kenneth w. estes_ a european anabasis. western european volunteers in the german army and ss,...

Preface

This study grew out of my persistent interest in the Russo-German confrontation in World War II. In my reading, I found occasional references to the Spanish "Blue" Division operating with the German forces on the Eastern Front. When the Marine Corps detailed me to Duke University in 1973, I read the published literature on the Spanish Division, and through it found that a score of volunteer formations fought on the German side, made up of troops from a variety of Western European countries. By the time I began to teach European and Military History at the U. S. Naval Academy, I had resolved to research and write a history of these troops and the circumstances of their service.

1

Any attempt to relate the experiences of a select hundred thousand Europeans within that vast campaign would seem, on the surface, to reflect a rather shallow calling. However, so little is really known—and so much has been misunderstood—about the relationship of the European volunteers to the German Armed Forces as to justify a study that makes use of all available archival and published sources. In many otherwise respectable studies of European history or of the war on the Eastern Front, the Spanish "Blue" Division, the "Walloon Legion," or the "Danish Free Corps" have been depicted as quasi-Nazi militias, totally in the service of German interests. Thus, the principal objective of this study has been to determine who these volunteers were, why they fought on the German side, and what they accomplished. Beyond the essential factors of the operational histories of the volunteer units, though, remains the examination of the peculiar circumstances encountered by the volunteers in an expeditionary force in a distant and strange land, under the control of an equally unusual military command, in an ideologically charged struggle in which their homelands remained to the end non-belligerents.

Thanks to a generous fellowship provided by the American Historical Association and the Mellon Foundation, I have been able to return to this subject in the twenty-first century and finish preparing it for publication with Columbia University Press. I never imagined, however, that the need for it would have increased so markedly from the time of its inception. I have been surprised to find that a right-wing branch of the historical revisionist "movement" has revived notions of the Western European SS as a forerunner of the NATO alliance and a precursor of the united stand against the ambitions of the USSR in Europe. Typically, J. Lee Ready, in his Forgotten Axis, offers an ethnic interpretation of European warfare, replete with crusades and exaggerated numbers. He even has the Waffen-SS conducting the training of the French Legion, which served only in the German Army. He labels the USSR a "prison for nations," and portrays Russians as bloodthirsty and sneaky throughout. The Waffen-SS is described as "Europe's first army." Equally disheartening is Christopher Ailsby, who in declares, "The Waffen-SS was an organization that had fought in a manner never encountered before ... and was to lay the foundation for the integrated NATO defenses after the war," with nary a mention of how this sleight of hand actually was accomplished. My mission is thus to provide a more logical basis for

understanding the volunteer phenomenon in the ensuing pages.

SS: Hell on the Eastern Front,

1

This study would never have been completed without the substantial assistance given me by many individuals and organizations. I credit my continuing interest in history above all to Professor William H. Russell, my principal mentor during my undergraduate years at the U. S. Naval Academy. Professors Theodore Ropp and Irving B. Holly improved the vigor and scope of my contemplative powers at Duke University during my early graduate years. This study developed under the careful scrutiny of Professors James F. Harris and George O. Kent at the University of Maryland. Professor Kent directed the dissertation development and provided unbounded confidence and patience as I prepared it over a considerable period of time.

Preface1. Introduction2. Propaganda3. Neutral Variation4. Transformation5. Fanaticism6. CollaborationBibliographyMaps

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I have benefited over the years from institutional support rendered by the U.S. Naval Academy, and particularly by my department chairmen there, Professors John A. Huston and Larry V. Thompson. Several U. S. Marine Corps officers provided encouragement and opportunities for me to further my studies: Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, Colonel Robert C. McInteer, Colonel Marc A. Moore, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Seabrook, in particular. John Cummings and Helen Branham placed the resources of the Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy at my disposal, and Emerson Ford proved remarkably adept at finding obscure writings through the Interlibrary Loan Office of Duke's Perkins Library. Robert Wolfe and George Wagner provided a decade of help with the records in their charge at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Numerous individuals assisted me in my work at the following libraries: Library of Congress; Weiner Library, London; Danish Royal Army Library; Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt, Bibliotek für Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart and Spain's Servicio Historico Militar (now named the Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar) and Archivo de la Milicia Nacional (now combined with the Archivo Militar, Guadalajara). Michael B. Barnett of the Citadel allowed me an opportunity to float a trial balloon at his 1980 conference, where Earl F. Ziemke handled it kindly and cogently. Finally, for what success I met with in meeting former volunteers in the Waffen-SS from various European countries, I must thank the late Richard Schulze-Kossens for providing names and introductions. One of these led me to the home of

in Brussels for several days' stay and further introductions to many fascinating characters, including Léon Degrelle, the senior surviving European volunteer, then still living in exile in Madrid.

Fernand Kaisergruber

5

Columbia University Press' elite EPIC group, directed by Kate Wittenberg and editor-in-chief Sean Costigan, has provided the most exquisite publishing experience that an author might desire, a level of coddling and pampering of historians and writers that I have never seen in my previous work with publishers. The technical assistance of the staff has quelled the substantial gamut of fears and unknowns connected with electronic publishing. Copy editing by Paul Erickson greatly enhanced my presentation. The attention of AHA, Mellon and EPIC staff to the project and the historians involved certainly elevated the character and prestige of the project more than I had imagined. We of the third cohort in the Gutenberg-e project of course benefited enormously from the interaction we enjoyed with the preceding groups, and I have drawn many insights and ideas for my own project from observing them and their works. I remain spoiled by the EPIC experience, and am glad of it.

Beyond these individuals remain hosts of colleagues, friends, and family, too numerous to mention, who have contributed ideas, lent sympathetic ears, and provided encouragement over the years.

Notes:

J. Lee Ready, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1987), passim. Christopher Ailsby,

(Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1998), 183.

Note 1: The Forgotten Axis: Germany's Partners and Foreign Volunteers in World War II SS: Hell on the Eastern Front: The Waffen-SS War in Russia, 1941-1945

Back.

A European Anabasis — Western European Volunteersin the German Army and SS, 1940-1945

Fernand Kaisergruber

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1. Introduction

The Volunteer Phenomenon

The participation of foreign nationals in the service of the German armed forces during the Second World War has evoked both curiosity and consternation. Many Germans saw their presence as evidence of the legitimacy of the war against Bolshevik Russia and proof of a reassuring measure of acceptance of the "New Order in Europe," the political structure the German Reich's envisioned in occupied Europe. For the resistance movements and post-war liberated governments, these volunteers represented collaboration and treason of the basest order.

1

What foreign nationals volunteered for service in the German forces? For what ends did they serve and why? How many served, and to what extent did they contribute to German military fortunes? This study attempts to analyze the experience of Western European volunteers in the German Army and Waffen-SS in order to discuss the character of their military collaboration, their motivations, and the effects of their service on the German war effort. In so doing, it will focus on German efforts to integrate non-German nationals into the German (armed forces), how successful they were in doing so, and what measures they took to achieve their objectives.

Wehrmacht

Although foreign nationals from virtually every European nation served in one or more branches of the German armed forces, those serving in the ground forces far outnumbered those who served in the air and at sea; they also took a more direct part in combat than the others. Of the national groups concerned, the Western European volunteers—especially those racially categorized as "Nordics" by the Nazi regime—served the longest in the war and came closest to achieving integration with the German forces. This study of foreign volunteers in the German armed forces will focus on the Army and Waffen-SS contingents, the manner and circumstances of their formation, and the method and rationale of their employment. In studying the character of volunteer participation and employment in a comparative cross-national and politico-military perspective, several interesting factors emerge: the nature of military collaboration, German attitudes toward foreign nationalities, actions of the German military bureaucracy, and true military performance.

The only full-length study of the volunteer phenomenon is the apologist work of a former SS commander, General Felix Steiner, entitled Based

largely on personal notes, memory, and contemporary literature, this book overemphasizes the notion of the SS as a pre-NATO anti-Bolshevik European army and exaggerates the numbers of participants. George Stein, in his classic study, opened a chapter on the Western European SS volunteers with the remark that "no serious study of the mobilization of non-German manpower for the German armed forces has yet appeared...." He exposed the notion of the SS as Euro-army as a myth and established

the essential facts of its organization, composition, and operation, but developed none of these to any extent. Robert Gelwick's unpublished doctoral dissertation on SS personnel policies is encyclopedic but nonanalytical, although it includes a chapter on volunteer policy. Edgar Knoebel's unpublished doctoral dissertation on SS manpower policy in Belgium covers Belgian volunteers in some detail against a background of native politics and occupation policy. David Littlejohn, a British librarian, published an encyclopedic study of European collaboration in general. He used a remarkable assemblage of contemporary literature to flesh out the basic secondary sources and outline the history of military volunteers as well as native militias, paramilitary and political action cadres, all as extensions of collaborationist politics. Finally, François Duprat muddied the waters in several

Die Freiwilligen: Idee und Opfergang. 1

The Waffen-SS,

2

The Patriotic Traitors,

Preface1. Introduction

Volunteer Phenomenon

SS RecruitingIdeology & RaceNew OrderRusso-German

War2. Propaganda3. Neutral Variation4. Transformation5. Fanaticism6. CollaborationBibliographyMaps

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studies of the Waffen-SS by accepting much of the 1950s-vintage apologia, compiling numerous errors and failing to provide adequate documentation. 3

The historiography of wars frequently demonstrates that a vital waiting period must elapse before sound historical analysis can begin to supplant the 'war as I knew it' brand of memoirs and the more tendentious and politically-tainted types of polemics. Thus, the 1980s brought considerable improvement to the field. The essay by Jurgen Förster and Gert R. Überschär in Volume Four of the German Military History Research Office series on Germany in World War II provided essential development of relevant themes, and Bernd Wegner's book on the organizational and ideological components of the Waffen-SS became a required adjunct to the surveys by Stein and Robert Koehl. However, the apologist line has regrettably gathered new momentum, under the guise of "revisionism," and even the myth of the Waffen-SS as a NATO progenitor is rising again with new fervor. The best of these remains the work of Hans Werner Neulen, who frequently provides most interesting details but without satisfactory documentation, more in the line of Duprat's earlier work. In the last decade, a number of studies by national historians have detailed the activities of volunteer contingents from France, Spain, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium in a manner that stimulates my hopes that we may eventually free ourselves from the apologist line. 4

5

What I hope to contribute by using new and original source material, as well as by fully exploiting the known sources, is to clarify the essential events, factors, and statistics of the volunteer phenomenon in Western Europe and to establish the diversity of the volunteer experience in terms of variables developed through German occupation policies, racial notions, and ideological values. In addition, I will seek to answer the question of the actual utility—military and political—of the volunteer movement to the German war effort in the same manner that Alan Milward assessed the economic value to Germany of occupied Europe. 5

With this material contribution to the history of the volunteer groups and military collaborationists in Europe, I also hope to place an obstacle before future writers. Any attempts to glorify or exaggerate the accomplishments of these volunteers must deal with my findings first. Otherwise, let readers of these authors beware!

There were four essential issues that determined the course and character of the Western European volunteers' service in the German forces: manpower policy, Nazi ideology, the New Order, and the Russo-German War. Military manpower policy in the German armed forces played a crucial role in the struggle of Himmler's Waffen-SS to obtain full-fledged status as a second army and the fourth military service. Later, the SS would fulfill the German Army's worst nightmares and conceive of itself as the sole military standard-bearer of the postwar Third Reich. Nazi ideology and racial doctrines, as sporadic and unbalanced as they became in practice, influenced the recruiting of volunteers. Notions of Germanic racial superiority initially limited the terms of service offered to foreign volunteers by the German forces, but at the same time Germanic racial myths possessed a powerful influence among the political right in the "Nordic" occupied territories. The political extension of the Germanic Reich, the New Order in Europe, had its own influence over potential volunteers and German bureaucrats alike. German propagandists would point to the Western volunteers as evidence of a nascent pan-European brotherhood, and the veterans themselves would allege, that they had done it all for Europe. Finally, the epic event of the Russo-German War of 1941-1945 proved catalytic (as well as catastrophic) for the fortunes of foreign nationals in the German forces. Initially, the coming of the war against the Soviet Union presented great opportunities for German propaganda in the occupied and neutral states of Europe. The war against Russia qualified in this extreme view as a crusade undertaken by the strongest European power—on behalf of the rest of Europe—to rid civilization of the "Bolshevik Menace," which in some tracts was even more wickedly referred to as the "Judeo-Bolshevik world enemy."These trends worked most decisively in

ex post facto,



the evolution of the Waffen-SS, which sought particular advantages from the recruitment of non-German citizens.

Armed Forces Manpower and SS Recruiting

At the start of the European war, the Waffen-SS organization that would eventually deploy the bulk of the foreign manpower used in the war had only recently won official recognition as a military force. The SS ( ) itself originated in the 1920s as a special security force of the Nazi Party, which protected Hitler and his chief functionaries as they toured Germany. With the elevation of to the head of the 280-man SS in 1929, its final character began to take form. After the Nazi seizure of power and the overthrow of the revolutionary Nazi militia (SA) by the SS in 1934, the latter organization became institutionalized as the guardian of the movement and began to spread its influence, tentacle-like, through the Nazi hierarchy and the economic, legal, social, and educational frameworks of the new Germany. Quasi-military functions within the ever-growing SS

devolved upon the enlarged bodyguard, the (Special-duty Troops), which had formed four motorized infantry regiments by 1938. Rigorously screened for political and ideological malleability and correct racial characteristics, these troops performed routine ceremonial duties but had no clear military function. Their sole legal basis for

existence stemmed from Hitler's decree of 17 August 1938, which designated them as a standing military unit obedient to his direction and independent of the Wehrmacht or the German police.

Schützstaffel

Heinrich Himmler

6Verfügungstruppen

7

Armed, trained, and established as conventional military formations, the SS troops received weapons, equipment, munitions, and tactical doctrine publications from the Army. They were subject to mobilization, but until that time the Army could exercise inspection authority only in matters of weapons training, and then only with Himmler's permission. Furthermore, service in the SS regiments eventually was to count toward fulfillment of a German citizen's military service obligation. As Hitler's

personal "army," the regiments fought in the early campaigns of the Blitzkrieg, subordinated to Wehrmacht field commanders but administratively independent under Himmler's bureaucracy. This dichotomy was partially rectified when extended negotiations with the Armed Forces High Command over the composition, formation, and role of the SS military force culminated in the order of 2 March 1940, which designated, for the first time, the guard regiments, newly-formed divisions, and support units as the " (Armed)-SS." This act was the closest that the Armed SS would come to being officially designated as a member of the Wehrmacht. Although the Waffen-SS continued to operate tactically under Army and Wehrmacht command, and its recruitment, training, equipment, and doctrine remained in accordance with Wehrmacht standards, Himmler still controlled the actual administration and training of the force up to the point when individual units deployed to the front.

8Verfügungstruppen

Waffende jure

9

10

Scholars have long thought that the exclusion of the Waffen-SS from official military status frustrated Himmler's search for its recognition as "the fourth branch of the Wehrmacht." We now know that Himmler's ambitions far exceeded this goal, and that he sought the replacement of conventional armed forces by a superior, ideologically prepared, and revolutionary order. Its major struggle centered upon recruiting and expansion. From the beginning of its effective field service in the Blitzkrieg era, the Waffen-SS sought a role as an elite armed force and permanent installation as the party's shock troop. SS leaders envisioned the eventual replacement of the regular armed forces as a necessary development in the transformation of Germany into the "Thousand-Year Reich" of the New Order, which could only be policed by a politically indoctrinated military force. Such motives could scarcely be admitted in the early days, especially when Hitler had consistently promised each of the various military services sole responsibility for the defense of the



German state. 10

Obtaining manpower for the new Waffen-SS divisions became the chief responsibility of SS Brigadier General , a man of considerable organizational ability, who in late 1939 established a national recruiting office at SS headquarters in Berlin to coordinate the activities of the local offices of the various military districts. With Himmler's enthusiastic backing, Berger exploited loopholes left to the SS by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW). The latter had allocated recruits for 1940 among the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the ratio 66-9-25. Waffen-SS recruiting was not taken into consideration in this allocation. Rather, the SS received authority simply to fill specifically authorized divisions, regiments, and requisite support troops. Berger and his aides ruthlessly exploited this gentlemen's agreement, under which the OKW did not supervise the detailed execution of SS policy. The SS recruiters ignored any implicit limits and took in as many draft-age volunteers as their recruiting propaganda could attract.

Gottlob Berger

12

Not content with such bureaucratic subterfuge, Berger also searched for manpower sources not directly controlled by the OKW, including men who were not citizens of the German Reich. Ethnic Germans, or Volksdeutsche, from annexed or occupied territories showed promise as a recruiting pool, especially when the war brought parts of Eastern Europe under German control. Finally, the so-called "Nordic" peoples of Northern Europe—Finns, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians, and Dutch—could meet the racial requirements of SS recruiters and, if induced to volunteer, would not count toward any OKW recruiting statistics. A hundred of these Nordics had entered SS service by 1940. After April of that year, Berger's recruiting offices pursued them in earnest. 12

Without combat laurels, however, the Waffen-SS could not have grown in manpower and material strength as it did. The actions of the one and several motorized regiments in the Battle for France as part of the mechanized spearhead established their worth in Hitler's view, which was all-important. Justification for further expansion was found in the pending campaign against Russia, such that SS field strength doubled between the fall of France and the beginning of the "Barbarossa" offensive, as the invasion of the Soviet Union was known.

Verfügungsdivision

13

Given such expansion, the megalomaniacal plans of Himmler and his recruiting chief appeared somewhat feasible. By late 1941, the Waffen-SS had emerged as a second army, and, thanks to its ideological training, constituted "an uncompromising National Socialist alternative to the traditional military establishment." As long as it pursued an active role in fulfilling Hitler's "historic mission" as a reliable, personal instrument of that destiny, the Waffen-SS could feel secure. The image cultivated by the SS as a unique ideological corps, separate from the Army and more closely tied to the party and political authority, would further secure its position after the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt upon Hitler, in which several German Army officers participated. This attempt tarnished the Army in Hitler's eyes and made Himmler's notion of elevating the SS to the status of sole arms-bearer of the nation feasible at last, despite the fact that the war was then reaching its final, fatal turn toward German defeat. 14

Ideology and Race: The Greater Germans

15

The "Germanic" ideal that the propaganda of the SS and other branches of the Nazi regime often promoted emerged from the panoply of ideological currents swirling in Europe. Rooted in concepts, Germanic thought placed preeminent value on racial purity in a society. Over time, this ideology became both non-Christian and anti-Semitic. Suffused in romanticism, mysticism, and utopianism, it attracted few followers as an intellectual movement. However, its influence over the general population, which read

fin-de-siècleVölkisch



Germanic treatises or other romantic literature reflecting Germanic thought, cannot be gauged. 15

Hitler's own ideological constructs certainly favored the inclusion of Germanic ideals in any program of the Nazi state. Although the Führer never precisely articulated his thought, its chief components remained anti-Semitism, aggressive territorial expansion, and an all-encompassing historical view that emphasized national life as a continuing struggle for survival. 16

Hitler consistently identified nationality with race. The racial status of the individual remained unalterable; hence, whole nations had their fates determined on the basis of racial criteria under the Nazi order of things. Hitler accepted the Germanic race as clearly superior. He saw it as having created the only cultural values of any worth, and therefore being morally destined for world domination. Under Hitler's direction, the German armed forces would cease their drive to the west and south and "resume the Germanic expansionist program where it had stopped six hundred years ago, and to press once again over the routes of the medieval crusading orders into the lands of the east." 17

When it came to the concrete expression of Germanic thought and deed, Hitler proved rather indifferent to fashioning any Germanic utopia. For instance, the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany took place on strategic grounds, not out of ideological necessity. This reality did not prevent Nazi propaganda from using Germanic doctrines in an attempt to impress the Norwegians and Danes they now held captive. Hitler and his circle even spoke of Germanic empire-building, but discerning cynicism from naïveté in such matters remains well nigh impossible. 18

Ultimately, Heinrich Himmler became the most aggressive proponent of the Germanic Reich, not Hitler. The latter insisted that any final legal or political definition of the Nazi world would have to wait for the successful conclusion of the war. Himmler's Germanic policy envisioned the coordination and annexation of Northern and Northwestern Europe, using collaborationist parties and German propaganda in the process. Neither proved very compelling to the captive populations, who nevertheless bent to the letter of German rule, if not the spirit. Ultimately, Himmler's hopes for a Germanic Empire rested on the shoulders of foreign volunteers, who, if recruited in sufficient numbers, would win support for a pan-Germanic association with the Third Reich. Joint service against a common enemy—the oft-touted "Judeo-Bolshevik enemy of the world"—bonded by common SS arms would produce a cadre capable of converting the meeker populations at home. 19

20

Even after the first offensives against Russia had failed, Himmler remained convinced of both final victory and the ultimate achievement of a Germanic Empire, with a multinational SS army guarding the eastern marches of the empire against the Asiatic hordes. He saw the pan-Germanic empire not merely as an extension of the old Greater Germany, but as part of a process leading to a "Germanic-Gothic" empire extending to the Urals, and perhaps even a "Gothic-Frankish-Carolinian Empire" whose dimensions had yet to be established! 20

These notions so excited SS leaders that they easily confused chicken and egg. Thus Berger, the recruiting chief, claimed in a speech before Wehrmacht generals that, "the SS saw the Germanic Reich as its ultimate goal since 1929, when the Reichsführer SS [Himmler] took command." According to this vision of the past, the SS then more or less undertook the mission of "building a Germanic Reich for the Führer." 21

The SS did stand at the forefront of the pan-German movement, using its prestige,



influence, and institutions to provide impetus to the Germanic agenda. Himmler's success in establishing "superior police and SS" administrative heads in Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium gave him much the same influence there that he enjoyed in the Reich. Some concrete measures in line with pan-German ideology did emerge as the eastward conquest proceeded and the planned settlement of the land by Germanic settlers began. In the homelands, native party leaders and many of their followers received SS rank. Native SS organizations were formed in all the occupied Nordic countries extending south to Walloon Belgium, which belatedly received "Germanic" status in 1943. 22

Through its very direction of the Germanic movement, the SS was to reveal its fatal weaknesses. In typical heavy-handed fashion, the SS insisted that pan-Germanism meant full subordination to the Third Reich and its hierarchies. Any notion of pan-German equality remained operational only in theory, or in the dreams of the collaborators. National politics had no role in the SS-defined empire, which reduced the occupied Nordic states to the level of (provinces) within the Third Reich. We will see that Germanic notions of ideology scarcely affected the methods by which Germany and especially the SS would treat the captive populations of Europe.

Gaue

23

New Order Policies and the SS

Given the generally recognized heinous nature of German occupation policy, it seems curious that any of the occupied peoples could have been attracted by it. The Nazis claimed, with some relish, to have created a New Europe, unified in such a way that it cancelled all the ills of the nationalist past. However, other than the police and extermination functions of the SS, no German policy or institution applied equally across the old national borders. Nazi racial doctrines hopelessly crippled the project of forging a unified Europe. Possibly only Hitler himself could have implemented any synthesis of administrative, social, political, economic, and military policy in Europe, but the direction of his war left him no time and energy for such a massive task. 24

25

Nevertheless, the myths of the "New Order in Europe" substantially displaced the "Germanic Empire" in German propaganda as the war continued. As larger numbers of non-Germanic peoples fell under German sway, their occupiers used pan-Europeanism to encourage collaboration. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the volunteer phenomenon swept up more non-Germanics than Germanics in Western Europe alone, not to mention the larger mass of non-German volunteers in the East. The propaganda of "Germanic Empire" gave way to pamphlets and posters extolling the unification of Europe, emphasizing the crusade against the Soviet Union. Typical was a series of pamphlets published by Dr. Franz A. Six of the German Foreign Country and Scientific Institute in 1944. These essays recalled the historical pattern of European community, the dangers of communism, the role of Germany in reuniting Europe, the crusade against Bolshevik Russia, and the role of European volunteers in fighting and supporting that crusade. 25

By mid-war, the SS took particular care in its training camps to hold up the "Europa" concept to incoming volunteers, especially officers and NCO cadets. At the SS Cadet School, Bad Tölz, the program of instruction included five hours per week of "ideological training," mostly consisting of political history, racial history, and the study of Europe under National Socialism. The latter topic portrayed "the European task in the East: to create a new law, economy, and economic role of the East for Europe...." 26

Germans and foreigners alike in the SS began to believe in this doctrine. Much of this feeling derived from the special comradeship-in-arms that developed in the combat units of the Waffen-SS, where in some cases a few foreign officers commanded German soldiers (and, more often, the contrary was true), with no apparent friction. Oblivious to economic



and social deprivation in their German-occupied homelands, the foreign troops grasped at the multinational ethos of the Waffen-SS as a harbinger of a new world, in which equality of citizenship would be guaranteed to the nations participating in the crusades of the New Order. An instructor at Bad Tölz, who later served as its last commandant, reported to Hitler personally in August 1944 that foreign volunteers were concerned not only with defeating Bolshevism, but also in guaranteeing the future of their homelands by fighting for their independence:

I received the reply that exactly as he [had] stated in a telegram to Reich Commissioner [Josef] Terboven on 28 September 1943 in Oslo, he guaranteed independence of all European states after the war. An excerpt of the text of this Hitler telegram to the Norwegians reads as follows: "It is the irrevocable will of the Führer after the victorious end of this battle of destiny to permit a National and Socialist Norway to arise in freedom and independence, which surrenders to the higher sphere of a European Community only those functions which are indispensable for the security of Europe since this community alone can sustain and guarantee such security."

I was commissioned by Hitler to impart his opinions to the European officer candidates of the Waffen-SS. 27

30

Several of the combat leaders of the Waffen-SS, including Generals Paul Hauser and (both former Army officers), earned Himmler's reproach by transgressing SS

ideology and ideals and advocating a European community over a Germanic Reich. As senior survivors of the SS after World War II, their published and private remarks stimulated much of the largely postwar mythology surrounding the SS as a European Army.

Felix Steiner

28

Despite the enormous falsehood perpetuated by Nazi propaganda in this matter of pan-Europeanism, which runs in direct contradiction to their true policy, which baldly calculated to subjugate the entire continent, the postwar mythology has grown stronger. The

establishment of the NATO alliance and the European Economic Community provided encouragement for the much-maligned SS veterans and military collaborators. They persuaded themselves that the SS had served as the progenitor of the European integration movement, and that they had been the movement's pioneers. Of all the

German and Western European veterans of the Waffen-SS that I have interviewed, only one, a Flemish Belgian, saw things otherwise. A twenty-two-year-old teacher and reserve army officer, he joined the SS in 1942. He had no political affiliation, and remained a devout Catholic with a strong distaste for communism. He saw pan-Germanic and European doctrines as mere propaganda. German officers in the Waffen-SS units discussed no politics other than the general course of the war, certainly never in terms of Europa-policy. In his opinion, the "New Europe" concept grew out of the prisoner-of-war association after the war and the first writing of war experiences and unit histories.

29

30

31

The Russo-German War

The most important influence on the foreign volunteer phenomenon stemmed from the campaign itself in which most volunteers fought, the war with the Soviet Union. Without this casus belli, the numbers of non-Germans volunteering to serve in the German forces would have remained very small, and would be a subject of only passing curiosity. But the nature of the war and the character of the major opponents created the most favorable conditions for volunteer service.

Given the pariah status of the Soviet Union in the first twenty years of its existence and



the polarization of political viewpoints in most European countries between the wars, it became most expedient for Nazi propaganda to feature the Russo-German War as a "crusade" destined to rid Europe of the encroaching Red Menace that had threatened weak and strong nations alike for a generation.

The course of the four-year conflict between National Socialist Germany and Communist Russia has attracted a great deal of attention from popular writers and historians over the past several generations. As an epic event in human and military history it has no rival. It continues to capture the imagination of readers because of the incredible expanse of the battlefield, the numbers of men and machines committed and lost by each side, and the utter ferocity of combat, as the opposing ideologies portrayed the battle as a clash of civilizations. 32

35

Operation Barbarossa, the German plan for the invasion and occupation of Russia,called for a lightning advance by the Wehrmacht to destroy the Red Army in its forward positions deployed west of the Dnieper River and out of the Stalin Line fortifications. A general pursuit would carry the German forces eastward to an approximate line between Archangel and Astrakhan. The area east of this line—the major cities and industrial and agricultural regions—would fall under the territorial administration of the Reich, leaving

the Soviets in some form of a rump Siberian republic. Reinforced economically by the industry of the Donetz basin and the agricultural production of the Ukraine, the Third Reich would remain secure for its millennial rule. Although the Germans came perilously close to their objective, Hitler's fatal miscalculation proved to be his underestimation of the political strength of the Soviet system under Stalin.

The initial invasion force assembled by the Wehrmacht ensured its initial superiority in quantity and quality over its Soviet counterpart. Some 3.8 million men, 3300 tanks, 7000 artillery pieces, and 2000 aircraft launched Operation Barbarossa. On the ground, the Germans deployed 148 divisions, 19 of them armored, along with 14 divisions of the Romanian Army. Against these, the Red Army could bring into action only 138 divisions in the western border areas, all of them undermanned and under-equipped.

German planning staffs identified three possible strategic targets for the offensive. A northern thrust against Leningrad offered the political advantages of "liberating" the Baltic States, capturing the second-largest Russian city, and achieving an early link-up with Finland, which was waging a separate war to recover traditional Karelia. A direct advance eastward against Moscow would eliminate the Soviet capital and seat of the Stalinist administration and seize the transportation center of the country. A southerly offensive offered the economic advantages of an early conquest of the Ukraine and Donetz regions. Hitler, in his matchless fashion, chose all three objectives for his forces. 33

The attack fell upon the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. To this day, the degree of surprise the Wehrmacht obtained remains inexplicable. Stalin had received direct warnings from Churchill and his own master spy in Tokyo, Richard Sorge. Soviet forces in the border

regions had fortified themselves very little, had laid no anti-tank mines, and yielded huge numbers of prisoners. Many operational errors grew out of contemporary Soviet military doctrine, which emphasized an immediate counteroffensive instead of static defenses. However, the Red Army also performed poorly as a result of leadership losses incurred in the great purges of 1937, obsolescent armaments, and its inadequate maintenance and training. These early victories caused Hitler to think of a shift of strategic objectives prior

to the final collapse of the Red Army. Thus, from Smolensk—reached by both Napoleon and the Germans in July—Hitler redirected the main Wehrmacht effort into the Ukraine and away from Moscow. German forces were not back in position to launch the attack on Moscow (Operation Typhoon) until September—the

34

35

OperationBarbarossa

Eastern Front,Summer 1941

Eastern Front,



month Napoleon reached the city. At this point in the 1941 campaign, German losses totaled 410,000 men (eleven percent of the invasion force), and thirty per cent of their tanks and prime mover vehicles. Only 217,000 replacements became available, and twenty-one of the twenty-four divisions held in the OKW reserve had to be sent to the front. The friction of war literally worked hard on the Wehrmacht in terms of

men and machines during the September-December slog towards Moscow.36

The Moscow campaign backfired on the Germans, as the Soviet Army had withheld its last reserves of fresh Siberian troops until 5 December. Their counterstroke caught the German forces bogged down at the end of overextended lines of communication. The Germans reeled back fifty to one hundred

miles, suffering some 200,000 casualties. After this defeat, the German Army staff called for a defensive posture on the Eastern Front in order to await new weapons and a general refurbishing of forces. Hitler, on the other hand, saw time running out, with the Italians already in trouble in North Africa and the United States having entered the war, albeit diverted for some time in the Pacific. He directed the Wehrmacht to strike to the south in 1942, entering the Caucasus and eventually wheeling northward behind Moscow. The Red Army would thus have to fight for its oil and communications against a German Army refitted by the summer of 1942 with fresh mechanized equipment but still shorthanded in infantry. New allied divisions from Italy, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia would fill in the lines, but no reserves would remain. 37

40

The Red Army also reorganized and re-equipped itself in the summer of 1942, replacing older leaders with younger generals. These commanders, however, wasted their strength in a fruitless summer offensive. The German forces crossed over the Don, invested Stalingrad on the Volga, and sent a small army group into the Caucasus. Hitler's quest for Stalin's city drew the Wehrmacht out of the campaign in the open into street fighting, where it

sacrificed its technical and training edge. Once again Soviet reserves, carefully marshaled and committed against under-equipped German and allied troops, broke the Axis lines and this time trapped a German field

army. The surrender of the Sixth Army—the first German field army lost since the Battle of Jena—preceded only by a few months the loss of a second field army in Tunisia (with each, Germany lost some 300,000 killed, wounded, and missing). The Axis forces lost the initiative, and a fatal war of attrition now enmeshed the Germans and their cohorts.

Hitler's attempt to maintain the offensive in Russia in 1943 failed in the huge battles around Kursk, and from August onward the Germans fell back before increasingly superior Soviet forces, which were now well equipped, better supplied, and led by seasoned combat commanders. The summer of 1944 saw the destruction of the German Army Group Center and the arrival of the Red Army at

the frontiers of Germany and Hungary. At the end of 1944, the Russo-German War ceased to be a discrete campaign, and the Third Reich simply folded under the triple onslaught of Eastern and Western Allied armies

combined with aerial bombardment.

The collapse of the Thousand-Year Reich after a mere twelve years dashed any concomitant plans for a Germanic Empire stretching from the Pyrenees to the Urals, or any supranational realignment of the old nation-states under any New Order. The thousands of European volunteers who dug themselves out of the rubble of Germany or found themselves in Allied prisoner of war camps met with very little sympathy for their situation at the hands of their liberated countrymen or Allied captors. A few faced firing squads and hangmen, most endured a few years of imprisonment, and numbers of them sought sanctuary in exile from these and other repercussions.

44

Fall 1941

Eastern Front,Winter 1941-2

Eastern Front,Spring 1942

Eastern Front,Winter 1942-3

OperationBagration, 1944

CentralEurope, 1944



Aside from the tendentious argument that they led the wave of European integration that later swept over the continent, the surviving former volunteer veterans seem to share one attribute: they show little remorse, and avow that their years in Wehrmacht or SS uniforms remain in memory the most exciting years of their lives. Some may have dismissed these years as anachronistic, born of youthful exuberance, and many strive to forget. For significant numbers, however, frequent reunions with former comrades bring them back to the year they joined their regiments.

Notes:

Felix Steiner, (Göttingen: Plesse Verlag, 1958). Note 1: Die Freiwilligen: Idee und Opfergang

Back.

George H. Stein, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 137. Note 2: The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945

Back.

Robert A. Gelwick, "Personnel Policies and Procedures of the Waffen-SS" (Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, 1971); Edgar E. Knoebel, "Racial Illusion and Military Necessity" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1965). David Littlejohn, (New York: Doubleday, 1972); François Duprat,

(Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1968).

Note 3:

The Patriotic Traitors Histoire des SS Back.

Jurgen Förster and Gert R. Überschär, "Freiwillige für die 'Kreuzzug Europas gegen den Bolschewismus,'" in Vol 4,

(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983); English edition, (New York: Oxford University Press,

1998). Bernd Wegner, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöninger, 1982; English edition,

(Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1990). Robert Koehl, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Hans Werner Neulen,

(Munich: Universitas, 1985).

Note 4:Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Der Angriff

auf die Sowjetunion The Attack on the Soviet Union

Hitler's Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1933-45The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and

Function The Black CorpsAn deutscher Seite:

Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SSBack.

Alan S. Milward, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). Note 5: War, Economy and Society

Back.

Gerald Reitlinger, (New York: Viking Press, 1957) has been supplanted by Robert Koehl's as the standard authority. However, its narrow concept of the Waffen-SS as an armed formation designed for internal security must be replaced by notions of the SS as an emerging revolutionary state in its own right, and the Waffen-SS as its future army, as asserted by Bernd Wegner,

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1990), 360-65.

Note 6: The SS: Alibi of a Nation 1922-1945The Black Corps

The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology, and Function.

Back.

Stein, xxv-xxxii. Note 7: Waffen-SS, Back.

Ibid., 22; Alfred Schickel, "Wehrmacht und SS," 19:5 (May 1969): 247-50. Note 8:

Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau Back.

Stein, 49; Schickel, "Wehrmacht und SS," 257; Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat and Hans-Adolph Jacobsen, (New York: Walker, 1968), 260-74.

Note 9: Waffen-SS,Anatomy of the SS State

Back.

Stein, 48. Wegner, Waffen-SS, 128-29. Note 10: Waffen-SS, Back.

Stein, 35-36, 48; Wegner, 209 ff. On the organization of Note 11: Waffen-SS, Waffen-SS,



Berger's office, see Gerhard Rempel, "Gottlob Berger and Waffen-SS Recruitment, 1939-1945," 27:1 (1980): 107-22. General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff, OKW, commented in his diary entry for 25 May 1940, "the plan for a limitless expansion of the SS is alarming." Schickel, "Wehrmacht und SS," 260. Berger became head of the SS Central Office in August of 1940, but this only added duties of overseeing ideological training; Wegner, 209-12.

Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM)

Back.

The OSS estimated that some 442,000 including Alsatians, were available for military service, with 15,000 more coming of age each year. National Archives and Records Administration, Military Records Division, Record Group 226, OSS (R & A) document 1238, 25 September 1943. Luxemburgers and some Alsatians were considered citizens of the Reich under a complex set of rules. See Norman Rich, vol. 2, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 23-35, 166; Willard A. Fletcher, "The German Administration in Luxemburg, 1940-42,"

13:3 (March 1970): 533-44. Bernd Wegner, "Auf dem Wege zur pangermanischen Armee," MGM 28 (1980): 101-3. For a statistical breakdown of early volunteers by nationality, see Kurt G. Klietmann, (Osnabrück: Munin, 1965), 501.

Note 12: Volksdeutsche,

Hitler's War Aims,The Establishment of the New Order

The Historical Journal

Die Waffen-SS: eine DokumentationBack.

Schickel, "Wehrmacht und SS," 260. Note 13: Back.

Ibid., 262-64; Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 103, 113n; Stein, 17. Wegner later enlarged and detailed the Himmler vision of a new army decisively in his masterly see especially 346-59.

Note 14: Waffen-SS,

Waffen-SS; Back.

George L. Mosse, (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1963), 13-125, passim; Hans-Dietrich Loock, "Zur

'Grossgermanischen Politik' des Dritten Reiches," 8:1 (January 1960): 38. University courses in Germanic Philology, such as those offered before the war at Louvain, may have influenced students and had some impact on the volunteer movement; Interviews with Franz Vierendeels, Groot-Bijaarden, Belgium, 29 May 1982 and Léon Degrelle, Madrid, 8 June 1982.

Note 15: The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich

Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte

Back.

Eberhard Jäckel, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1972), 117-21. Note 16: Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power

Back.

Rich, vol. 1, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973),, xlii, 4-7.

Note 17: Hitler's War Aims, Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion Back.

Loock, "Zur 'Grossgermanischen Politik,'" 39. See also his (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), 263.

Note 18: Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven Back.

Loock, "Zur 'Grossgermanischen Politik'," 40-56. Note 19: Back.

Bernd Wegner, "Der Krieg Gegen des Sowjetunion 1942/43" (esp. subsection "Germanische und Volksdeutsche Freiwillige") in Horst Boog, et al.,

(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990), 836.

Note 20:Der Global Krieg: Die

Ausweitung zur Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative, 1941-1943Back.

Loock, "Zur 'Grossgermanischen Politik,'" 56. Note 21: Back.

Ibid., 57; Rich, 2: 348-93. Wegner, 334. Note 22: Hitler's War Aims, Waffen-SS, Back.

Loock, "Zur 'Grossgermanischen Politik,'" 62-63; Wegner,332-39.

Note 23:Waffen-SS, Back.

Rich, 1: 248-50. Note 24: Hitler's War Aims, Back.



Interviews with Alfred Mäder, Rendsberg, Germany, 13 March 1981 and Richard Schultze-Kossens, Düsseldorf, 26 March 1981; Franz A. Six, ed., (Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1944).

Note 25:Europa und die Welt

Back.

Jüttner letter, 5 February 1944, on cadet school course plan for 1944/45, reprinted in Richard Schultze-Kossens,

(Osnabrück: Munin, 1982), 126-43.

Note 26:Militärischer Führernachwuchs der Waffen-SS: die

Junkerschulen Back.

Testimony of Richard Schultze-Kossens at Trial of Gottlob Berger, 13 January 1948. Copy in possession of Schultze-Kossens.

Note 27: Nürnberg International Tribunal, Back.

Stein, 146-48. See the personnel files of Hauser and Steiner as well as other officers of the Waffen-SS in the Berlin Document Center (BDC), U. S. Mission, Berlin, now administered by the Bundesarchiv. Later these were filmed in NARA Record Group 242, microform A3343. Former SS Major Alfred Mäder opined that "the Hauser crowd in the Waffen-SS was ready to smash the Brownshirts" when the war ended, thus ensuring the triumph of the European ideal over the SS state; Mäder interview.

Note 28: Waffen-SS,

Back.

On the calculable nature of Hitler's goals, see Rich, vol. 2, 420-22. Note 29: Hitler's War Aims,

Back.

George Stein, "The Myth of a European Army," 19:2 (April 1965): 21-27, remains an adequate counterpoint to the postwar literature of pan-Europeanism. For a flagrant example of the last, see the discussion series "Freiwilliger für Europa" in the April-October 1976 issues of

Note 30: Weiner Library Bulletin

Der Freiwillige. Back.

Interview with Jan Vincx, Herentals, Belgium, 29 May 1982. Note 31: Back.

Among the huge literature on the Eastern Front in World War II, the best surveys are Albert Seaton, (New York: Praeger, 1971), and John Erickson, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975) and (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983). Also useful for the general readers are Alan Clark, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), Alexander Werth, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964) and Paul Carrell [Paul Schmidt], (London: Harrap, 1964).

Note 32:The Russo-German War

The Road to Stalingrad Road to Berlin

BarbarossaRussia at War 1941-1945

Hitler's War on Russia Back.

Walter Warlimont, (New York: Praeger,1964), 138. Note 33: Inside Hitler's Headquarters

Back.

Erickson, 73-77, 87-94. Note 34: The Road to Stalingrad, Back.

Ibid., 15-21 Note 35: Back.

George E. Blau, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955), 71-72.

Note 36: The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations 1940-42 Back.

Ibid., 131. Note 37: Back.




2. Crusade and Propaganda

SS Prototype: The "Wiking" Division

The initial wartime expansion of the Waffen-SS was accomplished primarily by drafting police and military-age members of the general SS organization into the new regiments and divisions that took form in 1939 and early 1940. The Army, Air Force, and Navy shared strict military recruit and draft quotas set by the Wehrmacht High Command. Any additional recruiting of manpower for the Waffen-SS would have to come from the shares of the other three services, which competed hotly for priority. The Waffen-SS command gloomily forecast that the Wehrmacht would only allow them to recruit approximately two percent (or 12,000 men) of the yearly draft. Since the maintenance of the units in hand required 18,000 men a year, new sources of manpower had to be found. For this rather pragmatic reason, the Waffen-SS began to organize a concerted recruiting effort in foreign territories that were coming under the control of the Third Reich. On 30 April 1940, the SS began to recruit in occupied Denmark and Norway for a new regiment, designated SS Nordland. 1

1

Foreigners of Germanic racial groups who could meet Waffen-SS physical standards already served in very small numbers, having been authorized for the SS Germania Regiment in 1938. Himmler's dreams of a pan-Germanic order led by his SS elite also dated back to long before the war began, but he had made little progress. Even before receiving Hitler's approval, recruitment for the Waffen-SS began in the Low Countries and Scandinavia, although the "clandestine" and supralegal period lasted only a few days before the permissions were obtained. The SS established formal recruiting stations in countries in these regions between July 1940 and January 1941, Norway being last. 2

The Danish and Norwegian volunteers in SS were intended to make up half of the regiment's strength, the rest being German recruits. Himmler specified that the German officers and non-commissioned officers had to be especially fit and ideologically sound to deal with the foreign volunteers as Germanic representatives of the Nationalist Socialist movement. After the fall of the Low Countries in June, the SS began to form

the SS Regiment, a formation for Dutch and Flemish Belgian volunteers. Because this small-scale foreign recruiting met with limited success at this time, the Waffen-SS was allowed to add a fifth (and last, in the viewpoint of Hitler and the High Command) Waffen-SS division. In September 1940, Hitler ordered a slight expansion of the Waffen-SS, parallel to the spring 1941 Army expansion program for the coming offensive against the Soviet Union. The division, named SS in December, was to consist as much as possible of Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch volunteers, and would be equipped as a motorized division of the Army. SS Division was then formed by bringing together the and Regiments, filled out with German troops and officers, the Germania Regiment (detached from the old SS ), and an artillery regiment. In late December, the division was redesignated , to avoid confusion with the Regiment.

Nordland

3Westland

Germania

GermaniaNordland Westland

VerfügungsdivisionSS Division Wiking

Germania 4

Generally, the first recruits from the Nordic occupied countries appear to have been ideologically motivated by the Germanic concepts of the New Order, pan-Germanism, and anti-Bolshevism, as well as the apparent desire to escape the declining circumstances of their native homelands. Emil Staal, a Dane, joined the Danish Nationalist Socialist Party at the age of sixteen, and volunteered for the SS Regiment in June 1940, at the age of nineteen. Strongly anti-Bolshevik and pro-Nazi, he sought adventure and escape from the living conditions in Denmark, returning only after being seriously wounded in the

Nordland

11/18/03 2:20 PMA European Anabasis: Chapter 2


Caucasus in 1942. Bent Lemboe, his countryman, joined SS for a year on the

encouragement from his father, a Danish Nazi since 1933, even though many Danes thought a Nazi-Soviet war was inevitable by early 1941.

Two Norwegian veterans of Ole Brunaes and Leif Kristiansen, felt despair and

some guilt over the sudden collapse of Norway in 1940 and the flight of the government to British soil. They saw Germany as the only possible guarantor of Norwegian freedom and identified the Norwegian SS units as the cadre for a new Norwegian Army. These two volunteers displayed sympathy for Germany and antipathy for British war interests, and apparently learned anti-Bolshevism only on the front lines:

5 Nordland

6 Nordland,

7

I didn't know what Quisling stood for and what he thought, but I could see the British plot developing: provoke German occupation of Scandinavia in order to produce a German-Russian War. (Kristiansen)

5

Though we doubted we would come into action within time—England, Germany's only opponent left, was nearly beaten—we accepted the aims [Norwegian independence after a German victory]. Later on, from the 22nd of June 1941, the motivation for the volunteers was plain enough: to fight the Soviet communism threatening against Europe and thereby Norway. (Brunaes) 8

The early volunteers of the regiments of the SS Division encountered their first shocks well before the opening of the Russo-German War, however. German training camps and hard-bitten drill sergeants assaulted the young egos of the volunteers both spiritually and physically. Brunaes observed:

Wiking

The training was, of course, no Sunday school. Our German teachers were no real deep psychologists, but, like us, ordinary healthy German youth, from all parts of the people and from all professions. They had ... self-confidence, well skilled with a dynamic efficiency and were remarkably proud of their famous German military traditions.

We Norwegians, coming from a country where the national defense had been neglected, the military professions ridiculed and any tradition nearly ruined, here had a lesson to learn with regard to accuracy, toughness, discipline, cleanliness—physically as well as morally (fingernails being examined before eating, the locking of wardrobes strictly forbidden, thefts from comrades punished hard). 9

As a group, the Nordic volunteers lacked the military background that German youths had gained from their compulsory paramilitary and labor service; they proved to be "independently minded and strongly inclined to criticism." But SS training generally prevailed, and the and its sister regiment, SS , took shape during training under the imaginative guidance of the Division commander, SS Brigadier General Felix Steiner, previously a commander of the elite SS Regiment. Steiner, a former Army officer with World War I experience, proved to be a progressive and enthusiastic officer who stressed leadership by example and the maintenance of high morale among the troops. His persuasive enthusiasm and sensitivity to the disparate national characteristics of his former troops and the new volunteers made him an ideal choice as the commander of the first multi-national unit in the German armed forces. To Steiner, "the western volunteer phenomenon had deeper psychological foundations" that reflected the spiritual crisis of European youth. Disenchanted with the nationalism of their fathers, they would prove responsive to Steiner's characterization of a common European culture and heritage as a binding force in the Wiking Division. Steiner's innovative grasp of military leadership principles probably led him to accentuate a pan-Germanic or European bond among his men in order to establish unit integrity and cohesion. His postwar

Nordland WestlandWiking

Deutschland



reminiscences retained this pan-Germanic ideology, undoubtedly reinforced by his professional success as a leader of multi-national units. 10

The recruiting standards of the SS and Regiments remained identical for both foreign and German applicants. Dutch and Flemish men, between seventeen and forty years of age, who could establish Aryan racial characteristics, attest to good health, and meet the minimum SS height (165 cm) would enlist in the SS Regiment for two to four years. Recruiting officers at The Hague and Antwerp stood ready to receive the volunteers, as did similar offices in Oslo and Copenhagen for SS .

Westland Nordland

Westland

Nordland 11

10

Recruiting for the Division fell far short of the expectations of Berger and his recruiters. In June 1941, as the division slipped into its assembly area prior to the opening of the "Barbarossa" offensive against Russia, only 1564 foreign volunteers mustered in the total roll call of 19,377 men. The remainder consisted of German SS men, with a scattering of recruits among these. The representation of the nationalities in the division, as of 22 June 1941, took the following form:

Wiking

volksdeutsch

12

Dutch 631 Swedes 1

Norwegians 294! Swiss 1

Danes 216 Finns 421

By 19 September 1941, the numbers had changed relatively little:

Dutch 821 Flemish 45

Norwegians 291 Swedes 8

Danes 251

Himmler remained undaunted by the poor recruiting results, and continued to fantasize about building a pan-Germanic army within the Waffen-SS. Apparently, the mere presence of a thousand Western Europeans in the ranks proved sufficient evidence to him that his notions continued to be well-founded. However, the pre-Barbarossa recruiting effort had clearly failed, and the Waffen-SS manpower problems would be alleviated in the end only by the induction of ever-increasing numbers of from Eastern and Southern Europe.

Volksdeutsche

13

Almost all of the non-German Wiking volunteers served asinfantrymen in the SS and SS Regiments, although a few served as artillerymen in the Artillery Regiment. The SS apparently made no effort to train foreigners in technical services and specialties at this time. These conditions would change

somewhat under later recruiting programs, but in 1941 those foreigners assigned to this elite SS mechanized division simply filled in the ranks of the infantry companies.

Nordland Westland

14

15

The SS Division crossed the Soviet border in 1941 with Army Group South units, generally operating as a flank guard unit or loaning its regiments to other corps units for particular missions. In 1942, however, the Division played a more decisive role, spearheading the seizure of Rostov and the drive into the Caucasus and the Maikop oil fields. Following the German collapse at Stalingrad, the Division took part in defensive battles around the Don until it was relieved for refitting in April of 1943. Wartime propaganda highly touted this division as the embodiment of the multi-national Germanic empire and its crusade against Bolshevism. Indeed, thethird battalion of the Regiment was formed by a

Wiking

Wiking

Wiking

Nordland Finnish SS Volunteer Battalion



in 1942. Later, a reinforced Estonian battalion would replace the Regiment in its entirety in the order of battle. However, available statistics demonstrate that

casualties outstripped replacements, and the numbers of non-German troops in SS declined until its 1943 relief from the front lines.

NordlandWiking 15

Wiking

Replacement troops found themselves assigned to various units of the Division without attention to their nationality. Their new German commanders had little good to say about the quality of these replacements, compared to the veterans trained in the several months before the Barbarossa offensive began. The Regiment commander advised the division staff that the 275 Germanic volunteer replacements (mostly Danes and Norwegians) he received in December 1941 had created a good general impression, but were "much too soft" and "cry like babies" compared with the earlier volunteers. He pleaded for stricter basic training and insisted that a two-to-one ratio of German to non-German troops remained desirable.

Wiking

Nordland

16

Such reports may have represented scapegoating attempts by commanders eager to explain embarrassing incidents, such as a desertion in the 1st Company, Regiment, in early 1942. Even Himmler became aware of this apparent disgrace and cautioned his chief recruiter, Berger:

Nordland

The missing in action report from SS Division on Privates Asbjörn Beckström and Ludwig Kuta, a Norwegian and a Dane who both shamefully deserted, once again reinforces my opinion that the ideological and military training of Germanic volunteers must be combined to obtain real success or, as otherwise expressed, so as not to alter the heretofore successes.

Wiking

17

The Legion Experiment

As the Russo-German War loomed, SS recruiters still faced severe personnel shortages, including a lack of foreign volunteers for the Division. Although that division remained the only sizeable Waffen-SS expansion that Hitler had authorized, SS leaders, such as Berger, sensed the need to relax racial and physical standards in order to improve recruiting in the occupied territories. Permission came in April 1941 to recruit up to 2500 Flemish and Dutch nationals in a volunteer regiment, SS The volunteers received all SS privileges but were not considered true Waffen-SS men.

Wiking

Nordwest.

18

20

By 25 May, some 920 volunteers had been assembled in the Hamburg-Langenhorn barracks of SS Nordwest, to be joined by over 560 more Dutch, Flemish, and Danish volunteers over the next three months. Flemish and Dutch volunteers filled separate companies of the regiment, and SS planners foresaw separate battalions of Flemish and Dutch volunteers in SS with sufficient Dutchmen recruited to form an additional regiment. However, by late September, the SS admitted having too few recruits to complete this scheme, and the Regiment was broken up to form a pure Dutch regiment and a Flemish battalion, both organized as motorized infantry formations.

Nordwest,

Nordwest

19

The opening of the Russo-German War proved catalytic to the formation of national volunteer contingents in the Waffen-SS. Rather than fielding further multi-national formations such as the regiments of the Division, the Waffen-SS adopted the expedient method of recruiting separate national "legions," counting on the sponsorship of the collaborationist parties to assist in recruiting, motivated by national pride in "their" legions and the crusade against the Bolshevik enemy now cornered by their German masters. The origins of the legions policy in the German hierarchy remain obscure, and it was most likely purely opportunistic. The spontaneous offers of neutral and occupied

Wiking



nations to furnish volunteer contingents proved irresistible, if only on propaganda grounds. The Spanish, Dutch, and Danish offers certainly presaged the official legions policy, which Hitler approved on 29 June. In accord with the SS pan-Germanic ideology stressing Nordic blood ties, the Waffen-SS would accept only truly "Germanic" legions recruited in Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Flemish Belgium, leaving the proposed Spanish, French, Croatian, and Walloon Belgian contingents to the Army for training and deployment. 20

In Denmark, Danish Nazi Party leader seized upon the announcement of the Barbarossa offensive to enhance his position with German authorities. Clausen called upon Danes in a speech on 23 June to fight for Europe against the ("world enemy") by enlisting in the SS Regiment Party comrades urged Clausen to consider a national legion similar to one that had fought in Finland the previous year. The party contacted Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Kryssing, commander of the 5th Artillery Battalion, Danish Army, for support in this endeavor. Kryssing, a Danish nationalist, sought support from the Danish government for the legion's formation and received official permission for Danish citizens, including regular military officers, to accept foreign service in the same manner as had volunteers for the Finnish war.

Frits Clausen

WeltfeindNordland.

21

Sufficient volunteers assembled in Copenhagen to form a battalion, for service with the Waffen-SS. Official recognition of this venture by the Danish government came with a 8 July War Ministry regulation permitting foreign service for Danish officers, and then an official parade on 19 July as 435 officers and men, led by Colonel Kryssing, marched past an assembly of Danish officials and officers, under the Danish flag, to the music of a German military band. As the apparently friendly crowd cheered, the contingent boarded a train for movement to the German Langehorn Barracks at Hamburg.

Freikorps Danmark,

22

Kryssing served as the first volunteer of the He strove to set an example by enlisting his two sons as volunteer soldiers and his wife as a nurse in this unit. Of the approximately 1000 men of the who reported by early August, some forty percent had served previously in the military, a few (thirty) being veterans of the Finnish War. The officers came from the regular and reserve ranks of the Danish Army. They had to demonstrate Aryan racial background, lack of criminal record, and financial solvency to the German Waffen-SS recruiting office at

Freikorps.

Freikorps

25

DanishVolunteers



Copenhagen. Many officers were hand picked by Colonel Kryssing. First Lieutenant Per Sörensen, who would perish in the rubble of Berlin in 1945 as the last battalion commander, was noted by the Copenhagen office to be "... a competent and reliable officer. Lieutenant Colonel Kryssing is very interested in his accession and posting as an SS first lieutenant. Sörensen is an officer of exceptionally good appearance. He disposes of a sure and deliberate bearing...." 23

In contrast to the SS Regiment of 1940, where a large number of ethnic Germans from North Schleswig had volunteered, the supposedly represented a purely native Danish movement, reflecting a variety of motivations, none of which included economic gain, according to former Major Oleif Krabbe, one of the first company commanders. He estimated the motives of non-commissioned officers of the as follows:

NordlandFreikorps

Freikorps

24

A. Professional military interest 2-5%

B. War-adventurer 5-10%

C. Dissatisfied with home life 3-5%

D. Anticommunist beliefs 20-25%

E. Conservative or nationalist beliefs 10-15%

F. Favored new European political order 15-20%

G. National-Socialist family or member 30-35%

Thus, political motivations predominated among the early volunteers, according to Major Krabbe. Officers were mostly between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age, and enlisted men predominantly between eighteen and twenty. Most of the latter were skilled or unskilled laborers. As the Danish volunteers gathered in Hamburg to begin their

training, SS headquarters issued orders to organize them as an independent battalion of three infantry companies and one weapons company, all to be motorized.

25

26

While the basic training of the continued, German authority began to exercise its influence on this ostensibly national unit. SS observers became impatient with the leadership of Colonel Kryssing and his manner of discipline. Kryssing was a patriotic officer, but was not sufficiently politically motivated to ensure that National Socialist values trumped Danish interests among those in his command. The SS headquarters viewed this as an insufferable characteristic given what they viewed as the National Socialist tenor of the unit's members. After the New Year, Himmler decided to replace Kryssing with SS Major Christian von Schalburg, a former Danish Army captain and an experienced officer in the Division. Kryssing protested that under von Schalburg the would come under National Socialist influence and that the Bolshevik enemy should be fought under non-political auspices. Such was not the desire of Himmler and the SS leadership, however, and von Schalburg, a fierce anti-Communist with proven leadership acumen, became the commander on 13 February 1942.

Freikorps

Wiking Freikorps

27

Von Schalburg proved a popular leader and took steps to raise the caliber of the by integrating ten German officer instructors into the unit in key positions. By May, the battalion was prepared for combat assignment, with its three infantry companies and one weapons company, the latter featuring two platoons of two infantry cannon (75-mm), one with three anti-tank guns (50-mm), and a combat engineer platoon.

Freikorps

28

30

The was alerted on 7 May that they would be airlifted the next day to the Eastern Front, their destination the "Demansk Pocket." This was a nearly isolated salient

Freikorps



extending deep into Russian lines south of Lake Ilmen, still held under Hitler's "no retreat" order of the winter campaign by the badly depleted divisions of the German II Army Corps. The Danish battalion was earmarked as a replacement battalion for the lone SS division in II Corps, the 2nd .SS DivisionTotenkopf

After unloading from their Junkers-52 transports at the Demansk airstrip, the moved into its assigned lines on 20 May. Major von Schalburg's Order of the Day, No. 70 of 22 May 1942, praised the Danish volunteers (in German) for entering battle to defend Germandom under the leadership of the Germanics, Adolf Hitler, against Judaic Bolshevism. He urged the troops to fight loyally and well, as didtheir predecessors of the Division, ending his order with, "... we will become loyal

fighters for Denmark's honor and the Greater Germanic Empire." That day, the Danes launched an attack, alongside the reconnaissance battalion of the Division, capturing hundreds of meters of the dense, swampy, forested terrain and causing great casualties among the Russian defenders (some 1300 killed, according to the II Corps journal). Russian counterattacks then hit the Danes, felling their commander von Schalburg, among twenty-one other dead and fifty-eight wounded on a single day, 2 June 1942. A week later, the again mounted an assault, this time under its new

commander, the German SS Lieutenant Colonel Hans von Lettow-Vorbeck. He also died in close combat, along with twenty-six of his troops, on 10 June. Captain Kund B. Martinsen, a Danish company commander, took command of the as it struggled for its existence. Heavy skirmishing continued until early on 27 July, when the Danes were relieved and withdrawn from the Demansk Pocket. The Order of the Day of the SS Division for 3 August 1942 cited the accomplishments of the

as a key reinforcement for "Fortress Demansk." It credited the Danes with killing 1376 enemy troops and capturing an additional 103, along with over 600 weapons and much ammunition.

Freikorps

Wiking

Totenkopf

Freikorps

Freikorps

TotenkopfFreikorps Danmark

29

The battle strength reports of the Danish battalion revealed much of the nature of its three-month baptism of fire. Among the steady accumulation of casualties suffered by the Freikorps, 9 officers, 17 NCOs, and 133 enlisted men died in action. This extreme example also pointed out the continuing difficulty of maintaining the national contingents at the front, as recruiting and training replacements forever lagged behind their casualties, as the table below indicates. 30

Date Effective Strength

(Officers/NCOs/Enlisted Men)

10 May 42 24 / 80 / 598

28 May 42 19 / 63 / 446

15 June 42 7 / 23 / 274

1 July 42 9 / 38 / 290

1 August 42 10 / 28 / 171

11 August 42 10 / 32 / 180



The Danish volunteers returned to Copenhagen, and four weeks' leave was granted. Reassembling on 12 October in the Citadel garrison, the now mustered 1100 officers and men, thanks to returning wounded and new recruits. From 18 October to 21 November the Danes retrained, and on 19 December they entered the front lines of the 1st SS Motorized Infantry Brigade, stationed between Newel and Veliki-Luki. The battalion then engaged in positional warfare with little action for four months. The Danes were then pulled out of their lines on 24 March 1943 and transported by the Germans to Grafenwöhr for reformation into a new SS regiment. The officially disbanded on 20 May 1943.

Freikorps

Freikorps

31

35

SS recruitment in Norway had lagged significantly in early 1941, despite Himmler's directive accepting married volunteers as old as forty with full SS status, and the inducement that former members of the Norwegian Army could obtain equivalent rank in the Waffen-SS. But with the start of the Barbarossa offensive, German recruiters could seize upon new incentives and motivations. They carefully orchestrated a call for volunteers based upon the "flood of requests ... to take part in the opposition against Bolshevism." The formed at the end of July under SS direction with the size of a reduced regiment of one infantry battalion and a cyclist battalion. A Norwegian, Major Jorgen Bakke, commanded the Legion. The Germans entertained the notion of deploying the Legion to the Finnish front, where the new 6th was engaged. This measure would have revived feelings of Scandinavian solidarity that were kindled in 1939-40 by the Russo-Finnish War. Armed Forces High Command quashed these ideas, however, when it notified SS headquarters that transport shortages made such a transfer impossible for the moment.

Legion Norwegen

SS DivisionNord

32

The Norwegian legionnaires moved to a German training camp near Kiel, and then overland to the Leningrad front of Army Group North in early 1942. On 10 March 1942, the Norwegians entered the German siege lines surrounding Leningrad as part of Battle Group "Jackeln." This unit, a conglomerate of Army and SS units, had relieved several first line divisions in their entrenchments to free them to counterattack the dangerous Volkhov Pocket to the south. The Legion at this time numbered about 1150 officers and men, with a further 150 in replacement depot. It fought as a single infantry battalion of three rifle companies, one weapons company, and one anti-tank company. The second, cyclist battalion never filled, probably because the new recruits flowed to the frontline companies as replacements. 33

The first Red Army counteroffensive on the northern front brought several of the volunteer contingents into action. It opened as the newly formed Soviet Second Shock Army forced the Volkhov line on 13 January, penetrating at the juncture of the German 126th and 215th Infantry Divisions at Yamno. The Shock Army at first advanced slowly, but later, upon the vociferous urging of the Soviet High Command, it advanced to a depth

of some forty miles. The two German infantry divisions held on to their ruptured flanks to preserve a tight bottleneck at the base of Second Shock Army's penetration, and Army Group North not only produced

enough reserve potential to halt the Russian advance but was able to pull the 4th SS Police and 58th Infantry Divisions out of their positions near Leningrad and pinch off the penetration near Lyubino Pole from the north and south, respectively, on 19 March. The breakthrough battle now became a battle for the reduction of the "Volkhov Pocket," and the Second Shock Army was doomed to eventual dismemberment. The

Soviet WinterOffensive, 1941



Norwegian legionnaires later engaged in difficult trench warfare on the static Leningrad front. Artillery fire, frequent patrols, and raids kept casualties steady and fatigue high. The sole major Soviet attack it faced, a thrust from Leningrad toward the Oranienbaum pocket, seems to have missed the Norwegian Legion, which fought to hold its positions on the Russian flank. In early August Battle Group "Jackeln" disbanded, and the Legion came under the command of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade, where it remained for the rest of its frontline service.

34

35

The worrisome conditions under which struggled did not go unnoticed. himself visited the front for a couple of hours on 13 May. Following him, a

delegation of Norway's occupation authorities and collaborationist ministers visited the Legion for a day on 1 July, accompanied by the German Army and Corps commanders. Ten days later, the SS Police Commissioner for Norway, Wilhelm Redeiss, fired off a letter to Himmler complaining of the "wasting away" of the Norwegian Legion at Leningrad and called for its withdrawal. He stated that only 290 men defended a four-kilometer front line and some forty casualties (three dead) had been suffered in the last ten days. Redeiss urged the consolidation of the legionnaires with the new recruits in the SS Division. The German Army Corps Commander, when he heard of this proposal, remonstrated that all the Norwegians could best serve in the Legion under his L Corps. Since so many foreign units (Spanish, Flemish, Dutch, Latvian, and Russian) already served in the Corps, it was best suited to be a showcase of national interests. He judged the battle-worthiness of the Norwegians as "good" and pleaded with authorities not to undermine the status quo.

Legion NorwegenQuisling

Wiking

36

SS headquarters proved less than satisfied with the Norwegian Legion, however, and its removal from the front was soon accomplished. Already, in the fall of 1942, headquarters had taken action to remove Major Bakke and his second-in-command, Major Andersen, from the Legion. Bakke had proved obstinate and fiercely "parochial" (read: nationalist) in his dealings with the Germans. His "unpleasant personality" and "independent character and spirit," combined with his age (forty-eight) and poor training, rendered him of little value in a political or training role. Personnel Chief Berger urged SS headquarters to deny the officers further duty, saying, "it is better in any case to have [Bakke and Andersen] as civilian opponents under our own skirts." The new commander, as of 23 September 1942, was Major Arthur Quist, a well-educated and linguistically talented former Norwegian Army officer who proved more popular with Germans and Norwegians alike. 37

40

Whether because of the lack of positive leadership or the abominable conditions at the front, most Norwegian legionnaires declined to extend their enlistments. This created a crisis at SS headquarters in disengaging the Legion from its position with the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade and shipping it home to Norway in time for discharge. They feared a consequent loss of credibility if they failed to do so. Himmler fumed at Berger at the end of January 1943 over the unit's poor leadership that had succeeded in motivating only twenty percent of the legionnaires to remain. The ordered the replacement of the Norwegian Legion with the Latvian Legion at the front in February 1943. He proposed to remove the legionnaires to an SS training base, merge them with new Norwegian recruits of the regular Waffen-SS, urge reenlistments, purge the officers, and consolidate the resulting companies or battalion through intensive training. Himmler called for the eradication of national politicization and reserved the decision on future deployment of Norwegian volunteer units to himself.

Reichsführer

38

Himmler may have been alluding to the continued interference by the Quisling government in the administration of the Legion. Quisling hoped to use the Legion as leverage toward Norwegian autonomy in the new Germanic Reich. As a prototype of a Norwegian army, it would assert Norwegian sovereignty and his own position as head of



state. For his part, Quisling urged party members to volunteer for the Legion, thus winning Berger's approval. On the other hand, Norwegian authorities recruited a separate "Police Company" for the Legion and sent it to the front

in September 1942. In October, a Ski Company, supposedly containing some of Norway's "world master" skiers, was recruited and sent to the SS Nord Division in Finland. Two more Police Companies would join the ski unit in Finland, elevating that unit to battalion strength. 39

While the Ski Company was being transported from its training camp to the German Northern Front, the detached from the Leningrad front in March of 1943 and withdrew to Grafenwöhr training camp for reassignment.

Legion Norwegen

40

In Holland, the deeply collaborationist National SocialistMovement (NSB) of served German recruiters well and responded positively to the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union. In addition to Mussert's party, German recruiters sought the numerous young Dutch conscripts between seventeen and nineteen years of age who had been called up during the Low Countries Campaign of 1940 but had not served. Finally, Dutchmen who contracted to work in Germany received some attention from SS recruiters. Himmler had pressured his recruiters to "fill the Westland Regiment in four weeks," preferably from the young conscript group. Recruiting Chief Berger also preferred non-NSB men, based upon reports that they performed well and demonstrated more willingness as soldiers. There were also concerns that the NSB and labor ranks should not be bled entirely dry for the SS recruiting program.

Anton Mussert

41

Mussert called upon the nation to join the "crusade" in the East, and the former Dutch Army Chief of Staff, General Hendrick A. Seyffardt, lent his prestige to the recruiting drive for a Dutch national legion. Ironically, the first such call for a legion had come from a fringe party, the Fascist National Front, whose leader, Arnold Meijer, gained the approval of SS Reichskommissar Hans Rauter and the Waffen-SS staff in the Netherlands. But he later recanted when the recruiting campaign was already underway, by then with the support of the full range of Dutch collaborationism. The Waffen-SS organized the Dutch Legion in regimental strength, but had to disband the SS Regiment to furnish enough Dutchmen for the necessary three battalions and support companies. Half of the one thousand Dutch members refused service in the Legion Niederlande, however. These men opted to return home, where 120 of them would eventually serve in a cadre battalion intended for local security duties in Holland.

Nordwest

Nordwest

42

45

In the Dutch case, some local initiatives worked against immediate increases in Waffen-SS recruitment. Mussert had agreed during April-June 1941 to support a Luftwaffe National Socialist Motor Corps (the German ) recruitment program that apparently netted some 4000 recruits for appreciably more comfortable duty in the Netherlands. Presumably, a portion of these recruits might have rallied to the Legion or Waffen-SS later in the year. Mussert himself remained blind to realities, however, and spoke avidly in August 1941 of forming three regiments of legionnaires, leading to the "first Dutch division." The contingent passing before him in review on 11 October however, numbered a mere 650 men.

NSKK

43

The Dutch legionnaires trained at Arys in East Prussia in the fall of 1941. Despite problems with Dutch officers similar to the case of the Danish the Dutch Legion became the second of the national contingents of the Waffen-SS to enter combat. Transported by ship from Danzig to Libau in mid-January 1942, the Legion entered the Volkhov Front north of Lake Ilmen, at the height of the Soviet winter offensive.

Freikorps,

proved the strongest of the national legions in number, but also the Legion Niederlande

VidkunQuisling



least "national" in composition, as the following strength report for 9 January 1942 indicates: 44

Officers NCOs Enlisted Men Total

German 40 329 331 700

Dutch 26 2 2179 2207

Flemish - - 26 26

TOTAL 66 331 2536 2937

These figures demonstrate that German personnel provided most of the leadership in the Dutch Legion, with the bulk of the troops being foreign volunteers. The few German enlisted men probably provided administrative and technical services, taking little part in combat.

50

The initial assignment of the Dutch Legion, as it moved by rail from Libau to the Volkhov Front, involved rear area security and mopping up remnants of the Soviet Second Shock Army, destroyed by the major German forces in the Volkhov Pocket during battles that raged from February through June. The three battalions of the Legion were attached initially to the German Army's 20th Motorized Infantry Division. This unit was a division headquarters with few organic troops, used to control various security operations in the Eighteenth Army rear area. The Dutch were grouped with some small German units in the Battle Group "Jaschke." The Second Battalion of the drew first blood on 11 February 1942 as it forced a roadblock on the Gora-Gusi road defended by "strong" Russian forces. The legionnaires forced the barricade, killing six Russians and capturing three. According to its war diary, "one prisoner (Jew) was shot while escaping." These initial operations revealed some

difficulties in controlling the Legion, according to Group "Jaschke":

Legion Niederlande

45

Working with the staff of is very difficult, as officers fail to appreciate the tactical situation. Reports are so unclear and two-sided. Division directs the staff of II/A.R.20 [Second Battalion, Artillery Regiment 20, then supporting the Legion] to keep Division informed directly, such that a clear picture may be obtained.

Regiment Niederlande

46

Shortly thereafter, the Germans assigned the Legion to the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade, under which command the Dutch would serve out their deployment.

At the end of this operation, the SS replaced the unpopular German commander of the Dutch Legion, Colonel Otto Reich. His replacement, SS Lieutenant Colonel Josef Fitzthum, took command on 15 July 1942. He had commanded the Flemish Legion at the front and had already displayed some skill in handling foreign volunteers. After participating in the mopping up of the Volkhov Pocket, collecting prisoners and booty, the Dutch received the assignment of guarding the Leningrad-Novgorod railroad line, undertactical control of the . By the end of July, however, the Legion had moved with its parent 2nd SS Infantry Brigade to the Leningrad siege lines. Its strength reports reflected the typical depredations of campaigning in the Russian winter and in the thickly forested swampland between Leningrad and Lake Ilmen.

285th Security Division

47

Date Nominal Strength Combat Strength

Officers NCOs Enlisted Men

55



19 Jan. 1942 65 290 2418 (n/a)

27 March 1942 50 243 1566 32/172/1286

1 June 1942 45 257 1432 29/170/1219

24 July 1942 34 187 976 16/79/478

These figures indicate that never exceeded sixty-percent personnel effectiveness in its frontline duty, dropping to effective battalion strength by the time it occupied the trenches before Leningrad. The differences between nominal strength and combat strength reflected personnel out of action because of injury, sickness, and wounds. The overall decline over the six-month period was due to transfers, deaths, furloughs, and convalescent leave.

Legion Niederlande

Probably because of its declining strength, the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade in September grouped the Dutch Legion with the Norwegian Legion and two Latvian security battalions in Battle Group "Fitzthum," under the Dutch Legion commander. These units settled down into months of tedious positional warfare on the Leningrad siege front. The Dutch

volunteers fought a typical action on 4 December 1942. A 600-man Russian assault force hit the first battalion of the Legion, and many Russians broke through their lines. The Battle Group responded with a counterattack by Dutch and Norwegian legionnaires to restore their former positions, killing some 350 enemy troops and capturing 42 at a cost of 30 dead, 66 wounded, and 3 missing. Colonel Fitzthum's after-action report commented that the enemy consisted of penal companies of "... not especially high combat value." Another assault on the Legion in February 1943 included tanks, thirteen of which fell to Legionnaire Gerardus Mooyman's anti-tank gun. Mooyman became the first foreign volunteer recipient of the coveted Knight's Cross, with concomitant exploitation by propagandists and recruiters in the homeland.

48

49

On 27 April 1943, detached from the front and moved to Grafenwöhr training camp for refitting and reorganization. In mid-May, Himmler ordered a three-week furlough for the Legionnaires, who he wished to retain past their initial enlistment periods, but noted that, "for political and military reasons, it is impossible to send the entire group on leave to the homeland." There would be no victory parade for the Dutch Legion, now or in the future. Already, conditions in the homeland posed problems for Germans and collaborating natives alike.

Legion Niederlande

50

Few Flemish recruits had entered the Waffen-SS during theestablishment of the SS Regiment of the Division in 1940. Generally, this fact stemmed from the divided interests of the right-wing Flemish National Union Party and other groups, which variously promoted Flemish independence, association with Holland (a "greater Dutch" union), as well as pan-Germanic interests. The creation of the volunteer unit by the SS proved in some respects an answer to the political confusion in Belgium, as agreed to encourage his party and militia to volunteer for this native formation, ostensibly intended for local guard duty in the west. After its establishment in April 1941, Flemish volunteers were recruited for three

companies of this regiment. German authorities generally disliked the "Greater Dutch" political philosophy festering in the ranks of SS and opted for separate Dutch and Flemish Legions. The collaborationist parties in

this largely Catholic nation responded favorably to the opening of the Russo-German War and supported a legion program. Thus, in the Radom training camp the took form in September 1941. Like its Dutch counterpart, it included a significant

number of German leaders and technical personnel, the former including the legion's commander, Major Michael Lippert.

Westland Wiking

NordwestStaf de Clercq

Nordwest

Legion Flandern

51

Enlisted

60

LegionFlandern



Officers NCOs Men!

Total

German 11 77 74 162

Flemish 14 1 935 950

TOTAL 25 78 1009 1112

Ironically, the formations of Flemish volunteers may have sparked similar interest in the French-speaking part of Belgium, which was ever anxious over Flemish notions of independence or union with the Netherlands. The Walloon political circles around the king and other Belgian unionist forces may have had a significant impact upon the public announcement in June that a would form for service against the Russians, in competition with the Flemish separatists.

Corps Franc Wallonie

52

The SS organized the Flemish volunteers as a motorized infantry battalion of three rifle companies, one weapons company, and a cannon company with anti-tank guns and heavy mortars. Problems developed in procuring vehicles for the legion, however, and horses were issued to the befuddled recruits. Then, when orders arrived on 27 October 1941 for a 2300-kilometer march to Tossno via Riga, the SS issued over 150 vehicles in November, requiring an emergency training program for their operation and maintenance. On 10 November, began its trek eastward, to become the first of the SS volunteer units to enter combat operations, as part of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade.

Legion Flandern

53

The march to Russia turned disastrous in the freezing winter. On 14 November, no engines could be started in the -28° Celsius morning at Pleskau. Ten days later the first units of the legion began to enter the Tarassowa region (south of Tossno) and were assigned to anti-partisan duty. Finally, on 18 December, the Legion entered winter quarters at Zabeln and Kandau. By this time, the Legion reported some 125 of 161 vehicles as inoperable and only 23 officers (of 26 on hand), 72 NCOs (of 81), and 559 men (of 898) as fit for duty. 54

Serious combat began for the Flemish in January as the Legion reinforced the 424th and 422nd Regiments of the German 126th Infantry Division in containing the Soviet Second Shock Army's thrust over the Volkhov River. Severe defensive fighting took place, with numerous frostbite casualties aggravating the state of the frontline riflemen.

This assignment extended into March, when the first of many joint operations occurred with units of the Army's 250th (Spanish) Infantry Division (see below). On 17 March, the Legion reinforced the 58th Infantry Division, occupying a defensive position east of Ljubzy. On 1 April came another joint operation with Spanish troops, wherein the Flemish Legion observed great confusion and panic in Spanish ranks. Also in April came a change of command, as SS Lieutenant Colonel Lippert fell badly wounded. His replacement on 18 April was SS Lieutenant Colonel Josef

Fitzthum, who would later command the as well. Legion Niederlande 55

As with the other volunteer units receiving their baptism of fire, demonstrated weaknesses that their German leadership quickly criticized. After a combat action at Veschki-Sentitzy (1-9 March 1942), the Legion's operations officer noted:

Legion Flandern

56

1. Poor reconnaissance of enemy field positions and strength. The attack was not conducted with air and artillery support.

2. Too few German officers and NCOs have been in the companies. As soon as the company commander is killed or wounded ... the attack stalls. As soon as a new leader arrives, the attack resumes. The troops are good but lack leadership.



3. Insufficient liaison between regimental headquarters and the Legion.4. Unsatisfactory evacuation of wounded.5. Unsuccessful coordination with Spanish units on flank.6. Artillery fired on registration points, rather than by direct observation from the front

lines.

The same report noted good cooperation with German units and handling of supplies and ammunition.

June saw the Flemish Legion engaged in the final mop-up of the Volkhov Pocket. By this time, its combat strength had dropped to a dangerously low level: 13 officers, 26 NCOs, and 288 enlisted men. Assigned to Battle Group "Burk," the Legion attacked alongside two Spanish battalions to clear the villages of Bol Samosje and Mal Samosje. According to the Legion's war diary, the Spanish attack stalled and a battalion refused to advance. Group "Burk" then ordered the Flemish Legion to continue their attack to relieve pressure on the Spanish. This four-day action alone cost the Legion two officers, two NCOs, and thirty-seven enlisted casualties (including eleven dead). 57

Evidently, the fighting skills of had improved measurably with experience. The 26 June after-action report of Battle Group "Burk" praised the Flemish for their tough step-by-step fighting through the woods against a strongly fortified enemy. It credited the legionnaires with destroying thirteen bunkers and killing some two hundred enemy soldiers. Burk chastised the Spanish unit, on the other hand, for not carrying weapons at the ready, throwing off ammunition for heavy weapons, and panicking in the fight.

Legion Flandern

58

On 11 July 1942, the Flemish buried their dead in a burial ground by the Volkhov River. Lieutenant Colonel Fitzthum presided over this memorial service and decorated many of the survivors. He praised the bravery of the legionnaires and spoke of the history of Flanders and the mission of the Germanic in Europe's search for How inspired the Flemish were at this point was not recorded, but certainly they must have felt physically and emotionally spent after six months of nearly unrelenting combat.

Volk lebensraum.

59

70

Legion Flandern now joined the German siege lines south of Leningrad, as the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade joined the L Army Corps in the vicinity of Pushkin. The commander, Fitzthum, took over the Dutch Legion, and Captain Konrad A. Schellong took charge of the Flemish on 16 July 1942. Schellong, who later emigrated to the United States, commanded the volunteers for the duration of the war, attaining the rank of colonel.

Along with the Dutch and Norwegian Legions in the 2nd Brigade, the Flemish Legion settled into trenches for a year of tedious trench warfare along the Izhora River. Fresh replacements then began to arrive from Belgium, and the Legion slowly revived as a battle-worthy unit. Allowing time for training and transportation, sufficient new recruits had probably joined the Legion by October to restore its ranks completely.

60

61

The Flemish volunteers patrolled and skirmished with Russian troops around Krasnoe-Selo into 1943. They rotated out of the trenches on 12 February as the brigade reserve in time for the Second Ladoga Battle. This assault saw part of the Spanish Volunteer Division, east of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade, smashed by a Soviet corps assault. The Flemish Legion buttressed the western flank of the Soviet breakthrough for a month, while larger German units successfully counterattacked to stem the Russian effort. During these operations, the Legion (now only 450 strong) transferred to the 4th SS Police Division. It remained under this division until its withdrawal from the front on 14 April 1943. 62



Army Legions

The Russo-German War surprised the French public in the summer of 1941. For varied reasons, many Frenchmen welcomed the opening of an eastern front in the war, for it brought the prospect of the destruction of Communism, reduced pressure upon France, and later introduced the first realistic hopes that Germany might be defeated. It also strengthened the positions of the collaborationist parties, especially amid the depression, cynicism, and pessimism that the Armistice had fostered in French life. For some of those Frenchmen not interested in friendship with Germany, it posed the notion that a German victory remained the sole alternative to the Bolshevization of Europe, including France. For these observers, such a fate loomed worse than German domination of France. However, the Hitler regime took little note of this phenomenon, and would not share the war against Russia with Vichy France as it would with its Finnish allies and Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Slovakian, and Hungarian satellites. 63

The idea for a French legion to fight at the side of the Germans came neither from Vichy nor the Germans. Rather, it was the creation of the Paris collaborationist parties (the "Paris ") in association with the German ambassador in Paris, Otto Abetz. The major parties were the (PPF) of Jacques Doriot, the Ressemblement National Populaire (RNP) of Marcel Deat, and the (MSR) of . Smaller parties from the right-wing fringe also took part in the call for volunteers, which never found any central direction but remained subject to individual party initiatives. In early July, Abetz received approval via the German Foreign Ministry to accept the formation of a French Legion for service in Russia. Apparently, Hitler did not react warmly to the prospect of arming thousands of French fanatics (with a potential recruitment of 30,000 being estimated by Abetz), and stipulated that no more than 15,000 be recruited and that the initiative for the Legion remain on the French side.

FrondeParti Populaire Francais

Mouvement Social RevolutionnaireEugene Deloncle

64

Abetz continued to orchestrate the actions of the Paris collaborators with restraint. Public meetings, propaganda campaigns, and the formation of symbolic committees of party leaders and intellectual notables all took place amid a feverish anti-Bolshevik atmosphere in July and August. This case of military

collaboration initially reflected themes common in pre-war French national politics. Only later would overlapping interests produce arguments paralleling German propaganda and notions of pan-Europeanism.

75

The usual Wehrmacht age, health, racial, and social regulations applied to the recruits, but the more stringent racial and physical strictures of the SS did not apply in this case to a legion destined for Army service. Nevertheless, it appears that the Germans used medical screening to deliberately keep the numbers of recruits at a tolerable level. These measures squelched the collaborationists' hopes for fielding a French division of all arms for the Russian front, similar to the Spanish "Blue Division" already being sent to Germany. The best records indicate that some 3600 legionnaires enlisted and were accepted by the German Army through February 1942, and a further 3000 through May 1943. These modest results were apparently not improved by the extension of recruiting to the Free Zone of France and North Africa, authorized by Admiral Darlan on 9 December 1941. 65

The (LVF) first assembled with a parade on 27 August 1941 at the Borguis-Desbordes Barracks at Versailles. German and Vichy officials reviewed the first contingent of the LVF. The event was soured, and the misfortunes of the LVF presaged, by the wounding of Pierre Laval and Marcel Deat by a would-be assassin's submachine gun, fired from the ranks of the Legion.

Legion des Volontaires Francais contre le Bolchevisme

66

The LVF entrained in segments from Paris and assembled at Deba, Poland during

LVF rally, Paris



September and October for its training under German Army supervision. The 1st Battalion (820 officers and men) and the 2nd Battalion (896 officers and men) and a regimental headquarters company first constituted the Legion, while a third battalion slowly accumulated over the next several months. The troops and leaders proved a strange mixture of idealists, adventurers, political opportunists, and professional soldiers. Doriot himself stood in the Legion's ranks as an NCO. Colonel Roger Henri Labonne, formerly military attaché to Turkey, assumed the command of the Legion, christened Infantry Regiment 638 by the German Army. At the age of sixty-five, Colonel Labonne brought to this challenging assignment no combat experience, along with a "... mediocre intelligence but a marked opportunism." His troops displayed little cohesion during training, indeed reflecting a diversity of physical, psychological, social, and political ability that would have shaken the most seasoned commander. 67

For instance, worlds apart from the old-soldier commander stood the idealistic chaplain, Monseigneur Count Jean Majol de Luppe. A sixty-seven-year-old monarchist and confirmed anti-communist, he believed firmly in the German New Order in Europe, and current German propaganda often featured in his sermons and rhetoric. Writer Jean Foutenoy represented the inassimilable soldier-of-fortune type of volunteer. Hailed as a fascist Malraux, he admired the Germans but criticized the Doriot faction, finding the ranks of Deat's RNP more congenial. He had worked as a correspondent in China, supporting the Kuomintang Party, and had fought in both the Spanish Civil War and the Russo-Finnish War as a volunteer. Abetz recommended him enthusiastically as the Legion's propaganda officer. He was fluent in Russian and German, had worked for the Havas Agency in Moscow, and was a confirmed anti-communist, anti-socialist, and pro-Nazi. His appointment was confirmed, with some reservations, by German Army authorities. 68

Outside of the various political rivalries at work, the major source of contention was between the professional soldiers and the political activists. The soldiers, including many of the senior officers of the Legion, saw the Legion as a symbol of France's military honor, and retained their traditional enmity for Germans and the Wehrmacht. The most radical Paris collaborators, however, advocated German hegemony and the absorption of France into the New Order. 69

80

The first battalion arrived in Deba on 8 September 1941, the second battalion on 20 September, and the assembled regiment took its oath of service on 5 October. Because the first elements departed for the front on 28 October, the Germans obviously provided only the most rudimentary training to this most heterogeneous regiment in their army. The degree of disinterest evidenced by the Army High Command in the French volunteers emerges from General von Trothas' address to the regiment on 19 October. He made no mention of New Order politics, but simply greeted the French as participants ( ) in the war against Bolshevism. He called on them to fight for France and for Petain. They were to remember that they wore the gray of the German Army, and to be loyal soldiers.

Kampfgenossen

70

The German Army headquarters ordered the LVF into Army Group Center as a replacement regiment, presumably ready for attachment to one of its divisions. On 11 November, Field Marshal von Bock ordered the French toreinforce the , then on the offensive near the Smolensk-Moscow highway. Almost immediately, the LVF began to attract criticism from German observers. On 16 November, Army Group Center wired the High Command:

7th Infantry Division

71

The French Legion, at this time on the march from Smolensk to Vyasma, has not yet reached Jartzewo, with its daily progress of 8-10 kilometers. Yet



according to its liaison officer, the regiment is completely exhausted from this. Failures of officers, unsatisfactory care of horses, complete ignorance of march discipline seem to be the main causes, as well as insufficient training of the men. Army Group has reached an understanding with the Legion's commander to march on with short marches and several rest days and special measures for supply of the troops in order at least to bring the troops behind the battle lines.

Three days later, the first French troops straggled into the 7th Division's area. The division commander decided not to risk using the LVF as an integral regiment, and directed the two French battalions to reinforce his 61st and 19th Infantry Regiments, respectively.

On 24 November, the First Battalion occupied its position and initiated the combat phase of the LVF's campaign. The French troops occupied defensive positions and carried out one confused attack on Russian lines before the Germans had seen enough. On 4 December, the division staff noted excessive frostbite cases in the Legion, the result of careless behavior in the cold and lack of knowledge of bunker construction.

The next day, the war diary noted that the 638th Regiment remained a "legion" (a novel pejorative usage) and had much to learn to become operationally ready. The French troops continued to suffer in the cold, and the division staff decided to relieve the first battalion on 6 December and the second battalion on 8 December. On the latter day, the division decided that the LVF should not return to operations, and that it would require much work in training and a training area to accomplish it. It ordered the LVF detached. The VII Corps noted the detachment, adding, "... the deficiencies in training are no longer to be spanned by improvisation." By this time, only 1040 of the 1520 legionnaires (or sixty-eight percent) remained effective for action, after less than two weeks of light engagement. 72

The VII Corps intelligence officer investigated the Legion the day following its relief. He judged their discipline and morale poor. The men seemed willing, but the officers were too old or broken in spirit. Seeing an immediate need for German officers to take over essential tasks, he recommended the merger of the German liaison personnel with the LVF command staff, a reorganization of support services, the institution of discipline along German lines, and immediate training in cold weather survival. 73

85

Army Group Center attempted to retain the LVF for rear area security duty, but the Army High Command announced Hitler's decision on 13 February to withdraw the legion to Radom, Poland, for training. In the post-mortem critique conducted by the Germans, all the organic weaknesses of the legion—which they could have detected in training—were reviewed: lack of cohesion, unfit leaders, and politicization. The entire Marseilles contingent, for instance, was rejected as overage, the youngest being forty-five years old! German observers also decided, perhaps in self-indulgent hindsight, that racial impurity in the Legion "must have contributed" to the unit's difficulties. 74

The Army High Command ordered the training command in Poland to refit and reorganize the LVF. Only the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion (still in training camp) would remain operational. The regimental headquarters, the 2nd Battalion, and the separate companies were all disbanded. Headquarters further ordered the discharge of all enlisted men over forty years old, all colored troops, all former Russian émigrés, all Germans from the French Foreign Legion, and anyone who had failed individually at the front. The refurbished battalions would return to operations as soon as personnel and materiel had been prepared. 75

Apparently the Germans judged the 3rd Battalion ready for operations first. It had, after all, remained in Poland since its formation in November, and probably had benefited from



serious training. The camp commander shipped it out on 11 May to the , on rear area security duty for Army Group Center. The command ordered the

German liaison staff to supervise continuing leadership training for the willing but inexperienced French officers and NCOs.

221st Security Division

76

The 3rd Battalion attached to the 221st Security Division on 15 May, and fared no better than its French predecessors. The German officers criticized the French leadership, the weakness of volunteer spirit, political divisiveness, and the unit's poor care of horses and equipment. The Germans sacked the battalion commander on 7 June and placed a captain in command, noting some improvements. Troop strength plummeted, as division records indicated on 7 August shortages of 4 officers, 42 NCOs, and 284 men of the 11, 111, and 626 authorized, respectively. The Germans noted that none of the troops on hand had been granted leave since entering service the previous September. Yet the morale of the men must have impressed them, as the volunteers' major concerns regarding the battalion, beyond family support, centered on expanding the LVF to regimental size and returning it to the front to prove its worth. 77

Over the next six months (through mid-March 1943), the 221st Division continued to find fault with the personnel system of the French Legion. "Lawless, adventuresome and criminal elements" constituted a significant proportion of the replacements. Too many officers requested their release. Losses in the 3rd battalion had remained low (one officer and 103 men were casualties, while 40 others had been furloughed), but qualitative and quantitative deficiencies remained (7 officers and 366 men had arrived as replacements). 78

90

The 1st Battalion of the French Volunteer Legion reformed and retrained in Radom. The German commander for Poland inspected it in July 1942 and apparently liked the training and material condition of the battalion. He still saw too many undesirables in the ranks, but ordered the battalion prepared for deployment by the next month. The battalion joined the 186th Security Division in the Borisov-Mogilev region in October 1942 for anti-partisan operations in Army Group Center's rear areas. 79

Attempts to revitalize the LVF extended to the rest of Metropolitan France. The Vichy Government's war minister, General Bridoux, announced that the LVF would be renamed the "Tricolor Legion" and would recruit from both zones of France with the sponsorship of Vichy. The popularity of service with the Germans did not increase, however, and the available French troops did not permit reactivation of the full 638th Regiment until late 1943. The occupation of the remainder of French soil in 1942 by the Germans demonstrated that Vichy would not be able to erect an integral army under the guise of the Tricolor Legion, so the government disbanded it in January 1943. Hitler in any case forbade the formation of any new legions, but authorized the return of the LVF to regimental size. 80

Before the demise of the Tricolor Legion, a curious offshoothad been spawned, the This organization planned to field an LVF-style regiment in North Africa to resist the Anglo-American forces then advancing on Tunisia. Several hundred volunteers enlisted in this enterprise, but only a single 205-man company, called Volunteer Company served for a month in Tunisia. The company joined the 754th Regiment of the German and was captured upon the fall of Tunis. Several French officers received German decorations and praise for their actions during the tough defensive fighting in April 1943.

Phalange Africaine.

Frankonia,334th Infantry Division

81

By late 1943, sufficient new recruits had accumulated for the Germans to reform the regimental staff and 2nd Battalion of Infantry Regiment 638. Colonel Edgar Puaud, a



veteran of the Foreign Legion, took command of the regiment on 1 September 1943, and concentrated it at the end of 1943 under the . Puaud brought great energy and verve to the reformed LVF, and the German liaison staff recommended a reduction of its own size because of the generally good discipline and leadership in the unit.

During a major anti-partisan sweep in February 1944, Puaud's regiment gained credit from the Germans for capturing 1345 partisans, killing 1118, overrunning 43 camps, and destroying approximately 1000 positions and bunkers. These anti-partisan operations, at which many of the French

veterans of North Africa apparently excelled, came to naught in face of the great Soviet summer offensive of June 1944. The bulk of Army Group Center's combat units were destroyed in this major debacle, and the LVF had to be pressed into action blocking the Smolensk-Warsaw highway before one

of the Russian spearheads. A battle group composed of most of the Legion (less the 3rd Battalion), a few local German troops, and four Tiger tanks stood firm on 24-27 June. The survivors withdrew to Minsk and assisted in defending that city after rest and reinforcement. Finally, in August 1944, the LVF withdrew to its new training camp at Greifenburg, Pomerania. It was the last of the original legions of 1941 to cease operations.

286th Security Division

82

83

In Belgium, the German campaign of 1941 proved a boon to , the embattled leader of the Rexist Party, a right-wing Catholic activist party with fascist pretentions. His party was torn by internal dissensions, his hopes for national status with the German New Order threatened by German plans for partition, and his hopes for a preeminent role for his party in the future dashed by German occupation policy. Degrelle seized upon the Russian campaign with characteristic vigor and flamboyance: "We were defeated civilians, surrounded by a victorious military; there was no nation in existence. I wanted to win rights for my country from the Germans at their side at the front."

Léon Degrelle

84

95

On 8 August 1941, the first contingent of French-speaking Belgians, 860 strong, departed Brussels as the Degrelle volunteered as a private soldier, having no military background himself, but determined to seize his moment of destiny. Arriving in the East Prussian training camp at Mesenitz on 10 August, the Walloons settled down for a

month's training with the German Army. Typically, these volunteers suffered in their first encounter with German discipline and training techniques, and experienced some culture shock with the issue of German Army uniforms, but training concluded on 15 October. On the next day, the 373rd ( ) Infantry Battalion of the German Army departed by train for the battle area of Army Group South in the Ukraine. Led by Captain Georges Jacobs, a reactivated retired professional officer of the Belgian colonial troops, last having served with the 17th Infantry

Regiment, this battalion consisted of a headquarters and four companies, with a total of 19 officers and 850 legionnaires. Now it began a half-year odyssey in search of an identity.

Legion Wallonne.

Wallonien

85

War AgainstRussia



The Rexist Party had failed in 1940 to turn its pro-German stance to any advantage, having been largely ignored by German occupation authorities. Rexist arrogance proved no substitute for performance, and the Germans saw no benefit in favoring a party that they consistently viewed as insignificant in membership and devoid of significant following among the Belgian population. Degrelle lacked nothing in effort, however, and his consistent ambition and opportunism would affect the Walloon Legion as much as his party in the ensuing years of the war. Initially, about the only person of any stature that would listen to Degrelle on the German side was the ambassador in Paris, Abetz, who encouraged Degrelle's fantasies of becoming a major figure in the New Order that had descended over the continent. 86

German Army commanders at the front saw little use for the small band of Walloons, consigning them to anti-partisan guard duty in the Dnepropetrovsk-Samara River sector. From 19 November 1941 to 17 February 1942 the fell under command of various units of the First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies, mostly resulting in ridicule from the Germans and charges from the Walloons of maltreatment. Cold, sickness, and a few casualties reduced the legion to 650 effectives in December. The Germans took mortars and heavy machine guns away from the Walloons on 10 December for redistribution to combat units, further humiliating them. Morale plummeted, command

difficulties increased, and there was talk of dissolving the Legion. The operations section of the Seventeenth Army noted:

Legion Wallonne

87

Difficulties with the Walloon Battalion. On one hand, the battalion complains about unfair treatment by the German command to OKW, yet on the other extreme, reports of Group "von Schwedler" (IV Corps) on behavior of troops bordering on treason. The Walloon Battalion will, in change of previous orders, be assigned to the rear of LII Corps. (21 Dec. 41) Use of the Walloon Battalion remains restricted depending upon its cohesion [ ] (8 Jan. 42). inneren Festigung88

The Germans appointed a new commander, Pierre Pauly, formerly a Belgian general staff officer, along with a new German liaison officer. Only ten officers remained with the seven hundred-man battalion. Before much cohesion could develop, however, the Walloons found themselves facing part of a Russian breakthrough on the Donetz front toward Dnepropetrovsk. Under orders of the , the 100th Light Infantry Division

100



Walloon Battalion and a company from SS of the Division cleared the village of Gromovayabalka and stood firm on 28 February against an assault by two regiments supported by fourteen tanks. A second attack pushed the Walloons into a few huts on the southwest tip of the village, but the battalion commander rallied his men for a counterattack and retook the town hut by hut, leaving one hundred Russians dead. German troops relieved the battalion on 2 March, but only two officers and one-third of the troops remained in action. Among the survivors, the Germans decorated thirty-seven men with the Iron Cross, Second Class. Léon Degrelle, lightly wounded, won promotion to sergeant for valor in this action.

Germania Wiking

89

Despite the damage sustained by the Legion, its morale seems to have improved in the aftermath of the Gromovayabalka battle. Captain Georges Tchekhoff, a Russian imperial naval officer and émigré, naturalized in Belgium, became the Legion's third commander as it withdrew behind the front to rebuild. In Belgium, replacement companies formed under Rexist recruiting efforts and German direction and reported to Meseritz for training.

This new replacement effort reflected the wholesale failure of the Legion to gain popular approval. The Rexist party had to plumb the depths of its manpower pool, sending members of the political hierarchy, a part of

its youth corps, and volunteers from the Walloon Guard, a local security force, to fill the draft. 90

On 21 May 1942, the Walloon Legion joined the 97th Light Infantry Division and began to find its identity. Lucien Lippert, newly promoted to captain, assumed command of the Legion. A professional Belgian officer and artillerist, he would prove its most popular commander until his death in 1944. Experienced NCOs, including Degrelle, had been promoted to fill lieutenant positions, and new replacements arrived to

restore the battalion to some eight hundred strong. General Ernst

Rupp, the 97th Division's commander, prescribed detailed training and exposure to limited operations to prepare the Walloons for battle. After

refurbishing their weapons, the division deployed the battalion in reserve and patrolling duties, to allow cohesion and leadership to develop. The battalion occupied the division's front lines on the Donetz River in June, holding a defensive posture during the great German offensive assault of that month. The Walloons then trailed in the division rear as the infantry followed the victorious German mechanized columns into the Don basin and the Caucasus, entering the latter in August; Rupp praised the Walloons for securing the division's lines of communications. On 21-22 August, the Walloons received their first combat assignment: a mopping up of Cheryakov, a village in the Caucasus held by a weak enemy battalion.

91

92

The strangely political circumstances of operating foreign legions appear clearly in the record of this action. The Legion cleared Cheryakov by the end of the 22nd, capturing thirty-five Russians and an anti-tank gun. The Walloons lost one dead and a dozen wounded on their side. Despite the brevity of this light action, the division on two occasions radioed the battalion during the mop-up, asking "What is the situation?", as if its commanders were fearful of setback. The next day, division radioed the liaison officer, "Was Lieutenant Degrelle involved in the assault? Essential for assault award ( )." Upon confirmation of that fact, the division called for an immediate recommendation for an Iron Cross medal.

The division staff then filed a report with corps headquarters. It attached a report to Armed Forces High Command citing the Walloon Battalion's work in action against the enemy, noting that the Rexist

leader had distinguished himself with especial personal bravery. Finally, in September,

Sturmabzeichnen

Kaisergruber:Departure

Kaisergruber:Commanders

Kaisergruber:Close combat



Captain von Lehe, the German liaison officer, wrote a glowing report of the seizure of the village in the style of a press release for the homeland.

Certainly the battle value of the 373rd Battalion had improved by late 1942, and there seems little reason to doubt Léon Degrelle's courage and energy under fire. Yet, the attention focused on the Cheryakov fight leads one to conclude that the German Army viewed the foreign legions as propaganda troops, not as actual units intended for serious military employment. Indeed, as the casualties mounted in the Walloon Legion from Russian counterattacks, the 97th Division relieved it on 28 August and used it

for flank security duty thereafter. During this period, the battalion came under control of SS Division for about a week. Degrelle and General Steiner apparently took a liking to each other, Degrelle being

particularly impressed by the SS manner of command, organization and ideological zeal.

Wiking

93

Orders came for the withdrawal of the Walloons for leave and refitting. Degrelle received notice in early September to report to Berlin to coordinate the release of Rexist volunteers for the Legion from among the Belgian prisoners of war held by the Germans; the High Command had just authorized the release of three hundred of them. The Rex Party hoped to form a second battalion for service on the front, and the army command in Belgium provided assistance. All of the legionnaires at the front, excepting one company of about 150 men, returned to Belgium on 18 December for furlough. The last group participated in the German withdrawal from the Caucasus in the aftermath of the Stalingrad disaster, and flew out in mid-February 1943. 94

105

The German Army began assembling veterans and new Recruits in Germany at the Meseritz Camp in March of 1943. Released prisoners of war, new recruits from Belgium, and workers recruited from Germany swelled the ranks to between 1600 and 2000 strong by early April. By this time, however, Degrelle had determined to take the Legion into the Waffen-SS, and now negotiated with Himmler and Berger in Berlin toward that end. 95

Notes:

Stein, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 94. Note 1: The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945

Back.

Mark P. Gingerich, "Waffen-SS recruitment in the 'Germanic' Lands, 1940-41," 59 (Summer 1997): 815-30. Note 2:

Historian Back.

Himmler memo 23/4/40, Records of the Reichsführer-SS, Captured German Military Records Group, National Archives Microfilm Publication T175/Roll 59 /Frame 2574370 (hereafter cited as T175/59/2574370).

Note 3:

Back.

Steiner andDegrelle

Preface1. Introduction2. Propoganda

SS PrototypeLegion

ExperimentArmy Legions

3. Neutral Variation4. Transformation5. Fanaticism6. CollaborationBibliographyMaps



Danske Soldaten I kamp pa Ostfronten 1941-45 (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1978), 127, states that there were 177 Danes in in August 1943.

Jüttner letters, T175/106/2629439ff. Note 4: Back.

Staal interview, Glücksberg, Germany, 22 May 1982. Note 5: Back.

Lemboe interview, Glücksberg, Germany, 22 May 1982. Note 6: Back.

Brunaes and Kristiansen interviews, Glücksberg, Germany,21-22 May 1982. Note 7:

Back.

Kristiansen interview; Letter, Ole Brunaes to author, 7 April 1982. Note 8: Back.

Letter, Ole Brunaes to author, 7 April 1982. Note 9: Back.

Peter Strassner, 3d ed. (Osnabrück: Munin, 1973), 22-27; Stein, 46-47; letter, Jorgen Holst to author, 8 February 1982. Note 10: Europäische Freiwillige,

Waffen-SS, Back.

SS recruiting notices (in Dutch), T354/159/2690396-97. Note 11: Back.

Strassner, 443. Note 12: Europäische Freiwillige, Back.

Bernd Wegner, "Der Krieg Gegen des Sowjetunion 1942/43," in Horst Boog, et al.,

(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990), 835; Gingerich, "Waffen-SS Recruitment," 830.

Note 13:Der Global Krieg: Die Ausweitung zur Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative, 1941-

1943Back.

report T354/639/199, for instance, shows no non-Germans in the communications platoon of the reconnaissance battalion. Note 14: SS Wiking

Back.

On propaganda, see (Berlin: Nibelungen, 1943). Statistics in T175/59/2574743-46 and

Strassner, 435. Krabbe, in

Note 15: Aufbruch: Briefe von germanischen Freiwilligen der SS Division Wiking

Europäische Freiwillige,

SS Wiking Back.

Elo Jørgensen interview, Copenhagen, 25 May1982; Franz Vierendeck letter, (June 1979): 27; SS Note 16:

Der Freiwillige Nordland letter, [in margin: "Ja!"] 15/3/42, T175/107/2631091-92. Back.

Letter, Himmler to Berger, 14/4/42, T175/66/2582014. Note 17: Back.

Jüttner letter 3/8/41, T175/110/2634951; Stein, 151. Note 18: Waffen-SS, Back.

Letter, Berger to Himmler, 20/5/41, T175/110/2634815-6; Letter, Himmler to Berger, 1/8/41, T175/110/2734571-72; Franz Vierendeels, 2 vols. (Antwerp: St. Maartensfond, 1973), I: 19-21; Philip H.Buss and Andrew Mollo, (London: MacDonald and James, 1978), 45-46; Feldpostnummern 10/9/41, T175/106/262880ff; Jüttner letter, 24/9/41, T175/110/2634450-51.

Note 19:Vlamingen aan het Ostfront,

Hitler's Germanic Legions

Back.

Himmler letter, 29/6/41, T175/106/2629090; letter, Berger to Himmler, 9/7/41, T175/106/2629026-32. Note 20:

Back.

Clausen speech text, T175/17/2520920. Vilhelm La Cour, Note 21: Danmark under Besaettelsen (Copenhagen: Westermann, 1947), 512-16; H. Klint,

(Copenhagen: Richard Levin, 1978), I-ii; Krabbe, 19-20; Wilhelm Tieke, (Osnabrück: Munin, 1957), 186-89; Erich Thomsen, (Düsseldorf:

Frikorps Danmark Krigsdagbog Danske Soldaten,

Im Lufttransport am Brennpunkte der OstfrontDeutsche Besatzungspolitik in Dänemark 1940-45



Bertelsmann, 1971), 95-96. Back.

Kotze telegram, 20/7/41, T175/106/2628961. The 8 July 1941 regulation is covered in several sources, best by Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith, (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 1998), 396-99.

Note 22:

Under Hagekors og Dannebrog: Danskere i Waffen-SS 1940-1945Back.

Ole Kure file, BDC; Copenhagen recruiting office letter 20/7/41; Per Sörensen file, BDC. Note 23:

Back.

Krabbe, 21-22. Note 24: Danske Soldaten, Back.

BDC files of fifteen Danish officers; 3:5 (May 1943): 157-60, T580/72/Ord. 339.

Note 25: Freikorps Vormingsbladen der Germaansche SS Back.

Jüttner orders 11/9/41 and 7/3/42, T175/110/2534499 and 111/2635392. Note 26:

Back.

Thomsen, 99; Krabbe, 59-60; cf. RFSS T175/111/2635496-7 and 2635498-500. Note 27: Deutsche Besatzungspolitik, Danske Soldaten,

Back.

Tieke, 191; Krabbe, 60. Note 28: Lufttransport, Danske Soldaten, Back.

T580/71/Ord. 335. This document confirms that Danish was abandoned as the language of command with the departure of Kryssing. Such actions by the Germans tended to undermine the national spirit that legionnaires reflected when they volunteered. II Corps, T315/143/1007. T501/299/169-70; Krabbe,

69-71; von Lettow-Vorbeck, nephew of the African colonial general of WWI, had been slated to command Legion Flandern, but was reassignedupon von Schalburg's death. Dänemark, T501/299/254.

Note 29:

Freikorps Dänemark, Danske Soldaten,

Freikorps Back.

T501/299/254, frames 169-172. Note 30: Freikorps Dänemark, Back.

Tieke, 260-94; Krabbe, 80-87. Note 31: Lufttransport, Danske Soldaten, Back.

Himmler letter 3/2/41; T175/63/2579266. Reichskommissar Terboven's proclamation, partly reported in Kurt G. Klietmann, (Osnabrück: Munin, 1965), 369; Jüttner organizational orders 30/7/41, T175/110/ 2134589; OKW letter 5/2/42, T175/111/2135478. Gert R. Überschär notes that the employment of the Norwegian Legion was not welcomed by the Army Commander Norway, who commanded troops in Northern Finland; Förster and Überschär, "Freiwillige" (1998), 1076.

Note 32:Die Waffen-SS - eine Dokumentation

Back.

Battle Group Jackeln, T354/647/0004. L Corps, T314/1235/1064; Berger letter 16/3/42, T175/111/ 26535488. Some 1300 of 2242 Norwegian SS men were in the legions program at this point.

Note 33:

Back.

Army Group North, "Kriegsjahrbuch 1942," T311/136/718595-732; Werner Haupt, (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1966)118-26. As of 23 March, the Second Shock Army was commanded by Maj. Gen. A. A. Vlasov, who would later figure in German plans for using Russian volunteers in combat.

Note 34:Heeregruppe Nord 1941-1945

Back.

Battle Group Jackeln, T354/647/122, 142. Note 35: Back.

Ibid., frames 56, 82; Redeiss letter 17/11/42, T175/66/2582527-8; L Corps, T314/1239/288-90. Note 36:

Back.

Brunaes interview; Berger letters 25/8/42 and 18/11/42; Bakke file, BDC; Quist file, BDC. Note 37:

Back.



Himmler letter 31/1/43; T175/66/2582499-502; cf. frames 2582474ff. Note 38: Back.

Norman Rich, vol. 2, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 129-38; Quisling letter 17/11/42, T175/66/2582383; cf. Swedish Legation Report 24/9/43, National Archives, Records of the OSS, Record Group 226, document No. 53815 [hereafter cited OSS, doc. 53815]; Berger letter 29/9/42, Berger file, BDC; Klietmann, 371-721; Berger letter 16/10/42, T175/66/ 2582442; Himmler letter 9/8/43, Ibid., frame 258251. The ski unit is called Ski Regiment Nord in some correspondence, but it never increased beyond battalion size.

Note 39: Hitler's War Aims, The Establishment of the New Order

Die Waffen-SS,

Back.

L Corps, T314/1235/846; Himmler letter 1/3/43, T175/66/ 2582416-7. Note 40: Back.

Himmler memo 24/6/40, T175/63/2578840-1; Berger memo 3/4/41, Berger file, BDC. Gerhard Hirschfeld,

(Oxford: Berg, 1988), 288-300.

Note 41:Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under

German Occupation Back.

Klietmann, 365, 368; Stein, Waffen-SS, 154-55; Procureur-Fiscall bij het Bijzonder Gerechtshof te Amsterdam,

(Amsterdam: Buijten Schipperheijn, 1947), 211; Jüttner order 24/9/41, T175/110/2634450-51. The Flemish Legion also drew cadres from SS Nordwest. Records indicate that one battalion of remained intact after these losses. Called

it was filled with volunteers who only wished to serve in Holland. Berger letter 27/5/43, T175/22/2527438; Leib letter 15/9/41 T580/71/Ord 335. On Meijer and the Legion, see Hirschfeld, Nazi Rule, 296.

Note 42: Die Waffen-SS,Documentatie: status en

werkzaamheid van Organisaties en Instellingen int de Tijd der Duitse Besetting van Nederland

Nordwest SS Wachbatallion,

Back.

Hirschfeld, 293, 287. Note 43: Nazi Rule, Back.

T354/653/518. Note 44: Legion Niederlande, Back.

Ibid., T354/653/375. Note 45: Back.

Battle Group Jaschke, T315/735/940. Note 46: Back.

T354/653/362, 491-93, 509ff.The designed strength of the legion was 111 officers, 546 NCO's, and 2840 enlisted men. Total Dutch SS losses by 7/9/42 reportedly were: Waffen-SS, 174 killed and 15 missing; Legion, 250 killed and 31 missing; Letter, Rauter to Himmler, 12/9/42 N. K. C. A. In't Veld, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 819.

Note 47: Legion Niederlande,

De SS en NederlandBack.

L Corps, T314/1235/969. Note 48: Back.

Ibid., frames 581-94; In't Veld, 1520. Note 49: De SS en Nederland, Back.

Himmler letter 19/5/43, T175/63/2579229. Note 50: Back.

Berger letters 1/9/41 and 16/9/41, T580/71/Ord. 335. Note 51: Back.

Eddy De Bruyne, "Le Recrutement dans les Stalags et Oflags en faveur de la Légion Wallonie," a study presented at the Center for Historical Documentation on War and Contemporary Society, Brussels, February, 1998.

Note 52:

Back.

Franz Vierendeels, 2 vols. (Antwerp: St. Maartensfond, 1973), 1:45. Legion Flandern, T354/653/8-9. E. E. Knoebel, "Racial Illusion and Military Necessity" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1965), 176-79, doubles the number of Flemish volunteers. The war diary of the Legion contains a complete roster of officers, T354/653/144-47.

Note 53: Vlamingen aan het Ostfront,

Back.



T354/653/ 65ff. Note 54: Back.

Ibid., frames 180-274; 2nd SS Brigade, T354/161/386792ff. Lippert recovered from his wounds and later commanded SS Brigade as a colonel in late 1944; Lippert file, BDC. Josef Fitzthum died 10/1/45 in Albania as a general; Fitzthum file, BDC.

Note 55:Landstorm Nederland

Back.

T354/653/235-39. Note 56: Legion Flandern, Back.

Ibid., frames 332ff; Vierendeels, 1: 148-49. Note 57: Vlamingen, Back.

2nd SS Brigade, T354/161/3807302-9. Group Burk reported the following losses: 11 killed and 31 wounded; III/262 , 18 and 118; Battalion Valentine (20th Division), 4 and 1. The strength of on 12/6/42: battle strength: 6/32/257, ration strength: 10/43/333; T354/161/457). Vierendeels shows 11/21/220 battle strength at end of June; 1: 158-59.

Note 58:Flandern,

Flandern

Vlamingen, Back.

T354/653/352. Note 59: Legion Flandern, Back.

Schellong file, BDC. Note 60: Back.

March 1942-June 1944 recruiting statistics from Jan Vincx notebook, Vincx interview, Heventhals, Belgium, 29 May 1982. Klietmann reported 21 officers and 664 enlisted in the legion as of 31/12/42; 505.

Note 61:

Die Waffen-SS, Back.

Friedrich Husemann, 2 vols. (Osnabrück: Munin, 1971), 2:163-64; Himmler order 15/3/43, T175/66/2581994; Vierendeels, 1:211-14.

Note 62: Die guten Glauben waren,Vlamingen,

Back.

Eberhard Jäckel, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 180-81. Cf. OSS, R & A 201, "State of Moral of the French People, Aug-Dec 1941." The standard works on France in the period of Vichy and the German occupation remain too numerous to mention, but Philippe Burrin,

(New York: New Press, 1996) has become the new standard, and incidentally contains the fullest treatment of military collaboration of these general studies.

Note 63: Frankreich in Hitlers Europa

France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise

Back.

Jäckel, Frankreich, 182; Owen A. Davey, "The Origins of the Legion des Volontaires Francais contre le Bolchevisme," 6:4 (1971): 29-33. Some 2100 Alsatians volunteered for service in the Wehrmacht before the Germans imposed conscription, a fact likely reflecting Alsatian separatist sympathies; no broader collaboration movement emerged such as became the case in Brittany (Burrin, France under the Germans, 365). For an effective summary of the actions of the Vichy government and Parisian collaborationist parties as the Russo-German War broke out, see Julian Jackson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 190-194. See also Förster's details in "Freiwillige," 1058-60.

Note 64:Journal of Contemporary History

France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944.Back.

Jurgen Förster, "Croisade de l'Europe contre les Bolshevisme," (RHDGM) 118 (1980): 12-15; Yves Barjaud, "Die Legion

der anticommunistischen französischen Freiwilligen 1941-1944," 13:3/6 (1965): 129-30. Davey, "Origins of the LVF," 34-37, also suggests a sixty-five percent acceptance rate. Crucial to the limitation in numbers was the German refusal to allow French POWs to volunteer for the LVF. Delarue estimated 13,400 candidates in July 1941 for the LVF, a number that was reduced by 4600 for physical and 3000 for legal problems, leaving 5800 candidates, of whom 3000 were accepted. From November 1941 until August 1944 (34 months), 2800 more LVF recruits were accepted. Of the roughly 5800 in service, 400 died, 2400 were discharged, 800 deserted, and 2200 returned to the depot in Greifenberg. Jacques Delarue, (Paris: Fayard, 1968). Burrin accepts

Note 65: Revue Historique de la Dieuxime Guerre Mondial

Feldgrau

Trafics et crimes sous l'Occupation



Delarue as authoritative on these and other details of the LVF (France under the Germans, 383, 435). Back.

Robert Aron, (Boston: G. P. Putnam, 1958), 287; Förster, "Croisade,"15. Note 66: The Vichy Regime 1940-44

Back.

LVF liaison staff, T561/223/333ff. The organization included two heavy weapons companies, typical for German infantry regiments. Albert Merglen, "Soldats francais sous uniforms allemands 1941-1945," 108 (1977): 73.

Note 67:

RHDGM Back.

Davey, "Origins of the LVF," 43; Abetz letter T77/1027/2499283-84; Army CinC, France, letter 1/11/41, T77/1027/2499281-82. Note 68:

Back.

Davey, "Origins of the LVF," 42-43. Note 69: Back.

LVF liaison staff, T501/223/333-404. Note 70: Back.

Army Group Center, T311/288/91. Note 71: Back.

VII Corps, T314/351/522; 7th Infantry Division, T315/372/770925, T315/375/832, 1037, 1058-59. Note 72:

Back.

VII Corps, T314/351/123-36. Note 73: Back.

OKH memo 13/2/42, T77/1077/2499800; Memo, "Organizational failings of operations by French Volunteer Legion," T501/223/89. See also denunciations of legion officers by colleagues, T501/223/91-103 and T77/1027/2499768-811, 2499804-9. Burrin, 433-34.

Note 74:

France under the Germans, Back.

OKH letter 3/3/42, T501/190/189-92. Yet Army CinC, Poland, letter 21/3/42 established a 15th (Arab) Company, 638th Regiment with German leaders, medium infantry guns from French stocks, to train at Radom. T501/190/172.

Note 75:

Back.

Army CinC, Poland, memo 16/3/42, T501/190/172; Operations Report 15/4/42, T501/216/85. Note 76:

Back.

221st Security Division, T315/1679/600-623, T315/1680/247, 620. Note 77: Back.

221st Security Division, T315/1680/282. Förster offers additional pithy commentary from the documents on the Legion's military acumen; see "Freiwilligen," 1062-64.

Note 78:

Back.

T501/190/849; Pierre Rostaing, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1975), 52; Barjaud, "Die Legion," 132. Note 79: Le Prix d'un Serment 1941-45

Back.

Aron, 449-50; Merglen, "Soldats francais," 76-77; Report of German Armistice Commission 31/7/42, T77/1027/2499985. Bridoux's son was a captain and major in the LVF; Jäckel, 228-29. Burrin shows Darlan authorizing recruitment in unoccupied France and North Africa on 3 December 1941;

383.

Note 80: Vichy Regime,

Frankreich,France under

the Germans, Back.

Merglen, "Soldats francais," 77-78; T77/833/1732-50; T501/120/441. Cf. discussion of Moslem Legion, T77/1049/6624474-76. Note 81:

Back.

T501/223/108-313; T77/1027/2499985ff; Barjaud, "Die Legion," 133. Note 82: Back.

Barjaud, "Die Legion," 133; Rostaing, 134-41; on the character of French anti-partisan operations, see Rostaing, 52-126. Delarue noted the many judgments by German military tribunals against LVF personnel: prison terms and

Note 83: Le Prix d'un Serment,



reductions, as well as four executions (in May 1942). The Germans felt that they had to intervene to quell the pillaging by the French. He states that a score were executed between 1941-45, "a considerable number considering the effective strength of the LVF." Delarue, 200. Trafics et crimes, Back.

Léon Degrelle interview, Madrid, 8 June 1982. Charles d'Ydewalle perhaps first noted Fernand Rouleau as the proper founder of the Legion in his "La Legion Wallonne sur le front russe," in Robert Aron, ed., (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1968), 236. The Belgian amateur historian Eddy De Bruyne, in his over twenty years of work on the Walloon collaboration, has borne out the initiative of Rouleau, who demanded the authorization for the legion from the German occupation authorities while Degrelle was out of town visiting his friend Ambassador Abetz in Paris. Degrelle took advantage later of the dismissal of his Rexist deputy to assert the idea as his own. Such rivalries among the Rexists equaled the internal dissention in the LVF for at least another year.

Note 84:

Histoire de Notre Temps

Back.

R. Ladri [Rene Ladriere], "Carnet de Campagne 1941-42," typescript, xerox in possession of author, 2, 7; Roger de Goy, ed., "Legion Belge Wallonie: Historique" (Unpublished calligraphy manuscript, 1946), 3-4; D'Ydewalle, "La Legion Wallonne," 242.

Note 85:

Back.

The best English-language source is Martin Conway, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993);

see especially 3-75, passim. Abetz, of course, filled a curious foreign ministry post, since Berlin was represented at Vichy and the occupied part of France fell under Wehrmacht administration. Thus, Abetz served literally as ambassador in Paris, where he provided unending encouragement to the collaborationist parties there. His wife and Degrelle's had been friends since childhood, hence the special relationship. German authorities estimated total membership of the Rexist party at approximately 8000 throughout the war; Conway, 219.

Note 86: Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement

Back.

Ladri, "Carnet de Campagne," 19; Förster, "Croisade," 24; 97th Infantry Division, T315/ 1187/325-468; Léon Degrelle, (Oldendorf: Schütz, revised edition, 1972), 24-25.

Note 87:Die verlorene Legion

Back.

Seventeenth Army, T312/678/8312606, 8312663-64. Cf. 21/12/41 telephone conversation between commander, Seventeenth Army, and commander, Group von Schwedler: "Army commander informs that a complaint from members of Walloon Battalion has been passed to OKH; the strained relations with German liaison officers as well as the careless combination by the German headquarters [of Walloons] with Hungarians and Italians. The commander wishes to hold an interview with the responsible leaders to clarify the relations and to avoid, in retrospect, raising of a foreign policy discord by these elements." T314/229/1093.

Note 88:

Back.

LII Corps, T312/1284/412; Hans Niedhardt, (Graz: Leopold Stocken, 1981), 164-65; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 14-16. Note 89: Mit Tanne und Eichenlaub

Back.

de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 19. Maj. Baumann, a German staff officer in Brussels for Legion affairs, wrote about the effort in some detail; see T501/173/61, 190. Pauly was cashiered by the Germans after an affray with a German officer who reproached Walloon indiscipline. D'Ydewalle, "La Legion Wallonne," 242; Conway,

121-23.

Note 90:

Collaboration in Belgium, Back.

de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 21-22; T501/173/135-48. Note 91: Back.

97th Light Division, T315/1188/998ff, T315/1189/1-1049. The Army reported the losses of the Legion to 6/7/42:Note 92:

Officers NCOs Enlisted



Dead 3 16 62

Missing - - 15

Wounded 1 22 87

Sent Home 9 15 47

OKH letter 8/8/42, T175/69/2585643. Conway, in mistakenly falls for the Rexist legend that "throughout 1942 the Legion had little respite ... where it was frequently to the fore in German offensives" (127).!

Collaboration in Belgium,

Back.

97th Light Division, T315/1189/1009-1049, T315/1191/66-216; Degrelle interview. Note 93:

Back.

97th Light Division, T315/1191/67; de Goy, "LegionBelge Wallonie," 31-32. Note 94:

Back.

Note 95: Back.




3. A Neutral Variation and Some Consequences

The Spanish Division

The immediate origin of the Spanish "Blue Division" also dates from the opening of the German offensive against the USSR on 22 June 1941. On the previous day, Germany's Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, had directed his ambassadors and emissaries in twelve friendly countries to read the German declaration of war against the Soviet Union to the respective foreign ministers and report the mood in which the declaration was received. From Madrid came a very positive response, with Ambassador Eberhard von Stohrer indicating that the Spanish Foreign Minister, Ramón Serrano Suñer, had voiced his appreciation for the notice. After consulting with Generalissimo Francisco Franco, he told the German ambassador that the Spanish Government welcomed the beginning of the fight against Communism and that Germany's action would prove popular throughout Spain. Stohrer mentioned that Serrano

1

... was asking the German Government to permit at once a few volunteer formations of the to participate in the fight against the common foe, in memory of Germany's fraternal assistance during the Civil War. This gesture of solidarity was, of course, being made independently of the full and complete entry of Spain into the war beside the Axis, which would take place at the appropriate moment.

Falange

1

Two days later, von Ribbentrop wired Stohrer that the German government would gladly accept the offer of volunteers. Undoubtedly, the German Foreign Office was

highly pleased with such a response to the beginning of the Russo-German War, for Franco's Spain had proved to be a difficult friend ever since the Anti-Comintern Pact, of which Spain was a member, had been distorted by the 1939 Russo-German Non-aggression Pact.

Falange 2

Although Spain never entered the Second World War, it approached that possibility repeatedly on its own terms, and steered far from strict neutrality. Franco would not enter the war for free, however, and maintained a high price for Spanish participation in the Axis Alliance. The greatest temptation for the Generalissimo came with the fall of France following the summer of 1940. The prospect of acquiring French holdings in Africa and the possibility of an early German peace with Britain brought Franco to the bargaining table. Hitler, who exercised the real choice in the matter, would not meet Spanish demands. Astoundingly, Franco kept toying with the prospect through the end of 1942. Spain had been weakened by the devastation of the Spanish Civil War and by shortages of critical food and fuel; for both of these, Spain depended upon trade with the United States and Britain. Despite the continual urgings of his Germanophile Foreign Minister, Serrano, Franco opted to preserve technical neutrality. He agreed to German requests for naval provisioning in Spain and the Canary Islands, and planned joint operations against Gibraltar with the Germans, as well as cooperation in economic matters and intelligence assistance. Whenever he considered a formal declaration of war, however, it was on the basis of Germany meeting his own totally unrealistic demands for huge quantities of arms, food, and fuel, along with territorial expansion in North Africa at the expense of Vichy France. 3

Serrano Suñer's offer of military assistance in the war against Russia rekindled Hitler's hopes of gaining Spain's entry into the war on Germany's terms, and this wishful prospect of Spanish aid would remain a significant political consideration for both countries through the Second World War. But Serrano's words had been disingenuous, for Franco had no

5



apparent notion of owing a debt to the Germans for the assistance they had rendered during the Spanish Civil War. His sympathies for the German cause and offers to enter the war were not rewarded by promises of colonial expansion in North Africa. Thus, the offer of a Spanish volunteer unit, which Serrano had discussed openly in Spain before the Russo-German War began, simply represented part of Franco's continuing businesslike manner toward Hitler. It would form a substantial gesture for future exploitation with the Third Reich, yet would not immediately imperil relations with Britain and the United States. Franco's policy of maximum profit with minimum risk in the Second World War remained virtually unchanged after the crucial negotiations with Germany in late 1940 had collapsed. 4

The decision to send a full division of volunteers was reached the next day in a meeting of the Spanish Council of Ministers. The size of unit to be sent was probably determined by the need for a degree of self-sufficiency in a truly distant theater of operation. Because the army would not allow the party to supercede it in any military expedition, it determined that the officers would be drawn from the regular forces, and only a few militia officers of junior grade were allowed to volunteer. The lower ranks were filled with Civil War veterans, regular soldiers, and -inspired youth. This volunteer effort was immensely popular in Spain, and large numbers of volunteers had to be turned away or deferred until the later replacement and rotation program was instituted. In several units, regular army officers volunteered as ordinary soldiers upon finding the

leadership billets already filled. German reports describing that about forty times the required number of men had volunteered may well have been valid judgments in some cities, but not in former strongholds of the Spanish Republic, like Barcelona. The main reason for this response was the appeal of an anti-Communist crusade (the term invoked for the Civil War) combined with the popular expectations of a quick victory by the

Germans.

Falange

Falange

5

The Council of Ministers selected to command the division. He was then a major general, serving as military governor of the sensitive Gibraltar region and as commander of the 22nd Infantry Division. His selection reflected the joint political and military character of the Volunteer Division, which would remain evident throughout its existence. Muñoz Grandes had served with distinction, like Franco, as a young officer in Morocco and had gained the recognition of General Primo de Rivera. Finishing the Civil War as a corps commander in Cataluña, he became Secretary General of the on 9 August 1939, a post he held for six months. He was therefore a man likely to be acceptable to both the Army and elements of the Division, as well as to the Germans, since his pro-Axis sentiments were well known.

Augustín Muñoz Grandes

Falange

Falange

6

The organization and assembly of the division, already popularly christened the "Blue Division" after the blue shirt that formed part of their paramilitary uniforms, was accomplished in the remarkably short time of twenty days. This can be taken as an indication of the eagerness of the Spanish to be present operationally for the impending "collapse" of the Soviet state. Despite German assumptions that the division would be organized on their own system, the actual formation reflected German practices only in principle. Either through Spanish misinterpretation of data furnished by the German Embassy in Madrid or from a desire to incorporate a larger number of volunteers in order to meet imagined exigencies of combat in Russia, the usual triangular divisional organization (i.e., three regiments, each of three battalions) swelled to include a fourth infantry regiment of "fixed reserves" and an additional battalion of "mobile reserves." The major components of the division thus totaled one artillery and four infantry regiments, with separate support battalions of reserve infantry, engineer, reconnaissance, anti-tank, communication, and service troops. The various units were recruited in particular geographic regions of Spain and initially took the names of their respective commanders.

Falange

7



The Spanish Air Force also decided to send a volunteer air unit of experienced fighter pilots, most of whom had fought in the Civil War. This unit later became known to the Allies as the "Blue Squadron" or the "Salvador Squadron," but actually there were to be five squadrons formed, serving one after another as the Spanish Volunteer Squadron. The first such squadron was commanded by Major Angel Salas Larrazábal. 8

The army designated Irún on the French border as the assembly area of the Blue Division. In each major Spanish city, parades, reviews, and religious ceremonies highlighted the assembly and departure of the various local contingents. Some basic military indoctrination and training marches took place during the first week, but no equipment other than uniforms was issued at this time to volunteers. The main farewell ceremony took place on 13 July at Madrid's northern train station. Army Minister General José Varela and Serrano Suñer attended the departure of the first of the infantry units, the leading battalions of the Rodrigo Regiment. Meanwhile, advance liaison groups had flown to Germany as early as 5 July, and on the 14th General Muñoz Grandes flew to Berlin with his personal command group. The first troop trains crossed the border into France on 15 July, and arrived at Grafenwöhr training camp on 18 July. 9

10

During their stay of slightly over one month at Grafenwöhr, the Spanish contingent reorganized, trained, and received Germany Army equipment. The Spanish division was restructured to conform to the normal German infantry table of organization. German units were formed on a "triangular" rather than "square" structure, with three infantry regiments to a division, three battalions to a regiment and so forth. The personnel of the Rodrigo Regiment were redistributed, and the other three received German Army numerical designations. As the single volunteer division in the German Army to form with native leadership, this division also had the distinction of having the German division commander's authority for courts-martial conferred upon its commander, hitherto reserved only for German citizens. The Blue Division now entered German service as the

, with a total strength on paper of 11,046 officers and men. 250th (Spanish)

Infantry Division 10

The only marked departure from the German model was the reserve battalion, which would reinforce any regiment heavily committed in either attack or defense. The Spaniards had expected that their division would be organized as a mechanized unit suited for the fullest rigors of modern warfare in the Russian steppes. They had therefore recruited a large number of mechanically talented men in anticipation of just that. To their chagrin, the Germans issued them 5750 horses and only 928 motor vehicles. To make matters

worse, the horses were for the most part infirm Balkan animals that were only marginally tamed. The need for proper handling and care for these animals would plague the division, since a large number of the former university students and city dwellers who had volunteered had never laid eyes on such animals! The reason for this situation was patently simple, though, since mechanized forces formed only a small, elite nucleus of the largely horse-drawn German Army. In fact, the only wholly motorized units in infantry divisions organized like the 250th were the regimental anti-tank companies and the divisional anti-tank battalion. Like many of the lower echelon German infantry divisions, the Spanish Division was largely equipped with a variety of obsolete but still serviceable items.

The anti-tank guns, for example, were the prewar 37-mm type that would prove to be only marginally effective against the latest Soviet tanks. Motor transport for the Division ranged from standard issue bicycles to three-ton trucks. The Germans issued to the motorized anti-tank units a most curious assortment of ex-civilian Renault, Peugeot,

and Hudson Terraplane automobiles fitted to tow the 37-mm guns and in some cases equipped with radio mounts.

11

12

Spanish BlueDivision



The Spanish officers and men could hardly afford to take time out for brooding about material deficiencies, since precious little time remained for training their heterogeneous unit into a cohesive organization. The Spanish Army officers remained particularly hostile toward the many Falangist volunteers who had held party leadership positions in Spain and appeared ill-suited to the hard life of a Spanish enlisted man. On the other hand, many of these political soldiers had enlisted on the assumption that such service would improve their status in the party upon their return. Faced with hostility on the part of the regular officers, they felt betrayed and often complained to visiting dignitaries of unfair

treatment. The immense problems of creating a workable team from a broad mixture of military, political, university, and peasant types, and at the same time training the respective combat arms and services in the characteristics and use of their equipment in the space of a single month appear, to this day, to

have been an unreasonable undertaking. The youth of the volunteers was of some advantage in overcoming the constraints of time. Under a vigorous training program, the Spaniards eagerly learned to manipulate guns, howitzers, mortars, and machine guns. They often surprised their German mentors with their rapid gun drill, accompanied by much shouting and scrambling, as opposed to the brief, efficient and "by the numbers" German norm. However, the training of a seasoned body of infantrymen and exercising of the larger tactical units remained impossible in the short period at hand. 13

The pilots of the First Spanish Volunteer Squadron flew to Tempelhof (Berlin) Airfield under the command of Major Salas. The Spanish contingent then moved to the Werneuchen Fighter School, eighteen miles outside of Berlin, to begin refresher training on the Messerschmitt BF-109E aircraft and the latest German air tactics. They completed their training on 28 August. The squadron consisted of an air echelon of seventeen pilots with mechanics and radio technicians, and a ground echelon with the remainder of the

twenty-three officers and eighty men. 14

August brought the last hurried stages of preparation for the Blue Division at Grafenwöhr. Evaluation of the combat training the Spanish received can only be cast in the light of the latter experiences of the Division in Russia. In retrospect, it seems clear that the German Army either did not realize the complexity of the training needs of this initially heterogeneous mixture of individuals or simply ignored all such indicators in the interest of forwarding another division to the replacement-starved army groups of the Eastern Front. Thus, after scarcely a month of existence as a unified division, the Spaniards of the German Army departed between 20 and 23 August for the front. 15

15

When the Ninth Army of Colonel General Adolf Strauss received the message that it would receive the new Spanish Division, the staff noted in the headquarters war journal that, hopefully, the Spaniards would ease the threatening situation the army had encountered east of Toropets. However, they also observed that, at normal rates of marching, the Division would not reach that city until 8 October at the earliest. 16

As the Spaniards marched eastward, the situation changed drastically for Army Group Center with the completion of the tasks assigned to its armored forces in the Leningrad and Kiev encirclement operations. Hitler issued his Directive No. 35 on 6 September, which called for a radical shift of most of the available armored unit strength to Army Group Center and set a deadline for the end of September for beginning Operation Typhoon: the

seizure of Moscow. As the German mechanized forces were shifted and realigned,



the suddenly weakened Army Group North of Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb found itself at an immediate disadvantage. A sharp Russian attack on 24 September against the Eighteenth Army caused the Germans to give up some ground on the east bank of the Neva River. At the same time, German intelligence revealed a Soviet buildup on the east side of the Volkhov River and the Valdai Hills to the south which, they feared, could threaten the thinly-held junction of the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies. Colonel General Franz Halder recounted the

events of 24 September as a crisis in the German Army High Command (OKH). To buttress von Leeb's army group, Hitler directed the cancellation of the transfer of one of Leeb's motorized divisions that had been scheduled to go to Army Group Center, and ordered the immediate transfer by air of anti-tank mines, two parachute regiments from reserves, and an infantry regiment from Army Group Center. This proved totally beyond the German air transport capabilities, and as a result OKH ordered Army Group Center to give up a complete infantry division, which was sent forward by rail. The Spanish Division was picked for this assignment, probably because it was just approaching the key rail center of Vitebsk.

17

18

The Spanish command drew up infantry regiments on line to occupy the Volkhov river front from Lobkovo south through Novgorod, and along the shores of Lake Ilmen to the mouth of the Veryazha River (a forty-mile frontage) using, from north to south, the 269th and 262nd Regiments and a mixed group of reconnaissance, anti-tank, and other smaller units. With this, the Blue Division of Spain became the largest foreign volunteer unit to be deployed in combat by the Wehrmacht. 19

The arrival of the Spanish Division and other reinforcements to Army Group North now permitted that command to plan a limited offensive with the triple objective of tightening its stranglehold on Leningrad, linking with the Finnish Army in eastern Karelia, and diverting Soviet resources from the major effort of Operation Typhoon, the seizure of Moscow. The last mechanized group controlled by Army Group North, the XXXIX Corps, was staged at Chudovo for the thrust along the single railroad line to Tikhvin. To cover the flanks of this operation and expand the bridgehead over the Volkhov, two corps of infantry would be employed, of which the southern one, designated Group "von Roques" on 11 October, included the Spanish Division and its neighbors to the north, the 126th Infantry and 18th Motorized Divisions.

The Sixteenth Army issued its operation order on 10 October, just as the Spaniards were occupying their new positions. According to the order, the Spaniards were expected to attack with two regiments frontally across the Volkhov River from Novgorod to seize the towns of Kostova and Bozhenka and consolidate a bridgehead at Msta over the river of the same name. This represented a most ambitious undertaking, even for a full-strength division. Two days later, the Germans revised their plan and designated a more limited objective of covering the right flank of the 18th Motorized Division as it advanced along the Shevelevo-Posad road toward the Msta River. 20

20

The 269th Regiment of Colonel José Martinez Esparza executed the first Spanish attack in Russia with assault battalions massed between Udarnik and Kotovitzy. Reconnaissance patrols crossed the river on 17 and 18 October to test Russian defenses and were driven back by a sharp Russian spoiling attack on the second day. On the following day, the 2nd Battalion (II/269th) followed and linked with elements of the 18th Motorized Division, which had crossed easily at Kuzino. Pivoting to the south, the Spanish battalions took Russa and Sitno on 21 and 22 October after hard fighting. The Germans had meanwhile thrown pontoon bridges across the Volkhov at Udarnik, and the III/263rd Battalion and 250th



Reserve Battalion joined the battalions of the 269th in the assault. On 23 October, the Russians unsuccessfully counterattacked Sitno in regimental strength, and repeated their assaults four days later. In each attack, the Russian forces left hundreds of dead on the battlefield. The Spanish took hundreds of prisoners, indicating the very low state of Russian morale at this point in the campaign. Tigoda and Nikitkino fell on the 28th and 29th to the III/263rd, but the 250th Reserve Battalion met heavier resistance near the river and was repulsed from Muravi. Meanwhile, on the Spanish left flank, the German motorized infantry captured Ottenski and Posad against light opposition. Colonel Martinez Esparza sent a company-sized patrol eastward to link with the Germans. When this was accomplished, the captain in command returned from Ottenski reporting that the extremely rough terrain and dense woods left only the Shevelvo-Posad road as an effective communications route. Meanwhile, the XXXIX Corps struggled to the

northeast against stiff Russian resistance, losing much armor in the mud on the way. A final thrust over the last six miles to seize Tikhvin succeeded on 8 November, but the troops were already at the point of exhaustion. The 18th Motorized Division was therefore ordered up from the right flank on the same day, and the Spaniards relieved the 30th Regiment of that division at Ottenski and Posad. The I/269th and the 11th Company of III/269th, which had made the earlier reconnaissance, entrenched there in the face of growing enemy pressure.

21

The Spanish companies of this garrison had suffered heavily in the earlier phase of the Volkhov battle, and averaged only about fifty men each. Three anti-tank guns and two captured Russian 122-mm guns augmented the infantry strength of the two strongpoints. Fierce Russian attacks drove in Spanish outposts and cut the road between Posad and Ottenski on 12 November. Major Tomás García Rebull, a staff officer of the 262nd Regiment, took a relief column of infantrymen and anti-tank guns and forced through scattered Russian patrols to clear the road.

That night, the Russians returned to the attack with several battalions and heavy air and artillery support, cutting all communication with the embattled Posad defenders, who were threatened with complete annihilation. General Muñoz Grandes threw his available reserves to this critical sector. He ordered the II/269th Battalion to attack south from Ottenski and concentrated his last available units at Shevelevo: one company each of the 262nd and 263rd regiments, and one other created from clerks, technicians, and bandsmen of the division headquarters. On 15 November, the relief forces reached Posad to find their shattered comrades of the I/269th Battalion. Positions were held by only four or five men in some sectors, surrounded by heaps of Russian corpses and dead Spanish comrades. Major García Rebull was the senior survivor of the Posad garrison and succeeded to the command of the relief unit, made up of the 2nd Company, I/261, the 7th Company, II/262, and the 3rd Company of the Engineer Battalion, which possessed anti-tank guns and mortars. The II/269th Battalion returned to Ottenski, with the 180 survivors of the I/269th continuing on to Shevelevo for well-deserved rest and reorganization. The Spanish outposts settled down to a static defense through the remainder of the month. 22

Starting on 4 December, the Spanish lines received heavy Russian infantry assaults with strong air and artillery support. The I/269th remnants at Shevelevo returned again to

Ottenski to shore up the vulnerable salient of the Spanish lines. The III/263rd alone suffered 190 casualties in the Nikitkino area during the next four days. But the stiffest fighting again involved Major García Rebull's men at Posad. In bitter cold—minus thirty-eight degrees Celcius—the Spaniards defended in place with small arms, shovels, and axes, repeatedly repelling

desperate Soviet assaults. On the 7th the Spaniards were ordered by XXXVIII Corps to withdraw, and they destroyed all their immovable equipment, including six guns, and evacuated Posad and Ottenski during



the night of 7-8 December. On the 9th, XXXIX Corps evacuated Tikhvin and, after extensive pleading on the part of von Leeb, Hitler allowed Army Group North to begin the wholesale withdrawal behind the Volkhov line during the period 15-24 December. All Spanish units re-crossed the frozen Volkhov by 10 December and occupied their former sector without incident through 24 December. 23

According to Spanish sources, 566 men of the Blue Division died during the course of the Volkhov-Tikhvin offensive. The mission of flank protection had been accomplished, but the action left an indelible mark upon the Spaniards as to the strength of the Soviet air and artillery power, a respect that would last through the whole campaign. 24

The Soviet forces on the Volkhov Front attempted to pursue the retreating German and Spanish units across the river, but were generally too weak. The most critical threat developing in the Spanish sector through the New Year took the form of a three-regiment attack on the thinly-held northern sector on 27 December. Russian shock troops crossed the ice at 2:30 A.M., hit the Spanish outposts, and seized a salient between Udarnik and Lobkovo. Local Spanish reinforcements held the Russians at bay until that afternoon, when Major García Rebull counterattacked with two companies of the I/269th Battalion and retook the Volkhov bank, isolating the enemy remaining on the west side of the river. The Spanish claimed 1080 Russians killed in this action. That night the Spanish units were relieved by the German 424th Regiment of the 126th Infantry Division as far south as Kottovitsy. The Spanish Division in effect shifted southward to cover the Lake Ilmen sector with stronger forces. Frozen to a depth of three feet or more, the lake had become a serious problem as Soviet patrols and partisans made extensive use of it as a communications route. The Division also had difficulty in covering its old sector with adequate strength, because of the heavy losses it had suffered in the earlier offensive. 25

25

The Spanish Division had regularly sustained high casualties in continuous fighting on the Volkhov front. Observing that their casualties were on the order of three thousand in the first four months of combat, the Army Group North staff began to worry about restoring the strength of the Spanish Division. The replacement system ultimately devised by the Spanish Army High Command was to continue recruitment for the Volunteer Division and periodically forward "marching battalions," numbering 800-1000 men, to the Russian front, via Grafenwöhr. As the ranks of the Division filled out, veterans would be sent home in similar returning units of about 500 men each. In this way, over 36,000 Spaniards ultimately served with the Blue Division in the Russo-German conflict. The first such marching battalion of 44 officers and 719 men reached the Division during February 1942.

!The part that the Blue Division was to play in the battle of the Volkhov Pocket was,

contrary to later Spanish claims, rather limited in scope. The XXXVII Corps assumed control of the southern flank of the pocket and used the 58th Division as its primary assault unit. The weaker Spanish and 126th Divisions were used to support the flanks of the 58th Division in its northern thrust and to supply additional artillery support. Other units that came under eventual control of the Corps—285th Security Division, Second SS Infantry Brigade, and Group "Jaschke" (part of the 20th Motorized Division)—cordoned the southern and southwestern flanks of the Second Shock Army and prevented its further advance.

The first immediate action the Spanish Division took was to extend its lines north to relieve some units of the hard-pressed 126th Division. Then, over the next five months, artillery and infantry battalions of the Spanish Division were attached to or placed in direct support of other German units engaged in surrounding and liquidating the Russian forces in the Volkhov Pocket.

26

27



In the first four months of 1942, as many as three Spanish infantry battalions and five batteries of artillery were simultaneously on loan to the 58th and 126th Divisions, but the only significant offensive action took place on 12 and 13 February when the I/269th and the 9th Company of the II/263rd joined a combat group of the 126th Division in thrusting north from Ossiya to Bolshoy Zamoshye to relieve a company of the 285th Security Division that had been cut off in the initial Russian advance. 28

Four months later, as the general mop-up of the pocket commenced, Battle Group "Burk" formed to sweep through the same swampy, forested region. In a battle lasting nine days (21-28 June), Spanish troops of the III/262nd, the 250th Reconnaissance Battalion, and one company each of the Spanish Division's engineer and anti-tank battalions advanced in concert with German and Flemish units over six miles from Ossiya to seize Maoloye Zamoshye and destroy remnants of the Russian forces. This battle, where the Spanish soldiers received their first taste of intensive forest fighting and forever recalled it as the "green inferno," cost the Spanish Division about 270 casualties, making it their most costly single undertaking thus far in 1942. The Spanish units returned to division control at the end of June, but mopping up by German units continued in the former pocket area through July. The rest of the summer of 1942 was spent in relative quiet on the banks of the Volkhov. 29

The Spanish Blue Division was not destined to complete a full year on the Volkhov River. The OKW had directed General Erich von Manstein's Eleventh Army, which had just completed the storming of the Sevastopol, to transfer its command groups, siege artillery, and four divisions to the south Leningrad sector for the implementation of Operation Northern Light: the seizure of Leningrad. Army Group North allocated seven of its own divisions, including the Spanish Division, to the Eleventh Army for the Leningrad assault, which would begin on 14 September and be completed in a matter of weeks. 30

General Muñoz Grandes received his orders on 1 August 1942 to transfer the Spanish Division to an assembly area northeast of Vyritsa. This move took place from 16 to 30 August, upon relief by the German 20th Motorized Division. The Eleventh Army then moved the Spaniards to the sector Pushkin-Krasny Bor, relieving the German 121st

Infantry Division from 4 to 7 September in the LIV Corps zone of operations. The Spaniards received numerous heavy weapons that were left in the positions prepared by the 121st Division. The 250th Artillery Regiment took possession of the three 220-mm mortars and three 155-mm howitzers, both weapons of French make. The infantry regiments received an assortment of captured Russian anti-tank guns, six 76.2-mm and four 45-mm guns in all. The Spanish troops did not imagine at the time, though, how important these acquisitions would become. In the division rear, the German 138th

Artillery Command deployed a large collection of siege guns, ranging from 155-mm to 370-mm, which were to be used in support of Operation Northern Light. 31

30

Throughout the Leningrad campaign of Army Group North, however, the Russians had a habit of upsetting the most detailed German plans. The final storming of Leningrad was forestalled and ultimately cancelled by the new Soviet offensive of 27 August-2 October, in which the Russians broke through the Eighteenth Army's lines from east and west to attempt a junction at Mga and isolate the German forces in the Lake Ladoga sector. General von Manstein committed his best divisions and used up much of his ammunition in defeating these thrusts. By the time he managed to stabilize his front, there remained little question of mustering the strength necessary to carry out the planned Leningrad offensive. Manstein and his staff thereupon transferred south to establish Army Group Don, and General George Lindemann's Eighteenth Army assumed control of the Leningrad area. 32



Spanish troops settled down to their by now familiar routine of positional warfare in their new location. Replacements continued to arrive from Spain, and only patrol actions and the ever-present Soviet artillery fire exacted a few casualties. At the same time, however, events in Spain took place that became of significant importance to the men of the Blue Division.

In a shakeup of his government on 3 September 1942, Franco dismissed Serrano Suñer and General Varela as Foreign Minister and Army Minister, respectively. Serrano also lost his position as President of the Political Council, and became thereafter a political nonentity. In their stead, the Generalissimo appointed Lieutenant General Count Francisco Jordana—an Anglophile—as Foreign Minister, and General Carlos Asensio became the new Army Minister. Asensio was generally regarded as a pro-Axis

officer and thus, on the surface at least, Franco had preserved the "neutral" balance of his government. But Serrano had been the chief protagonist in the commitment of the Blue Division to the German cause, and Count Jordana was well known as being opposed not only to the Division, but also highly suspicious of the popular General Muñoz Grandes, whose pro-German character he regarded as highly dangerous.

Falange

33

Despite German wishes to the contrary, was sent to the Blue Division as its new commander. An officer of the General Staff, Esteban-Infantes had previously headed the replacement organization for the Division in Spain. Muñoz Grandes was not willing to step down as the division commander for reasons of personal prestige and because he wished

to participate in the planned attack on Leningrad. He had no wish to embarrass Esteban-Infantes, so upon the latter's arrival at the Volkhov position in August of 1942, he made him the Blue Division's deputy commander. The Spanish High Command finally exerted its will and compelled Muñoz Grandes to return on 12 December to a new assignment in the Army Ministry.

Brigadier General Emilio Esteban-Infantes

34

The end of 1942 saw the Spanish Division secure in its lines at Pushkin-Krasny Bor, but there existed increasing indications all along the Eighteenth Army front that a Soviet offensive was in the offing. The Spanish sector boasted no natural terrain features, such as rivers or high ground, to assist defensive preparations. The 11.5 miles of front was occupied by all three regiments, leaving few units for use as reserves. Early January brought the First Ladoga Battle, in which the Soviet forces finally succeeded in breaking the Leningrad siege by driving from both the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to a meeting point north of Mga, isolating the German forces on the shores of Lake Ladoga. In furious fighting, the trapped Germans broke through to Mga and succeeded in stabilizing a new front by early February. During this time, the L Corps took over operational control of the Spanish Division, on 22 January. 35

35

Army Group North noted the possibility of a Soviet attack from the Kolpino area on 6 February, but probably felt that the momentarily-stabilized Mga area remained more critical and, in any event, the 4th SS Police Division was reforming several miles southeast of Krasny Bor, where it was expected to be able to give some support. 36

On 10 February 1943, the Spanish Blue Division met its most severe test in what turned out to be a veritable struggle for existence. An extremely heavy artillery and rocket barrage rained down upon the Spanish positions, starting at 6:45 A.M. Then the Russian infantrymen of three rifle divisions, spearheaded by over one hundred tanks, poured down the frozen corridor between the east bank of the Izhora and the October Railway.

The 37-mm guns of the Spanish anti-tank battalion were utterly



ineffectual against the Soviet armor and were quickly overrun. The I/262nd Battalion was rolled back to the southeast, and the II/262nd and 250th Reserve Battalions bore the brunt of the Russian assault, between Krasny Bor and the Izhora River. The powerful Russian attack shattered these two battalions, with the exception of a couple of platoon-sized

strongpoints. By 1:00 P.M., the Russian assault had begun to reach the nearest Spanish artillery batteries, which blew up their guns to prevent their capture. The second line of Spanish reserve troops around Krasny Bor had counterattacked valiantly but were simply outweighed from the beginning. Conspicuous acts of bravery slowed the Soviet attack. Captain Manuel Huidobro Auzunema, commanding the machine-gun company positioned behind the II/262nd Battalion, personally led his counterattack and called for artillery fire on his own position to assist in the destruction of Russian forces. Though he was able to stop the Russians on his right flank, his left flank collapsed after sustaining seventy-five percent losses, and the gallant commander was killed during the subsequent hand-to-hand fighting. Nearby, soldier Antonio Ponte saved comrades from his engineer company by seizing an anti-tank mine and throwing himself upon a Russian tank that had broken into their position. Both man and tank were destroyed in the resulting explosion. Such acts of heroism among the isolated strongpoints of the Spanish position were crucial in stemming the initial onrush of Russian troops. 37

By 3:00 P.M., when communications were lost between the Spanish Division and its right flank neighbors, the first German reinforcements had rushed into the battle area.

The L Corps had sent three 75-mm anti-tank guns of the Norwegian Legion to the Spaniards and all of its available reserves to shore up the eastern flank of Krasny Bor, including a regiment of the SS Police Division and elements of the 390th Infantry Regiment (215th Division). The Eighteenth Army sent in Tiger tanks, assault guns, anti-tank guns,

the 85th Mountain Regiment (4th Mountain Division), and the Army Engineer School troops. The Spanish Division moved all the troops it could spare from its left flank to the Izhora to hold the west flank of the penetration area, but Army Group North despaired of closing the gap between the Izhora and the October Railway. To this end, they released the 212th and 24th Infantry Divisions from other assignments and sent them to the south and southeast, respectively, of Krasny Bor. This quick reaction on the part of the German command ultimately prevented a major Soviet breakthrough, as the regiments of the 212th established a new front line between the SS Police Division and the Spanish Division by 13 February. On the 19th, the newly arrived 24th Division attacked in a counteroffensive and, with the support of tanks and assault guns, recovered some of the lost ground around Krasny Bor. 38

General Esteban-Infantes shored up his Izhora River flank with companies of the 263rd and 269th Regiments, recovered some scattered survivors of Krasny Bor, and improvised new units from sick and wounded men moved up from the field hospital. By 18 February, a stabilized new front extended about two miles to the south, linking with units of the German 212th Division. With only three effective 75-mm anti-tank guns in their possession, the Spanish Division nonetheless gave no further ground to the Soviets, who attacked the Hispano-German forces repeatedly through the end of March. The Russian objectives in this action, which the Germans called the Second Ladoga Battle, were again to cut off the German forces in the Mga area by means of two widely set pincer strokes, southeast from Kolpino and west from the Volkhov front, near Pogostye. In choosing the Krasny Bor sector, the Russian commanders followed their favorite tactic of attacking at a juncture of two major units, in this case the L Corps and "Group Hilpert" (LIV Corps) boundary, occupied by the Spanish and German 5th Mountain Divisions. Only the fiercely fought, often hand-to-hand defensive action of the Spanish troops against overwhelming odds and the fairly rapid reaction of the higher German commands prevented



a major Soviet success in their drive from Kolpino. The Russians attacking in the Pogostye sector met three German divisions in rugged terrain and were more easily repulsed. 39

Since the Spanish Division had suffered over three thousand casualties in the fighting at Krasny Bor and the Izhora, the Germans shifted it gradually to the west as new units

arrived to take up the defenses around the Russian salient. Ultimately relieved by the 254th Infantry Division on the Izhora flank, the Blue Division by April occupied a narrower sector (about nine miles) centered on the town of Pushkin. Because only about three thousand men arrived from Spain as replacements during the first three months of 1943, the Spaniards found it difficult to reconstitute those units decimated at Krasny Bor. For the remainder of 1943, the Spanish Division exchanged artillery fire and fought patrol actions with their Russian opponents, often

entrenched only a few hundred meters away. Spain decided on 25 September 1943 to

withdraw her volunteers and requested their immediate removal from the front for preparation for their return. American and British diplomatic pressure had forced this decision, made urgent by Germany's deteriorating situation. To demonstrate Spain's continued interest in the war against Communism, however, a volunteer "Legion" would remain to continue the fight.

40

41

40

When the Eighteenth Army ordered Gen. Esteban-Infantes to prepare his unit for withdrawal on 5 October, the Spanish officers assumed that they were to be shifted to yet another sector of the Leningrad Front. The German 81st and 123rd Infantry Divisions relieved the Spanish frontline troops during the night of 7-8 October 1943, and the latter assembled by the 16th west of Gatchina between Nikolavevka and Volosovo. At the time of its departure from the front, the Spanish Division was still below strength by three thousand men and had serious equipment shortages, which indicated that the Germans had not replaced most equipment lost in the battles of the earlier part of the year. The German command finally informed the Spaniards on 14 October that the Division would return to Spain, leaving a legion of undetermined organization in its place. 42

General Esteban-Infantes received his first orders from Spain concerning the withdrawal on 20 October from the Spanish Foreign Ministry. In Berlin, the General was apprised of three conflicting points of view regarding the proposed Legion. The OKW wished to see the strongest possible Spanish contingent organized. The Spanish Foreign Ministry, reflecting Count Jordana's wishes, urged the smallest number possible (one or two battalions). Finally, on 21 October, the Spanish Army Minister directed that:

The Volunteer Legion will be constituted in as many battalions of infantry as the number of volunteers permit. All officers and men with less than six months' service will remain, plus any volunteers having more, that demonstrate a desire to remain. 43

Esteban-Infantes canvassed the division for volunteers and, finding few takers among the soldiers, decided to form the legion from the last seven march battalions. He designated his chief of staff, Colonel Antonio García Navarro, as its commander and devoted his own energies to the return of the division to Spain. After turning in the rest of their German equipment and uniforms at Grafenwöhr, the last men of the division arrived in Spain with General Esteban-Infantes on 18 December 1943. Behind them, buried in the snowy wasteland between Lake Ilmen and Leningrad, lay four thousand of their comrades: men of Posad, the "Green Inferno," Krasny Bor and the men who



fell in two years of continuous artillery barrages and classic position warfare. 44

The extended campaign of the Spanish Division illustrates well the varied fighting conditions of the Leningrad-Volkhov Front that were also faced by most of the other volunteers from Western Europe. However, the stamina and resilience of a complete infantry division, even a poorly equipped one of the German third echelon, allowed the Spaniards more continuous service and enabled them to sustain larger efforts than would have been possible for other European volunteer units. One assumes as well that the increased cohesion of fighting under trained native officers, using their native language and with the support of a native replacement system, however inadequate in scale, also afforded the Spaniards advantages not obtainable in the battalions or small regiments formed by the other "legions."

45

Generally speaking, the men of the Spanish Blue Division returned home to warm receptions. The government enacted special legislation permitting exceptional employment opportunities for the veterans of the Russian campaign. Many of the ex-divisionarios achieved high standing in the postwar government and Spanish Army, not the least of whom was Agustín Muñoz Grandes, who became a Captain General and the second-highest-ranking official in Spain prior to his death in 1970. The men who still remained

at the front with the Spanish Legion, however, faced a more ambiguous future. 45

Propaganda Value and Military Utility

By early 1942, volunteers from Western Europe numbering some 27,000 officers and men—the equivalent of two full-strength divisions—had shouldered German arms on the Eastern Front. At this point, three-quarters of these served in the German Army. In a campaign that cost the Germans almost half a million casualties in its first three months, one may well question the military value of the enterprise. Yet in the case of the Waffen-SS, foreign troops represented virtually the only source of manpower suitable for filling out new combat units. Faced with competition from the army, as well as severe high command restrictions on SS recruitment within the Reich, the SS had attempted direct recruitment in occupied European territories in 1940, but garnered only several hundred men for the SS Division. The foreign legions program of the SS enjoyed more success, since collaborationist parties responded more readily to filling national units for the campaign against Bolshevism. But even after the party faithful had come forward, the legions proved difficult to field with the Waffen-SS because of the difficulty in training them to SS standards, the small size of the legions, and the resultant difficulty in maintaining their combat potential as they suffered casualties. Then, too, came political drawbacks, as the collaborationist political leaders sought local advantages in return for their efforts.

Wiking

For instance, the Danish collaborationist Frits Clausen carried on a cat-and-mouse game with Himmler for months, as each sought support from the other without yielding concessions. Clausen insisted that he could not take responsibility for the recruiting effort until he had direct liaison with the and sufficient political clout (presumably with German backing) on the home front. He further attempted to entice the with his proposal of raising an entire Danish division for the Waffen-SS, if only he were given sufficient support and political power in Denmark. Himmler only responded with mild encouragement to continue his efforts and a few fallacious concessions, such as the symbolic naming of a new (German) SS regiment "Thule" and—as he informed Clausen with the words, "...this will be a delight to you"—the replacement of Kryssing at the head of the by the Danish Nazi Party member von Schalburg. He further complimented Clausen on the excellent rapport he had with youths in the citing a case where a dying man's last words at the front had been for his "Fører." Such exchanges typified Himmler's policy stance of stringing along his Germanic collaborators without really embracing any doctrine of partnership.

FreikorpsReichsführer-SS

FreikorpsFreikorps,

LoyaltyOaths



46

In the meantime, Anton Mussert had been irritating German officials with his requests for increased national autonomy for Holland within the New Order, showing himself to be as nationalistic as Quisling in his stance regarding German policy. Himmler particularly criticized Mussert's statements in favor of a federal European army to be the standard bearer for a new European federation of equal Germanic states. This exaggeration of Nazi Germanic propaganda was soon discouraged. Himmler informed Hans Rauter, his plenipotentiary in Holland, that the Germanic constituents had to realize that a European army would have to serve military ends, not propaganda or political functions, and that the 2600 legionnaires and 2000 volunteers in regular Waffen-SS units remained a far cry from the annual Dutch mobilization strength of 60-80,000 men. Mussert was not, however,

removed from the German scheme of operations in Holland, as Clausen later was in Denmark. He apparently recognized that he could only make the best of whatever concessions the Germans allowed. He continued to assist in military recruiting despite his diminishing prestige and influence. For example, in late 1943, Mussert made a typical speech in Genderland province in which he compared the National Socialist and the French Revolutions. He called for a ten-fold expansion of the volunteer effort, especially pleading for half of the Dutch workers employed in Germany (roughly 400,000) to volunteer for the front.

47

48

In their efforts to build and maintain the combat strength of their Western European SS units, Himmler's deputies found that other German agencies interfered with them. Berger told Himmler in April 1942 of a problem he encountered with the Foreign Ministry while the finished training for the front. A Danish general staff officer had approached a German official, offering himself, two captains, and 150 men for combat service in the Finnish Army. The Foreign Ministry favored exploring the possibility, since the men would not volunteer for either the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. Berger opposed this notion, citing the Führer's order and the OKW agreement on foreign volunteers in the Russian campaign. Himmler backed his subordinate and declined the Foreign ministry's initiative.

Freikorps

49

50

Like their collaborationist colleagues in the Nordic states, Léon Degrelle in Belgium and the Parisian pro-Nazis sought personal influence under the patronage of the occupiers. Degrelle certainly envisioned an expanded postwar Burgundian client state in the New Europe, run by the Rexist Party. He did ensure the survival of the party, as occupation authorities eventually suppressed all but the collaborationists. But Degrelle lacked real political clout with the Belgians, and some of his specific dealings with the Germans caused splits within the Rexist Party. The Germans recognized the situation and kept him at arm's length, except in the case of his military contributions. 50

The Walloon and French legions operated only sporadically with the German Army on the Eastern Front, as described above. In the case of the Spanish Division, however, the German Army had a longer, more continuous period of operations in which it evaluated this foreign unit and revealed its own attitude toward such formations.

From the beginning, the German government and military regarded the Spanish Volunteer Division more as a political and propaganda symbol than as a real contribution to the military potential of the Wehrmacht. In the late summer of 1941, few observers predicted the failure of the vaunted German military forces against the demonstrated weaknesses of the Soviet Union. The September war diary of the Ninth Army, which was still victoriously pressing forward, remains representative of this prevalent German attitude toward the volunteer formations in their midst: "... the deployment of the division from faraway Spain has much less a military effect than a political and propaganda effect. Therefore, despite any shortcomings they should be welcome as comrades in the struggle, like we were to



them in the Civil War." 51

The degree to which the German Army expected their Spanish comrades to contribute to the downfall of the Soviet Union was in no way better demonstrated than in the equipment the Germans issued to the Blue Division. The 250th (Spanish) Infantry Division, as its number indicated, was equipped as a third echelon infantry division similar to those mobilized in Germany from older reserve classes for a limited role in combat operations.

Thus the Spanish troops were issued the most basic German Army equipment—rifles, machine guns, and cannon—and were denied the more sophisticated armaments, such as tanks, assault guns, self-propelled artillery, and heavy anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, which were reserved for the elite German units. In retrospect, it remains interesting to note that the 37-mm anti-tank guns of the Spanish Division were reissued upon the Spaniards' withdrawal to rear area security units rather than to combat organizations.

From the quality of equipment issued and the brevity of the training period afforded to the Spanish volunteers, it seems probable that the Germans never intended to put them into the forefront of the fighting, despite the obvious Spanish dedication to that end.

52

53

Equally indicative of the German view of the Spanish Division's role was the choice of geographic area where the Spanish troops were deployed. Although their first assignment to the Ninth Army offered them some chance of sharing in the planned seizure of the Soviet capital, the climate in that area and in that of Army Group North, where the Spanish Division actually served, certainly did not allow them to demonstrate their fullest capabilities. Army Group South, where the Germans placed their Latin allies of the Italian Eighth Army, would have proved a much superior location for employment of the Blue Division. It may be argued with some persuasiveness that the Wehrmacht could not afford to weigh such considerations in the allocation of its fighting strength to various fronts, but if the German command did regard the Spanish contingent as militarily valuable, it served no useful purpose to place it in such a forbidding area of operations as the Leningrad-Volkhov sector. The Spanish commanders were rankled also by the separation between the Blue Division and the Volunteer Air Squadron, which remained in the center front. This factor was caused, undoubtedly, by the rerouting of the division as a handy reinforcement to Army Group North rather than by any deliberate act on the part of the Germans. The Spaniards, though, sorely missed what they viewed as their rightful air support, for Soviet aircraft were able to strike their positions seemingly at will, while the overtaxed Luftwaffe could not effectively support all areas of the Army Group North sector. 54

55

In contrast to the halfhearted way in which the Germans equipped, trained, and deployed the Spanish Division in their service, they became persistently assiduous critics of the Spanish approach to soldiering and warfare. German documents are filled with vituperation and rhetoric to such an extent as to suggest a disdain for all things non-Germanic.

The first hint of discord between Spanish and German procedures occurred at the beginning of the long foot march to the front from the Polish frontier. The Spanish troops found the going quite rough along the poor Russian roads, and their initially high spirits deteriorated somewhat along the 600 miles between Suwalki and Vitebsk. Almost immediately, the German liaison officers with the division remarked upon the ragged march discipline, the overloading of vehicles, and the frequent occurrence of tired men jumping on passing vehicles. By 1 September 1941, the Spanish troop discipline was portrayed in terms of

"stealing chickens on the march; associating with persons of Jewish race; threatening civilians; lack of march discipline; lack of care for horses, weapons and equipment. Especially noteworthy was the inability of junior officers and non-commissioned officers to enforce their orders to the troops."

55

56

A week later, the liaison staff reported to Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge—commanding



the Fourth Army, behind which the Spaniards were then crossing—that Spanish march discipline, poor care of the "defective Serbian horses," and problems in small unit leadership remained the key issues, but that these were partially balanced by the "good will and campaign spirit of the Spaniards." Soon the Spanish performance improved, largely through the example and personal efforts of General Muñoz Grandes, and the Germans expressed satisfaction with their marching as the daily rate of movement reached twenty miles per day. Upon the arrival of the Spanish Division in the Volkhov in October, though, a liaison

officer reported that the Spanish troops on the march still displayed an appearance "unusual to German eyes," perhaps the most truthful and objective comment to date.

57

58

The Spanish performance in the Volkhov-Tikhvin offensive under Group "von Roques" and the XXXVIII Corps elicited a variety of responses from German observers, including some admiration for their great sacrifices in the bloody Posad-Ottenski battles. However, the Spanish pride and reluctance to accept suggestions and advice from non-Spaniards did not set well with the often equally single-minded Germans. The XXXVIII Corps' commander termed the Spaniards "proud, sensitive, suspicious," and the prevailing opinion among the Army Group North staff was that the Spanish were "inflexible" and "slow but sure" in their method of combat and, therefore, "a sure and rapid coordination with the 250th ... [Division] was not feasible." It is difficult to determine the specific actions that gave rise

to such comments, but the Spaniards themselves often said that the differences between the German and Spanish mentalities remained considerable. The Spaniard looked upon the war as an opportunity to demonstrate his anti-Bolshevik dedication, but the German soldier had sworn a total commitment to an ideological fight to the bitter end. Thus, the Spaniard had little appreciation for "Teutonic" seriousness and discipline as a mode of day-to-day living. However, under the challenge of combat the Spaniard could be depended upon to rise to the occasion with full vigor.

59

60

Despite such grumbling among the German staff sections, the official policy toward the Spanish troops remained favorable, if somewhat patronizing. Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder made this clear in his letter to Field Marshal von Leeb of 11 November 1941. In this brief note, Halder took note of the fact that Spanish troops did not measure up to German norms of general discipline and care of horses, weapons, and equipment. He nevertheless urged Leeb to approach the Spanish command with delicacy and tact, in consideration of the political significance of any German official actions. 61

60

Thus, those attributes which remained typically Spanish in areas such as general conduct and administration enjoyed a degree of grudging toleration by German authorities. The Spaniards, on occasion, stretched such toleration to the limit, particularly in the case of

furloughed personnel in the rear areas. German district commanders from as far away as Königsberg reported "wild, undisciplined public conduct" and even Spanish sources conceded a certain libertinism on the part of their off-duty personnel, such as when competing with German submariners in Königsberg for the nocturnal pleasures of the city. In fact, the

amount of fraternization enjoyed by Spanish troops led the Germans, in their typically organized fashion, to request data from the Spanish Division on the number of Spanish

soldiers who presumably had married local nationals, the type of ceremonies performed, and the nationality of the spouses. This request received a rather terse response from General Muñoz Grandes to the effect that such marriages were forbidden, as was the transportation of any women to Spain.

62

63

The German observers never overlooked any Spanish shortcomings in battle. Their harshest criticism fell upon the Spanish performance in the action of 22-24 June 1942, during the mop-up of the Volkhov Pocket, or "Green Inferno." Colonel Hoppe, whose battle group of



German Army, SS, Flemish, and Spanish troops carried out the operation in the Zamoshye area, was admonished by higher headquarters because of the relatively heavy losses suffered by the Spanish contingents in that operation. Apparently, the official German policy had been to conserve the Spanish Division while it rebuilt itself in the aftermath of its losses from the first four months of operation. In his official after-action report, Hoppe pointed out that, in his opinion, such casualties should not have occurred in a mop-up action, and Spanish ineptitude and inexperience remained the real reasons for them. The casualty figures for that period support his views, for the two German battalions sustained only ten to forty percent of the casualties recorded for the two Spanish battalions involved. 64

Spanish reports maintained that the German units failed to support them in their first advance of 21-22 June and, when met by Russian small arms and light artillery fire from the front and flanks, they had been forced to withdraw to their original starting points. They claimed also that their units withdrew with "order and enthusiasm." 65

Hoppe, on the other hand, presented evidence to the contrary, indicating that the Spanish units had advanced carelessly into action and, upon their initial surprise at meeting strong Russian resistance, had fallen back in complete disorder. He referred to a report by SS Major Burk, who commanded the group composed of his 2nd SS Infantry Regiment staff, the SS a battalion of the 20th Motorized Division, and the 232nd Security Battalion. Burk reported that "... he met Spaniards, even officers, who had thrown all their weapons and equipment away and he had to halt them with his pistol in hand and force them to return [to their position]." Hoppe concluded that the Spanish

Legion Flandern,

66

... military development is wholly unsatisfactory. The officers don't control their men and do not follow [sound] military or tactical principles. Also, the men have totally insufficient basic training. Thoughtlessness and carelessness lead to their shocking casualties. 67

65

The German reports on the action advised that the use of Spanish units in conjunction with those of other nationalities could serve no useful purpose. The Spanish training deficiencies, tactical errors in massing troops and failing to make proper use of terrain, lack of initiative in small unit leadership, and the difficulty in communicating among the mixed units due to the insufficient numbers of translators were all cited as primary reasons for this judgment. The last item in that list might have had greater influence in the conduct of the forest fighting than all the others, but the conclusion of the report was that the Spanish units should be left to fight alone and under their own leadership to the extent that the level of training of the Spanish Division permitted. 68

The Volkhov Pocket operation probably represented the nadir of Spanish military performance, but whether it approached the depths of the German observations or not must remain a subjective judgment in absence of sufficient eyewitness accounts. In general, the German Army found the Spanish officer and soldier to be

... willing, hard and personally brave ... [but] excessively self-conscious stemming from his lack of discipline; he is fatalistically indifferent and makes poor judgments. The leadership is unimaginative and schematic, owing to the spirited interest of Spaniards in delayed, political type discussions. 69

Ultimately, the military value of the early volunteer formations of the Army and Waffen-SS must be measured at the time of their withdrawal in the summer of 1943. In the Army, the large Spanish Division had shown itself capable of performing as a second line German infantry unit in limited offensive and static defensive missions. Thanks to its size, its employment of regular army officers, and its replacement system, it performed well under a



harsh climate and demanding military situation. The smaller French Legion utterly failed in the same circumstances as a reinforcement regiment for combat duty with the German Army, and only over time and after thorough reorganization did it perform adequately as a rear area security unit. The Walloon Legion, almost a miniature of the French LVF, saw sparing use in rear security missions, stoutly fought in the defensive, and managed a single mop-up operation in the offensive. Its exploits hardly matched Degrelle's rhetoric and postwar memoirs, but it eventually developed an esprit and some level of internal cohesion under the care of its German division.

In the SS, the several thousand Germans and several hundred Germanic volunteers of SS Division had proven themselves worthy of elite division status after the drive into the Ukraine in 1941 and the demanding battles carried into the Caucasus in late 1942. However, casualties and a sluggish Germanic replacement system kept the proportion of Germans to Germanics quite high. Of the roughly six thousand men in the SS legions program, only the thousand Danes of the found employment as frontline troops as they reinforced the Totenkopf Division. After recovering from the crucible of Demansk, the Danes paralleled their fellow legionnaires in occupying static defenses with the SS infantry brigades. The Dutch Regiment and the Norwegian and Flemish battalions all became rear security units, fighting stiff mop-up operations in the Volkhov Pocket, and then joined the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade in the siege lines of Leningrad. In effect, the 2nd Brigade became a supra-legionary unit, presaging the legions' incorporation into the Waffen-SS as full-fledged units of the SS military order.

Wiking

Freikorps

70

The brief campaign in which Wehrmacht planners expected the volunteer formations to participate did not terminate with a victory parade in Moscow at year's end. Rather, the volunteers endured the second campaign year, emerging from the experience in 1943 with their strength sharply reduced. If the Germans were to capitalize upon volunteer manpower in their war effort, clearly more decisive and effective means of putting these forces into action would have to be found.

Notes:

Telegram, Stohrer to Foreign Minister, 22 June 1941, inU.S. Department of State, Ser. D, vol. 12, doc. 671, (Washington: G.P.O., 1964), 1080-81 (hereafter cited as DGFP). For Ribbentrop's circular, see Multex no. 401 of 21 June 1941, DGFP, vol. 12, 1072-73. Suñer's motivation drew as much from his desire to strengthen his own power as any genuine sympathy for the German effort. See Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1975), 29-30.

Note 1:Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945,

Spanien im Zweiten WeltkriegBack.

Telegram, Ribbentrop to Stohrer, 24 June 1941, DGFP, vol. 12, doc 671, fn. 2, 1081. For the best English language work on Germany's policy toward Spain in the war, see Charles B. Burdick, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); on the Spanish Volunteer Division, see Gerald R. Kleinfeld, and Lewis A. Tambs, (Carbondale, IL, Southern. Illinois University Press, 1979). Both these dated works must be corrected with the essays and bibliography appearing in Ricardo Recio Cardona, ed., (Madrid, Ediciones Vandalia, 1999), especially Rafael Ibáñez Hernández, "Españoles en las trincheras: la División Azul," 55-87. See also Stanley Payne and Delia Contreras, ed.,

(Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1996).

Note 2:

Germany's Military Strategy and Spain in World War II

Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia

Españoles en la II Guerra Mundial, el frente del Este

España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial Back.

The most authoritative analysis is Javier Tussel, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995); see especially 13-16,

83ff.

Note 3: Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: entre el Eje y la neutralidad.

Back.

Preface1. Introduction2. Propaganda3. Neutral Variation

Spanish DivisionPropaganda and

Utility4. Transformation5. Fanaticism6. CollaborationBibliographyMaps



Traditional notions justifying the decision to send Spanish volunteers are ably refuted by Denis Smyth, "The Dispatch of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front: Reasons and Repercussions," 24 (1994): 537-553. Rafael García Pérez has written a detailed dissertation and book covering the German-Spanish negotiations after the Spanish Civil War over German expenses. He alleges that a direct offset for German Civil War expenses was proposed by Spain, using Spanish Volunteer Division expenses totaling some 613.5 billion pesetas, of which 56.5 percent would have been charged against Spain's Civil War expenses, which in any event never saw a final resolution. Although an interesting construct, García Pérez' work does not alter my view of Franco as forever an opportunistic fence-sitter in the war;

(Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994), 263-67, 629, 505.

Note 4:

European History Quarterly

Franquismo y Tercer Reich: las relaciones económicas hispano-alemanas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial

Back.

Telegram, Stohrer to Foreign Ministry, 25 June 1941, DGFP, vol. 13, 16-17; Telegram, Heberlein (chargé) to Foreign Ministry, 4 July 1941, ibid., 81; Ramón Garriga,

(Buenos Aires: J. Alvarez, 1965), 273-79; Rafael Ibáñez Hernández, in "Españoles en las trincheras," 56-59, details the conditions of recruitment. Gonzales Saez and García Rebull interviews.

Note 5:Las

Relaciones Secretas Entre Franco y Hitler

Back.

Emilio Esteban-Infantes, (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1956), Introduction; Clyde L. Clark, (n.p., 1951), 410; Stanley G. Payne, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1967), 426-33. Ibáñez Hernández, "Españoles en las trincheras," 62-65.

Note 6: La División AzulEvolution of the Franco Regime

Politics and the Military in Modern SpainBack.

Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar (IHCM), Archivo General Militar de Avila, Archives of the Spanish Volunteer Division (División Española de Volontarios), Armario 28/Legajo 1/ Carpeta 4/Documento 1, and 28/331/2 (hereafter cited as DEV). Tables of Organization also appear in Esteban-Infantes, 25, and in OKH, T-78/ 412/6380886-7. Ramón Salas notes that the four-regiment scheme reflected the typical division structure of the Spanish Civil War, but other sources show the contemporary Spanish Army had already converted to the more modern triangular division. Ramón Salas Larrazábal, "La Division 'AZUL'," 158 (April 1990): 50. Ibáñez Hernández, "Españoles en las trincheras," 66, characterizes the fixed reserve regiment as a depot not intended for combat, but this is not supported by a reading of the division's documents above. The term "Blue Division" until recently was scorned by many regular officers —preferring the official designation of División Española de Volontarios—as is the term "soldiers," as opposed to official "volunteers." These were the 'politically correct' terms adopted by the Franco regime.

Note 7:

División Azul,

Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains

Back.

Jusús Salas Larrazábal, "Actuación en Rusia de los Escuadrillas Expedicionarias Españolas." 2 (October 1984): 50-96. The five squadrons served in sequence with Luftwaffe fighter groups supporting Army Group Center, hence never in support of their own division. The last flight withdrew in February 1944.

Note 8: Aeroplano

Back.

DEV, 28/33/1/2; Esteban-Infantes, 19; DGFP, vol. 12, 81. Fernando Vadillo, Orillas de Voljov (Barcelona: Edicones Marte, 1971), 39-40; Juan Eugenio Blanco, Rusia no es Cuestión de un Día (Madrid: Publicaciones Españoles, 1954), 7.

Note 9: División Azul,

Back.

DEV, 23/33/1/2. Esteban-Infantes, 25; Ibáñez Hernandez, "Españoles en las trincheras," 70. Note 10: División Azul,

Back.

Army Group North Report, T311/72/7093733-55, passim. The Spanish were undoubtedly encouraged to anticipate mechanization by a German request that they bring large numbers of motor vehicles and communication equipment. See the file of the Madrid Embassy in the German Foreign Office File, Series 502, filmed by the U.S. State Department in T120/295/728-9.

Note 11:

Back.



OKH files, T311/99/7130653.

Esteban-Infantes, 22-24; Blanco, Rusia no es Cuestión, 12-13; Vadillo, 145; Tomás Salvador, 250 (Barcelona: Ediciones Domus, 1954), 47; Tomás García Rebull interview, Madrid, 20/3/74.

Note 12: División Azul,Orillas de Voljov, División

Back.

Esteban Infantes, 22-24; Garriga, 273-80; Blanco, 13-14; DEV, 28/33/4/1; Ibáñez Hernandez, "Españoles en las trincheras," 71-72; García Rebull interview and Antonio Gonzales Saez interview, Madrid, 20/3/74.

Note 13: División Azul, Relaciones Secretas,Rusia no es Cuestión,

Back.

Dionisio Anfiesta interview, Madrid, 21/3/74; Andrés Gonzáles Martínez, (Madrid: Editorial Aeronautica, 1955), 29-50; Garriga, Relaciones

Secretas, 273-75.

Note 14: Alas Españoles Sobre Moscú

Back.

According to Förster, the German Army first planned a three-month training period, which was shortened to a single month on the pleading of Muñoz Grandes. This may indicate the prevalent sense of the volunteer groups that the war would end that fall with a victory parade in Moscow. Förster, "Freiwilligen," 1055.

Note 15:

Back.

Ninth Army Headquarters War Journal, T312/281/7842323-27. Note 16: Back.

6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Gräfe, 1965), 1:655-59 (hereafter cited KTB des OKW). Note 17: Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1940-45,

Back.

Franz Halder, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1964), 3:249. This simple operational reason for the change of the Spanish Division's zone of action has been missed by all other observers. Even Tussel suggests that perhaps the Germans changed the assignment because of their low opinion of the combat value of the unit (Franco, 290).

Note 18: Kriegstagebuch,

Back.

Esteban-Infantes, 57-59. An OKW letter dated 14 November 1941, titled "Operational Foreign Volunteers," lists the following (quoted):Note 19: División Azul,

Army Waffen-SS

1. Spanish Division Finnish Bn. in SS Division Das Reich

2. French reinforcement regiment in Army Group Center

2. Norwegian Bn.

3. Wallonian Battalion no. 373 of 97th Infantry Division

3. Dutch Legion - 1 Regt.

4. Croatian reinforcement regiment in 100th Infantry Division

4. Danish Bn.

5. Volksdeutsch Bn. from Slavic countries

Back.

DEV, 28/33/13/11; I Corps, T314/40/1200-34; Sixteenth Army, T312/544/8151643; Esteban-Infantes, 59. In light of the great disparities existing among German, Spanish, and Russian spellings of geographic names, the latest U.S. Army Map Service publications have been used for this study.

Note 20:División Azul,

Back.

DEV, 28/33/11/3; 250th Division, T315/1720/55-56; Esteban-Infantes, 59-70.

Note 21: División Azul, Back.

DEV, 28/34/1/1; Army Group North, T311/72/7093-155; Esteban-Infantes, 73-80; García Rebull and Gonzales Saez interviews. 33rd Corps replaced Group "von Roques" in command of the southern




Volkhov flank on 14 November. Back.

DEV, 28/34/3/3; 250th Division, T315/1726/59-64; Esteban-Infantes, 80-84; Vadillo, 621; Gonzales Saez and García Rebull interviews.

Gen. García Rebull recalled that in one company, the 3rd of the I/263 Battalion, only one officer and seven men remained to walk out of Posad on the night of 7 December.

Note 23: División Azul, Orillas de Voljov,

Back.

Esteban-Infantes, 80-86. Without exception those Spanish veterans interviewed expressed such respect for the volume and lethality of the Soviet artillery that they labeled it the "best in the world."


Back.

DEV, 28/34/3/3; 250th Division, T315/1726/66/274; Sixteenth Army, T312/544/3151850-5; Esteban-Infantes, 87-90; García Rebull interview. Note 25:

División Azul, Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093813; Esteban-Infantes, 105-08, 302; Jose Díaz de Villegas, (Barcelona: Ediciones Acervo, 1967), 158-59.

Note 26: División Azul, La División Azul en Linea

Back.

Army, T312/1596/692-830. Note 27: Back.

XXXVIII Corps, T314/898/960;DEV, 28/34/8/1/; Esteban-Infantes, 112-14. Note 28:


126th Infantry Division, T315/1360/79-80; Army Group North, T311/72/7093834-42; Esteban-Infantes, 114-19; Eighteenth Army, T312/1596/692-830.


Back.

Erich von Manstein, (Chicago: Regnery, 1958), 260-64; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 113-16; Emilio Esteban-Infantes,

abridged, translated with annotations by Werner Haupt (Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel, 1958), 152-55.

Note 30: Lost VictoriesBlaue Division: Spaniens Freiwillige

an der Ostfront,Back.

DEV, 28/35/12/1, 29/36/1/2; LIV Corps, T314/1352/277-83, 316; Esteban-Infantes, 119-27. Note 31:


Erich von Manstein, (Chicago: Regnery,1958),, 265-66; Haupt, 134-36 Note 32: Lost Victories

Heeresgruppe Nord, Back.

Clark, 353; Payne, 431-32; Carleton J. H. Hayes, (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 53-59.

Note 33: Evolution of the Franco Regime, Politics and the Military,Wartime Mission to SpainBack.

Ibañez Hernandez, "Españoles en las trincheras," 64-65. No satisfactory biography exists of either of the commanders of the Spanish Volunteer Division, and the memoirs of their interpreter errs into hagiography and Germanophilia. See Juan Ackermann Hanisch,

(Madrid: Barbarroja, 1993).

Note 34:

A las Ordenes de Vuecencia: Autobiografía del intérprete de los Generales Muñoz Grandes y Esteban-Infantes Back.

Army Group North, "Kriegsjahrbuch 1942," T311/136/7181595-732. Also see T311/99/7069367; Haupt, 141-48; Esteban-Infantes, 130.

Note 35:Heeresgruppe Nord, División Azul,

Back.

Army Group North, T311/99/7069406-55. Note 36: Back.

250th Division, T315/1726/431-36; Esteban-Infantes, 158-71; Gonzales Saez and Julio Esteban-Infantes interviews. The assault force consisted in the main of the Soviet 45th, 72nd, and 63rd Rifle Divisions, with two brigades of tanks and other supporting units. Ponte and Auzunema were posthumously awarded the on


Laureada



15 February 1944 and 20 November 1945, respectively. Back.

Army Group North, T311/99/70694070-93; L Corps, T314/1235/ 631-833; Esteban-Infantes, 170-77. Note 38:


Esteban-Infantes, 170-77.; 250th Division, T315/1726/437-44. Husemann noted the heavy Spanish casualties, but concluded that the "panicky flight of the Spaniards hazarded the left flank of the [SS Police] Division," Friedrich Husemann,

2 vols. (Osnabrück: Munin, 1971), 2:137.


Die guten Glauben waren, Back.

Husemann, 2:137 ; DEV, 29/39/11/1 and 29/40/8/1. Note 40: Die guten Glauben waren,Back.

Hayes, 157-65; Memo, Hayes to Secretary of State, 30 March 1943, in State Department, 6 vols. (Washington: G.P.O., 1962), 2:606; Airgram, Hayes to Secretary of State, 29 July 1943, 2:611-17; Samuel Hoare, Viscount Templewood,

(London: Collins, 1946), 250-59; Dieckhoff report in OKW files, T-77/885/5634781.

Note 41: Wartime Mission,Foreign Relations of the United States 1943,

FRUS 1943,Ambassador on Special Mission

Back.

Esteban-Infantes, 229-44; L Corps, T314/1244/283 and 1322; Eighteenth Army, T312/914/9097066. Note 42: División Azul,

Back.

DEV, 28/18/9/4. Note 43: Back.

DEV, 28/18/9/4, 11/4 and 15/2; OKW, T77/856/5601717-12, T/885/5634748; 5:1183-84, 1217, 1316; Esteban-Infantes, 229-44; Julio Esteban-Infantes interview.

Note 44:KTB des OKW,


Clark, 387; Segundo Cuaderno, (Madrid: Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular, 1943), 21-24. Postwar careers of many of the officers and men of the Blue Division were mentioned in Raymond Proctor,

(Moscow, ID: Research Foundation, 1974), a primarily diplomatic study with unfortunate inaccuracies in the recounting of the Spanish Division's operational history. Less unsatisfactory is Gerald R. Kleinfeld and Lewis A. Tambs,

Note 45: Evolution of the Franco Regime, La División Azul

Agony of a Neutral: Spanish-German Wartime Relations and the "Blue Division"

Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia Back.

Clausen letters 4/2/42, 19/2/42, T175/17/2520986-8; Himmler letter 4/3/42, T175/17/2520993-4. Note 46:

Back.

Himmler letter 28/2/42, T175/74/2592584-5. Note 47: Back.

Norman Rich, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 156-57; Text of Mussert speech in police report, 12/10/43, T175/63/2579155.

Note 48: Hitler's War Aims, vol. 2, The Establishment of the New Order

Back.

Berger letter, 5/4/42, T175/14/2635489. Note 49: Back.

Tommy J. Knight, "The Establishment of German Military Government in Belgium, 1940-41," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas, 1967), 122-23, 127-28. Conway, 61-175, passim.

Note 50:


Ninth Army, T312/281/78442327. Note 51: Back.

An excellent short evaluation of the German Army's peacetime organization is in Robert M. Kennedy, DAP 20-255 (Washington: G.P.O., 1956), 26-31.

Note 52:The German Campaign in Poland,

Back.

Eighteenth Army, T312/914/9097066. Note 53: Back.



Esteban-Infantes, 210-11;Emilio Esteban-Infantes interview. Note 54: División Azul,

Back.

250th Division, T315/1726/49. Note 55: Back.




Army Group North, T311/72/7093733-56; Sixteenth Army, T312/544/ 8151826. Note 59:

Back.

Esteban-Infantes, 95-96; Emilio Esteban-Infantes and Gonzales Saez interviews. Note 60: División Azul,

Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093721. Note 61: Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093779, 7093897; Esteban-Infantes, 205-06; Vadillo, Orillas de Voljov, 186; Blanco, 58.

Note 62: División Azul, Rusia no es Cuestión, Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7130677. Note 63: Back.

126th Infantry Division, T315/1360/79-89. Note 64: Back.

DEV, 28/35/7/2. Note 65: Back.

126th Division, T315/1360/86-90. The German view is supported in Salvador, Division 250, 251-56 and Vadillo, (Barcelona: Ediciones Marte, 1971), 402-06.

Note 66:Arrabales de Leningrado

Back.


Ibid., frame 7093839. Note 68: Back.

OKH, Foreign Armies South, T78/445/6419511. Note 69: Back.




4. Transformation in 1943

Reforming the Military System

With considerable use of propaganda from German and collaborationist sources, the Waffen-SS gained a few thousand troops in one Dutch regiment and three battalions of Danes, Norwegians, and Flemings. Recruiting, transportation, and training took so long that almost a full year elapsed before these units had taken position in the Leningrad sector of the Eastern Front. That front, for all its deadly combat and arduous conditions, had become the backwater of the Russo-German War by the end of 1941; the volunteer legions quite simply provided basic manpower to fill out the thin lines of a subsidiary German theater of war. Since the legions experienced difficulty in maintaining their strength at the front (because of casualties, sickness, etc.) one may conclude that the recruiting effort had run dry and the legionnaires simply represented an initial and relatively isolated wave of enthusiasm. As the war carried into 1942 and the Soviet state continued to refuse to collapse, potential volunteers for the legions may have lost their zeal.

1

On the other hand, the several thousand regular Waffen-SS recruits in the SS Division had proven themselves primarily in the more demanding battles in southern Russia, from the Ukraine in 1941 into the Caucasus in late 1942. The apparent reluctance of the Waffen-SS to throw the legions into the more decisive sectors was symptomatic of a bias against them that, in view of the deteriorating German fortunes, would have to be rectified.

Wiking

Himmler's regulations governing the national legions demonstrated his original intention to keep them separate from the more select ranks of the regular Waffen-SS. In a sense they became foreign auxiliaries, much as the legions of Rome had employed foreign levies to augment purely Roman units (although we shall see how—like the Romans—the Waffen-SS came to depend more and more on foreign troops to stem the tide). These foreign volunteer units were to be "appendages" to the Waffen-SS units ("

") and would be controlled through the central command office of the SS. The normal uniform of the Waffen-SS was altered to show the different status of its wearer, and the rank structure was also varied accordingly (e.g., a non-German major in the legion would be called a while a German major would be called

). Their oath was modified only to the extent that fidelity was pledged to Hitler solely as Führer, and not as Chancellor of the Reich.

der Waffen-SS angeglierdert

Legionssturmbannführer, SS-Sturmbannführer

1

The second-rate status of the legionnaires soon transcended purely bureaucratic levels, as they received considerable abuse from hard-bitten German drill instructors in the training camps. Lacking any recognition of the differing psychological, social, or cultural characteristics of the Germanic volunteers, the Germans injured the feelings of foreign officers and enlisted men alike. One can see from contemporary observations how far apart the Germans and the foreign volunteers remained in orientation. The subtle differences in volunteer motivations hardly came to light when, as higher bureaucrats lamented, "It is simply incomprehensible how little influence Waffen-SS methods have upon the men's ideological attitude." 2

Gottlob Berger had anticipated the need to correct German errors in handling volunteers in order to salvage his faltering Germanic recruitment program. In February 1942, he outlined several examples of SS bungling, which threatened to alienate all further recruiting efforts. Some volunteers who had served as officers and NCOs in the Russo-Finnish war had served too long in subordinate grades. The absence of sufficient measures to preserve the

5

Preface1. Introduction2. Propaganda3. Neutral Variation4. Transformation

Reforming the System

Germanic CorpsAssault BrigadesResults

5. Fanaticism6. CollaborationBibliographyMaps



nationality of volunteer units showed when nine Danish volunteers were killed in the SS (nominally an all-German unit) after only a brief training period. Failures to notify next of kin through military channels had also occurred in several cases. Since indicators of slackening recruitment had surfaced already, Berger recommended that Himmler promulgate an order emphasizing the importance of the Germanic portion of the SS; order improvements in postal services to the volunteer units; indoctrinate German unit commanders who supervised Germanic volunteers; and single out a portion of the volunteer group for officer and NCO courses.

Das Reich

3

Himmler sought in particular to improve the leadership skills of German officers and NCOs in the non-German volunteer units. He ordered them to devote their fullest attention to the "instruction and care" ( ) of and Germanic volunteers entering and leaving the service. He stressed that the failure to develop real comradeship would spoil the opportunity to win foreigners to service with the Waffen-SS and for the Führer. The volunteers had the unique perspective of serving far from the Reich—without the influence of German education and cultural heritage—and yet fighting in the cause of the Germanic order. Only by understanding this perspective would the SS leadership prove successful, in Himmler's view. A stream of orders from Himmler and his staff implemented these and other views of the Germanic "problem."

Erziehung und Umsorgung volksdeutsche

4

As the numbers of foreign SS troops slowly increased from recruiting, wounded returned from convalescence, and the withdrawal of the legions from the front for refitting, the problem of finding foreign officers of sufficient quality and experience to lead larger and more complex units demanded much attention. SS officers had benefited from six months of cadet training at the SS at Bad Tölz and Braunschweig (small numbers of cadets trained as well at army and technical schools). Hence, foreign officers and cadets began training at Bad Tölz in 1942 under Himmler's guidelines reforming the volunteer system. Officers graduating from Tölz received regular Waffen-SS rank rather than

legionary status, and technically remained indistinguishable from their German SS peers. Thus, by February 1943, 47 officers and 172 cadets from Flanders, Holland, Norway, and Denmark were training at Tölz. These efforts greatly improved the existing leadership capacities of the volunteer contingents in the Waffen-SS (which had only 7 native officers for 2300 men) and the four legions (with 50 officers for 6000 men).

Junkerschulen

5

6

The SS leadership hoped for even greater expansion of the Germanic volunteer pool, and special courses for Germanic cadets and officers were ordered in May 1943. This same order forbade the elevation of the Germanic officers to their former grades in their native services without graduation from Tölz and its strict training and examination process. The foreign volunteer officers received the standard moral, ideological, tactical, and technical training of the Bad Tölz curriculum, taught for the most part in German. The sole drawback to this essential construction of a volunteer officer corps lay in the time required to train these cadres, since the expansion of the foreign SS units consistently outstripped the production of Tölz graduates. 7

In the end, the opening of foreign labor pools in the Reich to SS recruiters proved the strongest impetus in improving the recruiting for the Western European SS formations. Albert Speer's Labor Ministry gave its approval to recruitment of Germanic volunteers in German factories in late April 1943. By July, Berger jubilantly reported his success to Himmler in signing up 2500 men, and forecast another 6500 enlistments by mid-September. Actually, Berger obtained some 8105 recruits by mid-August, but only 3154 proved suitable for duty: 8

"Recruited" "Suitable"

10

Kaisergruber:to GermanyKaisergruber:Joins Legion



Norwegians 2 2

Danes 211 119

Dutch 3262 1448

Flemings 1069 529

Walloons 904 279

French 2608 736

Swiss 47 40

Lichtensteiner 1 1

Estonian 2 1

TOTAL 8105 3154

The specific conditions and incentives that produced these recruits remain open to speculation. Sporadic reports from the SS recruiting offices in the western Reich indicate that recruiting teams made good use of propaganda films, fliers, and speeches by foreign SS veterans imploring their countrymen to take a stand against Bolshevism. Recruiters used some anti-Semitic propaganda as well. Although some complaints of strong-arm tactics and impressments of workers appear in recruiting office files, there is no corroboration in documents or the pertinent literature. 9

Because the French LVF remained on anti-partisan duty in the rear of Army Group Center and the Walloon Legion never returned to combat duty with the German Army, the army never had occasion to evaluate its method of handling foreign units. It of course already had its hands full maintaining millions of German conscripts in fighting shape on the Eastern Front as well as the Western Front later in the war. Volunteer formations that had been thrust upon the German Army in 1941 simply remained insignificant to all but a few harried staff officers charged with their maintenance. The sole exception was the Spanish Division, which merited attention because of its size and length of service at the front. Because Spain remained a "neutral" in the war and was not an occupied territory, it only shared some of the experiences of other nations providing volunteer units.

When the Spanish Volunteer Division formed and trained at Grafenwöhr during July and August of 1941, the Spanish Army virtually divested itself of control and responsibility for that unit. The volunteers in effect were handed over to German authority in almost the same sense that war materials changed hands between the two countries. Planning on a short and victorious campaign, no attempt was made by Spanish authorities to maintain a replacement organization or any kind of logistic support system. The only support echelon furnished to the Blue Division by its home government was the rear area medical

establishment. This consisted of small staffs of Spanish doctors and nurses in the German hospitals at Hof, Berlin, Königsberg, Vilna, and Smolensk (later, Riga), and a completely equipped hospital train manned by twenty Spanish doctors, thirty-two nurses, and twenty-eight orderlies. Based initially at Porkhov, the train would carry casualties in excess of its capacity to the Smolensk facility. 10

Left to fend for itself, the division relied upon a combination of experience and conscientious study to prepare for the Russian campaign. From commanding general to the most junior reserve lieutenant, the officers of the Blue Division had considerable experience from the Spanish Civil War and were aware of the impact of the latest weaponry upon tactics. The division staff sections translated a large number of the latest German doctrinal bulletins and battle experience studies and circulated them to all units. The commanders of the various units wrote basic orders and disseminated procedures for combat operations from their first days at Grafenwöhr. Every attempt was made to collate and disseminate German and Spanish combat experiences throughout the campaign in order to improve the division's



combat readiness and efficiency. In the area of training, however, nothing could be accomplished in the way of unit battle drills, which would fully indoctrinate the Spanish rank and file in the latest combat techniques necessary for the rigorous frontline operations in which they were quickly employed by the German command. The Spanish officers were quite stoic regarding this lack of combat temper within their units, however, and remained confident in the ability of the Spanish soldier to adapt to the most hostile environment and compensate for training deficiencies with the fiery spirit he had so often demonstrated in his previous "crusade against the Reds." 11

Generally, the officers were vindicated, as the Spanish Division carried out its various missions with a high degree of determination and personal sacrifice. Many of the Spanish officers showed a keen sense of leadership and demonstrated great energy in setting personal examples of dedication and endurance. Perhaps the most visible example of this type of officer was the first commander, General Muñoz Grandes. Already well known as a man of great integrity and professionalism, he endeared himself to his officers and men by sharing all of their hardships on the march and in combat. He was also very quick to demand similar sacrifices on the part of his subordinates, and impressed German observers more than any other Spaniard as a combat leader. The later Spanish commanders, Esteban-Infantes and García Navarro, were well-respected staff officers but did not impress the Germans nor many Spaniards as having the inspirational personality of their first leader. 12

15

The officers and men of the Blue Division soon had cause to regret their total dependence upon the Germans for logistical support. On the extremely cold Eastern Front, the Spaniards naturally suffered somewhat more than their German comrades, who themselves remained in dire straits due to the insufficient supply of winter clothing available in the winter of 1941-42. Equally uncomfortable for the Spanish troops were the German field rations and hardtack. As a partial solution, the Spanish government began in early 1942 to forward special trains to the division and squadron periodically which contained quantities of rice, coffee, condensed milk, olive oil, tobacco, wine and other items unobtainable from German sources. The division also requested a shipment of 15,000 pairs of boots during the first winter, indicating the extent to which the German supply system had failed. In general, the Spanish soldier was sufficiently hardy and withstood the multiple discomforts of poor rations, cold and wet weather, and rugged terrain about as well as the German soldier. Perhaps the most difficult condition the Spaniards encountered was the overwhelming quantity of supporting arms—tanks, artillery, and aircraft—that the Soviets employed against them. 13

The Spaniards encountered a clear problem in their continued recruitment program for replacements in the 1942-43 period. Although officers continued to volunteer in excess of requirements, attracting sufficient volunteers for the ranks grew increasingly difficult. This resulted in part from the diminution of anti-Communist enthusiasm on the part of Spaniards when it became obvious that no quick German victory was in sight. The return of the first severely wounded and disabled men from the front and the publishing of lengthy death notices also dampened volunteer ardor. This trend of lessening enthusiasm continued until—by mid-1943—the relief battalions numbered not students and workers among their ranks, but Spanish Legionnaires, from Morocco, Spanish Army soldiers, and a smattering of militia and civilian members. Undoubtedly many of these men were soldiers of fortune and troops bored with ordinary garrison duty. It has also been suggested that in many cases authorities placed some pressure upon men to obtain their services.

Regulares

14

The Germanic Corps

Before the withdrawal of the legions from the Eastern Front, Himmler had already



compromised the exclusive status of his foreign auxiliaries by combining them with each other and with German units. Thus, in September 1942, Himmler reported to Hitler that he would merge the legions with the formerly all-German SS brigades in Army Group North. The Danish volunteers joined one regiment of the 1st SS Brigade, and the Dutch and Norwegian Legions formed a regiment in the 2nd SS Brigade. Such mergers undoubtedly

stemmed from the experience of operating the weak legions in the huge combat maelstrom of the Russian Front. In recognition of the fact that only larger units were viable on the front and that the legion recruitment had already run its course, Himmler now decided to combine the available Germanic volunteers in a new multinational division modeled on the successful SS Division, as part of the 1942 expansion program of the Waffen-SS.

15

Wiking

The new division, christened the volunteer mechanized infantry division SS Nordland, absorbed the SS Nordland Regiment from Wiking, the remnants of the volunteer legions, and new replacements recruited in Norway, Denmark, and Holland under Berger's refurbished recruitment program. The impetus for creating the new "Germanic" division most likely arose from the potential for professional prestige and probable promotion for two men already connected with the volunteers in the Waffen-SS. 16

commander Felix Steiner, and Dr. Franz Riedweg, Berger's chief of the Germanic Directorate, argued their case persuasively to Berger in September of 1942. Military efficiency demanded larger and more cohesive units than any combination of legions would prove likely to produce. In addition, they argued, the political apron strings of the nationalist-collaborationist party leaders would have the least effect upon the volunteers if they served in the proper military environment of a frontline division. Finally, the greatest military potential and political benefits would accompany the establishing of a corps command as flag bearer for the Germanic doctrine of the SS.

Wiking

17

20

Himmler's decision, after viewing the improved recruiting figures, came in February 1943. He ordered the establishment of the new division to duplicate SS and with it a tactical corps headquarters to be commanded by General Steiner. Hitler approved the formation, to be named . Its three regiments would take native versus German names: and The Flemish volunteers would remain separated from the other groups for political reasons, and would later form a separate brigade. As a replacement for its lost regiment, the Division would receive the SS Regiment, based upon the Estonian Legion, which in reality never exceeded battalion size.

Wiking,

SS NordlandDanmark, Norge, Nederland.

Wiking Narwa

18

The Germanic character of the Division and the parent scarcely extended beyond the three regiments of infantry. The armored regiment,

divisional artillery, and other support units were filled by German SS personnel and recruits recently obtained by Berger from Romania. To make matters worse, Himmler and his staff found that the foreign volunteers and their supporters in the homeland did not relish such close association with each other in a Germanic division, after having experienced a degree of independence in the national legions. Mussert and German authorities in Holland warned that the name would offend the Dutch, since it suggested the Scandinavian nationalities. Berger produced evidence supporting Mussert's opinion that a Dutch division could be formed (some 15,000 Dutch volunteers then served in the SS and various party militia and auxiliaries in Holland). Himmler ordered the SS Regiment separated from SS and formed a distinct Dutch division, later scaled down to brigade size. The 4th

concentrated former Dutch legionnaires in one regiment, designated the 48th Regiment SS and new recruits and transfers in another, named the 49th Regiment SS Further expansion was not possible before the brigade joined the III Germanic SS Corps for training.

Nordland III (Germanic) SS Armored Corps

volksdeutsch

Nordland

Nederland NordlandSS Mechanized

BrigadeNederland

General Seyffard,De Ruyter.

19



As originally conceived by SS headquarters, the III Germanic SS Corps would field two battle-worthy divisions, and manned by ten thousand Germans and ten thousand Germanic volunteers. At the end of 1943, this corps would enter combat as one of four elite corps of the expanded Waffen-SS. In actuality, when this corps assembled in Yugoslavia for training, it did so with only the Division and Brigade. The elite Division could not be spared from the southern Russian front. In addition, the resulting national mixture proved wholly inadequate vis-à-vis the original plans. Only 4900 Germanic volunteers (Danes, Dutch, and Norwegians, with a few Swedes and Flemish) had reported to the corps. Likewise, a mere 5600 German Waffen-SS men could be found, requiring the inclusion of over 8400 troops.

Wiking Nordland,

Nordland NederlandWiking

volksdeutsch 20

Although some additional Nordic volunteers remained in the SS Division, it seems doubtful that they ever exceeded a few hundred in number. The corps staff blamed new

problems in recruiting and personnel administration for their shortfalls. New repressions in Holland by occupation authorities, the illegal general strike by the Dutch, and the drafting of workers between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five into the Reich Labor Service posed new problems for SS recruiters. Competition from the Dutch homeguard—where combat duty proved less likely—and the German Navy, which was opened to Germanic recruitment in 1943 by Hitler, proved problematic as well. The establishment of a Norwegian volunteer ski battalion for SS Division Nord on the Arctic Front required leaders and troops from the Norge Regiment.

Wiking

21

Strength by Nationality, December 1943III GERMANIC ARMORED CORPS

Unit Germans (%) Volksdeutsche (%) Germanics (%)

SS Nordland 4131 (33) 5895 (47) 2491 (20)

SS Nederland 1048 (19) 2148 (40) 2230 (41)

Corps Troops 443 (44) 386 (38) 181 (18)

TOTAL 5622 (30) 8429 (44) 4902 (26)

25

The latter scarcely could afford such transfers virtually on the eve of battle. 22

Far from being a large multinational corps command, the III Germanic SS Corps had taken shape as a German SS Corps under which the several expanded legions had been grouped and some of the new drafts from Romania attached. The language of command was German, as were the senior commanders: Steiner commanding the corps, Brigadier General Fritz von Scholz commanding the SS Division, and Brigadier General Jürgen Wagner (formerly regiment commander of SS ) leading the SS Brigade. German officers commanded all the regiments, and foreign SS officers held command only at the battalion and company levels, filling about half of these positions.

volksdeutsch

NordlandGermania

Nederland

23

After forming these large units, the SS command transported the entire corps in August to Yugoslavia for training and to assist in the anti-partisan war in the Balkans, recently vacated by Italian units after Italy's surrender. The difficulty of carrying out training exercises and hunting partisans can only be inferred from the corps operations report, which noted two officers and forty-one enlisted men killed (2/109 wounded) during this period! Four Iron Crosses, first class, and forty-four of the second class were awarded to men of the corps at the same time for combat exploits.

In late November, after ten weeks' training in Yugoslavia, the corps headquarters and Division began movement to the Leningrad front and its Nordland



assigned sector, with the Brigade following three weeks later. SS tank unit—the only one available to the corps—was sent west to train in the new Panther tank, leaving the corps with only artillery and assault guns for support until the new year.

Nederland Nordland's

24

Steiner's corps reached the Oranienbaum front, its initial assignment under the Eighteenth Army. This was a salient around the port of Oranienbaum bypassed in the initial German drive of 1941 because of its forbidding terrain. Third-rate units had guarded it in the past, but German commanders watched nervously as the Russians built up reserves behind the Leningrad front and reinforced the Oranienbaum front for the anticipated winter offensive of 1944.

30

Steiner estimated the SS Division as combat ready and capable of meeting Soviet Army attacks, but not yet up to the demands of a major battle. The division featured a skilled and experienced division staff which still lacked the cohesion that comes from working as a team. He considered the subordinate leaders "hard and experienced," and the battle spirit of the troops very good. His SS Brigade was not ready to face a tank attack, and required more training. He reported to higher headquarters that he would use the Dutch Brigade for coastal defense until it became more battle-worthy.

Nordland

Nederland

25

The III SS Corps' commander took operational responsibility of the Oranienbaum secto on 27 November 1943, subordinating the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions and numerous small units then in the lines. The SS Division began occupying the lines on 13 December, when the SS Regiment relieved four army battalions. By the year's end, the two Luftwaffe Divisions guarded the east side of the Soviet salient, with on the south and on the west side. Steiner's Corps also exercised control over various army, navy, and replacement units, organized as Battle Group "Coast" under the command of none other than Brigadier General C. P. Kryssing, the original Danish Freikorps commander, now the corps artillery officer. He had been promoted to general rank on 1 August 1943, the first foreign volunteer to attain that rank in the German armed forces.

NordlandNorge

NordlandNederland

26

This situation barely lasted two weeks, for the Soviet winter offensive of 1944 began on the Leningrad front on 14 and 15 January with twin assaults delivered by Soviet armies into the narrow corridor separating Leningrad and Oranienbaum. The assault destroyed the 9th Luftwaffe Division and threatened the neighboring 10th with collapse. Steiner used battalions of the Division and Brigade to stave off disaster on the collapsing flank for a week, and then as a rear guard for a rapid withdrawal to the Luga River line to the east. Finally, the Corps occupied the Narva Salient, a land bridge connecting the Gulf of Finland with Lake Peipus, the northern hinge of Army Group North as it faced the Russian attacks from the emergency "Panther" Line with only half the

frontline strength it possessed prior to 14 January. During February, the Soviets attacked the Narva salient frontally against the newly arrived 20th Estonian SS Division, which held. Next came a dangerous penetration

in March on the southern flank, between SS and the neighboring 11th Infantry Division. and the army units executed three counterattacks to restore the German lines. Then came a series of powerful attacks into the city of Narva from the east. The Brigade resisted these attacks, incurring

very heavy losses. The 49th Regiment lost half its strength, and the 48th Regiment virtually ceased to exist. Then came the 24th Regiment's turn to bleed, as it drew heavy attacks south of Narva city. By July, the infantry companies of SS Division mustered under one hundred men each, and both infantry regiments dropped to two weak battalions each. But they held, and the stand of the

Nordland Nederland

27Nordland

Nordland

NederlandDe Ruyter

SeyffardDanmark

Nordland



Narva SS troops received great publicity in war propaganda, being one of the few bright spots in a miserable winter for the German forces. Steiner's superior commander, General Grasser, nominated him for the Swords of the Knight's Cross. This act received hearty endorsement by the beleaguered commander of the Eighteenth Army, General Lindemann. He called Steiner's Narva battle a "defensive success for the whole eastern front ... holding off eleven divisions and six tank units of the Soviet Second Shock and Eighth Armies with his weakened two divisions and single brigade."

28

By the end of March, the III SS Armored Corps reported over 7500 casualties in SS and SS representing thirty-three percent and sixty-two percent, respectively, of their strengths upon arrival in December.

Nordland Nederland,

Killed Wounded Missing (Officers/Enlisted)

DivisionNordland 24/788 58/2708 9/516

BrigadeNederland 25/626 33/2244 5/473

35

Against these heavy losses, the corps had absorbed 1336 replacements from the remnants of the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions and some army units, of which 710 went to SS and 482 to SS These statistics lend credence to survivors' reports that fewer than half of the foreign SS men survived the Narva Battle.

Nordland Nederland.

29

Pressure continued from Russian forces through the summer of 1944 against Army Group North, but it was the collapse of the German Army Group Center that summer that doomed the northern group. Army Group North first had to give up first-rate divisions to set up new fronts against the Soviets around the collapsing central front. Then the burden of overextending German lines and a dangerous thrust toward Riga in the rear of Army Group North forced a precipitous retreat by the Germans across Estonia and intothe Courland ( ) Peninsula. The III SS Armored Corps withdrew there in fairly good order, providing battalions as "alarm units" to block Russian thrusts along the way. The corps then anchored the center of the Courland Army Group lines in mid-September and prepared for yet another defensive winter battle.

Kurland

30

The Assault Brigades ( )Sturmbrigaden

While the Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian Waffen-SS volunteers fought in the icy north in their regiments under General Steiner against the Soviet 1944 winter offensive, their Flemish, Walloon, and French comrades fought in independent formations attached to the German field armies in the south, under equally harsh conditions.

Himmler had decreed early in 1943 that the Flemish volunteers would not serve in the

LeningradFront



units of the III Germanic SS Armored Corps. He continually saw political dangers in mixing Flemish and Dutch groups, for fear that such association would fuel the "Greater Holland" notions of Staf de Clerq and his Flemish National Union Party. He authorized the establishment of a separate regiment for the Flemish, to be sent to the 4th SS Police Division, with other Flemish volunteers detailed as infantry replacements for Division's SS Regiment and as replacement technical troops in the existing first line SS divisions (excepting the 1st SS ).

WikingGermania

Leibstandarte 31

The Flemish Brigade

SS Headquarters ordered the conversion of to at the end of May, in compliance with Himmler's policy. By combining the some six hundred effectives from the legion with available Flemish recruits and replacements in the SS depots, the SS envisioned forming a reinforced battalion (three infantry companies and a machine-gun company) together with separate companies of infantry, assault, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank guns, all of these motorized. The brigade trained in Bohemia with its new equipment through the latter half of the year.

Legion FlandernAssault Brigade SS Langemarck

32

40

These assault brigades, established under the SS reorganization of 1943, were organized as balanced forces of all arms rather than as infantry regiments. In the field, they served as rapid reinforcement elements, compatible with and augmenting the strength of the regular SS divisions, which spent more and more time at the front as the German situation on the Eastern Front began to deteriorate. On just such a mission, the Flemish volunteers, still led by Major Konrad Schellong, moved by rail in December toward Army Group South, then reeling from sequential Soviet attacks along its front.

Assault Brigade SS joined the 2nd SS Das Reich Division, then fighting at battle group strength under the Fourth Panzer Army. The German forces fought into 1944 to restore their broken Ukrainian front south of Zhitomir. The Flemish brigade deployed first to Staro Constantinov and then Yampol, anchoring the left flank of their division and the LIX Corps of the Fourth Panzer Army against a forty-mile gap in the German lines, extending westward. The brigade mopped up battalion-sized pockets of Soviet troops in its zone in late February, but major Soviet attacks began to hit the brigade in its Yampol position as the Soviet offensive in the Ukraine found its second wind. Regimental attacks from three sides were repulsed on 29 February at a cost of thirteen killed and forty-five

wounded. The Russians returned with "overwhelming strength" on 2 March, hitting the Flemings from two directions. They held their positions by means of sharp counterattacks, but after a day the Flemish SS evacuated their wounded and began to withdraw to the southeast. Soviet tanks and infantry caught them on 4 and 5 March, and they only broke through to friendly lines by infiltration.

Still, the German command credited the SS Brigade with destroying or capturing nineteen tanks, eleven artillery pieces, eighteen mortars, twenty-four anti-tank guns, and numerous weapons. Some sixty-one prisoners were taken, and about two thousand Russian troops killed during the month at the front. Major Schellong, wounded in this fight, received the Knight's Cross with a citation crediting SS Langemarck's stand at Yampol with saving the major fortress of Tarnopol further to the south.

Langemarck

Langemarck

33

There was little rest for the Flemish troops at Staro Constantinov, however, as the Germans pulled the entire corps back to Proskurov and built a new line of resistance there. The entire First Panzer Army then had to fight its way out of a pocket, withdrawing behind the Saret River in April. The Brigade came out of the Ukraine with an estimated combat strength of four hundred, barely twenty-eight percent of its fielded

Langemarck



strength. Losses in the officer corps hit the brigade especially hard. The brigade commander, all company commanders, and most platoon leaders had become casualties. The survivors gathered in Knowitz, Czechoslovakia in late April for refitting and retraining. 34

The brigade recovered rather rapidly from its ordeal, as new recruits and returned convalescent troops swelled its ranks to 47 officers, 262 NCOs, and 1422 men by 30 June 1944. Konrad Schellong, now promoted to lieutenant colonel, resumed command of the brigade, now formed into two battalions (each of three infantry companies, one weapons, and one anti-tank company) and four support companies of artillery, assault guns, and light and heavy anti-aircraft guns. 35

On 19 July, the First Battalion, under Captain Wilhelm Rehmann, was ordered on the march to the Narva front as a reinforcement to the beleaguered III Germanic SS Armored Corps. On 25 July, the battalion occupied the lines with the SS Regiment of the battered Brigade. The Flemings also reinforced the SS Regiment as Steiner's corps withdrew towards Courland amid heavy fighting. Some 130 Flemish survivors embarked, shipping in Reval for their return to Germany. On 30 October, these remnants joined their brigade near Soltau as it reorganized for expansion to division status.

De Ruyter NederlandNorge

36

The French Brigade

45

The origins of the French Assault Brigade differed greatly from the Flemish unit. The French legion, or LVF, remained in action with the German Army until the summer of 1944. Almost a year earlier, however, recruiting began in occupied France for a French unit of the Waffen-SS. Individual Frenchmen had enlisted in the Waffen-SS in France and Germany since 1942 but had not served together in a single unit. By late 1942, Himmler apparently had overcome his varied prejudices and Francophobia so that he could approach Hitler for permission to form a French SS regiment ( ). Hitler's reaction to his henchman's idea, while undoubtedly interesting, remains undocumented. Himmler confirmed in mid-December that the regiment would become an assault brigade and would include no members of the LVF. The latter point permitted the inclusion of only those of the highest racial standard in the ranks of the French SS, men who thought and appeared as "Germanics." Himmler proposed the names "Charlemagne" or "Gobineau" for the formation, the latter after Count Joseph Gobineau, "the founder of racial study and proponent of Germanic thought in France."

Standarte

37

The Laval government agreed under pressure from the German government to permit a Waffen-SS recruitment program in France for a French SS unit, with the understanding that they would not fight on French territory or against the Free French Forces. The usual committee of collaborationist luminaries formed to support the drive. Laval's proclamation of 23 July 1943 gave all French SS recruits identical legal status with members of the LVF. Officers and NCOs of the former French Army could qualify for command after attending appropriate SS schools. Sixteen recruiting stations recruited volunteers in the provinces for the central Paris SS office. 38

In the first six months of official recruiting in France and among French laborers in Germany, some 30 officers, 44 NCOs, and 1614 enlisted men assembled as the

. The groups trained in Sennheim, Alsace, under 8th French

SS Volunteer Assault Brigade



SS Major Heinrich Hersche, a former Swiss Army officer. Unlike the other Waffen-SS formations, the Assault Brigade SS Frankreich used French as their language of command (as would be the case with the Walloon SS). The SS even convened a special officer's course at Bad Tölz in the first three months of 1944. There, twenty-eight former officers and cadets of the French Army received the standard SS cadet course, taught by French-speaking instructors. 39

The senior French volunteer, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Marie Gamory-Dubourdeau, received a commission as major in the Waffen-SS at the end of the course and returned to SS as its commander. The confidence the SS leaders placed in their training techniques became apparent when the first operation orders came to the brigade. On 20 July, the operationally ready First Battalion, under command of Captain Pierre Cance, detached for duty on the Eastern Front with the 18th SS Infantry Division battle group. A German liaison staff commanded by an SS lieutenant accompanied Cance to interpret orders, but the SS command forbade any exercise of authority over Cance. Major Gamory continued training his staff and other units with German assistance.

Frankreich

Horst Wessel

40

The French SS men entraining for the front in the summer of 1944 were young men led by young officers who had been seasoned at Bad Tölz in SS leadership and tactical skills. Although they came from diverse social and economic backgrounds, the internal dissension typical of the French LVF did not prevail in SS The detailed screening and vigorous physical training of the SS account for some of the differences. But the high morale of these volunteers reflected the ideological commitment of the French collaborationists and their in volunteering for service with what they recognized as the military elite of the conqueror's war machine. Perhaps this essential cohesion made the difference in the performance of French SS men under fire compared to the men of the LVF some two and a half years earlier.

Frankreich.

esprit

41

50

In early August, the French SS battalion joined the 18th SS Infantry Division, deployed in defensive positions in reduced strength near Sanok, Galicia. The battalion secured the left flank of the division and held its lines in a reliable fashion as the German forces regrouped on the Eastern Front. Then, on 19 August 1944, the division began its withdrawal, as the German Army Group North Ukraine began to fall back before the late summer Soviet assaults. Several sharp fights with Russian troops in this retrograde movement produced about a hundred French battlefield deaths, including seven officers. Still, the battalion emerged from the fighting intact under its

commander, Cance, with three hundred effectives. The French SS men earned fifty-eight Iron Crosses, second class, from the commander of the SS battle group. The battalion then boarded transportation to Schwarnegast in the Danzig corridor, where the entire assault brigade had assembled, now totaling three battalions and some two thousand men.

Horst Wessel

Horst Wessel

42

The Walloon Brigade

The veterans and new recruits of spent the first six months of 1943 on leave, assembling and retraining at Pieske, near the Polish frontier. Rexist Party leader Degrelle spent much of this time persuading the SS hierarchy to take the Walloon volunteers into the Waffen-SS. Berger told Himmler on 5 January that Degrelle had made inquiries about forming a Walloon SS unit in the summer of 1943. Degrelle greatly admired the SS troops for their youth and enthusiasm for National Socialism. The Army officers, he claimed, appeared older, more

Legion Wallonie



conservative, and easily tired by the rigors of campaigning. The SS represented mental toughness and physical strength; character counted for more than did intelligence. The mysticism of the SS credo seemed analogous to what Degrelle sought to impress on his countrymen through the mysticism of the Rexist movement. Degrelle also considered postwar politics in his decision to seek SS sponsorship. For him, it was clear that army veterans would have no role in the politics of the New Order after the war—the SS state represented the future. Although Berger remained lukewarm to Degrelle's pressure, Degrelle won over Himmler personally with his persistent arguments about the presence of Germanic blood in the Walloons and promises of two thousand recruits in Walloon Belgium ready to enlist in the Waffen-SS. With this shift toward the SS, Degrelle cast his lot firmly with the German side, to the astonishment of many of his more national-minded party followers. By 1944, the Legion clearly meant more to Degrelle than the Rexist Party, and he became the undisputed icon of New Order Europe, making speeches in sympathetic circles in Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, and Paris. 43

Himmler came to an agreement with the German Army and Armed Forces High Command about the SS takeover of the Walloon Legion in May 1943. There appears no evidence that

the Army resisted the loss of the enlarged, two-battalion legion. Effective 1 June, the Walloon volunteers became the Volunteer Brigade SS later numbered as the

. Himmler determined the existing two battalions of 1600 men (700 of them veterans) too weak for use as a brigade without supporting arms units. Although he foresaw eventual expansion to a full mountain or infantry division, Himmler ordered the troops redistributed into one battalion of infantry with additional companies of anti-tank, light artillery, and engineers, and planned to introduce artillery units as new recruits arrived. Captain Lippert would retain command in the SS, with promotion to major.

Wallonien, 6th SS Volunteer Assault Brigade

44

Although Himmler first envisioned sending the Walloons to the SS Cavalry Brigade for use in anti-partisan operations, by July he had decided to equip them as a first-rate motorized assault brigade. Perhaps he felt encouraged by a staff report that month which identified over 18,000 Belgians in military service. These included Flemings and Walloons of the SS, home guard auxiliaries, and transport services. The report stated that service in the Waffen-SS still attracted youthful Belgians, who recognized that service as the most distinguished. 45

Himmler also agreed to Degrelle's request that French be the language of command in the brigade and that their chaplain be incorporated into the organization. His pleas that the brigade be allowed to carry the Belgian flag and fight in Belgian uniform as the core of a new Belgian Army fell on deaf ears, however. The other legions absorbed into the Waffen-SS fared less well, and perhaps the youth and romantic zeal of Degrelle appealed to the equally dreamlike Reichsführer-SS. 46

55

The Walloon Brigade completed its combined arms training in the Waffen-SS at Wildflecken and entrained on 11 November for the Eastern Front as a reinforcement unit for the SS Division at Korsun in the Ukraine. The 1850 man brigade, with its 250 vehicles, would prove a welcome addition to still heavily engaged on the front despite the loss

of its SS Regiment earlier in that year. The German forces stood on the defensive against successive Soviet attacks through the winter of 1943-44.

Wiking

Wiking,

Nordland

47

The Division initially employed the new brigade piecemeal, scattering companies into the veteran and Regiments and the division rear. By 5 December,

WikingGermania Westland

Assault GunStG IIIG



though, the brigade held its own portion of the front: a quiet, forested sector some twenty-five kilometers wide. The division counterattacked some Russian penetrations in early January, and Degrelle volunteered the brigade to eliminate a salient remaining before the village of Teklino, between the Germania Regiment and the Battalion. Narva 48

Assembling companies in depth, the Walloon Brigade attacked from 14 through 17 January to clear the two kilometers of Russian defenders. The brigade sustained about 200 casualties in this effort, its baptism of fire in the service of the Waffen-SS. 49

The Walloons could not congratulate themselves for long, though, as the Soviet Sixth Tank Army ripped through the German lines on 26 January and completely encircled the German

forces in the Korsun area two days later. Inside this pocket (called Cherkassy to this day by German veterans, though that town remained outside the pocket) stood some 56,000 German troops of five divisions and supporting units (of the XI and XLII Corps). Higher headquarters organized an airlift to supply the beleaguered defenders and rushed parts of two Army armored corps to relieve them, but ultimately the troops

had to fight their way out over the last nine kilometers to friendly lines. 50

The Walloon Brigade, initially positioned in the northeast extremity of the pocket, gradually fell back under pressure toward the Korsun airstrip, as the German commander of troops in the pocket prepared for relief or breakout to the west. By 11 February, the Walloons took up their final positions around Novo-Buda (southwest of Korsun), bringing some 350 of their wounded with them. Only 250 effective combat troops of the Walloons remained in action, with five anti-tank guns and two infantry guns. Four German tanks remained in support. A sniper killed Major Lippert the next day, while he was scouting his lines. Taking his place was Léon Degrelle, promoted to captain on 30 January, now the fifth commander of the Walloon volunteers. 51

60

The Walloons struggled through the perilous breakout operation with SS Division. Some 30,000 of the 56,000 German troops made good their escape, albeit without weapons and equipment.

In all, some 1100 Walloons died or fell into captivity at the Korsun pocket. The approximately 650 dazed survivors, like their German counterparts, proved incapable of further duty after their narrow escape, and the German command moved them to Wildflecken for rest and reorganization.

Wiking

52

German propaganda attempted to portray the Korsun breakout as a defensive victory. Degrelle played some part in this effort and gained some measure of Nazi support in the process. He flew out from the front after the breakout (Hitler had wanted him flown out earlier, but the airstrip had fallen). On 23 February, Degrelle made a radio broadcast about the battle. He played down the obvious dangers the German forces had faced and lied about the numbers of Germans lost in the pocket. He characterized it as a typical breakout, where the Germans asserted their tactical superiority over the Russians. Four days later, he made a seventy-five minute speech at the Brussels Sports Palace to an estimated crowd of 10,000 Belgians. After the war, Degrelle claimed that the Korsun (Cherkassy) breakout became a shot in the arm for the European Waffen-SS, as all national units grew to division size as a result of increased recruiting, but this peculiar growth will be studied in the following chapter. 53

It suffices to observe that, in the space of a few days, Degrelle received the Knight's Cross and promotion to major of the SS from Hitler. On 1 April, he received another rare personal honor as he led a motorized

Kaisergruber:Breakout

Degrelle andHitler

WalloonParade



detachment of SS as it paraded through Brussels and Charleroi. It encamped near Mons so that its veterans could enjoy a three-week furlough. The veterans of SS

caustically remarked later that they had endured their own "Cherkassy" but had no Degrelle in their ranks to guarantee them appropriate publicity.

Wallonie

Langemarck

54

The Assault Brigade Wallonie slowly recovered in its new training camps in Germany. In May 1944, some 800 new recruits arrived in camp. In Degrelle's absence, Major Tchekhoff, a former commander from the legion days, took charge until Major Franz Hellebaut, a Belgian Army general staff officer,

arrived after his release from a prisoner of war camp. Hellebaut would command the Walloon Brigade tactically through the end of the war, although he nominally served as chief of staff under Degrelle. This arrangement was a legacy of Lucien Lippert, who maintained a

correspondence with Hellebaut during the war and asked the latter to take command if he were killed. 55

At the end of July, the brigade moved to Breslau and continued training. Vehicles and weapons were issued, and the brigade's strength swelled to some 1800 effectives. During September, a number (estimated at over 1500) of new recruits drawn from factories, prisoner of war camps, and Rexist paramilitary formations arrived in training camp, the beginning of a refugee flood that caused the Germans to consider expanding SS to nominal division size. Wallonie 56

65

A final episode in the life of the Walloon Assault Brigade paralleled that of its Flemish sister formation, SS Langemarck. In mid-July, the Germans called for a reinforcement battalion to be sent to the III Germanic Corps in Estonia, which was being bled white in the Narva battles. Accordingly, a battle group of three companies and some support units—440 men in all—entrained for the Eastern Front under command of a First Lieutenant Reulle. On 25 July, this unit unloaded at Johvi, forty-five kilometers west of Narva. At this point, Léon Degrelle joined this small band of Walloons from Brussels and assumed command.

Rather than reinforcing the III Germanic Corps, though, the Walloon battalion marched south to the vicinity of Dorpat (or Tartu), where it was thrown into a fluid, confused muddle of German units attempting to contain the Soviet breakthrough at Pskov. On 10 August, the Walloons joined Battle Group "Wagner." For three weeks, they fought against Soviet infantry, tank, artillery, and air assaults. At the end of that period, only half of the battalion remained in action. As the Germans retreated toward Courland, the Walloon battalion left through the port of Reval, rejoining

the assault brigade at Breslau in September. The anti-tank platoon leader, Lieutenant Léon Gilles, a veteran legionnaire since 1941, won promotion and a Knight's Cross in this action. Degrelle again flew out of the combat zone to confer with SS headquarters in Berlin and received the Oak Leaves to go with his Iron Cross from the Führer. The SS

Regiment57 Norge

As noted above in the discussion of the organization of the Germanic Corps by the SS, the recruitment of expert skiers in Norway diverted numerous volunteers from the SS Regiment. In the late summer of 1942, some 120 Norwegians responded to the call by the SS by volunteering for service in northern Finland in the SS mountain division stationed

Norge

Kaisergruber:Degrelle

Kaisergruber:Degrellein command

Kaisergruber:Lippert



there (the 6th SS Nord Division, an all-German unit formed in 1942). The company trained together in infantry tactics through the fall at the SS training camp at Sennheim, Alsace. Officers attended the cadet course at Bad Tölz. Military ski training followed for the Norwegians at Dresden at the German Police training center. Finally, in February 1943, the company entrained for Danzig and there joined their officers, newly graduated from Bad Tölz. By ship, train, bus, and foot, the Ski Company moved through Finland beyond the Arctic Circle to join the SS Nord Mountain Division. Subordinated to the reconnaissance battalion, the Norwegians found themselves on the division's north flank, patrolling out of wooden huts and bunkers built into the snow. The May thaw brought the skiers' skirmishing activities to a halt and they returned home for leave in July. Allied intelligence reported that ninety men returned to Norway and immediately toured the country in a propaganda campaign. 58

The success of using Norwegian ski specialists stimulated the SS command to expand the Ski Company to battalion size, even at the expense of drawing Waffen-SS men from the SS Regiment operating in Army Group North. As early as April 1943, Berger had urged the to combine the skiers with the SS Regiment to ensure the success of the conversion of the old Norwegian Legion into a regiment of the Waffen-SS, but Himmler insisted on keeping the skiers with the SS Mountain Division, saying that they would transfer to SS only if the latter expanded to division strength. In the end, volunteers filled out three ski companies and a staff company. Their Norwegian officers had experience from SS or the Legion and had trained at Bad Tölz. A German officer commanded the battalion, which trained in the fall of 1943 in Oulu, Finland.

NorgeReichsführer-SS Norge

NordNorge

Wiking

59

In January, the Norwegian skiers returned to SS where they again formed a scouting and security screen on its north flank. Later, another contingent of volunteers, the Second Police Company, joined the battalion. Recruited from among Norwegian police for a six-month term of service, the police company augmented the skiers' defensive positions, but departed in April for the homeland. In June, the battalion suffered several attacks from Russian forces in regimental strength. Personnel reorganization came as some 150 men returned home and 200 more, including the 150-man Third Police Company, joined the battalion in August.

Nord,

60

The Finnish capitulation in September brought an end to the ski battalion's career, along with the other units of the German Twentieth Army, all of which retreated into northern Norway from their positions before Murmansk. As the German forces passed through Narvik, the ski battalion detached from SS which transferred to the Western Front, and boarded ship and train to reach Mysen in southern Norway in early December. There the skiers sat out the end of the war without seeing any further action.

Nord,

61

Political and Military Results

70

As the last days of 1943 faded, the German armed forces gathered their resources and prepared to face what their leadership increasingly saw as the decisive year of struggle. Could the German forces hold a defensive position in the East until the Allies' second front invasion attempt, expected in the spring, was repulsed? If so, the entire Wehrmacht could return eastward and resume the offensive en masse with a vengeance. As it turned out, neither objective could be attained. German forces would only take the offensive in limited counterattacks through the end of the war.

The Germans could look with some satisfaction, however, upon their revisions to their methods in the military use of foreign volunteers. The Waffen-SS improvements in recruiting, training, and fielding volunteers and mixed units had produced tangible results



compared to the questionable and varied performances of volunteer units the previous year. To be sure, the declining German fortunes on the battlefield had modified the first instinct, which had been to view foreign contingents as mere propaganda troops. Previously, only Himmler and his inner circle had envisioned a large foreign military contingent. Now, the entire institution of the SS saw the occupied Western states as valuable sources of military manpower as well as the of the labor manpower that was already being exploited. This fundamental change in values among the German leadership, particularly the SS middle-tier leadership, proved necessary to move forward various measures calculated to make the best use of foreign volunteer soldiers.

With the exception of the Spanish volunteers, the German recruiting apparatus began to take a larger share of responsibility for finding and inducting foreign volunteers. Recruiting stations of the Waffen-SS multiplied and spread over the major Western European cities. The agreement with the Labor and Armaments Ministries was exploited to recruit French, Belgian, and Dutch volunteers in greater numbers. In many respects, these recruiting measures signified recognition by the Germans that the value of the collaborationist parties and their leaders had reached an end.

Apparently, once the collaborationist parties had made their initial calls for volunteers for the Army or SS, the well had dried up. The collaborationist leaders had failed to expand their movements and held little power of persuasion over the general populace. With no advantage remaining to dealing through the collaborationists, the German tendency was to take direct charge.

Himmler wrote Dr. Best in Denmark that Frits Clausen should cease to complain about the disbanding of the All the former legions had been brought into the SS Division for practical and military reasons. It was not technically an SS division, as the men wore no SS runes on their collars. The regimental names—Danmark, Nederland, and Norge—corresponded to the nationality of the legion they absorbed. As to the Danes fielding their own national unit—an apparent desire of Clausen's—Himmler stated, "it depends upon him when the Grenadier Regiment Danmark becomes a Danmark Division." Later, the SS leadership would recommend disbanding the peacetime Danish Army to influence more Danish officers toward service in the SS. By 1944, the Germans cared so little for the Danish Nazi Party that Berger enlisted most of its paramilitary into the Waffen-SS.

Freikorps. Nordland

Schallburg Korps

62

75

In Norway, these German policies failed to generate any real popular support. SS recruiting, independent of the Quisling Party, did not prove effective. Although numbers of skiers for SS Nord, sailors for the German Navy, and local guard personnel could be found, the turnout of Norwegian volunteers for the SS Regiment remained disappointingly low. Apparently, Norwegians clung most stubbornly to the notion of national units. A letter from a returning SS veteran reported great disillusionment among his countrymen. Norwegians had enlisted to fight for Norway on a contract basis, not to fight for Germany throughout the war's duration. Norwegian volunteers had been spread too thinly in "German" units. "Most would fight better when they stand alone as Norwegians and go where the Germans indicate," he stated. He cautioned the Germans to win them over with good will and equity, not by trying to convert them to the National Socialist way and by saying Germany was Norway's sole friend.

Norge

Nordland

63

An anonymous memo in the SS files on Norway, obviously written late in the war, lamented, "we can expect no more volunteers or workers." It went on to suggest a formal peace with autonomy for Norway to make an example of Germanic solidarity and to promote pro-German feelings. "A peace treaty in some form would be fundamental to the resumption of recruiting." The author enthusiastically foresaw 10,000 seamen for the Navy and two to four divisions for the front being gained in this way. 64



Volunteers did prove more plentiful outside of Scandinavia, however, and significantly larger numbers of Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutch reported to the SS recruiters in both native cities and German factories. Volunteers in this period probably presented a different character than those in the first wave of 1941. The volunteers of 1943 did not feel any political motivation to join the German forces, as the collaborationist parties had all failed to gain public recognition or wholesale German support by that time. On the other hand, the resistance movements had gained strength by 1943, and pro-German, anti-communist men may have felt increasingly uncomfortable in their homelands. The material conditions of life in occupied Europe (except Scandinavia) clearly had deteriorated, making service in German factories or the German military somewhat appealing. Finally, there can be no doubt as to the manifest boredom many experienced in occupied Western Europe. This factor may have proven a particularly strong motivation among the demobilized and imprisoned soldiers and officers of the French, Belgian, and Dutch Armies. One of the major aims of political collaboration with occupation authorities lay in the freeing of the prisoners of war retained by the Germans. Many of the foreign labor recruitment programs hinged upon agreements for compensatory release of prisoners of war. For instance, Philippe Burrin credits the Vichy regime with facilitating the release of 220,000 of the 600,000 French prisoners returned from the German camps (of 1.5 million originally taken), with 90,000 specifically released under the labor relève. Many to whom the idea of fighting the Soviet Union held some political appeal saw fit to leave POW camps or the jobs they had found after the French Army had demobilized. 65

German propaganda efforts to enhance the image of foreign volunteers in the Wehrmacht and to promote notions of Germanic solidarity had improved considerably by 1943 as well. Personal testimonials in the form of published letters and pamphlets emerged from the presses, as did narratives of combat by foreign volunteer units. German radio communiqués, weekly newsreels, and news magazines featured items on foreign volunteer contingents. This media exposure augmented recruiting posters and other publicity forms, and helped keep volunteer recruiting in the public eye. 66

Regardless of the ebb and flow of recruiting, though, the primary change in German employment of foreign volunteers came in the organization and equipment of the units themselves. Although the German Army continued to equip and operate foreign units as second-rate or auxiliary forces, the Waffen-SS units fielded in 1943 bore little resemblance to the legions of 1941. Training improved as well, with considerable use being made of officer cadet training for foreign officers, regardless of prior experience. Finally, by 1943 the weaponry provided for the volunteer units of the Waffen-SS was indistinguishable from that given to the best German SS units, with the exception of tanks and self-propelled heavy artillery. These items, in critical shortage throughout the war, reached only a score of Army divisions and the half-dozen "elite" divisions of the Waffen-SS (including SS ). In the III Germanic SS Corps and the SS assault brigades, first-line anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, including the redoubtable 88-mm guns, as well as plentiful machine guns, mortars, and infantry cannon reached the hands of foreign volunteer troops. The SS even attached units of assault guns, slightly less valuable than tanks, within the Walloon and Flemish assault brigades.

Wiking

80

The weapons and training invested in the new wave of volunteer units allowed the Germans to treat them as first-line combat units and deploy them accordingly. All of the Western European volunteer formations that were formed in 1943 entered the front lines in early 1944. The Germanic Corps anchored the flank of Army Group North in an admittedly quiet sector, but performed well in the withdrawal to the Narva position and the heavy defensive fighting involved. The three assault brigades of Walloons, Flemish, and Frenchmen were attached to the elite SS and SS andsecond-line SS Divisions respectively and fought conspicuously well in difficult combat actions with those divisions. Finally, the Norwegian ski battalion performed well in

Wiking Das ReichHorst Wessel

Assault GunStG IIIG



its specialized role with SS Nord in the polar region.

None of these demanding actions could have been handled by the weak, loosely knit and ill-prepared legions of 1941-42. On paper, the Germans had succeeded in expanding their one mixed SS division of 1941 ( ) to a full field corps of two and one-half divisions (

). The erstwhile legions of the Army and SS had become either mixed regiments within SS or modern SS assault brigades. The Army still operated the Spanish Division and French LVF under original circumstances, but it otherwise slowly devolved the responsibility for foreign units to the SS.

Wiking Wiking, Nordland, Nederland

Nordland

These "paper" results concealed serious shortages in manpower and recruiting, which nearly collapsed in Scandinavia; the proportion of Germanic volunteers in the two and one-half Divisions of the original Germanic Corps proved to be about twenty-five percent instead of the desired fifty percent. Nevertheless, the combat potential and overall quality of the Germanic Waffen-SS units increased markedly over the 1941 standard.

The year 1944 proved disastrous for German fortunes and overall strategy, and as the volunteer formations fell back on the front or withdrew for refurbishing, yet another reorganization of Western volunteers was in the offing, and yet another "wave" of units would be fielded. These foreign volunteers participated in every detail of the final German Götterdämmerung.

Notes:

Himmler order 3/11/41, in Kurt G. Klietmann, (Osnabrück: Munin, 1965), 477-81.

Note 1: Die Waffen-SS - eine Dokumentation Back.

Heinz Höhne, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 476; George H. Stein,

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 154-55.

Note 2: The Order of the Death's Head,The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War

1939-1945 Back.

Berger letter 9/2/42, T175/109/2633657-62. Note 3: Back.

Himmler order 6/12/42, T175/166/2699094-95. Cf., T175/29/2535696, 2535688-93 and 17/2520978; Jüttner letter 3/2/43, T175/175/2760406-12, concludes "... it is therefore an offense to call these men 'gypsies' and 'criminals.'"

Note 4:

Back.

Himmler letters, 29/5/42, 31/1/43 and 1/3/43, T175/66/2582573, 2582499-502 and 2582416-7. Note 5:

Back.

Richard Schultze-Kossens, (Osnabrück: Munin, 1982), 46. Schulze-Kossens, the last Commandant of

Bad Tölz, estimated 3000 foreign officers gained SS rank without SS training (30).

Note 6: Militärischer Führernachwuchs der Waffen-SS: die Junkerschulen

Back.

Schulze-Kossens, Militärischer Führernachwuchs, 56-58. The first four classes of 1943 had 278, 243, 177, and 184 Germanic cadets, including large numbers of Estonians. There also existed bureaucratic problems for the volunteer program in the form of the personal rivalry between Gottlob Berger, chief of the SS Main Office, and Hans Jüttner, head of the SS Operations Staff. The latter controlled the training, organization, and operational employment of SS units. Jüttner tended to obstruct Berger by advocating quality over quantity in SS formations. The frequent discord in the areas of recruiting, training, and operations contributed to the stagnation of the volunteer program. Bernd Wegner, "Auf dem Wege zur pangermanischen Armee," MGM 28 (1980): 106-07.

Note 7:

Back.

Labor Ministry letter, 27/4/43, T175/59/2574728; Berger letter, 28/7/43, T175/Note 8:



59/2574712; Berger letter 21/8/43, T175/59/2574773. Back.

Reports of SS Recruiting Office "West," T175/15/2518296-320; 160/2691850ff. Cf. Analysis of 3000 letters of West European workers read by Frankfurt SS office, 1-19 July 1943, T175/70/2546746-63.

Note 9:

Back.

DEV, 28/33/7/2; Emilio Esteban-Infantes, (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1956), 25; María Lothano Cabo interview, Madrid, 20/3/74. It should be noted that the Spanish Division received on 3 and 18 September a few hundred men from Spain as replacements for those men sent home from Grafenwöhr as sick or disabled. There were also several accidental deaths during the early movement and training phases. DEV, 28/1/16/3.

Note 10: La División Azul

Back.

In particular see the "Memoria: Sobre la influencia de las épocas de lluvias, frios y deshielo en los servícios de guerra en la campaña 1941-42 en Rusia," a 29-page staff study covering climate effects on terrain, unit types, operations, and rear area services with attached charts and graphs, XXXVIII Corps, T314/903/842-72; DEV, 28/33/3/1-6; García Rebull and Emilio Esteban-Infantes interviews.

Note 11:

Back.

Rafael Ibáñez Hernández, "Españoles en las trincheras: la División Azul," in ed. Ricardo Recio Cardona (Madrid, Ediciones Vandalia, 1999), 68-69; García Rebull and Gonzales Saez interviews.

Note 12:Españoles en la II Guerra Mundial, el frente del Este,

Back.

ose Díaz de Villegas, (Barcelona: Ediciones Acervo, 1967), 188; Gonzales Martinez, (Madrid: Editorial Aeronautica, 1955),172-74. Especially useful is the personnel and correspondence file of Lt. Col. Luís Zanon Andalús, DEV personnel record #25675, Archivo de la Milicia Nacional (now in Archivo Militar, Guadalajara).

Note 13: La División Azul en LineaAlas Españoles Sobre Moscú

Back.

DEV, 28/18/11/1. Esteban-Infantes, , 105-06; Gonzales Saez, Garcia Rebull, and Emilio Esteban-Infantes interviews. Note 14: División Azul

Back.

Himmler memo 29/9/42, T175/109/2633371. Cf. Jüttner order 28/8/42, T175/109/2633385 (not executed). Note 15:

Back.

Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 108. Note 16: Back.

Riedwig letter, 2/9/42 and Steiner letter 16/9/42 in Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 114-16. Note 17:

Back.

Himmler memo 3/3/43, T175/111/2635157-62; Himmler letter 18/3/43, T175/74/2592299-302; Berger letter 10/2/43, T175/59/2574736-42; Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 116-21. Himmler had originally proposed the name SS for the new division, symbolizing what he thought were the traditional forefathers of contemporary Danish, Dutch, Finnish, Flemish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Swiss cultures.

Note 18:

Waranger

Back.

Seyss-Inquart letter, 9/4/43, T175/74/2592576-7; Berger letter, 7/5/43, T175/111/2635328; Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 109-10; Klietmann,

237-41.

Note 19:Die

Waffen-SS, Back.

III SS Armored Corps, One-year operations report, 31/3/44, T354/120/3754140ff; Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 129-30. Note 20:

Back.

O. Krabbe, (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1978), 127. Peter Strassner reprinted July/August 1944 strength figures for SS 8892 Germans, 715 Volksdeutsch, 130 Dutch, 177 Danes, 619 Flemish, 664 Estonians, 47 Norwegians, 5 Swedes, and 2 Finns; 3rd Edition

Note 21: Danske Soldaten I kamp pa Østfronten 1941-45

Wiking:Europäische Freiwillige,



(Osnabrück: Munin, 1977). Back.

III Corps report, 31/3/44, T354/120/3754140ff; Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 111. Note 22:Back.

Wilhelm Tieke, 3rd Edition (Osnabrück: Munin, 1981), 9-10; Krabbe, 143. Note 23: Tragödie um die Treue,

Danske Soldaten, Back.

Because of the paucity of mechanized equipment in Steiner's force, one might conclude that the III SS Corps was neither Germanic, Armored, nor a Corps! N. In't Veld, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 1521.

Note 24:

De SS en Nederland Back.

III Corps report, 31/3/44, T354/120/3753892-914. Note 25: Back.

Ibid. Note 26: Back.

Krabbe, 163-70; Tieke, 32-57; Earl Ziemke, (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1968), 258. Note 27: Danske Soldaten, Tragödie,

Stalingrad to Berlin Back.

Grasser letter in Steiner file, BDC; Tieke, 57-67; Krabbe, 177.

Note 28: Tragödie, Danske Soldaten, Back.

III Corps report, 31/3/44, T354/120/3754140ff; interview with Elo Jorgenson, Copenhagen, 24 May 1982. Note 29:

Back.

Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 403-9; Krabbe, 196-201. During this phase the Division blocked a potentially catastrophic Soviet breakthrough toward Riga on 22 September.

Note 30: Danske Soldaten,Nordland

Back.

Wegner, "Auf dem Wege," 111; Himmler memo 3/3/43, T175/111/2635157-62; Berger letter 10/2/43, T175/59/2574736-42. Note 31:

Back.

Jüttner letter 31/4/43, T175/111/2635303, including table of organization. In October, the Flemish unit was redesignated the 5th SS Assault Brigade Vierendeels estimates the strength of the brigade at 2000 officers and men initially; Franz Vierendeels, 2 vols. (Antwerp: St. Maartensfond, 1973), 2:49.

Note 32:Langemarck.

Vlamingen aan het Ost front,Back.

Fourth Panzer Army, T313/1399/8691142ff; LIX Corps, T314/1524/1020-23; Schellong file, BDC; Vierendeels, 2:80-97. Note 33:

Vlamingen, Back.

Ziemke, 276-82; Jüttner letter 29/4/44 reprinted in Vierendeels, 2:106-07. Note 34: Stalingrad to Berlin,

Vlamingen, Back.

Klietmann, 509. Note 35: Die Waffen-SS, Back.

Vierendeels, 2:120-36. Note 36: Vlamingen, Back.

Himmler letter 12/12/42, T175/124/2598758; Robert Aron, (Boston: G. P. Putnam, 1958), 450-51.

Note 37: The Vichy Regime 1940-44 Back.

Eberhard Jäckel, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 301-02; Bertram M. Gordon,

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press, 1980), 266. Philippe Burrin, (New York: New Press, 1996), 434-5, states that

postal censors reported that most recruits by the first half of 1944 were motivated by a lust for adventure, material needs, and failed romances, with only a minority showing political interests. For a facsimile of the Vichy proclamation, see Jean Mabire, (Paris: Fayard, 1973), Appendix.

Note 38: Frankreich in Hitlers EuropaCollaboration in France during the Second

World War France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise

La Brigade FrankreichBack.



Jüttner order 16/9/43, T175/111/2635147; Klietmann, 518; Schulze-Kossens, 57-58. Course convening order 26/1/44 in Pierre Cance file, BDC. A detailed history of the Sennheim (Alsace) training complex, where other foreign contingents trained as well, is Henri Mounine, Cernay 40-45:

(Ostwald: Editions du Polygone, 1999). Hersche, born in Zurich in 1889, demonstrates the transparent Swiss presence in the Waffen-SS. A major in the Swiss Army (1909-1935), he entered the Waffen-SS rolls on New Years' Day, 1942, was made an SS major on February 19, and won promotion to SS Lieutenant colonel on 21 June, 1944. He seems to have served only in the Berlin staff and training commands, probably because of his languages; Hersche file, BDC.

Note 39: Die Waffen-SS,Militärischer Führernachwuchs,

Les SS-Ausbildungslager de Sennheim.

Back.

Rouff letter 20/7/44, T175/166/2699113-14; Gamory took command at 59 years of age. Married, with no children, and a Doriot party member, he received consistently good evaluations from the Germans; Gamory File, BDC. The choice of the SS Division proves of interest, as it formed on 25 January 1944 from the former 1st SS Infantry Brigade (motorized), which spent most of its operational life as part of the rear area security forces, including in the Orel-Mogilev zone where the LVF practiced that particular trade. It never received its allocation of vehicles and generally fought in nominal brigade strength; Rolf Michaelis, (Erlangen: Michealis-Verlag, 1996), 194-233.

Note 40:

Horst Wessel

Die Panzergrenadier Divisionen der Waffen-SSBack.

Letter, Henri Fenet to author, 25/3/82; Fenet interview, Paris, 3/6/82; Gordon, 270-75. According to Burrin, the collaborationist elite despised mass movements and military mobilizations, but joining the Waffen-SS allowed them to fantasize themselves as a "heroic aristocracy," thus fitting Bernd Wegner's description of the SS order (France under the Germans, 421).

Note 41:Collaboration in France during the Second World War,

Back.

Merglen, "Soldats francais," 78; Mabire, 315-454, passim; Ziemke, 331. Burrin cites an Abetz report from 14/6/44 of roughly 3000 recruits obtained (France under the Germans, 435).

Note 42: La Brigade Frankreich,Stalingrad to Berlin,

Back.

Berger letter 5/1/43, T175/80/2600745; Degrelle interview, Madrid, 8/6/82. Conway's excellent analysis concludes that this venture by Degrelle signaled a final rupture with his own Rexist party and Belgian politics, and that Degrelle became "... a solitary adventurer seeking crumbs of prestige and power amidst the ruins of thebesieged Reich" ( 175, 233).

Note 43:


Himmler letter 24/5/43, T175/53/2567726-30. Note 44: Back.

Jüttner order 3/7/43, T175/111/2635315; letter 1/7/43, T175/80/2600715-31. Cf. Himmler letter on racial and military quality of Walloon trainees at Meseritz, T175/53/2567730. Organizational details are in de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 40-41.

Note 45:

Back.

Degrelle letter 25/12/44, T77/1423/1421-23. At approximately this point, Degrelle escaped scrutiny by the police and occupation authorities over the 'suicide' of his wife's lover, a German Luftwaffe officer, found in the street near Degrelle's house with "...bullet wounds to the head and heart...." One can only speculate on the degree to which Degrelle fell ever deeper into an increasingly pro-German collaborationist mindset. See Conway, 190-91.

Note 46:


Degrelle, (Oldendorf: Schütz, 1972)326; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 41. Although Walloon veterans speak of the purity of the Walloon Brigade, the assault gun company accompanying the brigade to SS came from Assault Gun Battalion 4 of the SS Police Division; Husemann, 2: 229. On the other hand, since French remained the language of command in the assault brigade, this may represent a transfer of equipment and cadre alone.

Note 47: Die verlorene Legion

WikingDie guten Glauben waren,

Back.



De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 41-44. Note 48: Back.

Ibid., 47-51. Note 49: Back.

Ziemke, 226-33. Note 50: Stalingrad to Berlin, Back.

De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 64-66. Lippert had been promoted to lieutenant colonel in early February. Note 51:

Back.

Ibid., 68. Ziemke notes the poor psychological state of the survivors, despite their good physical condition ( 238). Note 52:

Stalingrad to Berlin, Back.

Degrelle speeches, 23/2/44 and 27/2/44, Degrelle clipping file. Wiener Library Biographical Archive G15, Reel 10, Item 217; Degrelle interview. Note 53:

Back.

De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 75; Vierendeels interview. Note 54: Back.

De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 75-76; Fernand Kaisergruber interview, Brussels, 23/5/82; Lippert letter 1/12/43, copy in possession of Fernand Kaisergruber. Tchekhoff died in Argentina in 1979. Hellebaut died in Brussels in 1983.

Note 55:

Back.

De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 69-70. Note 56: Back.

Ibid., 77-78; Gillis obituary, (May 1977): 25. Degrelle stated that he lost eighty percent of his battalion, but 215 returned to the Walloon Brigadeat Breslau ( 375; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 76)

Note 57: Der Freiwillige

Die verlorene Legion, Back.

Berger letter 16/10/42, T175/66/2582542; Frode Halle, "Fra Finland til Kaukasus," 28 (July/August 1982): 19; (September 1982): 7-10; Stockholm Legation dispatch 2694, 17/1/44, Record Group 226, Document 62769, OSS Files.

Note 58:Der Freiwillige

Back.

Berger letter 13/4/43; Himmler letter 4/43; Quist File, BDC. Halle mentions Norwegian complaints of mixed-up orders stemming from German-Norwegian translation problems; (September 1982): 10.

Note 59:

Der Freiwillige Back.

Halle, (November 1982): 14-17; (December 1982): 8-10. The responsibility for recruitment of replacements for the ski battalion was transferred to the SS Ordnungspolizei by Himmler's order 9/8/43, T175/66/2582461.

Note 60: Der Freiwillige

Back.

Halle, (February 1983): 7; Staff Company, Ski Battalion T354/145/3785796-991, passim. For a personal memoir, see Kaare Söberg letter,

27 (July/August 1981): 24.

Note 61: Der Freiwillige Norge,Der

Freiwillige Back.

Himmler letter 17/4/43, T175/22/2527574-5; Berger letter 27/5/43, T175/17/2521029-30; Berger letter 6/6/44, T175/120/2656984, reported enlisting 350 of 400 men of the Schallburg Corps.

Note 62:

Back.

Per Imerslund letter, undated (c. 1943), T175/109/2633669; Terboven report 4/10/44, T175/66/2582381-2. Note 63:

Back.

Unsigned and undated memo, T175/66/2582393. Note 64: Back.

These observations stem from conversations and correspondence with foreign volunteers; particularly useful were: Fenet interview, Andre Dedouge interview, Brussels, 23/5/82; and Abel Chapy, letter to author 17/2/82. Burrin, 143.

Note 65:

France under the Germans,Back.

For example, A. N. Petersen, (Copenhagen: n.p., Note 66: Dansk Daad paa Ostfronter



1943); K. B. Martinsen, (n.p., 1944; Xerox in Royal Army Library, Copenhagen); J. B. Van Heutsz, (Amsterdam: Storm, 1942); and (Berlin: Nibelungen, 1943).

Frikorps Danmarks KampeWiking door Rusland

Aufbruch: Briefe von germanischen Freiwilligen der SS Division WikingBack.




5. Despair and Fanaticism, 1944-45

The Last Legion

As the new volunteer assault brigades of the Waffen-SS deployed to the front in early 1944, the last foreign legion joined the German Army. An anachronism, given the gigantic replacement problems facing the army, the Spanish Legion nevertheless salved Spanish honor and simultaneously allowed the withdrawal of the considerably larger and more effective 250th (Spanish) Infantry Division. 1

1

The Spanish Legion officially was born on 19 November 1943, when the first volunteers transferred to the former Soviet Army barracks at Jamburg (Kingisepp), on the banks of the Luga River some fifteen miles east of Narva. Army Group North published an official table of organization the following day. It established the Legion

as a command group with three The was a small battalion-sized unit, immediately traceable to the Spanish Foreign Legion in origin. The first two of these units each consisted of three rifle companies and a machine-gun company. The third was a support unit made up of an infantry gun company, an anti-tank company, and a mixed company of communication, scout, and engineer personnel. The total strength on paper was to have been 2133 men, but a more reasonable estimate of the maximum strength of the Legion seems to have to be about 1650. The German Army furnished a liaison staff of twelve officers and seventy-three men, including translators.

2banderas. bandera

3

As noted in Chapter Two, the formation of the Legion took place under rather confusing circumstances and can rightly be termed an action. Certainly, most of the officers and a cadre of the enlisted men came from the recently arrived march battalions, and the assembled personnel undoubtedly reflected the changed Spanish attitude over the benefits of service on the Eastern Front. According to German reports, the newly arrived replacements were an "insecure element in search of adventure" and numbered many released convicts among their ranks. Colonel Navarro rejected seventy-five men immediately and sent them home. In the first two weeks following the Legion's formation, seven men deserted and an equal number inflicted disabling wounds upon themselves. One of the former individuals was recaptured and promptly hanged on Colonel Navarro's order. To German observers, it remained clear that a quiet sector would have to be found to break in this heterogeneous organization.

ad hoc

4

On 15 December 1943, the XXVIII Corps of the Eighteenth Army was notified that its would receive the Spanish Legion—then en route by rail from Jamburg—for operational use. The 121st was positioned in the rugged, thickly wooded area around Vinyagolovo, defending a salient with its three weakened regiments (300-350 men per battalion). Since the Legion had a frontline infantry strength of about 1000 men, the Corps ordered it into a position occupied by four battalions of the German division. Between 18 and 19 December, the First and Second Banderas replaced battalions of the German 405th and 407th Infantry Regiments. This was considered a quiet sector of the German front, and the Spanish troops settled down to a month of uneventful positional defense. Discipline among the Spanish unit remained questionable, however, as Corps records indicated more cases of desertion and self-inflicted wounds.

121st Infantry Division

5

The situation of Army Group North at the end of 1943 had deteriorated to a critical point. 5

Preface1. Introduction2. Propaganda3. Neutral Variation4. Transformation5. Fanaticism

Last LegionFinal Levies Last Stand Crusade Ends

6. CollaborationBibliographyMaps



The Spanish Division and three German divisions had been withdrawn by October, while the Army Group had acquired sixty miles of additional frontage from Army Group Center during the same period. As replacements, Field Marshal Georg von Kuchler received the Spanish Legion and three divisions of SS troops recruited in the . In such a weakened state, the Army Group staff planned a new position to its rear that would considerably shorten the front lines (by twenty-five percent) and remove the Soviet threats posed in many salients on the current lines. The plan, Operation "Blue," called for a January withdrawal of over 150 miles to the natural defensive barrier formed by the Narva and Velikaya Rivers and Lakes Peipus and Pskov. This position, the so-called "Panther Line," was buttressed by fortifications that had been constructed since September. The retreat would be carried out in stages, using intermediate defensive positions, the most important of which was the Line formed on the October Railway running through Tosno, Lyuban, and Chudovo. There the two most exposed Corps, the XXVI and XXVIII, would regroup and catch their breath before proceeding farther back to their positions in the Panther Line.

Baltic states

Rollbahn

6

The fate of Army Group North turned for the worse in the new year, for Hitler rejected all proposals for an early withdrawal into the "Panther" position, insisting that the Russian forces be kept as far as possible from Germany and that they be forced to pay dearly for each meter of ground. Finally, Hitler transferred three more first-rate infantry divisions out of Army Group North to reinforce Manstein's Army Group South as it reeled back from the Dnieper River under continuous Soviet assault. Field Marshal Kuchler now held an extremely precarious position, and could only await events on the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts with great pessimism. 7

On 14 January 1944, a fearful combined Soviet offensive on the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts began. The weight of the Soviet attack fell on the German left flank, trapping some German forces between Oranienbaum and Leningrad. From the Volkhov Front, two Soviet Armies (the Eighth and the Fifty-ninth) fell upon the Eighteenth Army's center. Though not pressed particularly hard in their sector, the Spanish troops wavered and apparently withdrew from some of their positions without instructions. They probably were afraid of encirclement, since Russian troops and partisans typically infiltrated the German front and then appeared in the rear areas. The Legion's discipline—such as it was—cracked under the first strain of defensive fighting, and confusion reigned supreme in its place. The XXVIII and XXVI Corps were ordered back to the position on the 19th, and already the German commander of the 121st Division was pleading for the "immediate detachment of the completely unreliable Spanish Legion."

Rollbahn

8

The Legion fell back essentially in disorder to the town of Lyuban, where the 121st Division held that part of the for a week (21-28 January). The continual onslaught of Soviet forces quickly dashed all German hopes for a short withdrawal, and Army Group North initiated the general retreat on 28 January. Hitler replaced Kuchler with Field Marshal Walter Model on 1 February, agreeing belatedly to a withdrawal of the Eighteenth Army to the Luga River. The situation was irretrievable, since by 29 January the Army had lost two-thirds of its frontline infantry, and, after attempting a mobile defense for two weeks, Model began to move first the Army and then all of Army Group North into the Panther Line.

Rollbahn

9

The Spanish Legion played no further part in the intense fighting retreat—the German command literally banished it from the battlefield. The XXVIII Corps attempted to use the Legion to defend Lyuban, but achieved only misunderstandings with the Spanish Command and a dilatory attempt by the First to strike out to the north of the town. The Corps

and Army staffs decided by 26 January that the Spanish troops were "unfit for battle," and that night the Legion set out on the road from

Lyuban through Vditsko and Oredezh to Luga, finally camping a few kilometers east-

Bandera 10



northeast of Luga on 29 January. Exhausted after marching and fighting occasional partisans, the Spaniards could not pause long, for the Army had decided to move them further to the rear and also to use them as railroad security troops. Thus, from 2 to 14 February the Legion moved by increments through the Panther Line at Pskov, then west of the Pskov and Peipus Lakes, to a strategic rail junction at Tapa. 11

The units of the Legion occupied four towns on the Reval-Narva railroad lines—Tapa, Lekhtse, Janedu, and Aegvidu—covering about fourteen miles distance in all. Colonel Navarro now determined to retrain his unit and purge it of its unsuitable elements with the intention of making it a combat-worthy organization. He felt that three months of training and personnel exchange would prove sufficient to make the Spaniards dependable.

However, the future utility of the Legion was debated extensively in the German Command. The commanding officer of the Army Group North, Rear Area immediately protested the presence of the Spanish troops in his zone. He testified that more than two years of typical Spanish excesses, committed by troops on furlough and convalescent leave, had severely tested his patience and, therefore, the Spanish Legion could just as well continue their rearward march back to Germany! The commander of the XXVIII Corps wrote at the same time that the Legion, despite its assignment in a quiet sector, safe from tank attack and in improved positions, had proved "unable to carry its own weight at the front." Only after the complete replacement of its unreliable elements would the Legion be suited for defensive missions in positional warfare. Ultimately, the Eighteenth Army staff concluded that there was no place for the Spanish unit in the approaching defensive struggle to hold the Narva River line.

12

13

10

Army Group North decided on 23 February, in spite of all these remonstrations, to retain the Spanish Legion for "coastal security" operations in the Tapa region. By this time, however, the obvious shift of the war in favor of the Allies had caused the United States and Great Britain to bring increased pressure upon the Spanish government to observe a stricter form of neutrality in the war. The principal objective that the Allies wished to obtain was the embargo of Spanish shipments of a critical war material, wolfram (tungsten ore), to Germany. Also at issue were German espionage activities in Spain and Morocco, Spanish internment of Italian warships and merchant shipping that could now aid the Allied cause, and the Spanish soldiers and airmen still in the service of the German Wehrmacht. 14

Allied diplomats continued to pressure the Spanish government to withdraw the Spanish Legion and air squadron from the Eastern Front. On 11 February, Spain's government informed the German ambassador that the Spanish Legion had proved a failure, and that the record of the Blue Division had therefore been "clouded" by the men of the Legion. The implied request for the Legion's return was made official twelve days later, and it was duly reported to Berlin on 26 February. The German High Command decided almost immediately to honor the Spanish request, and a message to Army Group North on 3 March 1944 announced the Führer's decision to withdraw the Spanish Legion. OKW orders followed on 5 March to confirm the Legion's return to Spain, orders that also applied to the Spanish Air Squadrons. 15

Field Marshal Model informed Colonel Navarro on 3 March that the Legion would return home with Germany's thanks for aiding the fight against Bolshevism. The Spaniards assembled for the last time at Tapa and boarded three trains on 16, 23, and 30 March for the long ride back to Hof and their demobilization. The last contingents crossed into Spain on 17 April 1944. Such was the ignominious end of the Spanish Legion, after scarcely a single month of combat operations. With the return of these last troops,

the official participation of Spanish volunteers in the German Armed Forces came to an end.

16



Final Levies

The contributions of the Western volunteer contingents to the German war effort of 1944 diminished after the defensive battles of the winter and spring. The III Germanic Corps fell back into Courland before the Russian summer offensive, and all three of the Western volunteer assault brigades returned to their training camps for reforming and retraining. Between June and November, the German Army lost almost a million men on the Eastern Front, and a further half million in the West. In addition, the fateful Allied landings in Normandy had breached the Atlantic defenses, opening a new front, and Allied troops marched into the Rhineland, recapturing most of the territory won by the Wehrmacht by mid-1940. In the East, an entire army group (Center) collapsed under Russian attack, and the first Prussian villages received their Soviet garrisons. 17

These disasters provided a two-pronged impetus for the final expansion of the Western European volunteer units. The staggering losses in German manpower dictated that Germany use all available sources of reinforcement, including the long-discussed "Vlassov Army," recruited for service with the German Army from among Russian prisoners of war. By comparison, the expansion of the Western SS volunteer brigades must have appeared a more attractive option to the German leadership. Secondly, the approach of the Anglo-American armies from the west produced a desperate surge of refugees from France, Holland, and Belgium, mainly former collaborationists anxious to escape the retribution that

accompanied liberation. Collaborationist leaders established exile headquarters, at Soltau, Hannover (Hildesheim), and Sigmaringen for Flemish, Walloon, and French groups respectively, and refugee families

located in the environs. Party militias and military-age youths joined their national Waffen-SS formations with some encouragement from collaborationist leadership. 18

15

In the case of the Flemish, thousands of collaborationist families had fled their homeland in August and September. The Germans resettled them as a group near Soltau (near Lüneburg), and some 2000 men volunteered for SS service in the first three months of their arrival. Encouraged by these numbers, Himmler ordered the Assault Brigade SS Langemarck to Soltau and directed it to be expanded to divisional size on 12 September. 19

Lieutenant Colonel Schellong received the assignment to expand his brigade into the 27th SS Division. The latter consisted (on paper) of three infantry regiments (Numbered 66-68), each of two battalions, an anti-tank company with seventy-two hand-held rocket launchers and a support company with eight mortars and four infantry guns. In addition, the SS planned to form an artillery regiment, a mixed battalion with assault guns, heavy and light anti-aircraft batteries, a brigade fusilier company, and support troops.

Langemarck

20

Filling out this division required that the Germans draw Flemish troops from a variety of sources. SS recruiters continued to enlist Flemish workers from German factories, and other Flemings, originally recruited as truck drivers and laborers in the Todt Organization and the National Socialist Motor Corps (the German ), arrived from France, Russia, and the Baltic and Balkan regions where they had been deployed. The refugee groups around Soltau provided significant numbers, as noted above, although "some pressure" was used to persuade all men capable of bearing arms to join the new battalions. Then, too, the Flemish auxiliary guards hired by the German Army, Navy, and Air Force to watch over military installations now found themselves newly "volunteered" for service in the Waffen-SS. Finally, the paramilitary arms of the Flemish collaborationist groups were absorbed into SS

NSKK

Langemarck. 21

OperationBagration

Kaisergruber:Refugees



Various Flemish sources claim that some 15-18,000 men filled the ranks of the division: 3000 from the Assault Brigade and its replacements in depot, 7000 from other formations (military, NSKK, Todt), and 5000 from new recruits. Even if that many Flemings could be found, the difficulty of forming a complete division—with technical services, heavy supporting weapons, and the like—into a combat-ready organization was simply impossible given the time available and the chaotic political and military situation. German officers filled the primary staff and command billets through battalion commanders. Schellong took command of a regiment, and Colonel Thomas Müller received command of the division. 22

For its first assignment, SS moved to the Eifel region, as a follow-on unit for the German Ardennes offensive. It probably would have garrisoned Belgian cities in the event of a German victory. For this purpose, as the division moved west from Soltau on 24 December, it included a "Ministerial Company" of civilian personnel intended to establish a puppet government in re-conquered Flanders. Not intended for frontline service, this company received only rudimentary military training. When the German offensive turned sour, however, the division was not risked in combat, and it returned to Soltau to resume training. In its place, the German High Command ordered a divisional battle group formed for combat employment. The first battalions of the 66th and 67th Regiments and the mixed anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalion assembled under command of the redoubtable Konrad Schellong. This group remained in the Eifel region until the end of January, when it entrained for the Budapest front. En route, the Germans redirected it to Stettin and a final battle in Pomerania.

Langemarck

23

20

The Walloon experience closely paralleled that of their Flemish counterparts in the twilight of their Waffen-SS experience. Over 1800 new recruits came to the depots of SS from among the political refugees moving into Hannover after Allied armies crossed the Belgian frontier. Also in this group could be found Walloons from the Todt Organization, the NSKK, the Wehrmacht auxiliary guards, and a company of Spaniards. The 28th SS Division was formed on 18 September 1944 from the 1800-man assault brigade and these new recruits. Its organization duplicated that of the SS Division, except that its size remained half that of the Flemish formation. Training began in mid-October, and it soon became apparent that only a much smaller unit could be prepared for combat, owing to the diminished morale and physical condition of so many of the recruits as well as the restricted amount of time, materiel, and ammunition available for training. The division consisted of two regiment headquarters (69th and 70th Regiments) sharing only three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one engineer battalion, one anti-aircraft company, and support units. Apparently, the SS withdrew their German commander, a Colonel Burk, and the combination of Major Hellebaut and Lieutenant Colonel Degrelle resumed command of the Walloons.

Wallonien

Wallonien

Langemarck

24

In mid-December, additional recruits permitted activation of a fourth battalion of infantry, with the division's overall effective troop strength now reaching 4300. The division moved

to the Rhineland for possible use in the Ardennes breakthrough. Léon Degrelle took a small group of political aides with a motorized escort onto Belgian soil (Limerlé) in order to maintain contact with German forces and

stake out ground for a political role in the event of a German victory. Degrelle also attended briefings at the German Sixth SS Army and Army Group B headquarters. As the offensive waned, the Walloons transferred back to the north to resume training. 25

The largest refugee group was the French, and they also manifested the

ArdennesDec. 1944

ArdennesDec.-Jan. 1944



most unusual transformation of a volunteer unit. As France fell to the Allied armies liberation, thousands of collaborators, paramilitary troops, and auxiliary police members fled to Germany. At the same time, the French Legion (LVF) of the German Army and the Cance Battalion of SS returned from their respective batterings on the Eastern Front. Himmler secured an order from the Führer raising the Brigade to divisional strength on 10 August 1944. Christened the 33rd , this unit was considered a second-rate SS division composed of non-Germanic levies, similar to the several "Eastern SS" divisions raised in the last months of the war by Himmler's lieutenants.

Frankreich

FrankreichSS DivisionCharlemagne

26

At a German SS training camp near Könitz in West Prussia, a startling agglomeration of Frenchmen gathered, wearing a wild mixture of military and paramilitary uniforms. The 1200 veterans of the LVF under Colonel Puaud watched trainloads of French NSKK men arrive, along with former local security guards enlisted by the German Navy and Army. The approximately 2300 transport personnel and 1200 guards showed a poor state of morale, shouting "A bas les biffins, a bas les boches" ("Down with the footsloggers [infantry], down with the Germans"). A few kilometers away stood the 1200 regular SS soldiers of the Brigade. But the major disruptive element came in the form of 1800 men of the Vichy under the command of the mercenary, Joseph Darnaud. The latter had joined the SS in 1943 to enhance his status with the Germans and the various political circles of the Vichy regime. Now he hoped to lead his as an integral unit of the Division, and his followers looked to him with totalobedience. His former subordinate, SS Lieutenant Henri Fenet, recently returned from the Sanok Front, told Darnaud that the war against Russia differed completely from fighting the in France, and that they would be exterminated. Only with Waffen-SS training and indoctrination would he and his subordinates be able to carry out their duties in combat.

FrankreichMilice,

MiliceCharlemagne

Milice

Maquis

27

The first difficulties the SS faced, however, lay in convincing the LVF veterans not to desert the SS. The Legion had a long (if somewhat irregular) service history, and fought out of loyalty to France in a traditional (albeit foreign) armed service. They generally were older and less ideologically motivated than the SS men. The veterans of SS Frankreich, on the other hand, boasted of their place in the New Order and total subservience to Germany. 28

25

Since Puaud remained the senior French officer in the group and commanded the LVF, he proved to be the crucial element in consolidating the various French elements. He was initially given an SS appointment at the rankof colonel, then breveted brigadier ( ) and given command of SS Charlemagne. He, with the assistance of the old chaplain, Majol de Luppe, convinced the bulk of the LVF to don SS uniforms. Darnaud bitterly accepted his fate, as the troops were distributed throughout the division. The Germans shipped all of the disparate French troops to Wildflecken for training.

Oberführer

Milice

29

SS now numbered some 7600 troops, organized into two infantry regiments (each of two battalions), artillery and anti-tank battalions, support companies, and a replacement battalion. The regular SS men of the former Brigade went to the first infantry regiment, the 57th, and the LVF veterans remained separate in the 58th Regiment. At Wildflecken, the division began to train as a unit under the direction of a

large German inspectorate, headed by SS Brigadier Dr. Gustav Krukenberg. A former reserve Army officer, Krukenberg was fluent in French and had lived in France between the wars. Well qualified culturally and linguistically, he proved ideally suited to the task of bringing the various personalities and heterogeneous political and social groups together in a large SS military formation. In effect, he commanded the SS Division, but

Charlemagne

Frankreich

30

Charlemagne



he did so as an intermediate commander between the German headquarters and Colonel Puaud, such that the latter received the full accords of a commander. 31

As in the case of its predecessors, political forces continued to have a centripetal effect on the French unit. The rump Vichy government at Sigmaringen, under the influence of Darnaud (there for liaison duty), requested the division's employment on the Western Front. In the Vosges sector, German forces continued to occupy French soil, a state of affairs that offered the possibility of contact with collaborators still behind Allied lines. However, German forces in the East faced imminent disaster after the fall of Hungary, East Prussia, and Silesia, leaving a long coastal corridor, Pomerania-West Prussia, exposed to Russian attacks. Thus the French Division, along with other units still in training, collected its cadets from technical schools and moved to Hammerstein as a reinforcement unit for Army Group "Vistula." It had trained barely two months, however, and lacked the cohesion of the earlier French assault brigade. The latter had formed over a year's time, with ample opportunity to prepare officers at Bad Tölz, NCOs at Sennheim, and technical troops at SS weapons schools. The troops imbibed the SS spiritual motivation, and the Battalion (I/SS ) displayed no failures in unit cohesion, probably as a result of the long training period. SS on the other hand, never approached this level of preparation prior to its commitment to the front.

CanceFrankreich

Charlemagne,

32

The last division of Western European SS volunteers that the Germans created during the war proved a real curiosity. In March 1943, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands, authorized the formation of the as a "territorial home-guard unit" intended for service in the Dutch homeland. Rauter saw this organization as an ideal cadre for recruiting Dutchmen for the Waffen-SS, with the idea that a little taste of SS service would breed a thirst for field service with the elite. In October, the three

battalions thus formed (26 officers and 1912 men) became the German officers and NCOs predominated at the command levels, with Dutch recruits filling the ranks. It seems doubtful that the Germans saw this unit as ever having any potential combat value. Its Dutch recruits obviously preferred serving in the homeland, guarding concentration camps and performing police functions, to duty on the Eastern Front fighting

the Red Army. However, the generally worsening manpower situation of 1944 and the Normandy landings caused the Germans to mobilize the as the 7th Volunteer

Infantry Brigade of two regiments of infantry in September 1944. The first regiment (the original ) fought British para-troopers in the Arnheim area and other forces near Hasselt, Belgium.

Landwacht Nederland

33Landstorm Nederland.

LandstormSS Landstorm Nederland

Landwacht

34

After the fighting around Arnheim, the brigade withdrew for refitting, having suffered some forty percent casualties in its two regiments. In the eleventh hour of the Germanic Reich, Mussert and the NSB forced their paramilitary guards into the brigade and added Dutch workers and "hunger volunteers," swelling the ranks to some 8000 strong. In February 1945, the SS raised the brigade to division status as the 34th Infantry Division SS But this designation remained purely official, since the two regiments (the 83rd and 84th) remained below strength, with two battalions each, and only an anti-tank unit was added, along with a scratch collection of German artillery batteries. The division stayed on the lower Rhine, out of direct action, until the general capitulation. The Germans judged it fit only to garrison villages as police units.

Landstorm Nederland.

35

30

As the SS created its last Western volunteer division, the ubiquitous Spanish volunteers reappeared for a third and final iteration of the national volunteer experience. The motives of these men are difficult to ascertain, but the group undoubtedly included soldiers of fortune, ardent anti-bolshevists, and those seeking employment and living conditions superior to what Spain offered. The documentation of their experience, beyond the mere

OperationMarket Garden



facts of their existence, remains extremely sketchy due to the many gaps in German records from the last year of the war. Nevertheless, they are an essential feature of the Spanish volunteer experience if only because of the psychological expression of will that they represented, and the German policy that accommodated them in the last days of the Reich.

On 18 January 1944, the German Embassy in Madrid reported to Berlin that 135 Spaniards, mostly officers and men of the former Blue Division, had appeared at the embassy during the previous week to offer their service in the Spanish Legion or in the German Waffen-SS. 36

On 26 February, after Count Jordana had requested the Spanish Legion's return, the German OKW ordered the establishment of a "Special Staff F" in Versailles for the induction of Spanish volunteers into the Wehrmacht. Some Spaniards had already begun to cross the border into France to enlist in German service, and the staff set up collection stations at St. Jean de Luz, Lourdes, and Perpignan to receive these men, who were aided by smugglers and mountain guides in evading Franco's border guards.

Despite ambiguous reports of Spaniards entering France and Count Jordana's formal protest over the "illegal" recruitment of Blue Division veterans, the numbers of men who actually were accepted for military service may have remained small. A 14 April 1944 telegram reported that, at that point, only one officer and forty volunteers had arrived in Versailles. In what was perhaps the peak six-week period of activity (8 June-20 July 1944), Special Staff F recruited 150 men for the Army and sent them to a training center in Hall, Austria. A further eighty men preferred industrial

labor to military service and transferred to Biarritz. 37

As the first units of the Spanish Legion left the Russian Front for their ultimate return to Spain, the German High Command advised Army Group North to send any Spaniards wishing to volunteer for service in the Wehrmacht or find work in Germany to the Versailles recruiting office. The German liaison staff of the Spanish Legion in Königsberg advised the High Command on 27 March that over 100 men wished to join the Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS, but their officers, ostensibly acting on orders from the Spanish government, had discouraged such actions. The Königsberg office nevertheless established a cadre training

battalion at the Stablack and a rifle company became operational on 31 July 1944. Two translators were placed with the battalion staff and thirteen more in the company, called "Volunteer Unit Stablack," which mustered sixty Spaniards initially.

38Kaserne,

39

With the Allied liberation of France, this obscure German recruiting of Spaniards had to cease. No records have been found that would clearly establish how many Spaniards were taken into German service in this way, but it was certainly several hundred men at the least. Furthermore, one small complement of Spaniards may have remained among the German forces, sheltered by the Königsberg staff.

35

The Spanish troops recruited in France and the troops retained in Stablack ultimately joined with two battalions billeted in towns about twenty-five miles north-northwest of Vienna. The "Spanish Volunteer Replacement Battalion" at Hollabrunn apparently fed the "Spanish Volunteer Training Battalion," activated on 25 October 1944 at Stockerau as part of the 1st Croatian Brigade. The latter unit was established for anti-guerilla operations along the Austro-Yugoslavian border, and proved unsatisfactory in this mission. One Spanish

company reportedly was assigned to the German 3rd Mountain Division—part of the Eighth Army in Army Group South—and during the retreat from the Ukraine into Slovakia this unit took heavy losses and had to be dissolved.

40

41



The Spanish troops left in Stockerau numbered many restless and adventurous individuals among their ranks, for thirty-three of them left their unit between 11 and 17 December and joined the 28th SS Division, then reforming near Osterwald, Hanover. The volunteers were attracted to the Walloon Division by a Lieutenant Luís García, who commanded a Spanish company of that unit. This action stemmed from Léon Degrelle's energetic and widespread canvassing of German-held territory as he attempted to build a complete SS division. The commander of the Croat Brigade strongly protested this recruiting procedure of the SS to his military district commander in Vienna on 19 December and enclosed a confiscated travel permit of a Waffen-SS man named Rafael Barrio, who apparently was one of the illicit recruiters.

On the other hand, a memorandum in the OKW records dated 16 December indicated that Spanish units were ordered disbanded by the German Army, with all volunteers to be absorbed by the SS. However, whether the SS recruiters were merely acting within their understood rights or coercing Army troops remains a matter of conjecture.

Wallonien

42

43

Just over a month later, the Vienna headquarters dissolved the Spanish Volunteer Battalions and established the 101st and 102nd Spanish Volunteer Companies as reinforcements for the , then located at Sared, east of Pressburg (Bratislava). The Germans provided two officers and forty-two men as a cadre and six translators for each company, a fact that may indicate that few Spanish leaders were either available or desirable. The Army also ordered further recruitment of Spanish troops to cease, and advised commanders to "send any useless Spanish personnel to labor units."

357th Infantry Division

44

German documents contain no accounts of these Spanish volunteers for the rest of the war, although some documents do show the 101st and 102nd Companies serving with the 357th Division through the end of March 1945. During this period, the division was part of the Eighth Army and formed part of the German line along the Hron River in southern Czechoslovakia from 31 January through 2 March. It then fell back through the Lower Carpathians to a point about twenty-five miles north of Pressburg. 45

The SS finally absorbed the 101st and 102nd companies in March. Sources indicate that Spanish troops from these last volunteer companies attached themselves to the SS Nordland Division, then part of Army Group Vistula, which was in defensive positions northeast of the German capital in early April 1945.

40

The above details, while perhaps excessive, serve to indicate the scarcity of extant data relating to foreign volunteers in the last year of the war. This condition has fostered the publication of memoirs and revisionist works that have stetched the truth about the final volunteer contingents' experiences to questionable lengths. Carlos Caballero Jurado, a revisionist writing in Spain, published a short treatise on the last Spanish contingent entitled the and asserted that over a thousand Spaniards had fought in the last battles of the Third Reich, driven by political and ideological convictions. Encouraged by Caballero and the Blue Division veteran Francisco Vadillo, Wayne Bowen included much of this point of view in his dissertation and other work, including an article that presents the revisionism of this cohort.

Ghost Battalion,

46

But these and other studies have not taken into account the romanticism and downright fabrication that can accompany personal accounts. For example, the writings of Miguel Ezquerra, who claimed to have had many adventures, including having commanded the last battle group of Spaniards in Berlin and having been promoted to colonel in the SS by



the Germans, remain hard to verify, but they are unlikely to be reliable. But by far the most prolific—and convincing—author is Vadillo, author of no fewer than five sequential volumes spanning the years 1941-45. Vadillo returned from frontline service with the Spanish Division at the age of eighteen; he later became a journalist and art critic, wrote poetry and novels, and received acclaim as Spain's greatest boxing reporter. His books on the Spanish volunteers lack documentation, but show much authenticity. In my opinion, though, they must be treated as part novel, part history, and should be verified at every step, as in the case of a similar French author, Jean Mabirè, and the American Richard Landwehr, who also writes on the European volunteers. 47

Counting the numbers of the Spanish (and other) die-hards becomes equally exasperating as evaluating the accounts of their experiences, and the possibility of a double count exists between records kept by SS and Army units and the various testimonial accounts. Thus, one harbors the deep suspicion that the total number of Spaniards serving in these and other post-Legion contingents may have numbered no more than 400. Compared to the almost 40,000 Spaniards that served in the volunteer Blue Division and the almost 1700 in the ill-fated Spanish Legion, this is a small number of war-adventurers and misfits who must have blended well with the last hard-bitten SS men gathered together in the ad hoc fighting units of the war's final days. Whether battalions were really companies and colonels really captains all became blurred in the final days of the Third Reich. Neither the (small) numbers of these last volunteers nor their enthusiasm for the doomed Nazi cause can really justify any claim that they "... represented the persistence of support for the New Order among certain elements of the Spanish population." 48

The Last Stand

New Year's Day of 1945 found the Western volunteer Waffen-SS formations preparing to fight the war's last battles as the Red Army broke into the Reich and advanced toward their meeting with the Anglo-American forces. The III Germanic Corps fought the fourth Battle of Courland in early January, with SS Brigade bearing the brunt of the Soviet

assault. Its 49th Regiment reported a combat strength of only eighty men at this point. German and ethnic German replacements continued to join the Corps, however, and the high command considered it valuable enough to order its withdrawal to West Prussia to engage in the defense of the Reich. Pulling out of the lines on 28-30 January, the Corps sailed for Stettin, arriving just over a week later, and immediately prepared for combat.

NederlandDe Ruyter

49

Since the replacement divisions of the German Army and SS raised in 1945 fielded only two regiments, the SS elevated SS to division status. This was typical of the creation of "paper" divisions that were barely under-strength brigades by the high command in the last months of the Reich. Since the SS had recruited only 339 Dutchmen for SS in 1944, one may assume that this unit, like SS received mostly German replacements on the eve of battle. Germanic replacements from depots probably amounted to a few hundred returned convalescents and the last trainees from the 1944 recruiting effort.

Nederland

NederlandNordland,

50

45

The Germanic Corps moved to Stargard for Operation "Sonnenwende," one last and futile German offensive. The two Belgian SS battle groups (now called divisions) joined the Corps, and the untried SS formed a reserve for Army Group Vistula. The real muscle for the Stargard attack came from SS SS the SS Armored Division, and the SS Police Division, as wellas the Army's Corps Group SS no longer had the combat potential of a first-line division, however: the first battalions from both the and

CharlemagneNordland, Nederland, Frundsberg

Munzel. NordlandNorge Danmark



Regiments had been detached in November and sent to SS Division as replacement battalions. In their effort to maintain the one elite volunteer division at full strength, the SS command had reduced to a typical 1945 infantry division of five battalions of infantry, albeit motorized to some extent.

Wiking

Nordland

51

Preparations for the Stargard offensive soon went awry. Steiner's new staff of the Eleventh SS Armored Army had difficulty coordinating the disparate Army and SS units and meeting the high command's requirements for a mid-February attack. Instead of launching a crushing blow on the unsuspecting Russian forces, only a single division, SS initiated the attack. Poor weather kept the division roadbound, but it penetrated seven miles to Arnswalden on 15 February, rescuing a small German garrison and thousands of refugees

trapped there behind Russian lines. The other assault divisions began their attacks over the next two days, with SS and SS covering the flanks of the point divisions. Minefields and stiffer anti-tank defenses brought this ragged attack to a close with only a few more miles gained. The mobile assault divisions withdrew to cover the Berlin-Oder front, leaving Steiner with and two Belgian battle groups to cover the now alerted Russian forces on

the Stargard sector.

Nordland,

WallonienLangemarck

Nordland, Nederland,

52

The Stargard offensive, unsuccessful as it was, did compel the Soviet Army to spend all of March clearing their northern flank in Pomerania, lest further disrupting attacks come from that direction. The Russian offensive started on 1 March. Four Soviet armies swept into Pomerania from the south, with the thrusts of two tank armies of the western flank of the drive falling upon SS SS and some German Army units. The unfortunate Dutch units once again suffered partial dismemberment, and only two battalions remained of their former 48th and 49th Regiments. The Flemish brigade pulled back toward Altdamn and Stettin with companies reduced to between thirty and forty men each. The Walloons withdrew rapidly under cover of rear guard actions parallel to and north of the Flemings. SS used its remaining armor to parry Soviet thrusts, including those directed at neighboring units, as the infantry of Regiments and delayed the Soviets and withdrew toward Stettin and the Oder River. The average strength of the infantry companies again fell below one hundred. Most replacements by this time were recent German conscripts and former air force and navy personnel. Thus the proportion of Western European volunteers fighting in the divisions diminished as casualties mounted. Upon reaching the relative safety of the Oder River, the division came out of line for reorganization.

Nederland,Langemarck,

Nordland

Norge Danmark

53

The worst disaster of the Russian offensive in Pomerania fell upon the 7000 Frenchmen of SS In the vicinity of Körlin, while moving toward the German front in three columns, the division encountered the advanced breakthrough echelon of the Red Army's

Second White Russian Front. Totally surprised, and without artillery support and supply columns, the 57th and 58th Regiments were bowled over by the Russian tanks and infantry. Colonel Puaud disappeared in the main action with most of his men. One column, including General Krukenberg and Captain Fenet's battalion, managed to stay together and fade into the forests. Krukenberg managed to rally some 1200 French

SS men and retreat to the west and friendly lines. A third element, under Captain Martin of the artillery battalion, found itself cut off by Russian columns. These 300 Frenchmen withdrew east to Danzig, which became an isolated pocket of German forces in the wake of the Soviet offensive in Pomerania. The German command attached the French to the 4th SS Police Division as replacements, and on 1 April it boarded ships and left Danzig. They arrived at Copenhagen on 5 April, taking no further part in the fighting.

Charlemagne.

54

50

RussianOffensive, 1945



Out of the wreckage of his division, Brigadier General Krukenberg scraped together a Regiment at Neustrelitz, with infantry battalions numbered 57 and 58 and no heavy weapons. Not surprisingly, of these 1200 surviving volunteers, approximately half had satisfied their curiosity about fighting the Red Army and asked for release from further action. They became a "labor battalion" and withdrew to the west. The remaining troops received weapons and training in close anti-tank combat with hand-held rocket launchers.

Charlemagne

55

Krukenberg received orders on 24 April to report to Berlin and take command of the battle group of SS which fought Soviet troops in the city up to the last day of the war. Krukenberg took with him an escort group commanded by the fatalistic Captain Henri Fenet, consisting of about 300 of his 57th "Battalion." An equal number of French SS men in the 58th Battalion and the newly-converted "laborers" moved west, surrendering to British troops at Bad Kleinen. Fenet's mixed battalion joined in Berlin, fought for a week, and surrendered to Russian troops on 2 May.

Nordland,

Nordland

56

The last French SS troops to see action were the men of the depot battalion at Wildflecken, a cadre of the never-formed 59th Regiment under the ubiquitous Swiss, Major Hersche. Fleeing eastward to escape advancing American forces, the 600 Frenchmen joined the 38th SS Division, a battle group created from SS schools and training units in Bavaria. Together they fought a one-hour skirmish with U.S. forces at Moosburg on 29 April. The unit surrendered to U.S. forces at the Austrian frontier, but a few refugees continued south until captured by Allied forces at Bolzano. The latter group, ironically, included Lieutenant Colonel Gamory-Dubourdeau, last attached to the SS headquarters at Berlin and formerly the first commander of the 1943 Assault Brigade SS

Niebelungen

Frankreich. 57

The fragmenting of the SS Division reflected the experience of all German forces in the East, as supplies and replacements dwindled and the last Soviet thrusts crossed the Oder River and closed around Berlin. After crossing the Oder, the III Germanic Corps reorganized behind German lines west of Schwedt. SS, Navy, and Luftwaffe men arrived as replacements, the first element including a Hitler Youth unit destined for the Regiment. The Walloon and Flemish battle groups no longer accompanied the Corps, however, and received no replacements. They remained instead at Altdamn from 18 March onward, guarding the approaches to Stettin from a precarious bridgehead east of the Oder. On 27 March, the Germanic Corpsmoved SS and into the Oder defenses between Gartz and Schwedt.

Charlemagne

Norge

Nederland Nordland 58

The final Russian offensive over the Oder in the sector of Army Group Vistula took the form of a combination punch, first at Seelow (16 April) and then south of Stettin (20 April). As reinforcements for the Seelow defenders, SS and most of SS were ordered to move to the south. The Regiment, in battalion strength, remained behind under the command of the 547th Infantry Division. The III Germanic Corps headquarters stood by without troops assigned.

Nordland NederlandDe Ruyter

59

Well-armed with infantry and anti-tank weapons, but pitifully below strength, the men of and moved directly into the path of the Soviet forces advancing from the Oder toward Berlin. Near Strausberg, on 18 April, SS was hit and bypassed by Russian mechanized forces. About half of the troops fell back into Berlin with their command group, but the rest had fallen as casualties or were cut off in their attempted retreat. The last battle of SS proved even more disastrous, as it was overrun and virtually destroyed west of Frankfurt in the "Halhe Pocket" battle.

Nordland Nederland

Nordland

Nederland

60

55



In the Altdamn-Stettin sector lay the bloodied battle groups of SS and SS each having suffered about 100 killed and 400 missing, plus hundreds of wounded in the retreat across Pomerania. At first, the German command positioned the Belgian battalions several kilometers east of Altdamn in an attempt to keep the port in operation. By 18 March, however, the SS volunteers held, until early April, only a thin strip of land on the east side of the river, which at least afforded better fields of fire than did the German-held left bank. At this point, upon withdrawing behind the Oder, the Walloons held a council of war und released those volunteers who no longer wished to continue the losing fight. The 23 officers and 625 men who chose to remain assembled in one last battalion, plentifully equipped with machine guns, mortars, and automatic rifles. At the end of March, a second battalion was formed from men of the artillery and engineer units who had come forward from their technical schools, but it appears that it was never committed to battle in the first line.

Wallonien Langemarck,

61

The Flemings of SS likewise consolidated their remaining men into two heavily armed battalions and an artillery group. One Walloon and one Flemish battalion, along with a German battalion and a section of tank destroyers, was commanded by the Walloon Major Hellebaut as the final Russian push over the Oder developed on 20 April 1945. Colonel Schellong commanded the other Flemish battalion and the artillery, on Hellebaut's right flank.

Langemarck

62

The Soviet forces crashed over the Oder along the Danzig-Berlin Autobahn, and demolished the battle group of the SS Police Division guarding the crossing. The Walloons and Flemings made feeble counterattacks, but the Russian breakthrough gained momentum, and by 22 April it had become a clear success. From this point onward, the Belgian SS men simply backed away helplessly from the Russians, who advanced between five and ten kilometers per day without any serious German interference. In all probability the SS volunteers joined the general flight of the entire German Third Armored Army of General Hasso von Manteuffel. By 1 May, the Belgians stood between Wismar

and Bad Kleinen (the Regiment rested nearby). Degrelle ordered his troops to make for Lübeck, where they eventually surrendered to British troops. He then drove with his bodyguard into Denmark. The Division commander, Colonel Müller, told the Flemings that they were free to evade capture or surrender to the Anglo-American forces. They burned division records and gave out workers' passports to volunteers who wanted them, but most men stayed together as a group and surrendered at Schwerin. The Dutch and German survivors of the SS

Battalion, lightly engaged in April, also followed the Flemings into captivity at Schwerin.

Charlemagne

Langemarck

De Ruyter

63

In the midst of the collapse of the Oder front, the final act of the Third Reich played out in its battered capital, Berlin. Among the rubble of the badly bombed city, some 50,000 defenders organized a semblance of resistance against superior Russian forces. Here stood the last battalions of SS Division, each fighting at company strength, commanded by Brigadier General Krukenberg from 24 April to 1 May. His escort company of French SS men joined Swiss, Belgian, and Spanish SS troops recently arrived from training schools.

Nordland

64

These last volunteer SS men—Frenchmen, Belgians, and Spaniards[Author: what about the Swiss, who you mention in the previous sentence?]—arrived during the night of 24 April, and by 30 April were locked in furious combat at the Belle-Alliance Platz with Russian tanks and troops driving toward the Chancellery and Air Ministry buildings. As the Soviets pushed the SS troops back, some of them occupied the Chancellery for a last-ditch defense on 1 May. Hitler had already committed suicide, but the fanatical and hopeless defense of the dying city continued. Among these last stalwarts was a small group of Spanish volunteers.

60



In the rubble of the partially destroyed Chancellery, these Spaniards fought at the side of French and Estonian volunteers and defended the seat of the "Thousand-Year Reich" against Russian assault until they expended their last anti-tank rockets and hand grenades. The dazed survivors then fell back to the Air Ministry as the German commander of the Berlin garrison, General Helmuth Weidling, negotiated for a capitulation. The unconditional surrender of Berlin came on 2 May, but the SS men of the former and Divisions split into small groups and attempted to slip out of the city. Almost all became prisoners within a day. Among the dead left in Berlin were several veteran 1941 Legionnaires, including Per Sorensen of

fame and Jean Fonteroy, propagandist-correspondent of the

Nordland Charlemagne

Freikorps Danmark Legion des Volontaires Francais. 65

Numerous small groups of European volunteers fought at the front or found the front thrust upon them during the final collapse of the Reich. Many volunteers attending schools away from their units or involved in cadre training found themselves mobilized into scratch battle groups and thrown into the heat of battle in Berlin, Breslau, West Pomerania, and Hungary. On the latter front, the SS Division, first of the "European volunteer" divisions, fought its last battles along with the two battalions of and and some scratch units of mixed nationality drawn from training commands in Austria.

Several hundred each of the Danish, Norwegian, and Dutch volunteers participated in the heavy fighting in Hungary in front of Budapest. The Russians continued presssure in Hungary through the fall of Vienna in

mid-April. Thereafter, the Red Army shifted its pressure north toward Berlin. The division drove west and surrendered to the Americans.

WikingDanmark Norge

Wiking

66

The Crusade Ends

The last year of the war found Germany struggling to avert collapse. The pursuit of foreign military volunteers was not overlooked among the many desperate moves the Nazi regime conceived and executed before that collapse came. The final responsibility for the foreign volunteer military units devolved upon the SS, as the Army formed no new foreign combat units after 1941, and those the Army had formed either dissolved or converted to the SS by the war's end. 67

The volunteer program accelerated in the last year of the war, as the SS attempted to expand the successful assault brigades of 1943 into full-sized divisions. This appeared a feasible course of action as wartime exigencies cancelled the earlier racial, physical, political, and bureaucratic requirements of the volunteer program. The obstacles previously posed by the nationalism of the native collaborationist parties also disappeared with the 1944 invasion of France and the approach of the liberation. In France, Belgium, and Holland, the collaborationists lost all their inhibitions in siding with the German authorities. A refugee flow into Germany attested to this loyalty born of desperation and also provided the manpower for the final volunteer levies for the Western European volunteer Waffen-SS units. The lack of an Allied liberation in Denmark and Norway meant no change to the souring mood of the Scandinavian collaborationist movement and no final surge of military manpower for the SS in that quarter.

For their own part, the SS leaders demonstrated their increased need for foreign military units by promoting a true integration of their fighting forces. Not only did they form larger national units, but the SS also provided first-line equipment (except for armor) to all the volunteers, and the high command began to use them in a manner indistinguishable from other German units. The SS bureaucracy reflected the new status of volunteers as well, as they were promoted on an equal basis with German Waffen-SS officers. Foreign SS officers commanded German troops and other nationals of the SS without prejudice or apparent

FinalOperations, 1945



difficulty. Lack of requisite experience prevented the elevation of foreigners to division command, but foreign battalion commanders proved effective in the SS system. 68

The Stargard offensive indicated the degree to which the mixed and national units of foreign volunteer SS troops proved useful. That action proved a fiasco because of weather, German command and control problems, and the transportation nightmare that already had become reality by February 1945. The German-Scandinavian, German-Dutch, Flemish, and Walloon units engaged at Stargard performed to the limit of their personnel and material strength, but the overall war situation determined the fate of the Western European Waffen-SS. The situation of 1941-42 could not be duplicated. The final campaign proved a war of attrition in which Russian casualties were matched by German losses and those of the new battle groups and divisions of volunteers. The training of full divisions could not be accomplished amid shortages of time, fuel, and ammunition. The collapses in the East, South, and West allowed no time for the proper preparation of the 1945 divisions, which instead sallied to the front piecemeal in battle groups or as untrained reserves. Neither of these stillborn training and preparation actions by the German high command could hold the front or spare the frail volunteer units.

The collapse came quickly. Other than the flood of refugees, recruitment proved notably poor in 1944 and probably next to nil in 1945. Thus casualties incurred in the actions in the last months of the war could not be replaced, and after Stargard the volunteer units fell back precipitously before the Russian tide, sustained only by scratch replacements transferred from the German Navy, Luftwaffe, and a few men from the volunteer unit depots. After the Oder River line fell and the Red Army surrounded Berlin, there remained no hope. The volunteer units began to march toward the west and survival. Many volunteers voted not to continue fighting, and their officers obviously supported their desires by forming "labor" units and leading their troops away from the fighting. Those few remaining die-hards, such as the few hundred Frenchmen of the Fenet Battalion that accompanied their German brigadier to Berlin, proved to be exceptional.

65

Ultimately, deficiencies in training, supplies, and equipment proved crucial for the volunteer units, although lack of replacements brought them to their final end. The Spanish Legion, SS and SS all deployed lacking the cohesion bestowed by unit training and remained underequipped across the spectrum of standard Army and Waffen-SS matèriel. The still-operating elements of the and units, along with the Fenet battalion, containing the final active remnants of SS all performed reasonably well in combat, in some instances down to the last days of the German

Landstorm Nederland, Charlemagne

Wiking, Nordland, Langemarck, WallonienFrankreich,

Götterdämmerung.

Notes:

Although the Spanish Legion proved to be the last legion formed by either the Army or SS, its operational life proved quite brief, and the French LVF outlasted it by remaining in action through mid-1944.

Note 1:

Back.

DEV, 29/43/6/4; OKH, T78/412/885. The designation "Spanish Legion" is used here, as it was the official one used by the German Army. Spanish works sometimes refer to it as the a traditional sixteenth-century military and legionary term, or in popular literature as the "Blue Legion." The term "Spanish Foreign Legion" is used loosely here to distinguish the standing organization in Spain's African Army from this unit, formed for service on the Eastern Front, for the former had changed the term to designate its constituent regiments in 1925.

Note 2:

Tercio,

Back.

Kaisergruber:Last Fight



OKH, T78/412/885 Emilio Esteban-Infantes, (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1956), 254; Army Group North, T311/72/7093863, 7093887; XVIII Corps, T314/800/494-75.

Note 3: La División Azul

Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093882, 7093900; Tomas Salvador, (Barcelona: Ediciones Domus, 1954), 384. Note 4: División 250

Back.

XXVIII Corps, T314/800/333-477. Esteban-Infantes, 252-62. Note 5: División Azul, Back.

Earl Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1968), 248-58; Albert Seaton, (New York: Praeger, 1971), 408-12. Note 6:

The Russo-German War Back.

Albert Seaton, (New York: Praeger, 1971), 408-12. Note 7: The Russo-German War Back.

DEV 29/43/6/4, 4; XXVIII Corps, T314/800/1253-61; Army Group North, T311/72/7093900. Note 8:

Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093900; Ziemke, 258-66; Hartweg Pohlman, (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1962), 118-26. Note 9: Stalingrad to Berlin,

Wolchow Back.

XXVIII Corps, T314/800/1280; Esteban-Infantes, 258-62; Salvador, División 250, 394. Note 10: División Azul,

Back.

DEV, 29/43/6/1, 4; XXVIII Corps, T314/800/1284-99; Eighteenth Army, T312/923/9112356-9113133; OKW, "Lage Ost" situation maps 23 January-14 February 1944; Esteban-Infantes, 260-63.

Note 11:


Esteban-Infantes, 363-66; Eighteenth Army, T312/982/9113134. Note 12: División Azul,Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/709389 and 7093900; Eighth Army, T312/ 728/9113024. Note 13:

Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093902. Carleton J. H. Hayes, (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 212-25.

Note 14: Wartime Mission to Spain Back.

OKW, T77/856/5601615-17, T77/885/5601699, 5634689; Army Group North, T311/72/7093904; Esteban-Infantes, 220-21; Anfiesta interview. Spanish historians, such as Rafael García Pérez, indicate that Hitler approved of this course as early as 20/2/44, but no postwar writers seem to have noticed the wretched performance of the Legion in its brief baptism of fire, or the apparent relief with which the German military command detached this last Spanish contingent. See Pérez,

(Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994), 505.


Franquismo y Tercer Reich: las relaciones económicas hispano-alemanas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial

Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093903-13; OKW, T77/885/5634667-8; Esteban-Infantes, 267; Salvador, 401-02. Note 16:

División Azul, División 250, Back.

Ziemke, 412. Note 17: Stalingrad to Berlin, Back.

Gerhard Hirschfeld cites a September 1944 flight of some 30,000 NSB followers and families to Germany, but they may not have produced an influx of volunteer replacements for the Waffen-SS. Much of Holland remained under the control of the German military, including the SS Division, through the end of the war. This division was already swollen by forced drafts of NSB and other collaborationist militia. Note that Mussert joined the NSKK in June 1944, and his deputy Meinod M. Rost van Tonnigen joined SS in September. See Hirschfeld,

(Oxford: Berg, 1988),

Note 18:

Landstorm Nederland

Landstorm Nederland Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation



309. Back.

Edgar E. Knoebel, "Racial Illusion and Military Necessity" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1965), 275--76; Himmler orders 12/9/44 and 18/9/44 in Franz Vierendeels, 2 vols. (Antwerp: St. Maartensfond, 1973), 2: 147-48.

Note 19:

Vlamingen aan het Ost front,Back.

Vierendeels, 2: 149-51; Jüttner order. Note 20: Vlamingen, Back.

Vierendeels, 2: 158-59; Franz Vierendeels interview at Groot Bijaarden, 29/5/82; Kurt G. Klietmann, (Osnabrück: Munin, 1965), 258. Reich Youth Leader Paul Axmann announced in a 9 March 1945 letter the formation of a Flemish Hitler Youth Battalion of four companies for the Flemish division, T175/66/2581969. This battalion trained in the rear until the "last stand" of the division at Prenzlau the following month. It then "went into action with one rifle per three men"; Vierendeels interview.

Note 21: Vlamingen,Die Waffen-SS — eine Dokumentation

Back.

Vierendeels, 2: 162-65; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," Appendix, shows approximately 5500 men in SS in January 1945 and approximately 3800 in April 1945. See also T175/91/2729117.

Note 22: Vlamingen,Langemarck

Back.

Vierendeels, 2: 169-71; Vierendeels interview; Klietmann, 258.

Note 23: Vlamingen, Die Waffen-SS, Back.

De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 75-83; Klietmann, 261-62. Degrelle claimed 6000 men in "his division" when interviewed, but the strength chart appendix in de Goy shows slightly over half that amount.

Note 24: Die Waffen-SS,

Back.

De Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 84-87; Léon Degrelle, 390-94, Martin Conway, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 265.

Note 25: Die verlorene Legion,Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement

Back.

Klietmann, 285; Albert Merglen, "Soldats francais sous uniforms allemands 1941-1945," RHDGM 108 (1977): 79.The SS officially designated the SS Division the 33rd Waffen-Grenadier Division , indicating its low status as a combat unit in the SS.

Note 26: Die Waffen-SS,

CharlemagneBack.

Pierre Rostaing, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1975), 145; Merglen, "Soldats francais," 70; Fenet maintained that the Frenchmen in the NSKK posed no problem as they already had served "under German discipline"; Fenet interview. Eberhard Jäckel notes that 100 French officers and 3000 troops served in the German Navy as security guards; Jäckel, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 300. Philippe Burrin also estimates a contingent of 3000 each for the combined NSKK and air force transport services and the armed guards of the construction agency Organization Todt. He concludes that French volunteers in the summer of 1944 totaled approximately 12,000 combat troops and 10,000 uniformed auxiliaries in the German forces; Burrin, (New York: New Press, 1996), 436. The collaborationist refugee wave of the fall of 1944 may have been over 15,000, including roughly 4000 Milice and their families (Burrin, 455). See Christian de la Mazière, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974), 38-42. De la Mazière provides an impressive eyewitness account of his experience as a late-1944 refugee-volunteer in SS

Note 27: Le Prix d'un Serment 1941-45

Frankreich in Hitlers Europa

France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise

The Captive Dreamer

Charlemagne. Back.

la Mazière, 29-30. Note 28: The Captive Dreamer, Back.

Ibid., 43-44; Merglen, "Soldats francais," 79. There were some desertions; see Rostaing, 148. Milice officers did obtain many commands, owing to their earlier rank in the SS; Merglen, 80.

Note 29:Le Prix d'un Serment,

Back.



Jean Mabire, (Paris: Fayard, 1974), 492-97. Note 30: La Division Charlemagne Back.

Merglen, "Soldats francais," 81. Note 31: Back.

Ziemke, 423-28; de la Mazière, 76; Fenet interview. Records from Bad Tölz show no French cadets among the 100 foreign cadre members in training between November 1944 and March 1945; T175/191/2729865-30067, passim.

Note 32: Stalingrad to Berlin, Captive Dreamer,

Back.

Louis de Jong, 10 vols. (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1969-), vol. 7/part 2:1202; In't Veld,

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 1521; Klietmann, 291, 507; letters 31/4/43 and 21/9/43, T354/646/243 and 232; Armed Forces Command Netherlands, letter 29/4/44, T580/35/ ordering 234N.

Note 33: Het Koninkrijk des Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoonlog 1940-45, De SS en Nederland Die Waffen-SS,

Landstorm Division,NederlandBack.

Battalions of the SS fought initially under the command of the 17th SS Götz von Berlichingen Mechanized Infantry Division; Netherlands, Documentatie (Amsterdam: Buijten + Schippenheihn, 1947), 185; Klietmann,

513; Battle report, II/1st Regiment 16/9/44, T354/646/345. Rosters of the 1st Regiment for August 1944 show mostly German officers, and these were in general overage, reserves, or had been previously wounded, T354/646/416-19. Jan Vincx and Viktor Schotanius,

(Antwerp, 1988) details operations from September 1944 to the war's end.

Note 34: Landstorm Nederland

Die Waffen-SS,

Nederlandse vrijwilligers in Europese krijgsdienst 1940-1945. I: Landstorm Nederland

Back.

Documentatie, 185; In't Veld, Klietmann shows a strength of 94/489/2647 as of 20 September 1944, but this is an SS headquarters tally, probably not reflecting losses in that month ( 513).

telephone plan, 5/4/45, T354/646/4.

Note 35: De SS en Nederland, 1522;

Die Waffen-SS, Landstorm Division

NederlandBack.

OKW, T77/885/5601722, 5634659-64. Note 36: Back.

OKW, T77/885/5634643, 5634650-65, 563583-4; Jordana's protest of 7/2/44 noted in OKW memo 23/2/44, frame 5634695. Note 37:

Back.

Army Group North, T311/72/7093916; OKW T77/887/5634558. The Königsberg letter indicates that the commander of the concerned, a Captain "Carlier" (no record exists in DEV personnel files), had warned his troops that any man staying in Germany would be declared a deserter in the event that his mobilization class was called up by the Spanish government. However, Clyde Clark shows that Spanish legislation effective from 21 December 1943 to 1 January 1945 granted amnesty to draft evaders and deserters in foreign countries; Clark, (n.p., 1951), 442, 555-56.

Note 38:Bandera

Evolution of the Franco RegimeBack.

OKW, T77/885/5634630-4; OKH, T78/412/6380883, T78/414/6382624-9. Curiously, the OKH files indicated that other companies were planned in Stablack from time to time for expansion to a full-strength battalion, but no mention was made of any additional sources of personnel. Probably this action was forestalled by the establishment of the Stockerau training battalion. Miguel Ezquerra stated that 400 Spanish troops gathered at Stablack; see (Barcelona: Ediciones Acervo, 1975), 22, 92.

Note 39:

Berlin, a Vida o Muerte Back.

OKH, T78/414/6382624-9; XVII Military District, T79/97/720; Ezquerra, 70-71. Note 40: Berlin,

Back.

OKW, T77/885/5634563; OKH, T78/412/6380880; XVII Military District, T79/97/720. Two Spanish accounts of prisoner-of-war experiences noted the arrival in Russian POW camps of survivors of what most likely was this Spanish unit or the companies in the 357th Infantry Division noted below: Juan Negro Castro, (Madrid:

Note 41:

Españoles en la URSS



Escelicer, 1959), 227; Gerardo Oroqieta Arbiol and César García Sánchez, (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1958), 389.

De Leningrad a Odessa Back.

XVII Military District, T79/97/720-9. Rafael Barrio Toquero had been in the anti-tank units of the 269th Regiment and Legion. Personnel Record #2892, Archivo de la Milicia Nacional (now in Archivo Militar, Guadalajara).

Note 42:

Back.

OKW, T77/885/5634561. Veterans of SS recalled their Spanish company as having been of "average" quality, performing adequately in combat. Kaisergruber, Hellebaut, and Degrelle interviews. Cf. Ezquerra, 80-87, 96.

Note 43: Wallonien

Berlin, Back.

XVII Military District, T79/94/672-74; OKH, T78/412/6380884. Note 44: Back.

OKW, T78/412/6380442, 413/6381250; OKW, "Lage Ost" situation maps, 8 January-27 April 1945; Editorial comment, 26 (September 1980): 31. Werner Haupt, "Von Narva bis zur Schlacht von Berlin," addendum in Emilio Esteban-Infantes, trans. Werner Haupt (Leoni an Starnberger See: Druffel, 1958), 146-47; Ezquerra, 105.

Note 45:Die Freiwillige

Blaue Division,Berlin, Back.

Carlos Caballero Jurado, (Valencia: AC Tercera Posición, 1987). See also his

(London, Osprey: 1991). Wayne Bowen, "The Ghost Battalion: Spaniards in the Waffen-SS," (Winter 2001).

Note 46: El Batallón Fantasma: españoles en el Wehrmacht y Waffen-SS, 1944-45. Foreign Volunteers of the Wehrmacht, 1941-45

The Historian Back.

Ezquerra, for example, claims to have been promoted from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel orally between his 1944 arrival in Stablack and final combat in Berlin. During this time, he allegedly served in the Army's special operations unit, the "Brandenburgers," first fighting in and out of Paris, and then with his Spanish commando unit, fighting behind the American (!) lines in the Battle of the Bulge. He claimed to have had personal contact with Hitler, who orally (of course) awarded him the Knight's Cross, Himmler, Goebbels, and Berger, and to have seen Martin Bormann and Axmann. In the last days of the war, his "Ezquerra Unit"—now absorbed into the Waffen-SS, although all his oral promotions had come from Army officers—consisted of three companies of Spaniards, some "Doriot " [ ] and more Spaniards from the Walloon Division. While I cannot prove this a fraud, neither can I find any corroboration of his tale. Given the frequency with which false war and military veterans are being "outed" in the United States, I feel that this perhaps falls in the same category.

Note 47:

Maquis

Milice sic

Back.

Wayne Bowen, "The Ghost Battalion: Spaniards in the Waffen-SS," paper read at the annual meeting of the Society for Military History, Penn State University, 16 April 1999.

Note 48:

Back.

Wilhelm Tieke, 3rd Edition (Osnabrück: Munin, 1981), 155; O. Krabbe, (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1978), 212-13. Krabbe notes a replacement battalion of Alsatians in SS (206).

Note 49: Tragödie um die Treue,Danske Soldaten I kamp pa Østfronten 1941-45

Nordland Back.

Ziemke, 413; Klietmann, 238; Rauter letter 11/1/45, T175/64/2579779. Also recruited in 1944 were 318 replacements for SS and 2580 for SS The upgraded SS Division was given the number 23, borrowed from a Croatian SS division disbanded earlier; George H. Stein,

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 297

Note 50: Stalingrad to Berlin, Die Waffen-SS,Wiking

Landstorm Nederland. NederlandThe

Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945Back.

Krabbe, 137. Rolf Michaelis makes good use of Army Group Vistula records to show how SS fared in the last months of the war:Note 51: Danske Soldaten,

Nordland

Cumulative losses 1 Sept. 1943-28 Feb. 1945



Officers Enlisted

Dead 82 2487

Wounded 225 8636

Missing 16 875!

To which one may add losses in March 45:

Officers Enlisted

Dead 16 350

Wounded 242 1369

Missing 7 380

For the SS Division, the casualty figures worsened:Cumulative losses 1 Sept. 1943-28 Feb. 1945

Nederland

Officers Enlisted

Dead 55 2487

Wounded 141 5748

Missing 42 1609

The losses for in March 1945:Nederland

Officers Enlisted

Dead 13 299

Wounded 38 932

Missing 6 776!

The belief that SS recruiters could find Germanic volunteer replacements in any adequate proportion to fill these deficiencies defies all reason. The Brigade/Division in effect had to be completely replaced twice in its brief period of operation. Rolf Michaelis,

(Erlangen: Michealis-Verlag, 1996), 105, 300.

NederlandDie

Panzergrenadier Divisionen der Waffen-SSBack.

Ziemke, 446-47; Krabbe, 215-17; Vierendeels, 2: 191-96; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 98-103. Note 52: Stalingrad to Berlin, Danske Soldaten,

Vlamingen, Back.

Ziemke, 457-60; Vierendeels, 2: 201-03; Krabbe, 217-21; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 108-12; Wilhelm Tieke, (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1981), 29.

Note 53: Stalingrad to Berlin, Vlamingen,Danske Soldaten,

Das Ende Zwischen Oder und Elbe: der Kampf um Berlin, 1945Back.

Merglen, "Soldats francais," 82; Rostaing, 159-75; de la Mazière, 86-126; Jean Mabire, (Paris: Fayard, 1975), 328-29; Husemann, vol. 3, contains no mention of French SS attached to the SS Police Division. Richard Landwehr, in

(Silver Spring, MD: Bibliophile Legion Books, 1989), 108ff, notes several experiences of small units of the division in March-April; however, these accounts are drawn from secondary sourcesthat are impossible to confirm.

Note 54: Le Prix d'un Serment,Captive Dreamer, Mourir a Berlin

Die guten Glauben waren,Charlemagne's Legionnaires:

French volunteers of the Waffen-SS, 1943-1945

Back.

Merglen, "Soldats Francais," 83; Rostaing, 179-80. Note 55: Le Prix d'un Serment, Back.

Mabire, 330-31; Rostaing, Le Prix d'un Serment, 189-207. Fenet maintains that he overloaded nine trucks with thirty-seven men each, thus exceeding the hundred men usually assigned to Krukenberg's bodyguard; Fenet interview. Michaelis shows the French portion of the 1500-man battle group in Berlin to have been

Note 56: Mourir a Berlin,

Nordland



roughly a company, counting the remnants of Fenet's battalion and some men from the SS Division school. (Panzergrenadier Divisionen, 106-7). In any case, mentions of a French in Berlin that have been cited in postwar literature cannot be supported.

CharlemagneSturmbatallion

Back.

Mabire, 333-34, On the last day of SS C existence, 2 May 1945, Major Boude-Gheusi released his German troops, and told his French SS men to find civilian clothes and pose as foreign workers. Most were captured, ending up in POW camps; Tieke, 470. Hitler, despite his gift for charade in the final months, never took the French Waffen-SS too seriously. When informed of the arrival of SS units in the Konitz area near the Soviet breakthrough on 24 February, he commented, "die nutzen nichts." Helmut Heiber, (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1962), 888.

Note 57: Mourir a Berlin, harlemagne's

Ende,Charlemagne

Hitler's LagebesprechungenBack.

Krabbe, 221-22; Tieke, 238; SS Division situation map of Franz Vierendeels Feb.-April 1945, copied by author from specimen furnished to U.S. National Archives.

Note 58: Danske Soldaten,Tragödie um die Treue, Langemarck

Back.

Ziemke, 474-76; Tieke, 203. Army Group Vistula reports in late April showed SS to be short of infantry, officers, and NCOs, but with good artillery and reconnaissance battalions. The attachment of a half company of Tiger tanks may have bolstered its fighting power somewhat, but it must be considered a paper division by this time; Michaelis, 103.

Note 59: Stalingrad to Berlin,Nordland

Panzergrenadier Divisionen, Back.

Krabbe, 225-29; Tieke, 204-12; Klietmann, 238. Note 60: Danske Soldaten, Die Waffen-SS,

Back.

Ziemke, 460; de Goy, "Legion Belge Wallonie," 117-35; Vierendeels map; Degrelle, 444-46, maintains that the Walloons suffered sixty percent casualties at Altdamn, but that only eighty men desired to leave the front when offered the chance.

Note 61: Stalingrad to Berlin,Die verlorene Legion,

Back.

Vierendeels, 2: 204, 222-23. Note 62: Vlamingen, Back.

Ziemke, 287; Tieke, 469-70; Vierendeels map; Degrelle, 473. Degrelle at this point left his troops, staying ahead of the Allied liberation forces until he reached Oslo. There he persuaded Albert Speer's pilot to fly him in an obsolete bomber (a Heinkel 111) some 2000 kilometers at low altitude to Spain on 8 May, where he crash-landed on the coast. His Spanish exile, although apparently comfortable, continued until his death in 1994. His wife refused to follow him into exile, and he later married a sister of Joseph Darnand.

Note 63: Stalingrad to Berlin, Das Ende zwischen Oder und Elbe,Die verlorene Legion,

Back.

On the rudimentary state of the Berlin defenses, see Erich Kuby, (Munich: Schere, 1965).

Note 64: Die Russen in Berlin 1945 Back.

Kuby, 142, 233; Werner Haupt, (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1966), 200; Haupt, "Von der Narva bis zur Schlacht von Berlin," 134; Cf. Ezquerra, 105-23, for a highly questionable account. KTB des OKW, 7:1898; Andrew Tulley, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 146-47.

Note 65: Russen in Berlin, La Dernière Bataille de Hitler

Berlin,Berlin: Story of A Battle

Back.

Krabbe, 138-41. Improvised reinforcement units seem to have restored little resilience to German units. Ziemke notes the apparent failure of the IV SS Armored Corps, including SS in late February: "...of deserters rounded up 75% were SS men." (Ziemke, 458). Dutch researchers have noted that Dutchmen in labor battalions with the SS and the Netherlands East Company were trapped by the Russian offensives and did enter the fighting in self-defense. Apparently, however,

Note 66: Danske Soldaten,

Wiking,Stalingrad to Berlin,



there was no wholesale incorporation of these groups into the Waffen-SS; E. Fraeukel Verkade and A. J. van der Leeuw, "Nederlandse SS-Frontarbeiders," in ed. A. H. Paape (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 63-67.

Studies over in Oorlogstijd,NederlandBack.

An exception may be noted in the case of the Army's 162nd (Turkoman) Infantry Division and some ninety field battalions of Tatar troops formed in 1942-43. See Joachim Hoffman, (Freiburg: Rombach, 1976).

Note 67:

Die Ostlegionen 1941-43 Back.

Interviews with Alfred Mäder, Rendsberg, 13/3/81, and Richard Schulze-Kossens, Düsseldorf, 21/3/81. Note 68:

Back.




6. The Character of Military Collaboration

Motivations

It remains difficult to this day to determine the precise reasons that caused tens of thousands of Northern and Western European citizens to volunteer for service in the German armed forces. At best, one may identify an imposing array of social, economic, political, ideological, and psychological factors that operated variously or in tandem upon the captive and neutral populations.

1

There may exist a general psychological operative condition that great events like the Second World War bring into being. Faced with events of such impact, certain elements of the population may feel impelled to participate, not to sit by while the world changes its shape. However insignificant the service of a single soldier remains in a historical moment so expansive and weighty as the Second World War, one cannot ignore the individual's desire to contribute. Indeed, groups of foreign volunteers appeared in almost every theater of this war, on each side of the conflict. The Spanish Civil War and Russo-Finnish Wars also witnessed popular volunteer movements that presage the subject of this study. Robert Wohl, in his study of generational dynamics in the period between the wars, introduced the notion of the war-adventurer, citing the works of Uruh, Jungen, Flex, and Wurche as examples of this phenomenon. The complex social, political, and intellectual conditions of post-World War I

Europe included those brought about by a continent being torn between new and old ways, or by generational conflict. The youth welcomed the new ways and displayed great willingness to deal with and overcome the challenges of their day with direct actions. The direct-action gangs of political parties in interwar Europe certainly reflected such exuberance. In peacetime, such men pursued sports or engaged in other reckless actions. In wartime, they would seek combat service on distant fronts as an expression of decisive action. In a sense, the volunteer movements in the Second World War reflected the rekindling of the late Romantic movement. The desire to experience exotic activities and lands on the part of the social and intellectual inassimilable of 1940 may have been an expression of his longing for renewal. There was nothing novel in Western culture

about the idea of seeking a spiritual rebirth through adventure. A desire to be reborn and relinquish the trappings of contemporary society may well have led individual Danes and Spaniards to the shores of the

Volkhov River and Dutchmen and Belgians to the mountains of the Caucasus. Foreign legions and flashy elite regiments held a certain attraction to those Europeans not emotionally satisfied by their experiences of the 1930s.

1

Wanderlust

2

This general intellectual trend may best account for the shifting tide of volunteers in the German forces. As Wohl points out,

By 1943, it was clear to all but the most doggedly reactionary and antisemitic members of the generation of 1914 that Fascism had been a colossal failure. It had provided a means for checking social change rather than for advancing it; it had failed to deliver on its promises of creating a new type of human being and a new system of values; it had released a flood of violence and aggression; It had committed crimes of unprecedented horror; and it had resulted in a disastrous civil war of European nation-states that had left Europe impoverished and powerless. 3

The volunteer of 1940-41 clearly saw the war both as a period of service and as a cause in a markedly different fashion than did the volunteer of 1943-44. The Spanish student boarding a troop train for Germany in Madrid in July 1941 may well have imagined himself

5

Kaisergruber:Bordeaux

Kaisergruber:Joins contingent



detraining in Moscow in time to participate in the victory parade. Such a viewpoint would not have been found in the mind of the Belgian worker recruited in Düsseldorf in 1943 or the French collaborationist refugee joining the SS Division in Sigmaringen during the last winter of the war.

Charlemagne

The actions of the collaborationist parties in occupied Western Europe bore heavily upon the volunteer movement. This condition was not true in the early years of the occupation, when German victory and long-term rule seemed relatively certain. Leading collaborationist leaders like Clausen, Degrelle, Mussert, and Quisling continually sought to solidify and even expand their position and influence with German authorities. By encouraging their followers to volunteer in national legions or "European" Waffen-SS regiments, they might secure the future of their parties in the homeland, even if the homeland was merely part of the New Order. National interests certainly prevailed initially, reflecting many pre-war themes such as anti-communism and increasing dissatisfaction with local bourgeois governments. Later, however, the overlapping national interests of occupied states and Germany made the European New Order propaganda more viable. Some volunteers undoubtedly were genuine political idealists who believed (or acquired from propaganda themes) the notion that they could share in the creation of a supra-national Germanic empire and vanquish a Bolshevik menace from the eastern marches of Europe. These objectives did not even require a volunteer to be an active

collaborationist. There existed a "thin gray line" between collaboration with and resistance to the German order in Europe that embraced large segments of the population. Within this category one may group anti-

Nazis who remained at their posts in industry or civil service, thereby undoubtedly being of general benefit to the German war effort, yet who tried to do what they could to slow the Germans or thwart their aims. There were also those officials who remained on the job as buffers between the Nazi hierarchy and their own citizens. Many other officials accepted their collective fate as a German satellite state and worked to salvage the best possible position for their countrymen. Last in the "gray line" grouping were the men who saw in an authoritarian New Order the only chance to forestall the victory of dreaded Socialism or Communism. Mussert and Staf de Clercq may have qualified in the last group, described as "Germanics but not Greater Germans" by Norman Rich. 4

Any consideration of the motivations of the citizenry of the occupied nations must include economic factors as well. The quality of life in Northern and Western Europe had varied through the 1930s and, under the double blows of wartime restrictions and occupation by a foreign power, were bound to become worse, even in neutral states. Factors of employment, income, savings, and material and food supplies undoubtedly preyed upon a population already rendered insecure by defeat and the seeming internal collapse of local government. The friendly, robust, healthy, well-fed, and well-equipped soldiers of the conqueror must have made some impression upon the young and active segments of the population. 5

Beyond generalized hypotheses, what evidence exists to indicate tendencies among the volunteers? There exist a memoir literature, a few journals, and some associations of surviving volunteers. Unfortunately, the number of volunteers thus represented falls far short of the size of the volunteer groups. The selectability of such the sample represented by these materials—those surviving, living in the homeland, located close to the veteran's association, positively nostalgic about their wartime experience, and willing to publicly demonstrate such nostalgia—makes this source material immediately suspect. The feelings of surviving veterans in the associations moreover may remain too nostalgic and too corporative in the postwar period to indicate reliable trends of wartime thought. 6

Two social scientists studied collaborationists, including military volunteers, in their homelands after the war. Because their sampling technique was sufficiently broad and random, these studies remain the best indicators of volunteer motivations. A Dutch psychologist, Dr. A. F. G. van Hoesel, published his study of 432 "young political offenders" in 1948. Of his study sample, 264 men had served in German military and semi-military

Kaisergruber:Leaves Brussels

Kaisergruber:Rexist

Kaisergruber:German troops



service in the war. The others had committed crimes of civil collaboration(joined the NSB, Organization, etc.). Van Hoesel categorized his military collaborators in the following manner.

Todt

7

Service PoliticallyReliable (%)

Politically Unreliable (%)

Total (%)

Waffen-SS 29 (22) 31 (23) 60 (23)

Landstorm 4 (3) 4 (3) 8 (3)

Landwacht 3 (2) 15 (11) 18 (7)

Army 5 (4) 9 (7) 14 (5)

Navy 16 (12) 5 (4) 21 (8)

Air Force 57 (44) 50 (38) 107 (41)

Anti-aircraft 3 (2) 6 (5) 9 (3)

NSKK 14 (11) 13 (10) 27 (10)

TOTAL 134 133 264

10

Those men labeled as "politically unreliable" had joined or associated with the Mussert NSB Party or similarly national-socialist organizations. A few qualified as pro-German by holding German citizenship. Because van Hoesel dealt with men caught and convicted, and because his sample includes so many men who did not serve in ground combat units (especially the Luftwaffe), it may have only limited bearing on this study. However, onemight group the and members with the SS, which absorbed them in 1944. The Army volunteer group, and later the Navy and Air Force groups, probably consisted in the main of local security guards, although individuals could and did volunteer in regular combat forces of the Wehrmacht. Thus, only the SS and its auxiliaries, which evolved into national volunteer units, may be clustered into a like-minded group. At any rate their combination yields a group of 36 "reliable" and 50 "unreliable" men, for a total of 86, second only to the Air Force contingent and almost one-third of the overall group.

Landwacht Landstorm

Consider, then, van Hoesel's conclusions as to why these men became political offenders: 8

Primary Motivation Reliable Unreliable Total

Poor Domestic Situation 19 4 23

Evade Police 6 2 8

Escape Reform School 6 1 7

Arrested by Germans 6 2 7

Orphaned - 2 2

Food Shortage at Home 71 12 83

Adventure 26 19 65

Employment 5 3 8

Attracted by Benefits 7 2 9

Idealism 1 11 12

Drafted (German citizen) - 3 3

"Duty" to NSB or Family - 176 176

Only Son of NSB'er - 13 13

None of the Above 4 11 15

Unknown - 1 1

TOTAL 150 282 432



Unfortunately, van Hoesel did not select out his military group for separate motivational investigation. Among the entire group and, one may assume, the military volunteers, the majority cast their lot with the German side because of political status in National-Socialist circles, hunger, adventure, escape from home life, and idealism, in decreasing order of frequency. 9

Van Hoesel also supplied demographic and sociological data on his sample group. Essentially, this data only demonstrated that most of the offenders came from large cities (262 of 432) and held mostly lower-class occupations—unskilled, skilled, and clerical (373 of 432).

15

More detailed sociological research appeared in a study of collaborators in Denmark, published in 1955. Sociologist K. O. Christiansen studied 5152 male collaborators, out of some 13,000 that were sentenced after the war under the penal code. He then interviewed 2967 of these to obtain more detailed data. Significantly, Christiansen proved more discerning in his categorization of military collaborators. His group labeled "soldiers" excluded party militia and auxiliary guards. Only volunteers in the Waffen-SS,

and anti-aircraft troops fell under the "soldier" designation; these totaled 3718 men, of whom 654 were interviewed.

Freikorps Danmark,

10

Christiansen split his study group into two major subdivisions: those recruited early in the war (1940-43) and those recruited in the last years of the war (1944-45). He further divided them by degree of "Nazification": German minority, Danish Nazi Party members, and the remainder. Frequency of "Soldiers" in Danish Collaboration Groups 11

Total Interviewed

Group Number Military (%) Number Military (%)

German Minority 2417 580 (24) 361 77 (21.3)

Danish Nazis 3956 1260 (85.9) 859 215 (25)

Rest 6627 1878 (28.3) 1747 362 (20.7)

Having established this correlation between his interview group and the overall group, Christiansen gathered sociological data for the various categories of collaborators, including his "soldiers" group. The most significant data follows:

Geographical Distribution of Danish Military Collaborators 12

German Minority Danish Nazis Rest

Region 1941-43 / 44-45 1941-43 / 44-45 1941-43 / 44-45

Capital 8 0 86 10 124 39

Prov. Towns 46 0 42 3 39 11

Countryside 12 3 33 1 42 18

Abroad 6 2 38 2 77 12

TOTAL 72 5! 199 16 282 80

Social Class of Danish Military Collaborators 13


Class 1941-43 / 44-45 1941-43 / 44-45 1941-43 / 44-45

Lower 11 2 38 5 121 34

Middle 61 3 55 11 155 46

Upper-Middle/Upper

0 0 6 0 6 0

20



Unemployment among Danish Military Collaborators (when recruited) 14


1941-43 / 44-45

1941-43 / 44-45

1941-43 / 44-45

Total inMilitary Group

72 5 199 16 282 80

No. Unemployed (%)

7 (10) 0 22 (11) 0! 59 (21) 14 (18)

All Collaborators% Unemployed

(11) (26) (25) (26) (34) (51)

Evidence of Previous Criminality 15


1941-43 / 44-45 1941-43 / 44-45 1941-43 / 44-45

Total inMilitary Group

72 5 199 16 282 80

Previous Criminality (%)

5 (7) 0 31 (16) 0 72 (26) 41( 51)

All Collaborators% PreviousCriminality

(5) (19) (13) (15) (25) (32)

From this data, Christiansen concluded that Danish military collaborators came from groups that enjoyed better economic standing than other collaborators, and that economic motives played the least substantial role in their collaboration compared to other groups of collaborators. He also noted that soldiers recruited in the early part of the war were significantly older than those recruited in the last year. His inference that the latter were therefore the least mature of the group might gain support from the last column in the "Criminality" table, showing that half the non-Nazi Danes volunteering in the last year of the war had some criminal record! 16

Major Krabbe, a 1941 volunteer in the Danish who finished the war as a battalion commander in SS wrote the most detailed study of all the participants. His characterization of volunteer motivations in the Danish case echoes the findings of the above studies, albeit with a conservative flavor.

FreikorpsLangemarck,

Krabbe saw the youth of Denmark as confused and agitated. They were nationalistic in spirit, but saw no employment or economic security afforded by their homeland. They also saw no leadership among the higher officials, as the latter knuckled under to German rule. Denmark represented no future; in fact, in their view Europe lay under the threat of internal collapse and civil war. Therefore, it was virtually instinctive for some of the young and the active elements in the population to react to the "dynamism" of National Socialism. The Germans were masters of their own destiny, and a young man could find direction in his life by embracing their cause. This condition existed partly because German foreign policy was not in itself disagreeable to most Danes in the early expansionist period of the war. No intelligent Dane expected neutrality to survive the outbreak of war, and therefore it fell to him to choose sides with some foresight. 17

Danish patriotism proved rather narrow and old-fashioned in Krabbe's view. The volunteers in his homeland had no conception of the state as a living organism to which they owed a social responsibility. In the face of defeatism at home, many turned outward to the old dreams of a united Europe, united in this case under strong German rule, which appealed to many. 18



While stressing the strongly nationalistic and political aspects of the volunteer character, Krabbe also strongly denies any economic motive. Danes, he said, did not seek to earn a living by military service. The money earned could not purchase anything of note, and he and his countrymen were not promised post-war jobs or land by the Germans in return for their service. 19

25

In the main, it seems likely that Krabbe, like the other veteran writers of the postwar period, tended to exaggerate the degree of political idealism and minimize economic or material motives among the volunteers. There seems little doubt that individual motivations ranged over a considerable spectrum of possibilities, and no single interpretation of the movement is sufficient. Svein Blindheim, a Norwegian Army major who served in the Free Norwegian forces on the Allied side, studied Norwegian volunteers, drawing social data from 709 obituaries. He determined that the strongest motive in the case of the Norwegians was family environment, reinforced by political parties and organizations. The nationalist right-extremist party, the Fatherland Party, seemed to have had a strong influence on many Norwegian volunteers. The primacy of family influence might help to explain the fading recruitment pattern for the Waffen-SS in Norway, as only a finite number of right-wing families with military age members existed to answer further calls for volunteers. 20

Willy Massin studied the collaboration movement in Flanders—including military volunteers—in the province of Limberg, where a Waffen-SS cohort of 530 formed from 1941 to 1944. According to Massin, the factors influencing Limbergers to join the Waffen-SS included support for the Staf de Clerq faction, the expectation that Belgium would cease to exist under the New Order, the geographic and ethnic proximity of Limberg and Germany, propaganda about the anti-Bolshevik crusade, and the attraction the uniform held as a status symbol for individuals. He created a hierarchy of motivations for this cohort of volunteers that includes: political-ideological motives, material gain, desire to escape to a foreign legion, labor in Germany, various personal situations, and lastly a spirit of adventure. 21

Eddy De Bruyne, after decades of studying the Walloon volunteers inthe Legion and reading their papers and conducting interviews, divided this cohort into groups distinguished by their particular motivations for volunteering for German military service. These groups, ranked in order, are:

Sturmbrigade,

22

1. Those legionnaires who had Belgium (and its future) in mind and on whom totalitarian propaganda did not have much grip, as faith in their country protected them from Nazi German influence.

2. The Rexists, who had tried to take advantage of the German presence to impose a New Order regime.

3. Volunteers blinded by national-socialist social realizations and who had ended up by showing sympathy or even admiration for Nazi Germany and its regime, and who, maybe for other reasons too, ardently wished the German victory.

4. Practicing Catholics yielding to their religious ideals who had gone to war to fight communism with the same spirit that once had animated the Crusaders, since they truly considered Bolshevism to be the greatest threat to Christianity.

5. Individuals attracted by material advantages for themselves and their families; individuals eager to avoid a criminal conviction or to forget either sorrow, grief or a domestic disagreement ; individuals willing to put on the uniform even knowing this gesture was reprehensible on moral or legal grounds.

feldgrau



6. The ones who on behalf of the oath of allegiance to Degrelle, naïve admiration, boundless friendship, inner conviction, or party discipline—joined Degrelle without being aware that the latter was (mis)using them for mere purposes of prestige and personal ambition.

Volunteer Ebb and Flow

In addition to examining the motivations and sociological character of the volunteer movement, one must also investigate the raw statistics of these groups. The figures reveal not only some evidence of the military value of the foreign cohorts in terms of the numbers men placed in the field, but also demonstrate some of the variations in national experience.

The statistics relating to the recruitment and maintenance of the volunteer legions that resulted from the 1941 recruiting drives proved the most satisfactory because of the superior documentary coverage from the early war years.

30

Operational Strength of SS Volunteer Legions, 1941-43 23

15 Aug. 1941 5 Jan. 1942 6 Feb. 1943 30 June 1943

Norwegians unk.! 1218 612 1314

Danes 480 1164 633 1404

Dutch 1100 2559 1263 3975

Flemish 600! 875 528 1960

TOTAL c. 2500 5816 3036 8653

Cumulative Personnel Accessions for SS Volunteer Legions

Total Accessions

30 June 1943 Discharged (%) Dead (%)

Norwegians 2296! 824 (36) 158 (6.8)

Danes 1896 311 (16) 181 (9.5)

Dutch 5873! 1329 (23) 569 (9.6)

Flemish 2636 410 (16) 266 (10)

TOTAL 12,701 2874 (23) 1174 (9)

Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. The legionary program placed only about 5500 men, or roughly a brigade of troops, at the disposal of the Germans. Their peak strength was obtained only after the legions had been withdrawn from the front and in fact were being merged with the Waffen-SS through the creation of the SS Division. Obviously, Holland provided the bulk of the manpower in the foreign legions program, but all four legions represented the same approximate of the respective 1942 national populations (i.e., .041-.057 percent). The higher rate of discharge (or, conversely, the

lower rate of reenlistment) for the Norwegian Legion seems significant. This legion, which suffered the fewest casualties of the four surveyed, may serve to illustrate a lesser degree of willingness to volunteer for such service on the part of Norwegians, or a greater annoyance with German attitudes or policies toward the Germanic peoples as cited earlier in this study.

Nordland

pro rata

24

Western Volunteers in the Waffen-SS (Excluding Legions), 1940-44 25

4/5/40 15/1/42 2/2/43 30/6/43 9/8/43 31/1/44

Norwegians - 665 947 1415! 1930 3878

Danes 41 1235*! 630 2142 3575 5006

Preface1. Introduction2. Propaganda3. Neutral Variation4. Transformation5. Fanaticism6. Collaboration

Ebb and FlowGerman ProgramMilitary Value Conclusions<

BibliographyMaps



Dutch 11 2255 1815 5546 9583 18,473

Flemish 11 696 487 1525 3517 5003

Walloon - - - - unk. 1812

French - -! - - unk. 2480

TOTAL 63 4851 3879 19,331 18,547 36,682

*including Danish Ethnic Germans

The above table demonstrates the general success of the 1943 expansion program, which combined the legions with the Waffen-SS (except in the case of the French SS) and reaped the benefits of improved recruiting and training measures directed by Himmler and Berger in 1942. With the exception of the French volunteers, the incidence of volunteering remains proportional to the respective size of the various national populations over the period investigated. By early 1944, Germany had gained -through the -the equivalent of three divisions, or a field corps. However, these numbers include men still in training (basic, NCO, and officer training courses as well as instructor cadres) not immediately available for combat operations. In mid-1943 the training establishment comprised between forty-six and fifty-six percent of the personnel listed in the preceding table.

Waffen-SS

The changing fortunes of the war and the failure of the Waffen-SS to maintain its recruiting success into 1944 brought an abrupt reversal of the above trends, a reversal that available documents can illustrate only in part. The SS recruiting office in Norway reported on 30 September 1944 that, of the 4133 Norwegian volunteers it had recruited for the Waffen-SS, only 1434 remained in service (606 dead, 2043 discharged). This report clearly indicates that only a few hundred recruits volunteered in 1944 in Norway and that the volunteer movement there had come to a standstill. The SS fared little better in Holland

that year, as only 3273 more men came forward, and 2580 of these volunteered only for the SS Brigade stationed in the homeland. One suspects, in

absence of any documentation, that the SS met with equally dismal results in Denmark in 1944, especially since Danish SS units grew no more than the other "Nordic" units in the last year of the war.

26

Landstorm Nederland 27

35

Only in the territories liberated by the Allies did the Waffen-SS gain volunteers at anything approaching the levels of 1943. Here, in the case of French, Walloon, and Flemish volunteers, the Germans clearly benefited from the refugee flow of collaborationists and their families into the Third Reich. A few thousand civilians joined the ranks of the existing "national" SS units, but probably more volunteers proportionately came from other formations amalgamated into the SS: Wehrmacht, NSKK, and paramilitary auxiliary forces.

Organization Todt,

In light of these statistics, we may now venture a generalization regarding the Western European volunteer phenomenon. It seems to have cycled through three phases: a slow buildup from 1940 to 1942, stimulated by the opening of the Russo-German War; a rapid expansion in 1942-43, as new sources of recruits, as well as better propaganda, recruiting, and training measures took effect; and a drying up of perhaps all but the most fanatical volunteer enlistments in the last year of the war.

In terms of national experiences, certainly the Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian cases support the general trend in great detail. The Spanish experience also reflects the pattern, given the immense spontaneous support of both the general population and the government for the Spanish Volunteer Division in 1941. The autonomous administration and regulation of Spanish volunteers by the Spanish government prevented any expansion on one hand or deterioration of replacement activity on the other. But a few hundred Spaniards returned to German arms in the last year of the war, against the express wishes of their home government. Their actions and their fates closely paralleled those of the other volunteers of the eleventh hour of the war. 28



A statistical summation of the Western volunteers' service in the German Army and Waffen-SS must remain speculative because of gaps in the available documentation. However, the recruiting figures and the strength reports of the various national and mixed units suggest that the following numbers of Western volunteers shouldered arms alongside German Army and Waffen-SS soldiers in the Second World War (figures approximate): 29

Norwegian 6500

Danish 7000

Dutch 27,000

Flemish 10,000

Walloon 5000

French 10,000

Spanish! 36,400

TOTAL 101,900

40

Excluding the roughly 40,000 Spanish, French, and Walloons who served only in the German Army, the 62,000 men of the "Western European SS" barely exceeded ten per cent of the entire Waffen-SS at its peak strength in June 1944. Given the fact that almost one million men served in the Waffen-SS during the war, and that about half of the Western volunteers shouldered arms in the last two years of the war, one must conclude that their numbers may not have justified the efforts made by the Germans to recruit them. 30

Assessing the German Program

Much of the fluctuation experienced in the recruitment of volunteers in Western Europe reflected prevailing German administrative and professional military policies and attitudes. A variety of political, diplomatic, social, and military factors impeded the development of a truly positive policy on the German side for forming and deploying military formations of foreign volunteers. Volunteer recruitment began as a bureaucratic subterfuge on the part of the SS recruiting office to skirt OKW restrictions placed upon the expansion of Himmler's private army, which the dreamed of shaping into an elite Germanic order. The handful of foreign recruits thus gained for the SS Division and the non-elite battalions of SS scarcely merited notice before the opening of the Russo-German War brought substance and form to the program originally begun by the SS. The evident popularity of the German war against the Soviet Union with the European Right elicited genuine enthusiasm among adventuresome and politically-minded men in their twenties and thirties. The Franco government of Spain and the collaborationist parties in occupied Western Europe exploited the evident popularity of the war with their followers to represent themselves to the German government and armed forces as worthy co-belligerents. As sincere as the spontaneous motivations of the early volunteers seemed, so were the motives of their political leadership in the homelands patently self-serving with respect to German power on the Continent.

Reichsführer-SSWiking

Nordwest

The German Army involuntarily received responsibility for the European volunteer contingents that were deemed racially unsuitable for the SS. Although no formal policy appeared at the Army staff level, the Army made its indifference to these volunteers clear in practice. The staffs of the various army commands considered the Spanish, French, and Walloon contingents to be propaganda troops to be employed at whatever level of involvement their competence merited. The rudimentary training given these troops by the Army scarcely prepared them for the "Battle of Civilizations" they would encounter in the East. Yet the German commanders and staff officers directed their standard military critique at these troops from their first appearance at the front. Despite any improvements in the performance of the volunteer units, though, no German army commander ever pressed for



a larger contribution by the Spanish and Vichy governments or the collaborationist groups to the war effort. Instead, the army commands dutifully accepted the burden of training, equipping, and deploying their foreign units in 1941 as a political necessity thrust upon it by the Foreign Ministry (and by Army occupation authorities in Belgium, in the case of the Walloons). Army commanders recognized the propaganda value of the New Order ideal and the anti-Bolshevik "crusade," but in no official document can one find any measure of enthusiasm for deploying foreign troops. In large measure, this institutional attitude stemmed from the professional pride and high standards that the Wehrmacht possessed as a result of its successes in the 1940 campaigns. No army in the world could approach the German Army in training, battle doctrine, experience, and equipment at that time. A certain professional arrogance undoubtedly grew out of this situation. Many officers probably saw no need for the Army to share its campaign with ill-trained Spanish, French, and Belgian troops of questionable steadiness. The Wehrmacht would triumph without any assistance from non-German misfits, especially when these arrived at the front unready for the rigors of combat. As a Ninth Army operations staff officer entered in his war diary after advancing beyond Smolensk, "only German civilization could have accomplished this!"

Likewise, the German Army arrogantly assumed it could conclude its campaign in the East without any measurable support other than that from their Finnish and Romanian allies guarding the flanks of the main contest.

31

The SS hierarchy, with its more ideological bent, displayed considerably more enthusiasm for the employment of foreign volunteer forces. But their own ideological and racial dogmas diffused their efforts and spoiled the opportunity to exploit fully the popularity of the Russo-German War with the European political Right. The reliance upon weak collaborationist parties in the early recruitment drives, mandated by Nazi political goals, tended to discredit the recruiting effort. A wider popular response could have possibly resulted from a general appeal to the public that specifically ignored the collaborationist element, which could and often did embarrass the bulk of the native citizenry. In addition, Nazi racism distorted the pan-Germanic ethos Himmler and his staff intended to foster within the Waffen-SS. Drill sergeants mistreated foreign recruits in a typical basic military training environment, but the SS also revealed racial prejudices typical of Nazi Germany at the peak of its power that mirrored these of the Army. Other than the few promising officer cadets, who were already commissioned in their native military services, no foreign volunteers received technical training in tanks, artillery, communications, engineering, and the like. Instead, they served as infantry and truck drivers in the legions and the SS Division of 1941-42. Apparently only in 1943 were SS technical schools opened to foreign volunteers of the assault brigades and III Germanic Corps. Likewise, only in late 1943 did the Waffen-SS begin to equip the volunteer units with modern, first-rate weapons and to train their personnel in the proper tactical use of these weapons.

Wiking

Perhaps the SS also thought in terms of the "home by Christmas" propaganda in 1941, and neglected to share the key role played by its elite divisions in the campaign. Admittedly, the legions program in the SS suffered from transitory problems of personnel selection and training, as well as the changing character of the Waffen-SS as it made the transition from being a military elite to a mass army. But the Danish performed well when attached to the SS Division, and the other legions might have benefited from operating with an experienced parent unit. The SS recruited the legions under less stringent racial standards than those that applied to the Waffen-SS in 1941, however, and never seriously entertained notions of combining the two until the wartime situation deteriorated and the 1943 expansion program became necessary. Again, if the short-war illusion pervaded the SS leadership, then they too would have looked at the racially "inferior" legions program as more an adjunct to propaganda and political policy in the New Order than as a serious military program.

FreikorpsTotenkopf

45

This continuing dichotomy between ideological values and military needs and requirements did not resolve itself until the midpoint of the war, after Germany had lost the military initiative on all fronts. Essentially, Germany proved unwilling to modify the racial and political tenets of her foreign and occupation policies in order to encourage a potentially large contribution to her war against the Soviet Union. Perhaps she could not have



absorbed large numbers of foreign volunteers due to a lack of equipment in 1941. The Germans fought their war on a economy that was finely tuned for short campaigns, with radical shifting of a partly militarized economy. By the time she geared up for a war of attrition against her implacable opponents, the occupied territories had endured several years of exploitation. Any popularity the Third Reich might have enjoyed with the masses was well past, and perhaps only the collaborationist groups and the social and economic inassimilables in Western Europe could be counted upon to provide recruits.

Blitzkrieg

Assessing Military Value

The statistical tabulations detailed earlier in this chapter establish the relative size of the national groups that resulted from the German volunteer program. The Waffen-SS began the program by admitting a few thousand Germanic troops in 1940-41. The legions program doubled this figure, and upon the combination of the two programs in 1943 the Waffen-SS had over 30,000 volunteers from Western Europe at its disposal. At this point the SS eclipsed the similar program of the Army, which operated with about 20,000 volunteers from later 1941 until the autumn of 1943. Standing force levels of Western volunteers may have reached 40,000 in early 1945, as the refugee-recruits entered the French and Belgian Waffen-SS units.

These thousands of men of the Western volunteer SS served in military organizations of varying quality, and therefore the mere statistics of their service do not indicate their military value to the Third Reich. Clearly, the SS Division ranked as an elite SS formation, although it was not decisively engaged until 1942. However, only a few thousand foreign volunteers stood in the ranks of this mechanized infantry division, and then only as infantry. By the end of the war, SS retained only a few Germanics on its rolls. The other 1941 volunteer formations proved a mixed bag. The SS Legions proved too small for decisive engagement because of the difficulty of furnishing replacements. The Danes and Flemish seemed to perform up to Waffen-SS standards, while the Dutch and Norwegian legions contributed little other than filling in the siege lines around Leningrad with other second-rate formations. The Army's Spanish Division could and did sustain casualties and proved as capable of limited offensive and reliable defensive operations as any German second-rate infantry division. The French Legion failed miserably at the front, and the small Walloon Battalion could not sustain casualties and proved of marginal use with regular Army divisions at the front.

Wiking

Wiking

In 1943, the SS formed a second multinational division, SS and expanded further with a companion brigade, SS The legions of the SS merged with these formations, now grouped under the headquarters of III Germanic SS Armored Corps. Ambition in SS headquarters outstripped recruiting levels, as only one-fourth of the Corps consisted of Western European volunteers, and large numbers of Germans and ethnic Germans filled the technical branches and some of the infantry ranks as well. The and formations performed satisfactorily until their destruction in April 1945, by which time they had few of the scarce Western European volunteers in their ranks. They resembled less and less the pan-Germanic ideal of the Waffen-SS, as most replacements came in the form of German and ethnic German SS men.

Nordland,Nederland.

NordlandNederland

The Army lost its Spanish Division in 1943, and transferred the Walloon Battalion to the Waffen-SS. The next year with its deteriorating military situations saw the usefulness of the French and Spanish Legions come to an end. However, the "pure" volunteer assault brigades of the SS acquitted themselves well, showing that French, Walloon, and Flemish volunteers could fight as first-rate troops when provided with proper weapons and comprehensive training.

50

Finally, scratch units appeared in 1945 to fight for Germany in its last throes of battle. The weak expansion divisions of French, Walloon, and Flemish SS troops and the lackluster Dutch Landstorm accomplished little beyond maintaining the continuity of the front, even less in the case of the unlucky French volunteers. The III Germanic Corps lost its armor,



and its divisions ran into the Russian steamroller between Berlin and the Oder. A few surviving companies and battalions fought in Berlin, Prentzlau, and Lake Balaton as the last flames of fanaticism flickered out.

It seems possible to generalize regarding the effectiveness of the volunteer formations on the basis of their performance at the front, where ground gained or held, unit cohesion, and casualty rates contribute to a subjective impression.

Combat Effectiveness of Western Volunteer Units

Utility Mixed Units National Units

Good SS SS

WikingNordland SS (1944)

SS (1944)SS

Freikorps DanmarkWallonienLangemarckLegion Flandern

Fair SS Nederland! Spanish Volunteer DivisionSS F (1944)SS French Legion (1944)Walloon LegionSS SS

rankreichLegion Nederland

Legion NorwegenLandstorm Nederland

Failure French Legion (1941)Spanish LegionSS Charlemagne

In the final analysis, the changing character of the Russo German War decisively influenced the relative effectiveness of the volunteer units. The first year of the war featured a campaign of maneuver in which the Germans proved superior. Here the relatively small legions and the Spanish and SS Divisions could make calculable contributions. The year 1943 saw a balance in tactical power and skill on the battlefield, and volunteer units generally held static positions. But in 1944 the war became an attritional conflict in which volunteer units, with their tenuous replacement systems, proved hopelessly outmatched. They were beaten up too easily at the front and required larger infusions of German replacements to remain viable.

Wiking

The question may well be raised, Could the Germans have made better use of military collaboration? Certainly, it would seem that an early relaxation of Waffen-SS racial standards and the genuine offer of a measure of autonomy in Hitler's New Order in return for participation in the campaign against Bolshevism might have produced higher numbers of volunteers than the collaborationist parties and leaders were actually able to do. If larger, multi-national units had been equipped and trained with meticulous care—as was the case with the elite 1940 SS Division and the 1943 SS Assault Brigades—and sent into the decisive phases of the campaign, the popular enthusiasm for and reception of wartime propaganda might have been most rewarding. However, the available evidence seems paradoxically clear that Nazi Germany remained unable (or unwilling)—on ideological grounds—to give racially and politically "inferior" peoples a vested interest in the clash of the totalitarian powers. The victor of 1940 made no plans for native collaboration and, when it happened, it resorted to the basest forms of exploitation. In addition to such an ideological predisposition, it further seems clear that the Wehrmacht was not interested in sharing its limited inventory of first-rate weapons and equipment (particularly armor) with non-German forces. Contrasting hypothesis and reality, one may reasonably conclude that Germany's armed forces committed racial suicide on the Eastern Front as the cream of its manpower—equipped with the best weapons—was bled white in battle after battle, while the foreign volunteers looked on as loyal auxiliaries. The completeness of this suicidal policy

Wiking

55



was illustrated in the last months of the war, when mostly foreign units were available as reserves to feed into the last, hopeless battles.

Conclusions

These distinct phases of the volunteer phenomenon appear patently clear at this point. In the first two years after the fall of France, the Germans held some appeal for the inhabitants of occupied and neutral countries in Western Europe. There was a popular surge of support for the German cause in the opening weeks of the Russo-German War. Yet Germany made no preparations to encourage and receive foreign volunteers in her armed forces. When volunteers materialized—from various places, driven by various motivations—the only decision made at the highest level of the armed forces command concerning their disposition was to divide them on racial grounds between the Army and the Waffen-SS. The latter group further subdivided volunteers on physical and racial criteria between the native legions, formed as integral units in the homeland, and regular Waffen-SS units. As the war continued past the optimistic dates set forth in the planning for Operation Barbarossa, and several volunteer units compiled good operational records, they began to look more appealing to the Germans as part of a solution to their crushing manpower problems. Better recruiting, training, and propaganda yielded good results, and the number of volunteers roughly quadrupled, but the time of real enthusiasm had passed and the pace of recruiting faded after 1943. In the last year of the war, relatively few volunteers came forward except for refugees from the liberated territories, and these did not represent the best soldier material. These last volunteers became replacements for existing mixed or foreign units and, in a few cases, formed scratch units that were deployed for last-ditch stands. In summary, the Germans acted too late, with too little good will, to win a popular following in Western Europe that could have contributed in a decisive manner to their war in the East.

The motives that brought the Western volunteers to SS recruiting offices or the Army legions proved varied and not necessarily conducive to forming cohesive military formations. These motives usually boiled down to adventure seeking, material gain, or hopes for political advantage and status in the homeland. Certainly, once the volunteers entered combat, they developed considerable camaraderie with the Germans at the front. They also fought the Russian enemy under brutal conditions. It was easy for them to recognize the Bolshevik menace promulgated by the Nazi propaganda, and many believed that they were defending the eastern marches of Europe against Asiatic hordes. But to most Europeans, the notion of a Euro-army marching east under the banner of the New Order remained mere propaganda and probably rarely proved an effective primary tool of volunteer recruitment.

Some parallels exist between the foreign volunteers in the Army and Waffen-SS, on the one hand, and the character of the German freebooters as illustrated by Robert Waite in his study of the German Freikorps of 1919-23 on the other. A study of war-adventurer

phenomena in the Spanish Civil War and Russo-Finnish War might also establish some significant characteristics of the European milieu that presaged the appearance of Western European volunteers in the German forces. Such an analysis exceeds the scope of this work, but the similarities between soldiers of fortune, immature idealists, and social inassimilables among the and the Spanish and Finnish war volunteers remain too striking a concept to dismiss out of hand.

32

Freikorps

The numbers of Western volunteers remained quite modest relative to the national homeland populations. Certainly they proved disappointing to the visionaries of the SS volunteer program—Berger, Steiner, Reidweg, and Himmler himself. However, these foreign volunteer accessions assisted the continuing expansion of the Waffen-SS and incrementally increased its combat power. The actual strength and utility of the mixed and native Germanic units varied wildly, although the mixed units of the III Germanic Armored Corps passed most tests of military efficiency until their final destruction in 1945. Even the weaker units, such as the legions and the higher-numbered divisions of the Waffen-SS, however, proved useful in occupying static positions at the front, thereby freeing stronger units for more vital tasks.



Such experiences placed the foreign volunteer units in less favorable circumstances than the glowing, tendentious myth-making of wartime propaganda or the postwar apologists would have us believe they occupied. The multinational Euro-army never existed. On the contrary, German racial policies and crude management techniques almost lost them the small national contingents they had accumulated, until the recruiting reforms and relaxed racial standards of Himmler and Berger temporarily augmented the intake of recruits. 33

60

What, then, can the reader make of George H. Stein's assessment of the Western volunteers in his seminal study of the Waffen-SS at war?

Only the West Europeans—numerically the smallest group [of non-Germans]—fought consistently well. The best of them—and this included most of the early volunteers from Norway, Denmark and Holland—were practically indistinguishable from the native Germans in the crack SS divisions. [They] ... remained a formidable and reliable fighting force until the end. 34

Stein's judgment of 1965 cannot be substantiated by the evidence. The Western volunteers in the Waffen-SS spanned a wide range of quality, and the performance of their units ranged from very good to pathetic. They did not fight consistently well, and it seems hard to determine what volunteer units matched the performance of the elite SS divisions other than the mixed SS Wiking Division, in which the volunteers filled mostly infantry companies and the majority of German troops manned the tank, artillery, and specialist units. By the end of the war, the volunteers hardly constituted "formidable and reliable" fighting units. Some formed pockets of resistance in hopeless positions, but most were swept aside by the numerous and well-supplied Soviet forces.

The history of military collaboration in Western Europe during World War II demonstrates clearly that the degree of participation by occupied states in the New Order was governed by rules of association rather than assimilation. The Germans offered little in the way of integration into their military or political systems, even to the most dedicated European collaborators. Only by the time the war situation had deteriorated beyond hope did the Waffen-SS achieve a degree of integration of foreign and German troops and leaders that resembled the picture advanced by the recruiting propaganda.

There seems no reason to doubt that the volunteers themselves gambled with the odds, and that they suffered considerably at the hands of postwar tribunals when Germany collapsed. Things could have been different. Germany came perilously close to defeating

the Soviet Union in 1941, and that event could have won Hitler's regime a stalemate in the Second World War, leaving him in sole control of the European continent. What would have been the position of the Western volunteers then? With their war decorations, Army and SS rank, and campaign laurels, the volunteers might have enjoyed an especially favorable position in the new Europe. Regardless of the racial-national hierarchy that most certainly would have characterized the postwar New Order, veterans of the "Crusade in the East" would have held indisputable advantages over fellow citizens in their homelands. Military rank, an Iron Cross around the neck, military pensions, and preferential jobs and land grants were the least emoluments of advanced status they could have counted on, far more than political collaborators might have had. Certainly, men like Léon Degrelle, Jacques Doriot, and General Mu&nti;lde;oz Grandes could have expected to receive high political positions on the Nazi-dominated Continent (Mu&nti;lde;oz Grandes, in any event, rose to a position in Spain second only to Franco prior to his death in 1970). Younger, lower-ranking volunteers of note might have included winners of the Knight's Cross, like the Dutch soldier Mooymann and the French Captain Fenet. These and others might have led postwar youth syndicates and probably would have fared well in the civil service in their native lands.

35

36

65

Unfortunately for these volunteers, and fortunately for the majority of the Western states, the prospects for the New Order collapsed with those

Kaisergruber:



of the Thousand-Year Reich. The 100,000 Western European volunteers could not contribute enough to tip the scales in favor of German military victory. Today, a few hundred survivors, mostly in their seventies and eighties, meet regularly to relive their memories and pass them on to their children, few of whom seem to pay attention or understand. If this study gives any perspective to their amazing story, it has justified itself in that light.

Notes:

Robert Wohl, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 49-60. Note 1: The Generation of 1914

Back.

Ibid., 228-30. Note 2: Back.

Ibid., 234; Cf. Heinz Höhne, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 459; George H. Stein,

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 141.

Note 3: The Order of the Death's Head,The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite

Guard at War 1939-1945 Back.

Norman Rich, "Collaboration or Resistance: The Thin Grey Line," address to the Citadel Conference on Hitler and the Nazis, 25 April 1980, elaborates onhis conclusion to vol. 2, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 422-25. Philippe Burrin,

(New York: New Press, 1996), 384. In July/August 1941, the following Western European New Order collaboration leaders left for the Eastern Front with the first contingent to be raised in their respective countries: France, PPF Leader Jacques Doriot and Marc Augier, co-founder of grouping; Belgium, VNV militia (Black Brigade) Leader Reimond Tollenaere (after 22.01.1942), Leader Jef François (no frontline duties), Rex-Vlaanderen Leader Paul Suys (no frontline duties), Rex Movement Leader Léon Degrelle, his deputy Fernand Rouleau (no frontline duties); the Netherlands, Leader A.J. Zondervan (no frontlineduties), Leader Henk Feldmeijer; Denmark, DNSAP (Danish Nazi Party) Youth Leader Christian Fredrik von Schalburg; Norway, Chief of Police Jonas Lie and Nasjonal Samling founding members Björn Oestring, Charles Westberg, and Ragnar Berg; Thanks to Eddy De Bruyne for compiling the list.

Note 4:

Hitler's War Aims, The Establishment of the New OrderFrance under the Germans: Collaboration

and Compromise

Les Jeunes de L'Europe NouvelleVerdinaso

Weer AfdeelingNederlandsche-SS

Back.

John Lukacs, (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1976), 191-99. Note 5: The Last European War 1939-1941

Back.

Note, for instance, a May 1982 reunion of veterans of SS and attended by the author where only some 110 veterans of the some 5000 who

served in the war gathered. Interviews generate hypotheses, ideas, some historical data, and may indicate some emotional and psychological trends, but only the most detailed statistical survey encompassing those who eschew their past service as well would avoid the possibility of fallacious conclusions. See also Wohl, 49-60.

Note 6: Wallonien Legion Wallonien

Generation of 1914, Back.

A. F. G. van Hoesel, (Utrecht: St. Gregorinschuis, 1948), 7-8. Note 7: Die Jeugd die wij vreesden

Back.

Ibid., 21. Note 8: Back.

Van Hoesel's number (176) of "automatic" offenders, who joined out of NSB family influence and propaganda leading them to obvious "duty," proves quite close to the size of his groups II and III, the nonmilitary offenders who were members of National Socialist organizations (122) or German civil organizations, such as Organization Todt (46). The method is fallacious, but if these motives and groups coincided, then the military group volunteered out of reasons of hunger, adventure, escape, and idealism, thereby conforming to the "Wanderer" generalization of Robert Wohl's

Note 9:

Generation of 1914. Back.

On soldiering



K. O. Christiansen, 2 vols. (Copenhagen: G/E/C/ Gads, 1955), 1: 49-53. Note 10: Landsviger kviminaliteten i sociologisk . belysuing,

Back.

Ibid., 2: 33. The Germans counted the German minority Danes as Volksdeutschen, not Germanic volunteers, hence they served in any SS formations except the Germanic legions. Cf. memo 29 January 1942, T175/29/2535712.

Note 11:

Back.

Christiansen, 2: 4. Note 12: Landsviger kviminaliteten, Back.

Ibid., 2: 52. Note 13: Back.



Ibid., 1: 341-44. Note 16: Back.

O. Krabbe, (Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1978), 11-12. Note 17: Danske Soldaten I kamp pa Østfronten 1941-45

Back.

Ibid., 16-17. Krabbe also mentions fear of Russification in the event the Germans lost (18). Note 18:

Back.

Ibid., 2. See the discussion of in Chapter Two of this study. Edgar Knoebel's study found that few Flemish volunteers for either the Waffen-SS or the Legion showed political affiliation; Edgar E. Knoebel, "Racial Illusion and Military Necessity" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1965), 379-81.

Note 19: Freikorps Danmark

Back.

Svein Blindheim, (Omslag: Noregs,1977), 190-91. Note 20: Nordmen under Hitlers Fame

Back.

Willy Massin, (Diest: W. Massin, 1994), 166-89, 233. Well documented, this study contains interesting details such as the dates the first Flemings joined various units (SS 7Feb 1941; SS 14 Apr 1942; SS [!]: 29 May 1941; and

6 Aug 41. He further details geographic, social, and other background elements of the 530 Waffen-SS volunteers, including a rich appendix of documents.

Note 21: Limburgers in het Vlaams Legioen en de Waffen-SS

Westland:Nordwest: Nordland Legion

Flandern:Back.

Eddy De Bruyne, unpublished manuscript, 338-340, to appear in English as

(London: Helion & Co., 2003.

Note 22: La Collaboration francophone en exil, Septembre 1944-Mai 1945, Walloon Collaboration in Occupied Belgium: Leon Degrelle 1940-45 Back.

Note 23: T175/59/2574713/a>. Back.

Ibid. Note 24: Back.

Compiled from Klietmann, 500-01; Burkhart Müller-Hillbrand, (Darmstadt: E. S. Mittler, 1954-1969), 3: 142; T175, frames 109/2633910,

59/2574743-6, 59/ 2574712-14, and 59/2574725.

Note 25: Die Waffen-SS, Das Heer 1933-45

Back.

T175/66/2582381-82. These statistics quite possibly omitted recruiting successes of Norwegians from outside of Norway, such as men of the Norwegian Legion and Norwegian workers recruited into the SS Regiment.

Note 26:

Norge Back.

T175/64/2579779. These figures may reflect the absorption of the Dutch Landstorm into the Waffen-SS rather than the accession of new recruits, thus making the overall recruiting picture even more dismal for the SS.

Note 27:

Back.

A summary of the roughly equal number of Spanish volunteers serving on the Allied side appears in Javier Tussel, Franco,

(Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995), 595-606.

Note 28:Espa&nti;lde;a y la II Guerra Mundial: entre el

Eje y la neutralidad. Back.



The accounting method employed involved combining Müller-Hillbrand's totals for January, 1944 with known losses to mid-1943, and adding estimated recruiting for 1944-45. Spanish figures are more authoritative. The government estimated 36,000 volunteers, to which I add an estimated 400 unauthorized volunteers from 1944-45. Stein estimated as many as 125,000 in the Waffen-SS alone ( 138);Lother van Greelen, (Munich: Welsermühl, 1963), 363, estimated 131,000. These figures remain approximate, but are frequently supported by recent national studies—for instance, the detailed study of Kjell Fjørtoft, (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1995), 448-51, who concludes that over 7,000 Norwegians served in the Waffen-SS. Some scholars remain broad in their estimates, like Gerhard Hirschfeld, who estimates 22-25,000 Dutchmen serving in the Waffen-SS before 1945! Hirschfeld,

(Oxford: Berg, 1988), 288. I can give no better caution than did John F. Sweets in 1986, when he concluded, "My research suggests that authors dealing with themes of collaboration and resistance must be especially careful in examining evidence regarding the size of those two phenomenon." Sweets, (New York, 1986), viii.

Note 29:

Waffen-SS,Verkauft und Verraten

De som tapte krigen

Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation

Choice in Vichy France: The French under German OccupationBack.

The overall strength of the Waffen-SS peaked in mid-1944 at 594,443; Müller-Hillbrand, 3: 317. Note 30:

Das Heer, Back.

Ninth Army, T312/281/7842340. Note 31: Back.

Robert G. L. Waite, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952). Note 32: Vanguard of Nazism

Back.

Cf. Mark P. Gingerich, "Waffen-SS recruitment in the 'Germanic' Lands, 1940-41," 59 (Summer 1997): 815, where he notes the irony that of the slightly more than one million Waffen-SS troops, over half were foreign volunteers, thus ignoring the discharge rate accruing to foreign volunteer enlistments, which does not correspond in the case of German enlistments, when charted over the war's duration. Thus, of the maximum strength of c.594,000, more were German, I suspect, than Gingerich's figures imply. Note Martin Conway's statement that the Germans made no preparations for the collaborationist phenomenon, and when it occurred, their instinctive behavior was to exploit it for their own narrow ends; Conway, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 284.

Note 33:Historian

Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist MovementBack.

Stein, 191. Note 34: Waffen-SS, Back.

With the exception of the Spanish volunteers, and most other neutrals, the foreign volunteers of Western Europe serving in the German forces faced strict punishment as military collaborators. Although few executions took place, almost all received prison terms of two to six years, and lost most civil rights and any possibility of return to universities or civil service and military careers. The Danish volunteers experienced the irony of a retroactive criminalization of their service—imposed by the Penal Code Amendment of 1/6/45—that had the effect of revoking the original sanction of the Danish government, which alone of the occupied countries maintained its internal sovereignty until late 1943. A Danish historical team has compiled a broad assembly of otherwise unremarkable research and interesting local color obtained from letters and interviews of Danish Waffen-SS veterans that proved thrilling to an otherwise uninformed Danish population, receiving rave reviews and best-seller status: Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith,

(Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 1998).

Note 35:

Under Hagekors og Dannebrog: Danskere i Waffen-SS 1940-1945

The prisoners of war held in the USSR returned early or later, depending upon the view the Russian leadership took of relative advantages of releasing them or not. Thus the French and Norwegians returned almost immediately upon the end of the war, but the Spaniards had to wait until 1954. Not surprisingly, more than a few of the foreign volunteer cohort ended up in the French Foreign Legion, along with former German comrades, several serving another lost cause in Indochina. See Echard Michels, "Mythen und Realitäten: Deutschen in der Fremdenlegion, 1943-55," 55 (1996): 438-42. MGM Back.



Conway offers a pithy assessment of Degrelle that is applicable to many others as well: "... from the outset a whole-hearted collaborationist who never lost sight of the basic truth that the collaborators were no more than courtiers seeking the favor of the Nazi elite ... he maneuvered ceaselessly within the labyrinth of the Third Reich until finally—aided by the military feats of the —he achieved at least a partial reward" ( 285).

Note 36:

Legion WallonieCollaboration in Belgium, Back.




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Interviews

Anfiesta, Dionisio García. Madrid, 21 March 1974. Captain, Spanish Air Force. Served with the 4th Air Squadron as a ground officer.

Brunaes, Ole. Glücksberg, 21-22 May 1982. Served as Lieutenant in the SS and in the Germanische Leitstelle.

Cuadra Medina, Mariano. Madrid, 21 March 1974. Lieutenant General, Spanish Air Force; later, Air Minister. Commanded the 4th Air Squadron in Russia, flying 103 sorties.

Dedouge, Andre. Brussels, 23 May 1982. Served in Walloon Legion and SS from December 1942 through the war's end.

Wallonie

Degrelle, Léon. Madrid, 8 June 1982. Leader of Belgian Rex Party; enlisted in Walloon Legion; finished war as commander of SS Wallonie.

Esteban-Infantes, Julio. Madrid, 17 March 1974. Colonel, Spanish Army. Served as aide-de-camp to his brother, the second commander of the Spanish Volunteer Division.

Fenet, Henri. Paris, 3 June 1982. Served in SS and ending war in Berlin as a captain.

Frankreich Charlemagne,

García Rebull, Tomás. Madrid, 20 March 1974. Lt. General, Spanish Army. Served as an infantry major in the Spanish Volunteer Division.

Gonzales Saez, Antonio. Madrid, 15 March 1974. Student Volunteer in the Spanish Division. Served through April, 1943 as a soldier.

Hellebaut, Franz. Brussels, 23 May 1982. Former Major, Belgian Army. Commander and Chief of Staff of SS after release from German prisoner of war camp.Wallonie

Jørgensen, Elo. Copenhagen, 25 May 1982. Served in SS through end of war as an NCO.

Nordland

Kaisergruber, Fernand. Brussels, 23 May 1982; 26-28 October 2002. Served in Walloon Legion and SS from 1942 to 1945 as NCO.Wallonie

Kristiansen, Leif. Glücksberg, 21 May 1982. Served in SS Nordland, 1942-45.

Lenboe, Bent. Glücksberg, 21 May 1982. Served one year in SS Nordland.

Loock, Franz. Brussels, 23 May 1982. Served in Walloon Legion and SS Wallonie.

Loxano Cabo, María. Madrid, 20 March 1974. Served as a nurse in the medical services group of the Spanish Division through July 1942.

Mäder, Alfred. Rendsberg, 13 March 1981. Former major in the SS. Had experience with Dutch and Latvian volunteers.

Schulze-Kossens, Richard. Düsseldorf, 26 March 1981. Former colonel in the SS. Was an infantry officer on Russian and Western Fronts, military adjutant to von Ribbentrop and



Hitler, and last commandant of the SS Cadet School, Bad Tölz.

Staal, Emil. Glücksberg, 21 May 1982. Joined SS at age nineteen; wounded in Caucasus in 1942 and discharged.

Nordland

Vermeire, J. Brussels, 23 May 1982. Former captain in the SS. Served in SS Wallonie.

Vierendeels, Franz. Groot-Bijaarden, Belgium, 29 May 1982. Enlisted in Flemish Legion; rose to lieutenant in SS Langemarck.

Vincx, Jan. Herenthals, Belgium, 29 May 1982. Enlisted in Flemish Legion; became lieutenant of artillery in SS Wiking.


VierendeelsAudio

