however, some different features from the
other UN summits. Firstly, it was held in two phases, in
Geneva and Tunis in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Secondly, the
WSIS devised mechanisms to formalise the participation of
civil society. The Civil Society Bureau was a kind of self-
governance mechanism to allow civil society organisations to
organise their own agenda, choose their own representatives
and set guidelines for their participation.
Nevertheless, the limit of the Summit form of institution
has also clear implications for the outcomes of the process.
Summits have a defined outcome in the form of two documents,
namely: a declaration of principles and a plan of action
(Klein, 2004, p.5).
The agenda of WSIS
The participants of the Geneva phase of the Summit
identified two clusters of issues for further elaboration,
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
95
namely: Internet governance and the financing of ICT for
development. The UN Secretary General set up working groups to
study and forward recommendations on these issues.
Internet governance
The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was
assigned to develop a working definition of Internet
governance, identify the public policy issues for discussion,
and develop a common understanding of the expected roles of
the various stakeholders.
Internet governance was defined as the process of
development and application of principles, norms, rules,
procedure, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of
the Internet. The definition also envisaged a
multisatakeholder governance approach in which governments,
civil society and private sector will have their respective
roles in the process. Then, the WGIG specified the issues that
needed to be addressed by this governance arrangement. In
fact, the bulk of the activity of the working group related to
identifying and framing the relevant public policy issues for
the WSIS31.The issue of allocation of critical resources such
31 The key public policy areas were agreed to be:
1. Issues relating to infrastructure: management of the domain name, IP
addresses, root server system, technical standards, peering and
interconnection, etc.
2. Issues relating to the use of the Internet: spam, cyber crime, etc.
3. Issues adjacent to the Internet but with much wider impact:
intellectual property rights, and international trade. But these are
issues, which the working group, identified as already within the
ambit of existing international organizations.
4. Issues related to the use of Internet for development such as
capacity building in developing countries.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
96
as the root server and domain names was the most controversial
which, according to Gurumurthy and Singh (2005), even eclipsed
other equally important issues32. Some authors also suggested
that the original mission of the WSIS was to put that issue to
rest (Klein, 2004).
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is an organisation subject to U.S. domestic law and
government supervision, and responsible for administration,
allocation and coordination of IP addresses, domain names, and
root server systems. Due to the history of the Internet, the
Domain Name System, for example, was under the U.S. Department
of Defence, until it was later transferred to this private
organisation. A number of participants of the WSIS were of the
view that this entity is not truly multilateral, accountable,
and transparent. The ITU had also an interest in appropriating
some of the powers of this organisation and combining the
administration of the new logical infrastructures with the
physical one traditionally under its regulation (Afonso, 2005,
Klein, 2004).
The U.S. and business groups represented in the WSIS were
in favour of the status quo. The official position of the U.S.
was clear and unequivocal.
Specific recommendations were also made in respect of each public
policy issue identified above. These recommendations evaluated the existing
organizations dealing with each of the public issues against the
abovementioned criteria. The working group forwarded different alternative
models of governance mechanisms based on the criteria of transparency,
accountability, multilateralism, and coordination.
32 The root server keeps a database of Top-Level Domain Names. These
are .com, .org, .edu, etc. Without such domain names, users of the Internet
would be forced to remember IP addresses, which are a series of numbers, to
communicate with each other.
Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores
97
The United States remains open to discussing with all stakeholders
ways to improve the technical efficiency as well as the transparency
and openness of existing governance structures. However, it is
important that the global community recognize that the existing
structures have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly
robust and geographically diverse medium that it is today. The
security and stability of the Internet must be maintained (USA,
2005).
The challengers of the status quo rejoined that this
argument unduly focuses on technical efficiency and problem-
solving capacity of ICANN, rather than on representation and
democratic decision-making. However, it is clear that
controlling ICANN, and through it, the critical Internet
resources, is consequential. The usual example mentioned to
highlight this problem is the country code top level domain
―.iq", the Iraq domain, which has been in the hands of a
private company outside of the country (Afonso, 2005, p.5).
The European Union was also against the unilateral
control of the core resources by the US (Gurumurty & Singh,
2005). The EU representatives stated that the current ICANN
regime is commendable for the public private partnership it
embodied. However, it should include the participation of more
governments (European Union, 2005).
On the other hand, the issue of ICAIS was raised by
developing countries as a major problem that should be
addressed by the WSIS. In its comments on the report of the
WGIG, the African group insisted that the issue of
interconnection costs should be at the top of the agenda. The
report of the working group framed the issue as one of "uneven
distribution of cost" resulting from "absence of an
appropriate and effective global Internet Governance mechanism
to resolve the issue"(WGIG, 2005, P.4).
The recommended measures included:
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examination of alternative solutions such as
establishment of regional backbones, and
local and regional access points,
multistakeholder participation in resolving
the issue in various international
organisations,
donor programmes to fund establishment of
exchange points and local content in
developing countries ,and
continuation of the work on ICAIS at ITU and
other organisations (WGIG, 2005, p.16).
Therefore, the issue of ICAIS did not receive any novel
response at the WSIS. While representatives of the developed
countries emphasised technological fixes and market solutions,
the developing countries called for enhanced donor support.
Financing ICT for development and ICAIS
The other contentious issue, which was assigned to a task
force for further study, was the question of financing,
deployment, and use of ICT in the poor countries of the world.
The initiative to address this issue came from African
representatives. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal proposed
a scheme for transfer of resources from the North to the South
in order to bridge the "digital divide". This transfer was to
be made under what was later called "digital solidarity
agenda". The proposal was to secure financial resources for
ICT projects primarily from taxes levied on sales of
computers, software, and network equipment and the use of
international communications. Donations were also solicited
from governments and financial institutions (www.dsf-fsn.org).
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This proposal was opposed by the US, EU, Japan and the
business community while a large number of developing
countries supported it. The developed countries insisted that
financing should be sought within the existing mechanisms.
Moreover, it maintained that the solution to the problem of
the digital divide lies in the countries themselves. They have
to open up their market through privatisation, competition,
and liberalisation.
Nevertheless, the Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF) was
established as a legal foundation in Switzerland in March
2005, with a dominant membership of municipalities from
different parts of the world. Its major source of fund has
been the 1% voluntary contribution from the contract value of
sale of ICT goods and services by corporations. Then, these
corporations are granted a logo and a permission to advertise
their philanthropic deeds. This voluntary contribution from a
supplier's profit margin is finally invested in community
projects. The Fund is administered by a coalition of
governments, private sector, civil society, and international
organisations (www.dsf-fsn.org).
The Task Force for Financing Mechanisms (TFFM)
underscored the decline in recent years of official aid to the
third world and the inadequacy of government budget. On the
other hand, it emphasised the renewed reliance on private
capital, mainly from foreign investment. In its recommendation
to address the financing issue, it suggested that all sorts of
mechanisms be used, including the old and the new ones such as
the Digital Solidarity Fund (TFFM, 2004, p.13).
As a political document, the WSIS official declaration of
principles and plan of action alluded to principles of
Universal Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, and
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inclusion of small island countries, the disabled and the
young generation. Still, resources for social and
developmental goals are to be obtained from private investment
or charity. The summit in general emphasised the following
policy measures to bridge the digital divide:
the creation of enabling environment i.e.
conducive private investment and ownership
regime,
multistakeholderism i.e. public-private
partnership in which the private sector
plays a key role, and
capacity building with an emphasis on
cultivation of a mass of consumers for ICT
goods and services (Gurumurthy & Singh,
2005; Hamelink, 2004; Mansell &
Nordenstreng, 2006).
Civil society and the WSIS
Though world summits promise to facilitate participation
by different groups, WSIS goes further in its declared aims to
involve civil society actors on co-equal terms with
governments and private sector representatives. There was an
attempt to make the WSIS a model for the multistakeholder
approach (Padovani & Tuzzi, 2004).Accordingly, the Executive
Secretariat of the WSIS created a Civil Society Division,
which was entrusted with the task of facilitating the full
participation of civil society. The rules of procedure of the
Summit allowed the accredited non-governmental organisations,
civil society and business members to sit as observers at
meetings and make oral statements when invited by the
presiding officer of the body concerned. The Civil Society
Division, in consultation with governments, was responsible
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for determining which civil society organisation should
participate and in what order (Banks, 2005; Cammaerts &
Carpentier, 2005).
After the Geneva phase of the summit in 2003, civil
society participants drew their own declarations, and specific
recommendations in respect of the various issues discussed
during the summit. The Civil Society Declaration, entitled
"Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs", attempted to
challenge as well as to constructively engage with the
official WSIS discourse. The following are the major elements
of the declaration.
The unitary information society concept must
be replaced by the concept of information
and communication societies. This was to
emphasise the importance of communication as
a basic need .Besides, it sought to draw
attention to the diverse visions and
approaches to the problem facing the world.
The primacy of public services and
protection of the public domain must be
promoted. In particular, private ownership
of intellectual property and infrastructure
was singled out as detrimental to the
development of information and communication
societies. ICTs should not be treated merely
as private resources and commodities.
Community use and ownership must be
encouraged as well.
The idea of enabling environment, which in
the official WSIS version emphasised the
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primacy of the market, must be substituted
by a focus on empowerment of citizens.
The idea of technological neutrality must be
rejected and a participatory approach in
designing and provision of technology must
be adopted.
Despite this statement of common opposition, there are
some areas of convergence between the official and civil
society declarations. The civil society declaration does not
fully represent a coherent set of principles either. The
following section also highlights the differences within civil
society representatives themselves along a North-South fault
line.
With respect to the specific issues of ICAIS, the
declaration had little to add. In order to address the lack of
efficient African backbone network, which is the reason behind
the exorbitant cost of traffic and access, it suggested a
reinforcement of the current efforts to build infrastructure.
An example of such an effort cited in the declaration is
construction of Internet exchange points. The principles to
guide expansion of infrastructure were also stated as
equality, partnership, fair competition, and regulation at
local and global level.
The civil society declaration also endorsed the Digital
Solidarity Fund on condition that it is properly managed to
extend public services to underserved areas. It added its own
proposal for a Community Media Fund by a donor-civil society
partnership to construct community information and
communication initiatives.
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The WSIS had important implications for the theoretical
and practical analysis of the role of civil society in the
democratisation of global governance. Various questions have
been raised about identity of civil society, the institutional
framework for participation in global governance, and
existential problems for radical actors.
Identity of civil society
Civil Society at the WSIS identified itself as follows:
Organizations-including movements, networks and other entities-which
are autonomous from the State, are not intergovernmental or do not
represent the private sector, and which in principle, are non-profit-
making, act locally, nationally and internationally, in defense and
promotion of social, economic and cultural interests, defense of
human rights, promotion of development objectives and for mutual
benefit(Banks,2005).
Banks (2005) later reported that, notwithstanding this
assumption about civil society, there were also civil society
organisations that supported the existing intellectual
property regime. Some civil society groups promoted the agenda
of their government. Some civil society members regarded even
the apparently universal value of human rights as a ―sectoral
issue‖, not to have priority in the final text of the WSIS
declaration (Marzouki & Joergensen, 2004).
Chakravartty (2007) also alleged that most civil society
organisations from the North promoted the interests of the
developed countries on many issues. The first was the issue of
freedom of expression. This, however, focussed on condemnation
of states such as China, Singapore, Tunisia and Pakistan.
Civil society also collaborated with EU to push for
democratisation of ICANN. On the other hand, this
―partnership‖ in negotiation did not work on the issues of
intellectual property rights and financing access to
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resources. In general, civil society prioritised the right to
information while relegating redistributive issues to a
secondary status.
Civil society organisations from the North, according to
Chakravartty, owe their view of state/civil-society
relationship to their history and local political environment.
The Tocquevillian form of voluntary associational groups
advancing the public interest can flourish only in a stable
and democratic state, not in the political and economic
environment prevailing in most developing countries. Civil
society in the global South, therefore, cannot stand against
the state. It must support the state as the only actor that
can press for ―meaningful redistributive policies in the
transnational governance arena‖ (p, 311).
Chakravartty makes a valid point about the dangers of the
marginalisation of the state due to neo-liberal prescriptions
by NGOs and international organisations. The Structural
Adjustment Programme of the 1980s and the consequent erosion
of public service and social welfare have illustrated this
point. However, it is also necessary to pierce the corporate
veil of the state and problematise its ideology of
development. Her argument assumes existence of a developmental
state that is beyond class partisanship.
Secondly, by drawing a sharp contrast between capitalist
states of the North and developmental states of the South, her
analysis obscures the reciprocal relationship between global
capital and peripheral actors.
Moreover, third world countries, with or without
developmental orientation, have not been able to influence
decisions in international institutions for lack of
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geopolitical and economic capabilities. Hence, the suggestion
to rely on these states to resist global neo-liberal forces
does not draw any lesson from the NWICO and similar previous
initiatives.
The institutional framework of participation
Civil society representatives at the WSIS had to deal
with the problems of effective and meaningful participation33.
The multistakeholder approach to global governance posed two
types of challenges to civil society actors. One is the
superficiality of participation, or in the words of Cammaerts
and Carpentier (2005), ―the unbearable lightness of full
participation‖. On the other extreme, there is the danger of
domestication (Calabrese, 2004b).
The obstacles for full participation of civil society
arise because the decision makers in this intergovernmental
processes are states (Banks, 2005). Hence, civil society
actors not accredited by their own government cannot
participate. Secondly, private sector organisations like the
World Economic Forum and the International Chamber of Commerce
were categorised as civil society actors. The civil society
forum provided by the UN required ―partnership‖ with these
groups. Due to this characteristic problem of participation,
it has been suggested that representation in these
33 The factors militating against effective participation mainly
arose from the reluctance by some state members of the WSIS to involve some
civil society actors. The accreditation process was used to exclude, for
example, Reporters without Borders-a media NGO, for exposing suppression of
free press by some states (Banks, 2005; Cogburn, 2004; Cammaerts &
Carpentier, 2005).
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international institutions has limited value. Civil society
should also establish alternative forums for a more vigorous
participation (Calabrese, 2004b; Sader, 2002; Cammaerts &
Carpentier, 2005).
While some civil society advocates point at the rough
terrain of the international institution for their poor
participation, others have applied the same criticism to civil
society‘s internal workings. Chakravartty denounced the
dominant civil society organisations from the North for
―centralization and bureaucratization of civil society within
the WSIS‖ (2007, p.301). Likewise, Schmidt (2004) claimed that
the very definition of civil society excluded grassroots
organisations in Africa. In their place, professional NGOs,
which are part of the aid community, were represented.
Existential problems of civil society
The scarcity of material resources to make sustained
political participation in global forums has been an enduring
problem for civil society actors, especially for those
organisations from the developing countries. Cogburn (2004)
observed that the principal form of interaction among global
civil society participants was email exchange. Hence, the
digital divide itself was a major obstacle preventing NGOs in
the South from taking part in global platforms and
transnational networks.