KANT, T H E LOCAL SIGN T H E O R I S T S , AND W I L F R I D S ELLAR S ' D O C T R I N E OF

A N A L O G I C A L P R E D I C A T I O N

G E N E P E N D L E T O N

I~ For some time Wilfried Sellars has been presenting a highly interesting - - as well as critical - - account of the Kantian corpus. In at least one instance, however, his criticisms of Kant have been anticipated by a group of thinkers including Lotze, Helmholtz, and Carnap, all of whom postulated the existence of what are termed "local signs" to account for anomalies in perception. These local signs are, in fact, forerunners of Sellars' "Counterpart characteristics" postulated to explain how spatial appearances arise from an essentially non-spatial medium. I will concentrate on this relationship between local signs and counterpart characteristics in order to show how the thinkers involved, though highly disparate in their approaches to Kant, nonetheless postulate similar theoretical entities to account for what they perceive as anomalies in Kant's theory of space. Further, I will conclude by demonstrating that the Sellarsian doctrine of analogical predication falls victim to criticisms stemming from Carnap's considerations of structural isomorphism as presented in The Logical Structure of the World.

According to Sellars, the Kantian doctrine of intuition conflates two species of representation. The first species (sense impressions) consists of non-conceptual elements brought about by sensibility proper - - that is, "sheer receptivity") The second species (intuitions proper) are conceptual items best expressed linguistically by so-called "this-such" locutions. 2 On Sellars'view, sense impressions are unapperceived states of consciousness which "guide" their conceptual counterparts of the second species without themselves ever being brought to awareness) In view of Sellars' opposition to abstraction and the "myth of the given", one would expect Sellars to maintain that the elements of the sensory level are not directly assimilated into the conceptual level. Rather, sense impressions guide their conceptual counterparts "from without"- - that

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~s, they remain unapperceived. What then are the consequences of these views for Sel lars ' in terpreta t ion of Kant, as well as for the former 's philosophical system as a whole?

lI . To begin: Sellars is not happy with the locat ion of space in the Kant ian framework: "If I am right, the idea that space is the form of outer sense is incoherent. TM The argument support ing this claim begins simply enough. Assume that I have been "impressed" by a green square adjoining a red square. In other words, I have a green-square-left-of-a- red-square type of impression. Is this impression a complex formed from the simpler impressions of a green square and that of a red square? As a robust Tractar ian I must respond with a "Yes!" to this question. If I am further prodded with the query, "What , then, is the relationship between these simpler impressions that goes to make up the impression of a green square left-of a red square?", I am somewhat at a loss. I cannot respond that the relationship is spatial in any ordinary sense, for I would then be committed to the absurdity that one impression is to the left of another - - i.e., that one sensory state is to the left of another, and so on. Yet, I am certainly aware of one square being to the left of another. How am I to account for the relationship between impressions which in turn accounts for my awareness of this spatial complex?

I am certainly aware of objects (or, more cautiously, shapes) as standing in spatial relations to one another. If I am to avoid abstract ionism while at the same time maintaining that sense impressions perform a guiding role in regard to experience, then I must account for the influence of the sensory on the conceptual without claiming an abstract ion of the conceptual from the sensory. The move Sellars makes is to maintain that the sensory level is analogous to the conceptual. 5 The analogy consists in the fact that there is an isomorphism at the second-order level. That is, though the qualities, properties, and relations of sensory states are not identical with the properties, qualities, and relations of their conceptual counterparts, the two levels are similar by virtue of sharing second-order properties. Thus, the left-of relation is brought about by a relation at the unapperceived level - - a relation which, though not one of left-of, is like left-of in that it too is transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetrical. In other words, both levels share certain second-order properties, yet have no first-order properties in common. With the preceding ploy, Sellars believes he has avoided the "myth of the given" and yet maintained the influence of the sensory on the conceptual.

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What, then, of the purported incoherence of Kant's contention that space is the form of outer sense? It is simply this: Since spatial properties such as to the left of, below, etc., are at the level of conceptualization (i.e., they are apperceived) and, further, since sense impressions are representations which are never apperceived, how can space (i.e., the properties of being to the left of, etc.) be the form of outer sense - - that is, the form of sense impressions? Instead, Kant should have seen that there exist characteristics at the level of sense which are the counterparts of those characteristics of the conceptual level which appear to us to be spatial. 6 If we return to the example of the green-square-left-of-the-red- square representation at the level of awareness, we see that on the Sellarsian view this relation of left-of must have a counterpart at the level of sense impressions, a counterpart that resembles the relation left-of only in that both share certain second-order porperties (e.g., transitivity). However, it must be stressed that the counterpart relation left-of does not resemble it at the first-order level - - sense impressions are not left of one another. There are then structural properties of sense impressions which, when translated into the idiom of awareness, appear as phenomenal spatial properties.

Ill. It might be thought that Sellars' employment of counterpart characteristics is something of an eccentricity in a discussion of perceptual activity. However, this view has forerunners as long ago as the early nineteenth century. This may seem somewhat surprising in view of Sellars' account, for the latter is obviously based on concepts derived from formalization techniques brought into prominence by Carnap, et alia. Nevertheless, Sellars' recognition that properties associated with physical objects (spatial properties, etc.) are incapable of exemplification by mental acts is also shared by certain nineteenth century thinkers. Further, though not expressed in Sellars' terminology of second-order properties, these men also postulated a relation of analogy between the properties of physical objects represented by consciousness and the characteristics of the mental processes which give rise to them. The thinkers I have in mind are Herbart, his successor, Lotze, and Helmholtz. I will begin by discussing Lotze's account of spatial perception as presented in his Metaphysic.

Book III of the Metaphysic is devoted to what Lotze refers to as "psychology". I will focus on Chapter Four of this Book entitled "The Formation of Our Ideas in Space". As Lotze recognizes, the nature of spatial perception is such that it seems as though the perceiver merely

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drinks in the spatial characteristics of the world without any effort on his own part. However, such a view would be mistaken. Lotze realizes that the apparent effortlessness of spatial perception disguises the problem of".. .the mysterious transition of the physical excitation into a knowledge of that excitation... '7 His characterization of the problem is similar to the argument Sellars employs in his discussion of why counterpart characteristics are necessary to account for spatial perception.

When we perceive the points a, b, c, in this order side by side, our consciousness sets a to the left and c to the right of b: but the idea of a, through which we thus represents a, does not lie to the left, nor the idea ofc to the right, of the idea of b; the idea itself has not these predicates, it only gives them to the points of which it is the idea.8

This, of course, is the nineteenth century version of Sellars' problem that the sense impressions which give rise to spatial perceptions are not themselves spatial. In Lotze's version the ideas of spatial points lying beside one another are not the sort of things that hae spatial predicates. In fact, even if we assume that consciousness itself is spatial and that ideas occurring within it do lie to the left and right of one another, our knowledge of this fact (that ideas are next to one another) would not itself be spatial. On the countrary-to-fact assumption that "con- sciousness is a space" the same problem arises that Lotze found in the more acceptable view of the non-spatiality of consciousness. Once again, quite simply, the problem concerns the transference of spatial predicates through what is essentially a non-spatial medium. That is, Lotze sees an extended and, hence, spatial organ (the retina, for example) as giving rise to impressions which are not themselves spatial, but which nonetheless give rise in turn to spatial images. The author remarks that some "clue" is needed in order to arrange these non-spatial impressions in such a manner that the image they produce reflects the spatial arrangement of the physicial object (or objects) that gave the impetus to the entire process. Lotze employs the homely example of disassembling a collection in order to transport it from one place to another. To ensure that the original order of the items of the collection is maintained numbers may be pasted to each of the items in question. The "clue" which maintains the order of the collection is simply the number added to each item, thus preserving the arrangement during transport.

Lotze's discussion is couched in physiological terms. That is, he is

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concerned with such matters as nerve fibers, retinal points and so on. Nonetheless, the problem of the origin of spatial images which are grounded in non-spatial impressions is the same for both Lotze and Sellars. For Lotze, then, the explanation of the "localization of impressions" must begin with an account of how qualitatively similar stimuli give rise to spatially distinguished responses. How is this accomplished? Lotze postulates what he calls an "extra-impression" which arises along with the main impression produced by the stimulus. The extra impression is specific to each nerve fiber in the sense organ - - for example, each nerve fiber origination in the retina gives rise, when stimulated, to a main impression which depends on the "quali ty" of the stimulus and on an extra-impression which is specific to that very nerve fiber. In this way qualitatively similar stimuli may give rise to spatially differentiated responses because of the non-spatial " token" (extra- impression) which is associated with one and only one nerve fiber originating in the extended sense organ. Lotze summarizes as follows:

Let A B C, then, stand for three diverse stimuli, p q r for three different spots in an organ of sense, rr r p for three specific extra impressions, which those spots connect with the main impressions occasioned by A B C: then the difference between those connected l o c a l s i g n s rr r p will be the clue by means of which the sensations falling upon p q r can be localized in separate places in our perception of space. 9

It is the so-called "local signs" (or extra-impressions) then which permit distinction of qualitatively similar impressions in perceptual space.

Now the description "extra-impression" suggests that Lotze viewed these so-called "local signs" as impressions in some sense distinct from the color impressions, for example, which require spatial localization. However, such a view of the matter is too simple to capture Lotze's thought. The relationship is between the content of an impression and its local sign, rather that between two distinct impressions. In other words, the local sign is, as Lotze puts it, a"subsidiary determination" or qualitative property of the impression which, though not itself spatial, nonetheless gives rise to an awareness of spatial relations. Such a subsidiary determination of an impression is,

...a qualitative property of some kind which the impression acquires (in addition to its other qualities) in virtue of the peculiar nature of the place at which it comes into contact with the body.l~

Yet this is surely not the end of the matter. For even if we grant Lotze his

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local signs, we are still faced with explaining h o w they give rise to an awareness of ordered, consistent, spatial phenomena. That is, how do local signs preserve the spatial arrangement of betweeness, for example? Let us assume that I am presented with B lying between A and C (where A, B, and C are impressions). A, B, and C will have local signs (qualitative properties) rr, r, and P respectively. On the basis of these local signs B will be perceived as between A and C. However, as Lotze recognizes, unless there is some further relationship among the local signs themselves, the fact that 7r is the local sign of A and K of B, etc., will not suffice to preserve the spatial arrangement in question. In other words, 7r must be so related to K and P that the sensations with which they are each associated will exemplify the spatial relationship of betweeness. If this were not the case, then the local signs,

...would suffice to prevent three perfectly similar stimuli from coalescing, and to make them appear as three instances of the same felt content. But the only result would be an impulse to hold the sensations apart in a general way; there would be nothing to lead us on to give the sensations thus produced a definite localization in space."

As might be suggested, Lotze's solution is to suggest that the local signs are arranged in a continuous gradation according to some quality they all share. In other words, the local signs are, for example, linearly ordered on the basis of their participation in a common characteristic. Thus, in considering the ability of local signs to localize, Lotze says the following.

If they are to lead this localization they must necessarily be members of series or of a system of series in each of which there must be some general characteristic in common, but within its limits a difference, measurable in some way, of every individual from every other. If

x = rrq- A , p = rrq- A, o r K = p - - A

then, but only then, can these signs be the reason why a perception which can and must apprehend these arithmetical differences in some spatial way or other should place B nowhere but in the middle between A and C. 12

From the above it is concluded that Bx may be said to lie "between" the two impressions ATr and Cp. Consequently, when translated into spatial awareness the three signs rr, x, and p, in association with the main

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impressions A, B, and C, will give rise to the spatial perception of lying between. Once again, this is the result of the location of rr, K, and p in the logical space of their shared characteristic. Much of this sounds quite similar to the Sellarsian version of analogical predication presented earlier. For both Lotze and Sellars it became necessary to postulate non-spatial characteristics to account for spatial perceptions. Also, these non-spatial characteristics must themselves display higher order characteristics in common with those of the spatial perceptions to which they give rise. This is explicit in Sellars and implied in Lotze through the latter's account of the serialization of local signs.

IV. As I have already mentioned, Lotze is not alone in his adherence to a theory of local signs. His views influenced Helmholtz in the latter's work on physiological optics. In particular, Helmholtz adopted what he described as the "empirical" standpoint as far as the formation and significance of sense impressions was concerned. What Helmholtz was opposed to was the doctrine that sense qualities are somehow directly intuited without involving the intellect to any degree. Instead, he advocated the empirical theory.

The fundamental thesis of the empirical theory is: The sensations o f the senses are tokens for our consciousness, it being left to our intelligence to learn how to comprehend their meaning. The tokens which we get by the sense of sight may vary in intensity and in quality, that is, in luminosity and in color. There may also be some other difference between them depending on the place on the retina that is stimulated, a so-called localsign. The local signs of the sensations in one eye are entirely different from those in the other eye.13

In other words, all sensations act as signs of qualities or characteristics which remain unapperceived. In the case of local signs, these are qualities of visual sensations which permit them to be discriminated according to their retinal origin. Visual sensation A may be differentiated from visual sensation B because of their differing places of origin in the retinal field. If local signs did not exist, A and B would be undifferentiated as to location.

All of this sounds, of course, much like what Lotze has said concerning local signs. Lotze's views are also echoed in Helmholtz's reflecton on the ability of local signs to capture spatial relations.

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...I am disposed to think that it is not unlikely that the resemblance between the local signs of adjacent points is greater than it is between those of points that are further apart. ~4

Here is some indication of how local signs permit spatial representations (according to Helmholtz). The fact that local signs stand in an ordered relation of resemblance (those "closest" together being those that most resemble one another) is the condition of the translation of physiological events into spatial impressions. As Lotze has done before him, Helmholtz has attempted to account for impressions of spatial ordering by postulating analogous relations among the so-called local signs. That is, the relation of greater resemblance between signs A and B rather than between A and C is translated into an impression of the correspondent of A being closer to the correspondent of B than it is to the correspondent of C.

We have already seen that Helmholtz is an advocate of the view that the spatial relations involved in normal human perception (visual perception) are the result of experience and not intuition. That is, Helmholtz denies the Kantian doctrine that human perception is equipped with a special mode in which spatial relations are immediately given. Lotze, too, is opposed to the view that spatial relations are merely "absorbed" into consciousness. However, if one is to stress the role of experience in the perception of spatial relations, then, in the words of one of Helmholtz's editors, there must be,

...from the very beginning, for example, a certain discriminating quality (or local sign in Lotze's way of using that term)... characteristic of each place on the retina whereby one place could be distinguished from another. ~5

In sum, for both Lotze and Helmholtz local signs are characteristics of visual sensations which give rise to awareness of spatial relations. Such spatial awareness is accomplished by the translation of local signs and the relationships among them into analogous relations of the spatial type.

V~ The notion of a local sign did not die out with the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, it has been employed by Rudolf Carnap in his Logical Structure of the WorM. For example, in speaking of the identity of elementary experiences, Carnap states,

Thus we consider that relation which holds between two

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elementary experiences, x and y, if and only if in x there occurs an experience constituent a and in y an experience constituent b such that a and b agree in all characteristics, namely, in quality in the narrowest sense, in intensity, and in the location sign which corresponds to the place in the sensory field, provided that the sense modality in question has these characteristics. Thus, two color sensations agree with one another if they agree in hue, saturation, brightness, and in location sign (i.e., in the place in the visual field); likewise, two (simple) tones, if they agree in pitch and loudness. 16

As is the case with his predecessors, Lotze and Helmholtz, Carnap postuales a characteristic of visual sensations which locates the latter in the visual field.

In the work just mentioned Carnap attempts to rationally reconstruct the world via a constructionalist system. In so doing, he stresses the importance of what he refers to as "structural descriptions". Carnap believes that it is possible to give two types of description for the objects of any given domain:

A property description indicates the properties which the individual objects of a given domain have, while a relation description indicates the relations which hold between these objects, but does not make any assertion about the objects as individuals. 17

According to Carnap, it is the aim of each scientific theory to replace the property descriptions of the objects of its domain by relation descriptions. In particular, property descriptions are to be replaced by a type of relation description known as "structure description". In a structure description not only are the monadic properties of the object not specified, but the specific nature of the relations involved are left unmentioned as well. Instead, structure descriptions indicate relations on the basis of their higher order properties such as symmetry, etc. In other words, in a structure description "only the structure of the relation is indicated, i.e., the totality of its formal properties."

Carnap's next step is to point out that one may offer a definite description of each object within a given domain merely through structure descriptions, and, thus, without mentioning properties of individuals or their specific relationships. The extended example which Carnap employs involves the railway stations of the Eurasian railway system. One may correctly pick out any railway station by employing a map which includes only the train lines. Thus, the railway stations are

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not indicated on the map by name, but rather must be picked out by virtue of the number of railway lines that intersect at a particular point. It should be possible correctly to identify all the railway stations in the Eurasian network in the following manner:

...we look up the intersections of highest order, i.e., those in which the largest number of lines meet. We will find only a small number of these. Assume that we find twenty intersections in which eight lines meet. We then count, for each such point, the number of stations between it and the next intersection on each of the eight lines, and we will hardly find two of the eight to coincide in all eight numbers. Thus, we have identified all twenty points. ~s

Of course, if this method does not serve to distinguish all railway stations from one another, one may still appeal to other relations - - telephone connections, for example. If stations are still indistinguishable on the basis of all geographic relations, then one may turn to cultural relations, etc. After all this,

If there should still be two locations for which we have found no difference even after exhausting all available scientific relations, then they are indistinguishable, not only for geography, buty for science in general. They may be subjectively different: I could be in one of these locations, but not in the other. But this would not amount to an objective difference, since there would be in the other place a man just like myself who says, as I do: I am here and not there.~9

The importance of the above for my purposes lies in Carnap's point that two locations which are identical in all their relations (for example, two railway stations with identically interconnecting lines, telephone connections, etc.) are objectively indistinguishable. The only possible differences between them would be subjective. In other words, one would only be able to distinguish between them on the basis of phenomenal properties. As far as science is concerned, there is no criterion by which to distinguish such points. That is, the structure descriptions of the two points would be identical - - the structures involved would be isomorphic. In order to differentiate the two points, one would have to appeal to non-scientific properties - - that is, properties associated with sensation, feeling, taste, etc.

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VI. Now I may at last return to Sellars' doctrine of analogical predication and its consequences for his views on Kant. One might launch an attack on the notion of analogical predication and counterpart characteristics in regard to Kant by showing that they are in conflict with basic Critical principles. To begin such an attack I will quote from Helmholtz's editor, von Kries:

The difference between an object seen above and one seen below consists simply in the fact that we do see one of them above the other. If there is any other distinction enabling us to connect and associate this difference of spatial appearance that could be considered as being at the bot tom of it, we are not able to bring it to consciousness at any rate. 20

What von Kries is saying may be put as follows: The spatial distinctions which hold among objects consist in their manner of appearance. That is, one object is said to be above another object because they appear in exactly that manner. One is conscious of two objects in a certain spatial relationship; their relationship (as spatial) consists of that very consciousness.

As far as Lotze, Helmholtz, and Carnap are concerned, impressions give rise to spatial perceptions by means of characteristics of the impressions which, though not themselves spatial, are somehow translated into such spatial relations. I have said that these local signs are, in effect, Sellars' counterpart chavocteristics in a slightly different guise. Like Lotze et alia, Sellars claims that the non-spatiality of sense impressions precludes their being directly apprehended in a spatial manner.

Instead, sense impressions (unapperceived states of consciousness) exemplify certain charecteristics which, like the local signs of Helmholtz and Lotze, give rise to phenomenal spatial relations. In the last quote given in the text above yon Kries noted that spatial characteristics are subjective in the sense that their distinctiveness lies in their appearance and not in any other characteristics of which one may be aware. That is, we are aware of one object being above another on the basis of a phenomenal relation which simply appears as spatial - - its spatiality, in other words, consists solely in its appearing as such. If it is, in fact, the case that such spatial relations are the result of local signs, the latter are themselves never apperceived. The subjectivity of spatial properties consists, then, in the fact that they are what they are on the basis of their phenomenal "feel". And the notion of such a "feel" is a subjective characteristic.

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Also, when we turn to what Sellars says about counterpart characteristics and their associated spatial properties, something similar seems to be implied. Counterpart characteristics give rise to associated spatial perceptions on the basis of shared second-order properties. That is, the sense impressions which precede (logically) spatial perceptions exemplify characteristics which are translated into apperceived spatial relations. What are carried over in this translation are the structural properties of the counterpart characteristics and not their first-order properties. In other words, the apperceived spatial relations and the counterpart characteristics that "guide" them are structurally isomorphic.

As I have shown in the discussion of Carnap's Logical Structure of the World the latter demonstrated that the components of systems that are structurally isomorphic are objectively indistinguishable. Carnap grants that two points which are structurally indistinguishable may yet differ in their appearance, but such distinguishing features are merely subjective. In other words, the two points would differ only in what are basically incommunicable characteristics - - that is, the "feel" of sensations and appearances, and not their structural properties. Certainly, Carnap is not alone in his views. Kant shares Carnap's notion that it is only the structural properties of sensations that are communicable and intersubjective. In Reflexionen 653 of the Nachlass Kant says the following:

In the relation between sensations lies something that is generally valid even though each sensation has only private validity. 21

In essence, Kant is agreeing with Carnap that sensations per se are, as subjective elements, private and therefore incommunicable. On the other hand, the relations among subjective elements are objective and, hence, communicable.

What has all this to do with Sellars' and his doctrine of analogical predication? According to Sellars, sense impressions and the spatial perceptions which they guide are structurally isomorphic. Further, Sellars is an advocate of the view that things-in-themselves are also structurally isomorphic to these spatial perceptions. It is Sellars' contention that Kant should be willing to countenance the extension of the categories to the noumenal realm. It is also Sellars' contention that the categories are the most abstract concepts of objects. When "schematized" the categories are specified in such a manner that they are applicable to spatio-temporal objects. Hence, the schematized category of causation, for example, would be applicable to spatio-

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temporal objects in the sense of being "a concept of uniform sequence throughout all space and time". One might think that if the categories are differentiated by their schemata into categories applying to spatio- temporal objects rather than mere objects in general, then if these same categories are to apply to"noumenal ' objects, a different schematization is required. However, the Sellarsian view is a bit more subtle than this.

...things-in-themselves, insofar as they affect our sensibility, have, like sense impressions, attributes and relations which are in their own way analogous to those of perceptible things, and by virtue of which they elicit sense impressions which are in their different way endowed with Space-like characteristics (confused by Kant with the form of outer intuition) and perform the guiding role described above. That Kant implicitly accepted some such view of things-in-themselves is, I think, clear. 22

In other words, Sellars believes that there is a similarity of structure holding among things-in-themselves, the sense impressions brought about by the former, and the intuitions/appearances brought about by sense impressions. This isomorphism is a systematic correspondence at the second-order level holding among the first-order peroperties of things-in-themselves, sense impressions, and intuitions/appearances. Thus, all three of the aforementioned species share their second-order characteristics.

However, if Carnap and Kant are correct, then those characteristics which have objective validity and are inter-subjective and communicable (that is, the second-order characteristics) are identical in both things-in- themselves and the appearances which result from their action on the self. For Sellars has claimed that ultimately things-in-themselves, sense impressions, and the spatio-temporal objects that are the end product of the perceptual process all share their higher-order (structural) properties. However, as both Kant and Carnap have pointed out, the structural properties are precisely those characteristics which have objective validity. On Sellars' view, things-in-themselves and appearances (spatio-temporal objects) are objectively indistinguishable - - that is, they share all their structural properties.

If it is the case that the Sellarsian doctrine of analogical predication leads to the conclusion that things-in-themselves and appearances cannot be distinguished on the basis of their objective (intersubjective) characteristics, then Sellarsian doctrine runs counter to Critical principles. For the only basis on which to distinguish things-in- themselves from mere appearances would be subjective and

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incommunicable. Let us suppose, then, a contrary-to-fact situation in which someone was able to experience things-in-themselves. How could this person know that things-in-themselves were being experienced rather than mere appearances? After all, on Sellars' view there is no objective criterion by which to distinguish the two. It would not be possible, then, for person X who experiences mere appearances and person Y who experiences things-in-themselves even to be aware that there are differences between them (albeit of a subjective nature). For example, X might see one object above another, while person Y sees the structurally identical situation in the realm of things-in-themselves. However, given the structural identity of the two situations, neither X nor Y could detect a difference between what might be called the two "realms". This is the consequences of theories such as those of local signs and analogical predication, and this is a counter-Critical result. The distinction between things-in-themselves and appearances surely does not reside in mere subjective distinctions - - that is, characteristics with only private validity. If it did, a move from experienceing appearances to experiencing things-in-themselves would be merely a matter of "taste". One would be aware of a difference in feeling and nothing else. One would not be able to distinguish an awareness of things-in-themselves from a sudden alteratin of one's sensory equipment. Consequently, the Sellarsian position runs counter to Kantian principles.

KENT STATE UNIVERSITY KENT, OHIO 44242

USA

NOTES

i Science and Metaphysics, W. Sellars (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968), p.7.

2 Ibid., p. 4L 3 Ibid. ,p . 10. 4 Ibid. ,p . 8.

5 Ibid., p. 25f. 6 Ibid., p. 26. 7 Metaphysic, H. Lotze, 2nd ed., ed. Bosanquet (Clarendon, Oxford, 1887), p. 250. 8 Ibid. ,p . 251. 9 Ibid., pp. 255-6.

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~o Microcosmus, H. Lotze, 3rd ed., Vol. I, ed. and trans. Hamilton and Jones (T.T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1888), p. 309.

~ Lotze, Metaphysic, p. 259. 12 Ibid., p. 260. 13 Treatise on Physiological Optics, Helmholtz, trans, from 3rd German ed., ed.

J.P.C. Southall (Optical Society of America, 1925) p. 533. J4 Ibid., p. 536. 15 Ibid., p. 609. 16 Logical Structure o f the World, R. Carnap, trans. R. George (University of

California, Berkeley, 1967), p. 125. 17 Ibid., p. 19. 18 Ibid., p. 25-6. i9 Ibid., p. 27. 2o Helmholtz, Treatise, p. 616. 21 Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, K6niglich Preussische Akademie der

Wissenschaften, 1902-) v. 15, Pt. 1, p. 289. 22 Sellars, Science, p. 57. Also, with regard to the extension of the categories to the

noumenal realm consider the following from Sellars: ...as Kant sees it, the distinctive feature of human experience is that it is experience of a world of spatiotemporal objects. In evaluating this conception, it must be remembered that Kant equates Space and Time with Newtonian Space and Time, and that he would grant that a world of experience might have a structure which, though not in this sense 'spatial' or 'temporal', has properties which are analogous to the latter in ways which make possible a schematizing of the pure categories and hence which satisfy the abstract requirements of a concept of a world of experience which has been purified of all contingent features.

"Toward a Theory of the Categories" in Essays in Philosophy and Its History, W. Sellars (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974), p. 319.

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