INTENTIONALITY AND INTENTIONAL CONNECTIONS

DALE JACQUETTE

I

In Quality and Concept, George Bealer criticizes Roderick M. Chisholm's contingency criterion for the intentionality of syntacti- cally simple sentence prefixes. Bealer attempts to show that Chisholm's criterion provides neither a necessary nor sufficient mark of the intentional. But he fails to notice that the very same style of counter example raised against Chisholm's criterion can also be advanced as an objection to his own revised definition of intentional connections. There is an intuitively satisfying way of amending Chisholm's original formulation of the contingency criterion so that it avoids these criticisms without falling into the errors of Bealer's revision. For this the criterion is narrowed in direct application from the set of syntactically simple sentence preffLxes to the set of semantically simple sentence prefixes relative to a language. The scope of the criterion is then regained and enlarged in indirect application by means of an expansion or recovery principle.

II

The contingency criterion of intentionality which Bealer attacks is found in Chisholm's Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on "Intentionality". 1 The criterion states:

We may say that a simple sentence prefLx,M, is intentional if, for every sentence p, M(p) is logically contingent.2

The restriction of the criterion to syntactically simple sentence prefLxes is indicated by Chisholm's stipulation that:

T

A simple sentence prefix may be said to be an expression that contains no proper part that is logically equivalent to a sentence or to a sentence function and that is such that the

13

DALE JACQUETTE

result of prefixing it to a sentence in parentheses is another sentence. ~

It is important to see that the criterion is limited to expressions that already fit or can easily be reworded into a canonical syntax in which a prefix is applied or attached to a sentence. 4 Although the criterion may not provide a complete test for intentional contexts generally, it is at least supposed to do so for the somewhat more restricted range o f intentional contexts expressed by syntactically simple sentence prefixes. If other intentional contexts can be reduced to these, then the criterion may ultimately provide an adequate universal test of intentionality.

III

Bealer disregards the admitted limitations o f Chisholm's criterion, and finds the restriction to prefix locutions objectionable.

. . . Chisholm's treatment of intentional language must be classified as a special case of the multiple-operator approach to in ten t iona l i ty . . , since 'Whatever x believes is true' contains the predicate 'believes', which expresses an intentional relation, it would seem to qualify as an intentional sentence. However, it is not clear that Chisholm's treatment helps to show this, for predicates are not sentence prefixes. It would seem better, therefore, to bypass Chisholm's linguistic superstructure and instead to define the concept of intentional relation straight- away. This is what I advocate, s

But it is uninteresting to condemn the criterion because of conditions explicitly limiting its adoption and use. That the criterion does not indicate the intentionality of every intentional sentence is no point against it. What is more, the sentence Bealer finds troublesome includes a syntactically simple sentence prefix that satisfies Chisholm's criterion, 'x believes ( - - ) ' . Bealer insists that predicates are not sentence prefixes, and in general this is true. But some terms are both predicates and prefixes, and there is nothing to prevent quantifying over (if not into) intentional prefix contexts. Chisholm might say that a sentence is intentional if or if and only if it contains an intentional syntactically simple sentence prefix satisfying the contingency criterion, as in (Vp) (x believes (p) D p [is true]). 6

14

INTENTIONALITY

IV

The core of Bealer's argument is not concerned with problems of scope or application, but with the inadequacy of Chisholm's criterion in its own right. Bealer offers several putative counter- examples in an effort to show that the criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient. He maintains that if the criterion is not to depend on accidental syntactical features of ordinary English, then it must apply to any genuine language.

For example, let English* be the language that results when English is supplemented with certain new vocabulary items. In English* let M~ be a syntactically primitive sentence prefix that is synonymous to the complex sentence prefrx:

Socrates is Greek & ( - - or not - - ) . Now observe that, for any sentence A, M~(A) is a contingent sentence. Take an example: Socrates is Greek & (1 +1=3 or not 1 + 1 =3) is a contingent sentence. Thus M ~(1 + 1 =3) is contingent. In this way, M1 qualifies as intentional according to the definition. However, M~ is clearly not an intentional sentence prefix. 7

This is supposed to prove that Chi sholm's contingency criterion is not sufficient. There are some nonintentional syntactically simple sentence prefixes that nevertheless produce contingent prefixed sentences when attached to other sentences.

To challenge the criterion as a necessary mark of the intentional, Bealer deffmes M2 as a syntactically simple sentence prefix of English* synonymous with the complex sentence preftx, ' ( - - ) or John believes that ( - - ) ' .

There are numerous sentences A such that M2(A) is not contingent. For example, since '(2+2=4) or John believes that (2+2=4)' is necessary, 3,/2(2+2=4) is necessary. Yet there is good reason for thinking that M 2 is an intentional prefix: '(1+1-~3) or John believes that (1 +1=3)' is necessarily equivalent to 'John believes that (1+1=3)', which is undeniably inten- t ional)

Here it appears that the contingency criterion is not necessary because there are sentence prefixes that are syntactically simple in some languages, which, when attached to certain sentences, result in prefixed sentences that are intentional but not contingent.

These are the most convincing of Bealer's counter examples. He offers several others which should briefly be considered before

15

DALE JACQUETTE

returning to M~ and M2. The first introduces M3 as the preftx '9 believes that ( - - ) ' . Bealer writes: "This prefix fails to satsifythe def'mition. E.g., M3(2+2=4) is not contingent since '9 believes that 2+2=4' is not contingent. ''9 But Bealer argues that M3 is an intentional prefix, since M3(2+2=4) implies " . . . an undeniably intentional proposition, namely, the proposition that something believes that 2+2=4. "1~ The difficulty in this part of Bealer's argument is that although "9 believes that 2+2=4' implies that 'Something believes that 2+2=4", '9 believes that 2+2=4 , does not significantly or nontrivially imply that 'Something believes that 2+2=4'. Since '9 believes that 2+2=4' is, as Bealer observes, not contingent, but logically necessarily false, it implies any and every proposition, including 'Pret'tx M3 is intentional and prefix M3 is not intentional'. To hold that '9 believes that ( - - - ) ' is intentional because "9 believes that 2+2=4' implies that 'Something believes that 2+2=4' is like insisting that 'Gottlob Frege is a prime number such that ( - - ) " is a mathematical prefix, on the grounds that 'Gottlob Frege is a prime number such that 2+2=4' implies that 'Something is a prime number such that 2+2=4 '. But of course the preftx is non mathematical; it is outside the realm and vocabulary of mathematics, and is not a part of any mathematical theory, even though it includes in its formulation concepts that are properly part of mathematics. (The same holds for Bealer's example M4, synony- mous with the prefix, "This positron believes that ( - - ) ' . Bealer cautiously asserts: "Perhaps M4 is a counterexample since, for all we know, 'This positron believes that 2+2=4' is not contingent. ''11)

Finally, Bealer proposes a counter example involving Ms, a syntactically simple sentence prefix of English* synonymous with the English prefix 'John introspects that ( - - ) ' . Bealer explains: "This is a counterexample s ince . . . 'John introspects that someone other than John is in pain' is not contingent. However, Ms is undeniably intentional. ''t2 Bealer is correct to hold that the prefix is intentional. But it is not seN-evident that the preftxed sentence is necessarily false. There may ultimately be no better test for what is logically possible in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind than the consistent description of what is at least conceivable or imaginable (though the possible and imaginable do not always coincide). Surely there are imaginable circumstances, different from the actual, in which introspection delivers up propositional informa- tion about the pain of others. This would not be introspection o f another's pain (which no doubt is impossible), but only the

16

INTENTIONALITY

knowledge gained by introspection that another is in pain. The possibility would not entail that pain is felt or experienced as pain by another person's act of introspection, and there appears to be no logical prohibition against propositional information of this or any other kind from being presented to the mind by reflection on its own internal psychological states. The propositional object of introspection 'that x is in pain' cannot be eliminated in favor of nonpropositional introspection o f pain itself, for that would make the counter example inapplicable to sentence prefix contexts, and therefore inapplicable to Chisholm's criterion. If it is conceivable or imaginable that introspection might yield ordinary empirical facts about the world, then tentatively or provisionally it may be regarded as logically contingent, even if actually false. The same should hold for introspective determination of the fact that another person is in pain. I f there is a decisive reason why the fact of another's pain cannot logically be known by introspection, Bealer has not said what it is. The counter example is at best unproven and therefore inconclusive.

V

The apparent difficulties for Chisholm's criterion posed by counter examples M I - M s move Bealer to propose a diagnosis and alternative approach. He sets aside the linguistic framework of Chisholm's criterion, and makes no further mention of syntactically simple sentence prefLxes. Instead he offers a definition of a real intentional entity, a relation or connection that connects psycholog- ical subjects to complex ideas. The definition states:

A connection is intentional if and only if it can contingently connect an individual to a complex idea independently of the veracity of the idea. 14

This seems to have the virtue of avoiding the counter examples to Chisholm's contingency criterion, since the new proposal is not limited by restriction to syntactically simple sentence prefixes. The emphasis on the contingency of intentional attitudes in Chisholm's criterion is preserved, is but removed from any danger of conflict with M r M s . Yet Bealer's definition of intentional connections is subject to'precisely the same style of counter example as that offered against Chisholm's criterion.

It is remarkable that of all Bealer's counter examples to Chisholm's

17

DALE JACQUETTE

criterion, only the first, Mr, is potentially damaging. Chisholm does not attempt an analysis or definition of intentionality, and is therefore not committed to providing both necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept. On the contrary, it is likely that Chisholm regards intentionality as a primitive psychological-semantic relation incapable of further analysis or definition. Even if Chisholm had offered a biconditional characterization of intentionality, that would still fall short of definition or analysis because of discrepancies between synonymy of meaning and mere logical equivalence.

Bealer's misinterpretation of Chisholm's conditional criterion as a biconditional 'analysis' or 'definition' begins with a fatal misquotation or faulty paraphrase. 16 He formulates Chisholm's criterion as follows:

A simple sentence prefix M is intentional if and only if for every sentence A, M(A) is a contingent sentence, t7

But in offering a partial criterion of intentionality for some intentional contexts Chisholm says that if (and not, and only if) syntactically simple sentence pref'txM produces a logically contingent sentence for every other sentence to which it is attached, then sentence prefLx M is intentional.

This makes putative counter examples about sentence prefftxes that are intentional but that produce pref'Lxed sentences that are not contingent entirely irrelevant. The only kind of counter examples that might hold sway are those involving sentence prefixes that are not intentional, but that produce logically contingent preFtxed sentences when" attached to other sentences. Bealer's counter- examples M24k/s are of the 'intentional-but-not-contingent' type, whereas only M~ is of the relevant 'contingent-but-not-intentional' type. If Chisholm had attempted an analysis of the concept of intentionality, or an if and only if biconditional characterization in which contingency is made a necessary condition of the intentionality of a syntactically simple sentence preftx, then it would be easy to refute the criterion without resorting to Bealer's examples by postulating the English* prefLx synonymous with the complex 'John believes-while-fully-doubting that ( - - ) ' . This is also arguably intentional, but results in a logically impossible rather than contingent prefixed sentence for any sentence taken as argument. Chisholm's criterion as Chisholm formulates it is not subject to any of these kinds of counter examples.

Bealer's misquotation and misinterpretation cause him wrongly to

18

INTENTIONALITY

identify an 'inconsistency' in Chisholm's doctrine of the irreducibility of intentionality. Commenting on the Chisholm-Sellars correspon- dence onthe primacy of the intentional, Bealer writes: " . . . Chisholm's position that no intentional sentence can be analyzed without appeal to further intentional vocabulary is nearly inconsistent with his view that the concept of an intentional sentence has a purely logical analysis. ' 'is But again, Chisholm carefully avoids analysis and offers a criterion rather than a definition because he believes that intentionality is incapable of analysis or eliminative reduction. Bealer falsely attributes incorrect philosophical positions to Chisholm, criticizes him for holding views he never held, and finds inconsistencies where none exist.

VI

We may accordingly suppose that Bealer's counterexamples M2~/s are neutralized. The strategy behind the formulation of M1 can then be made explicit. The technique is formalized by an abstraction device.~9

M1 = [Socrates is Greek & (x V%x)] x

(Here and below some of the variables are restricted as in bounded quantification to sentences or propositions by the truth functional conditions placed on them within the abstract.)

The counterexample obtains when prefix M1 is applied or attached to the sentence '1+1=3'.

M1(1+1=3) [Socrates is Greek & (x v ~x)] x ( l+ l=3) Socrates is Greek & (1+1=3 v ~(1+1=3)) Socrates is Greek and 1+1=3 or not 1+1=3

Similar transformations underwrite Bealer's M2 counter example.

M2 = [x v John believes that x] x . ~ (2 +2 --4) [x v John believes that x] x (2+2=4) 2+2=4 or John believes that 2+2=4

The abstracts are conversions of compound conjunctions or disjunctions. M~ abstracts the conjunction, and M2 the disjunction, of two sentences:

19

DALE JACQUETTE

(M1) Socrates is Greek (&) (VX)(X [is true] v %x [is true]) [or (3x ) ( . . . x . . . ) ] .

(M2) (Vx)(x [istrue]) [ o r ( 3 x ) ( . . . x . . . ) ] (v) (Vx)(John believes that x) [or (3x ) ( . . . x . . . ) ] .

The same method can now be deployed against Bealer's definition of intentional connections.

VII

To appreciate Bealer's definition, it is necessary to understand his theory of genuine qualities, connections, and conditions, and his distinction between two traditional conceptions of intensional entities.

Bealer affirms: "According to conception 1 intensional entities are identical if and only if they are necessarily equivalent. According to conception 2, each definable intensional entity is such that, when it is defined completely, it has a unique, non-circular definition. ''2~ He contends that genuine qualities, connections, and conditions conform to conception l, and " . . . fix the logical, causal, and phenomenal order of reality. ''21 What Bealer calls mere Cambridge properties, relations, and concepts by contrast are complex, not genuine, and conform instead to conception 2. 22 Genuine qualities, connections, and conditions that make up the world are simple and incapable of definition, and therefore can only be characterized by necessary equivalences under conception 1. But mere Cambridge properties, relati6ns, and concepts are constructed by the mind out of genuine qualities, connections, and conditions by means of basic thought, and concept-building operations, including negation, con- junction, disjunction, and abstraction. These Cambridge entities, because of their complexity, and unlike primitive genuine qualities, connections, and conditions, can always be decomposed or analyzed into more fundamental intensional elements by unique noncircular definitions under conception 2. Intentional intensional entities are supposed to belong to conception 2, and the logic of conception 2 is described as appropriate for the theory of intentionality, as against that of conception 1.23

Intentional connections are therefore a kind of theoretical hybrid - intensional entities that conform to conception 1 by virtue of being genuine connections, but that also conform to conception 2 by virtue of beingintentional and part of the theory of intentionality.

20

INTENTIONALITY

Bealer allows that conceptions 1 and 2 may be the extremes of a continuum of conceptions of intensional entities. He admits that: " . . . b e t w e e n these two traditional conceptions there are any number of intermediate conceptions, and one should leave open the possibility that in actual contexts of thought and speech any of these conceptions might be at work. ''24 But this is unsatisfactory. Bealer gives no indication of the need for an intermediate conception of intensional entities in his treatment of intentional connections. He characterizes intentional connections entirely by means of necessary equivalences, as though they unequivocally belonged to conception 1, despite their central conception 2 role in his theory of intentionality.

I f we ignore the question of whether intentional connections are conception 1 or conception 2 intensional entities, there remains a related difficulty about the linguistic, semantic, and ontological relativity of classifications of intensional entities as genuine or mere Cambridge. Bealer apparently accepts the distinction as absolute, and implicitly appeals to a privileged background language founded on a determinate conceptual category scheme, within which intensional entities can be uniquely and correctly sorted out as simple undefinable genuine qualities, connections, and conditions, or complex definable mere Cambridge properties, relations, and con- cepts.

Bealer's absolutism is illustrated by his remarks about Nelson Goodman's inductive neologism 'grue'. Bealer writes:

(a) x is grue i f f x is green if examined before t and blue otherwise.

(b) x is green i f f x i s grue if examined before t and bleen otherwise.

. . . although (a) and (b) above both express necessary truths, (a) alone is a correct definition on the second conception of intensional entities. 2s

Bealer's commitment to an absolute and determinate distinction between genuine and mere Cambridge intensional entities is evident in his unhesitating classification of (a) as conforming and (b) as failing to conform to conception 2. Later he adds:

Whereas green is a genuine quality (specifically, a sensible 1

quality), grue is only a concept . . . As such, grue plays no primary role in the objective, non-arbitrary categorization and identification of objects; nor does it play a primary role in the

21

DALE JACQUETTE

description and explanation of change; nor does it play a primary role in the constitution of experience .26

The proposition that (a) is decidedly a correc t definition on conception 2 while (b) is not can only be supported by the assumption that green is a genuine quality, and grue a mere concept or Cambridge property definable in terms of genuine qualities like green, blue, and time.

But why must this be? Even if on conception 2 the definability asymmetry holds in the conceptual category scheme of every cognitive subject (which Bealer certainly has not demonstrated), it does not follow that the ordering or defmability relation is logically necessary. There seems to be no conclusive reason why green must be a genuine absolutely primitive quality rather than a complex concept or mere Cambridge property. In an alternative conceptual category scheme the grue-green definability asymmetry might be reversed, and green might be correctly definable in terms of grue on conception 2, but not conversely.

Goodman acknowledges that grue is not 'projectible', but argues that this limitation is contingent. 27

. . . i f we start with "blue" and "green", then "grue" and '`bleen" will be explained in terms of "blue" and "green" and a temporal term. But equally truly, if we start with "grue" and '`bleen", then "blue" and "green" will be explained in terms of "grue" and " 'bleen". . . Thus qualitativeness is an entirely relative matter and does not by itself establish any dichotomy of predicates. 28

The practical problem of deciding whether predicate 'P' expresses a genuine or mere Cambridge intensional entity depends on the categorization of P as falling under conception 1 or 2. If this is indeterminate, then definitions of 'P' cannot intelligibly be regarded as correct or incorrect on conception 1 or 2. But whether P conforms to conception 1 or 2 is relative to a language and its semantics and ontology. This means that whether P is a genuine or mere Cambridge intensional ent ry is also relative to a particular language and its conceptual category scheme. Bealer may want to avoid this result, but he cannot escape the semantic-ontological relativity of distinctions between quality and concept.

VIII

Bealer seizes on an oversight in Cfiisholm's statement of the

22

INTENTIONALITY

contingency criterion which makes it possible for syntactically complex sentence prefixes in ordinary English to be defined as syntactically simple in an alternative imaginable language English*.

If this tactic is permissible in Bealer's criticism of Chisholm, then it ought to be permissible in a counter criticism of Bealer's definition of intentional connections. There are genuine qualities, connections, and conditions of or relative to the conceptual category scheme of at least some speakers of ordinary English that are mere Cambridge properties, relations, or concepts of or relative to the conceptual category scheme of the speakers of an alternative imaginary language English*. There are also mere Cambridge properties, relations, or concepts relative to English* that are genuine qualities, connections, or conditions relative to ordinary English.

We may begin with a conjunction of two sentences:

(vx)(VyXx believes that y) (&) (Vy)(y [is true]).

Abstraction conversion principles, together with quantifier intro- duction and elimination and the rules of elementary propositional logic, produce the following relational property or connection:

M 6 = Ix believes that y & y [is true] ] x,y

A counterexample to Bealer's definition of intentional connections results when it is assumed that M6, a mere Cambridge property or relation of or relative to ordinary English, is a genuine connection of or relative to English*. Suppose that M6 connects the objects in the ordered pair J,I, where 'J' is any (psychological) individual, say, John, and T is any complex idea, such as that expressed by the sentence 'The sky is blue ?29

M6(J ,I) [x believes that y & y [is true] ] x ,y(J,I)

The sentence M6(J,I) contradicts Bealer's definition because M6 by construction cannot contingently connect an individual (John) to a complex idea (the sky is blue) independently of the veracity of the idea. This is due to the truth or veracity condition prescribed by the second conjunct of the abstract. IfM6(J,I) is true, then idea I must be true, eyen if M6(J,I) is contingent (where it is logically possible though false that John does not believe that the sky is blue,M6(j,I) & r (J,I)). But M6 is intuitively an intentional connection of English* holding between John and the complex idea that the sky is

23

DALE JACQUE'FI'E

blue. The sentence containing M6, unlike Bealer's putative counter- examples to Chisholm's criterion in M3 and 3/4, nontrivially or significantly implies that John believes (believes-true) that the sky is blue, and therefore that someone believes that the sky is blue. This, in Bealer's phrase, is undeniably intentional.

A variation on the same style of counter example which Bealer raises to challenge Chisholm's linguistic contingency criterion for the intentionality of syntactically simple sentence prefixes also defeats Bealer's definition of nonlinguistic intentional connections. This suggests that Bealer has not accurately diagnosed the source of trouble in Chisholm's criterion. The problem is not the linguistic framework, and the solution is not found in an appeal to the contingency of connections obtaining between individuals and ideas independently of the truth of the ideas.

IX There is a satisfactory way to amend Chisholm's criterion so that

it avoids Bealer's counter examples. The criterion may remain essentially unchanged if instead of applying to syntactically simple sentence pref'txes, it is revised so as to apply to semantically simple sentence prefixes relative to a language. This recommends itself as a promising course because Boaler's counter examples capitalize on the loophole in Chisholm's criterion which permits prefixes that are syntactically simple in an alternative language to abbreviate syntacti- cally complex problem prefixes in ordinary English. Restricting the criterion to sentence prefixes that are semantically simple relative to a given language outlaws Beater's M1-Ms prefixes from involvement in counter examples to the revised criterion, because although they are syntactically simple, as abbreviations synonymous with syntacti- cally complex prefixes in ordinary English, they are not semantically simple. Their meaning is complex, and can be expressed in terms of the complex English prefixes which they abbreviate.

To see how the amendment might work, consider the following definitions:

(D1) A semantically simple sentence prefix relative to language L is an expression of L that cannot be reduced in meaning or defined in terms of a greater number of more basic, primitive, or undefined terms of L, and which is such that the result of prefixing it to a sentence is another sentence.

(D2) A semantically simple sentence prefix, M, relative to

24

INTENTIONALITY

language L, is intentional relative to language L if and only if, for any sentence p o fL ,M(p) is logically contingent.

This revision of the contingency criterion has several important advantages over Bealer's def'mition of intentional connections. It avoids the counter examples Bealer raises against Chisholm's original criterion, and it is unaffected by the Ms-type counter examples offered in criticism of Bealer's definition of intentional connections.

Bealer expects an adequate mark of the intentional to apply to any language. His dissatisfaction with the limitations of Chisholm's criterion to syntactically simple sentence prefixes, and his desire to make Chisholm's conditional criterion into a biconditional definition or analysis, may be regarded as a rejection of relativism and a yearning for something universal and absolute in the theory of intentionality. It may appear that the relativization of the semantic version of Chisholm's criterion to particular langUages in (D1)-(D2) does not answer to this ideal. But if the revised criterion distinguishes intentional from nonintentional semantically simple sentence prefixes relative to any language, then the theory should have sufficient generality to blunt this Bealer-inspired objection. It has already been shown that Bealer's definition of intentional connections must also be relativized to languages and conceptual category schemes in which definability asymmetries between genuine and mere Cambridge intensional entities are determinately fixed. Semantic-ontological relativity is pervasive, and offers no firm negative basis for choice among alternative theories or criteria of intentionality, a~

But it may be regarded as a defect of the proposal that intentionality itself is linguistically relative. This contradicts the primacy of the intentional over the linguistic, and may be rejected for other reasons even by opponents of intentionality and intentional philosophy. But the difficulty is easily overcome. The proposal does not make intentionality linguistically relative, but only the intention- ality of certain sentence prefixes, and in particular of semantically simple sentence prefixes. It is obvious that this sort of relativity sometimes obtains anyway. Bealer's prefix M2 occurs in English*, but not in ordinary English. Its intentionality is therefore linguistically relative, intentional relative to English*, but not relative to ordinary English.

The problem is magnified when it is thought that the very same prefix occurring in several languages is intentional relative to some of the languages, but not relative to others. The set of semantically

25

DALE JACQUETTE

simple sentence prefixes is smaller than and a proper subset of the set of syntactically simple sentence prefixes. It includes Bealer's prefixes M1 and M2, which are syntactically but not semantically simple. Limiting the criterion to semantically simple sentence prefixes as in (D2) further truncates the account. Yet even this is not decisively objectionable. There is a method of recovering intention- ality in a non-linguistically-relative way from the linguistically relative intentionality of semantically simple sentence prefixes defined in (D1) and (D2). The procedure restores and expands the scope of Chisholm's original account to include semantically complex as well as semantically simple intentional sentence prefixes of any and all languages.

The following definition completes the attenuated criterion of intentionality for semantically simple sentence prefixes relative to a language, by enlarging it to include the intentional sentence prefixes of any language, whether semantically simple or complex.

(D3) A sentence prefix, M, is in tent ional per se if and only if either: (i) M is an intentional semantically simple sentence prefix relative to language L (satisfying (DI)and (D2)); or (ii) M is a semantically complex sentence prefix relative to language L, and there is at least one sentence p of L, such that when M is applied or attached to p, the resulting prefixed sentence M(p) significantly or nontrivially implies another sentence M'(p') of L that has applied or attached to it an intentional semantically simple sentence prefix M' relative to L (satisfying (D1) and (D2) ) .

The strategy behind the definition can be broken into three parts: (1) A semantically complex sentence prefix relative to language L is defined as a sentence prefLx of L that is not semantically simple according to(D1). (2) An intentional semantically complex sentence prefix relative to language L is defined as a semantically complex sentence prefix of L satisfying the conditions prescribed in part (ii) of (D3). (3) Intentional sentence pref'Lxes per se are defined as all and only the semantically simple and semantically complex inten- tional sentence prefixes relative to any language (which may be indexed or otherwise described as belonging to those languages).

Definitions (D1) - (D3) entail that Bealer's sentence prefix M2 is intentional, even though it does not produce contingent prefixed sentences for all other sentences taken as arguments. But Bealer's M3 and M4 do not qualify as intentional,, because when these are

26

INTENTIONALITY

prefixed to any sentence, the result is logically necessarily false, and does not significantly or nontriviaUy imply anything. The revised criterion does not relativize intentionality itself, but has indirect application to all syntactically simple sentence prefixes, and to semantically complex sentence prefixes that are also syntactically complex in at least some languages. The proposal includes all and only the intentional sentence prefixes of every language, whether syntactically or semantically simple or complex. The scope of Chisholm's original criterion is thereby not only restored but expanded, and in such a way that Bealer's counter examples are avoided.

X

The revision of Chishohn's contingency criterion has philosoph- ically interesting consequences. Chisholm's criterion fails to provide a general test for the intentionality of all syntactically simple sentence prefLxes. Consider the syntactically simple sentence preftx of ordinary English, 'John knows ( - - ) ' , or 'John knows that ( - - ) ' . This may be referred to asMT.

Mr = [John knows that x] x

When prefLX 3/7 is applied to some English sentences, the prefix produces contingent prefixed sentences that seem to fall under Chishohn's criterion, and for which the criterion gives positive results about the intentionality of Mr. But for other sentences the criterion malfunctions, and does not determine whether or not M7 is intentional. Let sentence p = 'Hegel died of cholera', and let sentence p ' = '2+2=5'. Then M4~o) is logically contingent, which suggests that by Chisholm's criterion M7 may qualify as intentional. But M~p') is not logically contingent, since 'John knows that 2+2=5' is logically necessarily false, on the assumption that knowledge entails truth, and that 2+2=5 is necessarily false. 31

Chisholm's criterion requires that an intentionai syntactically simple sentence prefix produce a logically contingent sentence for every other sentence to which it is applied. So it cannot be concluded from Chisholm's criterion that knowledge is intentional; or, more precisely, it cannot be concluded that the epistemic syntactically simple sentence prefix Mr, 'John knows that ( - - ) ' , is intentional. If Chisholm's conditional criterion is transformed into a

27

DALE JACQUETTE

biconditional definition or analysis as Bealer misinterprets it, then the principle implies that knowledge definitely is not intentional.

But it is strange to conclude that knowledge is not intentional. It is an inadequacy in a criterion of intentionality not to identify epistemic sentenceprefixes like 'John knows that ( - - ) ' as intentional. Chisholm's attempt to develop a satisfactory criterion of intention- allty is meant to fit into the larger project of advancing Franz Brentano's intentionality thesis, according to which mental pheno- mena are distinguished from physical phenomena by virtue of the intentionality of the mental. Brentano claims that intentionality is the mark of the mental, and Chisholm offers contingenc3~ as a mark of the intentional, On Brentano's dichotomy, knowledge is intuitively mental rather than physical. The classicial definition of knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus, carried forward by Chisholm among others, analyzes knowledge as a special kind of belief, specifically (non- defectively) justified true belief. 32 And belief is unquestionably intentional. If Brentano's intentionality thesis is correct, then knowledge must be intentional, though on Chisholm's unamended contingency criterion knowledge is either not identified as intentional, or is definitely not intentional.

The proposed revision of Chishohn's criterion regains the intuitively anticipated intentionality of knowledge. If knowledge entails belief, then 'John knows that ( - - ) ' is not semantically simple, and so cannot qualify as intentional by (D1) and (D2). But if knowledge can be reduced in meaning to a complex of conditions including belief, then if belief or some further reduction of doxastic belief prefLxes is intentional by (D2), then knowledge is also intentional by expansion or recovery principle (D3). 33

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY PARK, PA 16802

USA

28

INTENTIONALITY

NOTES

Roderick M. Chisholm, "Intentionality", The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), Vol. IV, pp. 201-204. See Chisholm, "Believing and lntentionality: A Reply to Mr. Luce and Mr. Sleigh", Philosophy and Phenornenological Research, Vol. XXV, 1964-1965, p. 269.

2 Chisholm, "Intentionality', p. 203. 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.: "Let us refine upon ordinary English in the following way: instead of writing propositional clauses as 'that' clauses, we will eliminate the ' that ' and put the remainder of the clause in parentheses; for example, instead of writing 'John believes that there are men', we will write 'John believes (there are men) . ' "

s George Bealer, Quality and Concept (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 229-230. The predicate '[is t rue] ' is used throughout to attribute truth to propositions. It is placed in brackets to indicate that it is unnecessary on a redundancy theory of truth. This is not Bealer's convention, but Bealer regards it as a desideratum that truth be representable as a predicate. (1bid., p. 14 (item 16), and pp. 23-25.)

7 Ibid., p. 230. s Ibid., pp. 230-231. 9 Ibid., p. 231. ~o Ibid. Bealer does not say that '9 believes that 2+2=4 , implies 'Something

believes that 2+2=4'. But he writes, ibid.: "Using only the law of existential generalization.. , we can derive an undeniably intentional proposition, namely, the proposition that something believes that 2+2=4." This indicates that strict or logical implication is at issue. The criticism is easily rephrased to the same effect by maintaining that 'Something believes that 2+2=4 ' cannot be significantly or nontrivially derived from '9 believes that 2+2-~4' by existential generalization or any other means.

11 Ibid. ~= Ibid.

13 D.M. Armstrong makes a similar point about the logical contingency of private or epistemicaUy privileged psychological experience (without distinguishing between knowledge by introspection of another's pain and knowledge by introspection that another is in pain). See Armstrong, "What is Consciousness?", The Nature o f Mind and Other Essays (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 62: " . . . nobody else can have the direct awareneis of my mental states and activities that I have. This privacy, however, is contingent only. We can imagine that somebody else should have the same direct consciousness of my mental states and activities that I enjoy. (They would not have those states, but they would be directly aware of them.)"

29

DALE JACQUE'I~E

14 Bealer, p. 232. is /bid., p. 229: '`The insight [in Chisholm's criterion] is that fundamental

intentional relations are ones that give rise to genuine phenomena and, therefore, must be able to hold contingently at least between certain relata."

t6 Ibid., pp. 229-230,244. 17 /bid., p. 228 (emphasis added). is /bid., p. 244 (emphasis added). 19 Bealer's abstraction notation is followed throughout. (See ibid., pp. 43-44).

Bealer's abstract [ . . . X r . . X n . . . ] x l , . . . , x n is his counterpart to the more familia~ lambda abstract kx r . . k X n [ . . , x r . . x n . . . ] .

20 Ibid., p. 49. Bealer develops an intensional logic for conception 1 on pp. 58-64, and for conception 2 on pp. 64-67.

21 1bid., p. 13. Compare p. 191: "Qualities, connections, and conditions conform to conception 1 while thoughts and complex concepts conform to conception 2."

22 /bid. Bealer follows Sydney Shoemaker in adapting the phrase 'Cambridge property' from P.T. Geach's term 'Cambridge change'. See Shoemaker, "Causality and Properties", Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, edited by Peter van Inwagen (Dordrecht-Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 110-111; Geach, "God's Relation to the World", Logic Matters (Oxford: Basil BlackweU, 1972), pp. 321-323; Bealer, p. 274, note 2.

23 1bid., pp. 4, 67, 176, 184. 24 /bid., p. 4. Also pp. 53-54. 2s /bid., pp. 2-3. 26 Ibid., p. 10. 27 Nelson Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction", Fact, Fiction, and

Forecast, 4th edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 78-80.

2s Ibid., pp. 79-80. Bealer writes, p. 178: " . . . Cambridge properties we cannot experience; for example, nothing could reasonably count as experiencing grue." But Bealer in these passages must be referring to causal possibility and impossibility, which would not rule out the contingency of experiencing grue as a genuine quality in an alternative nonactual conceptual category scheme. He writes, ibid., p. 182: "Qualities and connections are what. fix the actual conditions in the w o r l d . . . Condi t ions . . . are the actual states of affairs." (All emphases added above.) For a description of imaginable or logically possible circumstances in which grue is experienced as a genuine quality, see W.V.O. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web o f Belief, 2rid edition (New York: Random House, Inc., 1978), p. 88.

29 Bealer, pp. 186-187, outlines the distinction between simple and complex ideas. He attributes the concept to John Locke, A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by A.C. Fraser (New York: Dover Publica- tions, Inc., 1959), Vol. 1, pp. 32-33.

30

INTENTIONALITY

3o Semantic-ontological relativity is discussed in Alfred Tarski, "The Establish- ment of Scientific Semantics", Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, translated by J.H. Woodger (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), esp. pp. 401-403; Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1960); Quine, 'Truth by Convention", The Ways o f Paradox and Other Essays, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 77-106; Quine: "Fwo Dogmas of Empiricism", From a Logical Point o f View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 20-46; Qulne, "Ontological Relativity", Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 26-68. See George D. Romanos, Quine and Analytic Philosophy: The Language o f Language (Cambridge: The MIT Press (Bradford Books), 1984), pp. 52-53.

3~ Bealer, p. 229, refers to knowledge as a 'factive intentional relation'. a2 Plato, Theaetetus, 202-207 (Stephanus). Chisholm, Theory o f Knowledge,

2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 102-113. 33 This essay was read before the Society for Exact Philosophy, University of

Georgia, Athens, GA, May 3, 1984. I would like to thank Brian F. Chellas, Glenn Ross, and Peter Markie for useful criticisms of a previous version.

31