intentionality and self in the tractatus

Intentionality and Self in the TractatusAuthor(s): Jay F. RosenbergSource: Noûs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Nov., 1968), pp. 341-358Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214460 .

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Intentionality and Self in the Tractatus

JAY F. ROSENBERG

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

This paper is a study in exegesis. Thus, I do not wish to claim for the treatment of intentionality at which I arrive that it is correct, only that, at one time, it was Wittgenstein's. Indeed, as I shall point out at the end of the study, there are compelling reasons for rejecting the treatment as incorrect. Why, then, engage in the exegetical enterprise? First, of course, the enterprise has been engaged in before, yet the correct exegesis of the texts which I shall examine has not been forthcoming. So the record must be set straight. Second, when a philosopher of Wittgenstein's stature produces an analysis which is incorrect, it is fair to assume that his reasons for taking the stand which he takes are reasons to be reckoned with. So it is worthwhile, at least, to learn what those reasons are. Finally, we may expect that the examination of Wittgen- stein's attempts to come to grips with the problem of intentionality will give us some of the tools we need for our own treatment of the problem when we turn from exegesis to philosophizing proper. Although I shall not argue the case in this paper, I believe that, in this instance, the expectation is realized.

Let me set the stage, then, with three philosophical common- places. First, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, was committed to a thesis of extentionality.

5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.

(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)

Second, for a philosopher committed to an extentional language, the undeniable intentionality of propositional verbs presents a problem. Wittgenstein recognized this problem.

341



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5.541 At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way.

Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes that p is the case' and 'A has the thought p', etc.

For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A.

(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)

Third, Wittgenstein claimed to have a solution to the problem posed by intentional verbs-a solution commensurate with the doctrine of extentionality which he espoused.

5.542 It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p, and 'A says p' are of the form "'p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.

Indeed, Wittgenstein claimed that his solution had important consequences for the philosophy of mind.

5.5421 This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul-the subject, etc.-as it is conceived in the super- ficial psychology of the present day.

Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.

All this is commonplace and evident. What is not evident is whether Wittgenstein's solution works. In fact, not only is it not clear whether Wittgenstein has successfully reconciled the intentionality of propositional verbs with the doctrine of extentionality espoused in the Tractatus, but it is not even clear exactly what Wittgenstein's proposed strategy of reconciliation is. Black articu- lates the discontent thus:

Wittgenstein's own outline of an alternative analysis of belief statements is hardly more than a hint that generates its own perplexities. His idea seems to have been that a rough analysis of 'A believes p' can be taken to be: 'A utters S.S says that p' (where 'S' is imagined replaced by the quotation of



INTENTIONALITY AND SELF IN THE Tractatus 343

some sentence). The second conjunct in this analysis might take the form: "'London is larger than Paris" says that London is larger than Paris.' This certainly looks like a proposition that is merely contingently true, and that ought therefore to count as significant on Wittgenstein's principles. But it is far from obvious how it could possibly be construed as a truth- function of elementary propositions.'

In this paper, I shall argue that Wittgenstein did have a solution to the problem of intentionality, and, in fact, a solution con- sistent with the balance of the Tractatus. The solution is remarkably ingenious and subtle, and it is not surprising on this account that a correct exegesis of it has not been forthcoming. For the correct interpretation of the solution can only be seen when one realizes how completely Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, does away with the self without, in the last analysis, doing away with the self completely.

I should like to take as my paradigm a proposition of the form 'A says that p', and make only a few remarks at the end of the paper to show how the Wittgensteinian analysis may be adapted to propositions in which the principal verb is 'believes,' 'thinks' or some other member of the family of propositional verbs. My sample text, then, will be:

(a) Karl says that Johann loves Gretchen.

Any adequate analysis of (a) must fulfill at least two criteria. First, it must show that what is said is that Johann loves Gretchen (not, e.g., that Johann loves Marie or that Gretchen loves Johann). Second, it must show that it is Karl who says it (not, e.g., Johann or Marie). The theory of belief which Wittgenstein rejects (we may call it, following his lead, the Russell-Moore theory) fulfills both of these criteria. On this theory, asserting (thinking, etc.) is construed as a relation between a person and a proposition. Thus we have the picture2:

Karl says that Johann loves Gretchen *- ------------.

PERSON R PROPOSITION

Wittgenstein rejects this picture. To see why he rejects it, we must

1 Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Ithaca: 1964), p. 299.

2 Compare Russell's "map" in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in Logic and Knowledge, edited by Marsh (Macmillan, 1956), p. 225.



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take an excursion through his theory of language and, in particular, through the criteria governing the ideal or logically perspicuous language sketched in the Tractatus.3

The ideal language outlined in the Tractatus has two basic syntactic categories: names and propositions. Correspondingly, Witt- genstein adumbrates two ontological categories: objects and facts. Language, of course, is about the world. Thus we find in Wittgen- stein two primitive semantic ties, two "relations between words and the world", which jointly give rise to an ineffability thesis.

(P1) Facts are statable (but not nameable). Propositions state facts.

(P2) Objects are nameable (but not statable). Names denote (bedeuten) objects.4

The Wittgensteinian analysis, however, goes deeper. Proposi- tions not only state facts; they are facts. And it is by virtue of the logical form which is shared between fact and fact that a proposition is able to be about the world. Analogously, names not only denote objects; they are objects. More precisely, insofar as it plays a role in a proposition, a name is a linguistic simple deputizing (vertreten) in the articulated fact which is a proposition for the object which enters into the articulated fact which the proposition states. Thus in the semantic relations between a proposition and the world, we find a correlation of facts (the fact in the world and the fact which is a proposition) by means of a correlation of their objects (the linguistic objects-names which are "not further analyzable"-and the objects in the world for which they deputize) . The whole is called a "depiction": Fact pictures fact. And here we find a key to one part of Wittgenstein's positive solution.

The thesis of the non-nameability of facts brings out the

3I have conducted an extended defense of the interpretations to be offered here in "New Perspectives on the Tractatus," Dialogue, IV, 4 (1966) and "Wittgenstein's Theory of Language as Picture," American Philosophical Quarterly, V, 1 (1968): 18-30.

4 The parallels with Frege are as striking as they are instructive. Frege, too, has a dipartite ontology: objects and functions. Objects are nameable. Functions are not nameable. And so we have a Fregean ineffability thesis as well. But Frege runs aground on the linguistic side. For Frege, sentences are names. He, too, recognizes a double semantic tie: linguistic items have reference and sense. But since the double tie of reference and sense applies both to subject expressions (the linguistic correlates of objects) and predicate expressions (the linguistic correlates of functions), as well as to sentences, Frege is unable to come to grips with Bradley's Regress and is forced to fall back upon 'the metaphor of "unsaturatedness."




grounds for Wittgenstein's rejection of the Russell-Moore theory of assertion and belief. Propositions are facts. A person, within the context of the Russell-Moore theory, is denoted by a name and is, for all logical purposes, an object. Thus the proposed analysis of belief sentences takes the logical form

(object) R (fact)

where 'R' is supposed to represent a real relation. For Wittgen- stein this is simply impossible. Genuine relations relate objects and objects only. That this is so can be seen when one examines language. Relation-expressions relate names. Names denote objects. Facts are not nameable. And so, no genuine relation can relate objects and facts. Yet objects and facts do stand in relations -objects, for example, enter into facts-and so we are brought to the threshold of a second theme of ineffability in Wittgenstein.

A relation, so-called, between object and fact or between fact and fact cannot be a genuine relation. For Wittgenstein, it is what he calls variously a formal relation, a pseudo-relation, a structural relation, or an internal relation. And formal relations belong to the realm of what can be shown. "What can be shown cannot be said." (4.1212)

4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.

What expresses itself in language, we cannot ex- press by means of language.

Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.

Rather,

4.125 The existence of an internal relation between possible situations [facts] expresses itself in language by means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them.

Analogously, a formal relation between an object and a fact is shown ("expresses itself") by a formal relation between a name and a proposition. Names are linguistic objects. Propositions are linguistic facts. Just as the non-linguistic object enters into (occurs in) the non-linguistic fact depicted, so the linguistic object-a name-



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occurs in (enters into) the linguistic fact-the proposition which depicts it. Formal relation represents formal relation. Here there is no saying but only showing. Objects cannot be stated. Facts cannot be named. Formal relations, however, can be neither stated nor named-they can only be shown.5

The Russell-Moore analysis, then, is impossible on Tractarian grounds. What is the alternative? Recall our text:

(a) Karl says that Johann loves Gretchen

We could as well have said, "Karl says something which means that Johann loves Gretchen", and here 'says', at least, appears relatively unproblematic. Credit where due. The analysis is, essentially Car- nap's, and it provides us with a convenient second point of depar- ture.

(b) ( 3 s) (Karl utters s . &. s means that Johann loves Gretchen)

Karl, let us suppose, is a native speaker of German. In particular, then, let the truth-grounds of (b) be given by

(c) Karl utters 'Johann liebt Gretchen' . &. (Karrs utterance of ) 'Johann liebt Gretchen' means that Johann loves Gretchen.

Recall our criteria. The analysis is apparently a good one-all the better for spreading the two jobs constituting the criteria of an adequate analysis between two conjuncts. The second conjunct focuses on the fact that it is that Johann loves Gretchen which is said; the first, on the fact that it is Karl who speaks. Although neither conjunct is sufficient in isolation as a report of Karl's assertion, the conjunction of the two seems a reasonable beginning for an analysis adequate to the criteria laid down thus far. But what do these two claims come to on Wittgenstein's view of language?

For the Carnapian analysis, meaning is a relation between a sentence and a fact. But for Wittgenstein, we recall, sentences are facts. Now, I am not here illegitimately running together sentences and propositions, 'Satzzeichen' and 'Satz'. In the Tractatus, 'Satz' classifies functionally items which 'Satzzeichen' classifies structurally, but there is in re only one set of items to be classified-and, in terms

5 A paradigm: The one thing you cannot do with the sentence " 'Socrates' names Socrates" is explain what 'Socrates' names to someone who does not already know. (Vide 3.263).




of ontological categories, all of these are facts. Thus it is perfectly correct to say that (some) propositional signs (or sentences) are propositions, just as it is perfectly correct to say that some pieces of wood are chess-pawns.6 And so, for Wittgenstein, the second conjunct of the Carnapian analysis has the logical form

(fact) R (fact) and we have again reached the boundaries' of communicability. The sentence

(d) (Karl's utterance of) 'Johann liebt Gretchen' means that Johann loves Gretchen

looks to be of the form "the complex sign 'aRb' says that a stands to b in the relation R". But Wittgenstein has argued in 3.1432 that this is an incorrect reading. Rather, he claims, we ought to put "that 'Johann' stands to 'Gretchen' in a certain relation says that Johann loves Gretchen." Specifically, we have

(e) that 'Johann' and 'Gretchen' stand respectively to the left and the right of a 'liebt' says that Johann loves Gretchen.

Language pictures the world. The second conjunct of the Carnapian analysis, in particular, is a claim that one fact pictures another fact. But, for Wittgenstein, this cannot be said at all; it must be shown. What remains of the second conjunct of the Carnapian analysis then, is one fact only, the linguistic fact which is Karl's uttered sentence "Johann liebt Gretchen". That this sentence means that Johann loves Gretchen is shown, not said, by the (formal) fact that the sentence has logical form identical with that of the fact which it depicts. And here, as we have seen, we have a "correlation of facts by means of a correlation of their objects". 'Johann' deputizes for Johann; 'Gretchen' deputizes for Gretchen; and the two names (linguistic objects) stand in a linguistic relation which is logically isomorphic to a possible relation between Johann and Gretchen-the warm and human relation of love.

And what of the first conjunct of the Carnapian analysis? Many commentators have felt the incompleteness of Wittgenstein's own remarks in 5.542. Anscombe, for example, writes

It is perhaps not quite right to say that 'A judges p' is of the form "'p" says that p'. What he should have said was that

6I have argued this point at length in my "Wittgenstein's Theory of Language as Picture" cited above.



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the business part of 'A judges p', the part which relates to something having as its content a potential representation of the fact that p, was of the form "'p" says that p': 'A believes p', or 'conceives p' or 'says p' must mean 'There occurs in A, or is pro- duced by A, something which is (capable of being) a picture of p'.7

The first conjunct of the Carnapian analysis is meant to supply the missing piece.

(f) Karl utters 'Johann liebt Gretchen'.

But what becomes of this conjunct on Wittgenstein's theory of language? How would Wittgenstein treat propositions of the form 'A utters S', where 'S' is replaced by the name of some sentence? The surprising answer is that the entire question, on Tractarian grounds, is incoherent. The one thing we cannot do is replace 'S' by the name of a sentence, for sentences are facts and facts are not nameable. Thus 'A utters S' has the logical form

(object) R (fact)

and on Wittgenstein's analysis this cannot literally be said. We seem to have returned to our original quandaries.

There is, however, one piece of data which we have not yet employed in our attempted exegesis. On Wittgenstein's interpretation, one consequence of his analysis is that the subject is revealed as composite. (5.5421) The apparent form of the first conjunct is

(A) R (fact) For Wittgenstein, the actual form will reveal the compositeness of A. Thus it seems reasonable to propose, as a first approximation, the retranslation

(fact) e (A)

where A is here construed as a class or bundle of facts. In the case in point, (f) takes the form

(g) 'Johann liebt Gretchen' e Karl

where Karl is here regarded as a bundle of facts-linguistic facts and others as well.8

7 G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (New York: 1959), p. 88.

8 This is firmly within the tradition in which Wittgenstein wrote. Hume




Now the claim (g) is of the form

(fact) e (bundle of facts)

and so, on Wittgenstein's account, equally unsayable, for to say it we would have to name facts, and this we cannot do. If it cannot be said, then it must be shown. But how can we show that one fact is a member of a bundle of facts? To answer this question, we must solve the Bundling Problem.

The primary difficulty with the Humean analysis of self as a bundle of ideas and impressions (facts, thoughts, experiences, or what have you) lies in the question of what relation among the members of the bundle holds them together as a bundle. This I call the Bundling Problem. Hume runs aground on it. Wittgenstein, however, need not be at a loss. For, on his view, there are relations between facts, and, thus, if the self is a bundle of facts, there can be relations which hold it together as a bundle. But since the relations obtain among facts, they cannot be genuine relations but must be, one and all, formal relations.

Which formal relations will do? At this point we must recon- struct. Wittgenstein is remarkably reticent, but I should like to make a proposal. Consider the set of rules governing the regular inter- change of the indexical signs 'I', 'you' and 'he' with the adoption of various points of view. If I, from my point of view, say that I am in pain, you, from your point of view say, speaking to me, 'You are in pain' and, speaking to a third party, adopting yet a different point of view, say of me that I am in pain by saying 'He is in pain', refer- ring to me. What I wish to propose as Wittgenstein's view is that, in a perspicuous language, indexicality would manifest itself as a purely formal feature. Such indexical signs as 'I', 'you', and 'he' would not occur at all. Rather, the point of view would be shown, not said, and it would be shown by the formal fact that the propositions constituting a self stand in certain formal relations to one another, formal relations logically isomorphic to the regular pat- terned changes in the occurrence of personal indices in the propositions which we utter.9

had already "analyzed" the self into a bundle of ideas and impressions, and Russell (op. cit., p. 191) was perfectly prepared to identify Socrates with the series of his (sic) experiences.

9 For a preliminary mapping of the formal relationships of indexical reference, see Hector-Neri Castanieda, "'He,' A Study in the Logic of Self- consciousness," Ratio, VIII (1966), and "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American Philosophical Quarterly, IV, 2 (April, 1967).



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Perhaps the best way to sketch concretely the machinery of shown indexical reference is to describe a segment of the Tractarian world from an omniscient's point of view. The language which we shall use for this description-let us call it LO-must be capable of stating the facts, linguistic and non-linguistic, of which the Tractarian world consists (1.1), so I shall use ordinary English, en- riched with several technical devices. Formal relations among facts in the Tractarian world will then be shown in LO by formal (syntactic) features of the propositions of LO which state those facts. For simplicity, let us restrict ourselves to a two-person segment of the Tractarian world and, subject to the limitations of printed text, select two formal features of sentences to represent the formal relations joining facts into bundles constituting Tractarian selves. I shall distinguish these features typographically by the use of italics and boldface. I establish the following conventions:

(Cl) That a sentence of LO is in italics shows that the fact which it states is a constituent of the bundle constituting Karl.

(C2) That a sentence of LO is in boldface shows that the fact which it states is a constituent of the bundle constituting Johann.

Thus, for example,

(1) The hand at (x1, yi, z1) is damaged at t1.

represents a constituent of the Tractarian self which is Karl-what we would call an event in Karrs history-injury to his hand, whereas

(2) The tree branch at (x2, y2, z2) is damaged at t2.

presents an event in the Tractarian world, but one which is not a constituent of any Tractarian person.

In order to examine a stating in the Tractarian world from our omniscient's viewpoint, we shall need to add to LO the machinery for stating linguistic facts. To this end, let us employ the following definition schema:

(DI) x is FF1-counterpart = x stands to the left of an Fis F1. (D2) x and y are in fR--counterpart = x and y stand respec-

tively to the left and right of an FRY.

We can now make use of the convenient fiction that the language




used by Karl and Johann in the Tractarian world-let us call it LT --is itself ordinary English, subject, of course, to such modifications as will be needed to bring indexical reference into the realm of the shown. Thus, for example, we may state in LO:

(3) 'Johann' and 'Gretchen' are in 'loves'-counterpart.

(3) is a report in LO of the very occurrence in the Tractarian world which has been our principal topic-a saying by Karl, in LT, that Johann loves Gretchen. That it is that Johann loves Gretchen which is 'said is shown by the fact that the proposition (fact) reported shares logical form with the (possible) fact which it depicts. That is, as we have noted, 'Johann' deputizes for Johann; 'Gretchen' deputizes for Gretchen; and the two names stand in a linguistic relation, the relation of 'loves'-counterpart, which is logically isomorphic to a possible relation between Johann and Gretchen, the relation of love. That it is Karl who says it is also shown, in this case by the formal fact that the fact which (3) reports stands in certain formal relations to that reported by (1) and those other facts, linguistic and non-linguistic, which constitute the Tractarian person Karl. It is this formal fact which we represent in LO by a formal feature of (1) and (3)-their shared italic typography. Similarly, a saying by Johann that Karl is in pain would be reported in LO by:

(4) 'Karr is 'in pain-counterpart.

Here it is the boldface which shows that it is a constituent of Johann which is reported.

Let me now attempt to model the hypothesis which I have advanced that the formal relations binding facts into persons are indexical relations by using the same typographical features to de- velop the conventions of shown indexical reference. We shall need to introduce one additional sign into LT, the language of the Tractarian world. Let us suppose that the letter 'p', with appropriate formal features, is the vehicle of personal indexical reference in LT. Now consider the following triad of sentences in LO:

(5) 'p' is 'in pain'-counterpart (6) 'p' is 'n pain'-counterpart (7) 'p' is 'in pain'-counterpart

According to the conventions which we have established, (5) reports a saying by Karl in which indexical reference is made. Note now that the letter 'p' is italicized. That is, there is agreement be-



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tween the typographical features of the 'p' and the basic typographical form of the proposition. This itself is a formal fact, and we select it to be the representation in LO of a first person indexical reference made in LT. Thus (5) reports a reference by Karl to him- self, reporting a fact which, were Karl's language to be identical with ordinary English, we might put briefly as

(5') Karl says, 'I am in pain'.

The convention which we have thus adopted may be stated as

(C3) That there is agreement, but no disagreement, between the 'p' and the basic formal feature of the fact which is person-constitutive shows that the indexical reference is first person.

Consider, next, (6) which, according to our conventions, reports a saying by Johann in which indexical reference is made. In this case, the letter 'p' is italicized but not in boldface. That is, there is disagreement between the typographical features of the 'p' and the basic typographical form of the proposition. This itself is, again, a formal fact, which has as its counterpart a formal relation among linguistic facts in the Tractarian world. We select it to represent third person indexical reference according to the following convention:

(C4) That there is disagreement, but no agreement, between the 'p' and the basic formal feature of the fact which is person-constitutive shows that the indexical reference is third person.

Thus (6) reports a saying by Johann of Karl that he (Karl) is in pain, a fact which we might put briefly as:

(6') Johann says of Karl, 'He is in pain'.

Note that the disambiguation of reference which we accomplish through the phrases 'of Karr and 'he (Karl)' is accomplished in LT by the agreement of the formal feature of the 'p' with that constitutive of the person Karl. Such automatic disambiguation of indexical reference is a feature contributing to the 'ideality' or 'logical per- fection' of a language, and so it is nice to find it in our partially constricted fragment of LT, the ideal language adumbrated in the Tractatus.

Finally, let us look at (7). Here there is both agreement and disagreement of the typographical features of the 'p' and the basic




typographical form of the proposition-the 'p' is both in boldface and italicized. The corresponding convention will be:

(C5) That there is both agreement and disagreement between the 'p' and the basic formal feature of the fact which is person-constitutive shows that the indexical reference is second person.

Thus, (7) represents a saying by Johann to Karl that he (Karl) is in pain, a fact which we present briefly as:

(7') Johann says to Karl, 'You are in pain'.

Let us, now, very briefly, play out the last act in our romantic drama by developing a series of examples illustrative of the dual role which I have assigned certain formal features of facts in the Tractarian world-as bearers of indexical reference and as constitutive of Tractarian selves. The simplest method is to present each example twice, once in brief form and once as reported in LO.

(8') Johann says, 'I love Gretchen'. (8) 'p' and 'Gretchen' are in 'loves'-counterpart. (9') Karl says to Johann, 'You love Gretchen'. (9) 'p' and 'Gretchen' are in 'loves -counterpart. (10') Karl says to Johann, I hate you'. (10) 'p' and 'p' are in 'hates -counterpart. (11') Johann says of Karl, 'I hate him'. (11) 'p' and 'p' are in 'hates'-counterpart.

If it is the case that a point of view is marked off not by vary- ing personal indices but rather by internal relations among a set of propositions (i.e., facts), then we have a solution to the Bundling Problem. The binding of facts into a single bundle which constitutes a person is accomplished by those facts all being internally related to one another in such a way that the set of formal relations marks off and is jointly constitutive of a single point of view. This interpretation brings out the deeper appropriateness of Wittgen- stein's treatment of solipsism:

5.62 For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of the only language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.63 I am my world.



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On the interpretation which I am now proposing, the distinction between self and others cannot be stated. Rather it is shown by the formal relations among facts constituting, on the one hand, self, and on the other, others.

What is the upshot of the interpretation which I have outlined? Recall that Anscombe said that '"p" says that p' would be the business part of 'A says that p'. On my interpretation, we see that this is not quite correct. If by "analysis" one means the production of propositions equivalent to the analysandum, then, literally, 'A says that p' has no analysis. For it cannot be said. Nor should this come as much of a shock. Wittgenstein scrupulously accepted the consequences of his positions, and all propositions are part of a single extentional language. But intentional propositions cannot be recon- structed as extentional. Consequently, what they try to say cannot be said. For Wittgenstein, then, what they try to say must be shown. In fact, recalling our criteria of adequacy, there are two things which must be shown. Karl says Johann loves Gretchen. What stands in re to correspond to this claim is a single fact and that a linguistic fact or proposition. Call it the L-fact. The L-fact is the fact that a 'Johann' precedes and a 'Gretchen' succeeds a 'liebt'.10 This fact (itself in the world) stands in formal relations to other facts in the world. Some of these relations are semantic. 'Johann' deputizes for Johann; 'Gretchen', for Gretchen; and the L-fact as a whole shares logical form with the (possible) fact that Johann loves Gretchen. It is this which satisfies our first criterion. That these formal relations between the L-fact and the world obtain shows that what is said is that Johann loves Gretchen. Others of the formal relations between the L-fact and further facts in the world are what we might call indexical relations. The L-fact is internally related to each of a group of other facts, some linguistic and some not, which collectively constitute the person Karl by uniquely individuating a point of view. That these formal relations between the L-fact and other facts in the world obtain shows that it is Karl who says that Johann loves Gretchen.

Thus, in sum, we receive no truth-functional analysis of

(a) Karl says that Johann loves Gretchen. 10 The ambiguity of structure and function noted in the case of 'Satzzei-

chen' and 'Satz' extends here to the quotation marks. For a 'liebt' may either be an item having a certain structure, the identity conditions for which are geometrical, or an item having a certain function, the identity conditions for which are those adequate for sameness of expressed proposition.




That proposition vanishes completely. In Wittgenstein's ideal language, it cannot be said at all. What is said is simply that Johann loves Gretchen. That it is said, and that it is Karl who says it- these are both shown.

What, now, of the other propositional verbs? What, for example, of

(h) Karl thinks that Johann loves Gretchen.

Recall Wittgenstein's letter to Russell:

I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out ....

'Does a Gedanke consist of words?" No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know.11

Thought, in other words, is not language. But the logic of thought is the logic of language. And thoughts are, in all formal respects, fully analogous to propositions. Thus, on Wittgenstein's view, if Karl thinks that Johann loves Gretchen, there is in re some fact which is not a linguistic fact, but which is formally analogous to a linguistic fact. Call it the T-fact. The T-fact contains constituents. And if the T-fact is to be a thought that Johann loves Gretchen, it must fulfill three conditions: First, some constituent of the T-fact must deputize for Johann; second, some constituent must deputize for Gretchen; finally, the T-fact as a whole must share logical form with the (possible) fact that Johann loves Gretchen. That these formal relations between the T-fact and other facts in the world obtain shows that what is thought is that Johann loves Gretchen. What is it which shows that it is Karl who thinks it? Here we pro- ceed exactly as we did before. The T-fact is internally related to each of a set of (linguistic and non-linguistic) facts in such a way that the formal relations are jointly constitutive of a point of view and the bundle of facts, taken as a whole, constitutes the person whose point of view it is-namely Karl.

Once we have accounted for stating and thinking, the remain- ing propositional verbs fall into place. Belief, for example, can be

11 Notebooks 1914-1916 (New York: 1961), Appendix III, pp. 129-130.



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given the standard treatment as a disposition to think and/or say. Knowledge generates difficulties of its own, of course, but if there is something to be said for repairing the analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief, it will do as well for Wittgenstein as for anyone else.

We can see, too, why Wittgenstein writes

5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this require- ment.)

On the Russell-Moore theory, stating, thinking, or judging is a relation between a person and something else. There seems to be, however, no a priori reason why that relation should hold only between persons and propositions. Judgement being primitive and un- analyzable, it is hard to see what would preclude, for example, the Thames from one day showing up as one of the relata, placing Russell in the awkward position of judging a river. On Wittgen- stein's treatment however, if a judgement is made, then there must exist in re some fact, linguistic or mental, (an L-fact or a T-fact) which is, formally, a proposition, that is, which says something. And pieces of nonsense, like rivers, say nothing.

I began this exegesis by remarking that the correct interpretation of Wittgenstein's solution to the problem of intentionally could only be seen when one realizes how completely Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, does away with the self without, in the last analysis, doing away with the self completely. I submit that the apho- rism has now been made good. For what corresponds in re to the proposition 'A says that p' is not two items, a self and a fact stand- ing- in a relation, but rather only one item, a fact-and that fact a proposition. And what corresponds in Wittgenstein's ideal language to the proposition 'A says that p' is nothing at all. But the self has not completely vanished. Rather, it has been transposed into what is logically quite a different key. For the self re-emerges as a composite, the components of which are facts which stand in formal relations constitutive of a point of view.

Ingenious as Wittgenstein's proposals are, however, it is clear that they simply will not do as the last word on the intentionality of the mental. For one thing, it is not clear that the Wittgensteinian treatment of the self as a complex of internally related facts is an




adequate basis for an account of the peculiar and irreducible unity of the self manifested in one's own awareness of oneself as a rational agent who moves, thinks, and acts in a complex world videe Kant's "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" ). For another, the Cartesian reduction of perception to cognition (percipio to cogitato) demanded by Witt- genstein's position, and the consequent assimilation of complex objects to the ontological category of facts, seem unacceptable. Yet it is clear that Wittgenstein both recognized these reductions as consequences of his stand on intentionality and accepted them.

5.5423 To perceive a complex is to perceive that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way:

The most obvious shortcoming of the Tractarian thesis, however, lies in Wittgenstein's complete inability to give an account of iterated oratio obliqua. For if

(a) Karl says that Johann loves Gretchen

is a ladder-language proxy for a pair of formal facts which, in the ideal language of the Tractatus, can only be shown, it is obvious that

(h) Pierre says that Karl says that Johann loves Gretchen

can, in Wittgenstein's ideal language, be neither said nor shown. That it cannot be said is, I think, clear from the account which we have given of the simpler (a). That it cannot be shown can be seen when we recognize that, for it to be so, it would be necessary for the formal fact that several facts stand in indexical and semantic formal relations itself to stand in indexical and semantic formal relations to a collection of other facts. But this is impossible. A semantic formal relation is a relation between a statable and a proposition which states it. But formal facts are not statables, nor are they propositions. Thus, a formal fact cannot itself stand in semantic relations to other facts. On Wittgenstein's account, iterated propositional verbs are worse than nonsense. Thus Wittgenstein's account will not do.

Yet Wittgenstein's achievement should not be underrated, for, consonant with the criteria of adequacy of the Tractatus, the thesis of extentionality has, in a way, been made good. But the victory is atypical. In no sense has the intentional been reduced to or analyzed in terms of the extentional. Rather, like the semantic, the



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intentional has been relegated to the realm of showing. Indeed, it would not be too far from the truth to say that what is important in intentionality is but a species of the semantic, for it is the sharing of logical form which turns out to be central. This point, I believe, is of more than merely exegetical interest. But that is a problem for a war, not a battle, and so I shall end here.*

* An earlier version of this paper was read to the Philosophy of Language section of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, St. Louis, May, 1968. I wish to thank my commentator, Professor Leonard Linsky, for his helpful remarks which resulted in the removal of several unclarities and a couple of outright mistakes. I am indebted to the Smith Fund of the University of North Carolina for financial assistance in preparing this paper for publication.



intentionality and self in the tractatus

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