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Attitudes in the ArAb World

Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler

Amaney Jamal is assistant professor of politics at Princeton University. Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor and direc-tor of the International Institute at the University of Michigan. His es-say Gauging Arab Support for Democracy (coauthored with EleanorGao) appeared in the July 2005 issue of the Journal of Democracy.

o ver the course of the last quarter-century, democratic currents haveswept across much of the developing and postcommunist worlds. TheArab world, however, has remained largely untouched by this global

democratic trend. The first Arab Human Development Report, publishedby the United Nations Development Programme in 2002, lamented thatpolitical systems have not been opened up to all citizens and that po-litical participation is less advanced in the Arab world than in otherdeveloping regions. 1 The 2003 report reiterated this assessment, statingthat the Arab worlds freedom deficit remains critically pertinent andmay have become even graver since the 2002 report was issued. 2 Aseries of articles in the January 2004 issue of Comparative Politics de-scribed the resilient and enduring authoritarianism in the Arab world,and later that same year Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway con-cluded that in most Arab countries real progress toward democracyis minimal. 3 Nor has the situation changed very much in the last fewyears, as the 2005 Arab Human Development Report confirms.

Despiteor perhaps because ofthe persistence of authoritarianismacross the Arab world, popular support for democracy there is wide-spread. The evidence for this may be gleaned from twenty differentsurveys carried out in nine different Arab countries between 2000 and2006. 4 Indeed, cross-regional data from the World Values Survey indi-cate that support for democracy in the Arab world is as high as or higherthan in any other world region. 5 While this might appear anomalous ina region where ordinary citizens have had little experience with democ-racy, the absence of democracy may be the very factor that leads so

Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 1 January 2008 2008 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press

The Democracy Barometers


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99 Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler

order. These findings are shown in Table 2 (p. 100), which also presentspercentages for the individual countries.

There is considerable variation in the way that citizens in the Arab

world think about democracy. On the one hand, a solid majority ex-presses support not only for democracy as an abstract concept but alsofor many of the institutions and processes associated with democraticgovernance. For example, 62 percent of those interviewed believe thatcompetition and disagreement among political groups is a good thing fortheir country, and 64 percent believe the government should make lawsaccording to the wishes of the people. On the other hand, when asked toidentify the most important factors that define a democracy, about halfthe respondents emphasized economic considerations rather than politi-cal rights and freedoms.

In Algeria, Jordan, and Palestine (the question was not asked in Ku-wait and Morocco) only about half the respondents stated that the mostimportant aspect of democracy is the opportunity to change the govern-ment through elections or the freedom to criticize the government.The other half attached greatest importance to democracys (presumed)ability to provide basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter foreveryone or to decrease the income gap between rich and poor. 8

Such findings suggest that economic issues are central to the way thatmany Arab citizens think about governance and, accordingly, that manymen and women probably have an instrumental conception of democ-

racy. When asked to identify the most important problem facing theircountry, fully 51 percent of the entire five-country sample described thatproblem in economic terms, citing such considerations as poverty, un-employment, and inflation. Only 5 percent stated that authoritarianismis the most important problem. Slightly higher percentages mentionedthe U.S. occupation of Iraq (8 percent) and the Arab-Israeli conflict (7percent) as the most important problem.

Coupled with the finding that most Arabs want political reform to beimplemented gradually, this suggests that majorities in the Arab worldattach higher priority to solving economic problems than to securingthe political rights and freedoms associated with democracy. One wayto read this is that Arab-world majorities support democracy, at least inpart, because it promises to make governments more accountable andmore attentive to the concerns of ordinary citizens, particularly theireconomic concerns. In other words, for at least some respondents, it isnot so much that democracy is the right political system in a conceptu-al sense, but rather that democracy is a useful form of government thathas the potential to address many of a countrys most pressing needs.

This conclusion is reinforced by other findings from the Arab Barom-eter surveys. Respondents were much more likely to be critical of theirgovernment for poor economic performance than for a lack of freedom.Indeed, slender majorities view their governments favorably on political


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100 Journal of Democracy

T able 2p oliTical e ngagemenT anD e valuaTionS of D emocracy

a ll

c ounTrieSJ orDan p aleSTine a lgeria m orocco K uwaiT

Voted in the lastelection

52% 59% 71% 45% 50% 23%

Follows newsabout politics of-ten or very often

56% 49% 78% 45% 49% 23%

Political reformshould be intro-duced gradually

83% 77% 91% 79% 81% 88%

In a democracy,the economy runsbadly

31% 38% 41% 38% 10% 28%

Democracies arebad at maintain-ing order

33% 36% 42% 43% 12% 33%

Competition anddisagreement arenot a bad thingfor our country

62% 60% 50% 61% 67% 79%

The governmentshould make lawsaccording to thewishes of thepeople

61% 58% 59% 59% 81% 62%

Percentage ofpeople giving apolitical feature ofdemocracy as themost important*

48% 39% 58% 50%

* Percentage of people choosing opportunity to change government or freedom to criticize governmentrather than reduce income gap between rich and poor or provide basic necessities like food.

grounds. For example, 54 percent believe that they have the power to

influence government decisions; 50 percent believe that the courts arefair; 53 percent believe that they can criticize the government withoutfear; and 57 percent believe that they can join organizations withoutfear. By contrast, only 33 and 31 percent, respectively, believe that theirgovernment is doing a good job of fighting unemployment and narrow-ing the gap between rich and poor.

Democracy and Islam

Across all sectors of the Arab world, as in other Muslim-majoritycountries, there is a vibrant and nuanced discourse on the compatibilityof Islam and democracy. Although some Muslim clerics and religious


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thinkers contend that democracy is not possible in a political systemguided by Islam, others disagree. Equally important, it appears thatneither Arab intellectuals nor ordinary citizens accept the view that Is-

lam and democracy are incompatible. Rather, from mosque sermons tonewspaper columns, from campus debates to coffee-shop discussions,large numbers of Arabs and other Muslims contend that the tenets ofIslam are inherently democratic. 9

In Western discourses, by contrast, it has often been asserted thatIslam is opposed to democratic rule, and assertions along these linesare frequently advanced to explain the persistence of authoritarianismin the Arab world. The argument that Islam stifles democracy includesseveral interrelated assertions. First, some contend, as does Samuel P.Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations, that Islam and democracy are

inherently incompatible because Islam recognizes no division betweenchurch and state and emphasizes the community over the individ-ual. 10 Individualism, Huntington maintains, is a necessary componentof a liberal-democratic order. Second, some scholars assert that Islamiclaw and doctrine are fundamentally illiberal and hence create an envi-ronment within which democracy cannot flourish. Francis Fukuyama,among others, makes this argument. 11 Finally, some claim that Islamfosters antidemocratic attitudes and values among its adherents. On theone hand, according to this argument, the religion does not advocate acommitment to political freedom. On the other, Islam is said to promote

fatalism, the unquestioning acceptance of Allahs way, and thus tonurture acceptance of the status quo rather than the contestation neededfor a vibrant democracy. 12 As a result, according to this collection of ar-guments, the religious orientations and attachments of Muslim citizenscreate a normative climate that is hostile to democracy. Arab Barometer data permit an examination, admittedly limited tothe individual level of analysis, of these competing views of the re-lationship between democracy and Islam. To the extent that religiousorientations and attachments do discourage democracy, support for de-mocracy should be lower among more religious men and women. Thisis not the case, however. In fact, more religious Muslims are as likely asless religious Muslims to believe that democracy, despite its drawbacks,is the best political system. The Barometer has identified the frequencyof Koran reading as a valid and reliable measure of religiosity. Respon-dents are categorized according to whether they read the Koran everyday, several times a week, sometimes, or rarely or never. Strikingly, atleast 85 percent of the respondents in each category state that democra-cy is the best political system. Thus, since public support for democracyis necessary for a successful and consolidated democratic transition,and since available evidence indicates that religiosity does not dimin-ish this support for democracy among Muslim publics, it seems clearthat the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world cannot be


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explained by the religious orientations and attachments of ordinary menand women. A different question bearing on the relationship between democracyand Islam concerns the role of Islam in political affairs. Many Arabcitizens express support for the influence of Islam in government andpolitics. This is not the view of all citizens, however. In contrast tosupport for democracy, which is expressed by the overwhelming major-

ity of the respondents in the Arab Barometer and other recent surveys,men and women in every country where surveys have been conductedare divided on the question of whether Islam should play an importantpolitical role. For example, whereas 56 percent of the respondents in theArab Barometer surveys agree with the statement that men of religionshould have influence over government decisions, 13 44 percent disagree,indicating that they believe Islam should not play an important politicalrole.

Further, the division of opinion observed among all respondents ispresent to the same degree among those who express support for democ-

racy. Among respondents who believe democracy to be the best politicalsystem, despite any possible drawbacks, 54 percent believe that men ofreligion should have influence over government decisions while 46 per-cent disagree. This is shown in Table 3, which juxtaposes these itemsmeasuring support for democracy and support for a political role for Is-lam. Although there is modest variation from country to country, Table 3shows that respondents who support democracy are divided more or lessequally between those who favor secular democracy and those who favora political system that is both democratic and gives an important role toIslam. Consistent with findings reported earlier, it also shows that amongthe relatively few respondents who do not support democracy there isalso a division of opinion regarding a political role for Islam.

T able 3v ariaTion in The S upporT for D emocracy b y a TTiTuDeS T owarD a p oliTical r ole for i Slam

p ercenTage S aying ThaT D eSpiTe D rawbacKS ,

D emocracy iS The b eST SySTem of g overnmenTStrongly Agree/Agree that Men

of Religion ShouldInfluence Government Decisions

Strongly Disagree/ Disagree that Men of ReligionShould Influence Government

Decisions

All Countries 54% 46%

Jordan 52% 48%

Palestine 55% 45%

Algeria 58% 42%

Morocco 63% 37%

Kuwait 39% 61%


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How do Muslim Arabs who express support for democracy but alsowant their religion to have a meaningful role in political life understandwhat might be called Islamic democracy? Aspects of this question

pertaining to Islam itselfto views about the particular ways that demo-cratic political life might incorporate an Islamic dimensionare beyondthe scope of this essay.

More pertinent to the present study is the question of whether thosewho support Islamic democracy possess democratic values, both in ab-solute terms and relative to those who support secular democracy. Table4 (p. 104) presents data with which to address this question. The Tablecompares respondents who favor secular democracy and those who fa-vor Islamic democracy with respect to three normative orientations thatrelevant scholarship has identified as necessary (along with support for

democracy) to the long-term success of a democratic transition. Thesevalues are: 1) respect for political diversity and dissent, measured bythe importance that respondents attribute to the presence of politicalleaders who are open to different political opinions; 2) social tolerance,measured by respondents stating that they would harbor no objection tohaving neighbors of a different race; and 3) gender equality, measuredby a question asking whether men and women should have equal jobopportunities and wages. While these are only some of the values thatare important for democracy, responses to questions about them will of-fer insights about the presence or absence of democratic values among

Muslim Arab men and women in general and, in particular, about simi-larities or differences in the values of citizens with dissimilar prefer-ences regarding the place of Islam in democratic political life.

Several conclusions may be drawn from Table 4. First, most menand women in every country express democratic values. Almost all re-spondents consider it important that political leaders be open to diverseideas. Social tolerance, as reflected in openness to having neighborsof a different race, is also very high. Indeed, overall, there is only oneinstance in which less than two-thirds of those surveyed answered in amanner inconsistent with democracy. This instance occurs among thoseAlgerian respondents who say that they favor Islamic democracy. Ofthese, only 57 percent say that they favor equal job opportunities andwages for men and women (compared to 71 percent among secular dem-ocrats).

Second, there are very few significant differences between respon-dents who favor secular democracy and those who favor Islamic democ-racy. The former are more likely to endorse a norm that is consistentwith democracy in most instances, but differences are almost alwaysvery small. In only two of the fourteen country-specific comparisonsshown in Table 4 is the difference between those who favor secular de-mocracy and those who favor Islamic democracy greater than 10 percent(12 percent in one instance and 14 percent in the other). In almost all


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the remaining comparisons, the difference is actually 5 percent or less.Thus, the overall conclusion suggested by Table 4 is that democraticvalues are present to a significant degree among Muslim Arab citizens,most of whom support democracy, and that this is the case whether ornot an individual believes that his or her country should be governed bya political system that is Islamic as well as democratic. These observa-tions reinforce previous assessments related to Arab Muslims viewsregarding the compatibility of democracy and Islam.

A final question pertaining to the relationship between democracyand Islam concerns the reasons that some respondents favor secular de-mocracy while others prefer a political system that is democratic and

T able 4D emocraTic v alueS anD S upporT of a p oliTical r ole for i Slam a mong r eSponDenTS w ho S upporT D emocracy

T hoSe w ho SupporT

Democracy

p ercenTage a greeing wiTh STaTemenT

a bouT D emocraTic v alueS

It is important tohave political leaders

who are open todifferent political

opinions

Do not mindhaving neighborsof a different race

Men andwomen shouldhave equal jobopportunities

and wages

All

Countries

Secular Democracy

95 86 76

IslamicDemocracy

95 82 70

Jordan

SecularDemocracy 94 79 66

IslamicDemocracy

92 67 66

Palestine

Secular Democracy

96 NA 79

IslamicDemocracy

97 NA 72

Algeria

Secular Democracy

95 83 71

IslamicDemocracy 96 80 57

Morocco

Secular Democracy

93 94 78

IslamicDemocracy

95 89 77

Kuwait

Secular Democracy

96 88 85

IslamicDemocracy

98 92 84


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also incorporates an Islamic dimension. Of particular concern is whethera preference for democracy that has an Islamic dimension reflects theinfluence of religious orientations, political judgments and evaluations,

both, or neither. One hypothesis is that piety and religious attachmentsmay lead Muslim Arabs to favor Islamic democracy. Another is thatdiscontent with governments and regimes that are essentially secularmay predispose citizens to favor a system that incorporates an Islamicdimension. It is also possible that a preference for Islamic democracyreflects concern with preserving a measure of continuitythat is, withkeeping a measure of tradition in place even as a shift to something new(democracy) is taking place. We tested these propositions via a regression analysis that assessesthe impact on political-system preference of personal religiosity and po-

litical evaluations. Frequency of Koran reading is again used as a mea-sure of personal religiosity. Political evaluations include an item thatasks about trust in the head of the government, another that asks whetherordinary citizens have the ability to influence the policies and activi-ties of the government, and a third that asks whether democracies arenot good at maintaining order. Binary logistic regression is used sinceonly those who favor democracy (whether with or without an Islamicdimension) are included in the analysis. 14 Age, educational level, andeconomic well-being served as control variables.

The regression analysis shows that personal religiosity is not signifi-

cantly related to political-system preference in any of the five countriesin which Arab Barometer surveys were conducted. This is consistentwith earlier findings; not only does religiosity not lead men and womento be less supportive of democracy, it does not lead them to be moresupportive of a political system that incorporates an Islamic dimension.

Political evaluations, by contrast, are significantly related to politi-cal-system preference in every country. There is some cross-nationalvariation in the particular evaluations that are most salient, and thedirection of the relationship is not the same in every instance. A pref-erence for a democratic system that incorporates an Islamic dimensionis disproportionately likely among: 1) Jordanian respondents who havelittle trust in the head of government, believe that ordinary citizenshave the ability to influence the activities and policies of the govern-ment, and believe that democracies are not good at maintaining order;2) Palestinians who have these same sentiments; 3)Algerians who be-lieve that democracies are not good at maintaining order; 4) Moroc-cans who believe that democracies are good at maintaining order; and5) Kuwaitis who have little trust in the head of government, believethat ordinary citizens have little ability to influence the activities andpolicies of the government, and believe that democracies are not goodat maintaining order.

These differences invite inquiry into the ways that particular na-


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tional circumstances determine how political judgments shape citi-zens attitudes about the desired connection between democracy andIslam. Even in the absence of such inquiry, however, findings from the

Arab Barometer make clear that explanatory power is to be found inpolitical judgments rather than religious orientations.

The Desire for a Strong Leader

Despite the support for democracy that overwhelming majorities ofrespondents express in the Arab Barometer surveys, there are some re-spondents who state that it would be good or very good for their countryto have a strong nondemocratic leader who does not bother with par-liament and elections. This opinion is expressed by 17 percent of the

respondents in the five surveys taken together, although it is somewhathigher in some countries and somewhat lower in others, ranging from 26percent in Jordan to 10 percent in Algeria. Further, this undemocratic at-titude is expressed only slightly less frequently among individuals whoexpress support for democracy, being about 15 percent overall and rang-ing from 25 percent in Jordan to 8 percent in Algeria and Kuwait. Thesefindings are shown in Table 5. Since these percentages are fairly low, they are consistent with thefinding that most ordinary citizens in the Arab world believe that de-mocracy, whatever its drawbacks, is the best political systemand the

one by which they believe their own country should be governed. Onthe other hand, the inverse correlation between support for democracyand approval of a strong leader who does not have to bother with par-liament and elections is not as strong as might be expected. In otherwords, as noted above, there are some men and women who supportdemocracy and also state that an undemocratic leader would be goodfor their country.

How should this apparent contradiction be understood? While it ispossible that at least some of these individuals simply do not understandwhat democracy involves, it is probable that in many cases the juxtapo-sition of these contradictory attitudes reflects concern that a democratictransition could be destabilizing or disproportionately harmful to somecitizens even if it helps the country overall, and that it should thereforebe implemented in a guided fashion by a strong leader who is able toensure that political change will be carried out in an orderly fashion.This is consistent with the finding, reported earlier, that almost all re-spondents want political reforms to be implemented gradually. It mayalso be significant that support for an undemocratic leader is expressedmost frequently, both among all respondents and among those who sup-port democracy, in Jordan and Morocco, two poor countries in whicha monarch who is not responsible to the electorate is the guarantor ofpolitical order and political continuity.


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We have also carried out a regression analysis (similar to that pre-sented with respect to the connection between attitudes toward democ-racy and political Islam) to shed light on the connection between sup-port for a democratic political system and support for an undemocraticleader. Again, binary logistic regression has been used since the analysisincludes only those who support democracy and do not approve of un-democratic leadership and those who support democracy and do approve

of undemocratic leadership. 15 Also, once again, the same measures ofpersonal religiosity and political evaluations are employed, as are thecontrol variables of age, educational level, and economic well-being.

The results are consistent both with the conclusions about religiosityreported above and with the hypothesis offered to explain why someindividuals who favor democracy might also express approval of an un-democratic leader. On the one hand, in none of the five countries forwhich data are available is this combination of supposedly contradic-tory attitudes more common among those individuals who are more re-ligious.

On the other hand, political assessments have explanatory power infour of the five countries, Kuwait being the exception. In Algeria, Jor-dan, and Palestine, individuals who believe that democracies are notgood at maintaining order are more likely than others to couple supportfor democracy with support for strong leadership. In Morocco, thosewho believe that democracies are not good at maintaining order are lesslikely than others to combine a preference for strong leadership withsupport for democracy. In Morocco and Jordan (both of which are mon-archies) individuals who believe that citizens have the ability to influ-ence government activities and policies are disproportionately likely tofavor democracy, but also express support for a strong leader who doesnot have to bother with parliament and elections. Thus, as the Arab Ba-

T able 5S upporT for D emocracy anD a TTiTuDeS a bouT STrong l eaDerS w ho D o n oT h ave To b oTher

wiTh p arliamenT anD e lecTionS

T hoSe w ho Say ThaT h aving a STrong l eaDer w ho D oeS n oT h ave To b oTher wiTh p arliamenT anD e lecTionS in o ur

c ounTry w oulD b e g ooD

DeSpiTe D rawbacKS , D emocracy i S The b eST SySTem of g overnmenT

Strongly Agree/ Agree

Strongly Disagree/ Disagree

All Countries 15% 25%

Jordan 25% 37%

Palestine 14% 14%

Algeria 8% 18%

Morocco 16% 37%

Kuwait 8% 30%


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rometer data have shown with respect to all the questions investigated,the political-system preferences and views about governance held byordinary men and women are not shaped to a significant degree by re-

ligious orientations or attachments. By contrast, these preferences andviews do appear to be influenced in important ways by peoples judg-ments and perceptions relating to political considerations.

Support for Democracy , But of What Kind?

Data from the Arab Barometer survey make clear that there is broadsupport for democracy in the Arab world. In a way that is perhaps fed bythe very persistence of authoritarianism in Arab polities, the vast major-ity of Arab men and women believe that democracy is the best political

system and that it would be a good way for their country to be governed.This is not the whole story, however. People understand democracy indifferent ways. Often, they value it mainly as an instrument. They wantto see it implemented gradually, and they disagree among themselvesabout whether or not it should include an important role for Islam. Thus,an understanding of political-system preferences and popular viewsabout governance requires attention to multiple dimensions of supportfor democracy.

The Arab Barometer data also illuminate debates about the compat-ibility of Islam and democracy. More specifically, findings from these

surveys suggest that Islam does not foster antidemocratic attitudes. Onthe one hand, personal religiosity does not diminish support for democ-racy. Nor even does it foster a preference for a political system that isIslamic as well as democratic. On the other hand, those who do favorIslamic democracy are not significantly less likely than those who favorsecularism to embrace democratic norms and values. But while Islamicorientations appear to play no significant role in shaping citizens atti-tudes toward democracy, the Arab Barometer data offer strong evidencethat judgments pertaining to political circumstances and performance domake a difference. It is unclear whether popular support for democracy can and willactually become transformed into pressure for political reform anddemocratic openings in the Arab world. Earlier surveys also found awidespread preference for democratic governance, which is a sign thatundemocratic regimes and popular desires for democracy can coexist forconsiderable periods of time. Findings from the Arab Barometer suggestthe possibility that this may be partly the result of a desire for stabil-ity that parallels the desire for democratic governance. This is reflectedin the widespread emphasis on gradualism, as well as the support ofsome Arabs for a strong leader who does not have to bother with parlia-ment and electionsa support fostered, in part, by a belief that democ-racies are poor at maintaining order. Concerns about stability almost


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certainly reflect the geostrategic situation in the region, particularly thedestabilizing developments that have shaped politics in Iraq, Palestine,Lebanon, and Algeria in recent years. In some countries, concerns about

stability may also be encouraged by political leaders who justify theiropposition to reform by insisting that democratization will bring divi-siveness and disorder. All of this may reduce the pressure from belowfor a democratic transition and serve the interests of regimes committedto preserving the authoritarian status quo. But while findings from the Arab Barometer say little about whetherthere are likely to be transitions to democracy in the Arab world in theyears ahead, they do offer evidence that citizens attitudes and values,including those relating to Islam, are not the reason that authoritarian-ism has persisted. Indeed, the Arab Barometer indicates that if and when

progress toward democracy does occur, most Arab-world citizens willwelcome it even as they debate the precise character and content of thedemocratic political systems that they believe should be established. Asa result, those who wish to advance the cause of democracy in the Arabworld should focus their investigations not on the alleged antidemo-cratic impulses of ordinary women and men, but rather on the structuresand manipulations, and perhaps also the supporting external alliances,of a political leadership class that is dedicated to preserving its powerand privilege.

NOTES 1. Arab Human Development Report ( New York: UN Development Programme, 2002);ch. 7, www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/bychapter.html.

2. Arab Human Development Report ( New York: UN Development Programme, 2003);Introduction, www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/english2003.html.

3. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Middle East Democracy, Foreign Policy, NovemberDecember 2004, 2228. See also Marcia Posusney and Michelle Angrist, eds.,

Authoritarianism in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

4. See, for example, Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao, Gauging Arab Support for

Democracy, Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005): 8397; Mark Tessler, Do IslamicOrientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence fromEgypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, International Journal of Comparative Sociology 2(Spring 2003): 22949; Mark Tessler, Mansoor Moaddel, and Ronald Inglehart, Gettingto Arab Democracy: What Do Iraqis Want? Journal of Democracy 17 (January 2006):3850.

5. Ronald Inglehart et al., eds., Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-cultural Source-book Based on the 19992002 Values Surveys (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2004).

6. The Arab Barometer team consists of partners in five Arab countries: Fares Braizatof the Center for Strategic Studies, Jordan; Khalil Shikaki of the Center for Policy andSurvey Research, Palestine; Ghanim al-Najjar of Kuwait University, Kuwait; Mhammed

Abderebbi of Hassan II UniversityMohammadia, Morocco; and Abdallah Bedaida of theUniversity of Algiers, Algeria. The first wave of the Arab Barometer project was fundedby the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) of the U.S. Department of State.


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7. Additional surveys in the first wave of the Arab Barometer are scheduled to be car-ried out in Yemen and Lebanon in early 2008.

8. The characteristics attributed to democracy were assessed by the following item:People often differ in their views on the characteristics that are essential to democracy.If you have to choose only one thing, what would you choose as the most important char-acteristic, and what would be the second most important? The response code listed thefour attributes discussed in the text and also gave respondents the option of specifyinganother characteristic. Almost 99 percent of the respondents selected one of the four listedcharacteristics.

9. For excellent discussions of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, see KhaledAbou Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2004); John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1996); Jos Casanova, Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections onCatholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam, Social Research 68 (Winter 2001):104180; and Vali Nasr, The Rise of Muslim Democracy? Journal of Democracy 16(April 2005): 1327. For a data-based examination of why support for Islam in politicsis compatible with support for democracy, see Amaney Jamal, Reassessing Support forDemocracy and Islam in the Arab World: Evidence from Egypt and Jordan, World Affairs 169 (Fall 2006): 5163.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the WorldOrder (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 13539. See also his article Will MoreCountries Become Democratic? Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer 1984): 193 218.

11. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon, 1992),4546.

12. See, for example, Daniel Pipes, Debate: Islam and Democracy, PBS Wide Angle, 15 July 2003, www.danielpipes.org/article/1167. See also Bernard Lewis, TheShaping of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and ElieKedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, D.C.: Washington Insti-tute for Near East Policy, 1992).

13. We used factor analysis to assess the consistency among a number of survey itemsdesigned to measure judgments pertaining to political Islam. Many of these items loadedhighly on a common factor, offering evidence of reliability and increasing confidence invalidity. The item asking whether men of religion should have influence over governmentdecisions was the best single indicator of this dimension, and for purposes of clarity andparsimony it is used in the present analysis as a measure of support for political Islam.

14. Our regression tables may be found at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gra-tis/TesslerGraphics-19-1.pdf.

15. The regression table in question may be found at www.journalofdemocracy.org/ar-ticles/gratis/TesslerGraphics-19-1.pdf.

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