ivanova, milena and paternotte, cedric (2012) theory choice, good sense and social consensus

8/13/2019 Ivanova, Milena and Paternotte, Cedric (2012) Theory choice, good sense and social consensus

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Theory choice, good sense and social consensus

Milena Ivanova & Cedric Paternotte 1

(forthcoming in Erkenntnis)

1 Introduction

There has !een a significant interest in the recent literature in develo"ing a solution to

the "ro!lem of theory choice #hich is !oth normative and descri"tive, !ut agent$ !ased rather than rule$!ased %uch a solution goes !ack to Pierre uhem's notion of

'good sense' It #as recently revived !y avid %tum", !ecause of the crucial role that

intellectual and moral virtues "lay in it, and has since attracted significant attention

uhem defined good sense as #hat guides scientists facing the "ro!lem of theory

choice that is, #ho have to choose !et#een theories e ually com"ati!le #ith the

data *evertheless, he never "rovided a full account of good sense +ecent "a"ers

have tried to fill this ga" !y reconstructing good sense and e "laining ho# e actly it

solves the "ro!lem of theory choice -o#ever, these reconstructions are unsatisfying

for a num!er of reasons .irst, it is dou!tful that they are faithful to uhem/s conce"t

Indeed, some "ro"erties that uhem attri!uted to good sense seem to !e left out in

these reconstructions, #hereas some other "ro"erties they focus on are taken out of

their original conte t Moreover, these reconstructions disagree #ith res"ect to the

central characteristics of good sense %econd, it is also dou!tful #hether these

accounts "rovide ade uate solutions to the "ro!lem of theory choice .or instance,

none of them e "lain ho# an agent$!ased account can guarantee that good sense is

relia!le *either do they e "lain ho# an agent !ased a""roach could function in

10uthors are listed in al"ha!etical order only This "a"er is fully co$authored


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situation of underdetermination in order to lead to a conclusive choice 0s a

conse uence, it is unclear #hether good sense should, or even can, !e a solution to the

"ro!lem of theory choice

In this "a"er, #e e "lore #hether such a middle solution, !et#een "urely

normative and "urely descri"tive accounts, is tena!le e develo" an alternative

reading that manages to accommodate all the "ro"erties attri!uted to good sense In

section t#o #e introduce the "ro!lem of underdetermination and theory choice, as

#ell as its traditional solutions and their #eaknesses %ection three "resents uhem's

agent$!ased solution to theory choice !y discussing ho# he descri!ed the "ro"erties

of good sense and its different conte ts of use in em"irical sciences, mathematics

and history In "articular, #e e "lain ho# good sense is su""osed to solve the

"ro!lem of theory choice In section four #e "resent the current reconstructions of

good sense, develo"ed !y Phili""e Mongin (2334), avid %tum" (2335), Milena

Ivanova (2313), 0!rol .air#eather (2311), and evaluate them in terms of the

"ro"erties uhem ascri!es to his notion of good sense In section five, #e discuss

several conce"tual issues faced !y these accounts, inde"endently of their faithfulness

to uhemian good sense In section si , #e develo" a novel reconstruction of good

sense, seen as a social consensus smoothing device, #hich #e argue !est fits the

"ro"erties of good sense and e "licitly cashes out the effect that virtues have on

scientific "rogress .1 In section seven, #e discuss further o!6ections for the social

choice account, and e "lain #hy they do not have any !ite

2 The "ro!lem of theory choice


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The "ro!lem of theory choice arises !ecause more than one theory can accommodate

the availa!le data at a given time hen multi"le theories e ually accommodate some

!ody of evidence 2, #e need some kind of 6ustification for "referring one of the

theories and discard the other 7ne can, of course, deny that the "ro!lem of

underdetermination entails theory choice !y claiming that there is no fact of the

matter as to #hich theory is su"erior (or #hich one is more likely to !e true) 8ut it is

"hiloso"hically interesting to investigate #hat considerations enter into 6ustifying

"reference to#ards an individual theory, given the o!servation that hesitation does not

"ersist in scientific "ractice and that scientists often do have "references to#ards one

of the rival theories -o# are #e to choose !et#een theories that fit the evidence

e ually #ell9 Can #e 6ustify our "reference for one theory #ithin a set of em"irically

e uivalent ones9

To decide !et#een evidentially e uivalent theories, one solution is to resort to

non$em"irical criteria and com"are the sim"licity, unity, fertility, etc of the theories

7ther things !eing e ual, one theory may !e sim"ler, more unified or have made more

novel "redictions than its rivals, and !e favoured for this reason This is the #ell$

kno#n "oint that empirical e uivalence does not im"ly evidential e uivalence: even if

several theories are on a "ar #ith regard to em"irical data, one may fare differently on

some other "ro"erties and for this reason #e may consider it as confirmed to a higher

degree

The claim that theoretical virtues resolve theory choice can !e seen !oth as a

descri"tive claim and as a normative claim It could !e argued that the history of

science sho#s that scientists do resolve theory choice !ased on a list of theoretical

virtues 0 stronger claim is to argue that theory choice should !e resolved !y


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em"loying theoretical virtues, in #hich case some kind of algorithm needs to !e

constructed #hich allo#s a rule$!ased solution to theory choice

-o#ever, choice from su"er$em"irical criteria faces t#o serious "ro!lems,

#hich undermine a rule$governed solutions !ased only on these criteria .irst,

different criteria may lead to inconsistent or conflicting "references .or instance,

theory 0 may !e sim"ler than theory 8, !ut !e less unified In order to choose

!et#een them, some criteria should either receive relative #eights so #e can calculate

the overall score of every theory, or !e ranked according to a le icogra"hic order ;

-o#ever, there is no scientific consensus on (or "lausi!le e"istemic 6ustification of)

any such #eighting or ranking Moreover, the im"ortance of su"er$em"irical criteria

seems to vary over time ( uhem (14uhn (1455))

%econdly, the inter"retation of su"er$em"irical criteria is su!6ective to a

certain e tent They are many #ays in #hich a theory can !e deemed sim"le or

fruitful 0s a result, different scientists may disagree as to #hich theory they should

"refer, even if they agree that the sim"lest one should !e favoured =

0s >uhn famously remarked, these t#o "ro!lems of inconsistency and

su!6ectivity of su"er$em"irical criteria e "lain the lack of a rational algorithm for

theory choice 0s there is no #ay to devise a logical or rational method #hich #ould

al#ays allo# us to choose a theory #hen #e face an underdetermination "ro!lem, it is

natural that additional factors, for instance "sychological or sociological ones, e "lain

ho# scientists manage to make such choices in "ractice

The recently develo"ed agent$!ased accounts are aimed to avoid the "ro!lem

faced !y the rule$!ased solutions to theory choice They as"ire to "rovide a solution

that does not dictate rules !ut can nevertheless 6ustify the outcome of theory choice !y

im"osing a normative dimension to the agents making the choice The idea goes !ack


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to uhem's notion of good sense The function of good sense is to resolve theory

choice given the inconclusiveness of theoretical virtues 0ccording to uhem, only

evidence can rationally com"el us to ado"t or re6ect a theory -o#ever, #hen

evidence is not enough, good sense steers us to#ards the most reasona!le o"tion

*o# the uestion !ecomes: on #hich !asis can good sense discriminate !et#een

em"irically e uivalent theories9 itcher (144;) and later %trevens (233;), #ho em"hasi e that scientific success #ould

!e fostered !y allo#ing scientists to #ork simultaneously on different theories 7ften,

the o"timal scheme scientific resource allocation #ould not !e a uni ue allocation of

all scientists on a uni ue research "ro6ect, !ut a !et$hedging strategy that allocates

scientists to different "ro6ects de"ending on their chances of !eing successful The

virtue of these results is that they esta!lish not only that the !et$hedging strategy can

often !e collectively "refera!le, !ut also that the nature of the scientists/ individual

re#ards is such that !et$hedging may naturally emerge from individual choices In

other #ords, it might !e "refera!le for a scientist to !e dogmatic and #ork on a

generally neglected theory, !ecause of the greater re#ard if it succeeds@ as the re#ard

is cashed out in terms of "restige, it de"ends on the num!er of other scientists

#orking on the same "rogram, #hich is #hy different scientists may rationally choose

to #ork on different "rograms

These results threaten the relevance of good sense in scientific "ractice, and in

"articular our social consensus reconstruction .or although the a!ove authors give

very different accounts of #hat science is and #hy it is !y and large successful, they

agree that it is im"roved !y diversity, and at least entirely com"ati!le #ith the lack of

moral and intellectual virtues


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In other #ords, the diversity of scientists/ !eliefs is currently considered as a

positive feature of science == 8y these lights, it is odd that good sense is su""osed to

make them as similar as "ossi!le *ote that this is not only a "ro!lem for the social

account of good sense uhem holds that "erfect science #ould !e characteri ed !y

everyone e ercising good sense -o#ever, this cannot !e e "ected from a #ildly

diverse grou" of scientists, including some dogmatic ones If scientific "rogress is

im"roved, or accelerated, !y such diversity, then it cannot !e !ecause everyone is

reasona!le in a similar #ay, and even less !y everyone e em"lifying the same virtues

ogmatism, as long as it is distri!uted in the "o"ulation, not only can !ut does

contri!ute to scientific "rogress

%till, des"ite the fact the a!ove #orks strongly suggest that diversity of !eliefs

!enefits science, they do not "rove it they are !ased on models, that de"end on

technical assum"tions, and as a result only sho# that it is possible for diversity to

!enefit science

8y contrast, according to >uhn (14?2) conformity too is im"ortant in science

In normal science, scientists must !e "artial to the "aradigm in #hich they are

#orking they must !e dogmatic to some e tent so as to !e a!le to develo" it

regardless of early anomalies, and im"ortantly they must all !e dogmatic to#ards the

same "aradigm %o one can resist the diversity argument and, !ased on >uhn/s

defense of conformity, defend the social choice account of good sense

-o#ever, even >uhn allo#s for diversity in revolutionary science, as

scientists may develo" several "re$"aradigmatic alternatives to the current "aradigm

Moreover, conformity is im"ortant in normal science only !ecause >uhn does not

allo# the "ossi!ility of simultaneous fully formed "aradigms In later accounts of

scientific change, such as akatos/ (1453) and audan/s (1455), research


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"rogrammesKtraditions are allo#ed to com"ete 0s a result, diversity rather than

conformity a""ear to !enefit science

The "revious arguments suggest that diversity, rather than uniformity, !oth is

and should !e a feature of scientific activity -o#ever, #e do not think they "ose a

serious threat to the social consensus inter"retation of good sense, for the follo#ing

reasons The social consensus account em"hasi es the "ositive effect that the

similarity of beliefs about the truth of theories has on reaching a consensus a!out

theory choice +ecall that the "ro!lem is to 6ustify a choice !et#een theories that

en6oy e ual em"irical success@ good sense solves it !y !ringing !eliefs a!out the truth

of theories closer

8y contrast, >itcher and %trevens/ results highlight the "ositive effect of

cognitive division of la!our for scientific success -ere the "ro!lem is to ma imi e

the chances that a successful theory is develo"ed@ the solution is to have scientists

#ork on, or pursue , different theories

0s a conse uence, the seemingly contradictory diagnoses are not o""osed

.irst, they suggest solutions to different "ro!lems that of assessing and comparing

e ually satisfying theories, and of obtaining a satisfying theory to !egin #ith %econd

and more im"ortantly, their solutions, although res"ectively !ased on uniformity and

diversity, do concern different attitudes, res"ectively !elief and "ursuit 0s a matter of

fact, it is #ell$kno#n, at least since audan/s (1455) famous analysis, that the

acceptance and the pursuit of theories are distinct attitudes, for a scientist may #ell

acce"t one theory (as the !est theory availa!le) yet "ursue another one, for instance

!ecause it is "romising des"ite its current lack of success

Conse uently, the arguments !ased on good sense and on division of la!our in

science do not lead to t#o com"eting vie#s of science There is no conce"tual


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o!stacle to the "ossi!ility that mem!ers of a scientific community agree on #hat

counts as the !est availa!le theory #hile different mem!ers strive to develo" different

other theories

To summari e, the social account "rovides the !est fit to uhem/s descri"tion

of good sense, =< and esca"es the criticism !ased on >itcher and %trevens/ results,

according to #hich #hat most !enefits science is the diversity of individual attitudes

%till, this !y no #ay "roves that the social consensus account is correct It remains

under the threat of a theory that #ould manage to 6ustify the "ositive effect of

diversity of beliefs on scientific activity

B Conclusion

In this "a"er, #e have assessed recent solutions to the "ro!lem of theory choice that

originate from uhem/s conce"t of good sense e have argued that the current

reconstructions of good sense have limitations insofar as they do not accommodate all

the "ro"erties uhem attri!uted to good sense e have "ro"osed an account of good

sense as a social consensus soothing attitude that, #e argue, is the most faithful

reconstruction of uhem/s good sense Even though it e "ands uhem's original

analysis, it fits all the re uired "ro"erties and at the very least sho#s that it is a

consistent conce"t e have argued that the failure of the current reconstructions to

solve the "ro!lem of theory choice is due to their lacking 6ustification of the effect

that intellectual and moral virtues have on scientific "rogress e have also defended

the social consensus account against a""arent o!6ections stemming from recent results

that highlight the im"ortance of division of la!our in science %till, #e have not

"roved that it esca"es all "ossi!le o!6ections !ased on diversity, and so leave it o"en


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that a sound criti ue of social choice could !e develo"ed in the future In general, it is

difficult to assess the success of uhemian good sense as a solution to the "ro!lem of

theory choice, as all e isting reconstructions only manage to make sense of it !y

im"overishing or enriching it


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12 uhem is referring to Pascal/s famous claim that D e kno# truths not only !y reason, !ut also !y the heart

1; ood sense could in "rinci"le conflict #ith common sense In "articular, uhem argues that unlike common sense, good

sense is ac uired #ith scientific "ractice, can !e develo"ed !y e "erience, and scientists should aim to shar"en it in order to

fasten scientific "rogress .

1= 7nly in his (1441) though It is interesting to note that in his (14


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-o#ever, these degrees do not have to !e 3 or 1@ in cases of conflicting evidence, scientists may agree that they cannot

decide %o in unfavoura!le conditions, good sense #ill !e stuck under the social inter"retation as #ell

;2 %ee Ta!le 1, last ro#

;; .or introduction to such results, see illies (2333), Qoyce (2334) The first technical theorems are due to e .inetti and

oo!

;= %uch results of course de"end on technical assum"tions, #hich do not matter to our discussion

;< %tum" (2335) notices that good sense cannot !e reduced to relia!ility of the choice "rocess, or else !eing !iased to#ards

the !est theory #ould count as an e am"le of good sense

;? .or instance, >uhn noted that accuracy slo#ly !ecame a relevant criterion as science took the contem"orary #e are

familiar #ith@ !ut it #as not regarded as highly centuries earlier

;5 +ecall that it might !e una!le to accommodate the no$algorithm "ro"erty@ ho#ever, the account #ould have to !e fleshed

out significantly in order to su""ort this claim

;B *ote that although the social consensus account fits the "ro"erties of uhemian good sense, the the fact that good sense

functions at a collective level #as never e "licit in uhem/s understanding of good sense

;4 The social consensus account may a""ear to esca"e this de"endence on conditions -o#ever, even if individual degrees

of !eliefs converge to a given limit, this limit does not have to corres"ond to a degree 3 or 1 that is, to certainty that a

hy"othesis is true or false Indeed, in cases of conflicting evidence, scientists may agree that they cannot decide %o even

under the social inter"retation, good sense may !e stuck if conditions are unfavoura!le

=3 That is, the set of the other scientists/ !eliefs and a descri"tion of the social decision "rocess

=1 uhem did hold that different societies (such as the English, the .rench or the erman) e em"lified different kinds of

intuition or reasoning This sho#s that he ackno#ledged that social factors can !e detrimental to the use of good sense %till,

it does not mean that he considered good sense itself, or some "ro"erties thereof, as stemming from, or constituted !y,

effects at the social level

=2 Merton (+E.) #as the first to understand recognition as the main motivational source for scientists

=; 0s odfrey$%mith suggests D-ull argues that there is no need for individual scientists to take a cautious and sce"tical

attitude to#ard their own #ork@ others #ill do this for them (233;, 1?


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hy"othesis or theory is true rather than ho# to assess this truth in general

=< Rnderstood as the con6unction of "ro"erties mentioned in section ;

+eferences

de .inetti, 8 (145=) Theory of Probability. *e# ork

uhem, P (144? F1B4;G) Physics and Meta"hysics In + 0rie#, & P 8arker (Eds ), Pierre

Duhem: Essays in the istory and Philosophy of !cience ("" 24$


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Ivanova, M (2311) A ood %ense/ in Conte t: 0 +es"onse to >idd, !tudies in the istory and

Philosophy of !cience.

Ivanova, M (forthcoming) Is there "lace for e"istemic virtues in theory choice9, 'irtue

!cientia: (ridges (etween 'irtue Epistemology and Philosophy of !cience (0!rol .air#eather ed ),%ynthese i!rary

Qoyce, Q (2334) The evelo"ment of %u!6ective 8ayesianism, in a!!ay , -artmann % ,

oods Q (eds), andbook of the istory of )ogic* Lolume 13: Inductive ogic

>idd, I Q (2311) Pierre uhem/s e"istemic aims and the intellectual virtue of humility: a re"ly

to Ivanova !tudies in the istory and Philosophy of !cience (electronic version)

>itcher (144;) The "dvancement of !cience: !cience +ithout )egend* ,b-ectivity without

%llusions 7 ford: 7 ford Rniversity Press

>uhn, T (14?2) The !tructure of !cientific $evolutions Chicago: Rniversity of Chicago Press

>uhn, T (1455) 7!6ectivity, Lalue Qudgment, and Theory Choice In The Essential Tension (""

;23$;


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%trevens, M (233;) The +ole of the Priority +ule in %cience, The 0ournal of Philosophy

133(2):

ivanova, milena and paternotte, cedric (2012) theory choice, good sense and social consensus

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