THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY September 17, 1960

Community Development Programme Its Political Impact

Baldev Raj Nayar

I

S I N C E its incept ion in 1952, the communi ty development pro­

gramme in I n d i a has been the sub­ject of continuous debate and con­troversy. The supporters of the programme refer to the 'silent revo­lu t i on ' t ak ing place in the Ind i an country-side, whi le its cr i t ics pro­c l a i m the utter fa i lure of the pro­gramme to make any impression on ru ra l India ' s problems. I m p a r t i a l observers, however, w i l l continue to ask: Has the programme been effec­t ive? Does it meet the needs of the v i l l ager? H o w does the v i l lager view the programme? Some of the answers to these questions may be found in the series of reports that the Planning Commission has pub­lished evaluating the p rogramme at various stages of its development. The adequacy and effectiveness of the programme may also be mea­sured f r o m the po l i t i ca l impact i t has had on its beneficiaries. An i n ­q u i r y into the pol i t ica l impact of the programme, however, presuppo­ses the notion that the programme has had pol i t ical impl ica t ions .

A S P I R A T I O N S O F T H E P E A S A N T R Y

W h i l e the manifest purpose of the programme is to b r ing a radical t ransformat ion in the I n d i a n vi l lage - to usher ru ra l I n d i a into the twen­t ieth century—there can be no doubt that the satisfaction of the hones and expectations of the vi l lager that were bui l t up d u r i n g the nationalist movement is c ruc ia l to the mainte­nance of the Congress Par ty in power. In its struggle against the Br i t i sh regime, the Congress be­came an effective mass movement only when it mobil ized the peasan­t ry behind its organizat ion. The peasantry, for its p a r t supported the Congress because that organiza­t ion was ready to voice and vigorous­ly support: the demands and felt urges of the Ind i an vi l lager . Through its leadership of agrar ian move­ments, the Congress brought p o l i t i -

This study was made possible by the suppor t and guidance given by Professors M y r o n Weiner and Duncan MacRae, Department of Pol i t ica l Science, Unive r s i ty of Ch i cago—BRN.

cal awakening among the peasantry, made it aware of a possible better l i fe , and demonstrated to it the power of organized pol i t ica l action on a mass basis.

H a v i n g thus given the peasantry this pol i t ica l consciousness and this pol i t ical t r a in ing , the Congress has perforce to f u l f i l their aspirations, for, as Nehru had said, " th is w i n d is blowing to the vi l lages and to the mud huts where dwel l our poverty-stricken peasantry, and it is l ike ly to become a hurr icane if rel ief does not come to them soon." (Jawaharlal Nehru, Eighteen Months hi India 1 9 3 7 - l a w " Al lahabad : Ki tabis tan . 1938. pp 235-6.) In such a situa­t ion, for the Congress to ignore the peasantry after achievement of inde­pendence would be to invi te its own nemesis. As Nehru had warned in 1037, ' 'they are expectant and if the Congress call does not reach their ears, some other w i l l , and they w i l l respond to i t . But the call that w i l l f ind echo in their hearts must deal w i t h their own sufferings and the way to get r i d of them." ( Ibid , p 235.)

G R E A T P O T E N T I A L

The continuance of a stagnant, backward economy, w i t h the masses l i v i n g at subsistence level, and the presence in that society of radical elements ready to exploi t the result­i n g discontent, could thus be fatal to the continuance in power of the Congress par ty . P r ime Min i s te r Nehru in t imated such a possibi l i ty in a speech in New De lh i on Octo­ber 6, 1958:

Asia is and w i l l continue to be in an explosive state because the re­cent changes d u r i n g the last few years or so have unleashed a g ian t ; po l i t i c a l changes and the l ike have unleashed a giant kept tied up for one hundred and fifty years o r more . . . . I t does not want to continue to be s tarving or just l i v i n g on the verge of subsis­tence or existence. Often they make mistakes, they go in wrong directions. Let us try to restrain them f rom going in the wrong di rec t ion . . . . But are we to c r i t i ­cize if the people want better food, belter c lo thing and better l i v i n g condit ions? (India News, Infor-

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rnation Services of India , Wash­ington 8, DC, October 15, 1958)

A n d , in words reminiscent of his statement in 1937. Nehru went on to emphasize the importance, of meet­i ng these needs because " i f we don't , somebody else w i l l . " (Time, October 20, 1958)

The po l i t i ca l objectives of the communi ty development programme are part and parcel of those of eco­nomic p lann ing in general. In one. sense, the p rogramme is potential ly a more effective and widespread means for generat ing pol i t ical sup­port . It reaches out to vastly larg­er numbers of people than most other economic development pro­grammes. For example, under the First Five Year Plan . 77.5 m i l l i o n people were covered by the commu­nity development programme for an expenditure of 460.2 mi l l i on rupees. It is this great potential of the com­m u n i t y development programme to reach mil l ions of people as a symbol of the Congress Government 's dedi­cation to achieve progress and of its concern for the hi ther to neglected vi l lager that makes the p rogramme so po l i t i c a l l y significant. It be­comes important therefore to know the manner in which the communi ty development programme has affect­ed pol i t ica l behaviour in the ru ra l areas.

I I

The communi ty development pro­gramme was started in October 1952, about nine months after the First General Elections which were held at the end of 1951 and the begin­n ing of 1952. Five years later the Second General Flections took place in the first quarter of 1957. These two elections and the fact that large areas were s t i l l not covered by the programme afforded an oppor tun i ty to estimate the impact of that pro­gramme on vo t ing behaviour in r u r a l areas. In order to reduce the task to manageable propor t ions , the Pre­sent study was l imi ted to the State of West Bengal. This State was chosen because it is a compact, rela­tively small State where rura l and urban districts are rather sharply marked off and electoral districts are more l ikely to coincide w i t h commu­ni ty development blocks than in one

September 17, 1960 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

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of the larger and less densely popu­lated States.

To evaluate the pol i t ica l consequ­ences of the programme, three ques­tions seemed par t icu lar ly i m p o r t a n t :

( 1 ) What has been the impact of the communi ty development programme on vot ing par t i ­c ipa t ion? Do such pro­grammes increase vo t ing par­t i c ipa t ion or have they no substantial effect?

(2 ) How have such programmes contr ibuted to the chances for the continuance of the Con-gress par ty in power?

(3 ) What has been the impact of the programme on the deve­lopment of democratic and non-democratic forces in the country? Have such pro­grammes contr ibuted to the strengthening of democratic parties l ike the Congress par ty and the Praja Socialist party or have they weakened them? Or, have these pro­grammes led to the strength­ening or weakening of the non-democratic forces l ike the Communist pa r ty?

Equal ly impor tant was the quest ion:

What effect d id the dura t ion of the communi ty development programme have on vot ing behaviour? Since the nat ional extension service pro­gramme was started in 1951, thai year was chosen as the d i v i d i n g line and a breakdown made of places where the development programme had been started before 1954 and those where it had been started after 1954, The three major questions outl ined above were then asked in respect of both these categories.

R E S U L T S BERORE A N D AFTER C D

The statistical analysis covered by this article is based on two groups of electoral constituencies.

(1 ) The first group consists of 39 electoral constituencies or distr icts , wi th a total of 54 scats in the West Bengal State legislative assembly, covering a total of 62 development blocks. (The dis t r ic t of Purul ia , which was jo ined to West Bengal in 1956, has not been included in this study.) Election results of the First General Elections and the Second General Elections were compared for these constituencies. (Statistics for the Fi rs t General Elections were obtained f rom the Report on the First General Election in India 1951-52. New D e l h i : Election Commis­

sion I n d i a , 1955. Statistics f o r the Second General Elections were secur­ed f rom several sources since these had not been published officially at the t ime this study was under taken: (1 ) Newspapers, i nc lud ing The Statesman (Calcu t ta ) , The Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) and The Hindustan Standard (CaIcu t t a ) ; (2 ) Office of the Election Commission in New D e l h i ; and (3 ) th rough Pro­fessor M y r o n Weiner, Univers i ty of Chicago, who obtained these figures w h i l e " in Calcutta in 1957-58.) These constituencies were selected w i th the consideration that their populat ion should as far as possible be completely covered by the com­muni ty development programme in 1957. so that a val id comparison could be made for two elections, which would be differentiated by the fact that the constituencies while without a communi ty developement programme in 1952 were in 1957 fu l ly served by one. (For this pur­pose use was made of the details on the rura l -urban composit ion of dis­tricts and police stations provided in A M i t r a , Census of India 1951. D e l h i : Manager of Publications. 1953. Vol VI, Part I I , and the de­tails on the areas covered by the communi ty development programme provided in Government of West Bengal. Community Development and Rural Extension, Mimeo, M a r c h 30, 1957.)

lt was also desirable at the same time to include as large a sample as was possible for the purposes of this study. The popula t ion of twen­ty-four of the th i r ty-n ine constituen­cies included in this study is com­pletely covered by the communi ty development programme. In the case of the remain ing fifteen consti­tuencies, seventy to one hundred per cent of the popula t ion of most of them is covered by the programme. Any constituency w i t h a populat ion of less than fifty per cent under the programme was excluded f rom the study.

(Extensive use was made in this study of the material on the de l imi ­tat ion of constituencies to make sure that the same constituencies were be­ing compared for 1952 and 1957. for it is possible, because of changes in the boundaries of constituencies, that the same name for a constitu­ency in 1952 and 1957 may in ac­tual fact refer to different areas. Of special use in this connection were The Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies (West

Bengal) Order, 1951 , As Modified by Parliament, and Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Cons­tituencies Order, 1956. New D e l h i : Election Commission I n d i a , 1957.

The statistics employed through­out this study are in terms of elec­tors, not votes. In double-member constituencies an elector has two voles; in this case, each party 's or candidate's vote has been d iv ided in­to hal f . This is considered essen­t ia l in order to eliminate any dis­tor t ion in the calculat ion of overall percentages when both double-member constituencies, where each elector has two votes, and single-member constituencies, where each elector has only one vote, are group­ed together.)

NON-DEVELOPED AREAS

( 2 ) To evaluate the results a r r iv ­ed at by this comparison, a control group was established wh ich consi­sted of areas that had had no deve­lopment projects in 1957. This group comprised of twenty-eight r u r a l constituencies wi th a total of for ty scats in the West Bengal State legislative assembly. As in the ear­lier case, only those constituencies were selected which covered the same area in the two General Elec­tions. Aga in , these constituencies were chosen f rom the v iewpoin t that they should as far as possible consist only of ru ra l areas. Of these twenty-eight constituencies, twenty-three arc completely r u r a l ; four have a popula t ion which is 90 to 100 per cent r u r a l ; only one consti­tuency has a populat ion which is on ly 80 per cent ru ra l .

The discussion of the results of the statistical study that fo l lows centers around six pol i t ica l g roups :

( 1 ) The Ind ian .National Con­gress.

( 2 ) The Communist Par ty of I n d i a .

( 3 ) The Socialists—that is, the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, the Socialist Party, the For­ward Bloc ( R u i k a r ) , and the Praja Socialist Par ty which was formed after a merger of the preceding groups fo l low­ing the 1952 elections.

(4) The Marxis t Left , which in-eludes the Revolut ionary So­cialist Party of Ind ia , the Revolutionary Communist Party of Ind ia , the Bolshevik Party of Ind ia , and the For­ward Bloc ( M a r x i s t ) ,

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THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY September 17, 1960

( 5 ) The H i n d u Communal Group, wh ich consists of the Bhara-t iya Jana Sangh, the All-I n d i a H i n d u Mahasabha, and the Rama Rajya Parishad.

( 6 ) The Independents.

III

Before presenting the analysis of the impact of the communi ty deve­lopment p rogramme on vo t ing beha­v iour in the ru ra l areas of West Bengal, it seems desirable to give a b r i e f p ic ture of the pa r ty posi t ion as it emerged after the 1952 and 1957 General Elections in the State of West Bengal as a whole (exclud­ing , of course, the dis t r ic t of P u r u l i a ) .

CONGRESS G A I N S

Based on newspaper articles, the propaganda of opposi t ion parties, and the fact that the Congress party won on ly 152 seats out of a total of 252 seats in the West Bengal State legislative assembly in 1957 as ag­ainst 151 out of 238 in 1952, the general impression is that the Con­gress par ty is losing its po l i t i ca l strength in West Bengal . It is t rue that the Communists have strength­ened their position in the 1957 elec­t ions; but so has the Congress par ty (see Table 1) by securing 46.6 per cent of the vote in 1957 as against 39.4 per cent in 1952, (Th is is true even of Calcutta where the Con­gress party polled 13.0 per cent and 39.5 per cent in 1957 and 1952, respectively.) The gains in the Congress and Communist vote have come from the decrease in the vote of the H i n d u Communal group and the Independents. As for the other pol i t ica l groups, the Socialists suff­ered a slight decrease in their vote in 1957, whi le the Marx is t Left mainta ined its 1952 posi t ion. It is of interest to note that the total vot­i n g par t ic ipa t ion increased f rom 43.2 per cent in 1952 to 50.7 per cent in 1957.

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In order to look at the pa r ty posi­t ion in ru ra l and u rban areas, the electoral constituencies were d iv ided in to ru ra l and urban constituencies: the ru ra l constituencies i n c l u d i n g those that had more than two-thirds ru ra l vote, whi le the urban consti­tuencies consisted of those that had more than two-thirds urban vote. Those constituencies w i t h lens than two-thirds ru ra l vote and less than two-thirds urban vote were classi­fied as 'mixed ' A comparison of the urban and ru r a l vote reveal­ed that wh i l e the Congress par ty barely maintained its posit ion in the urban constituencies (41.9 per cent in 1952 and 4-2.7 per cent in 1957) , it made a significant increase in its vote in the r u r a l areas ( f r o m 39.2 per cent in 1952 to 47.9 per cent in 1957) . The r u r a l areas thus conti­nue to be the m a i n source of strength for the Congress par ty .

U R B A N S U P P O R T FOR C O M M U N I S T S

Whi le the Communist par ty improved its position in both r u r a l and urban constituencies, i t d i d far better in urban constituencies (14.8 per cent and 27.0 per cent in 1952 and 1957, respectively) than in rural ones (10.2 per cent in 1952 and 15.7 per cent in 1957) . The Socialists lost their vote percentage in rura l areas ( f r o m 14.1 per cent in 1952 to 10.5 per cent in 1957) , but increased it in urban areas ( f rom 7.5 per cent in 1952 to 12.4 per cent in 1957) . The Marx i s t Left increased its vote s l ight ly in the rura l areas ( f rom 5.0 per cent to 6.5 per cen t ) , but suffered a slight setback in the urban areas ( f rom 12.1 per cent to 10.2 per cen t ) . However, neither the increase nor the decrease is large enough to be significant. The H i n d u Commu­nal vote decreased in the ru ra l areas ( f r o m 8.6 per cent to 3.5 per cen t ) , but in the urban areas the group was almost completely e l iminated (0.8 per cent in 1957 as against 5.9 per cent in 1952) . Whatever

sl ight appeal the H i n d u Communal parties may have, that appeal does not seem to lie in the urban areas. W h i l e the Independent vote percen­tage decreased in ru ra l areas by one-third ( f r o m 22.9 per cent in 1952 to 15.9 per cent in 1957), in the urban areas it was reduced to a t h i r d in 1957 (6.9 per cent) as compared to 1952 (17.8 per cent ) .

In terms of total vo t ing pa r t i c i ­pat ion, the increase was far greater in the urban areas ( f rom 39.4 per cent in 1952 to 51.1 per cent in 1957) than in the ru r a l areas ( f rom 44.2 per cent in 1952 to 49.1 per cent in 1957) ; it may be noted, however, that in the 1952 elections the rura l areas had a better turnout of voters than the urban areas.

In the ' m ixed ' constituencies which formed a smal l part of the total electoral p ic ture , both the Congress party and the Communis t par ty made significant increases.

I V

Against the backdrop of the total electoral posit ion in West Bengal provided in the preceding discus­sion, we may now look at the sub­ject of more immediate interest to us: the impact of the communi ty development programme on vot ing behaviour in the ru r a l areas of West Bengal. An analysis of the results of this latter study yields the fo l lowing conclusions.

N o S I G N I F I C A N T I N C R E A S E

(1 ) The increase in vo t ing in areas under the communi ty deve­lopment p rogramme has been in no significant degree greater than in non-developed areas (see Table I I ) However, it is obvious that there was greater pa r t i c ipa t ion in pol i t ics in 1957 than in 1952 in both deve­loped and non-developed areas. Since the increase in vo t ing in developed areas was of almost the same mea­sure as in non-developed areas, this increase in vo t ing in developed areas cannot be said to be a func­tion of the communi ty development programme.

(2 ) The intensity of investment i n . and the dura t ion of, the pro­gramme have made no substantial difference in vo t ing pa r t i c ipa t ion which increased in, almost the same p ropor t ion in bo th pre-1954 and post -1954 developed constituencies. This would , of course, be a natural coro l la ry to the preceding proposi­t ion , for i f the to ta l communi ty development p rogramme has had no

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY September 17, 1960

discernible effect on vo t ing pa r t i c i ­pat ion, i t i s un l ike ly that any differ­entials w i t h i n the p rogramme would have had a more p ro found effect. N o r d i d the du ra t ion of the com­muni ty development p rogramme have any significant effect on the percentages of votes secured by the po l i t i ca l parties. Because of this lack of any different ial impact in terms of the dura t ion of the pro­gramme, no details or suppor t ing tables are inc luded here.

CONGRESS S T R O N G E R I N N O N -

D E V E L O P E D A R E A S

( 3 ) The communi ty development p rogramme does not seem to have necessarily mean! any greater strengthening of the Congress par ty . To be sure, the Congress vote i n ­creased in developed areas (Table I I ) . But more impor tan t , the in­crease in non-developed areas was greater than in developed areas. This statement is fur ther substantiated by the number of seats won. In the non-developed constituencies the Con­gress pa r ty won 28 seats in 1957 as against 23 in 1952; on the other hand, in the developed constituen­cies i t w o n o n l y 36 in contrast to 41 in 1952. I t seems obvious f rom the data presented here that, at least in the State of West Bengal, the communi ty development p rogramme has not led to any overwhelming enthusiasm for the po l i t i ca l party sponsoring the programme.

(4 ) What impact has the com­mun i ty development p rogramme had

on democratic opposi t ion? The Socialists are considered the on ly g roup fa l l ing in. the category of de­mocrat ic opposi t ion. The p rogramme seems to have had no favourable effect for the Socialists; qui te the contrary . The vote fo r the Socia­lists decreased in the developed areas, but what is more, the decrease here was greater than that in the non-developed areas (Table I I ) . Th i s result is interesting especially since the Communist par ty and the Marx ­ist Left parties, w i th whom the Socialists had entered into an electo­ral alliance, d i d increase their vote. Dissatisfaction wi th governmental policies or programmes has not re suited in people t u r n i n g to the So­cialists on any appreciable scale.

L E F T GAINS I N D E V E L O P E D A R E A S

(5) Has the communi ty develop­ment programme strengthened or weakened the non-democratic oppo­si t ion? Included in this category of the non-democratic opposi t ion are: ( 1 ) the Communist par ty , and the Marxis t Left, and ( 2 ) the H i n d u Communal group. Both the Com­munist par ty and the M a r x i s t Lef t gained more in developed constitu­encies than in non-developed consti­tuencies (Table II). This statement is also borne out by the number of seats wan. In the non-developed constituencies, the Communist par ty won four seats in 1957 as against five in 1952: in the developed con­stituencies it won seven seats as against three in 1952, However, the

M a r x i s t Le f t w o n the same number of seats in 1952 and 1957, that is, two in the non-developed constitu­encies and three in the developed ones.

(6 ) The H i n d u Communal group as well as the Independents have suffered a decrease in their vote in both the developed and non-develop­ed constituencies. In the case of the Independents, the decrease in vole percentage is almost the same in both types of constituencies (Table I I ) . The communi ty development pro­gramme thus seems to have had no impor tan t bear ing on the outcome of the electoral contest for this group.

As for the H i n d u Communal group, while the figures do show a slight va r ia t ion in the decrease in vote percentage in developed and non,-developed constituencies, it is not sharp enough to p rov ide any basis for a t t r i bu t i ng it to the com­muni ty development programme (Table I I ) . In short, then, the com­muni ty development programme is not a significant var iable in the for­tunes of either the H i n d u Com­munal group or the Independents. The H i n d u Communal group has met here the same fate as in the overall electoral results for the State of West Bengal .

S H A R E O F CONGRESS

(7) In what p ropor t i on have the Congress, the Communis t and the Marx is t Left parties gained f rom the decrease in the vote of the H i n d u

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Communa l group and the Indepen­dents? What difference does it make whether the areas happen to be deve­loped or non-developed? The follow i n g table sets for th the total vote decrease in the developed and non-developed areas.

In other words, the Congress p a r t y in the non-developed con-stituencies gained a larger percen­tage of the votes made available through the reduced percentage of other parties (that is. about 71 per cent) than i t d i d in the developed constituencies (about 29 per cent ) . On the other hand, the Communist par ty and the Marx i s t Left toge­ther carried off a larger percentage of the votes s i m i l a r l y made avail­able in the developed constituencies (about 71 per cent) than they d id in the non-developed constituencies (about 29 per cen t ) .

N o A P P R E C I A B L E E F F E C T

( 7 ) The results of this statistical study are summarised below:

(a) The communi ty development p rogramme has had no appreciable effect on vot ing par t ic ipa t ion in the rura l areas of the State of West Bengal.

( b ) The communi ty development programme has not appreciably improved the vote for the Con-

ress pa r ty in the r u r a l areas of West Bengal where the p rogramme is in opera t ion ; paradoxical ly , the increase in vote for the Congress p a r l y was greater in the non-deve­loped areas than in the developed ones.

(c) Areas where the communi ty development programme has been launched have seen a greater in-crease in the vote fo r the Commu­nist par ty and the Marxis t Left than in other ru ra l areas where no such programme has been established.

( d ) The democratic opposi t ion (that is, the Socialists) has suffered a greater loss in vote in areas where communi ty development blocks had been started than in other r u r a l areas where such blocks had not been set up.

V

How can we account for these re­sults? One path open for an ans­wer is an examination, of the actual funct ioning of the programme, Un­doubtedly, the communi ty develop­ment programme has brought several benefits to the vil lager and also the consciousness that government exists for the welfare of the governed. These benefits touch nearly al l the welfare aspects of village l i fe : there are programmes for agr icul ture , health, education, cooperatives, social welfare and other amenities. The programme has seen the adopt ion of improved agr icu l tura l practices, the establishment of popular inst i tut ions l ike the panchayats, the con t r ibu t ion by people of large sums of money and labour, and a perceptible change In the social outlook of the vil lager. However, these achievements have not been as spectacular as they are made out to be in certain quarters, and there appear to be many facets of the p rogramme which need seri­ous attention.

H O P E S A N D A S P I R A T I O N S R A I S E D

For one th ing , w h i l e the overall expenditures seem large, they do not amount to very much in terms of the ind iv idua l vi l lager . About 460 m i l l i o n rupees were spent on a popula t ion of 77.5 m i l l i o n d u r i n g the First Five Year Plan. The actual per capita expenditure works out to less than six rupees for the dura t ion of the Plan. As one wr i te r has commented, " r u r a l India is l ike a desert. ft absorbs q u i c k l y what­ever is spr inkled on i t . ' (The Statesman, Calcutta, M a y 2 1 .

1958.) Also, the r a p i d expansion of the programme seems to have a deteriorat ing effect on the qual i ty and efficiency of the programme. Viewed against the requirements of ski l led and trained staff there has been a v i r t ua l explosion of the pro­gramme on to the ru ra l scene. This has resulted in the d i lu t ion of the content of the programme and has adversely affected the qual i ty of personnel. What the communi ty de­velopment programme has done is to i n f o r m the v i l l age r of the possi­bi l i t ies of improvement without at the same time p r o v i d i n g the where­wi tha l for their f r u i t i o n . Aspira­tions and expectations thus ou t run accomplishments.

Again , attention has mostly been concentrated on the most accessible villages, wi th the result that large-scale disparit ies in development exist, and the villages which most need help gel the least benefit. The programme has not been very effective as far as the backward classes-social ly and economically and the landless arc concerned. A greater share of the funds seems to cater to the needs of the economi­cally well off and socially influential people. The large voluntary money contr ibut ions have fo r the most part come f rom these r i ch people, who in turn get the greatest at tention. The panchayats have been faction-r idden, and many of the co-opera­tive societies either exist on paper or are an ephemeral phenomenon. Nor has the programme been espe­cial ly successful in b u i l d i n g up a spir i t of self-help and self-reliance.

WAITING FOR BENEFITS?

To what extent are these inade­quacies of the communi ty develop­ment programme responsible for the pattern of vot ing behaviour? We saw that the Congress par ty has had a greater increase in votes in non-developed areas than in areas where there were development blocks. However, it must be borne in m i n d that the Congress vote in the developed areas in 1957, in fact, represented an in­crease—even though less than in the non-developed areas- over the vote in 1952. These areas, no matter what the weakness of the pro­gramme, have received some bene­fits f rom i t . What of the areas which have not benefited f rom any of the amenities that go with the programme? One may have ex-

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pected the Congress pos i t ion to be weaker in the non-developed areas than, in the developed areas, be­cause the non-developed areas have been denied these benefits. How­ever, the Congress par ty emerged here in a far stronger posi t ion.

What then accounts for the stronger support of the Congress party in the non-developed areas? Is it possible that expectations arc s t i l l held of the Congress par ty which in the developed areas have had to contend w i t h the test of experience? Should not these very areas, however, have turned against the Congress for hav ing neglected them in, contrast w i t h other areas that have been developed? For. whatever may be said of the isola­t ion of the Ind i an village, news does travel. Or. perhaps these areas have heard only of the wonderfu l benefits of the programme and rea­lize that the programme w i l l soon be brought to their areas by the Congress government?

S U P P O R T N O T A U T O M A T I C

Any answers to these questions at this moment must remain a matter of speculation. However, on the basis of our findings confined to the State of West Bengal, it can be said that ru ra l development programmes are not automatical ly fol lowed by popular enthusiasm and by greater pol i t ica l support for the govern­ment. In fact, even if a programme were successful in its operat ion, it may not necessarily lead to increased po l i t i ca l support . Achievement may only give rise to fur ther demand. The gap between aspirations and accomplishments may not neces­sari ly be a funct ion of the fa i lure of a programme, but it is possible that aspirations may outdistance capa­b i l i t y even in a successful pro­gramme. The appetite may come wi th the eat ing. Asp i ra t ion and accomplishment may thus operate in a spiral- l ike fashion, where demands lead to decisions on the part of government to meet them, w h i c h in t u rn lead to fur ther demands, and so on. At any point , when these demands are not met, the result may be w i t h d r a w a l of support on the part of the people to the govern­ment, no matter what satisfaction may have been afforded earlier. One need not therefore expect any neces­sary corre la t ion between success in economic development and pol i t ica l support.

In re la t ion to the search for an explanat ion for the v o t i n g behaviour in the areas under the communi ty development programme, one final comment seems indicated on the nature of the evaluat ion studies conducted so far. It is not enough that evaluat ion of the p rogramme be l imi t ed to the collection of data on what p roduc t ion goals have been met and what targets have been achieved. Equal ly, i f not more use­f u l , wou ld be i n f o r m a t i o n on the perception of the vi l lager of the role of the government, the communi ty development programme, etc. It is possible that what may appear to be fai lure on the par t of the govern­ment in achieving its set targets may not be viewed as such by the vi l la­ger, It may be that those who are economically under-pr ivi leged are so psychological ly under-pr iv i leged in their aspirations too that what may appear to be a small con t r ibu t ion on the part of the government may seem satisfactory to the vil lager.

The government 's eva lua t ion of the p rogramme has so far been a ra t ional one w i t h i n a bureaucrat ic f ramework . How many acres have been covered w i t h new i r r i g a t i o n projects? H o w many tons of i m ­proved seeds have been d is t r ibu ted? What has been the progress in the adopt ion o f improved agr icu l tu ra l practices? How many roads, wells, and schools have been b u i l t ? H o w many cooperatives, communi ty cen­tres and social education centres have been opened? But the crucia l question of whether the vi l lager con­ceives the p rogramme a fa i lure or success remains untouched. Wha t is required is an examinat ion of the relat ionship between the v i l lager ' s expectations and the func t ion ing of the commun i ty development pro­gramme.

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Prime Loan Rates T H E accompanying table shows

p r ime loan rates of commercial banks in 59 countries. These are the lowest rates at wh ich business firms of the highest credit s tanding can get unsecured loans f r o m banks.

M a j o r business f i rms occasionally may be able to bo r row at lower in ­terest costs where an open market in ' commercia l paper ' exists, but the volume of funds available in these markets is l i m i t e d .

Most borrowers, however, have to pay h igher rates,

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