james k. polk, not so dark a horse

James K. Polk, Not So Dark a HorseAuthor(s): Lee Scott TheisenSource: Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (WINTER 1971), pp. 383-401Published by: Tennessee Historical SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42623261 .

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James K. Polk, Not So Dark a Horse

By Lee Scott Theisen

James K. Folk is traditionally called the first dark horse in American politics. In the sense that he was not a major con- tender for the presidential nomination this is true. But Folk's nomination was won through astute politics, careful planning, timing, and luck- the requisites of all "dark horses" after him.

James K. Polk was no stranger to politics. Deeply involved in Democratic politics, he had served as Speaker of the House of Representatives and as Governor of Tennessee, 1839-1841: He was known to be a close friend and protégé of Andrew Jackson, and from 1839 on was regarded by many in both parties as a candidate for high national office. Respected as a tough and hard working politician, Polk ardently desired the vice-presidency in 1840. In- deed, he planned his campaign for the governorship of Tennessee in 1839 as a stepping stone for that post. Yet even at that time

many friends, such as Amos Kirkpatrick, saw Polk as President, not Vice-President.1

As Governor of Tennessee, Polk acquired the national reputation he desired. Democrats throughout the country, especially in the South, took note of him. Polk's activities on his own behalf for the vice-presidential nomination in 1840 aroused opposition from men such as Thomas Hart Benton who saw him as a presidential rival in 1844. The Van Burenites also evidenced a coolness toward Polk despite Jackson's activities on his behalf. Polk chose to ignore their attitude but did not forget it. However, Colonel Richard

Johnson's popularity, coupled with sectional animosity, dictated no vice-presidential choice for the Democrats in 1840. The choice was left to public opinion and to the electoral college. The party's defeat brought divisive elements into the open. Many, including John C. Calhoun, became more determined than ever to stop Van Buren in 1844 and perhaps wrest the nomination for themselves.

At the same time the Democracy in Tennessee became aware of the possibility of Polk's being beaten in the state in 1841. Some

1 Amos Kirkpatrick to James K. Polk, October 17, 1839, Polk Papers, Library of Congress.

383



384 Tennessee Historical Quarterly

of Polk's friends proposed that he be elected senator, while others remained convinced his chances nationally in 1844 would be enhanced by a victory in the gubernatorial race. Professed friends, such as A. O. P. Nicholson, whom Polk had recently appointed to the Senate in hopes of thwarting his ambitions to control the Ten- nessee Democracy, looked forward to Polk's elevation out of the state or equally likely his defeat in it. Said Nicholson, "I shall be

disappointed if your success in this contest does not lead ... to

your elevation to the Presidency."* Polk's gubernatorial defeat on August 5, 1841, was shocking; but

it was not viewed as having a decisive effect on his career because of the national Whig tide. Still, it did provide Nicholson and others with the opportunity to murmer openly their discontent with Polk's

leadership. Polk immediately began campaigning for the next gubernatorial election, and at the same time for the vice-presidency in 1844. He briefly allowed overtures from the Calhounites. Polk found it important to maintain his good relations with Calhoun even with the decline of Calhoun's political fortunes when in Virginia in 1843, Thomas Ritchie, editor and publisher of the Richmond Enquirer, engineered his state's endorsement of Van Buren. At the same time he reaffirmed his loyalty to Van Buren for there was still much anti-Polk animosity in the Van Buren camp.

Ultimately the final decision on Polk's place on the ticket lay with Martin Van Buren. In August of 1842 Van Buren visited Tennessee. This did further damage to Polk in the eyes of the suspicious Calhounites, and despite Jackson's efforts Van Buren failed to discuss the vice-presidency with Polk. Polk's association with the Little Magician increased his political difficulties in the state because of the strong anti-Van Buren sentiment. Nicholson and others utilized this feeling to weaken his leadership. There was growing sentiment in some quarters of the Tennessee Democracy for Lewis Cass of Michigan."

Furthermore, neither President Jackson's nor his own efforts had removed suspicions about Polks loyalty in the Van Buren camp. He persuaded the Democratic members of the Tennessee legisla-

'Eugene McCormack, James K. Polk, (Berkeley, 1922), 176. s Charles Sellers, Jr., James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 1795-1845, (Princeton, 1957), 466-67.



James K. Polk 385

ture to endorse the Van Buren measure to hold the National Con- vention in November of 1843 in order to prove his loyalty. This was opposed by the Calhoun forces who hoped to gain time for their efforts to dump Van Buren by postponing the convention until 1844. Although Polks success was duly noted in the smug circles in New York State a great portion of his strength with Van Buren men was predicated on his returning Tennessee to the Democratic column.

The Calhoun men continued their efforts to block Van Buren. In 1842 they played upon increased Southern animosity caused by the tariff. The Calhounites called for a national convention where members would be elected on the basis of Congressional districts and vote as individuals. Seemingly fair, this method gave the advantage to Calhoun with his unanimous support in some states and his strong minority strength in others. Recognizing the move for what it was the Van Buren forces attacked it vigorously and by July even the Charleston Mercury conceded the right of each state to determine the selection of its own delegates.4 None the less, partly in a moment of overconfidence occasioned by this set- back to Calhoun the Van Burenites agreed to postpone the national convention. They also agreed to postpone the convention in an attempt to placate the South. Senator Robert J. Walker, wrongly believed by them to be in the Van Buren camp, was influential in that decision. Walker, like Brown, was very much for the annexation of Texas. He did not reveal that he and others intended to whip up the Texas issue at the next session of Congress and bring pressure on Van Buren. Jackson's Texas letter was still secret. The Calhounites also planned to use the extra time to educate the public on the Texas question."

In Tennessee the beleagured Polk men worked hard to win back the governorship. When their efforts failed that August of 1843 Polk's chances for a place on the national ticket seemed ended. Open dissatisfaction appeared within the state party. A. O. P. Nicholson in particular challenged Polk. Dissatisfied with Van Buren, his element opposed Polk's advocacy of the New

4 Charles Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Sectionalist, 1840-1850 , (Indianapolis, 1951), 109-15. Wiltse also notes that Calhoun's efforts to secure the nomination were seriously hampered by his lack of an adequate number of newspapers to support him (142). 5 McCormack, Polk, 221-22.




Yorker.* Thus is was doubly important that Polk gain something at the Democratic National Convention. If he failed there it seemed certain that he would lose completely his hold on the Tennessee Democracy and his place in politics. This and his own driving ambition certainly decided him on continuing his pursuit of the nomination. Polk had little choice if he wished to continue in a

meaningful political position even in Tennessee. Even a slight prospect of political advancement would help hold the dissidents in line.

Outside Tennessee Polk's defeat was the signal for the anti-Polk forces to move again. Both within and without the calm Van Buren camp he was reviled.

A Mississippi newspaper, boosting Senator Robert J. Walker for second place on the ticket proclaimed that, "Mr. Polk has not himself kept up with the progress of the Democratic Party nor with its principles."7

The Calhoun forces took heart in Polk's defeat and did their best to tie his loss around Van Buren s neck. Their hopes were short- lived. New York and most of New England endorsed Van Buren, and when the Georgia Democracy suffered heavy losses in the fall election Calhoun's nomination by that state was withdrawn. It must have appeared to Calhoun as if his old enemy was about to triumph again as he had in 1832. Undoubtedly Calhoun burned with a desire for revenge and willingness to use any weapon at his command against Van Buren.

Like a small cloud in an otherwise clear sky that weapon had already manifested itself the previous February in a letter from Jackson to Aaron V. Brown on the Texas question. Brown was the Tennessee law partner of Polk. He had been a state legislator and at the time of the letter was a United States Congressman who wanted Texas admitted to the Union. Jackson's letter said,

I have said that Texas was, and I say now is all important to the safety and protection of Neworleans. . . . Texas is altogether important to the safety of the northwest. ... I have in every way that I could look at the subject viewed that part of Louisia [sic],

•Charles Sellers, Jr., James K. Polk, Continentalist, 1843-1846, (Princeton, 1966), 6; McCormack, Polk, 209.

'Sellers, James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 490.



James K. Polk 387

now Texas, as very important to the safety of the United States. . . .*

That September Jackson wrote Major William B. Lewis, "We must regain Texas, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must Brown was eager to add Texas to the Union. He undoubtedly knew Polk s attitude toward Texas and was more than willing to help Polk attain high office by whatever means.

Polk continued to pursue his national political aspirations. He and his friends wrote letters on his behalf. Jackson, though momen-

tarily discouraged by Polk's defeat in Tennessee, wrote Francis Blair and others that not only should Van Buren be the nominee, but Polk should be on the ticket with him.10 Jackson felt Polk would add strength in the South and West. Polk used the same

argument, and frequently noted he had support for second place.11 Within Tennessee Polk's strategy called for the Tennessee

Democratic state convention to nominate him for vice-president, but to nominate no one for president. The convention followed his orders on November 22, 1843. The action was explained away by arguing that the move forestalled the strong Cass strength in the state. Jackson added weight to this argument with a letter to Van Buren.1* The Tennessee delegation selected was strongly pro- Polk. Polk, who had little to thank the Van Buren-Blair crowd for in any case, now had a weapon at his disposal to bolster his national claims. This move was made easier by events in the party nationally.

By October of 1843 the efforts to eliminate Van Buren grew so

pronounced as to gain the attention of Niles' National Register ." Van Buren was never terribly popular in the party, except with the hard money men, but as long as he controlled the presidency or seemed sure to be reelected, few dared to risk his wrath. His failure in 1840, however, broke open the fissures in the party and

8 Andrew Jackson to Aaron V. Brown, February 9 [12], 1843, in John Spencer Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, VI, 1839-1845, (Washington, 1935), 202. 9 Jackson to Major William B. Lewis, September 18, 1843, in Bassett, Cor - resvondence, VI, 230. 10 Jackson to Francis P. Blair, October 9, 31, 1843; Jackson to Amos Kendall, November 2, 1843, in Basset, Correspondence , VI, 233-34, 238, 240. 11 Polk to Andrew J. Donelson, October 19, 1843, "Polk-Donelson Letters," in Tennessee Historical Magazine , III (1917), 53-54. " Jackson to Martin Van Buren, November 29, 1843, in Bassett, Correspondence, VI, 245-46. 18 Niles' National Register (Baltimore), October 21, 1843.



388 Tennessee Historical Qüabterly

various candidates emerged. Not the least of the worries of men like James Buchanan, Lewis Cass, Richard Johnson, and John C. Calhoun was the fear that if Van Buren were elected he would choose Benton as his successor and forestall their chances. The young and ambitious party members rising from the ranks added to their anxieties.

On November 7, Buchanan openly emerged as a favorite son." Vice-presidential candidates were not wanting. The Richmond Enquirer, solidly behind Van Buren, was booming Andrew Steven- son for that post."

The first clash between the opposing forces occurred at the Demo- cratic caucus on December 2. The Van Buren men were swept to control of the House offices. It was obvious, at least on the sur- face, that die Van Buren forces remained in control of the party. Andrew Jackson though was concerned enough about an anti-Van Buren conspiracy to write Blair again.1"

The other candidates began to drop out. On the 14th of De- cember, Buchanan withdrew." Calhoun also withdrew his name from nomination, although the news was not widespread until February of 1844. State after state moved to endorse Van Buren and his nomination, even under the two-thirds rule, seemed as- sured.

Speculation again turned to the second spot where the choice seemed to have narrowed down to Polk and Colonel Johnson. Tennessee's failure to endorse Van Buren now left Polk in an embarrassing position, but his good and close friend, Tennessee Congressman Cave Johnson worked hard to neutralize suspicion on the part of New York. He soon told Polk that he had succeeded to a great degree, particularly with Silas Wright, Van Bürens chief lieutenant.18 Nonetheless Senator Benton and others opposed Polk. As Cave Johnson pointed out to his friend, "the current's running strongly against you."1* The main trouble, Johnson re-

14 Ibid., November 25, 1843. 15 Richmond Enauirer (Virginia). November 24. 1843. 18 Jackson to Francis P. Blair, December 5, 1843, in Bassett, Correspondence, VI,

247-48. 17 Niles9 National Register (Baltimore), December 30, 1843. See also Jackson to Francis P. Blair, January 5, 1844, in Bassett, Correspondence, VI, 252. 18 Sellers, James K. Polk, Continentalist, 32-33. Cave Johnson to Polk, December 15, 29, 1843, Polk Papers . Johnson reported he was regarded as a thoroughly re- liable Democrat. 19 Cave Johnson to Polk, December 29, 1843, Polk Papers .



James K. Polk 389

ported, was getting rid of 'Old Dick'.*0 This report however con- trasted with earlier messages from Aaron Brown.21

The Van Buren machine swept on. On January 8, 1844, the Ohio Democratic convention elected twenty-three delegates pledged to Van Buren and endorsed Richard Johnson for the second spot." Other states followed suit, and even in Calhoun's stronghold Van Buren's nomination seemed obvious."

Despite what appeared to be the virtual extinction of Polk's hopes for second place, Andrew Jackson continued his efforts on Polk's behalf. Writing Van Buren in February he said,

Should Col. Johnson accept of, and be the nominee for vice President, I am fearfull it will not add to the democratic strength. . . . with Govr. Polk we will carry Tennessee . . . and the vote of Louisiana/4

The Van Buren forces, however, had decided Johnson's popularity was too great to be resisted. And when Johnson was nominated by the Pennsylvania convention the remaining opposition to him collapsed. William R. King accepted Tylers appointment as Min- ister to France.

Polk would not withdraw. He wrote Cave Johnson that his name must be placed before the convention, no matter what." At the same time he turned down President John Tyler's offer of a cabinet position, sending Cave Johnson a copy of his letter. He suggested Johnson use this letter to assure Silas Wright and the others that he was still loyal to the Van Buren cause." Polk seemed determined to maintain his position come what may. It is possible that Polk was determined to be nominated and not to withdraw because of the small but growing prospect of a deadlocked convention. Cave Johnson had already advised Polk that the Texas question was in the air and after the Clay-Van Buren

80 Cave Johnson to Polk, January 31, 1844, ibid . 81 Polk to A. J. Donelson, December 20, 1843, in Tennessee Historical Magazine,

III (1917), 54-55. 22 Niles' National Register (Baltimore), January 20, 1844. 88 Charleston Daily Courier, January 17, 1844. 84 Jackson to Martin Van Buren, February 7, 1844, in Bassett, Correspondence, VI, 258-59. 85 Polk to Cave Johnson, January 21, 1844, in Tennessee Historical Magazine, I (1915), 233-34. 8# Polk to Theophilus Fisk, March 20, 1844; Polk to Cave Johnson, March 21, 1844, in ibid., I (1915), 235-30.




letters became known he speculated that a third man might be

necessary." Southern papers in particular were full of Texas news and agi-

tation for annexation." A reprint of Andrew Jackson's earlier letter on Texas to Aaron Brown added weight to the annexation argument." Rumors flew of the "Treaty of Ashland" where Van Buren and Clay agreed to oppose the annexation of Texas.80 It is difficult to believe that as astute a politician as Polk would not perceive even the slimmest of opportunities.

A sure sign of the effectiveness of the renewed anti-Van Buren activities was the reemergence of favorite sons. By March of 1844 the Cass movement had grown to major proportions. A rumor abounded, which Polk quickly denied, that he was to have second place on the Cass ticket. It was about this time that Polk was offered the position in Tylers cabinet.

Those particularly devoted to annexation were determined that Van Buren would either come out for annexation or be replaced. It was no doubt obvious to the new Secretary of State John C. Cal- houn that he could conceivably destroy Van Buren's chances for the nomination with the Texas question. The opportunity to settle old scores could not be ignored. Jackson's Texas letter of 1843 was used repeatedly."1 The Van Buren partisans recognized the danger.

Even such irreproachable northern Van Burenites as John L. O'Sullivan of the Democratic Review, Samuel Medary of the Ohio Statesmen and George Bancroft were for Texas. And Old Hickory's was a voice that could not be ignored."

On March 27, apparently in cooperation with the Calhoun forces, W. H. Hammet of Mississippi wrote Van Buren for his views on Texas. While Van Buren drafted his reply, speculation abounded

87 Cave Johnson to Polk, April 30, 1844, Polk Papers . Charles G. Sellers speculated that Polk recognized the possibility of his emergence as a compromise candidate in a deadlocked convention. 88 For example see, National Intelligencer (Washington), March 16, 23, 1844; Richmond Enquirer, March 22, 1844. From that point on few days passed when the Enquirer was not filled with some news and agitation on Texas. 29 Richmond Enquirer, March 23, 1844. Jackson's letter to Aaron Brown of February 9 [12], 1843. 80 National Intelligencer (Washington), March 18, 1844. Reprint of an article from the Madisonian (Washington), March 16, 1844. 81 Ibid . 82 Sellers, James K. Polk, Continentalist, 56-57.



James K. Polk 391

that he would be against annexation. More than ever aware of his opportunity, Polk replied to an inquiry on April 23, that he favored "immediate annexation.""

When Calhoun wrote his letter to British Minister Pakenham making the annexation treaty a virtual pro-slavery measure, he made it next to impossible for Van Buren to support annexation as Calhoun undoubtedly knew. Both President Tyler and Calhoun were afraid Van Buren might take advantage of their efforts to annex Texas for his own political future.

On Saturday, April 27, Henry Clays Texas letter appeared in Niles' National Register ." The fellowing Monday, April 29, the contents of Van Buren's letter became known and appeared in Niles' National Register on the 30th. A short time after Jackson saw the letter Polk's good friend and Jackson's nephew, Andrew

J. Donelson, and others, were sent to bring Polk to the Hermitage. Concurrently the Virginia Democracy suffered disasterous set-

backs in the elections. On Wednesday, May 1, the New York Herald reported the losses adding, "had Mr. Van Buren's letter on annexation been published previous to the election there, it is probable the Whigs would have gained more ground."" Van Buren's letter was not printed in the Richmond Enquirer until May 3, though it was known there before then. Both the letter and the elections threw a deep gloom and panic over the Virginia Democracy. Everywhere meetings were held about Texas. The clamor for annexation increased. Said the New York Herald:

We are in favor of annexation of Texas at all risks and at any hazard. We are in favor of its annexation to-day, to-morrow, or the next day, or as soon as possible. We are in favor not only of the annexation of Texas, but of the whole of this continent, including the Canada's and Mexico, Oregon and all down to the North Pole and up to the Isthmus of Danen. . . . We want Mexico and the whole of this continent because the Anglo-Saxon race of this country want to show the world the model of a republic. . .

"Polk to S. P. Chase, April 23, 1844, Polk Papers. The Polk Papers indicate that S. H. Laughlin on April 24, and Williamson Smith on April 29, urged Polk to come out for Texas. However, he had already seen the opportunity the issue presented. " It was not printed in Charleston till the 30th of the month.

s5 New York Herald , May 1, 1844. See also Richmond Enquirer, April 30, 1844; May 3, 1844; Charleston Daily Courier, May 2, 1844; National Intelligencer, April 29, 1844. ** New York Herald, May 3, 1844.




It was widely reported that Thomas Ritchie, leader of the Virginia Democracy, had reluctantly decided to abandon Van Buren." The reports were correct. Movements were also afoot in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Mississippi to repudiate him. Some turned to Cass, a few to Calhoun. Some, like the New York Herald, urged Van Buren to withdraw.88

In the face of this the Van Burenites grew bitter but more determined to press ahead. The chances of a party split seemed likely. In some sectors of the party Commodore Charles Stuart gained strength, Cass drew much favorable comment, and Polk gained attention. But the Van Burenites threatened to see the party defeated rather than drop their leader.8' In higher circles considerable doubt over Van Bürens chances appeared. Silas Wright went so far as to indicate, undoubtedly in part to strengthen what support remained, that if Van Buren should fail to get the nomination, Polk would have first claim, "because you was known to be firm and true to the cause."" One aspect of Polk's strategy appeared to be working.

Determined to bring Texas into the Union, Andrew Jackson reluctantly concluded the party could not win with Van Buren. As Polk related to Cave Johnson later, Jackson,

urges immediate annexation. ... He speaks most affectionately of Mr. Van Buren, but is compelled to separate from him upon this great question, and says both he and Mr. Benton have by their letters cut their own throats politically. He has no idea that Mr. V. B. can be nominated or if nominated can receive any Southern support. . . . He says however that it is done and that the convention must select some other as the candidate. . . . Gen. J. says the candidate for the first office should be an annexation man, and from the southwest, and he and other friends here urge that my friends should insist on that point. I tell them, and it is true, that I never aspired so high. . . . [My friends] can use my name in any way they may think proper. . . ."

It is almost as if the Calvinistic Polk realized the great prize was

"Ibid.; Charleston Datty Courier, May 6, 1844. "New York Herald, May 4, 1844. " Charleston Daily Courier, May 8, 10, 13, 1844; New York Herald, May 9, 1844;

Richmond Enquirer, May 10, 1844; Niles' National Register (Baltimore), May 11, 1844. 40 Cave Johnson to Polk, May 8, 1844, Polk Pavers. 41 Polk to Cave Johnson, May 13, 1844, in Tennessee Historical Magazine, I (1915), 238-41.



James K. Folk 393

near and yet was afraid both of being unseemly and disappointed. He was fatalistic, but his candidacy had emerged. It would be a delicate matter to handle and a great deal would depend on its

management, as Polk noted.

Van Buren's position continued to deteriorate. There was a feel-

ing, however, that to abandon Van Buren so late would destroy the party. As late as May 22 he was still leading the other hope- fuls." Indeed, despite the confusion that attended the arrival of the delegates in Baltimore, there were many reports that he was sure to be nominated." Much of this belief stemmed from the

high praise Jackson still lavished on Van Buren in his second letter of annexation. Overlooked was the fact that time and again Jackson had indicated that if it were necessary to overturn Van Buren to obtain the annexation of Texas he would do so.

The Van Buren position by convention time was exposed to extensive erosion. There was the damaging whisper that Van Buren was not a winner. Great pressure was being exerted on all

delegates. Gideon J. Pillow, one of Polk's managers, noted that Polk was highly regarded. He indicated to Polk that he would stress party unity, not Polk's ambitions for the time being." He also reported that despite the embarrassing trouble that was devel-

oping in the anti-Polk wing of the Tennessee delegation, there was talk of Polk as the presidential nominee. Several delegations indicated strong Polk sentiment including the Massachusetts dele-

gation headed by Governor Marcus Morton and George Bancroft."

Though nominally Van Burenites, both men wanted a nominee who would enable them to win back power in their state.

It was obvious that the two-thirds rule would break Van Buren. Aware of this threat the Van Burenites were alternately threaten-

ing to block any other nomination and to place Senator Walker of Mississippi, a devoted annexationist, in second place. Cave

41 Charleston Daily Courier, May 15, 21, 25, 1844; New York Herald, May 7, 15, 20, 27, 1844; Niles' National Register (Washington), May 16, 1844. Niles also reports items from the Charleston Mercury in that issue. The Courier on May 22 [appeared May 27] estimated 91 delegates for Van Buren, 18 doubtful, and 166 opposed. 48 Charleston Daily Courier, May [15] 20, 1844; New York Herald, May 25, 1844; Niles 9 National Register, May 25, 1844. 44 Gideon J. Pillow to Polk, May 22, 1844, in American Historical Review, XI, No. 4 (July 1906), 835-36. 48 Ibid,, 837-38. See also Russell B. Nye, George Bancroft (New York, 1944), 130.




Johnson feared that the Tennessee delegation would soon openly oppose Van Buren, or break up, either of which would ruin Polk. Pillow reported that Johnson was in such low spirits that he might not attend the convention." About this time the Buchanan forces

openly joined the anti-Van Buren forces.

By Saturday, May 25, Pillow reported that Van Buren would almost certainly not be nominated. Furthermore he wrote Polk that he was far and away the choice for Vice-President and in-

creasingly spoken of for the Presidency. But he added,

We of the south cannot bring that matter up. If it should be done by the north it will all work right, but if we were to make sudi a move it would in all probability injure your prospects for the vice. . . . The Ohio delegates and the New England delegates I think are all or nearly so for you."

With Tennessee ready to abandon Van Buren over the two-thirds rule, a group of Van Burenites including Governor Morton and George Bancroft met with Cave Johnson. The plan they evolved was to throw the convention to a ticket of Silas Wright and Polk. No doubt the plan was developed with the idea in mind that only Polk would emerge for it was well known that Wright had de- nounced all the talk of himself and not Van Buren as the presidential nominee.

When the convention began on Monday, May 27, there were 325 delegates. With South Carolina refusing to attend there were only 266 actual voters. Outside of New York, which had 36 votes and 36 delegates, the largest delegations were from Virginia and Kentucky. Although Virginia had only 17 votes she had 53 delegates. Kentucky had 12 votes and 29 delegates. Tennessee was represented by 13 voting delegates. Ostensibly some 168 votes were pledged to, instructed for, or favored Van Buren, just nine votes short of two thirds." Much of this support though was already gone or very soft.

Around noon the convention was gaveled to order by Mr. Romulus M. Saunders of North Carolina. On his motion Mr.

" Sellers, James K. Polk, ContinentaUst, 80-82; Pillow to Polk, May 24, 25, 1844, Polk Papers ; Johnson to Polk, May 24, 1844, Polk Papers. " Pillow to Polk, May 24, 1844, in American Historiem Review, XI, No. 4 (July 1906), 840-41.

"Niles' National Register (Baltimore), June 1, 1844. Unless otherwise indicated the account of the convention is taken from Niles' National Register of June 1, 1844.



James K. Folk 395

Hendrick B. Wright of Pennsylvania was offered as president of the convention and quickly elected. He was conducted to the chair. Saunders then proposed that William F. Ritchie, son of the editor of the Richmond Enquirer , be made secretary of the convention. Quickly this was also declared unanimously adopted. Anti-Van Burenites now controlled the convention offices. Before the stunned Van Buren forces could recover, for they had not even offered up their own favorites such as Governor Henry Hubbard of New

Hampshire, Saunders again had the floor. With a few brief com- ments about the successes of the nominees of the 1832 convention, he proposed a resolution that the convention be governed by the same rules and regulations as the conventions of 1832 and 1835. Those rules included the requirement of a two-thirds vote for nomination. The floor was in immediate tumult.

Cave Johnson, fearing a party split should the rule be rail- roaded through, obtained the floor. He objected to the adoption of the rules before any attempt had been made to ascertain what

delegates were present and able to vote and moved that a committee on credentials be appointed. Discussion both for and against Saunders' motion continued amidst great noise and confusion.

Finally Senator Walker offered a resolution, subsequently modified, which created a credentials committee of one delegate from each state. In the meantime Saunders withdrew his resolution. Heated discussion continued until it was moved that the convention ad-

journ till 4 p.m. at which time the committee would report. The convention was called to order at 4 p.m. and the first order

of business was the report of the committee on credentials. There was some delay for the report was not yet ready. Again Saunders

brought up his two-thirds rule but it was laid on the table to enable the credentials committee to present its report. Governor Hubbard, the chairman, reported a total of 308 delegates in at- tendance. The report was unanimously adopted."

Once more Saunders' resolution was presented. Butler of New York said that the question should wait till permanent officers were selected. Senator Walker pursued the question, and was

alternately loudly hissed and cheered. Attempts to gavel down the demonstrations failed. Finally Butler rose to speak for an

49 This report did not include North Carolina. South Carolina was boycotting the convention.




hour against Saunders' resolution (hoping no doubt to kill it that

way). In his speech he predicted that the adoption of the rule would mean the breaking up of the party. Further debate was prevented by the report of the committee to nominate permanent officers. At 7:30, hot and agitated delegates adjourned till nine in the morning.

On Tuesday morning the convention assembled with Hendrick B. Wright as permanent president. Debate immediately began on the two-thirds rule. Kentucky allowed that it was ready to sacrifice its favorite candidate if necessary for party unity. This was no surprise to the disgruntled Van Burenites. Governor Hubbard requested that Saunders withdraw his amendment and let the whole matter of rules be settled by committee. This Mr. Saunders was unwilling to do.

Governor Morton then stated that the majority principle was the rule of demoracy and that it should be that rule which should govern the convention. Senator Walker replied by stating that the two-thirds rule was democratic. Furthermore he questioned whether it was good policy "now in the dark hour of the party, to pull down one of its fundamental principles.'"0 Question was loudly called for but ignored while discussion continued. Finally Presi- dent Wright ruled against a proposal by the Van Burenites to allow the states to vote as units. This would have deprived the strong anti-Van Buren minorities in some states of a voice."

With debate having gone on about four hours the vote was taken on the Saunders amendment. The two-thirds rule was ratified by a vote of 148 to 118. Thus, although 16 of the 26 states at the convention had come declared for Van Buren, only four, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Missouri voted with New York unanimously against the amendment. Van Buren was knowingly aban- doned by his own friends with no great reluctance. It was widely accepted at the time, as it had been recognized before the vote, that Van Buren was doomed. Even Van Buren s friends recognized this." So it was that the rule which had been initiated by Jackson

*° NÜes' National Register (Baltimore), June 1, 1844. 51 Sellers, James K. Polk, Continentalist, 88. Sellers notes that had this proposal passed, the two-thirds rule would have only passed by a vote of 120 to 119.

For example, the correspondent of the Charleston Daily Courier was at the capitol with many members of the House when the news of the vote arrived by telegraph. Some of the Van Buren members expressed the view at that point that their candidate would not be nominated. Many others concurred. Charleston Daily Courier [May 28] June 1, 1844.



James K. Polk 397

in 1832 to prove that Van Buren was the favorite of the whole

country was now used to defeat him. When the convention adjourned at 1:30 the question in all minds was who would be nominated. The convention was to convene at 3 p.m. It would take 177 votes to nominate. A simple majority was but 134 votes.

That afternoon the balloting began. Smoke hung in the hot air like a cloud. On the first ballot Van Buren received 146 votes to 84 for Cass, 24 for Colonel Johnson, 2 for Woodbury, 1 for Stewart, 6 for Calhoun and 4 for Buchanan. This was Van Bürens high water mark. It was more than a majority and only 31 votes short of the two-thirds required. Van Buren had lost at least 37 of the votes he had been promised coming into the convention. These, plus those he picked up such as Missouri, would have given him six more votes than the necessary two-thirds vote of 177. Of the votes he lost, 23 came from four southern states, Alabama, Missis-

sippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana. These, plus the vote of Tennessee, which voted solidly for Cass, would have put him over.

The balloting continued on into the humid afternoon. Van Bürens strength declined from the first ballot on and that of Lewis Cass picked up. None of the other candidates did well. Col. Johnson received his greatest vote on the third ballot with 38 votes and thereafter declined, the seventh was his last. Stewart's

candidacy never did get off the ground and he dropped out after two ballots as did Woodbury after three. Buchanan's strength showed a slow but steady gain to a peak of 25 on the sixth ballot. On the seventh he declined to 22. It was his last ballot. Calhoun was gone by the fourth ballot.

Throughout the afternoon a few states held fairly solidly to Van Buren. These were Maine, New York, Ohio, and Missouri. In the rest of the states there was a steady erosion of strength away from Van Buren to Cass. On the fifth ballot Cass took the lead 107 to 103. By the end of the seventh ballot the Van Buren men

grew alarmed for Cass had climbed to 123 votes, 54 short of nomination. About 6 o'clock, when the eighth ballot was called for an Ohio delegate rose to submit a resolution that read,

Resolved, that Martin Van Bureo, having received the vote of a majority of the delegates in this convention, on the first ballot, is elected as the nominee for the office of president of the United States."

"Niles' National Register (Baltimore), June 1, 1844.




Pandemonium ensued and fights broke out on the floor. Apparently this was the plan. The Van Burenites evidently feared that if the convention continued voting that night it would nominate Cass." If this was their objective they succeeded for after an hour more of noise and confusion the convention was adjourned till 9 the next morning.

That night the delegates were busy. Pillow wrote to Polk that the convention was totally disrupted and ungovernable from the chair. Pillow felt that had the balloting continued Cass would have been nominated. He also reported that he had been ap- proached by members of both the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts delegations to bring Polk's name before the convention. He had told them it must be brought out by the north."

The delegate from Massachusetts was probably George Ban- croft. He was active that evening. Originally for Van Buren, he foresaw the possibility of deadlock between the Van Buren and Cass forces. Sometime during his earlier conversation with Cave Johnson and his subsequent talks with Pillow Bancroft decided that the party could just as well take a chance with Polk. He then persuaded the New Hampshire delegation that Polk was a better choice than Cass.

When Pillow reported that Alabama and Mississippi had come over to Polk the two men began to work on New York and Ohio. Bancroft succeeded in switching both states and "went to bed that night, 'tranquil and happy'."" Thus it was that the opportunity that Bancroft, Morton, and Johnson had discussed earlier now presented itself. Both Bancroft and Pillow later claimed more prominent roles in the nomination than they probably deserved and it is worth noting that Cave Johnson was Polk's first cabinet appointee.

" See also Sellers. James K. Polk, Continentalist. 91. "Pillow to Folk, May 28, 1844, in American Historical Review, XI, No 4 (July

1906), 840-41. M Nye, George Bancroft, 130-31. Bancroft would later claim the lion's share of the responsibility for Polk's nomination, see Nye, 141, ftn. 1. Time and distance may not only have enhanced Bancroft's concept of his own role, but dimmed his mind as to his meeting with Morton and Johnson. No doubt as a historian he was also conscious of his. place in history. He informed Polk soon after of his part in the convention. He also wrote Van Buren stating he had "many personal causes for regretting the result." (see above). Cave Johnson reported that "the man who first started your name in the Baltimore Convention" was John Kettlewell. Johnson to Polk, January 11, 1845, Polk Papers.



James K. Polk 399

The next morning Bancroft consulted with Maryland and Louisi- ana. By that time Benjamin F. Butler held a letter from Van Buren withdrawing in favor of Silas Wright. Despite his knowl-

edge of Silas Wright's letter declining any nomination Butler decide to poll the New York delegation about Wright. His plan was crushed by Judge John Fine's promise to read Wright's letter in the convention including the declaration that his views on Texas were identical with Van Bürens." At this point Polk's name was presented and Butler lauded his loyalty to Van Buren and be- rated his opponents. As the balloting began the Van Burenites were fairly well-informed of the move to Polk either by the efforts of Pillow and Bancroft, or by Butler's maneuvers.

After some preliminary maneuvers the eighth ballot began. Again the states were called in geographic order. New Hampshire, the second state, cast its six votes for Polk. When Massachusetts followed suit with seven of its twelve, "a stunned silence filled the hall, broken by sudden cheers from the western delegates."™ By the end of the ballot the count stood at 104 for Van Buren, 114 for Cass, and 44 for Polk. When the results were announced the Virginia and New York delegations retired to consult.

Frazier of Pennsylvania then rose to explain why he had deserted Van Buren. He had voted for "James K. Polk, the bosom friend of General Jackson, and a pure, whole hogged democrat, the known

enemy of banks [and] distribution. . . He had not, he said, violated his instructions. By the time he finished the floor was in total disorder. The president of the convention demanded order and in due course some of the tumult died down.

A delegate from New York rose and charged heatedly that the Texas "firebrand" had been injected into the convention by the

"mongrel administration at Washington." As he spoke the noise and confusion rose again. Shouts and counter charges were heard from the floor. The Pennsylvania delegation indicated that it was

ready to sacrifice its own choice to the cause of party unity. This was received with tremendous cheers.

Massachusetts called for the ninth ballot. As the voting began several states requested that they be temporarily passed by. By the

"Sellers. James K. Polk, Continentalist, 95-96. 58 Nve. George Bancroft, 131-32. M Niles' National Register (Baltimore), June 1, 1844.



400 Tennessee Histobical Quarterly

end of the roll call thirteen states had voted and twelve had been

pased by. The vote stood at seventy-four for Polk and twenty for Cass.

William H. Roane of Virginia obtained the floor and announced that his delegation had returned and had made its decision, but he said they would wait for New York. When the New York delegation returned Roane rose to explain Virginia's choice. While he

pleaded Virginia's deep affection for Van Buren the state also desired to see Henry Clay defeated. Thus, said Roane, she cast her votes for James K. Polk. Roane's announcement was greeted with loud cheers and much activity.

Butler of New York gained the floor and complemented Virginia. He disclosed his secret letter from Van Buren authorizing him "to withdraw his name from the convention [if] it might be necessary to harmonious action.'"0 This too was greeted with loud cheering. Butler went on to explain that he too was voting for Polk, and

expressed great confidence in Polk's ability to win. New York then cast 35 votes for Polk, with one bitter delegate voting a blank. Amidst cheering, clapping, and other agitation the stampede to Polk began. Those states that had been pased over cast most of their votes for Polk, and other states changed their votes to him.

It was noted that one state was still unaccounted for. That was South Carolina. The unofficial delegate from the Palmetto State, Francis S. Pickens, rose in the gallery to "deafening cheers." When all had quieted down he spoke for half an hour "pledging his state to the nomination." His colleague, Franklin H. Elmore also spoke, stating that his state would cast more votes proportionately for Polk than any other. The entire convention became pandemonium. At 2 p.m. it was announced that the vote for Polk was unanimous, and the vote was wired to Democratic congressmen in Washington."

Polk's nomination was the result of a combination of factors. His chances for the nomination were slim, but circumstances, plus assiduous preparation enabled him to take advantage of his opportunity. Polk's major asset was his acceptability to all sides. This in itself was one of Polk's major goals all along. If the Van Burenites were to lose they certainly did not intend to lose to Lewis Cass or John C. Calhoun. The Van Buren forces had

•• Ibid., June 1, 1844. "Ibid.



James K. Polk 401

long been suspicious of Calhoun. The Washington Globe had blamed the entire anti-Van Buren movement on Calhoun. Francis Blair was especially obsessed with this belief. On at least two occasions he wrote Jackson blaming Calhoun for making Texas a sectional issue. If the country were split, said Blair, Calhoun would "make himself the great man of the fragment."" Thus the Van Buren forces might be indifferent to Polk, or even in some cases hostile, but most felt, if somewhat incorrectly, that Polk was not one of those that had conspired against them.

Among the Calhounites Polk was also acceptable. He was for the annexation of Texas, as well as a Southerner, and a slave holder. All anti-Van Burenites, no matter how divided, could agree that Polk's nomination represented their victory over the Little

Magician. Polk had also been presented to the convention at exactly the

right time. The convention appeared deadlocked, and the party seemed ready to break up. Thus Polk's name, which had already been circulated amongst the anxious delegates, was readily seized

upon to preserve unity and to win. Additional factors such as tension, the heat, and dismal prospect

of continuing indefinitely, all gave Polk a psychological boost. Polk's fine campaign team and the party's great familiarity with him

coupled with his past party services all added their weight. An- other intangible, but important factor was the knowledge that

Jackson had anointed Polk. If Jackson had seemed to have doubts about deserting Van Buren, the Texas issue and Polk's clever

planning negated it. Perhaps Jackson's letter to Francis Blair of

May 18, 1844 (after the Hermitage meeting with Polk) in which he urged that Van Buren accept Polk as his vice-president was no more than implicit deceit." If Jackson did have second thoughts Polk's efforts were too for advanced to have any effects. In any case, all of these factors were of vital importance in securing Polk's nomination. Given Polk's hard work and determined planning he was not so dark a horse.

•' Francis Blair to Andrew Jackson, July 7, 1844, in Bassett, Correspondence, VI, 299-302. See also Blair to Jackson, May 2, 1844, 281-82.

•»Andrew Jackson to Francis Blair, May 18, 1844, in »Wo., ZS4.



james k. polk, not so dark a horse

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