tripodi theoria sellars

8/12/2019 Tripodi Theoria Sellars

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A myth to kill a myth?

On McDowell’s interpretation of Sellars’ Empiricism and the philosophy of mind

As is well known, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (henceforth EPM )Sellars introduces two myths: the Myth of the i!en and the myth of "ones# $he former is

a deeply rooted epistemolo%ical picture, while the latter is a thou%ht e&periment in the

philosophy of mind# 'n the incipit of the last para%raph of EPM ( *) Sellars tells us in

%eneric and metaphoric terms that the myth of "ones is an important in%redient in his

o!erall ar%ument a%ainst epistemolo%ical foundationalism: +' ha!e used a myth to kill a

myth the Myth of the i!en-# Accordin% to McDowell (.//0a1 .//021 ./3/), in EPM

(especially in Sellars4 account of non5inferential knowled%e) the myth of "ones has a morespecific purpose, namely, to complete the account of e&perience that Sellars needs to

ar%ue a%ainst traditional empiricism (that is, one of the most widespread forms of the Myth

of the i!en): on McDowell’s !iew the myth of "ones should e&plain how to concei!e of

non5inferentially knowa2le e&periences as containin% propositional claims (EPM 3 ,

/)# 'n this paper ' ar%ue that the myth of "ones does not succeed in pro!idin% such an

account, especially on McDowell4s own terms: assumin% McDowell’s (./3/)

epistemolo%ical distinction 2etween inferential and non5inferential knowled%e, it turns out

that in Sellars4 thou%ht e&periment perceptual e&periences can contain propositional

claims only at the price of 2ein% known inferentially rather than non5inferentially# $herefore,

as ' ar%ue, McDowell’s Sellars is not successful in the re6ection of traditional empiricism,

for his anti5foundationalist ar%ument is not in accordance with his own re7uirements# 't is

worth notin%, howe!er, that ' wish to distin%uish McDowell4s Sellars from the +authentic-

8ilfrid Sellars# My ultimate %oal is to refute neither McDowell4s own theoretical !iews on

perception (insofar as they differ from McDowell4s interpretation of Sellars) nor Sellars4

ar%ument in EPM a%ainst the Myth of the i!en, 2ut rather McDowell4s interpretation of

Sellars4 attack on traditional empiricism#

'# $raditional empiricism

'n EPM one of the forms taken 2y the Myth of the i!en, a2stractly formulated, is

the idea that there is, indeed must be , a structure of particular matter of fact such



that 9 each fact can not only 2e non5inferentially known to 2e the case, 2ut

presupposes no other knowled%e either of particular matter of fact, or of %eneral

truths1 and (9) such that the non5inferential knowled%e of facts 2elon%in% to this

structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims particular

and %eneral a2out the world ( *.)#

Sellars’ main %oal in EPM is to ar%ue that such a %i!en structure cannot e&ist, for at

least two of its features are incompati2le with one another: 2ein% known (thou%h non5

inferentially), on the one hand, and 2ein% epistemically independent 3, on the other hand#

$he Myth of the i!en, Sellars claims ( EPM * ), typically characteri;es traditional

empiricism , a !iew (properly speakin%, a cluster of !iews) accordin% to which empirical

knowled%e has an ultimate foundation# <onsider an observation report such as (3)#

(3) $his is %reen#

One’s utterin% sentence (3) e&presses one’s non5inferential knowled%e that that is

green # Accordin% to traditional empiricism, such knowled%e presupposes no knowled%e of

other matter of fact, whether particular or %eneral# 'n part =''' of EPM (!i;# in *.5* )

Sellars re6ects this conception of o2ser!ation reports#

A second, less a2stract form of traditional empiricism is the idea that looks-statements such as (.) are reports of given appearances , and conse7uently +come 2efore-

all other statements e&pressin% knowled%e (includin% o2ser!ation reports such as (3)) 2oth

conceptually and in the order of e&planation#

(.) $his looks %reen to me#

Sellars writes that +while this idea has (9) 2een the most widespread form of the

Myth, it is far from constitutin% its essence- ( EPM 3/)# >e pro!ides an account of looks5

statements such as (.) in part ''' of EPM (!i;# in 3/5./)#

'n what follows ' will reconstruct "ohn McDowell’s authoritati!e interpretation of

Sellars’ attack on the a2o!e mentioned empiricist forms of the Myth of the i!en, and ' will

ar%ue that McDowell’s interpretation of Sellars’ ar%ument is not successful a%ainst

traditional empiricism# ' think that McDowell’s e&e%esis can 2e 2etter understood if

compared to an e7ually authoritati!e 2ut alternati!e readin% of Sellars on non5inferential

knowled%e, namely, o2ert @random’s (thou%h ' do not wish to su%%est that McDowell’s

1 See de=ries and $riplett (.///) for more details on such a notion#



interpretation is a mere response to @random)# $hus, ' will descri2e and compare

McDowell’s and @random’s interpretations of Sellars’ account of non5inferential knowled%e

(e&pressed 2y statements such as (3) and (.))# ' will not, howe!er, 2e concerned with the

o!erall de2ate 2etween McDowell and @random on perception, which is 2asically centred

on the 7uestions whether perception is a social phenomenon and how percei!ed states ofaffairs can rationally constrain empirical thou%ht . # ather, ' wish to use the comparison to

ar%ue that McDowell’s Sellars does not successfully challen%e traditional empiricism#

My ar%ument will run as follows# reliminarily, ' will 2riefly reconstruct @random’s

attri2ution of a + two-ply account - of non5inferential knowled%e to Sellars (section '')# $hen '

will discuss two main reasons why McDowell disa%rees with @random’s e&e%esis# Birst,

@random4s Sellars is an anti5empiricist tout court , while McDowell4s Sellars is a non5

traditional empiricist, for he aims to replace traditional empiricism with a reformedempiricism (where experience still has the role of yieldin% non5inferential knowled%e)

(section ''')# Secondly, @random4s Sellars completes his ar%ument a%ainst the Myth of the

i!en in the first part of EPM (2efore yleans and the %enius "ones come on the scene) ,

whereas McDowell4s Sellars’ ar%ument a%ainst traditional empiricism depends on the claim

that non5inferentially known perceptual e&periences ha!e propositional content, a claim

which in turn relies on the myth of "ones (section '=)# ' will su2se7uently focus on

McDowell4s !iew, accordin% to which @random4s attri2ution of a 4two5ply4 account of non5

inferential knowled%e to Sellars is not only wron% a2out Sellars 2ut also deeply implausi2le

in itself (section =)# $hen ' will pro!ide an e&e%esis of the dénouement of the myth of

"ones that will turn out to 2e more sympathetic to @random4s interpretation than to

McDowell4s (section ='), and ' will ar%ue that Sellars’ thou%ht e&periment, considered as an

ar%ument in narrati!e form, is a 2ad ar%ument 2y McDowell’s own standards (as '

reconstruct them in section =)# ' will conclude that since, 2y McDowell4s own standards,

the myth of "ones does not +kill- the (empiricist forms of the) Myth of the i!en,

McDowell’s Sellars does not succeed in challen%in% traditional empiricism (section =''')#

Cet me emphasi;e, howe!er, that my aim in this paper is 6ust to re6ect McDowell’s

interpretation of Sellars4 ar%ument a%ainst the Myth of the i!en, 2ut ' do not wish to ar%ue

that Sellars4 ar%ument, howe!er construed, is a failure# $hus, in the concludin% section '

will make this clearer 2y pointin% out some differences 2etween McDowell4s Sellars and

(what ' take to 2e) the authentic 8ilfrid Sellars (section ' )#

2 See, for e&ample, Mac2eth (forthcomin%)# osen2er% (.//Ea) also addresses all three authors discussed in this paper

on the !ery su26ect of non5inferential knowled%e# osen2er% ar%ues that Sellars4 stron% epistemic internalism isprefera2le in its essentials to 2oth @random4s and McDowell4s alternati!es# osen2er%, howe!er, 6ust touches upon themyth of "ones 2ut doesn4t focus on it# As far as ' can see, the si%nificance of the myth of "ones for the McDowell5@random de2ate has 2ecome clear only in more recent times (see, especially, McDowell .//0a, .//02, ./3/ and@random ./3/)#



''# @random’s Sellars

Accordin% to @random (.//.: *E05F*), in EPM Sellars pro!ides a two5ply account ofo2ser!ation reports such as (3)1 such an account %i!es the sufficient conditions of non5

inferential knowled%e# Bor e&ample, if one utters sentence (3) in the presence of a %reen

o26ect, then one4s (true) utterance e&presses non5inferential knowled%e if the followin% two

conditions are fulfilled# On the one hand, one4s utterance is one4s ( behavioural reliable

response to the stimulus %i!en 2y the occurrence of the %reen o26ect, in !irtue of one4s

!eliable "ifferential !esponsive "isposition (henceforth D D)# On the other hand, one is

a2le to #ustify one4s statement, in !irtue of one4s capacity of participatin% in an inferentially5articulated deontic practice# $he former capacity (the D D) mi%ht 2e shared 2y a parrot

or e!en 2y a con!eniently 2uilt artifact, while the latter capacity (that is, the capacity of

takin% up a position in the %ame of %i!in% and askin% for reasons) is an e&clusi!e

prero%ati!e of the human species or, at least, of 2ein%s endowed with a lan%ua%e#

Moreo!er, @random’s Sellars applies, mutatis mutandis , the two5ply account of

o2ser!ation reports such as (3) to looks5statements such as (.)# Assertin% the latter,

@random (.//.: *F ) claims, +is doin% two thin%s: first, it is e!incin% the same usually

relia2le differential responsi!e disposition that in other circumstances results in the claim

that somethin% is %reen# @ut second, it is withholding the endorsement of the claim that

somethin% is %reen# 'n other words, it is doin% somethin% that a%rees with an ordinary non5

inferential report of %reen thin%s on the first component of Sellars’ two5ply account of

o2ser!ation reports sharin% an D D 2ut disa%rees with it on the second component,

withholdin% endorsement instead of undertakin% the commitment-#

$o sum up, @random4s e&e%esis is 2ased on the followin% claim:

@(i): 'n EPM Sellars pro!ides a two5ply account of o2ser!ation reports such as (3) and of

looks5statements such as (.): assertin% 2oth (3) and (.) re7uires D D G inferential

capacity# 'n (3), howe!er, such a capacity is e&ercised 2y undertakin% the

commitment, while in (.) it is e&ercised 2y withholdin% endorsement#

Burthermore, @random (300H: 3 H5 ) re%ards Sellars’ two5ply account of non5

inferential knowled%e as sufficient to achie!e +one of the ma6or tasks of the whole essay-,

that is, +to dismantle empiricism- (namely, the idea that empirical knowled%e has an



ultimate foundation)# Bor the occurrence of the second factor of the two5ply account (that

is, the inferential capacity to take part in the %ame of %i!in% and askin% for reasons, a

capacity that @random concei!es of as itself not ha!in% a foundational structure) implies

that one4s non5inferential knowled%e of somethin% cannot 2e epistemically independent# 't

is worth notin% that accordin% to @random such an anti5empiricist task is alreadyaccomplished at EF of EPM , three para%raphs before Sellars talks a2out our mythical

ylean ancestors and the %enius "ones# $hus, @random4s second e&e%etical claim is the

followin%:

@(ii): Sellars (successfully) ar%ues a%ainst the empiricist forms of the Myth of the i!en in

the first half of EPM # Such an ar%ument is 2ased on the two5ply account of

o2ser!ation reports and looks5statements#

'''# McDowell’s Sellars: the role of e&perience

McDowell re6ects @(i)# Birst of all, he re6ects @random’s interpretation of Sellars’

!iew on o2ser!ation reports such as (3)# Accordin% to McDowell (.//0a: ..F5 ),

@random4s e&e%esis for%ets that Sellars considers seein% that5thin%s5are5so5and5so as a

form of (perceptual) experience # Inlike @random (300H: 3*35.), who re%ards the

occurrence of the term +empiricism- in the title of Sellars’ essay as somewhat misleadin%,

McDowell (.//0a: ..31 .//02: ) emphasi;es that Sellars does not intend to dispense

with empiricism tout court, 2ut only to dispense with traditional empiricism, as

characteri;ed 2y the <artesian Myth of the i!en# Accordin% to McDowell4s Sellars, what

one knows non5inferentially (typically 2y perception) is, after all, somethin% one encounters

in e&perience1 it is a 2it of reality, whose sensi2le presence one is perceptually aware of#

A%ainst the Myth of the i!en, McDowell4s Sellars shows that seein% that5thin%s5are5so5

and5so is not an epistemically independent e&perience, 2ut nonetheless, pace @random,

he thinks that it is a piece of experience , that is, in McDowell’s terms, a shapin% of

+sensory consciousness- (.//0a: ..F) *#

'f one followed @random, McDowell ar%ues (.//0a: ..F), one would think that

in!ol!ement of sensory consciousness in our ac7uisition of perceptual knowled%e has

nothin% essential to do with the !ery idea of perceptual knowled%e1 rather, it is at 2est a

contin%ent detail a2out the mechanism 2y which, in some cases, D Ds operate when

3 Bor a different criticism of @random4s interpretation of Sellars’ account of looks5statements, see de=ries and <oates(.//0), section '''#



certain physical o26ects occur# 'n a way, sensory consciousness would 2e like neuro5

physiolo%ical details, which are causally rele!ant 2ut not (so far) constitutive of the !ery

concept of perceptual knowled%e# McDowell doesn4t think that the idea of a piece of

knowled%e 2ased on D Ds (such that there is no conceptual role left for sensory

awareness) is inconsistent# ather, he thinks that such an idea does not con!ey whatSellars means 2y +perceptual knowled%e-, e&pressed 2y o2ser!ation reports such as (3)

(let alone 2y looks5statements such as (.)) E#

McDowell focuses on EPM * , where Sellars makes it clear what he re6ects in

traditional empiricism, a philosophical !iew that considers experience as the epistemically

independent %round of all knowled%e:

'f ' re6ect the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not 2ecause ' want to say that

empirical knowled%e has no foundation# Bor to put it this way is to su%%est that it is

really 4empirical knowled%e so5called4, and to put it in a 2o& with rumors and

hoa&es# $here is clearly some point to the picture of human knowled%e as restin%

on a le!el of propositions o2ser!ation reports which do not rest on other

propositions in the same way as other propositions rest on them#

<ommentin% these words, McDowell ar%ues that Sellars’ point a%ainst traditional

empiricism is not that perceptual knowled%e is not %rounded in e&perience, 2ut rather that

perceptual e&perience is neither self56ustified nor epistemically independent# 'n fact,

accordin% to Sellars (as interpreted 2y McDowell) +it is e&perience that yields the

knowled%e e&pressed in o2ser!ation reports- such as (3) (McDowell .//0a: ..*)#

Assumin% this interpretation of the role of e&perience in Sellars’ account of non5inferential

knowled%e, McDowell reconstructs traditional empiricism (J$K) alon% the followin% lines:

($K) $ne%s non-inferential knowledge of one%s own perceptual experiences is epistemically

independent&

Accordin%ly, McDowell’s Sellars’ Ar%ument a%ainst $K (henceforth, A$K) is the

followin%:

(A$K) $ne non-inferentially knows one%s own perceptual experiences, which have

propositional content& 'ut one%s knowledge of something that has propositional

content cannot be epistemically independent& ence, one%s non-inferential

4 See McDowell (./3/: 3.053*/)#



knowledge of one%s own perceptual experiences cannot be epistemically

independent, that is, )E is false #

$hus, McDowell’s Sellars answers the 7uestion +Does empirical knowled%e has

foundation?- with a *ualified +yes-, an answer that differs from 2oth the traditionalempiricist’s un 7ualified +yes- and @random’s Sellars’ strai%htforward +no-# 'n other words,

McDowell’s Sellars aims to replace traditional empiricism with a sort of reformed

empiricism # Accordin% to McDowell (.//0a: ..*), howe!er, 2oth this replacement and A$K

re7uire a more detailed picture of e&perience, +e&plainin% how it can yield non5inferential

knowled%e, 2ut only in a way that presupposes other knowled%e of matters of fact in

contrast with the presupposition5free knowled%e5yieldin% powers that e&perience is

credited with 2y traditional empiricism-# $he re7uired picture, McDowell claims, +is 6ustwhat Sellars offers (9) in part '''- of EPM , when he accounts for looks5statements such as

(.) (.//0a: ..*1 ./3/: 3*3)# Moreo!er, contra @random, McDowell emphasi;es that

Sellars re%ards such statements as reports , that is, speech acts that report somethin%# 'n

EPM 3F Sellars reckons that

there certainly seems to 2e somethin% to the idea that the sentence 4$his looks

%reen to me now4 has a reportin% role# 'ndeed, it would seem to 2e essentially a

report# @ut if so, what does it report, if not a minimal o26ecti!e fact, and if what itreports is not to 2e analy;ed in terms of sense data?

Accordin% to McDowell, Sellars’ answer to this 7uestion simply is: +a (perceptual)

experience -# Bor e&ample, consider EPM 3 ’:

8hen ' say 4 looks %reen to me now4 ' am reporting the fact that my e&perience is,

so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience , indistin%uisha2le from a !eridical one of

seein% that is %reen#

$o sum up, a%ainst @(i) McDowell sets up the followin% claim:

McD(i): Sellars’ account of o2ser!ation reports such as (3) and of looks5statements such

as (.) is not (2ased on) @random4s two5ply account# Bor Sellars’ reformed

empiricism a%rees with traditional empiricism at least on this: after all, such

statements are %roundedF

on perceptual experiences (thou%h accordin% to Sellars’non5traditional empiricism such e&periences are propositionally contentful and

5 See section ' 2elow for more details on the notion of a %round#



conse7uently cannot 2e epistemically independent)#

'=# McDowell’s Sellars: the promissory note and the myth of "ones

Accordin% to McDowell, e!en in the eyes of Sellars the first part of EPM (let alone

3/5./ and *.5* ) is not sufficient to support either the conclusion of A$K or his

reformed empiricism# $hat’s why McDowell re6ects @(ii)# >e acknowled%es, with @random,

that accordin% to Sellars whate!er the phrase +knowin% that5p non5inferentially- means

non5inferential pieces of knowled%e are not epistemically independent and self56ustified#

@ut McDowell emphasi;es, contra @random, what Sellars makes it clear in EPM 3 :

strictly speakin%, it is not entirely clear either what it means that perceptual e&periencescontain propositional claims, or whether it is possible that one non5inferentially knows

one’s propositionally contentful perceptual e&periences# $hat4s why Sellars must endorse a

promissory note # >e confesses ( EPM 3 ):

' reali;e that 2y speakin% of e&periences as containin% propositional claims, ' may

seem to 2e knockin% at closed doors# ' ask the reader to 2ear with me, howe!er, as

the 6ustification of this way of talkin% is one of my ma6or aims# 'f ' am permitted to

issue this !er2al currency now, ' hope to put it on the %old standard 2eforeconcludin% the ar%ument#

Accordin% to McDowell, Sellars deli!ers on the promissory note in EPM /, that is,

at the end of the first phase of the myth of "ones (.//0a: ..*) , the piece of

Lanthropolo%ical science fictionL ( EPM E ) that Sellars 2uilds up in the second part of

EPM (namely, E 5 *) to show that one can a!oid the Myth of the i!en while still

claimin% that mental e!ents (such as thou%hts and sensory impressions H) should 2e

concei!ed of as inner episodes that are knowa2le non5inferentially# Sellars’ thou%ht

e&periment can 2e summari;ed as follows:

(a) 'ma%ine human ancestors who think, act, ha!e a lan%ua%e and communicate 2ut

lack our concept of a thou%ht (as an inner episode)# Since they master a

2eha!iouristic psycholo%y (namely, they ha!e an episodic concept of thou%ht, that

6 Strictly speakin%, / is the 2e%innin% of the second part of the myth of "ones, that is, the part concernin% sensoryimpressions (as inner o26ects)# et, the point is that, 2efore takin% sensations into account, Sellars reminds the readerthat the philosophical promissory note endorsed in 3 has 2een finally deli!ered on#7 $hou%h Sellars in EPM deals with 2oth thou%hts and sensory impressions , for this paper4s concern ' shall 6ust focus onthe case of thou%hts#



is, thou%hts as utterances, as well as a dispositional concept of thou%ht, that is,

thou%hts as dispositions to utter somethin%), call them + yleans-#

(b) yleans are e7uipped with 2oth the resources of semantic discourse (for e&ample,

they know how to make semantic assertions of the form +9 in C means 555-) and the

resources of theoretical discourse (that is, they can postulate theoretical entities inorder to e&plain o2ser!ational phenomena)#

(c) $here is a %enius in the community, call him +"ones-, who finds it mysterious that

people appear to act intelli%ently not only while speakin% 2ut e!en when silent#

"ones e&plains the mystery 2y postulatin% uno2ser!a2le entities, call them

+thou%hts-, which are concei!ed on the model of !er2al episodes (for e&ample, 2oth

ha!e semantic properties) and, in certain circumstances, can %enerate intelli%ent

2eha!iour (!er2al or silent)#(d) "ones teaches his compatriots the theory of thou%hts, so that they learn to interpret

other people4s and their own 2eha!iour in terms of the theoretical concept of

thou%ht#

(e) Our ylean ancestors are then trained relia2ly to report the occurrences of their

own thou%hts, without the need to o2ser!e o!ert 2eha!iour any more (so that they

e!entually ac7uire the same mentalistic concept of thou%ht as we ha!e) #

Now, accordin% to McDowell (./3/: 3*3) only at the end of (the first part of) the

myth of "ones (that is, in EPM /) Sellars deli!ers on the promissory note he endorsed

in EPM 3 # $here Sellars reminds us

that amon% the inner episodes which 2elon% to the framework of thou%hts will 2e

perceptions, that is to say, seein% that the ta2le is 2rown, hearin% that the piano is

out of tune, etc# Intil "ones introduced this framework, the only concepts our

fictitious ancestors had of perceptual episodes were those of o!ert !er2al reports,made, for e&ample, in the conte&t of lookin% at an o26ect in standard conditions#

Seein% that somethin% is the case is an inner episode in the "onesean theory

which has as its model reportin% on lookin% that somethin% is the case# 't will 2e

remem2ered from an earlier section that 6ust as when ' say that Dick reported that

the ta2le is %reen, ' commit myself to the truth of what he reported, so to say of

Dick that he saw that the ta2le is %reen is, in part, to ascri2e to Dick the idea 4this

ta2le is %reen4 and to endorse this idea# $he reader mi%ht refer 2ack to Sections 3

ff# for an ela2oration of this point#

8 >ere two different issues are intertwined: the semantic issue concerned with the yleans’ ac7uirin% and masterin% aconcept of thou%ht and the epistemological issue concerned with their ri%ht to claim knowled%e of thou%hts# 'n the mythof "ones, howe!er, our ylean ancestors ac7uire the same concept of thou%ht as we ha!e only when (after trainin% andconditionin%) they 2ecome a2le to know their own thou%hts non5inferentially#



$o 2etter understand Sellars’ referrin% 2ack to 3 , it is worth notin% that one’s non5

inferential knowled%e of one’s perceptual e&perience that5p is e&pressed not only 2y

o2ser!ation reports such as (3) (where the role of e&perience is somewhat concealed) or

2y looks5statements such as (.) (where one mi%ht 2e tempted to concei!e e&periences asmere appearances), 2ut also 2y first person perceptual statements such as (*) (which

commit the speaker to the truth of +this is %reen-)#

(3) ' see that this is %reen#

Sentence (*) has two readin%s, one dispositional and one episodic, 0 which are

connected as follows: to see that5p (in the dispositional sense) amounts to ha!in% thedisposition to ha!e seein%5episodes that5p# Now, Sellars re%ards an episodic seein% that5p

(for e&ample, my now seein% that this is %reen) as a paradi%matic case of perceptual

e&perience, and perceptual knowled%e of such episodic e&periences, e&pressed 2y

statements such as (*), as a paradi%matic case of non5inferential knowled%e#

Now we are in a 2etter position to understand why McDowell 2elie!es that in EPM

the myth of "ones is an essential in%redient in the re6ection of $K 3/ , the foundationalist

!iew accordin% to which one’s non5inferential knowled%e of one’s own perceptual

e&periences is epistemically independent# $o this end we ha!e to recall that, f or McDowell ,

Sellars4 %oal (as a non5traditional or reformed empiricist) is to %i!e an account of

perceptual statements such as (*) as statements that e&press one’s non5inferential

knowled%e of one’s own propositionally contentful perceptual e&periences 33# More

precisely, for McDowell, Sellars4 point a%ainst $K is that, since such perceptual

e&periences contain propositional claims , non5inferential knowled%e of one’s own

perceptual e&periences cannot 2e epistemically independent (for, %enerally speakin%, it is

impossi2le to ha!e knowled%e of somethin% propositionally contentful independently of any

other knowled%e) & $hus, in McDowell4s !iew it is an essential in%redient of Sellars4 attack

on $K to clarify and 6ustify how it is possi2le that perceptual e&periences contain

propositional claims# >ence the promissory5notish character of 3 # Now, accordin% to

McDowell, Sellars re%ards the myth of "ones as deli!erin% on the promissory note

endorsed in EPM 3 # 8hat is the e!idence for McDowell4s interpretation? Birst, the

9See, for e&ample, Sellars (30 0: 3/E) and also osen2er% (.//E21 .//H: 3H 5H)# On Mcdowell4s attitude toward pre5"onesean yleans, see section =''' 2elow#10 ' would like to thank an anonimous referee for pressin% me on this point#11 Accordin% to McDowell, such an account, as Sellars’ referrin% 2ack (in EPM /) to 3 seems to su%%est, also

applies to the conception of e&perience re7uired 2y the analysis of looks5statements such as (.)#



reference to 3 in / of EPM # Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that in

EPM only the myth of "ones %i!es an account of statements such as (*) (where the !er2

+to see- is interpreted in its episodic sense, as opposed to its dispositional sense) 2y

showin% how to concei!e of perceptual e&periences as containin% propositional claims#

$he 2asic idea is that !er2al episodes are endowed with semantic properties# 'n particular,they are propositionally contentful# As is well known, Sellars has a story to tell a2out

propositional contentfulness of verbal or lin%uistic episodes (as opposed to inner

episodes) 3. # 'n the myth of "ones, howe!er, he considers the semantic properties of !er2al

episodes as somethin% that re7uires no further e&planation, that is, as a sort of

+une&plained e&plainer-# $hen Sellars tells us that the %enius "ones introduces the

theoretical concept of a thou%ht on the model of !er2al episodes (see sta%e (c) of my

reconstruction a2o!e)# 'n particular, "onesean thou%hts ha!e in common with their modelthe (semantic) property of containin% propositional claims# Moreo!er, "onesean thou%hts

include perceptual e&periences as a special case# Cast, 2ut not least, the former yleans4

knowled%e of their episodic thou%hts (includin% perceptual e&periences) is non5inferential,

for they are trained directly to know their own thou%hts (see sta%es (d) and (e) of my

reconstruction a2o!e) 3*# Iltimately, that4s why McDowell 2elie!es that the myth of "ones is

an essential in%redient in the re6ection of the Myth of the i!en: Sellars4 own myth shows

how non-inferentially known e&periences (as special cases of thou%hts) can contain

propositional claims 1 2ut nothin% propositionally structured can 2e epistemically

independent1 hence, our non5inferentially known e&periences cannot 2e epistemically

independent either, so that $K must 2e false#

$o sum up, a%ainst @(ii) McDowell puts forward the followin% claim:

McD(ii): in the first half of EPM Sellars’ account of looks5statements such as (.), let alone

his account of o2ser!ation reports such as (3), is not sufficient to support either

the conclusion of A$K or Sellars’ reformed empiricism# Bor only in EPM /, at

the end of the first phase of the myth of "ones (that is, the part concernin%

thou%hts, includin% perceptual e&periences) Sellars deli!ers on the promissory

note endorsed in EPM 3 (2y accountin% for first5person perceptual statements

such as (*))#

12 See, for e&ample, K M */5*3, 2ut also Sellars (30F*1 30FE1 30 01 30HE)# On this issue see also $ripodi (./33)#13 See also EPM * #



=# McDowell on chicken5se&ers

Accordin% to McDowell, 2esides e&e%etical errors @(i) and @(ii) @random also

makes a philosophical error1 for @random not only ascri2es the two5ply account of

o2ser!ation reports and looks5statements to Sellars, 2ut he su2scri2es to it# @y the sametoken, McDowell not only critici;es @random4s attri2utin% the two5ply account of perception

to Sellars, 2ut he thinks that such an account is 2ased on serious conceptual

misunderstandin%s#

McDowell (./3/: 3.0) considers +the chicken5se&ers of epistemolo%ical folklore#

$he chicks they pronounce to 2e male, %ettin% it ri%ht with sufficient fre7uency for their

pronouncements to count as knowled%ea2le, do not look, or smell, or in any other sensory

modality appear any different to them from the chicks they knowled%ea2ly pronounce to 2efemale-# Such people, confronted with a chick, find themsel!es inclined to say +male- or

+female-# @ut they account for the inclination only +from outside-, for e&ample, as the result

of an ac7uired disposition to respond to the presence of chicks with such utterances#

McDowell (./3/: 3E/) contrasts a chicken5se&er with a person who knows that somethin%

is %reen 2y seein% that it is# Prima facie , such a person has an inclination relia2ly to

respond to the presence of %reen o26ects# And her inclination is intelli%i2le to her in a

similar way as a chicken5se&er’s inclinations are intelli%i2le to him: they 2oth know that

they ha!e ac7uired some differential dispositions relia2ly to respond to the presence of

certain thin%s# $he chicken5se&er, howe!er, has only +e&ternal- reasons to follow his

inclinations, while the person who sees that somethin% is %reen ha!e also +internal-

reasons, namely, the thin%4s 2ein% %reen: she is aware of that, for the %reen thin% is

sensi2ly present to her#

Strictly speakin%, the chicken5se&ers of epistemolo%ical folklore do not e&ist# Bor

e&ample, ylyshyn (3000: *F 50) has shown that the real chicken5se&ers, as much as the

e&perts in other fields, 7uickly make inferences from o2ser!ational features of which they

are a little aware# Moreo!er, one does not 2ecome a chicken5se&er 2y drill or conditionin%,

2ut rather 2y 2ein% %i!en e&amples and e&plicit instructions# McDowell, howe!er, is 6ust

makin% a conceptual point# Accordin%ly, it does not matter whether his description of the

chicken5se&ers +is true of any actual capacity to sort chicks into male and female1 it is

enou%h that it could 2e true- (./3/: 3.0)#

McDowell’s ultimate point is the followin%: the person who sees somethin% %reen is

in a position to ha!e observational knowled%e, whereas the chicken5se&ers’ knowled%e

isn’t non5inferential, let alone o2ser!ational# On @random’s two5ply !iew, howe!er, the



chicken se&ers’ knowled%e is a paradi%matic case of non5inferential knowled%e# Accordin%

to McDowell (./3/: 3E3), this undermines @random’s !iew# @random distin%uishes

inferential from non5inferential knowled%e accordin% to whether or not a knower reaches a

2it of knowled%e 2y inference# Accordin% to McDowell (./3/: 3E3), howe!er, such a

definition is 6ust psychologically si%nificant, whereas it should 2e epistemologicallysi%nificant# 'n McDowell’s words, the distinction +should concern the character of a state

credentials, not the process 2y which it was arri!ed at- (./3/: 3E3)#

<onse7uently, McDowell (./3/: 3E3) pro!ides an alternati!e definition: +knowled%e

is inferential if the only way to !indicate its status as knowled%e is to in!oke the %oodness

of an inference to what is known from somethin% independently within the knower’s

epistemic reach- (for e&ample, one4s reason for that somethin% is that one sees it)#

Accordin% to McDowell, the chicken5se&ers’ don’t infer their claims a2out chicks from theirac7uired tendencies to make them# So their claims are non5inferential in @random’s

psycholo%ical sense# et, they are inferential in the epistemolo%ical sense# @y the same

token, if @random’s two5ply account of non5inferential knowled%e were true, knowled%e

e&pressed 2y o2ser!ation reports such as (3) or 2y first5person perceptual statements

such as (*) would 2e epistemolo%ically inferential# Accordin% to McDowell, this pro!ides a

sort of reduction ad absurdum of @random’s !iew, for knowled%e e&pressed 2y statements

such as (3) or (*) is a paradi%matic case of (epistemolo%ically) non5inferential knowled%e#

On the one hand, a D D %i!es no 6ustification (hence, no knowled%e) at all1 at 2est, it is

psycholo%ically direct# On the other hand, the inferential capacity of %i!in% and askin% for

reasons is not direct at all (either epistemolo%ically or psycholo%ically) 3E#

As ' ha!e said a2o!e, in this paper ' won’t take part in the o!erall theoretical

contro!ersy 2etween @random and McDowell# ather, in the ne&t section ' will take

@random4s e&e%etical side once in a while, namely, ' will pro!ide a somewhat @randomian

e&e%esis of the myth of "ones# $hen in section ='' ' will show that, McDowell’s criticism

(assumin%, for the sake of ar%ument, that it works) doesn4t applies only to @random’s two5

ply account of o2ser!ation, 2ut also to Sellars’ two5ply account of non5inferential self5

knowled%e in the dénouement of the myth of "ones (as ' reconstruct it in section =')#

14 McDowell (./3/) seems to think that in @random’s two5ply account there is room for only one kind of 6ustification,that is, inferential 6ustification# erhaps McDowell for%ets @random’s (300E: 3H 5 ) talk of a 6ustification +2y default-,which seems not to 2e +inferential- in McDowell’s sense#



='# 8here @random is ri%ht and McDowell %oes wron%

@random (.//.: F.E) puts forward a further e&e%etical claim, accordin% to which the

two5ply account of o2ser!ation reports is the +master idea- of EPM , for two further crucial

issues of EPM rest on it: one4s ac7uisition of empirical concepts (of which, accordin% to@random (.//.: *F05 .), Sellars %i!es a +rationalistic- account), on the one hand, and the

pro2lem of how theoretical concepts can come to ha!e o2ser!ational uses, on the other

hand 3F# 'n what follows, ' shall 2e concerned only with the latter issue, which Sellars deals

with in the so5called dénouement of the myth of "ones ( EPM F0)#

$hus, for this paper’s concern @random4s third e&e%etical claim is the followin%:

@(iii): Sellars relies on the two5ply account of non5inferential knowled%e in, amon% otherplaces, EPM F0, that is, in accountin% for the former yleans4 ac7uisition of the

capacity to know their own thou%hts non5inferentially#

Once a%ain, McDowell re6ects @random4s e&e%esis# Bor accordin% to McDowell +the

idea that the outputs of some responsi!e dispositions are constituted as conceptually

contentful 2y inferential articulation is not rele!ant to any point Sellars has occasion to

make in this part that is, in part ''', 3/5./P# Or, ' 2elie!e, anywhere in EPM -, includin%

the myth of "ones (.//0a: .*/1 ./3/: 3* )# $hus, McDowell sets up the followin% claim

a%ainst @(iii):

McD(iii): @random4s Sellars’ two5ply account does not occur in the myth of "ones (or

anywhere in EPM )#

'n what follows, howe!er, ' shall show that, as far as the myth of "ones is

concerned, McD(iii) is not well5documented (in fact, it is false), while @(iii) is, in 2road

outline, true# Cet me 7uote EPM F0 e&tensi!ely (a passa%e correspondin% to sta%es (d)

and (e) of my reconstruction a2o!e):

Once our fictitious ancestor, "ones, has de!eloped the theory that o!ert !er2al

2eha!ior is the e&pression of thou%hts, and tau%ht his compatriots to make use of

the theory in interpretin% each other4s 2eha!ior, it is 2ut a short step to the use of

this lan%ua%e in self5description# $hus, when $om, watchin% Dick, has 2eha!ioral

e!idence which warrants the use of the sentence (in the lan%ua%e of the theory) 9

15 See @random (.//.: * .5E)#



LDick is thinkin% that5pL, Dick, usin% the same 2eha!ioral e!idence, can say, in the

lan%ua%e of the theory, (9) L' am thinkin% that5p#L And it now turns out need it

ha!e? that Dick can 2e trained to %i!e reasona2ly relia2le self5descriptions, usin%

the lan%ua%e of the theory, without ha!in% to o2ser!e his o!ert 2eha!ior# "ones

2rin%s this a2out, rou%hly 2y applaudin% utterances 2y Dick of L' am thinkin% that5pL

when the 2eha!ioral e!idence stron%ly supports the theoretical statement LDick isthinkin% that5pL1 and 2y frownin% on utterances of L' am thinkin% that5pL, when the

e!idence does not support this theoretical statement# Our ancestors 2e%in to speak

of the pri!ile%ed access each of us has to his own thou%hts# +hat began as a

language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role&

8hat kind of trainin% is Dick4s? Accordin% to Sellars (30 32), it consists in +ac7uirin%

a tendency ( ceteris paribus ) to respond to his thou%ht that5p 2y sayin% 4' am thinkin% that5

p4-# $he word +respond-, here, is 2ein% used as a technical term 2orrowed from theSkinnerian theory of learnin%: thanks to "ones4s applaudin% (a positi!e reinforcement) and

frownin% (a ne%ati!e reinforcement) to his utterances, Dick 2ecomes conditioned to

2eha!e in a certain way 3 #

Accordin% to the !iew Sellars %a!e to >ector5Neri <astaQeda in their

correspondence (henceforth, Sellars 30 32), howe!er, after trainin% Dick 2ecomes a2le to

non5inferentially know his own thou%ht that5p if

(R) Dick 2ecomes conditioned to respond to the occurrence of the thou%ht that5p 2y

utterin% +' am thinkin% that5p-

( ) such a +conditionin% is itself cau%ht up in a conceptual framework- 3H#

Now, Sellars (30 321 30 F) makes it clear that, on closer inspection, claim (R) is

false, while claim ( ) is too concise# <onsider (R)# 't su%%ests that we (actual speakers and

thinkers) are like one (Dick) who is conditioned to utter +'4m thinkin% that5p- whenever he

has the thou%ht that5p# $his is clearly plethoric# $hat4s why Sellars introduces a

16 Strictly speakin%, one relatum of the conditionin% relation Sellars is talkin% a2out is a theoretical entity (i#e# Dick4sthou%ht that5p)# Moreo!er, the e&pression +Tconditioned response4 is (###) most fre7uently used 2y Americanpsycholo%ists in the Skinnerian traditionP in such a way that the o!ert is conditioned to the o!ert- (Sellars 30 32)# $hus,one mi%ht su2stitute such an e&pression with the more neutral e&pression +associati!e connection-, which refers to somesimilarly contin%ent and non5rational relation# >owe!er, this is mainly a terminolo%ical point#17Sellars (30 32) writes: +$he important difference 2etween a person who has merely 2een conditioned to respond tohis thou%ht that5p 2y sayin% 4' ha!e the thou%ht that5p4 and a person whose statement 4' ha!e the thou%ht that5p4expresses direct self-knowledge is not that in the latter case the statement isn t occurring as a conditioned response # 'tis# $he difference is that in the latter case the conditionin% is itself cau%ht up in a conceptual framework-#



modification in the scenario depicted in the dénouement, 2y su%%estin% that strictly

speakin% the latter relatum of the conditionin% connection (the former 2ein% Dick’s thou%ht

that5p) is not the utterance +' am thinkin% that5p-, 2ut rather the meta-thought ' am

thinkin% that5p 3 (henceforth M$)#

Notice that when he was a mere ylean, Dick already had thou%hts# @ut only afterha!in% learned the theory of thou%hts and ha!in% 2een trained 2y "ones Dick 2ecomes

conditioned to respond to the occurrence of his thou%ht that5p 2y M$, which he can

(thou%h he is not compelled to) e&press 2y the utterance +' am thinkin% that5p-# $hus,

accordin% to Sellars (30 321 30 F) (R) is 2est replaced with

(R)U Dick is conditioned to respond to the occurrence of his thou%ht that5p 2y ha!in% M$#

Now, consider ( )# 8hat does the e&pression +conceptual framework- refer to

there? $he inferential resources Dick is e7uipped with, and thanks to which Dick is a2le to

6ustify his M$# Accordin% to Sellars (30 321 30 F), Dick4s epistemic attitudes towards M$

are (2asically) the followin%:

( )U Dick acknowled%es that M$ asserts the occurrence of his thou%ht that5p, that it mi%ht

2e o!ertly e&pressed 2y the utterance +' am thinkin% that5p-, and that it is a relia2le

symptom of the occurrence of the thou%ht that5p .

Sellars (30 321 30 F) re%ards conditions (R)U and ( )U as sufficient for Dick4s direct

(that is, non5inferential) knowled%e of his thou%ht that5p# $he former, (R)U, accounts for the

directness of Dick4s knowled%e, while the latter, ( )U, accounts for the epistemic nature of

Dick4s response &

Now, it seems to me that such an account of non5inferential self5knowled%e

strai%htforwardly resem2les @random4s Sellars’ two5ply account of o2ser!ation reports# On

the one hand, 2oth (R) and (R)U are 2ased on D Ds (thou%h perhaps only the former is

2ased on a behavioural D D)# On the other hand, 2oth the %eneric ( ) and its e&plication

( )U ultimately refer to Dick4s inferential capacity to position himself in the %ame of %i!in%

and askin% for reasons# $herefore McD(iii) is wron% while @(iii) is ri%ht#

An analo%y discussed 2y Sellars (30 32) mi%ht %i!e rise to the followin% o26ection 30 #

Accordin% to Sellars (30 32), Dick4s case is analo%ue to the case of +a 2lind man who has

18 Bor Sellars4 use of dot57uotes, see e#%# Sellars (30F*), Sellars (30 0), Sellars (30HE)#

19 ' would like to thank an anonimous referee for drawin% my attention to this point#



learned the lan%ua%e of colored physical o26ects and the seein% of them-: for e&ample,

such a man knows that red (whate!er it is) appears darker (whate!er that means) than

yellow (whate!er it is)1 that yellow is the colour of this lemon while red is the colour of this

fla%1 and other thin%s of the sort . $hen he +has his !isual apparatus put in order and shortly

thereafter is a2le to see that we ha!e a case in which lan%ua%e, already meanin%fullyused, ac7uired a 4reportin% role4 e&pressi!e of direct, non5inferential knowled%e which it did

not, for that person, ha!e 2efore-: for e&ample, he now looks at this lemon and this fla%

and has, for the first time, the perceptual e&periences of colours, especially of this red and

this yellow, of this red 2ein% darker than this yellow, and so on and so forth# $he point of

Sellars4 analo%y, one mi%ht ar%ue, is not that Dick4s non5inferential knowled%e of his own

thou%hts has two components, namely, an D D and the a2ility to use the "onesean

conceptual apparatus, 2ut simply that the conditionin% leads Dick, who already learnt the"oneasean lan%ua%e of thou%hts, to ha!e e&periences of his own thou%hts# $hus, one

mi%ht conclude, in either cases the two5ply description does not seem to apply#

Cet me 2riefly reply to this o26ection# On the one hand ' a%ree, at least prima facie ,

that the two5ply description doesn4t apply to the 2lind man4s case# 'n fact, in this case

Sellars is 6ust concerned with the second component of a two5ply account of non5

inferential knowled%e, namely, the inferential a2ility to master a conceptual framework: the

%eneral point of his analo%y is to show that, as one (a 2lind man) cannot learn, properly

speakin%, to see coloured o26ects unless one has already ac7uired the conceptual

framework of colour5perception, so one (a ylean) cannot come, as it were, to ha!e

e&periences of his own thou%hts unless one has already ac7uired the "onesean theoretical

framework# So far, so %ood# On the other hand, howe!er, what does it mean that that man

+has his !isual apparatus put in order-? 't seems to me that, if we want to keep the analo%y

2etween the 2lind man4s case and the case of Dick, that locution doesn4t mean, strictly

speakin%, that that man ac7uired the a2ility to see (or to ha!e perceptual e&periences of)

colours, 2ut rather that he ac7uired the a2ility to relia2ly respond to coloured o26ects# >is

a2ility to see (or to ha!e e&periences of) colours is rather the further result of the

com2ination of two a2ilities: his 6ust5ac7uired a2ility to relia2ly respond to coloured o26ects

(an D D) and his old a2ility to master the conceptual framework of colour5perception (an

inferential capacity)# $hus, the two5ply description does seem to apply once a%ain#

'n the ne&t section ' will show that, assumin% McDowell’s epistemolo%ical definition

of +inferential knowled%e-, as well as his distinction 2etween epistemolo%ically and

psycholo%ically non5inferential pieces of knowled%e, and %rantin% for the sake of the

ar%ument that McDowell’s criticism of @random’s two5ply account of non5inferential



reports is successful, Sellars’ two5ply account of non5inferential self5knowled%e fails on

McDowell’s own terms#

=''# $he myth of "ones as an in!alid ar%ument

$he myth of "ones mi%ht 2e concei!ed of as the followin% argument ./ #.f one has the

epistemic resources that the yleans ha!e at sta%es (a) and (2) of the myth and if it

happens to one what happens to the yleans at sta%es (c), (d) and (e), then one has (in

sufficiently rele!ant respects) the same non5inferential knowled%e of one4s own thou%hts

as we (actual, non5fictitious people) ha!e# 'n what follows, ' shall ar%ue that, assumin%

McDowell4s epistemolo%ical point of !iew, such an ar%ument is not !alid, for the conclusiondoes not follow from the two premises# Namely, %i!en the premises, it is false that at the

end of the story the former ylean Dick has (ac7uired) the same a2ility to non5inferentially

know one’s own thou%hts as we ha!e & 'n other words, the myth of "ones doesn’t fit with

McDowell’s epistemolo%ical !iew of non5inferential knowled%e# =ery 2riefly, the point is that

e!erythin% McDowell says a2out the chicken5se&ers is also true of the (former) yleans .3 #

More precisely, if one assumes McDowell’s !iew on non5inferential knowled%e, one

should acknowled%e that at the end of the myth the former yleans ha!e not 2ecome

sufficiently like us# $heir utterance +' am thinkin% that5p- (2ased on the "onesean theory)

and our own utterance +' am thinkin% that5p- (2ased on our actual self5knowled%e)

correspond to different %rounds or reasons# $he former ultimately e&presses inferential

knowled%e, while the latter e&presses non5inferential knowled%e (in McDowell4s

epistemolo%ical sense)# $hat’s why Sellars’ account of self5knowled%e in the dénouement

of the myth of "ones fails on Mc"owell%s own terms #

Cet me further ela2orate on this point# 'f one asks +8hat ri%ht does Dick ha!e to

ha!e his meta5thou%ht?-, the answer will refer to the relia2ility of the conditioned response

to thou%hts with meta5thou%hts, as well as to the 6ustification of the in!ol!ed theory of

mind, that is, the "onesean theory of thou%hts .. # On the one hand, Dick knows that his

20 Bor a more detailed discussion of the myth of "ones as an in!alid ar%ument see $ripodi (./33), where ' try to showthat the myth of "ones doesn4t work independently of McDowell4s reconstruction# Bor different kinds of criticism, seeMarras (30H*a, 30H*2, 30HH) and $riplett and de=ries (.// )#21 'n his reply to McDowell (./3/), @random (./3/: *.*) underlines a similar point# >is o!erall ar%ument, howe!er, isdifferent from mine (accordin% to @random, McDowell simply finds the pre5"onesean scenario unintelli%i2le), and in whatfollows ' won’t focus on it#

22 Prima facie , this mi%ht strike one as non5Sellarsian# Bor Sellars often insists that in the case of our ordinary non5inferential first5person ascriptions 4the way the thou%ht occurred to us4 will 2e sufficient for the 6ustification of the(occurrence of our) thou%ht# $his is true, howe!er, only of statements that already ha!e a reportin% role# @ut the 7uestionis whether, in the post5"onesean and post5conditionin% scenario of the myth of "ones, the former yleans4 first5personstatements ha!e ac7uired a reportin% role in the same sense# My point in this section is that they ha!e not, at least if we



meta5thou%ht is a relia2le symptom of the occurrence of the thou%ht that5p, and more

precisely that %i!en the occurrence of the thou%ht that5p he has 2een conditioned to

ha!e the meta5thou%ht (that is, he cannot help ha!in% it)# On the other hand, Dick knows

that his own intelli%ent 2eha!ior (not only !er2al 2ut e!en silent) should 2e e&plained in

"onesean terms, that is, 2y attri2utin% certain thou%hts to himself# $hus, Dick4s 6ustificationfor his meta5thou%ht ultimately relies on behavioral evidence # Birst, "ones is presented 2y

Sellars ( EPM F*) as +an unsun% forerunner of the mo!ement in psycholo%y, once

re!olutionary, now commonplace, known as @eha!iourism-, concei!ed as the followin%

+methodolo%ical thesis-:

Methodological 'ehaviourism (M@): Scientific psycholo%ists are allowed to accept only one

kind of e!idence, that is, any e!idential data consistin% of or deri!ed from o!ertpu2lic 2eha!iour#

Secondly, Dick’s 6ustification of his meta5thou%ht depends on the theory of

conditionin% and the "onesean theory of thou%ht, 2ut 2oth such theories are e&plicitly 2uilt

in accord with M@# Accordin%ly, 2oth theories are merely supported 2y the o2ser!ation of

other people’s and one4s own o!ert 2eha!ior#

$he point is not, howe!er, that Dick4s self5knowled%e ultimately has the same kind

of %rounds as Skinner’s theory of conditionin% and as "ones’s proto5psycholo%ical theory

of thou%hts (namely, e!idential data consistin% of or deri!ed from o!ert 2eha!ior)# Bor it

also has the same kind of %rounds as a more sophisticated theory in co%niti!e psycholo%y#

$he point is, rather, that behavioral %rounds are a su2class of inferential %rounds (in

McDowell’s epistemolo%ical sense)# $hat4s why Sellars’ two5ply account of non5inferential

self5knowled%e can 2e critici;ed / la McDowell# At the 2e%innin% the ylean Dick (tau%ht

2y "ones) has inferential knowled%e of his own thou%hts, 2ased on 2eha!ioral e!idence &

Cater he 2ecomes conditioned suita2ly to respond to the occurrence of his thou%hts, so

that his knowled%e of them 2ecomes psychologically non 5inferential& Nonetheless, in !irtue

of M@ such knowled%e relies on 2eha!ioral %rounds, conse7uently it is still

epistemologically inferential # $herefore, McDowell must acknowled%e that Dick has not

actually 2ecome sufficiently like us, e!en on McDowell4s own terms, 2ecause our

knowled%e of our own thou%hts, whate!er one mi%ht say of its psycholo%ical status, is

assimilate a statement4s ha!in% a reportin% role with its e&pressin% non5inferential self5knowled%e in McDowell4sepistemolo%ical sense: as ' will try to show 2elow, the 6ustification of a former ylean4s own thou%hts (e!en after learnin%the "onesean theory and after 2ein% conditioned) turns out to 2e inferential rather than non5inferential (in McDowell4sepistemolo%ical sense), for it ultimately depends on a theory of thou%hts (which postulates thou%hts and connects themwith 2eha!iour) and a theory of conditionin% (which %uarantees the relia2ility of one4s meta5thou%hts)#



definitely non5inferential epistemolo%ically# 'n fact, accordin% to McDowell our non5

inferential self5knowled%e is 2ased on non5inferential %rounds# Bor e&ample, what ri%ht do '

ha!e for claimin% that this is red? ' am seein% it# Similarly, what ri%ht do ' ha!e to claim that

' am thinkin% that5p? ' am ha!in% this thou%ht# On the contrary, Dick claims that he is

thinkin% that5p merely rest on theoretical, inferential %rounds, which include 2eha!ioural%rounds as special cases# Such %rounds, howe!er, are deeply different from o2ser!ational,

non5inferential ones# $hus, e!en 2y McDowell’s own standards the myth of "ones fails#

<onsidered as an ar%ument the myth of "ones is not !alid, for it does not succeed in

pro!in% its conclusion (that is, that at the end of the fictitious story, in the post5"onesean

and post5conditionin% scenario, Dick has 2ecome sufficiently like us , insofar as the

capacity non5inferentially to know one4s own thou%hts is concerned)#

='''# $he failure of McDowell’s Sellars’ attack on $K

$he main conse7uence of the failure of the myth of "ones in EPM is the failure of

2oth McDowell’s Sellars’ A$K and his reformed empiricism# Bor a central idea of

McDowell’s Sellars’ A$K is the notion of non5inferentially knowa2le e&periences containin%

propositional claims# @ut this idea is ultimately 2ased on the myth of "ones, which

(accordin% to McDowell’s interpretation) should 6ustify Sellars’ endorsin% the promissory

note in EPM 3 #

At first %lance, the myth of "ones seems to succeed in 6ustifyin% such a promissory

way of talkin%# Bor the notion of perceptual e&periences containin% propositional claims

deri!es from the %enius "ones4 attri2utin% 2y analo%y the semantic cate%ories of manifest

utterances (that is, the model of the theory) to thou%hts (which include perceptual

e&periences as special cases)#

On closer inspection, howe!er, it turns out that, on McDowell’s own %rounds, the

myth of "ones does not show that the theoretical notion of a thou%ht as containin%

propositional claims can 2ecome the !ery same non-inferential notion of thou%ht as we

ha!e# <onse7uently, McDowell’s Sellars does not deli!er on the promissory note, which

re7uired 6ustification of the idea that thou%hts (that is, those inner episodes that we know

non5inferentially) can contain propositional claims# $hus, McDowell4s Sellars’ myth does

not +kill- the empiricist form of the Myth of the i!en, and neither A$K nor McDowell’s

Sellars4 reformed empiricism are 6ustified#

Prima facie , McDowell’s error is the followin%: first, he doesn’t reali;e that in the



dénouement of the myth of "ones Sellars ultimately puts forward a somewhat @randomian

two5ply account of self5knowled%e1 secondly, and more importantly, he doesn4t reali;e that,

insofar as he ar%ues a%ainst the attri2ution of non5inferential knowled%e to the chicken5

se&ers of epistemolo%ical folklore, he must contest (rather than endorse) Sellars4 own

myth, especially its dénouement (that is, F0)#More %enerally, McDowell reads the myth of "ones as if the dénouement did not

2elon% to it# McDowell reminds us that +when "ones starts work, his fellows already ha!e

the su26uncti!e conditional, hence the a2ility to speak of o!ert lin%uistic 2eha!iour with its

semantical character- (McDowell ./3/: 3**)# Moreo!er, McDowell thinks that Sellars

cannot fulfil his ma6or aim (that is, to dismantle traditional empiricism) unless he follows

+"ones in %oin% decisi!ely 2eyond those pre5"onesian resources# Only after the first phase

of "ones’s conceptual inno!ation does Sellars in effect declare that he has dischar%ed hispromissory note ( /)- (McDowell ./3/: 3**)#

$his readin% of the myth of "ones has a manifest ad!anta%e: it allows McDowell to

critici;e @random4s e&e%esis# @ut it has also a disad!anta%e, upon which ' ha!e tried to

cast some li%ht in this paper, and which ' would like to stress a 2it further in what follows#

On the one hand, McDowell scores a %oal a%ainst @random: @random’s two ply account of

looks statements is in terms of dispositions (which can 2e inhi2ited) to make lin%uistic

claims such as (.)1 2ut as McDowell underlines, +this apparatus is all a!aila2le 2efore

"ones’s inno!ation-# $hus, +in implyin% that his apparatus suffices for Sellars’ aims in art

''', @random precludes himself from properly re%isterin% the promissory character Sellars

stresses in his mo!es there- (McDowell .//0a: ..H)#

On the other hand, howe!er, McDowell misconstrues "ones’ inno!ation# Such an

inno!ation comes in two steps (rather than only one)# $he former, which McDowell

acknowled%es, is a conceptual inno!ation, that is, the introduction of a conception of inner

episodes on the model of lin%uistic episodes# $he latter, which McDowell for%ets a2out, is

the trainin% of the former yleans (such as Dick) non5inferentially to know their own inner

episodes# $he first step accounts for our characteri;in% inner episodes as containin%

propositional claims# $he latter step accounts for the non5inferential character of our

knowled%e of such episodes# $hus, if McDowell had accurately descri2ed the role of the

myth of "ones in EPM , Sellars would ha!e deli!ered on the promissory note at most at the

end of F , rather than, as he actually does, at the 2e%innin% of /# Bor F0 would ha!e

had no role to play in deli!erin% on the promissory note endorsed in 3 #

McDowell, howe!er, has misconcei!ed the role of Sellars’ own myth# Bor pace

McDowell the dénouement seems to 2e an inte%ral part of the deli!erin%# 'ndeed, the



promissory talk does concern the notion of non5inferentially knowa2le e&periences

containin% propositional claims# As ' ha!e shown, howe!er, the dénouement accounts for

the idea that perceptual e&periences can contain propositional claims only at the price of

makin% such e&periences inferentially rather than non5inferentially knowa2le (assumin% the

!ery epistemolo%ical distinction 2etween inferential and non5inferential pro!ided 2yMcDowell)#

$hus, on my !iew, unless McDowell4s Sellars pro!ides an alternati!e way to deli!er

on Sellars’ promissory note in EPM , that is, unless McDowell pro!ides an alternati!e and

persuasi!e readin% of (the dénouement of) the myth of "ones, McDowell’s Sellars does not

succeed in challen%in% traditional empiricism#

' # McDowell4s Sellars and 8ilfrid Sellars

'n this paper ' don4t claim that one cannot !indicate A$K, let alone that

foundationalism is true, 2ut only that one cannot !indicate A$K the way McDowell’s Sellars

tries to do it in EPM , that is, !ia the myth of "ones# Accordin% to McDowell, Sellars cannot

6ustify a crucial premise of A$K (namely, the idea that one non5inferentially knows one’s

own propositionally contentful perceptual e&periences) unless he deli!ers on the

promissory note he endorsed in EPM 3 (namely, unless he pro!ides a more detailed

picture of e&perience)# McDowell thinks that Sellars deli!ers on the promissory note in the

myth of "ones# @ut Sellars’ own myth fails on McDowell’s own %rounds# Now, suppose one

%rants all this# et, the fact that the ar%ument 2ased on the myth of "ones fails, at 2est

shows that McDowell’s Sellars’ !iew that perception has propositional content is not

6ustified1 whereas it does not show that it is wrong # erhaps McDowell or e!en Sellars in

EPM can 6ustify that claim in a different way# enerally speakin%, the failure of Sellars’

thou%ht e&periment (at least on McDowell’s %rounds) puts in 7uestion not so much

McDowell4s own philosophical !iews (a2out which ' ha!e e&plicitly said almost nothin% in

this paper), 2ut rather his interpretation of Sellars’ ar%ument a%ainst traditional empiricism#

@y the same token, it is important not to confuse McDowell’s Sellars with the real 8ilfrid

Sellars# 'n what follows, ' will list and hi%hli%ht some differences 2etween them, in order to

make it clearer what is the scope of this paper4s main ar%ument#

Birst of all, Sellars does not think that his main ar%ument in EPM is only directed

a%ainst those who think that foundational knowled%e is +su26ecti!e- (i#e#, it is knowled%e of

perceptual e&perience rather than of medium5si;ed physical o26ects)# ather, he concei!es



of it as directed a%ainst Lthe whole framework of %i!ennessL ( EPM 3)# $hus, McDowell’s

Sellars’ A$K has a narrower scope than the real Sellars’ ar%ument a%ainst the Myth of the

i!en#

Secondly, let us %rant that 2oth McDowell and Sellars a%ree that o2ser!ation

reports such as (3) and first5person perceptual statements such as (*) are somewhat%rounded on perceptual e&periences (thou%h accordin% to their non5traditional empiricism

such e&periences cannot 2e epistemically independent, *ua propositionally contentful)# 't

is contro!ersial, howe!er, what the pro2lematic e&pression +%rounded on- means here#

Such an e&pression often means the same as +6ustified 2y-, and that is 6ust what McDowell

means# @ut Sellars4 !iew is more multifaceted# On the one hand, accordin% to him

o2ser!ation reports express aspects of perceptual e&periences# And, at least prima facie ,

the e&pressin% relation does not seem to 2e the same as a %roundin%, 6ustification relation#On the other hand, on his !iew there is somethin% distin%uisha2le from perceptual

e&perience, namely sense impressions, 2ut perceptual reports are not 6ustified 2y sense

impressions, althou%h in a different sense they are grounded on them: such reports

e&press e&periences, which are caused (2ut not 6ustified) 2y such impressions .* #

$hirdly, and perhaps most si%nificantly, 2oth McDowell and Sellars ha!e a notion of

epistemolo%ically non5inferentially 6ustified claim, and 2oth of them think that such a notion

ou%ht to play a role in understandin% our knowled%e# @ut it is hi%hly contro!ersial whether

or not Sellars4 notion and McDowell4s notion are one and the same# On the one hand, it

seems that Sellars a%rees with McDowell in re%ardin% the inferentialVnon5inferential di!ide

as an epistemological distinction# Bor e&ample, Sellars (30 3a: 3.3) su%%ests that thou%h

from an ontolo%ical point of !iew theoretical entities e&ist in the same sense as

o2ser!ational entities, from an epistemolo%ical point of !iew a theoretical 6ustification is

completely different from an o2ser!ational one: for e&ample, ' 2elie!e on inferential

%rounds that a certain %as will o2ey the @oyle5<harles law or e!en that tomorrow the sun

will rise, whereas ' 2elie!e that this is red on non5inferential %rounds# (Notice, 2y the way,

that here the am2i%uous notion of a %round occurs a%ain)# erhaps one mi%ht e!en think

that this !iew is compati2le with McDowell’s (./3/), accordin% to which theoretical

6ustification is inferential (that is, in order to pro!e somethin% one has to make inferences

from somethin% known independently), while an o2ser!ational 6ustification is non5

inferential (that is, one does not ha!e to in!oke the !alidity of an inference in order to pro!e

somethin%, as his reason is, for e&ample, that one sees that it is so)# On the other hand,

23 See EPM /5*#



howe!er, this is surely not the way Sellars would descri2e thin%s .E # Bor e&ample, Sellars

(30HF: **5*F) considers the case where "ones sees there to 2e a red apple in front of

him# Accordin% to Sellars, +%i!en that "ones has learned how to use the rele!ant words in

perceptual situations, he is 6ustified in reasonin% as follows: ' 6ust thou%ht5out5loud 4CoW

>ere is a red apple4 (no counter!ailin% conditions o2tain)1 so, there is %ood reason to2elie!e that there is a red apple in front of me- (30HF: **)# Sellars notices that althou%h

the 6ustification of the 2elief that there is a red apple in front of "ones is an inference, it has

the peculiar character that its essential premise asserts the occurrence of the !ery same

2elief in a specific conte&t# 't is this fact that makes the 6ustified claim non5inferential (30HF:

*F)# 't is worth notin%, howe!er, that on McDowell4s definition "ones4 claim would 2e

inferential, rather than non5inferential# $herefore, in Sellars4 !iew the class of

epistemolo%ically non5inferentially 6ustified claims (in McDowell’s sense) seems to 2eempty# 'n fact, one mi%ht e!en wonder whether McDowell’s notion of an epistemolo%ically

non5inferential piece of knowled%e is the infamous notion of the i!en, that is, whether

McDowell ends up tryin% to s7uee;e a %i!en 2ack into his system under a different %uise#

$his is contro!ersial too# On the one hand, accordin% to McDowell our non5inferential self5

knowled%e is 2ased on non5inferential %rounds (in his epistemolo%ical sense)# Bor

e&ample, my ri%ht for claimin% that this is red is that ' see it# $hus, the seein% already

contains the claim, and to say that the claim is 2ased on the seein% seems to 2e the same

as sayin% that the claim within the seein% is self56ustified, a %i!en# On the other hand,

howe!er, one’s epistemolo%ically non5inferential knowled%e of somethin% (in McDowell’s

sense) is not re7uired to 2e epistemically independent, indefeasi2le, and a2le to pro!ide

epistemic support for all other knowled%e# McDowell’s characteri;ation of non5inferential

knowled%e seems to 2e compati2le with the followin% ideas: non5inferential knowled%e

re7uires the capacity to make inferences (as well as other semantic and epistemic

capacities)1 such non5inferential knowled%e is defeasi2le (for e&ample, 2ased on either

theoretical reasons or relia2ility considerations)1 such knowled%e does not constitute the

ultimate court of appeal for all other epistemic claims#

'n this paper ' cannot answer all such contro!ersial 7uestions e&hausti!ely# ' hope,

howe!er, that this last section made it sufficiently clear that one cannot easily identify

McDowell’s interpretation of Sellars and the real 8ilfrid Sellars# So that, as ' ha!e already

said a2o!e, this paper’s ultimate %oal is neither to refute McDowell’s own theoretical !iew

on perception, nor Sellars’ ar%ument a%ainst the Myth of the i!en in EPM , 2ut rather

24 See, for e&ample, Sellars’ criticisms of <hisholm’s notion that it can 2e the case that what 6ustifies my 2elief that5p isthe fact that-p in Sellars (30HF: * )#



McDowell’s interpretation and use of that nota2le authority .F #

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