insights 1998 fall

8/14/2019 Insights 1998 Fall

1/27


2/27

C o n t e n t s

2I N T R O D U C T I O N

Robert M. Shelton

H U M A N D I G N I T Y3 ON HUMAN DIGNITY

I smael Garca

19 ISMAELG ARCA: SP EA KI NG O FDIGNITY An Interview

24 R ESPONSES H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., Sherron K. George,

Paul J. Wadell 36 ON HUMAN DI GN IT Y A ND T HECHRISTIANCHURCH

James C. Goodloe

42B O O K R E V I E W S

THOMAS CRANMER , Diarmaid MacCulloch, reviewed by Michael Jinkins;PRACTICINGOUR F AITH: A W AY O F LIFE FOR ASEARCHINGPEOPLE, Dorothy

Bass, editor, reviewed by Terry Muck

45R E L I G I O U S E X P E R I E N C E A N D

C H U R C H G R O W T H

Scott Black Johnston

I n s i g h t sThe Faculty Journal of Austin Seminary

Fall 1998 Volume 114 Number 1

Editor: Terry Muck Insights Committee: Michael Jinkins, Michael Miller,

Kathryn Roberts, and Randal Whittington Insights: The Faculty Journal of Austin Seminary is published each spring and fallby Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, 100 East 27th Street, Austin, TX 78705-5797; e-mail:[email protected] http://www:austinseminary.edu/Entered as non-profit class bulk mail at Austin, Texas, under Permit No. 2473. POSTMASTER:

Address service requested. Send to Insights , 100 East 27th Street, Austin, TX 78705-5797.

Printing runs are limited. When available, additional copies may be obtained for $1.00 percopy. Permission to copy articles from Insights: The Faculty Journal of Austin Seminary foreducational purposes will be given by the editor upon written receipt of a request.

Previous issues of Insights: The Faculty Journal of Austin Seminary, are available on microfilmthrough University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 (16mmmicrofilm, 105 mm microfiche and article copies are available). This periodical is indexed in

Religion Index One: Periodicals, Index to Book Reviews in Religion, Religion Indexes: RIO/RIT/IBRR 1975- on CD-ROM and ATLA Religion Database on CD-ROM . Published by American Theological Library Association, 820 Church Street, Evanston, IL 60201-5613, e-mail:atla.com, www:http://atla.library.vanderbilt.edu/atla/home.html. ISSN 1056-0548

COVER:Diego Rivera (1886-1957)La Molendera , 1924Encustica sobre tela90x117 cmCol. Museo Nacional de ArteFotografa: Arturo Piera

Mexican muralist Diego Rivera is renowned and beloved for his grand depictions of the joys and struggles of human life. La Molendera, the simple, yet striking image of a woman laboring to produce her familys daily bread, evokes the tension that inhabits all of Riveras workthe daily mixture of rest and toil, work and celebrationof which human life is comprised. Human dignity emerges from these same disparate ingredients, ground out and shaped by the hands of the creating God who nourishes and sustains us.


3/27

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

This year we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations

Declaration of Human Rights. Considering the disagreements and heat-ed debates nations sustain within and among themselves regarding theform and substance of human rights; considering all their posturing regardingtheir compliance, or lack of compliance, with human rights; in light of theaccusations that human rights are just another manifestation of Western cul-tural imperialism; and given the moral relativism and subjectivism thatpresently defines our cultures ethos, the fact that the language of humanrights has established itself as the moral language all peoples of the world rec-ognize as normative for defining how humans ought to be treated is amomentous historical achievement, and one worth celebrating.

As postmodern thinkers challenge us to reconsider our moral categoriesand visions, it might be a propitious time for us to look at that which I taketo be the foundational concept behind the human rights debate: the conceptof human dignity.

To begin with, I would like to point to a duality intrinsic to the languageof human dignity. On the one hand we claim that human dignity is a given,a gift, or something innate to our nature. On the other hand we recognizethat dignity is a historical struggle. As given, or gift, the language of dig-nity is used to point to the stuff that enables us to recognize others as ourequals and worthy of recognition, respect, and care. From this point of view,neither the family, society, nor the state are the source of our dignity, nor can

3

O N H UMAN D IGNITY

ISMAELG ARCA

Ismael Garca is professor of Christian ethics at Austin Seminary. He received the M.A. from the University of Chicago and the Ph.D. from The Divinity School at the Univer- sity of Chicago. He joined the faculty of Austin Seminary in 1986 and gave this paper on the occasion of his inauguration as full professor in 1998.

Someone has said that the power or significance of any idea or essay isfound in the degree of passion it evokes from others, either in agreementor disagreement. If that is accurate, then the address titled On Human Dig-nity, delivered by Professor Ismael Garca on the occasion of his inaugura-tion as a full professor at Austin Seminary, should receive very high marks.

You will, however, want to make a judgment for yourself as you read theaddress and reflect upon the responses.Professor Garcas lecture certainly presents a number of provocative

ideas for anyone interested in and committed to the welfare of all humanbeings. While he resists any simplistic approach to the variety of issues relat-ing to human dignity, he successfully deepens the readers understanding of those issues, even as he highlights their complexity.

In sum, Dr. Garca argues that human dignity is both a gift (or a given)and a struggle. It is a gift and a struggle at all levels of existencemoral, cul-tural, personal, political, and economic.

Taking sharp issue with the basic approach of Professor Garca is Dr.

James C. Goodloe, a Presbyterian pastor. Dr. Goodloes appraisal of theaddress is that it is sorely lacking in theological undergirding and that it restsfundamentally on secular arguments and not theological ones. Dr. H. TristramEngelhardt, Jr., professor in the department of philosophy at Rice University,makes a similar argument in his essay, insisting that Christianity invites all tostep away from seeking dignity through others affirmation of their ownintrinsic dignity, but instead to pursue affirmation and dignity in Christ. Like-

wise, Dr. Sherron George, Professor Garcas faculty colleague, poses certainquestions about the modern notion of autonomy which she sees reflectedin the lecture, and Professor Paul J. Wadell of St. Norbert College in hisresponse wants to center the matter of human dignity in the worship and

prayer experience of the church.It all makes for stimulating reading. It is our hope that the material in this

edition of Insights will provide much food for thought about a most impor-tant matter. As always, this publication is offered as a gift to the church forits use.

Robert M. Shelton

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Col. Museo Nacional de Arte


4/27

ON HU M A N DIGNIT Y Gar c a

5

social and cultural diversity, and intentional in granting a public voice andrecognition to marginal social groups. Add to this their strong commitment tojustice for the poor, and it is no surprise that the postmodern ethical agendais attractive to oppressed and marginal groups and those who are in solidar-ity with them.

However, we ought to remain suspicious of this shift in language. Themoral language of obligation, in both its pre-modern and postmodern ver-

sions, has a strong paternalistic bent to it. Within our present social circum-stances, where we lack the structural basis to clearly know what our obliga-tion and responsibilities to others are, the language of moral obligations, prac-tically speaking, functions like charity, something those who amass wealthand power might want to exercise toward those who lack both of these. Thedanger is that the poor and powerless, in spite of the best of intentions of those who uphold the language of moral obligation, are reduced to the sta-tus of being passive recipients of other peoples graces. They are not assuredof an essential element of moral agencythe right of making claims and of asserting their interests and views with authority.

The enduring strength and the persuasiveness of the language of humanrights and of the Enlightenment sense of emancipation and self-realization isprecisely that it recognizes oppressed peoples and social groups as moralagents. It curtails the inclination of the non-poor to treat marginalized peopleas mere victims and provides all of us with better safeguards that assure us a

voice to determine howpersonally, politically, and historicallywe want toorganize our lives.

The specific way faith communities understand human rights is deter-mined by how they understand Gods covenant relationship with humanity.In the Christian tradition our dignity has its foundation in the way God haschosen to relate to us through Gods creation, Gods incarnation, and Godsredemption.

CREATIONIMAGODEI

At the center of the Christian understanding of human dignity lies the doc-

trine of creation, which affirms the intrinsic goodness of all creation. Thisdoctrine serves as the ground for both the churchs quite recent rediscovery of its ecological responsibilities and its traditional understanding of humandignity. Our dignity, and the respect due to us because of it, finds its groundin our being created in the image of God. Our intelligence, memory, imagi-nation, freedom, and the capacity to transform our social and natural worldare signs of our being creative agents that share in Gods image and likeness.

This doctrine can and ought to empower us both to transform our sub-jective self- understanding and to engage in liberating political commitments.It can motivate us to free ourselves from those feelings of superiority by

which we mask our undue privileges and self-interests as being among thoseinalienable rights others have a duty to attend, and that we conveniently use

they take our dignity away from us. These institutions, at best, can only struc-ture themselves and act in ways that acknowledge and respect our dignity.Dignity, thus, is a radically egalitarian concept; we all have it, and have it inthe same way, and under no circumstances can we lose it. One cannot avoidnoticing the religious nature of such a claim.

However, when pushed to its logical conclusion, this notion of dignity asgiven is counterintuitive. If we accept that the family, society, and the state

are not the source of our dignity, we also recognize that these institutions dohave the power to either significantly diminish or forward the realization of our dignity. We believe that struggles against oppression and domination arenecessary, meaningful, and justifiable. And thus that dignity is not just agiven, but in the language of liberation theologians, a historical project.

This sense of human dignity as both gift and historical task is dialectical.This dialectic reveals itself more clearly in the voice of disenfranchised peo-ple and nations. People that struggle against domination and oppressionargue that their dignity is the motivating force that enables them to endurethe risks and costs of their struggles. At the same time, they claim that achiev-ing human dignity is the purpose of their struggles. Dignity thus constitutesboth the beginning (the cause) and end (the goal) of their struggle for socialtransformation, greater self-determination, and self-respect. I take this circu-lar mode of reasoning to be neither vicious nor meaningless. It merely pointsto the mystery of the human condition: that it is precisely in the struggle toenhance our freedom, equality, and community that we give depth andgreater specificity to our sense of dignity.

THE THEOLOGICALDIMENSION OFHUMANDIGNITY

T he predominant explanation given for human dignity in Western culturehas been one which links humankind with God. Ultimately, it is becauseGod relates to us and treats us with steadfast love and with respect that weare called to treat others with love and respect. Since the ethos of modernity became dominant, Christians have come to use the language of human rightsto give content to what this love and respect entails. This was not always the

case. The pre-modern church militantly opposed modernitys struggle forhuman rights, viewing it as another attempt of secular humanism to under-mine the churchs influence and usurp the authority of religion. 1

It is somewhat ironic that, as the church has belatedly come to accept thelanguage of human rights, postmodern thinkers, such as the North Americanethicist John Caputo and the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, havebrought back the language of moral obligation which was the dominantmoral language of the pre-modern church. 2 Many postmodernists denounceand reject the language of human rights on the basis of its being overly indi-

vidualistic, abstract, universal, legalistic, and conflict-ridden. In its stead they propose the language of moral obligation as being group- and communal-ori-ented, concerned with and focused on the needs of others, committed to

4


5/27

Gar c a

7

ON HU M A N DIGNIT Y

6

our society has created poor and oppressed. Jesus ministry of liberation forthe unfree, the blind, the sick, and the poor, and his acceptance of sufferingon their behalf, gives us some sense of the content and direction of our com-mitment to human rights.

It is through liberating acts of service that we voluntarily make others aconstitutive part of our lives and we become part of theirs. We thus createcovenantal bonds that point to a future of utopian brotherhood and sister-

hood. This reunion, the product of our steadfast service, is what gives con-crete substance to our notion of love and justice. Love is the power thatinclines us to strive for greater and more inclusive harmonious unity withinall spheres of creation. And justice is that dimension of love in which wecommit ourselves to the creation of a new future where the poor and mar-ginal enjoy the full recognition and benefits of membership within our sharedcommunity.5

THE DOCTRINE OFR EDEMPTION

I f the doctrine of creation is the foundation of our sense of d ignity, and thedoctrine of the incarnation gives dignity historical specificity and direction,the doctrine of redemption points to the unconditional character of our dig-nity. Simply stated, Gods salvific work on our behalf affirms that no one, nomatter how virtuous or sinful, no matter how enlightened or ignorant, no mat-ter how simple or talented, is kept at the margin of Gods love. Or, as statedin the Reformed tradition, no matter how vilified we are we never lose thatsubstance of the divine within us. Thus we are to recognize the dignity of allpeople at all times and treat them as such.

Historically the Reformed tradition has shown passionate dedication toissues dealing with the nature, function, and formation of the social realm. Ithas taken seriously the political responsibilities and the rights of citizens. It isalso part of its genius to heighten our awareness of the depth of the reality of sin. Consequently, the Reformed tradition has insisted on our need of anddependence on revelation and grace for us to be able to understand and actin ways that affirm human dignity. In the Reformed frame of mind we are

redeemed not because of, but mostly in spite of, our best works and efforts.However, the tradition has also understood that if we are not saved by good works, our dignity is in that we have been created for good works. Ourstature as moral agents is neither diminished nor destroyed by the gift of redemption. If anything, redemption ought to heighten our sense of dignity,and this renewed self-esteem ought to motivate us toward a more steadfastcommitment to transform our moral laxity into moral discipline, our igno-rance into wisdom, our sloth into personal responsibility, and to make wholethe brokenness of our personal and communal life.

For the Reformed tradition the fact that dignity is a historical task neednot undermine our religious conviction that dignity is a gift from God. Godsgift of dignity entails autonomy. God does not coerce us, but rather invites us

to give ourselves permission to be apathetic to the legitimate rights claims of others. It can equally free us from those feelings of inferiority that make usaccomplices to the injustices present within our social world. It exhorts thepoor and non-poor to transcend their narrow self-interest and self-centered-ness, and engage in what the religious philosopher Cornel West calls a pol-itics of compassion, aiming at the creation of bonds and structures of soli-darity among those who formerly saw each other as strangers and/or ene-

mies.3

From this perspective it can be argued that if liberation best defines thepolitics of the poor and marginal, generous accountability ought to define thepolitics of the non-poor. It might very well be that this is what Derrida 4 hasin mind when he claims that commitment to justice for the poor is one of ourcentral moral obligations.

And as the innermost being of our trinitarian God is relational, this doc-trine also makes us aware that we have been created to live in and for rela-tionships with others and with nature. From our faith perspective, neither oursocial life nor our dominion over nature is merely instrumental. They are bothconstitutive of the dignity of persons. Dominion over nature, as we haverecently come to accept, calls us be stewards and to make the earth part of our community. Our feeding from nature must be such that nature is able tofeed or replenish itself as well. From a theological point of view, human rightsare an experience of and for moral solidarity. Individuals have rights claimsover the community, and the community has rights claims over the individ-ual. The rights that protect human dignity are the rights of persons in com-munity, not the rights of the individual against the community nor of the com-munity against the individual. Human rights presuppose that persons recog-nize each other as bound by a community of mutual dependence committedto overcome the conventional barriers that divide and exclude and whichkeep us in conflict with each other.

THE DOCTRINE OF THEINCARNATION

T he doctrine of the incarnation gives greater specificity to the notion of dignity present in the doctrine of creation. That God chose to reveal God-self through a person clearly uplifts the unique dignity of the human. In Jesusit is revealed both how God relates to us and how we ought to relate to God.God relates to us through steadfast service; divinitys service is, in itself, anaffirmation of our worth and value. But more importantly it is Gods way of disclosing that our dignity is intrinsically tied with the practice of serving andcontributing to the life possibilities of others.

In Jesus it is revealed that we share not only a common definition asimage of God but a common historical task, that of contributing to the com-ing of the promised kingdom. The authenticity of ones self-realization andemancipation is found in ones becoming an active agent for the emergenceof a reconciled world that signals Gods kingdom. To live for the kingdom isto live a life of faithful service, love, and care, particularly toward those whom


6/27


7/27

Gar c a

11


10

Since I strongly affirm the language of human rights as giving greaterdepth and clarity to our understanding of human dignity, I want to acknowl-edge the need to keep a critical attitude toward the interpretation of humanrights dominant in our social context. The postmodernists, as well as othercritical voices, claim that the quest for emancipation and self-realization,intrinsic to the ethos of modernity, is merely a disguised form of egoistic self-indulgence. They argue that:

1) Modernitys understanding and pursuit of personal emancipation andfulfillment is narrowly individualistic, radically conflictive, and supportive of aggressive competitiveness, all of which cement anti-communitarian attitudes.

We have become a society of litigators. More and more we are dependent onthe court to decide how we are to organize our life and settle our conflicts.Our politics no longer focus on the art of discussion and compromise, prop-er to a process of legislation that seeks inclusiveness and which attempts toarrive at the sense of the community. Legislation has become thoroughly conflict-ridden, a process of judicial reviews on rights where winner takes all,leaving our political community fragmented, divided, and resentful, no mat-ter the outcome. The abortion debate has shown this clearly. Rights claimsare understood as absolute claims to be enforced even at the expense of soci-ety, rather than as protective devises for the sake of forwarding and sustain-ing community.

2) Our sense of human fulfillment and emancipation is not only radical-ly egocentric but also subjective. It promotes what is known as the culture of therapy, a culture that through the power of media and the markets plenti-ful production of alluring and tantalizing consumer goods, makes pleasure,comfort, security, and feeling good about ourselves the main purpose andend of life. As long as I am able to manipulate the way I perceive myself, andas long as I feel good about myself, it really does not matter whether or notI am faithful to my promises and commitments, whether or not I contributeto society, or whether or not I perform my duties.

3) Such radical self-absorption leads to moral subjectivism, relativism,and permissiveness. In moral matters feelings and taste overshadow reason.

As morality is reduced to taste, all our choices become equally valid and weneed not justify them. The only moral concern is not to harm. The act of choosing itself, not what is chosen, is what is morally relevant. We are left

with no sense of values that are prior, and higher than ourselves, for which we are willing to sacrifice. In fact, the language of suffering and sacrifice isseen as pass.

There is much truth to these critiques of modernity. Who can deny thatthe aggressive pursuit of career development, the quest for greater autonomy and control over more dimensions of our life, and the inclination to unlimit-ed consumption and personal gratification do make life shallow and placetremendous strains on family commitments, friendships, and communal tiesof all sorts. Still, before dismissing modernitys quest for emancipation and

self-realization, one should at least pause to consider why its vision has been,and continues to be, morally normative for so many of us. Could it be thatmodernitys quest for emancipation and self-realization does not necessarily entail moral subjectivism, permissive self-indulgence, rampant consumerism,or lack of commitment to causes beyond our narrow self-interest?

In my view, the normative substance of the ethos of modernity and itssense of emancipation and self-realization is still meaningful and viable. This

is the same unfinished and unfulfilled ethos that has, not without struggle andgreat sacrifice, given motivation to the struggle for justice and for social inclu-sion of marginal social classes, genders, and races. It has shown itself capa-ble of significant flexibility, even to voice the imperative to respond to theneeds of our natural environment, its true silent victim. I am not persuadedthat at present there are available to us stronger visions of emancipation andfulfillment.

Our theological-biblical tradition has helped and must continue to helpus redefine modernitys notion of human dignity and human rights in waysthat allow us to recover the liberating ethos toward freedom, equality, justice,and community that is part of its original and still unfinished liberating vision.

Let me provide a more specific and concrete visionnot a final oneof the elements that presently inform our sense of human dignity.

At the personal level Without disregarding or minimizing the determining influences of the socialsettings and communities we live in, dignity centers on our being free moralagents who must assume responsibility for our actions. Dignity entails disci-pline and responsibility within all spheres of life. The difference we can makein our personal life we have a responsibility to make. From the simpleprocesses of body hygiene, keeping proper diets, and regular exercise to themore complex processes of enhancing our cultural development, cultivatingthe virtues that shape our character, and exercising those spiritual disciplinesrelated to the care of our soul, we must be pro-active and exercise our free-dom in a disciplined and responsible manner.

Dignity requires that we recognize all humans as ends in themselves, andrecognize ourselves as those humans. Dignity calls us to voice our interestand assert our life-plan as being as worthy of consideration as the life plansof others. We must be firm in the pursuit of our own self-care and resist beingmade mere instruments for the well-being of others. 8 However, as we strong-ly affirm the legitimacy of self-love, we must also recognize that our naturalinclination is always to attend to our own needs first. Practically speaking, itis best to start by giving priority to the needs of others. In fact, the legitima-cy of self-love is grounded on the commitment to take into account andrespond to the interest and needs of others as we go about determining andpursuing that which is good for us.


8/27

Gar c a

13


12

At the social level Human dignity thus is essentially relational. Our sense of dignity as well asour self-realization and emancipation is tied to that of others. The best of modernity affirms that self-fulfillment and emancipation cannot take place

without our positive contributions to the needs and life possibilities of others.In Kantian terms we are not just ends in ourselves but called to become mem-bers of a kingdom of ends . The paradox of authenticity is that we obtain it

not by pursuing it directly but as the by-product of serving the needs of oth-ers.The social and relational dimension of human dignity has also been rec-

ognized by non- Christian thinkers. Charles Taylor9 and Hannah Arendt, forexample, argue that in our social context, social recognition has become anindispensable human need, so much so that to be denied social recognitionis to be harmed in a significant way. Social anonymity and lack of recogni-tion is an affront to ones dignity. Social anonymity is the first step in beingmade socially invisible and silent, and the socially invisible and silent are theones most likely to be treated as mere instruments of the visions and plansof others.

Both authors acknowledge that dignity requires the creation of more pub-lic spaces within different social spheres where we can be recognized by oth-ers as responsible and contributing members of society. These public spaces,

where the community gathers in all its diversity to witness to each others words and deeds, enable all of us to discover our identity, our originality, ourauthenticity, and thus, our dignity. Dignity is mediated by the social structuresthat limit and give order to our mutual dealings. Thus, the task of dignity entails that social structures are to be transformed in light of our growing andchanging sense of (paraphrasing Paul Lehmann) what keeps human lifehuman. To become just, we need structural supports that make us act justly;to grant others recognition, we need structures that allow us to be recognized.

The Apostle Paul understood that every worthwhile historical task, likethe task of forwarding dignity through the creation of structures that are lov-ing and just, entails sacrifice and might elicit suffering. In Pauls case thechurch is the community that is called to undertake such suffering and sacri-fice. The centrality of sacrifice and suffering for the sake of love and justiceis also present in the Beatitudes. In my biased reading of the Beatitudes, weare told that it is not dignified to tolerate the injustices committed against thepoor and weak. The suffering which is the product of social injustices dimin-ishes the dignity of all of usbut most importantly the dignity of God. Weare not to tolerate it; on the contrary, we must resist it. On the other hand,

we are to endure with courage and determination and even joy the sufferingthat is imposed upon us as a result of our faithfulness to Gods justice, sincethis suffering is redemptivehistorically, soteriologically, and even cosmical-ly. This suffering and sacrifice edifies our sense of dignity and the dignity of those we struggle with and struggle for. In light of the biblical ethos, the lan-

guage of human rights will have historical efficacy only insofar as there are women and men who are prepared and willing to take upon themselves therights of humanity and stand up for the oppressed and dominated.

At the cultural level Social pluralism and the struggles of racial-ethnic groups and poor nationshave made us recognize that dignity is connected with the struggle against

cultural discrimination and for cultural affirmation. This is why marginalizedgroups and nations, as part of their sense of liberation, claim the right toresources to live in light of those traditions and cultural values that nurturetheir sense of meaning and identity. 10

Loyalty to those social groups that mold our character and to the tradi-tions and ways of life they represent is also a matter of social survival. How-ever, loyalty to cultural traditions entails more than adaptation and repetitionof what has been handed down to us. The preservation of tradition is mostauthentic when it brings forth and sustains new cultural expressions whichallow us to meet the multiple challenges brought to us in our fast-changing

world. The process by which we contribute to the furthering of our culturalheritage, therefore, is one and the same as the process by which we givedepth to our dignity.

One of the highest manifestations of our commitment to human dignity is expressed in our capacity not just to tolerate cultural diversity, but to con-tribute in positive ways to the preservation of cultural expressions other thanour own. Such a contribution shows respect for and recognition of the rightsof others, which is stronger and less paternalistic than mere tolerance. 11

At the economic level In our society money dominates all spheres of life. This is why we have cometo uphold both negative rightsnot to be deprived of our property and of the fruits of our laborand positive rightsto be assisted in times of crisisand/or when subjected to dehumanizing need. To be recognized, integrated,and counted as full members of society we must have access to an adequateamount of capital. Intuitively we recognize the deception of consumerism the belief that we exist for the sake of having. Still, within a society ruled by the impersonal laws of the market, one must have in order to be . As we men-tioned, in a society like ours, not having becomes a first step to not being.Thus we have affirmed: humans have the right to a voice in the determina-tion of our nations economic priorities; the right to work and to an adequate

wage that enables us to support, clothe, feed, and house ourselves and ourfamily; the right to create associations, for example unions and professionalguilds which defend our economic interests; the right to health care; and thecreation of some form of social security or a social safety net for protectionin time of crisis.

In our social context, money is so tied to our sense of dignity that at dif-


9/27


14

Gar c a

15

men for the emancipation of women, and elders for the well-being of chil-dren. Human dignity necessitates the common pursuit of values like the onesjust mentioned, values that bind us together and give us the sense the we doshare community. At present, justice for the poor and concern for nature pro-

vide two objective standards and political causes that serve as ideals, beyondand larger than our self-interests and worthy of our sacrifice, and that arecapable of allowing us to discover common ties.

Few tasks are more urgent today than caring for the moral and politicalhealth of our democracy. The restitution of the moral vision of the republicis not to be entrusted to political experts. This is a task for common citizens

who are vigilant and willing to identify and even sacrifice levels of their per-sonal self-realization in order to serve the common good. Disciplined, ordi-nary citizens alone can contain the corruptive power of money and the influ-ence of the market within the public sphere, the health care system, educa-tional institutions, and the religious and cultural institutions that give mean-ing to our lives. Vigilant citizens that support social pluralism and the emer-gence of multiple voluntary associations can provide alternate social andmoral visions, and the impetus for public participation of the sort that canrevitalize our public life. My grandmother, who was a Presbyterian, used totell me that Presbyterian schools used to produce such public-spirited peo-ple. I hope she is not rightthat we used to create and nurture such people.

At the moral level Dignity, as both task and struggle, calls for a reinterpretation of the substan-tive content of those moral values at the core of the human rights debate: the

values of freedom, equality, and community. From the perspective of humandignity, freedom is a more inclusive term than liberty or license. It entailsmuch more than doing as one pleases as long as it does not harm or dimin-ish the freedom of others. Freedom relates to our status as creative agents

who have the capacity, and who must assume responsibility, to give directionto our personal and collective life.

This attractive term, creative agency, central to my own understanding

of human dignity, is problematic. Postmodernists, who, in my interpretation,also define the human as creative agency, have a quite different understand-ing of what this entails. They interpret human emancipation mainly in aes-thetic terms, which in itself is not a problem. But their sense of art is prob-lematic. Art is bereft of any objective reference; it is reduced to the expres-sion of the subjective feelings of the artist. The intention and value of art, if it has an intention or value beyond expressing the feeling of the artist him-or herself, is to allow others to enjoy or feel whatever experience the artobject elicits within them. There is no intention of communicating or sharinga binding experience with others.

Morally speaking, the problem is that when the good is seen as the soleproduct of the agents spontaneous freedom and/or original self-expression,

ferent times, and in different ways, we have considered and proposed theneed to guarantee citizens a minimum income. We prefer that this income bederived through meaningful work, but in those cases when neither the pri-

vate nor public sector can provide a person with work, each person must beprovided with money. We have done so because we know that when deniedcertain levels of consumption, our life plans are frustrated and our dignity issignificantly violated.

At the political level If having is at the service of being, the political dimension of our existenceenjoys a certain priority in the realization of human dignity. Dignity has to doas much with sharing and exercising power as with having access to thegoods and services that nurture the body. Dignity is related to the struggle tocreate and nurture a pluralistic society that allows its members the right to a

voice and active participation within all the centers of decision-making thataffect their lives in significant ways. Thus we claim the right: to assembly; topropagate our ideas; to freedom of thought, religion, and speech; to freedomfrom torture and arbitrary imprisonment; to security from discrimination andprejudicial harassment; and to freedom from degrading treatment. And wealso structure our lives in ways that support the separation of power, the openand frequent competition for public office, and the creation of spaces for vol-untary associations that are self-determining.

Voluntary associations, a unique North American invention, present us with alternative values and lifestyles to those advocated by the state. They have the potential for becoming communities of resistance committed to jus-tice beyond the vision of the dominant political community. It is not by acci-dent that most African-American Christians understand the church as a com-munity of resistance12 and for the realization of universal brotherhood and sis-terhood, far beyond what the state might be willing to recognize and con-tribute to as legitimate.

Few experiences enhance and nurture our sense of dignity more than thepolitical tasks of organizing ourselves to achieve our self-given goals. The nar-ratives that depict the struggles of both the Civil Rights movement in the Unit-ed States and the base communities in Latin and Central America recount howthe dignity of the poor was and is significantly enhanced as they discovertheir capacity to organize themselves and achieve the religious, political, eco-nomic, and social ends they give themselves. For many people it is the churchthat provides a mini-public space for them to experience the organizationaland political skills of community-concerted actions.

Our communal self-realization and identity is seriously undermined by the politics of lobbying and narrow self-interest. Conversely, it is most authen-tic when we see ourselves as being connected to others in the quest, withinhistory and nature, of something larger than our narrow self-interestas

when whites struggle for the rights of blacks, humans for the care of nature,


10/27

ON HU M A N DIGNIT Y Gar c a

17

human rights tradition. Its best representatives are those saints whose politicsof compassion are to be advocates for the rights of refugeespeople who forreligious, political, and/or economic reasons are displaced by their leadersand have no place to call their own. These saints remind us that because weall belong to God, we all have legitimate claims, in spite of the claims of nations, over each others space and resources. This is what Gods sover-eignty really means.

To conclude, dignity as given and dignity as struggle are two sides of thesame coin. We cannot have one without the other. Without having dignity wecannot be dignified, but our being dignified is never our own creation. Dig-nity is ultimately a gift of Gods grace, of Gods creative freedom and optionfor us. And like many other expressions of Gods grace, we discover it andunveil its depths within our own historical becoming. It is in the struggle toforward the dignity of others that we have a sense of renewed conversion toGods purpose and aim for us. It is here that we unveil and have a glimmerof that stuff we call dignity.

NOTES1 For a comprehensive and insightful treatment of the topic of human rights and theRoman Catholic Church see David Hollenbach, S.J.,Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and

Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition(New York: Paulist Press, 1979). For aReformed perspective on human rights see All O. Miller, ed., A Christian Declaration

on Human Rights: Theological Studies of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977).2 John Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant

Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,1993).3 Cornel West, Race Matters (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993).4 Jacques Derrida, Racism Last Word, trans. Peggy Kanruf,Critical Inquiry 12(Autumn 1985). Also see The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of itsPupils, Diacritics 13 (Fall 1983).5 One of the most insightful treatments of the relationship between love and justice isthat of Jon Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books,1984), 39-63.6

Robert A. Evans and Alice Frazer Evans, Human Rights: A Dialogue Between the First and Third Worlds (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1983).7 Ronald Cole-Turner, ed., Human Cloning: Religious Responses (Louisville, Kentucky:

Westminster John Knox Press, 1997).8 Even Karl Barth, who, among the modern theologians is so committed to the notionof sacrificial love that he is highly suspicious of the legitimacy of any claims of self love recognizes that there is a legitimate claim not to be sacrificial to the point of los-ing ones identity and of losing oneself in the other. Church Dogmatics , III/2, trans G.

W. Bromiley, R. H. Fuller, Harold Knight, and J. K. Reid (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,1960), 248-269.9 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1992). Also see his Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, New

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992). Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

16

and in the absence of a sense of the given and the objectively prior, morali-ty loose its rootedness in the tradition and wisdom it embodies. A radically subjective and relative morality cannot be taught, does not allow us to engagein moral counseling, and is bereft of standards and guidance. As our choicesexpand, we are left with nothing of value to choose; and as we are empow-ered, we have less of a sense of the purpose, limits, and direction of thatpower. It is like having an Exodus experience but never having something

like the Ten Commandments that enable us know what are the minimumrequirements of living together and the purpose of life.Secondly, social equality entails something other than homogeneity,

uniformity, and sameness. Equality is not simple but complex. 13 More thanhaving the same, it consists of having that which allows us to be the uniquebeings we are. Paradoxically, social equality aims at difference. The commu-nitys reason for being is precisely to enable the emergence of that which isdistinct within our equal dignity. We celebrate plurality as the natural out-come of our freedom. The more spaces to exercise freedom, the greater andmore multiple will be the differences that appear among us. Plurality and dif-ference are what make community possible and rewarding, not to mentioninteresting and enjoyable. I do believe that what makes life in the city soalluring and attractive, in spite of the crime and creeping commercial ugli-ness, is the diversity of lifestyles and conceptions of life that one encountersthere.

Finally, from the perspective of human dignity, community entails morethan conformity, adaptation, and self-sacrifice for the common good. Para-doxically, community is for the sake of individuality, in the same way thattrue individuality entails commitment and sacrifice for the well-being of the

whole we belong to and that shapes us. As we mentioned, while it is thecommunity that has the services and resources for us to be all that we canbe, community is not a mere means for us, but an intrinsic part of what itmeans to be human.

The social and national community are central to our sense of identity and dignity; however, we are ultimately bound to a larger communitythe

world community. In good Augustinian fashion, love of family and friends, while good in itself, must lead to social and national love, and national loveand loyalty must lead to international love and bonding. The love and justiceexperienced at the national level prepares us to contribute to the creation of more just, compassionate, and loving world community structures.

Our capacity to freely enter into covenants of community with peoplefrom all over the world models the sense of inclusiveness that is part of Godscovenant with humanity. From the perspective of the Ultimate, universal tiescan be stronger than family, social, and national ties. International solidarity,aiming to eliminate dehumanizing poverty, torture, religious, and culturaloppression, at times can and ought to take priority over social and nationalloyalties. This universal and inclusive vision is part of the genius of the


11/27


12/27


13/27

INT E RVIE W INT E RVIE W

23

Its not complicated. The Bible is full of stories about lifting somebody whohas been put down. It seems hard to miss. Yet we do miss it. So maybe thereis something to be said for once in a while saying, You know, this story points to the dignity of so-and-so, or This story points to the importance of a commitment to human dignity.

How do kids learn about human dignity?

By the way they are treated. The family is the school of human dignity forchildren. How male and female family members relate teaches kids genderrelationships. How the finances of the household are used shows kids whocounts and who doesnt count in the world. Im seriously troubled by the cur-rent phenomenon of kids killing kids. Deep down we all know that one rea-son why these kids feel like that is that they feel nobody cares about them.They feel no sense of being accountable themselves because nobody seemsaccountable to them. We must revisit the question of what signals we give ourchildren in terms of our priorities and investments.

When you look at American culture are you optimistic that we aremoving in the right direction?If the options are between being optimistic and pessimistic then Im opti-mistic. It is intrinsic to our religious traditions. North Americans are concerned

with justice. People understand justice differently. Some people have limited views of what justice is, but few disregard it altogether.

22

is good, and were accountable for natures well-being. Nature does not havehuman dignity, but our dignity depends to some extent on our stepping upto care for the natural world.

Its easy to understand major abuses of human dignity. What are theeveryday, garden variety abuses of human dignity?Its when we lose the capacity to recognize the needs, pains, and joys of thepeople we live with. Life gets busy. We take our loved ones for granted. Cri-sis comes. We stop listeningwe hear people but dont pay attention to whatthey are saying. Children tell us what they need but we dont listen. Dead-lines, not people, fill our work.

Historically, who are the great heroes of human dignity?I think immediately of three people. First, Jesus. Jesus was stunning in hissensitivity to people who were marginal and oppressed. When Jesus spokeabout the poor he was speaking of people who were not morally nice, werenot socially graceful, and were actually unpleasant to be with. Still Jesuscalled us to love awful people, like Zaccheus.

Second, Ghandi. Ghandi, both in South Africa and India, showed tremen-dous passion to work for justice in a way that uplifts not only the dignity of others but his own sense of dignity.

Third, Martin Luther King and his capacity to deal with race relationships.Though King was flawed in terms of gender relationships, he had a vision of how to reunite those who had defined themselves as separate and enemies.His was an inclusive vision. He tried to promote Hispanic participation in theCivil Rights movement while many of the other African American leaders

were against it. He promoted justice for Vietnamese people when other peo-ple thought that it might be detrimental to his own cause.

But most important are the millions of anonymous saints whose works of love in both small and large ways keep the human race together.

What are the signs that a local church is not paying enough attention to human dignity?Reinhold Niebuhr used to argue that individuals have greater moral capacity than institutions. Institutions, in principle, tend to waft toward the immoral asa way of surviving and asserting themselves. Although he wrote little aboutthe church, I think there are hints in a couple of his works that if there is aninstitution that might be morally redeemable, it could be the church. I amtroubled in particular by churches that withdraw themselves into enclaves in

which all the people are more or less the same. Even when such churchesdo outreach programs, they keep the people they do outreach for at a dis-tance. Most of our churches are very homogenous. In the long term one hasto wonder what happens when we keep on dividing ourselves along this line.It is okay to have cultural identity but it is dangerous to only have culturalidentity.

How can a pastor preach or teach about these issues?


14/27

Engelhardt

25

The foregoing concerns are secular. Orthodox Christian theological hesi-tations are even more considerable: they disclose spiritual grounds for utiliz-ing caution in the pursuit of personal dignity. 5 After all, to seek ones owndignity or the personal dignity of others may be maleficent in encouragingpride. The radical power of Christianity lies not in the discovery of ones owndignity as a worth independent unto itself. Its power lies in the experience of Gods mercy and love. The focus has not been on achieving ones dignity,

but on the tender mercies, kindness, humility, meekness,longsuffering...[and] love, which is the bond of perfection. This is affirmedso that God can rule in your hearts, to which also you were called in onebody (Col. 3:12-15). The dignity of the Christian is achieved in the body of Christ through whom Christians can seek perfection (John 17:23) by beingunited to his holiness (Heb. 12:10). Even to love ones neighbor rightly, onemust first love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and

with all your mind, for this is the first and greatest commandment (Matt.22:27-38).6 If one does not first love God wholeheartedly, ones attempts atlove, the achievement of justice, and the realization of human dignity may horribly miscarry, as did many such in this century. It is in the spirit of thisinsight that one can understand a warning from St. Isaac of Syria (613-?) thatis at best troubling, if not scandalous, for the modern ear. It is better for youto free yourself from the bond of sin than to free slaves from slavery. 7

Christs revolution is not achieved first by changing the structures of this world, but by first changing the heart through repentance. Christ points to akingdom that is within us (Luke 17:21) and able to transfigure us, and that

will be established in the triumph of his Second Coming (Matt. 16:27). Ortho-dox Christians understand that Christ does not falsely prophesy when hestates, Assuredly, I say to you, there are some standing here who shall nottaste death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom (Matt 16:28).8In each of the synoptic Gospels, this prediction is followed by the Transfigu-ration on Mount Tabor, a transfiguration promised to and realized by Chris-tians ever since, as they enter into his kingdom before the Second Coming. 9The dignity sought, that leads to transfiguration, depends upon taking on aChrist-like life, which, to the outside observer, may appear far from dignified.Be persecuted, but persecute not; be crucified, but crucify not; be wronged,but wrong not; be slandered, but slander not. Have clemency, not zeal, withrespect to evil. Lay hold of goodness, not justice.10 The Christian is to liber-ate the world and to transform its structure by making mercy have prece-dence over justice. Conquer evil men by your gentle kindness, and makezealous men wonder at your goodness. Put the lover of justice to shame by

your compassion.11Secular concerns about dignity thus graft poorly onto traditional Chris-

tianity, which seeks not self-esteem, but repentance and transfiguration. Con-cerns about dignity are lodged more congenially within secular systems of mutual recognition, which attempt to account for the special standing of indi-

24

I smael Garca effectively presents the heuristically rich allure of the termdignity, the confusions it involves, and the temptations it offers. As henotes, the Declaration of Human Rights (1948) proclaimed a cento of for-bearance rights, procedural protections, and welfare claims. 1 Unconstrainedby philosophical discipline, economic obligation, or political responsibility,the United Nations was not forced to justify the rights claims it announced,determine how they might be supported, or oblige itself to enforce them. Thelanguage of human rights took on the force of a manifesto. Human dignity

was then engaged as a foundation for this plethora of rights, althoughhuman dignity itself is plural in meaning. The ambiguities run deep. TheLatindignitas already comes with a gaggle of meanings in identifying excel-lence, worth, merit, rank, and office. There are also the ambiguities in thefoundation and substance upon which Garca draws: is dignity innate tohumans, given to humans, a historical task to be achieved, inalienably equalamong humans, or able to be diminished? Likely, different senses of dignity differ in these crucial respects.2 Terms have their significance within a partic-ular framework of meaning.

Although ambiguity can nurture poetic force, there are also grounds toclarify important ambiguities. For example, if persons have a right to dignity,against whom do they have this right? By what force and under what cir-cumstances may persons coercively realize their dignity? What constraintsshould limit the pursuit of dignity? How are dignity concerns to be balanced,as well as harmonized, in the pursuit of other goods? These are questions of considerable weight: the unrestrained pursuit of democracy, rights, andhuman dignity has led to much bloodshed in this century. 3 Because dignity,rights, and equality can function as manifesto terms, words that seem to cap-ture a deep truth and whose criticism is perceived to be out of place, they can both direct and misdirect energy. After the horrors of this century,philosophers as well as political theorists would nevertheless do well toapproach with caution passionate but unclear claims of human dignity so asto understand how to mediate peacefully among competing interests. 4

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., is professor in the department of

philosophy, Rice University, professor of medical ethics, Baylor College

of Medicine, and member of the Center for Medical Ethics and Health

Policy. He is also adjunct research fellow, Institute of Religion,

Houston, Texas, editor of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,and co-editor of the journal Christian Bioethics. His most recent book is The Foundations of Bioethics , 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1996).

H. TRISTRAMENGELHARDT, JR .

R E S P O N S E S


15/27

Engelhardt R E SPONSE S

27

explores the dangers involved in the unrestrained pursuit of freedom: Universal free-dom can thus produce neither a positive achievement nor a deed; there is left for itonly negative action; it is merely the rage and fury of destruction.The Phenomenol-ogy of Mind , trans. James Baillie (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), 2nd ed., 604. Hegelhere identifies the bloodshed of the Reign of Terror in France. In the absence of restraining structures, traditions of compromise, and customs that moderate evenclaims to basic human needs, the pursuit of fairness, justice, and democracy can leadto their opposite, indeed to tyranny and death. Hegel surely would have regarded thetragedies born of the October Revolution, the establishment of communism in thePeoples Republic of China, and the killing fields of Pol Pot, all of which were under-taken in the pursuit of justice and rights for the oppressed, as flowing, in great mea-sure, from these roots.4 Issues allied to these are explored in H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics and Secular Humanism: Why Is There No Canonical Moral Content? in

Reading Engelhardt , eds. B.P. Minogue, G. Palmer-Fernandez, and J.E. Reagan (Dor-drecht: Kluwer, 1997), 259-85.5 My remarks develop from within Orthodox Christianity, which draws on the writingsof the undivided Christian theologians of the first millennium as if they were contem-poraries, which they indeed are.6 The Pentateuch states the first commandment forcefully. Love the Lord your God

with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength (Deu. 6:5). Seealso Leviticus 19:18.7 Quoted in Christos Yannaras, The Freedom of Morality (Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirsSeminary Press, 1984), 271.8 See, for example, Homily 66 of the homilies of St. John Chrysostom on the Gospelof St. Matthew.9 See the account of the transfiguration of St. Seraphim of Sarov (1759-1833) whenspeaking with Motovilov. Lazarus Moore, St. Seraphim of Sarov (Blanco, TX: NewSarov Press, 1994), 167-207.10 St. Isaac the Syrian, The Ascetical Homilies of Saint Isaac the Syrian , trans. Holy Transfiguration Monastery (Boston: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1984), Homily 51,246.11 Ibid., Homily 64, 314.12 Hegel elaborates the development of self-conscious mutual recognition in his Phe-nomenology of Spirit, as well as in the third part of The Encyclopedia of the Philo-

sophical Sciences (1830) and in The Philosophy of Mind , 430-439. The moral force of this analysis is then rendered explicit in The Philosophy of Right .13 Saint John Climacus,The Ladder of Divine Ascent , trans. Lazarus Moore (Boston:Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1991), rev. ed., 136.

26

viduals outside of both positive law and transformation by grace. KantsEnlightenment image of a rational kingdom of ends conveys dignity ( Wrde )on persons out of the respect ( Achtung ) owed to the other from regard of themoral law (das Gesetz ). Or dignity can be constituted out of the mutualacknowledgement of different persons ( das anerkennende Selbstbewutsein ),as in Hegels dialectic of mutual confrontation, which culminates in the fab-ric of morality.12 Dignity can be understood in diverse fashions within differ-

ent attempts to constitute a specific moral understanding of the status of per-sons derived from the character of morality, reason, or the human condition.History, society, and content shape the multiple traditions of the humansearch for self-affirmation.

Against this sense of tradition and the search for self-affirmation, Ortho-dox Christianity stands in contrast. It recognizes tradition not as a complexhistorical nexus, but as the presence of the Spirit. It invites all to step away from seeking, through others, affirmation of their own intrinsic dignity, butinstead to pursue affirmation and dignity in Christ. He who glories, let himglory in the Lord (2 Cor. 10:17). For the traditional Christian, a personsstanding comes from the free gift of creation and the even more marvelousgift of forgiveness and redemption, despite sinfulness. It comes from God andcan only be understood in reference to God. In this fashion, one can indeed

acknowledge an appropriate sense of ones dignity as rooted in the love andgrace of God. But one must be careful so that secular usages do not decou-ple a religious understanding from its rootedness in grace. A sense of self-

worth apart from this glorying in Christs love has traditionally been regard-ed as the first step to sinful pride. In reflecting on how vainglory is the moth-er of pride, St. John of the Ladder (579-649) warns: Praises exalt and puff one up; and when the soul is exalted then pride seizes it, lifts it up to heav-en and casts it down to the abyss. 13 This view of matters cannot but goagainst the grain of modern sentiments, as it did against that of Romans seek-ing dignitas . As Christ reminded Pilate, My kingdom is not of this world(John 18:36).

NOTES1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of theUnited Nations in Paris on December 10, 1948, combined forbearance rights (e.g.,rights to life, liberty, and security of person) and procedural rights (e.g., rights to free-dom from arbitrary arrest and access to fair and public hearings) with claim rights(e.g., rights to social security and to work). The Declaration does not give sufficientguidance regarding how the latter should be implemented, especially in developingcountries with vast differences in standards of living. Even today in countries such asthe Peoples Republic of China, it is quite difficult to realize a general right to socialsecurity.2 For a further development of my views regarding the unavoidable strategic ambigu-ities ingredient in cardinal secular moral terms, see H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., The Foun-dations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford, 1996), 2nd ed., chapter 2.3 In his criticism of the French Revolution in Absolute Freedom and Terror, Hegel


16/27

George R E SPONSE S

29

ed. Is that how others should treat me or how I should treat others? In theideals and development of the Enlightenment project which he espouses, thedangers of self-interest, self-centeredness, and excessive individualism areever lurking.1 While Garca plays with the dangerous fire of laissez faire indi-

vidualism, he doesnt seem to get burned, for he insists that both ones owndignity and that of others are essential, and that our social life is constitutiveof the dignity of persons. Rather than allowing preoccupation only with per-

sonal rights and dignity, he calls us to focus on the rights of persons in com-munity and to become a community of mutual dependence. This dialecti-cal approach assumes that autonomy and individualism do not imply narcis-sistic independence. Not only does human dignity implicate our recognitionand treatment of others, but ones self-realization and dignity is intrinsically tied with the practice of serving and contributing to the life possibilities of others.

After emphasizing the dignity of the other, Professor Garca returns tothe slippery dialectic when speaking of our right to seek our physical well-being and to contribute to the physical well-being of others. Perhaps hispoint is that we cannot treat others with dignity unless we have dignity, but

what seems to be unsaid is that having dignity does not guarantee that wetreat others with dignity, as experience and history painfully demonstrate. He

pushes the argument to the limits when he invokes Karl Barth to urge us tobe firm in the pursuit of our own self-care and resist being made mere instru-ments for the well-being of others. But immediately Garca tempers the callto self-love by saying it is best to start by giving priority to the needs of oth-ers. Then a kind of synthesis comes when he affirms that [O]ur sense of dig-nity as well as our self-realization and emancipation is tied to that of othersand that [T]he paradox of authenticity is that we obtain it not by pursuing itdirectly but as the by-product of serving the needs of others.

This summary of Dr. Garcas self/others dialectical brings us to the mod-ern/postmodern debate which he raises. While recognizing truths in numer-ous postmodern critiques of modernity, he claims that the postmodern morallanguage of obligation has a strong paternalistic bent to it. What about thepaternalism in modernitys language of progress, expansionism, and superi-ority? Isnt charity as much a part of the modern projects of developmentand mission as of postmodern moral obligations? Did not many people andnations become passive recipients of other peoples graces in modernism?

The Enlightenments understanding of autonomy and freedom molded Americas vision of Manifest Destiny and mission in which, according toRoger G. Betsworth, America had a responsibility to enable all nations togain freedom . . . to establish democracy throughout the world . . . to teachinferior peoples the ways of Christian America.2 How much of our policy of foreign aid and intervention reflects narrow self-interest? Has the generousaccountability of the non-poor, which Garca advocates, succeeded in trans-forming complexes of superiority and inferiority? Do we desire self-determi-

28

P erhaps the greatest problem in our world today is the number of people who have no sense of their own human dignity, coupled by the over- whelming frequency with which people do not recognize the dignity of oth-ers and treat them with indignity. The timely relevance of Professor IsmaelGarcas essay is striking.

I would like to respond to Dr. Garca by commenting on his basicassumptions and methods of ethical discourse, engaging the modern/post-

modern debate with which he teases us, looking beyond to missiological con-nections, and finally listening for silent voices.In his introductory comments Professor Garca unfolds the universal

scope of his subject by declaring that the language of human rights hasestablished itself as the moral language all peoples of the world recognize asnormative. He then affirms that the foundational concept behind the humanrights debate is the concept of human dignity. Herein lies Garcas uniquecontribution: he offers a fresh, creative lens for reflection and praxis of humanrightshuman dignity. A third basic assumption is that modernitys emphasison personal autonomy or the Enlightenment sense of emancipation and self-realization is foundational to human rights and dignity because it places indi-

viduals and social groups in the role of active, responsible moral agents. About this third assumption I will raise some questions.

Professor Garcas methodological explications are quite insightful. First,he demonstrates the duality or dialectical nature of human dignity which isboth divine gift and historical project or human struggle. Furthermore, he pre-sents a circular mode of hermeneutics in which dignity is concurrently moti-

vation, empowerment, and goal. Garcas familiarity with the language andmethodology of liberation theology is evident.

Another dialectical thread which is woven throughout the article is basicto its content. Is the concept of human rights focused on the rights, dignity,and treatment of others or is it directed more towards self, ones own rights,and achieving ones human dignity? In laying out his initial assumptions, Dr.Garca speaks of human rights as defining how humans ought to be treat-

Sherron K. George is assistant professor of

evangelism and missions at Austin Seminary,

having spent more than twenty years in the

mission field in Brazil prior to her appointment.

She earned the M.A. in English from the

University of North Carolina and the D.Min.

from Columbia Theological Seminary.

SHERRON K. GEORGE


17/27

George R E SPONSE S

31

Our dialogue will continue, but one thing is clear, the Realm of God ismanifest when we practice what we learn from Ismael Garca about humandignity.

NOTES1 Robert N. Bellah and his team graphically describe the results of self-reliance andmoral individualism in American culture and life in Habits of the Heart (New York:Harper & Row, 1986).2 Roger G. Betsworth, Social Ethics: An Examination of American Moral Traditions.(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1990), 112, 113.3In Foolishness to the Greeks: The Gospel and Western Culture (Grand Rapids: WilliamB. Eerdmans, 1986), Lesslie Newbigin discusses at length the Enlightenment conceptof human rights as the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (26) andquestions the subjective and infinite claims of every human to the pursuit of happi-ness.4 Robert J. Schreiter,The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local ( Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 122-127.5 Nashville, Tenn: Abingdon Press, 1997.

30

nation for nations which do not choose models we espouse? Has the modernproject led to moral solidarity with countries like Cuba? Has the Enlighten-ment sense of rights curtailed the inclination of the non-poor to treat mar-ginalized people as mere victims? A part of the richness of Ismael Garcasessay is that it elicits such questions and dialogue. Unquestionably humanrights and dignity are positive developments of modern culturesautonomous individual, but together with Robert Bellah and Lesslie Newbi-

gin,3

I am skeptical about some of modernitys marks on our individualisticand ethnocentric culture. While Dr. Garcas theological location of human dignity in creation

imago Dei , incarnation, and redemption are notable contributions of hisessay, I question the theological validity of the modern notion of autonomy.Modernitys concept of autonomy diverges from the neotestamental conceptof freedom couched within the framework of douloi , slaves or servants, ideasforeign to American individual autonomy.

Though I differ with my colleague on the concept and emphasis onautonomy, I applaud his final movement to redefine modernism in terms of global mutuality and solidarity. Robert J. Schreiter affirms that the churchsmissionary activity has gone through three phases: The Period of Expansion(1492-1945) of European civilization by invasion and conquest; The Period of

Solidarity (1945-1989) in the bipolar world of the Cold War where missionbecame dialogue, inculturation, and liberation; and The Period of Globaliza-tion (1989- ) of markets, communication technology, and mission. 4 While Ithink we are still learning the praxis of solidarity, we have entered a new eraof globalization in church and mission. Moving beyond the boundaries of modernity, Professor Garca affirms that what is ultimately at stake is . . . thestatus of membership within the national and world community and reach-es a crescendo with the call to freely enter into covenants of community withpeople from all over the world. Ethicist and missiologist meet when he soarsbeyond ethnocentrism and evokes universal ties and international solidar-ity in a global community.

My final remark is in relation to the voices heard and not heard in Dr.Garcas essay. He demonstrates how Western cultures understanding of dig-nity links humankind with God. If human rights and dignity are universal,how do non-Western voices explain dignity? We are celebrating the anniver-sary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, but I wonder to whatextent is our hermeneutic of human rights culture-bound.

As a liberationist, Garca recognizes that the historical struggle for humandignity is heard in the voice of disenfranchised people and nations. Do the

voices of those whom our society has created poor and oppressed findexpression in his scholarly presentation? With perception and sensitivity, Pro-fessor Garca speaks about the uniqueness of our group identity. Does hisunique Hispanic identity come through as it does so powerfully in his latestbook, Dignidad: Ethics Through Hispanic Eyes ?5


18/27

Wadel l

33

R E SPONSE S

32

forty years ago in his social encyclical Mater et Magistra , members of oneand the same household. 2 Realizing this basic and inescapable truth of ourhuman nature, as history tragically attests, is not a natural aptitude, but a dif-ficult and rare moral achievement which demands unlearning habits and atti-tudes that sabotage solidarity and cultivating those attitudes and virtues whichencourage it. Still, before that difficult reshaping of the self can even begin,

we must examine carefully the vision or perspective out of which we see (orfail to see) all Gods creatures, human as well as nonhuman, not only asblessed, but truly as our neighbors. In short, acknowledging the dignity andsafeguarding the rights of all of creation is initially, and perhaps even pri-marily, a challenge of the moral imagination.

No one has written more insightfully on this than the English philosopherand novelist Iris Murdoch. As she steadfastly demonstrates, seeing truthfully involves a lot more than just opening our eyes. Given our deep tendenciestoward distortion and deception, given our innate skills in falsifying and fab-ricating, it is no wonder that the dignity and sacredness of every human beingis not only often hidden to us, but something we sometimes actively work toconceal. As Murdoch explains, we prefer fantasy to the truth and fantasy,

which she describes as the proliferation of blinding self-centered aims andimages,3 can rule not only individuals, but also our cultural, political, eco-

nomic, and religious institutions.Take, for example, the seemingly indisputable claim that every humanbeing is a person. On face value few would contest this, but the manipula-tive and self-serving energies of fantasywhether expressed in the ideologiesof racism and sexism, the ideologies of consumerism and materialism, the ide-ologies of power and domination, or in our endless fascination with vio-lenceshow how easy it is to live as if some human beings are persons butthe vast majority are not. To see every human being as a person, a true childof God who is to be loved and cared for, is not something we naturally per-ceive; rather, it is the work of a keen and disciplined moral imagination char-acterized by reverence, respect, humility, and awe. Yet, to lack such visionmakes all the difference, because once we no longer see other human beingsor groups, precisely in their otherness , as persons having dignity and rights,

we have implicity decided that we owe them nothing, that they are not to becounted in our calculations of justice, and that indeed as nonpersons they areexpendable.

In short, one of the reasons that the struggle for justice and human rightsoften seems doomed is precisely because we have fashioned attitudes, prac-tices, behaviors, and policies which encourage us not to see . Unless we workto overcome this moral and spiritual blindness, the disenfranchised of theearth will continue to be crushed, perennial victims of our costly self-decep-tion, precisely because how we will act in a situation largely depends on what

we are capable of seeing. There is an intrinsic and inescapable connectionbetween truthful seeing and virtuous actions, between a keen and insightful

W hen reading Professor Ismael Garcias essay On Human Dignity, I was reminded of a scene in John Steinbecks great novel The Grapes of Wrath . It is the one in which the Rev. Jim Casy, the fallen and reluctantpreacher, reminisces about the time that he, like Jesus, went out to the wilder-ness to pray. Alone at night, looking up at the stars, he has an insight thatchanges his life:

An I got thinkin, ony it wasnt thinkin, it was deeper down than

thinkin. I got thinkin how we was holy when we was one thing,an mankin was holy when it was one thing. An it ony got unholy when one misable little fella got the bit in his teeth an run off hisown way, kickin an draggin an fightin. Fella like that bust the holi-ness. But when theyre all workin together, not one fella for anoth-er fella, but one fella kind of harnessed to the whole shebangthatsright, thats holy.1

So many things bust the holiness: the tentacles of selfishness, the seduc-tions of power, the lure of indifference. This is precisely why, as ProfessorGarca eloquently demonstrates, that although human dignity, the bedrock of human rights and of the claims and obligations of justice, may be divinely bestowed, it is, sadly enough, an endless struggle to achieve. Steinbeck is

right that it only takes one unjust person to make a mess of things. But whathappens when the fundamental structures, institutions, and powers of society together conspire to diminish the solidarity necessary for justice and to makeappeals to the common good sound utopian and quaint? More pointedly,

what happens to the calls of Cornell West and Professor Garca for a politicsof compassion when the reigning narrative of a dominant culture blinds usto the image of God in precisely the ones whose sufferings are a protestagainst the despicable sins of injustice?

The endless, and sometimes seemingly futile, struggle to ensure the rightsand to respect the dignity of every human being can only succeed when werealize that injustice is essentially a betrayal , an act of infidelity to those whoare not alien or stranger or enemy to us, but, as Pope John XXIII said nearly

Paul J. Wadell is Associate Professor of Theology at St.

Norbert College, De Pere, Wisconsin. He is the author

of several books and articles, including Friendshipand the Moral Life (University of Notre Dame Press,1989) and The Primacy of Love: An Introduction tothe Ethics of Thomas Aquinas (Paulist Press, 1992).

P AUL J. W ADELL


19/27


20/27

Goodloe

37

Scripture. He does not begin with the Christian faith. He does not begin withour theological heritage. He does not begin with the life of the church. Hebegins with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. That is what hecelebrates. And that tells us something from the beginning. This entire pro-ject rests upon thoroughly secular and political concepts.

I do not recall the language of human rights forming a significant part of the scriptural witness or of the theological heritage of the Reformed church.Nor do I recall that it is the business of the church to be celebrating humanhistorical achievements. I do remember that God has given us a number of commandments which we are expected to obey. I do remember that God hasgiven us a number of promises, the fulfillment of which we receive as gifts(not as rights which we can demand). And I do remember that God has givenus a Son who suffered and died and was raised again in order that we mightbe forgiven and live, which is to say that God has accomplished for us that

which we could not and cannot accomplish for ourselves. The language of rights and achievements is not helpful in the church. In fact, it is less than nothelpful. It is destructive and misleading. We live by grace alone.

Garca next turns to a discussion of human dignity, which he takes to bethe foundational concept behind the discussion of human rights. That is, hisinterest in human dignity is as a prop to advance the overriding cause of

human rights. The better we understand and promote this underlying digni-ty, he seems to be saying, the more prevalent and secure said rights will be. Again, who could be against human dignity? But, we have to ask, what is thesource, the origin, the meaning, and the significance of this term? Why should

we import an alien concept into the church, especially when the whole aimof the secular language is to define reality apart from any reference to theGod and Father of Jesus Christ and apart from any Christian language of thechurch?

I do not recall the language of human dignity, either, forming a signifi-cant part of the scriptural witness or of the theological heritage of theReformed church (there is that passage in Habakkuk 1:5-11 about the digni-ty of the dread Chaldean warriors who come for violence and whose ownmight is their god, but presumably it is not that dignity about which Garcaspeaks). In fact, a great deal of our history might be understood to have todo with the lack of human dignity, the failure of human dignity overreachingitself into pride, the failure of human dignity wasting away into sloth andavarice, and so forth. Perhaps the Fall should be understood as the loss of dignity. And then the gospel would have to do with what God does for us inthis regard, not something that we have in ourselves or do for ourselves. It isnot that we are opposed to human dignity. It is just that the whole currentlanguage of human rights and human dignity is an attempt to say that humanbeings have value in and of themselves, apart from any reference to God. Intruth, human beings have value because God values us. This makes all thedifference in the world. Many others have already noted that, apart from God,

36

H ow does the concept of human dignity relate to the Christian churchin general and to the ministry of the local congregation in particular?Can it serve as a theological principle to guide or affect the every-day ministry of the pastor or the mutual ministries of the members of thechurch? How can or should it af fect the way people relate to each other? Howcan or should it affect the mission of the local church to people outside orbeyond the church? At first glance, such questions appear easy. Who couldbe against human dignity? But a close reading of Professor Ismael Garcasinaugural address, On Human Dignity, complicates the matter tremendous-ly.

On the face of it, it would seem obvious that the church would wantboth to acknowledge and to encourage human dignity, both to recognize andto teach it, to uphold and to seek it. It would seem obvious that the church

would want to treat its members and its neighbors with respect and commonhuman decency. Of course we would want to do all that, and much more.

And therein lies the question. As we look at this particular project on humandignity, as we look at this particular program and proposal and attempt toconsider how and whether it might be of use or help in the local church, wemust raise certain questions: On what grounds would this concept of dignity be introduced? For what purpose would it be promoted? To what end oreffect would it tend? How would it relate to the gospel? Would it be helpfulor not to the cause of Jesus Christ?

Garca begins his address with the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. He rejoices that the lan-guage of human rights has established itself as the moral language of all peo-ples of the world, though one would have to ask whether all peoples havea moral language and, if so, whether they use this one. Moreover, Garcaregards the fact that the language of human rights, as normative for defin-ing how humans ought to be treated, is a momentous historical achievement,and one worth celebrating. That is his starting point. He does not begin with

O N H UMAN D I GNI TY ANDTHE C HRISTIAN C HURCH

J AMESC. GOODLOE

James C. Goodloe is pastor of Covenant Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Virginia. He received the D.Min. from Union Theological Seminary in Virginia and the Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.


21/27


22/27


23/27

BOO K R E VIE W S

42 43

the Protestant Reformation and shelteredtwo generations of evangelicalleadership, and a brutality towards theenemies of the Reformation that canhardly be imagined and cannot beexcused. In the end, however, it isCranmers liturgical bequest through theBook of Common Prayer that remainshis greatest legacy. No one has equaledhis prayers in English, nor the simplicity and beauty of his formulae for morningand evening prayer. If we can sayas Ithink we canthat the Lutheran Churchhas bequeathed to ProtestantChristendom a passion for the doctrineof justification, and the ReformedChurch, a tradition of preaching, then wemust also say that Cranmers AnglicanChurch has given us a model forcorporate prayer (embodied mostprofoundly and beautifully in theevensong service) that remains true tothe tenets of the Protestant Reformationand returns us to the roots of broadly

Catholic spirituality.

Dorothy C. Bass,editor, P RACTICING O UR F AITH : A W AY OF L IFEFOR A SEARCHING P EOPLE .San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997,232 pages, $14.

Reviewed by Terry C. Muck, professor of religion, Austin Seminary.

T his book begins by describing thechasm that separates the theory of Christian faith and the cultural context in

which we live our everyday lives. Inorder to connect these two, we need tointentionally build bridges to span thechasm. The authors of this collection of articles have a name for these bridges.They call them spiritual practices.

What are practices? The authorsdefine them this way: shared activitiesthat address fundamental human needsand that, woven together, form a way of life. Practices are needed today morethan ever because of the cultural malaise

Boleyn crisis, Cranmer refused to give into toadying. He served his monarch aspastor, calming the fury of a tyrant in thename of Christ, writing a letter to Henry that urged the King to patience like

Job. MacCulloch writes, Cranmersnegotiation of a frightening and complexsituation is a model of pastoral wisdomand courage. Knowing the King as hedid, Cranmer also knew the destructivequality of Henrys grief and anger. Yetstill he chose to highlight his ownesteem for Anne . . . still he left open thequestion of her guilt. . . . And whilesteadily holding the Kings grief and ragein his sight, he sought to pull Henry back to patience and humility, and toshape that rage so that it did not destroy the gains of the previous three years forthe evangelical cause.

MacCulloch also observes theinfluence Cranmer had on thedevelopment of the English language.The widest aftermath of Cranmers life

and work is to be found in the realm of language and of cultural identity.Cranmer could not have known in 1552that he was providing a vehicle forEnglish worship which would remainalmost unchanged for four hundred

years; with his natural modesty andrestraint, he might have been appalledby the responsibility if he had known.Like Martin Luther, who translated theBible into what we now recognize asGerman and in so doing helped to forma national identity among the disparateGermanic groups, Cranmer shaped thelanguage and linguistic identity of an

entire people. It was the happiest of accidents, writes MacCulloch, that thisecclesiastical functionary, propelled intohigh office by the accidents of politics,had a natural feel for English prose.

Cranmers leadership left a mixedinheritance to the English-speakingchurch, and this must be recognized: aliturgy which drew the laity into the very heart of a rich vernacular of prayer andpraise, and a fierce iconoclasm that

vandalized the artistic glory of themedieval Catholic church in Britain; apragmatism that advanced the cause of

B OOK R EVIEWS

single ecclesiastical animal, aperson who earnestly believedthat worship should rise above

vain, uncomprehendingrepetitions to a biblicalsimplicity, as Cranmer himself

wrote, so that the people may always undoubtedly learnsomething, and may return

home from the churches better instructedin the word of God. Yet, however great his

accomplishments, Cranmer was also asurvivor who accommodated himself andhis conscience to serve successfully under the reign of one of the mostcapricious and cruel monarchs in history.In fact, Cranmer survived because his

viewpoints coincided with those inpower above him, such as ThomasCromwell, the evangelical politician andfor many years Henrys chief advisor.

And, he survived partly because he wasa moral chameleon, able to justify the

torture and execution of Henrys enemieseven when they included Cranmers oldand very close friend, Anne Boleyn (and,in time, Cromwell himself). But Cranmeralso survived, at least to some degree,because of the character of hisErastianism which was never simply asuperficial adoption or endorsement of the religious views of the politicalleadership, nor merely a nationalisticjingoism, but a deeply held theologicalconviction that ones highest duty to Godlies in absolute subservience andobedience to ones monarch.

Calvin once said that in all of life

we have our dealingsournegotiationswith God. Cranmer putsflesh on Calvins words in the context of the political intrigues of RenaissanceEurope. He ne

insights 1998 fall

Documents