india micro finance investment environment profile

8/8/2019 India Micro Finance Investment Environment Profile

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The consensus view in the sector seems to be that a lack of MFI capacity is the numberone obstacle to scaling up outreach. There is a need for staff training in accounting andmanagement information systems (MIS), financial management, personnel management,and business planning. Younger MFIs typically require support (financial and technical)in building adequate MIS systems.

Table 4: Glance at Financial Performance StandardsSample of 42 Organizations

Operationalself-

sufficiency

Portfolio atrisk

Currentrepayment

rate

Operatingcost ratio

Total costratio

Clients perfield staff

72.8% 4.5% 90.4% 20.0% 34.9% 164Source: Side-by-Side: A Slice of Microfinance Operations in India , Sa-Dhan, 2004.

Disaggregating the numbers, Grameen-style MFIs have an average operational self-sufficiency of 109 percent, compared to 67 percent for SHGs. To some investors, theGrameen model, currently representing 10-15 percent of microfinance in India, has thepotential for explosive growth, given the right conditions. There has also been a majorincrease in the participation of commercial banks in the sector. New developments likethe securitization of MFI portfolios by commercial banks are underway. As they proveprofitable more and more commercial investors are expected to look to microfinance toform part of their portfolios. Some expect mergers and acquisitions among MFIs in thenear term, as competition increases and the most dynamic and efficient institutionssucceed.

On a cautious note, some MFIs express concern that as competition andcommercialization increase MFIs will look to maintain revenues by moving upmarketand into consumption loans. Of course there is room to serve a range of clients with avariety of products that suit their needs, but it would defeat the purpose of growing theindustry if it were to leave its target population behind.

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III. Regulatory Framework

Microfinance Act

With the absence of a unified microfinance act uniting MFIs under a single regulating

authority with a standard set of guidelines, regulation of microfinance in India issomewhat disjointed. MFIs are classified and governed according to the legal act underwhich they incorporated. An estimated 80 percent or more of the 2,000 MFIs in India areregistered as philanthropic societies and essentially unregulated. Others are categorizedas Commercial Banks, Cooperative Banks, Regional Rural Banks, Non-BankingFinancial Companies (NBFCs), Credit Cooperatives, or Mutually Aided CooperativeSocieties, and may be strictly supervised by the Reserve Bank of India, NABARD, orstate authorities, depending on the type of institution. Indian microfinance associations(notably Sa-Dhan) are working on drafting a microfinance act, which would combine themicrofinance activities of all these institutions under one aegis. Industry actors hope thatsuch an act would reduce confusion and allow for a better basis for comparison and

exchange of information among MFIs. A single regulating body could requirestandardized financial disclosure based on international best practices. Ultimately thisshould make well-performing MFIs more visible to potential investors or donors.

A microfinance act would be additionally useful for forming consensus about thefreedom to set interest rates. Banks lending less than Rs. 2,000 to individuals may notcharge more than their prime rate, which is currently around 10.5 to 11 percent, while therate at which they lend to MFIs or at which MFIs lend to clients is not regulated. Somein the industry support a rate cap in the interest of consumer protection, but most prefer toallow MFIs the ability to set rates as they see fit, and allow competition to drive themdown.

Savings

MFIs registered under the Societies Act face virtually no financial disclosurerequirements. They are prohibited from legally collecting savings, but it is widelyacknowledged that many MFIs mobilize deposits on behalf of their clients. In somecases this money is deposited in group accounts for clients in a commercial bank, whilein other cases the money is collected into a trust which is invested in the MFI. This agray area within the law which highlights the need for the poor to access savings servicesto keep their money in a safe, convenient place; and the need for MFIs to lower their costof capital. There is a synergy here which seems underutilized in the Indian context.

Under Indian regulations MFIs wishing to collect savings typically transform intoNBFCs. NBFCs must be at least one year old before they can colle ct deposits, and thenonly if they have received at least an investment grade credit rating. 8 There is a limit onthe terms of deposits that NBFCs can accept: the interest rate paid on deposits cannot bemore than 11 percent and no deposits for less than 12 months or more than 60 months canbe accepted. However, with a minimum capital requirement of Rs. 20 million (approx.

8 Given by one of the four credit rating institutions specified by RBI in a special Master Circular[http://www.rbi.org.in/sec14/57835.pdf]

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US$440,000considerably higher than found in many other developing countries) and alengthy application process, this is not an easy leap to makeand even then theauthorization to collect savings is only granted by special permission from RBI. In factmost requests are denied and RBI is thought to purposefully drag its feet on theapplications so as to limit the number of NBFCs it is required to oversee. Many in the

industry point out that India suffered a number of NBFC failures in recent years, whichexplains RBIs reluctance to grant licenses. But they note that microfinance institutionswere not among those that collapsed, and argue that with adequate supervision stepscould be taken to protect the poor and their deposits. Others feel that savings might bebetter approached through alternative models, such as credit unions.

Regulations on Investment

Even without the ability to collect deposits some MFIs are finding it worthwhile totransform into NBFCs because it allows them to raise equity. Raising equity, too, issubject to stringent regulations which many find restrictive. Minimum foreign

investment in an NBFC is set at US$500,000and must be matched by an equal amountof domestic equity as regulations prohibit majority foreign investment (unless a whollyowned subsidiary is formed, at much greater cost). It is generally agreed that raising thatamount of money in India is sufficiently difficult to effectively prohibit foreigninvestment in MFIs. Given this limitation, some are searching for modifications toIndian banking regulations that could stimulate domestic investment. Some havesuggested the implementation of the concept of the limited liability partnership in India,protecting investors from liability to the extent of their investment. A further step wouldbe to allow (domestic) venture capital funds and NGOs to invest in NBFCs. Finally,curiously, RBI in 2002 outlawed even borrowing from abroadincluding from donoragencies. This limits MFIs access to capital at preferential rates, a vital source of funds,and a potential source of quasi-equity, preventing them from leveraging more capital.With domestic loan rates starting at over 8 percent, borrowing abroad, even atcommercial rates, can be of benefit to MFIs.

MFIs also face restrictions on the receipt of foreign donations. In order to receiveoverseas grants they need permission from the Ministry of the Interior in accordance withthe Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. In general, it takes about two to three monthsto get a temporary permit under this regulation and the NGO is required to reapply for itevery year for three years until it is granted a permanent permit.

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IV. Incentives / Disincentives for Information Sharing

Current Attitudes to Disclosure

The lack of a single legal structure governing MFIs has hampered the level of disclosure

in the sector. MFIs are currently registered under a variety of legal acts, all of whichhave different reporting standards. To further complicate matters, microfinance is oftenonly one part of the organizations activities but there are no requirements for separatereporting. M-CRIL, the leading microfinance ratings agency in India, cites difficulties inidentifying the microfinance component of an organizations operations as one of themost difficult aspects of conducting a rating. The cost of obtaining a rating isapproximately US$10,000 but to this point a subsidy from CGAP (a market facilitator)means that the MFI is typically only responsible for 25 percent of the total cost.However, for some smaller MFIs even the reduced cost can be a significant barrier tohaving a rating conducted.

Attitudes to disclosure vary by the size of MFI. Large scale MFIs that have alreadyobtained international investment, such as AP-based BASIX and SKS, tend to haveexcellent levels of reporting which go far beyond the basic legal requirements. However,there is little or no incentive for small MFIs to increase their level of public disclosurebecause their operations are so small that they do not currently seek access to eitherinternational capital or large quantities of domestic capital. Medium-sized MFIs fallsomewhere between these two categories and Sa-Dhan reports that there areapproximately 50-60 mid-sized MFIs that are on the verge of being large enough to wantto increase public disclosure in order to seek outside money. It is already the case thatmid-sized MFIs obtaining loans from second-tier organizations such as CARE IndiasCASHE program or Ahmedabad-based Friends of Womens World Banking must

maintain MIS systems and provide high quality financial reports as a condition forreceiving funding.

Potential for New Sources of Funding

At present the potential for new international sources of funding in India appears to bequite limited. The 40 percent priority lending target that exists for domestic Indian bankshas given them a strong incentive to invest in the microfinance sector. This has led tosome of the larger banks, such as ICICI, using MFI client portfolios to channel fundsdirectly to borrowers. SKS, one of the largest MFIs in India, sees this model aspotentially becoming the dominant means of providing lending to the poor. The

increasing involvement of large commercial banks in the sector is likely to enhance thelevels of disclosure as MFIs compete to offer their client portfolios to the banks.

Proposed Microfinance Reforms

Sa-Dhan and others are currently working on a proposed microfinance act which couldsignificantly enhance information sharing in the sector. The act would provide a singlelegal structure to register microfinance organizations with unified reporting standards.

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Concern has been expressed that more stringent regulations could hurt the microfinancesector in the short-run. Under a standardized reporting environment, many MFIs couldlook unattractive as they currently run significant deficits and while donor agencies mayaccept this and understand the difficulties of scaling up small businesses, commercial

lenders may not. Despite these concerns, enhanced regulations and reporting standardswill almost certainly help the sector in the long-run.

Investors Requirements

Investors would like to see more unified reporting and accounting standards. At presentMFIs follow many different local accounting standards, making comparisons of differentorganizations very difficult. M-CRIL is working to promote CGAP accountingguidelines but given the sheer size and diversity of the sector this will be a difficultprocess. At present an M-CRIL rating is based on the MFIs performance across 50parameters focusing on the areas of governance, management and financial performance.

The governance section rates the composition of the board, the decision-making processand the formulation of business plans. The management section rates the process forconducting staff evaluations and meetings. In the financial performance section M-CRILattempts to convert the MFIs accounts to CGAP standards to assess portfolio size andquality but, as mentioned above, this can be difficult given the discrepancies in localaccounting practices.

Sa-Dhan has finalized a set of performance indicators for MFIs which it hopes will allowthem to better meet investors information requirements. These focus on measures of administrative efficiency, operating cost ratios, client-to-staff ratios, current repaymentrates and portfolio-at-risk over 60 days. In assessing and rating SHGs NABARD looks atfactors such as the age of the SHG, the regularity with which meetings are held, thedemocratic pattern of meetings and the regularity of savings and internal lending.

Investors would also benefit from the publication of impact assessments. Many investorsare interested in the social returns to microfinance as well as the financial returns.Studies which examine which sections of society an MFI reaches and the wider effectwhich its operations have on local communities could have a significant bearing oninvestment decisions. Large MFIs such as BASIX and SKS conduct studies assessing theeffect of their work on poor communities and extending such practices to mid-sized MFIscould potentially encourage greater investment in the sector.

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V. Investment Climate

The Demand-Supply Gap in the Provision of Microfinance Services

There is a widespread view that enough domestic capital is available in India to cover the

current demand for loans from MFIs. Government involvement in the sector hasguaranteed easy access to funds for many MFIs through subsidized loans provided bystate development finance institutions such as NABARD and SIDBI, as well as by thecommercial banking sector. The 40-percent priority sector lending mandated by RBI hasplayed a key role in the involvement of banks in microfinance. The fact that about 75percent of all banking assets in India are state owned has also contributed in a major wayto the scale of bank lending to SHGs. Commercial loans from domestic lenders are easilyavailable for large MFIs with good capital-adequacy ratios.

However, only 10 to 20 percent of potential microfinance clients in India are presentlyserved and the consensus view in the sector seems to be that the demand-supply gap in

microfinance can not be closed by existing MFIs because many, particularly the youngerand smaller organizations, lack the institutional capacity to expand. The current capacity-building efforts from a large number of government agencies, local and international aidinstitutions, apex financial institutions and potential banking partners, however, guaranteethat an increasing number of well-managed MFIs will be demanding financing in the nearfuture.

Commercial Investment Trends

While the largest institutional investors in microfinance in India, NABARD and SIDBI,are government agencies focusing on SHG bank linkage programs, major private

commercial banks have entered the sector with new models of investment and areexpected to become key players on the supply side of the market.

ICICI Bank, the largest private bank in India, pioneered large-scale private commercialbank investments in microfinance. The ICICI business model is to utilize MFIs as bank agents in the channeling of micro loans to MFI clients. ICICI uses such arrangements tosubstitute for opening branches in remote rural areas, which is very expensive and subjectto heavy regulatory obstacles. Under this type of partnership agreement, the micro loansappear on the books of ICICI, while MFIs receive a stable source of funds. ICICIrequires partner MFIs to deposit a cash collateral equal to up to 10 percent of the loanamount (with the exact percentage depending mostly on the portfolio-at-risk of the MFI).

While initially the interest of commercial banks in microfinance was stimulated by thepriority sector lending requirement, with the stable expansion of micro-lending activitiesover the last two decades banks are starting to realize that microfinance is a profitableand commercially viable business. Some of the largest domestic banks such as ICICI,HDFC, and UTI have already made their entry into the sector, and some foreign banksoperating in India such as ABN-Amro, Citibank, and ING Vysna have expressed interest.

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Opportunities and Issues for Investors

The potential role for foreign investment in the microfinance sector in India is perceivedby major market participants to be the provision of loan guarantees and equity or quasi-equity. The provision of loan guarantees will ensure better borrowing terms for MFIs

because guarantees will relieve MFIs from the need to internalize the cost of loan defaultthrough higher interest rates. Equity and quasi-equity investments will help MFIs buildup their capital base and be in a better position to leverage large domestic commercialloans. However, as discussed in the regulation section of this report, regulatory obstaclesto foreign equity and debt investments in MFIs in India are nearly prohibitive, leavingloan guarantees as perhaps the most promising vehicle for foreign investment at present.While domestic commercial capital is available, most MFIs are not very attractive forequity investors because of their low profitability margins and the difficulty of pullingequity out of an MFI that is not profitable. (Though there are no legal restrictions onpulling money out of India investors may find it difficult to find investors willing topurchase their shares of an unprofitable MFI.) Furthermore, the lack of uniform financial

reporting by MFIs substantially increases the transaction costs to potential investors. New Developments: Securitization

Most of the players in the sector therefore see international financing mostly as a meansof developing new models and products, such as loan portfolio securitization and micro-insurance. ICICI Lombard, in cooperation with BASIX, for example, is currentlyrunning a pilot program in providing weather-indexed crop insurance. ICICI bank, inpartnership with SHARE (a leading MFI), pioneered the securitization of the micro loanportfolios of MFIs. Under this type of agreement, the bank purchases an MFIs portfolioand re-sells it as a packaged financial product to interested investors (such as other banksthat can register such a security as a priority-sector investment). In a securitization deal,the MFI is still responsible for collecting the micro loans from its clients but the risk of repayment default is not backed by any of the MFIs assets. As collateral, ICICI uses afirst-loss default guarantee financed by the excess spread on the MFI portfolio (which isthe difference between the rate of return expected by the bank on the microfinanceportfolio and the rate charged by the MFI to its clients) or provided by a third party, suchas the Grameen Foundation funding of the guarantee in the SHARE deal. Micro loansecuritization benefits MFIs in several ways: it decreases their cost of funds, provides anew source of off-balance sheet funding, and thus allows an MFI to expand lendingoperations.

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VI. Microfinance Sector Risk Factors

Political Risk

Legislative elections in April and May 2004 shifted control of Indias parliament to the

left. Because the winning party, Congress, and its allied parties in the United ProgressAlliance, failed to gain a majority of seats, they must court the support of the IndianCommunist Party (CPI-M), which supports greater government controls over theeconomy and opposes any relaxing of the limits on foreign direct investment. This couldpresent a risk of greater government interference in the microfinance sector, for exampleby imposing interest rate caps which could hinder the viability of MFIs facing hightransaction costs. However, players in the microfinance industry seem to feel that therisk of such a cap is quite low. In addition, RBI confirmed in August, 2004 that, Theinterest rate applicable to loans given bymicro-credit organiza tions to Self HelpGroups / member beneficiaries would be left to their discretion. 9

The positive side of the new government is that as a populist coalition they are believedto be quite supportive of microfinance as a poverty alleviation and development tool, andtherefore may be willing to support positive legislative changes such as a uniformmicrofinance act. In general, the Indian central government seems to pose little risk tothe microfinance sector.

However, since the Indian political system is quite decentralized, the laws andgovernments of the different states can greatly affect the climate for microfinance. Somestate policies have been extremely supportive of microfinance, while others, primarilydue to populist political pressures, have undermined the sector at times. In addition,states that maintain only a weak rule of law (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa have been

mentioned in this category) may present a riskier operating environment for both MFIsand micro-enterprises. At least one MFI, however, states that it receives excellentrepayment rates in Uttar Pradesh, a result it attributes to the fact that its clients there haveno other way to access affordable credit.

Economic Risk

Following several years of strong economic growth and technological development,Indias new government is not expected to make any radical shifts in economic policy.However, the government is likely to increase social spending, which some analystsbelieve could hamper Indias ability to service its foreign debt and pressure interest rates

upward.10

Inflation, which remained quite steady in the range of 3.7 to 4.7 percent perannum from 1999 through 2003, is currently forecast 11 to be 6.5 percent for fiscal year2004-2005, and peaked at 8.3 percent in August, 2004. This is believed to be due largelyto increases in the price of fuel and manufactured goods.

9 RBI Master Circular on Micro Credit, August 21, 2004.10 STRATFOR Global Market Brief, May 23, 2004.11 By the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).

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Managerial Skill

Most Indian MFIs are excellent at doing grassroots work and have a deep understandingof the poor clients they serve. However, many organizations and most new entrants tothe field lack the financial experience and technical ability to properly manage invested

funds. Therefore, one of the key issues for someone thinking about investing in an IndianMFI should be to look at the financial skill level of the managerial staff, as well as thequality of the organizations MIS system. It cannot be assumed that a high repaymentrate indicates that an organization is prepared to make good use of new investment fundsor has a sensible plan for expansion.

Accounting and Financial Reporting

Raters and financial analysts feel that the lack of common and strong accounting andfinancial reporting regulation and monitoring for MFIs allows some of them to hide poorfinancial performance, exacerbating the risk of the emergence and continued operation of

irresponsible MFIs. This situation heightens the risk of institutional fraud, manipulationof portfolio-at-risk, and underperforming assets, particularly for unregulated MFIs (i.e.,those which are not registered as financial companies) which have no financial reportingrequirements.

Volatility

It is generally agr eed that repayment rates in the Indian microfinance sector are quite high(over 90 percent) 12 and fairly stable (in part because of family / household risk-sharingover multiple sources of income which can be used for loan repayment), and thattherefore the sector presents a good opportunity for safe investment. However, opinionsdiffer as to how much the health of the microfinance sector tracks with movements in therest of the economy. On one hand, those in the industry generally believe that sincemicrofinance clients and their micro-enterprises seem to be so isolated from themainstream economy, MFIs and micro-enterprises are not likely to be substantially hurtby downturns in the business cycle. One banker called the demand for the goods andservices offered by micro-enterprises virtually recession-proof. It then seems possible,however, that as microfinance clients and institutions become more linked withmainstream and formal markets, which appears to be the trend, their financialperformance could become more linked with the performance of the macro-economy inthe future.

On the other hand, some argue that the fortunes of the microfinance sector and the macro-economy are already linked, due to the belief that many microfinance clients repay theirloans at least in part with daily wages. If a significant amount of the money clients use torepay their micro-loans does in fact come from daily wages, then clients may default

12 90.4 percent was the average repayment rate among a sample of 42 Sa-Dhan members, althoughparticipants in the Indian microfinance sector have suggested that even higher repayments rates arecommon.

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more frequently when they face lower demand for their labor during economicdownturns, and movements in the microfinance sector could appear to be pro-cyclical.

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VII. SOURCES

Field Interviews (see list of organizations interviewed below)

Articles

Bindu Ananth and Sonju Annie George, Scaling up Micro Financial Services: AnOverview of Challenges and Opportunities, The Social Initiatives Group ICICI Ltd,August 2003.

Economic and Political Weekly, Microfinance: Productive Linkages, March 6, 2004:http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2004&leaf=03&filename=6907&filetype=html ICICI Bank, Micro Finance Products, December 2003:

http://203.199.32.111/icicisig/upload/MFI%20Brochure(gb)1.pdf International Country Risk Guide, India Country Profile, September 2004.

Khozem Merchant, Banks Size up Micro Loans, Millions of rural Indians have noaccess to financial services, Financial Times , November 4, 2004.

Mahajan, Vijay and Bharti Gupta Ramola, Microfinance in India Banyan Tree andBonsai, BASIX Quarterly Review, October 2004.

Meehan, Jennifer, "Tapping the Financial Markets for Microfinance," Grameen

Foundation USA Working Paper, 2004.PlanetFinance, Country Study: India, July 2000: http://www.planetfinance.org .

Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular on Micro Credit, online, August 2004.

Sify Finance, "CMIE Hikes Inflation Forecast to 6.5%," November 16, 2004:http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=13611430 Srivastava, Pradeep and Basu, Priya, Scaling-up Access to Finance for Indias RuralPoor, World Bank, 2004.

STRATFOR, India: Global Market Brief, May 23, 2004.

The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, online, ebrary, Inc.

The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, online, ebrary, Inc.

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http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2004&leaf=03&filename=6907&filetype=htmlhttp://203.199.32.111/icicisig/upload/MFI%20Brochure(gb)1.pdfhttp://www.planetfinance.org/http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=13611430http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=13611430http://www.planetfinance.org/http://203.199.32.111/icicisig/upload/MFI%20Brochure(gb)1.pdfhttp://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2004&leaf=03&filename=6907&filetype=html


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Websites

Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS): http://www.iris.umd.edu/ CIA World Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU): http://www.eiu.com Human Development Reports: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/ ILO Compendium of Official Statistics on Employment in the Informal Sector:http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/papers/comp.htm International Country Risk Guide: http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html LABORSTA Internet: http://laborsta.ilo.org/

The MIX Market: http://www.mixmarket.org/ National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD):http://www.nabard.org/ Sa-Dhan: http://www.sa-dhan.org/ Small Industries Development bank of India (SIDBI): http://www.sidbi.com/

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http://www.iris.umd.edu/http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.htmlhttp://www.eiu.com/http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/papers/comp.htmhttp://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.htmlhttp://laborsta.ilo.org/http://www.mixmarket.org/http://www.nabard.org/http://www.sa-dhan.org/http://www.sidbi.com/http://www.sidbi.com/http://www.sa-dhan.org/http://www.nabard.org/http://www.mixmarket.org/http://laborsta.ilo.org/http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.htmlhttp://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/papers/comp.htmhttp://hdr.undp.org/statistics/http://www.eiu.com/http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.htmlhttp://www.iris.umd.edu/


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VIII. Organizations Visited and Interviewed

Aadarsha Welfare Society , Andhra Pradesh A CASHE partner, Aadarsha Welfare Society is an NGO that organizes and supports

Self-Help Groups.

Aavishkaar India Micro Venture Capital Fund , Mumbai Aavishkaar India is a rurally oriented, for-profit social venture capital fund.

BASIX , Hyderabad BASIX is a livelihood promotion institution which provides financial services and technical assistance. BASIX strives to yield a competitive rate of return to its investors soas to be able to access mainstream capital and human resources on a continuous basis.

CARE India , New Delhi

CARE is presently implementing large-scale Credit and Savings for Household Enterprises (CASHE) program funded by DFID. Working in partnership with twenty fivemicrofinance institutions (MFIs), CARE's CASHE programme reaches sustained

financial services to about 250,000 poor women clients in the states of Andhra Pradesh,Orissa and West Bengal.

Friends of Womens World Banking (FWWB) , AhmedabadFWWB is a second-tier microfinance institution which provides loan funds, technicalassistance, and capacity building support to NGO MFIs.

ICICI Bank , Social Initiatives Group and Commercial Investment Group, Mumbai

ICICI Bank is India's second-largest bank. ICICIs Commercial Investment Groupinvests in and partners with MFIs to serve their clients, and its Social Initiatives Groupworks to strengthen the Indian microfinance sector.

Intellectual Capital Advisory Services Ltd (Intellecap), Mumbai Intellecap is a development consulting company and a development finance think tank.

Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd (M-CRIL), New Delhi M-CRIL is a specialized microfinance rating and research agency, focused on Asian MFIs.

Microcredit Summit Campaign , Hyderabad OfficeMicrofinance advocacy organization.

National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) GujaratRegional Branch, Ahmedabad

NABARD is Indias state-owned apex bank for rural development.

Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Gujarat Regional Branch, Ahmedabad

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Sa-Dhan , New DelhiSa-Dhan is the association of Community Development Finance Institutions, founded bySEWA Bank, BASIX, Dhan Foundation, FWWB, MYRADA, RGVN, SHARE and PRADAN.

Self-Employed Womens Association (SEWA), AhmedabadSEWA is an organization of poor, self-employed women workers. SEWA Bank is acooperative bank, registered with and supervised by RBI, whose client / members arealso poor women.

Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS), HyderabadSKS is a community-owned Grameen (village) banking program that provides poor women loans for both income-generating activities as well as for emergencies.

india micro finance investment environment profile

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