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Kierkegaard and Ethical TheoryAuthor(s): Paul L. HolmerSource: Ethics, Vol. 63, No. 3, Part 1 (Apr., 1953), pp. 157-170Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2378945

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E T H I C S AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL OF

SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

VolumeLXlII APRIL 1953 Number , PartI

KIERKEGAARD AND ETHICAL THEORY

PAUL L. HOLMER

K IERKEGAARD was a many-sided u-thor with a richly variegated lit-erature as his life-work. Though

he has been well knownto readersof the-ological literature for a relatively longtime and especiallysince Karl Barth andother European theologians have citedhim, it is only recentlythat the "literati"have discoveredhim.And thus faronly avery few have noted his philosophicalacuity; thereforethe task still remainsfor a philosophical scholar to show theuses Kierkegaard made of dialecticaltechniques and to what extent they ar-ticulated his many writings. This paperis an attempt to make evident a part ofthe neutral dialectical structure withwhich Kierkegaardworked as a thinker,but only in so far as he concernedhimself

with ethicalquestions.Thispaperwill doseveral things: offera characterization fhis writings from the point of view oftheir ethical content; isolate certain fea-turesofhiswritings hat constitutea the-ory of ethics; and relate, but only in themost cursory fashion, some of what hesays to contemporary discourse aboutethics.

Kierkegaard ived only forty-twoyears(1813-55). He nonetheless wrote overthirty books, a many-volumed journal,

and a thick handful of polemical pam-phlets and tracts. Most of this was writ-ten in the nine yearsfrom 1842 through1851. Kierkegaard'sgreatest problem asan author was not to find something towrite about; instead, his problem was tocontrol and to utilize with effectivenesswhat he so easily could command.Heneeded little stimulus to write, andamong authors he is perhaps rare in hisinsistence that authors do not need vio-lent or novel stimulation.He traveled asdid Thoreau-a great deal in his owncity. From his earliest years he recog-nized what he calledhis "poetic"capaci-ties. He dawdled with "possibles" andlearnedto spin systemsof them with thegreatest of ease. He found Hegel to hisliking, especially the multiple and inter-

related logical categories,but he noted aflawin all of it; he remarked hat if Hegelhad just said once that his system was

entirely hypothetical, he would have

been the greatestthinkerwho ever lived!

Though Kierkegaard wed Hegel a great

deal, he went on to become the most

devastating critic of Hegelian logic and

metaphysics in the nineteenth century.

Kierkegaard'spoetic capacities weretruly extraordinary.He had an ear for

the soundof a languageand loved to cre-

ate passages in which the complicityof

157



158 ETHICS

sounds and meanings would constitute asignificantaesthetic experience.Some ofhispages,he repeatedlysuggests,have tobe read aloud beforethey can be properly

appreciated. The extravagant prose ofEither/Or in which Mozart's music ispraised also draws attention to thesubtle relations between language andmusic and the difficulties of ascribingequally to each a noetic content. Allthese imaginativeand poetic sensitivitieswere at first a kind of threat to Kierke-gaard's sanity. He saw himself as poten-

tially many persons and was acutelyaware of the possibility of schizoid-likedevelopment.The unification of his tal-ents was his greatest personal problemand it was only after ten or eleven yearsof desultory university study, bitterquarrelingwith his father, a brokenen-gagement,and severalcrisesof a psycho-logicalsort that he wasable to write withcomplete control of himself. Then, he

said, it was likepullingthe chainand thewater came!1 And in two great spurts

thereafterhis many books came forth.In lateryears when reflectinguponthe

entire output, Kierkegaard said thatthese booksseemedto him to be his owneducation. Some commentators havemistaken this assertionto implythat theliterature is autobiographicaland have

used, therefore,his life to explicate histexts. But this is to neglectthephilosoph-ical detachmentwith whichhe wrote andis, furthermore, neof the reasons so fewof his readers have seldom even lookedfor the philosophical content in hisworks. Rather can it be asserted, andwith ample evidence, that his literaryvocationbecame the very meansof pull-ing all his disparatetalents into a singlecompass,and this effort comprisedbotha concentrationof his moral energies-"the purity of heart which comes from

willing one thing"-and an-orderingof

his imaginative iterary content in virtueof an idea. This was his education in be-coming a unifiedperson.

Because Kierkegaardwas a so many-

sided personality and writer, it is pos-sible to evaluate his literature rommanystandpoints. Just as his entire life wasspent in an intensive effort to achievemoral stature, so, too, are his books aneffort to understand moral endeavor.This does not mean that there is a one-to-one correspondence etween events in hislife andin his literature.On the contrary,

there is instead a high degree of detach-ment and disinterestedness pervadingthe literaturewhich is an instance of theobjectivity he could practice on mattersof the most subjective concern. It is thisobjectivity which gave him his categoricand philosophicgrasp;but there is more-for simultaneouslyhis poetic talentsenabled him to describe in detail andwithgreat sensitivitywhatit means to bea creaturewith interests, desires,aspira-tions, hopes, and loves. Kierkegaardbe-lieved religion grew out of moral needand thereforehis authorshipachieves anew set of categoriesfor describingre-ligionandits relationto philosophy.It isperhapsfair to say that he succeeded n

understandingand stating the nature of

moralityso as to includereligion,and he

thusbecamea critic of typical metaphys-ical and historicalmodes of interpreting

religion.One of the theses stated in different

formsin Kierkegaard'sworks is this one:"Alogical systemis possible;a system ofexistenceor existing is impossible."2Nologicaldelineationof an ethicalnorm,nological system-even if it possessed, in

virtue of an initial premise, an ethical

content-could, Kierkegaard believed,predicatefor me what I ought to be. The

many strainswithin Kierkegaard'sownlife werebroughtunder controlnot by a



KIERKEGAARD AND ETHICAL THEORY 159

principle but rather by a dominant en-thusiasm and passion. This was for himthe Christianfaith. But in his literaturethe diversityis controlled-not by faith,

for its locus is the personality-butrather by a formal and intellectual di-alectic, a kind of neutral rule-governedthought. Unlike most philosopherswhohave sought to augment thought by de-finingit as productiveof passion and en-thusiasm, Kierkegaard ought always toshow that its neutrality is the guarantyof its uses.

If one turns to Kierkegaard'sworks,one finds two major divisions. The firsthalf is written pseudonymouslyand indiverse styles and on a wide variety oftopics.The followingworkswere writtenfrom 1843 through 1846: Either/Or (intwo volumes), FearandTrembling,Repe-tition, The Concept f Dread, Philosophi-cal Fragments, Stages on Life's Way,Prefaces,and The ConcludingUnscien-

tificPostscript.The pseudonymicdevicewas used not to secure anonymity butrather to allowfor a development n lit-erary form of the ideal proportionsofvariousviews of life. The pseudonymousauthorsaremoresystematic and exhibitfewer imperfectionswithin their respec-tive normative commitments than anyhistoricalcounterpartcould possibly do.

These invented authors are personified"possibles," and no one who readsKierkegaard with philosophic acumencan afford to neglect the meanings andthe complexitieswhichthey add, simplyin virtue of their use by Kierkegaard, othe total literature.Theauthors(andonemust remember hat they are invented!)do, in varying degreesand with varyingsuccess, several things: they expressthemselves by showing their likes anddislikes,concernsandinterests,attitudesand desires;they also arguewith one an-other; and some of them translateatti-

tudes and interests into reflectiveformsand produce views of life. Two kinds ofdialecticemerge rom theseworks:on theone side, there is an intellectual dialectic

between normative systems of possibles;and, on the other side, there is "an ex-istential dialectic" as Professor DavidSwenson called it, in which passions,commitments, and interests mutuallyconfrontone another. The latter is theactual state of affairs for existing menand is the matrix which is presentedinthe literatureonly by the personalitiesof

the authors.The former s presented bythe authors n so faras they can success-fully "type" attitudes and show thatthey canbe ideationallyandnormativelyconstrued.Besides all of this, the authorsconfront one another almost as do theproponentsof views in Plato's dialogues;and in the string of volumes namedabovethere s to be founda hostofevalu-ative relationsexplored,between diverse

persons, norms, and attitudes. All thiscouldhave becomevery easily a jumboofimaginative fantasy. But within all of itthere was a controllingprinciplewhichheld each book to an extrinsicpurpose.To note this is to call attention to

Kierkegaard's peculiar philosophicalgrasp.

Each volume Kierkegaardwrote is an

aesthetic unity. Each can be readfor itsintrinsic worth. But Kierkegaard be-lieved that the most significantaspectofhisauthorshipcould bejudgedonlywhenone saw the intellectual commandthatpermittedso rich a variety. To find theextrinsic purpose within which eachsinglebookwas written was to find thatwhich was genuinely philosophicalandthe ground for his case against Hegel.This purposewas to show that to a dis-interested and dispassionate knowerthere were genuine ethical alternatives.To make this case Kierkegaardcreated



160 ETHICS

not only the alternatives-he calls them"stages"-but the authorsor proponentsof the stages. And the disinterestednesswhich is the condition within which

Kierkegaard reated his authorsand po-sitions is the very condition that manyobjectivists in ethics, including Hegel,had urged would mean the exclusion ofthe alternatives and would be the sine

qua non of ethical agreement.The totalliteraturemakes a point no single volumedoes, viz., that disinterestedness robjec-tivity as an attitude is necessary to

knowing, but that in respect to ethicsand religion t doesnot bring unanimity.What is said affirmativelycan be saidnegatively, too, and is in these volumes.The representativeof the aestheticviewof lifewho finds that pleasure s goodandthat the assertion,"pleasure s good,"isto definewhat rationalitymeans can bearrayeddisinterestedly gainstthe Kant-ian-like ethicist who asserts that a mini-

mal duty-awarenesss to definewhat ra-tionality is. Kierkegaard'stotal litera-ture expands a conception of rational-ity-and especially n respect to mattersof ethics and religion-which will ac-count for the ability to articulate theforegoing claims. The rational compasswithin which alternative positions-andhe writes about three, the aesthetic, the

ethical, and the religious-become possi-bilities and are neither excluded by norresolvedinto each other by reciting evi-dence or further systematization-thiscompassis disclosed only indirectly,notby overt argument,but rather by thepresentation of alternatives which theliterature s. The logicof the literatureheallows the readerto inferfor himself.

Three kinds of discourseare discern-

ible in the Kierkegaardian literature.There is first a kind of expressive andpersuasivediscourse.It reveals likes, at-titudes, passions, the "inside"of what

are, in another perspective, views orphilosophiesof life. This discourse s de-scriptive also of what a person is as asubject. But the point is that there are

kinds of subjectivity;andso Kierkegaardhere gives his imaginative capacitiesrather free rein and produces kinds ofsubjects.Then there is a secondkind ofdiscourse.Here the ideality, the criterio-logical norm, the ethical ultimate, the"good,"is disclosed. However, not onlythis, for Kierkegaard's uthorsargueandgive the case for their views; but as in

daily life and in the history of ethicalphilosophy nobody wins. Kierkegaarddoes not do as Plato and his imitatorsdid, load the case so that the cleverestdialecticianwill representultimately thewinningside. Hereagainthere is a multi-plicity andnot unanimity.The argumen-tation between views which is quite re-fined is not ultimately conclusive or anyview. Nor is it ever suggestedthat phi-

losophy as argumentation s ultimatelyperfectible n the directionof conclusive-ness. Against Hegel, the arch-rationalistfor whom logical discourseproduced ex-istential and evaluative certainties,

Kierkegaard'sentire authorship makesthe point that there is no science ofethics. Philosophyis misunderstoodf itis assumed that it can resolve the ulti-

mate differences oncerning he good. Tothe extent that an argumentclaimingra-tionality becomes persuasive,it does soin virtue of an extra-logical actor; to theextent that it loses its extra-logicalandpersuasive character, it becomes mostperfectlyrational.

Kierkegaard'swritingsarephilosophi-cal in a form other than those alreadyalluded to. For not only are his books

evocative and dialectical-there is athird level of reflection within whichKierkegaardhas writtenthe entirepseu-donymous literature. The literature,



KIERKEGAARDAND ETHICALTHEORY 161

Kierkegaardassures the reader, if youread it all, resolves no problems, settlesno ultimate issuesfor anyone, at least ofthe kind with which each volume is con-

cerned. There is a point of view, thatheld in disinterestedness and detach-ment, within which reflection becomespurely formal and has no immediatemoral significance. The discourse per-mitted by such a point of view has intel-lectual significance,but it solvesnoprob-lems of the moral life. Kierkegaardbe-lieves that this latter level of discourse

shouldbe kept disinterestedand that itsvaluesare not relevantto anyone exceptthe personwhoasksan intellectualques-tion. But to exist as a person poses aproblemwhich can be "answered"onlywith one's entire life. The kindof answerone's life is he believed to be the mostlegitimate-ultimately the only continu-ing-interest and concern.Therefore,hewas scornfulof all thinkers,whoin virtue

of an aristocratic alent, gave the highesthonor to derivative questions, those ofethical theory. But, at the sametime, heinsists that concernabout existing as aman doesnot solve intellectualproblemsabout the good, nor do theories aboutethical theories solve problems of con-duct.Almosteverypageof Kierkegaard'spseudonymous writings expresses un-

equivocaloppositionto the intellectual'sderogationof the passionswhichall menpossess and likewise to the pretense ofthe intellectual who claims that maxi-mization of the scope and power of theintellect will provide a highercertainty.As Kierkegaard uts it, what the man ofintelligenceknows by great thoughtanddiscipline that he does not know, theordinary man simply does not know.3

The differences between men, despitephilosophyandtheoriesofethics,becomeof vanishing significanceas one faces theissues that matter most.

The first half of Kierkegaard'sitera-ture then provides on the ethical side adiversity of content, held togetherby atheory, the theory of stages or alterna-

tives. Certain details of this theory willbe discussedin Section TI. The secondhalf of the literature, comprisingworkspublished from 1846 through 1851, arewrittenprincipally n Kierkegaard's wnname.4 It developswith great detail thepragmatic and ethical significanceof theChristianreligion. It therefore fills outanotherstage or alternative only alluded

to in the previous iterature.Becausethisis his own point of view and where hisown passions and interests are, Kierke-gaard admits with the use of his ownname that herethe formal scheme of theauthorshipand the content depictedaremore intimate.Nonetheless,all the limi-tations of argument and reflection arestill rigorouslyobserved,and the rich de-velopmentof a religiouscontentactually

affordsKierkegaardnumerousoccasionsfor excursive discussion of the neutralstructure of thought within which heoperates.

Whenmany of these later workswerealready completed, Kierkegaard notedfor posterity another "movement ofthought" within the entire literature.This movement is not an argument,

however, but is, rather, only the admis-sion of what was his intention as thecreator of it all. He says:

The movement described by the authorshipis this: "from" the poet (from aesthetics),"from" philosophy (from speculation), to theindication of the most central definitionof what

Christianity is. ...5

He freelyadmits that the aestheticworkswere somethingof a deception-if any-one assumedthat they revealedthe com-mitment of Kierkegaard-for their crea-tor was religiousall the time.' But theremarkable characteristic of Kierke-



162 ETHICS

gaard's authorship is that such an ex-planationis necessary. For it seems thatthe very perfectionwith which he coulddisclose the alternatives so that they

would balance each other even whengiven extended rational and persuasiveformsis testimonyin turn to the kind of"neutral" rational order which he in-

vokesagainstthe metaphysicaland ethi-cal logicality of the Hegelians. "I canonly begthe readernot to think of revela-tions or anythingof the sort, for with me

everythingis dialectical."7All the ways

of life, all the "goods," are within thehomogeneousorderof possibility to thereflectiveman; and to Kierkegaard, hecommitted Christian, not even Chris-tianity quaan objectof thought, was ex-cluded.A kindofproofof all this Kierke-gaard sees in his own work, Either/Or,which provides in a single work two ex-clusiveviews. It is, he says, "the apoth-eosis of tautology."8 To thought thereis

no principle of exclusion, and Kierke-gaard's entire literary output seeks toshow this. And to reflection which canconvert everyreal into a possiblethere isno temporal ogicrelatingonepossibletoanother as past is to presentnor is there

any other "pure"and reasonablemodeof deciding ssues.Thought, if pushedtoits extremes and if all innocence and

naivete is destroyed,disclosesthe struc-ture of ethical and religious decision

without therewithdictatingthe content.

II

Kierkegaard'siteratureis, if the pre-vious accountis correct,an attack upontwo schools of thought: first, those whoclaim cognitive significancefor ethical

claimsand,second,thosewhoclaim ethi-cal and religiousand metaphysical sig-nificancefor logicaldiscourse.He claims

to write truthfully, respectively,about acommon-senseand eudaemonicethic, a

community-orientednd intuitionaldutyview, and, finally, a religious-Christianview. But what propositionaltruths arehereofferedaredescriptiveof the persons

holding he above views. The secondkindof discourse, that of an argumentativenature on behalf of and between theabove views, which is perpetrated byvarious pseudonyms, seeks to state theobjectiveand evidentialground and thevalid relation which will allow one toidentifythe truth and the good. The fail-ure to achieve the same within the litera-

tureis the involvedmannerthat Kierke-gaard chooses to disclose the lie of hisage, viz., that everythingcan be resolvedin a state of objectivity. There is no ob-jective ground for ethical and religiouscertainty unless one wishes to slip overthe difficultyby beginningwith commonsenseor the assumptionthat all must beChristiansbecauseeveryoneis baptized.But to involve one's self to the extent of

making denials about ethical discussionis to havea kindof theoryof ethical theo-ries. This is the third level of reflectionwithin which, it has been argued, theentire literaturecan be understood.

Because no systemof ethics ever justi-fies the choice of the good to a neutral,

disinterested,detachedobserver,Kierke-gaard wouldhold, I believe, that thereis

no scienceof ethics.9 Of course,he doesadmitthat argument s significantwithinnonneutralstandpoints.A science of eth-ics is possibleif one assumesin advancethe good. But this, again, is Kierke-gaard's point, that there is no science

which can claim both disinterestednessor objectivityandproofin respectto the

good. Neither the nature of rationalitynor "all" the evidence resolves ethical

disagreementif it is in respect to thegood. To the disinterested spectatorthere is no good-there is not even the

ground for ethical decision. There are



KIERKEGAARDAND ETHICAL THEORY 163

only possibles,each of which can be sys-tematizedand logically developedwith-out thereby excluding the others. Someintelligencemay give a man reasonsfor

the good, but more intelligence andgreater objectivity give reasons for allthe possibles. Disinterestedness,if it isgenuinelythat, excludesthepassionsandremainsat the end of the inquirywhat itwas at the beginning. In disinterested-ness, no man finds the good. In disinter-

estedness, a man finds only theoriesabout ethical decisions and nevermakes

an ethical decision.It was because of such a view that

Kierkegaardoundit incumbentto allowhis pseudonymousauthor, Johannes deBilentio, to ask whether a teleologicalsuspensionof the ethical (here meaningthe community law applyingto all) waspossible.10Even if there were universalconsent to a rule about murder (a rule

about wrongness) and to a correlative

"good,"Kierkegaard's uthor finds thatAbraham believes himself to be rightagainst the majority. The communica-tion within the community upon rightand wrong is possible only because aninterest and a concern is commonly

shared.Ethical agreement s an instanceof common interest. Abraham is silent

while he teleologically(i.e., the suspen-

sioncouldhavebeen nonteleological) us-pends the rulebecausehis interestis not

engendered by the community. He

claimsto be actingin God'sinterest,notthe community's.To the outsider, e.g.,the authorof the book, the questionoc-

curs, "WasAbrahamor the communityright?"Most personswill decide depend-ing upon their interest and the reasons

that state this interest. But there is no

disinterestedand neutralcase for eitherthe communityor Abraham.To pretendthat there s a presuppositionlesshoughtor a necessary standpointwhich yet al-

lows one to decide is folly for Kierke-gaard.Action comesout of interestandneed andpassionand not out of disinter-ested awareness. To argue that science

solves the problem while insisting thatthe starting point is common sense isonly to introduce n thepremisewhatonewill bring out at the end. When ethicsbecomesthe science of correctchoices, itdoesso only in virtueof the learner's or-saking his detachment.

Kierkegaard's ttackis leveledagainstall who arguethat a commonrationality

will bringcommonvalues.He is opposedto the conception of thought, whetherKantian, Hegelian,or utilitarian,whichallowsa thinkerto construeethicalplu-rality as temporaryor illusoryor a tokenof lingeringimmaturity.Just as he ar-guedagainstHegelthat logicwasnot suf-ficient groundto decidewhat existed orwhat did not, or whether there was anextra-phenomenalreality or there was

not, so in mattersof ethics,he is at painsto show that the reduction of alterna-tives is not possible to a disinterestedknower. But with all this there is no de-nialof the significance f rationality.Thelogicizing of alternatives spells out themeaningsand gives one the advantagesof workingwith reflectively defineden-tities. But rationality, even in its most

developedform,unites men only withinthe world of possibles and does not ab-solve them of the rather terrifyingre-sponsibilityof choosing.

Kierkegaarddid not, because of whathas here been said, becomea skeptic onall mattersrelatingto ethics. He believedthat a theoryabout the natureof ethicaldecisioncould be true.But healsosoughtto show that such a theory did not re-place an act of evaluatingin the thinker.Even though it is true, as ProfessorDavid F. Swensonpoints out, that "thetheoryof the threespheresorstages con-



164 ETHICS

stitutes a philosophyof life in the form ofa philosophyof evaluation,"1 it is alsothe case that Kierkegaard did not be-lieve that this objective theory would

constitute the subjectivityof the thinker.Instead, he sought to show that it waspossibleto retain one'spassions, one's in-terests, one's commitments,while think-ing objectively about them, "in otherwords,that we can be objectivewith re-spect to our own subjectivity withoutlosing it.""2 The theory of the stagesclaimsto be trueratherthan false on the

basis of evidence. Such a theory is trueonly if there are alternatives, and anytheory of ethics which denies alterna-tives is false becauseit is therewith non-factual. While admitting this, Kierke-gaard also draws attention to the factthat his owntheoryis true,as any theoryis true, to the detachedand disinterestedspectator. He refusedto admit that dis-interestednesswas superior o interested-

ness-except to the intellectual life. Thetask for the intellectual was not to bedispassionate o the exclusionof the pas-sions, for this would be the exclusionofall things human;rather,the task fortheintellectualwasto be dispassionateabouthis passions and objective about his in-wardness.

For reasonsalreadynotedKierkegaard

argued another proposition which, ofcourse,he asserted only because he be-lievedit to be true, viz., that in respecttoethical ultimates there is only objectiveuncertainty. (For other reasons he as-serted the same in respect to all sen-tencesof the form,"something s,"where"is" denotesexistence.)This for Kierke-

gaard,I believe,wouldbe a philosophicaltruth. But it wouldnot be, therefore,di-

rectly significantethically. It might pos-sess an indirectsignificancef it served todissuadea personfrom assent to a claimto objectivecertainty.But it would then

free a person only to the alternativeswhere the decision would have to bemadenot in virtueof the assertionaboutobjective uncertainty but in virtue of

one'sinterest. The assertion s addressedin particular to persons of a differentphilosophical commitment and makessense only if disagreementabout ethicalultimates is justifiable and disagreementabout philosophical matters not justi-fiable. The nature of ethical decisionmust permit alternatives or stages; butthe nature of ethical decidingamongal-

ternatives, ideally at least, permits ofonly one true descriptivetheory. But toadmit the possibility of such a truepropositionwas not to reinstatephiloso-phy to her a prioriandsyntheticglory;itwas only to admit that intellectual un-certainty about the good did not entailintellectual uncertaintyabout being in-tellectually uncertain.

Therefore t seems to be Kierkegaard's

view that argumentations legitimateonthe nature of ethical judgments, pro-vided one has not defined the issues toexcludesignificantalternatives. In prin-ciple,agreementshouldbe possiblehere.On these matters Kierkegaardwas asmuch a rationalist as any thinker hasbeen. But he adds a little reminder.Assoon as most personslearnthat such an

inquiry does not get to the good or toGodin the last paragraph, heir interestin it will be dissipated. Kierkegaardspeaksas a psychologiston thesemattersand avers that philosophy has acquiredits adherents n virtue of an unwarrantedpromise.He is not thereforeopposed toreflectionbut insteadbegs the thinker toceaserougingdamephilosophyandplac-ing her in the windowto attract the cus-tomers!

No reflective problem concernedKierkegaard o continuouslyas that con-cerning he nature of truth. He raisedthe




question or hisreaders hroughJohannesClimacus, the thirty-year-old philoso-

pher-pseudonym nd authorof his Frag-ments and its sequel, The Concluding

UnscientificPostscript.In these volumesand in a few others,especiallyTheCon-cept of Dreadand Trainingin Christian-

ity, the issue is raised particularly n ref-

erence to the propriety of considering

ethical and religiousclaims as instancesof propositionaltruth. Kierkegaarddis-tinguishesbetweentwo kinds of proposi-

tions: those about matters of fact, the

empiricalordersof nature and history,and, secondly,those about "being,from

an abstract point of view," or ideal ex-

istence,that which"is"onlyfor thought.

These two constituted for him the do-

mains of cognitive propositionaltruth.

But any propositional ruthaboutan ex-

isting object predicates only the char-

acteristic of that object and not the ex-

istenceof that object.Existence,he says,as did Kant, is not a predicate. And in

respect to ideal entities Kierkegaard

says:

But if being is understoodin this manner the

formula [the correspondence between thought

and being] becomes a tautology. Thought and

being mean one and the same things, and the

correspondencespoken of is merely an abstract

self-identity."

If ethical truth is cognitive, whichkind of propositionalform does it as-

sume? Kierkegaard s clearon the point

that it is possibleto have an ethical the-

ory or a theory of the theoriesat least

whichcouldbe true.But this truthwould

be about the idealities which exist only

for one's thoughtas possibilities.At this

point, Kierkegaardmakesa radicalsug-

gestion, viz., that the word "truth" inethico-religiousdiscourseshould be uti-

lizedas a qualityof men andnot ofprop-

ositions. In other words, ethical and re-

ligious truth is not cognitive, but it is"subjectivity."

When subjectivity is the truth, the conceptu-al determination of the truth must include an

expression for the antithesis to objectivity, amemento of the fork in the road where the way

swings off; this expression will at the same time

serve as indication of the tension of the sub-

jective inwardness. Here is such a definition of

truth: "An objective uncertainty held fast in an

appropriation-processof the most passionate in-

wardness is the truth," the highest truth for an

"existing" individual.'4

These assertions of course claim to be

true but as is the case with mathematicalpropositionsin respect to an ethical in-

terest-"the truth of such a propositionis also an indifferent ruth."'5The pointof the assertion is that the nature ofethico-religious ruth is such that evenafter the correctphilosophicalaccount,the ethical issue is left to the passionateinwardnessof each individual.

To say that truthis subjectivityis not

to relegateall ethical issues to the realmof nonsense.Kierkegaard'spoint is thatthe truth of propositionssuch as "pleas-ure is good," "the only good is a good

will," "Christ s God"-these and otherslike them-is not actually ascertainable.Theirformgives theman objectivityanda cognitive-likeclaim which they do not

possess.Andto treat them as if they were

objectively cognitive, and this to disin-terested knowers,is to mistake the na-tureof ethicality and, for that matter,of

religiosity, too. They are cognitive onlyto the like-interested. hey are of noeticsignificanceonly to those who under-stand them to be an intellectual expres-sion of their shared inwardness.Theythenexpresstruthsaboutsubjectivitytopersons who are not detached but whoare themselvespassionatelygiven to oneor the other. What to an objectivepointof view is uncertainty is to the inter-

ested, the subjective, the certainty for



166 ETHICS

them. But what is then the conditionfor

the conviction but the most passionate

inwardness?Furthermore, the intention of the

user of ethical sentences such as thosenotedaboveis intrinsicto understanding

the natureof morality.Weuse these sen-

tences as if they containedimperatives.

Kierkegaardbelieves this to be the case

because every man seeksto makehis lifethe truth. Ethicality is not a matter of

searching for conceptual truths; it is,

rather,a matterof seekingto becomethe

truth, of translatingpossibles into real-ity. The end of the processis not, there-

fore,understanding s it is in the instance

of all propositionaltruths but is rather

"becoming" omethingdifferent hanone

was. The locus returnsto the subject.Kierkegaarddoes not deny the objec-

tivity of moral law or of pleasure and

pain any more than he denies the objec-

tivity of God'sexistence.But his theory

of the natureof ethico-religious ruth isan attempt to account for the disagree-

ment in whicheachparty claimsin turn

objectivity as a ground for adherence.

His view is an admissionof the disagree-

ment, and he nowheresuggeststhat it is

a pseudo-disagreement.The objective

uncertainty is genuine, and no philoso-

phy can resolve t. Also Kierkegaarddoes

attack the legitimacy of transferring hesubject-objectdistinctionfrom the areas

of mathematics,history,and the sciences

to ethics and religion. For those who

were claiming that this was only the

march of time in areas heretoforeob-

scurantistic,Kierkegaardhadonly ironic

laughter. This was to disregardthe pe-

culiaritiesof beingethical. In order to be

a subject-and in orderto knowwith ac-

curacyand precision-in the sciences,it

was essential to abstract one's self pur-

posively from one's passional self; but

the ethical demand is different-"The

ethical demand is that he become in-finitely interested in existing.'6 There-fore,Kierkegaardnsists that ethicaldis-agreement-i.e., disagreementupon the

natureand proprietyof ends-is a func-tion of the degreeof interestand passionand subjectivity. To ask, as some do,that maximumobjectivity be practicedto resolve the uncertainty is to neglectthe importantfact that in disinterested-ness there is no ethicality at all.

To know, he says, is to translaterealsinto possibles. This is the direction in

whichall knowledge-any and all knowl-edge-moves. "The aesthetic and intel-lectual principle is that no reality is

thoughtor understooduntil its 'esse'has

beenresolved nto its 'posse.'The ethicalprincipleis that no possibility is under-

stood until each 'posse' has really be-come an 'esse.")17 Ethicality does not

produceobjective truths-it transformsthe subject.There arethen two contrary

movements within the personality.Theaim in ethics and religion s not to knowthe truth but to become it. While not

denying the possibility of there beingtrue theories about the natureof ethicalexperience, Kierkegaardwas so trans-

parent to himself that he deniedethical

significanceto his own thinking evenwhile insisting upon its truth.

Correlative to what has here beennoted is Kierkegaard's declaration of

what reality is to an inquirerafter ethi-cality. Almost like the contemporarieswho professdifficultieswith every meta-

physicalassertion,he declares:

It is a misunderstanding to be concerned

about reality from the aesthetic or intellectual

point of view.... All knowledge about reality

is possibility. The only reality to which an

existing individual may have a relation that ismore than cognitive, is his own reality, the

fact that he exists. This reality constitutes his

absolute interest.... The only reality thatexists for an existingindividual is his own ethical



KIERKEGAARDAND ETHICALTHEORY 167

reality. To every other reality he stands in acognitive relation.... The real subject is notthe cognitive subject, since in knowing he movesin the sphere of the possible; the real subject isthe ethically existing subject.'8

UnlikeBergson,who declares hat the in-tellect deceives, or recent analytic phi-losopherswho want to redefine the lan-guageof knowingto do away with "real-ity"-claims, Kierkegaardasserts that invirtueof one'sinterestone standsin rela-tion to reality. But this relationis non-cognitive.

Kierkegaard allows for two kinds ofsyntheses as the achievement of men.There s a synthesis inpropositionswhichis in consequenceof an intellectual pur-suit. In order to achieve this, one ridsone's self of everything idiosyncraticandpersonaland passionate. This synthesishas no alternative modes of attainment.Neither revelation nor authority, intui-tion or faith, can ever provide noetic

syntheses. But there is anotherkind ofsynthesis, the kind that means puttingourlives together.To be a subjectin thissense is to effect a synthesis too, butwithin one's personalityand not withinpropositions. Furthermore, the lattersynthesis,one of deed,thought,and feel-ing, a living synthesis, can seeminglybehad without possessingfirst a galaxy of

objective truths. All attempts to deducethe nature of a personalsynthesis fromfacts are to Kierkegaardinstances ofsophism.He knew without the benefitofrecentphilosophythat value judgmentsdid not follow from factual judgmentsunless one'ssubjectivityintruded.To ad-mit the intrusion is to admit that here,too, the natureof one'spersonalsynthe-sis is a reflectionof what a personis and

not a reflectionof something objective.All the objectivity men can muster does

not producethe singularpossiblebut in-

stead always a plurality of possibles.

Where thought only multiplies the de-tails of competingpossibilitiesthe needsof the individual finally dictate a deci-sion.

To the ethicaland religiousman thereis no need to weep if the cognitivelyde-lineated cannot properly be called real-ity. Kierkegaardholds the metaphysicalethicists responsiblefor falsificationofthe case both for the nature of thoughtandforthe natureof ethicality.To claimcognitive significancefor ethical judg-mentsproducesa doubleambiguity. Nor

doesKierkegaardeel it necessary o slurthe noncognitive relation. He does notdemeanit by callingit emotive. He sug-gests instead that, to an ethical manwhose interests are in his own personalsynthesis, that interest, even if it be inhis peculiar and noncognitively ownedexistence, is his reality. What is com-municableabout this is only the thoughtin which each "I" in turn says that forhim, an interestedparty (not for the dis-interested ego), reality is his interest inhis personalexistence.But the truth ofthis sentence,communicable s it is, doesnot removeor impart the concernwhichit describes.

Needlessto say this impliesno deroga-tion of scienceor gnosis-it means onlythat one does not apply intellectualcri-

teria to all things human and that onestates in a newway that man is not onlya subjectforknowledgebut is also a sub-ject in the processof makinghis own ex-istence. Furthermore,Kierkegaard in-sists that thereis a kind of structuraliza-tion withinthe emotionalcosmos,the in-ward life, too. Swenson has very aptlyremarked that Kierkegaardhas shown

that the life of feelinghas inherentstructureandsystem, that valuations fall into coherent sys-tematic groups, that emotions are not merelyastructureless mush, like the "skin and squash"of Kingsley's caterpillar."9



168 ETHICS

He believes there is a kind of logos ob-taining within subjectivity. He suggeststhat there may be a one-to-one corre-spondence between the kinds of concern

and interest-and the degreesof interestin one's own existing-and the good thatis therein grasped. Kierkegaard s a kindof ethical intuitionist; but unlike mostintuitionists he takes great pains to showthat what may be graspedby insight maybe a function of what the subject is, ofhow concerned,how intense, how "need-ful" he is, of how he behaves towardhim-self and others. In other words,Kierke-gaard takes for granted that an ethicalsubject is always interested and is notqua an ethical man disinterested.If the

degree of interest is relevant, thenKierkegaardseeks to show how this in-terest canobtain. Meanwhile, he Danishauthor does not therefore deny objec-tivity to moral endsoreven God.And, inaddition,if the moralsubjectis differen-

tiated fromthe knowingsubjectinvirtueof interest,thentoo therearecorrespond-ing differences o be noted in the mean-ings of objectivity. The moral and re-ligiousordermay have its disciplinesandmay hedge its opportunitieswith rathersevere conditions.And if the certaintiesdeclared within subjectively qualifiedstates are genuine, they arecertaintiesorinsights relative to the kind of subjectiv-ity. The detailsof the literaturehere can-not be summarized,but sufficeit to saythat what Kierkegaardsays about hu-mor, irony, guilt, dread, despair, re-pentance, etc., are only relevant to thisdiscussionas oneviewsthese as qualifica-tions in subjectivity which may permitaccess to the objectivitiesof the ethicaland religious ife.

Whileadmittingthat every person s asynthesis already--and this because ofinterests and passions-Kierkegaarddoes not hold that it is therefore mpos-sible to exercise a dispassionateunder-

standing of this synthesis. His point isthat dispassionateness s an achievementof the intellectual life. A completelydis-passionate persondoes not exist. Reflec-

tion, however, can always translate thepresent synthesis that the personalityisinto an object of reflection;and if this is

done,anotherpossiblecan also be intro-duced. To be able to reflect is to be ableto reflect upon a plurality of possibles.And this is what makes "freedom"a sig-nificant word for Kierkegaard. He ad-mits the possibility of a causal descrip-tion of the synthesispeople are. But hesuggests always that whatevera man iscan become an object of reflection,andwithin the order of reflection one hasseveralpossibilities.To be able to decidein virtue of one's concernabout the pos-sibles, one of whichwill depict the actual"one"andanother the intended "one"-this is to be free. Everything in the en-vironment, includingall causes, is sub-

ject to the judgment,the interested udg-ment, of the person; and even thoughthis judgment will not representa dis-interested appraisal,it is the means of

deciding ethical issues and finally theonly way of deciding. For this reason,

Kierkegaard tressesthe relevanceof theinternalhistoryof each man, for it is thisinternalitythat gives the neutral facts ofnature and history their valuationalsig-nificance. The variety of modes of lifeand the conflict in ethical judgment isnot here attributed to ignorancebut isrooted instead, Kierkegaardbelieves, inthe nature of individuality.UnlikemanyethicistswhoyearnforunanimityKierke-gaard is prone to believe the hope is a

vanity which could be achieved at allonly at the expenseof personal ntegrity.

Withouthis having said so, it seemsap-parent that he is a kind of profounddemocratwho deniedevery endeavortomitigate individualityand who askedfor

agreementonlyon questions-even those




concerningethics-where evidence wasforthcoming.

To extol the individual is to extol thepassions.Kierkegaardoundthepassions

to be exclusive and the intellect inclu-sive, and he was content to propose atheorydescribing his difference.He pro-posed that a logicalsystem was possiblebut that a system of existencewas notpossible. In anotherformthis antithesisbecomesonebetweena dialecticof reflec-tion, on the one side, and a dialecticofexistence, on the other. He denies thatthereis a singlelogic for both actualand

possibles,thinkingand existing.But thisis not to deny that even the ethical al-ternatives, previously noted, are madehomogeneouswhen they are translatedintopossibles.To reflectioneach is a pos-sibility and each can coexistin reflectionwith others. But in existencethis is nottrue. There each possibility becomes anobject of interestand necessitatesexclu-

sion. In this sense there arises a hetero-geneity between the possibles-at leastwhen they are actualized.This confron-tation of oppositesin ethical concernisthe existential dialectic, the logos ofthe subjectivelife. I believethat Kierke-gaardcouldhave used the entirehistoryofpoetryin addition to hisown literatureto show that such contradictionsarewell patternedandhave beenlongrecog-nized. However, it must be pointed outthat this dialectic is not an instrumentfor intersubjectivecommunication.It isratherthe nameforthe matrixof opposi-tion within which our interests operateand which gives the subjective life itsform. To judgeit by the criteriarelevantto an intellectual dialectic was forKierkegaard an instance of profound

misunderstanding.III

Over one hundredyears ago Kierke-

gaardpenneda slashingattack uponthe

view that logicwasontological.It is onlyquite recently that the view has at-tracted attention and this time becauseof its congruencewith othercurrentphil-

osophical attitudes. What Kierkegaardsaid for clearlyarticulatedreasonsquitea while ago many persons now say,usually with few reasons but with thesupportof the environment.He extendedhis attack also to those who objectifiedethics and religion,to those who tried toextend logical categories to include Godand the good.And to philosophersof thepresenterawhochoose to be journeymen

rather than pontiffs, it may come assomething of a surprise to find thatKierkegaardalso decriedthe roleof pon-tiff.But hewas not quitelikethe analyticphilosopherthat representsthe modernvogue. His was too rich a thought andtoo catholic a sympathy. He was toowell rounded a philosopherto start aschool, and he never argued that his

analysiscouldsettle inadvancewhat wassense and what was nonsense. He ac-knowledged common sense, but he sawits evaluativeaspect and believed t to bea disclosureof a kind of subjectivity,wide in extent, and he refusedto contenthimself with analyzing only commonsense.And, also, he nevermade the der-ogation of other kinds of subjectivity-other views of life-a sine qua non ofphilosophy itself. Ernst Cassirer con-fessedto beinginspiredby Kierkegaard'searlyaestheticwritingsand became con-vinced that anyonewho could write likethat about a view of life must have beenan adherent of it. And yet this was nottrue. Even though Kierkegaard was aChristian,he never imputed obviousnessor self-evidence o Christianitynorintel-

lectual opaquenessto other views whichwere not his own.He refusedto tradeonrecentscience,on modernity,or the bal-let of categories.And whenhis ownwrit-ing was done, he was candid enough to



170 ETHICS

admit that his own analyses-and his

theoryabout theories-excluded none of

the significantalternativesfor any living

person.He wasat oncea thinkerwhowas

intellectually neutraland yet personallycommitted. He never imputed ethical

virtue to intellectual detachment nor

noetic significance to ethical interest.

Kierkegaard's estrainton these matters

makeshiman instanceof the kindof wis-

domwhichhe claimed o findin Socrates.

Kierkegaard'sdelineationof rational-

ity is most singular.He steers between

two extremes-an anti-intellectualism

which would replacereflectionwith au-thority or revelationor a kind of imme-

diacyand an intellectualismwhichwould

impute to reasoning the task of pro-

ducing God, freedom,and immortality.

He defends a third view, a view which

argues that rationality cannot be re-

placed, that there is no substitute for

logicality,whilealsoinsistingthat reason

has its limits beyondwhicha personcanonly make "the leap." While admitting

with Santayana that there is a leap,Kierkegaardwould never have called itan instanceof "animal aith." To Kierke-gaard it was human and noble to have

interests,and to haveinterestswas to be

motivated to make a leap of humanfaith. To be a man meant to be able to

evaluateeverything n virtueof an inter-

est. To lose interest in virtue of the cul-

tivation of the attributes necessary toknow was to Kierkegaardan expensive

way to lose one'shumanity.PerhapsKierkegaards an instanceof

the thinkerwho combinesboth the pas-

sionsand the enthusiasmsof our commonhumanity with the detachmentand the

objectivity by which to describe them.He does not have the first without the

second,as do the learned,or the second

without the first,as do so many contem-

porary analytic philosophers.And per-

haps the richness of his philosophizings

due to the fact that he never abstracted

fromhis humanityin orderto achieve it.UNIVERSITYOF MINNESOTA

NOTES

1. Kierkegaard'sccountsof his authorshipare

many, but especiallypertinentare The Point of

View,AboutMy Work sanAuthor, ndhisJournal,

esp. from1849on.

2. This is mostclearlystatedin TheConcluding

UnscientificPostscript, rans. Walter Lowrieand

DavidF. Swenson Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1941),pp. 99-115.

3. ThePostscript,passim;also in first pagesof

ForSelf-Examination,rans.HowardHong(Minne-

apolis:AugsburgPress,1941).

4. A fewof the laterwritingsarepseudonymous,

but with a differentntention romthe earlier nes.

He doesnotwishhis readerso assume hathe is giv-

ingan autobiographicalccountof thehighreligious

ethicality he describes,and he uses pseudonyms

(withhis ownname)to pointthisout.

5. On My Workas an Author(included n The

Point of View, trans. Walter Lowrie [London:OxfordUniversityPress,1939]),pp. 146-47.

6. ThePointof View,esp.pp. 10-44.

7. Ibid.,p. 83.

8. The Journals of Siren Kierkegaard,rans.

AlexanderDru (London:OxfordUniversityPress,1938),p. 106.

9. The Postscript,pp. 115-67; also Either/Or,trans.David F. Swenson,LillianM. Swenson,and

W. Lowrie (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1944),esp. II, 133ff.

10. Fearand Trembling,rans. Walter Lowrie

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941),pp. 79-100.

11. SomethingaboutKierkegaardMinneapolis:AugsburgPublishingHouse, 1945),p. 160.

12. Ibid., p. 161.13. ThePostscript,p. 170.14. Ibid., p. 102.15. Ibid., p. 182;cf. also pp. 169-224.16. Ibid., p. 280.17. Ibid., p. 288. Kierkegaardextends these

categoriesto religion also; cf. esp. Training inChristianity,rans.WalterLowrie London:Oxford

UniversityPress,1941),whenhe says:"The truth,in the sensein whichChristwas the truth,is not asum of sentences,not a definitionof concepts,etc.,but a life" (pp. 200-201).

18. ThePostscript, p. 280-81and287.

19. Swenson,op. cit., p. 161.

kierkegaard and ethical theory - paul h. holmer

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