increasing flood early warning and response capacity ... increasing flood... · increasing flood...

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

2012 Humanitarian Research and Innovation Grant Program

Increasing Flood Early Warning and Response

Capacity through Community Participation:

The Cases of Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City and Barangay

Banaba, San Mateo, Philippines

A Paper by:

Irwin Gabriel S. Lopez, MA URP, MA DAD

June 2013

Lopez, Irwin Gabriel (OCHA Humanitarian Research and Innovation Grant Program) Page 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ..............……………………………………………………………………………………...…………… 2

I. Introduction …………………………………........………...…………………………..…………………………. 3

II. Literature Review ……………………….……………..…….………………………...………………………… 4

III. Methodology

3.1. The Conceptual Framework ……….…………………………………..…………….………... 8

3.2. Research Methods …………………….…………………………………..…………….……….… 9

3.3. Sampling ……………………………………………………………………..…………….…………... 10

IV. The Study Area

4.1. The Philippines …..……………………………………………………….…….…………………… 11

4.2. The Case Study Areas …………………………………………………..………………………… 12

V. Results

5.1. Research Question 1: …………………………………………...……..………………….……… 15

5.2. Research Question 2: …………………………………………………......……………………… 18

5.3. Research Question 3 …….……………………………………………….….……....…………… 28

VI. Discussion

6.1. Barriers and Motivations ...………………………………………………………….……..… 31

6.2. On Encouraging and Utilizing Participation …………………..………………….…….. 33

6.3. On addressing the barriers to participation …………………………………........... 36

6.4. Implications of the Findings on Policies and Program Design ……………...... 38

VII. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………....… 39

Appendix A: List of Interviewees ……………………………………………………………………………... 41

References …………………………………………………………………………………………………...…..……… 42


ABSTRACT

This study analysed community participation within the context of a top-down and bottom-

up flood early warning and response system in the Philippines focusing on the cases of

Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City and Barangay Banaba, San Mateo, respectively. It used

semi-structured key informant interviews anchored on the use of grounded theory to gain

new insights and new theories from field data. This study analysed the reasons behind

people’s participation in flood preparedness, their actual roles in such measures and the

factors that will increase their participation or maintain it. It argues that barriers to

participation are nullified by the onset of floods, and that group membership determines

the roles of people in flood preparedness. It also argues that by increasing participation in

flood early warning and response, the community moves shifts their orientation from short-

term preparedness measures to long-term mitigation measures, such as relocation.


I. INTRODUCTION

“Flooding is the single most destructive type of natural disaster that strikes humans and

their livelihoods around the world” (UNISDR, 2002, p.4). In 2011 alone, 106 million people

were affected by floods all over the world (UNISDR, 2012), and most of these victims come

from Asian countries whose populations are exposed to recurrent flooding (UNISDR, 2002).

The Philippines, one of the most storm-prone countries in Asia, experiences roughly five

destructive typhoons each year and about three of these storms result in massive flooding

(Porcil, 2009; Preventionweb, 2012). A total of 36% of the country’s 103,775,002 people

also live under the poverty line (CIA, 2012) and cannot afford to dwell in safer places

resulting in settlements situated within flood-prone areas (Foreman, 2012). To make

matters worse, the country is “likely to experience an increase in the frequency and severity

of typhoons and flash-flooding incidents” as a result of climate change which is expected to

worsen the already adverse flood risks in the country (Chu, 2012; Allen, 2006, p. 81).

Sophisticated solutions for flood control or flood prevention are difficult to implement in

the Philippines primarily due to the costs they entail. In 2009, the country’s Department of

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) indicated that the “flood-control projects that could

have averted mega-floods caused by strong typhoons like Ondoy (Ketsana) remain in the

drawing board for lack of funds”. “Low levels of investment in infrastructure are directly

caused by the country’s tight fiscal situation” and worsened by damages from natural

disasters (NEDA, 2011, p.2).

Flood preparedness measures or forecasting, warning and response are more feasible

solutions as they are readily implementable and would entail less cost (UN-ISDR, 2011).

Community participation however is a mandatory pre-condition for these measures to work.

For one, sophisticated assessments done by experts are meaningless without the

participation of the local people (Murase, et al, 2008). “The experience in the Philippines

has shown that the involvement of the citizenry in disaster management has enabled

families residing in disaster-prone areas to better cope with the impact of a hazard and

recover from the aftermath of a disaster in a shorter time” (Delica, 1999, p.1).

This research breaks down participation into its drivers, barriers and utilization using the

perspective different key actors in a community. This research aims to analyze:

1. The factors that shape people’s intention to participate in community-based flood

early warning and response measures in the Philippines

2. The ways in which top-down and bottom-up the flood early warning and response

system best encourage and utilize participation to increase the overall capacity of

flood-prone communities

3. The ways to address barriers that affect participation in flood preparedness

measures


II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter introduces the concepts of disaster preparedness, community participation and

the other terms used in this research. It discusses the works of Wilcox (1994) and

Motoyoshi (2006) whose theories were used as bases in forming the methodology, research

question and the conceptual framework of the study.

2.1 Flood Preparedness

Disaster preparedness is a term used to refer to “capacities and knowledge” (UNISDR &

UNOCHA, 2008, p.3) or “activities and measures” (WBI, 2003) developed by governments,

organisations, communities and individuals in order to anticipate and respond effectively to

the impact of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions (UNISDR & UNOCHA,

2008, p.3), including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and the temporary

removal of people and property from a threatened location (WBI, 2003). Different terms

are used when preparedness is applied in the context of flood hazards in local communities.

Such terms include community-based early warning system (Phaiju, et al, 2010; Nilo, 2006),

local flood early warning system (Neussner, et al, 2008) and people-centred early warning

system (UNISDR, 2005b).

This research uses the term flood early warning and response to emphasize the pre-disaster

and post-disaster components necessary in a flood preparedness system, as illustrated in

Figure 2.1. ADPC (2008) used the related term “community- based early warning system

and evacuation”, but the term ‘evacuation’ undermines the equally important search and

rescue (SAR) components of such a system. Early warning refers to the process of

generating and disseminating warning messages that give individuals, communities and

organizations sufficient time to react and protect themselves against harm or loss caused by

certain hazards (Relief Web, 2008; UN-ISDR, 2009). Flood response on the other hand refers

to the provision of emergency services and public assistance in order to save lives, reduce

health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the short-term basic subsistence needs of the

affected people immediately after a disaster (UN-ISDR, 2009; WBI, 2003). The use of the

term response in this study also emphasizes how people in disaster-prone communities

have an unofficial but certain role as ‘first responders’ during disasters (UNISDR and

UNOCHA, 2008, p.8).


Figure 2.1: Key Elements of Early Warning Systems

Source: Phaiju, et al, 2010, p.29

2.2. Participation and Community-Based Flood Preparedness

Victoria (2006, p.276) defines people’s participation as a form of public action in which

“community members are the main actors and propellers where they directly share the

benefits of disaster risk reduction and development”. Various authors define participation

as a process or collective effort that enables citizens to:

1. Voice their concerns and opinions and take responsibility for changes in the

community (Armitage, 1988)

2. “Influence and share control over development initiatives, and the decisions and

resources which affect them” (WBLG, p.3).

3. Increase and exercise control over resources and institution (Westergaard, 1986)

4. “Become actively involved in a public project” (Wilcox, 2003, p.50).

There is no shortage of authors or organizations that have studied and established that

people’s participation increases disaster risk reduction capacity in communities. Davis

(2004, p.142) wrote that participation can harness the “powerful forces from within

vulnerable communities to address their own vulnerabilities” while Delica (1999, p.1)

maintained that participation can “enable families residing in disaster-prone areas to better

cope with the impact of a hazard and recover from the aftermath of a disaster in a shorter

time”. Murase, et al (2008, p.5) believes that “sophisticated assessment done by experts

are meaningless without the participation of the local people”.

2.3. Organizational Perspective: Framework for Participation by Wilcox

Wilcox (1994) provided a framework for participation made up of three components: 1)

level of participation, 2) phase / processes and 3) key interests of the people involved. The

level of participation can be expressed in different typologies, best illustrated through

ladders of participation and Wilcox (see Table 2.1), which identified five inter-connected

levels of participation that adopted the perspective of organizations promoting participation

(CAG, 2003).


Table 2.1: Wilcox’s Ladder of Participation

Type of Participation Explanation

5 Supporting independent

community interests

(greatest)

Local groups or organisations are offered funds, advice or other

support to develop their own agendas within established

guidelines

4 Acting together Community members decide together and form a partnership

to carry out decisions that were agreed upon

3 Deciding together Encouraging additional options and ideas, and providing

opportunities for joint decision-making

2 Consultation Offering some options, listening to feedback, but not allowing

or considering new ideas

1 Information (least) Merely telling people what is planned

Source: Rahman, 2005, p.4; Wilcox, 1994

In the context of this research, Wilcox’s work will be used to form the research question and

the questionnaires in order to determine and measure the levels of empowerment and

community participation in the study area. For Wilcox (1994), “participation does not

happen, it is initiated”, a statement that highlights the importance of phases or processes

involved in programs on participation- the second component of the framework. His work

underscores the importance structures and guiding participatory processes from initiation

to continuation. People are the third component of Wilcox’s framework. He mentioned the

need to analyze the roles of politicians, officers, practitioners1, stakeholders

2 and the

community3 which may vary because of a complex range of interests and priorities.

2.4. Individual’s Perspective: Intent to Participate by Motoyoshi

Wilcox's framework for participation represents the perspective of organisations (Wilcox,

1994). However, it needs a complementary framework anchored on the perspective

individuals. The causal model by Motoyoshi (2006) adequately summarizes the motivations

and barriers that affect participation in community-based flood preparedness measures as

well as other factors that may play a role in its implementation. He argues that the

intention to participate in disaster prevention activities rely on three factors: benefit

perception, cost perception and subjective norm4. These factors as well as the intention to

participate are, in turn, determined further by interest in flood disasters, as shown in Figure

2.2

1 Practitioners- people who are planning and managing the participation process (Wilcox, 1994)

2 Stakeholders- people affected by, or can affect, a decision (Freeman, 1984)

3 Community- a complex range of interests, many of whom will have different priorities (Wilcox, 1994)

4 Subjective norm- an individual’s perception of social normative pressures, or relevant others’ beliefs that he

or she should or should not perform such behaviour. “I will feel ashamed if I make no preparation while my

relatives and family were taking action for flood protection” (Motoyoshi, 2006, p. 132-133)


Figure 2.2: Motoyoshi’s Model for Community Participation

Motoyoshi (2006, p.132) concludes that people have a greater intention to participate in

community-based disaster preparedness activities when they take great interest in

subjective norms and flood disasters. Recognition of costs of disaster preparedness

activities also serves as a factor to decrease intention to participate. Lastly, it is possible to

activate disaster preparedness activities by regarding these activities not as measures to

reduce disaster risks but as voluntary activities in local communities.

While highly applicable in a lot of disaster-prone areas, Motoyoshi’s model was derived

from studying the context of Japan, a developed country that may have different

institutions and socio-economic conditions from a developing country like the Philippines.

In developing countries for instance:

“The existing systems of social protection are fragmented. The richest population

group has access to formal social insurance, and the very poor have some access to

social assistance and health services. But large population groups are not covered by

formal-sector social security institutions and receive no social assistance” (Dethier,

2007, p.292).

Recognizing the depth of Motoyoshi’s work however, his model was used in forming the

methodology for this research in order to verify its applicability in the developing country

context and add more component if necessary.


III. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this qualitative research is based on the use of grounded theory guided

by literature review and the development of an a priori conceptual framework. The study

made of use of three research methods- in-depth key informant interviews, review of public

documents and focus group discussions- to gather information, form concepts and verify

the findings and conclusions.

3.1. The Conceptual Framework

This study argues that organizational and personal factors determine the type and level of

participation in communities as discussed separately by Wilcox (1994) and Motoyoshi

(2006). There are the organizational components derived from Wilcox’s framework for

participation, which include people, processes and levels of participation. On the other

hand, there are the personal components of participation intended to study the

individual’s/ community member’s perspective on the aspect of participation in flood

preparedness. Figure 3.1 summarizes the components of the framework.

Combining Wilcox and Motoyoshi’s work into one framework presents different advantages

for this research. The dual-perspective and multi-level approach can provide a more

thorough context on the issues surrounding people’s participation in the case study areas.

This dichotomy can also help create more appropriate and less general results, analyses and

recommendations anchored on established theories and tested in the actual scenarios.

The two models were instrumental in formulating these three research questions of this

study:

1. What factors shape people’s intention to participate in community-based flood early

warning and response measures in the Philippines?

2. How can top-down and bottom-up the flood early warning and response system best

encourage and utilize participation to increase the overall capacity of flood-prone

communities?

3. How can communities address barriers that affect participation in flood

preparedness measures?


Figure 2.3: Conceptual Framework

Sources: Wilcox, 1994; Motoyoshi, 2006

3.2. Research Methods

3.2.1 In-Depth Interviews

Semi-structured key informant interviews were used because this method is very

appropriate in obtaining primary information from a limited set of experts, officials and

project implementers in the study areas. The interviews provided deeper insights on the

experiences, motivations and hindrances of a limited group of project beneficiaries, in this

case, the community-leaders and members. The use of semi-structured interviews was also

consistent with the use of the grounded theory because the earlier gave the researcher

enough flexibility to probe deeper once an important factor or variable is mentioned during

interviews.

As “qualitative inquiry designs cannot be completely specified in advance of fieldwork”

(Patton, 1990, p. 61) in-depth interview can yield the actual factors affecting participation

without suggesting them beforehand as what would happen if a close-ended survey were

employed. Using an open-ended survey on the other hand would have generated a large

amount of data which will eventually nullify its quantitative significance (Milne, 1997).

3.2.2. Document Analysis


Printed public documents related to the flood preparedness programs in the two barangays

were analyzed to allow the researcher to maximize his time for interviews with public

officials and community organizers. The documents were used to obtain advanced

information on the programs, streamline interview questions and verify/ corroborate

information from interviews and vice versa.

3.3.3. Focus Group Discussions

Joint-interviews and focus group discussions were used to obtain data from a homogenous

set of participants only in situations where time is a major constraint or when community-

members decided to participate in an otherwise one-on-one interview (the latter case is

attributable to the perceived hospitality of Filipinos). FGDs were also used to verify the

findings of the study with leaders and members of the two case study areas.

3.3. Sampling

In terms of selecting research participants, this study made use of snowball/ chain sampling

and opportunistic/ emergent sampling (Patton, 2002). While a set of respondents were

identified, the researcher provided room for flexibility to include new respondents and take

advantage of new needs, information and opportunities as the data collection progressed.

These sampling methods are consistent with the use of grounded theory, which is intended

to generate concepts from field data that may evolve as the interviews are taking place.

Local politics played a big role in the selection of resource persons for the study. While civil

servants, elected officials, community members from the barangay and the city were

interviewed for the case of Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City, the researcher could not adapt

the same structure with officials from Barangay Banaba and the Municipal Government of

San Mateo because initial interviews confirmed the lack of involvement of the barangay and

the municipal governments in the Buklod Tao Initiative at the time of the study. There was

also a history of legal disputes between Buklod Tao and the current local administration

which made it unwise to probe the latter’s lack on involvement. Lastly, there are efforts

made by the Centre of Disaster Preparedness to mend the relationships between Buklod

Tao and the municipal and barangay governments. The conduct of probing interviews with

government officials while these are on-going may jeopardize the efforts being made to

resolve the problem.


IV. THE STUDY AREAS

4.1. The Philippines

The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, ranking third in the

United Nation University’s list of countries most vulnerable to disaster risks and natural

hazards (Alave, 2011). Five of out the 20 typhoons that enter the country each year bring

death and destruction in the form of floods, heavy winds, landslides or storm surges (Porcil,

2009). Preventionweb (2012) pointed out that the country experiences three flood

disasters per year, with each event killing an average of 23 and affecting 124,212 people. A

total of 6.81 million people are exposed to coastal flooding while 3.71 million are exposed to

inland flooding. With the advent of climate change, storms are expected to be more

frequent and far more devastating which will worsen the already adverse flood risks in the

country (Chu, 2012).

The Philippines was chosen as the study area because of its:

1. Immense risks to both floods and climate change

2. High poverty incidence (36%) which increases the number of settlements in flood

prone areas (CIA, 2012)

3. Low capacity to invest in long-term flood mitigation measures (NEDA, 2011) which

underscores the need for people-based flood preparedness initiatives.

Two of the worst storm-related floods that hit the country were brought by Typhoons

Ketsana and Parma. In September 2009 Tropical storm Ketsana (Local Name: Ondoy)

devastated Metro Manila with floods from 452 millimetres of rain. Tropical Storm Parma

flooded Northern Luzon not a month after Ketsana hit the capital region. The twin disasters

resulted in the damages outlined in Table 4.1:

Table 4.1: Impacts of Typhoons Ketsana and Parma

Typhoon Ketsana

(Ondoy)

Typhoon Parma

(Pepeng)

TOTAL

Deaths 464 465 929

Injured 529 107 636

Missing 37 47 84

Evacuees 15,798 families

or 70,124 persons

3,258 families

or 14,892 persons

19,056 families or

85,016 persons

Affected Population 993,227 families/

4,901,234 persons

954,087 families /

4,478,284 persons

1,947,314 families or

9,379,518 persons

Partially Damaged Houses 154,922 55,062 209,984

Totally Damaged Houses 185,004 6,807 191,811

Infrastructure Damage 100 Million USD 160 Million USD 260 Million USD

Agriculture Damage 160 Million USD 595 Million USD 755 Million USD

Source: Republic of the Philippines, et al, 2009


Republic Act (RA) 10121 or the ‘Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of

2010’ aims for the establishment of strong national and local DRRM institutions in the

country. RA 10121 also provides a local structure at the country’s provincial and

city/municipal levels and a structure for the barangay (village), the smallest political unit in

the country (Republic Act 7160). The functions of the former Barangay Disaster

Coordinating Council were transferred to the Barangay Development Council (community-

level response, etc) in order to link disaster risks with development concerns, the decisions

of which are controlled by the latter (RA 10121, 2010). Such a transfer of functions and

power highlights the country’s intent to shift from reactive to proactive disaster risk

reduction measures. But while the public institutions are properly organized, none of the

measures that these institutions implement can be fully successful without the cooperation

and support of the citizens especially those in high-risk areas. This highlights the need to

analyse the context of disaster risk reduction to a scale lower than the barangays- the

community members themselves.

4.2. The Case Study Areas

Two case study areas were selected on the basis of uniqueness and the potential to obtain

deeper and more complex analyses on the subject of participation through comparisons

between the findings from each case (Patton, 2002). These areas are Philippine barangays

with established community-based flood early warning and response systems that are

known for their effectiveness and were already tested by actual massive disasters. One of

these areas has a top-down government-led initiative while the other has a bottom-up

people’s organization-managed initiative.

4.2.1 Study Area 1: Barangay Mangin

Barangay Mangin in Dagupan City, Province of Pangasinan is the first study area. The

barangay has a land area of 126.80 hectares (2.8% of total land area of Dagupan) and a

population 3,823 representing 2.2% of Dagupan City (Mata, 2009). It also has the highest

flood risk among the 31 barangays of the city (ibid). Figure 4.1 pinpoints the location of

Dagupan City and Barangay Mangin.


Figure 4.1: Map of Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City

Sources of Maps: 2012 Google; 2012 Digital Globe; http://noah.dost.gov.ph/;

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/wp-content/blogs.dir/10/files/2012/08/Dagupan-City-map.jpg

Barangay Mangin is a beneficiary of the Project PROMISE (Program for Hydro-

Meteorological Risk Mitigation in Secondary Cities in Asia), a project funded by the USAID

and implemented by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) in coordination with

the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP). The project created a self-sustaining top-down

or barangay-government-led flood preparedness system managed by the Barangay

Government of Mangin and supported by the city government of Dagupan.

When typhoon Parma struck Northern Luzon in 2009, Barangay Mangin was one of the most

flooded barangays of Dagupan. Typhoon Parma tested the system created through Project

PROMISE and has proven its effectiveness during the floods. The system was credited for

people’s 100% compliance in evacuation efforts and the barangay’s zero casualty rate

despite the scale of the floods (Mata, 2009).

4.2.2. Study Area 2: Barangay Banaba and the Buklod Tao

The second case study is in Barangay Banaba, San Mateo, Province of Rizal, the most high-

risk area in the Municipal Government of San Mateo in terms of floods (R4. R11). The

barangay is adjacent to the flood-prone Marikina River and is traversed by several creeks

that increase the risk of floods in the area. The barangay has a population of 20,861

crammed into the 1.382 sq.km area of the barangay for population density of 15,094 people

per sq.km. Figure 4.2 shows the location of San Mateo and Barangay Banaba.


Figure 4.2: Map of Barangay Banaba, Municipality of San Mateo Sources of Maps: 2012 Google; 2012 Digital Globe; http://noah.dost.gov.ph/

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/Ph_locator_rizal_san_mateo.png/250px-Ph_locator_rizal_san_mateo.png

Buklod Tao, (buklod- unity or bond; tao- man), a faith-based organization that was formed

and is based in Barangay Banaba in 1995, aims to address “issues on environmental

degradation that increase disaster and environmental risks” (R11). Buklod Tao established a

flood early warning system in the barangay as well as search and rescue teams spread in

eight of its most flood-prone puroks/ sub-villages (R11). Its system has been repeatedly

tested by deluge since the late 90’s. But one of its greatest tests is typhoon Ondoy, which

brought the worst flood in the history of the barangay and the entire Metro Manila. But like

Mangin, Barangay Banaba also had a zero casualty rate despite being in one of the most

dangerous areas of San Mateo, proving the effectiveness of Buklod Tao’s early warning

system.


V. RESULTS

5.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 1:

What factors shape people’s intention to participate in community-based flood early

warning and response measures?

This research used the terms “barriers” in lieu of Motoyoshi’s (2006) cost perception, and

“motivations” in lieu of benefit perception to avoid the pitfall of “pricing the priceless”

usually associated with the cost-benefit approach (Ackerman, 2008 p.3). Rightfully so, not

all factors identified are quantifiable or expressed in monetary value. This sub-chapter

outlines the motivations and barriers as well as other factors that shape people’s intent to

participate are discussed below.

5.1.1 Motivations

The data from Barangays Mangin and Banaba show that three sets of factors motivate

residents and key actors to participate in flood early warning and response. These factors

do not discriminate between a top-down or bottom-up system, but the particular context of

the community may provide varying justification on why they exist.

The first motivating factor is “fear” either through the “fear of death” (Respondent 1 or R1)

or the “fear for the life of family and friends” (R9, R13, R20). Fear can be attributed to

people’s previous experience on storms, floods and disasters which compels them to

participate in flood early warning and response before or during a flood (R8, R15, R17).

Experience gives people the knowledge of the worst that can happen and more importantly,

the knowledge to avoid them. R11 pointed out that in Barangay Banaba, the people who

participate in Buklod Tao’s initiative are those who experienced floods before, and that

people from adjacent well-off neighborhoods are less likely to participate as they are also

less exposed to the impacts of floods. Fear as a motivation is especially applicable during

the floods itself wherein “people’s only option is to either participate or to die” (R1).

The second motivating factor is capacity building through training and institutional

development within the community and/or the city where it belongs. Experience increases

people’s knowledge on hazards but capacity building increases their skills to make

substantial contribution and eventually their willingness to put this knowledge to good use

(R4). In the case of barangay Mangin, capacity building at the city and barangay improved

the knowledge of civil servants and politicians which further motivated them to create their

own early warning system and maintain it even beyond the project that facilitated its

establishment. During the project PROMISE, improved knowledge on their hazards and

capacity encouraged the barangay to negotiate with project implementers so that the latter

can provide rescue equipment which the community did not have at that time. The request

was granted and the set of equipment received from the project helped in actual search and

rescue operations when Typhoon Parma flooded Dagupan City only a few years after.


“The external organizations adjusted for them (Barangay Mangin) because these

organizations found out that they actually do not have enough rescue equipment.

Emergency response was not part of the project, but its inclusion was negotiated to

the funders because it helps the people prepare, anticipate a possible lack of

resource in case of disaster and gives everyone peace of mind at the same time.“

(R4)

The third factor pertains to a “sense of willingness or responsibility to help other people”,

which the respondents from both study areas expressed in different Filipino terms such as

“kusang-loob”, “bayanihan” or “pagtulong sa kapwa”, all pertaining to a sense of

volunteerism to help others in need. The term “katungkulan bilang Kristiyano” (Christian

duty) was also used numerous times, highlighting the role of religion in shaping participation

in the context of the highly Catholic Philippines.

In the case of Mangin, this sense of responsibility may be traced to the relationship of

people or their familiarity with each other; bonds that were formed after years of close

interaction in the barangay. R8, who has lived in Mangin for nearly 53 years, indicated that

the barangay is an old and close-knit rural community where “everybody knows their

neighbours and would help them in times of disasters”.

The case of Barangay Banaba presents a different form of justification behind the

motivation to help fellow community members. R11 mentions that having a “common

struggle”, most notably the threat for relocation of informal settlers and the direct effects of

environmental degradation on Banaba residents motivated them to organize Buklod Tao

and participate in its initiatives to surpass these struggles. Strategic actions toward

“awareness, organization and equipping community members” were very significant in

forming a grassroots disaster response for Barangay Banaba which eventually encouraged

more people to take part in Buklod Tao’s actions (Ibid.).

5.1.2 Barriers to Participation

Local politics act as a main barrier towards community participation in both top-down and

bottom-up flood early warning and response. In Mangin, the “political alliance prevents

some member of factions from helping or participating in their rival’s initiatives” (R2). In

Banaba, bad politics and dented organizational relationships connected with the previous

legal battles between Buklod Tao and the Municipal Government is seen as one of the

factors that prevented full cooperation between the people’s organization and the Barangay

Government of Banaba (R11). R11 also argues that “the presence of Buklod Tao itself is

acting as a barrier to participation because it increases the dependence of the barangay

government and its people in Buklod’s skills and resources”. These challenges however has

already been recognized and is currently being addressed (R4, R11, R21).

Poverty or economic difficulty is another barrier in flood early warning and response but it is

one with different effects before and during floods. At the pre-disaster stage, “if community

members participate in a disaster preparedness event, this will most likely result in foregone

financial opportunities on their part” (R21). “Mahirap kalaban ang kumukulong tiyan” (a

rumbling stomach is a tough opponent), a phrase that emphasizes how poverty shifts one’s

priority from survival in future disasters to survival in everyday life (ibid). During disasters

however, the presence of floods nullifies any form of economic disadvantages because


“safety becomes the primary concern” during this time (R13). “Rich or poor, rescue is

rescue” (R15). At a larger scale however, economic difficulties also “preserve the existing

vulnerabilities of people and the communities which forces them to address the superficial

effects of these vulnerabilities over and over, and compels some to lose interest in DRR

(R11).

Lack of knowledge on hazards and actions is another barrier to people’s participation and

was prevalent at the start-up phase of the flood preparedness initiatives in both case study

areas. Training, information campaigns and capacity building activities have addressed the

majority of this problem (R3) however the inclination of people to receive more relief goods

as the means solve the flooding problems in the community still persists. For some

residents, a greater quantity of relief goods (medicine, mosquito net, clothes, food, rice) or

a greater number of communal evacuation facilities for animals can help improve or

maintain a high-level of participation among community members especially during floods

that necessitate forced evacuation (R6, R7, R8 R9, R10, R20). Such perspectives reflect the

post-disaster orientation of people which reinforces their mindset as victims rather than

actors. It also undermines their potential to actually help establish or maintain the flood

preparedness system long before a disaster strikes.

Another related barrier is the limited opportunities for community members to participate in

the flood early warning and response initiatives. Members of organizations that maintain

both the top-down and bottom-up flood preparedness systems have far greater and more

significant roles than non-member. The latter have very limited decision-making powers for

the community and their roles are often limited to attendance/ training during community

forums and compliance during evacuation. While the institutional nature of this problem is

apparent and evident from the interviews and workshops as well as in the barangay’s

organizational chart itself, interviewees from the barangay government used the words

“tamad” (lazy), “makasarili” (selfish) and walang pakialam (indifferent) to explain the non-

participation of normal community members (Source: FGD).

5.1.3 Leadership and Communication

The research finds that the presence of strong leaders and an effective system of

communication among residents helped shape the high-level of participation in the two

study areas. But leadership and communication were classified as neutral factors because

they are temporary in nature and may also be barriers to participation as discussed below.

Strong community leaders motivate people to participate in flood preparedness measures.

Community members from Barangay Mangin cited how the barangay chairman (captain) is

“essential in terms of motivating people to participate in the PROMISE project” (R3). Aside

from managing and improving the system, R9 noted how her family would participate in the

flood preparedness measures because of their utmost respect to the leadership of the

current village chairman, whom she said she also knew for a long time. In the case of

Banaba, R17 mentioned that the Buklod Tao’s leader’s “sigasig na tumulong sa iba”

(dedication to help others) has inspired him to join the organization and participate in flood

preparedness measures. Buklod-Tao was also formed and formalized as a people’s

organization because of the strategies and initiative of its current leader.


On other hand, leadership can also be a barrier towards participation. R21 mentioned that

“how a leader interacts with his members also affects how people participate”. In Barangay

Banaba for instance, the head of Buklod Tao “can be too good and too fast for community

members, most of whom may have only finished high school. In the past, some members

resigned because of disagreements with the leaders of the organization” (ibid). For Mangin,

the barangay leader has a term limit of nine years and the current chairman is in his last

term putting concerns on the continuity of the early warning and response system in the

barangay.

The way the leaders communicate with the community members and other organizations is

a catalyst that shape participation within the communities. Before a disaster,

communication helps avoid a situation where “people do not know how they will

participate” (R21). The importance of communication also transcends during the response

operations itself as the report from kagawad (barangay councilmen) or Buklod Tao members

stationed near flood markers are the bases in deciding whether to evacuate or not (R11,

R2). R2 provides insights of the communication process during flood situations.

“Almost each sitio has a kagawad in-charge of flood monitoring. They monitor the

water level during floods and send updates to the barangay. The barangay comes up

with a decision and relays they information to community members through

megaphones, the church bell or the kanungknong”.

Effective leadership and communication existed in the communities even before the plan to

establish a flood early warning system was formulated. In Barangay Banaba for instance,

the current leader of Buklod Tao built the communication channel among the soon-to-be

members of the organization mostly through informal prayer meetings (R11, R17). The

bond and recognition for leadership that occurred through the years made it easier for

Buklod Tao to communicate and implement its core programs when they were formalized

as a people’s organization. In Barangay Mangin, the presence of a responsive government

was one of the criteria used to select Dagupan City as a beneficiary of Project PROMISE. The

selection criteria eventually paid off especially as the city and the barangay not only

successfully established a flood early warning and response system, but has maintained it

years after the project was finished (R4).

5.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 2:

How can top-down and bottom-up flood early warning and response systems best

encourage and utilize participation to increase the overall capacity of flood-prone

communities?

The structure of this sub-chapter reflects the elements of Wilcox’s framework for

participation: people, processes and forms of participation. The forms of participation are

defined through the people involved and their roles in early warning and response

processes in each of the two case study areas. In this chapter, the cases of Banaba and

Mangin will be discussed separately to capture the similarities and differences in the

frameworks for participation of top-down and bottom-up flood early warning and response

systems.


5.2.1 Top-Down Approach: The Case of Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City

The top down flood early warning and response system in Barangay Mangin has three main

actors: the city government, the barangay government and the community members of

barangay Mangin. Each of these actors has distinct roles that were utilized in unique ways

through the implementation of Project PROMISE in the city and in the barangay. However,

the roles of the city and the barangay, as public sector institutions, heavily outweigh the

significance of the roles of normal community members.

5.2.1.1 The City Government

In the case of Barangay Mangin, the city-initiated and barangay-maintained flood early

warning and response system depended heavily on the roles of the city government to train

people and to support the initiative from a policy and resource points of view. One of the

strategies employed through Project PROMISE is to invest in people and create champions to

ensure cooperation between local authorities and communities (R3; ADPC, 2007).

In the long-term, the strategy to focus on gaining the interest and building the capacity of

permanent civil servants allowed the project to survive beyond three changes in local

political administration. According to R4, by investing the time and commitment of its mid-

level managers and other personnel, the city has ensured the:

1. Awareness and understanding on flood preparedness measures

2. Support of the technical advisors (civil servants) of politicians and decision-makers

3. Sustainability of its flood preparedness measures even beyond the period of

PROMISE Project

4. The birth of more DRRM projects because funders recognize the capacity of the city

to implement them (R1)

“After they were trained, the department heads in turn led and conducted the trainings in

the communities. This ensured that the project survives three changes in political

administration (local election occurs every three years in the Philippines)” (R4).

The inclusivity of the project’s Technical Working Group also resulted in great advantages

for communities at the political level:

“Since the Department of Interior and Local Government, a national office

performing oversight functions on local governments, was part of the TWG, the

agency saw to it that DRR is integrated in the new elected officials’ trainings, which

ensured the sustainability of the program. Also, some of those trained (TOT) during

the project have enhanced their skills and are now resource personnel in trainings

for similar projects”. (R4)

The project helped setup flood preparedness systems not only in Barangay Mangin but in

the seven other high-risk barangays of the city as well in order to increase the knowledge of

its leaders and residents (R1). The TWG developed a color-coded flood warning system as

shown in Table 5.1. The table shows the use five colours- white (normal), yellow (alert

phase), orange (preparatory phase), red (full evacuation phase) and green (forced

evacuation phase)- as early warning signals which the residents can interpret themselves.


“The five levels are measured through flood markers pre-positioned across strategic points

of the barangay” (R2), such as those illustrated in Figure 5.1:

Figure 5.1: Photos of Flood Markers in Barangay Mangin (Source: Author)

Table 5.1 shows that the water-level in these flood markers also corresponds to the types of

response expected from all actors. The city has the option to be involved in the disaster

response at the barangay level as its personnel is trained and equipped in different forms of

search and rescue, including water search and rescue (WASAR) (R1, R3). However “the city

government will only intervene if the barangay can no longer handle the operations.

Despite the destructive level of the floods during Typhoon Parma/Pepeng in 2009, the

barangay (Mangin) did not need to call the city which allowed us to focus on other hard-hit

areas”. (R2)


Table 5.1: Color-Coded Alert System

Source: Mata, 2007


5.2.1.2. Barangay Government of Mangin

Majority of the responsibilities in implementing and sustaining the barangay-level flood

early warning system were designated to the Barangay government of Mangin and the

effective knowledge transfer led to the setup of an effective system. The barangay

government handled community organization, risk analysis and risk communication within

Mangin (R2, R3, R4). The transfer of skills and knowledge and the dissemination of

information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacity from the city to the barangay through

the top-down flood early warning system best utilized the participation of the barangay

officials. “Barangay Mangin used house-to-house information campaign to educate those

who cannot attend mass sessions” and inform them of the DRR initiative (R3).

The knowledge transferred led to an effective risk analysis and consequently, an interactive

community-made risk map that is useful for both planning and actual response (See Figure

5.2). The risk map helps identify the houses that have priority victims during floods” (R2) as

well as other parts of the communities that might be affected. Priority victims are disabled

people, small children and the elderly who may need assistance during floods (ibid.). But

more importantly, the map shows the capacities of the barangay to respond to the hazard

and the vulnerabilities. These three categories as well as their elements are enumerated in

Table 6.2.

Figure 5.2: Community Hazard Map (Source: Author)


Table 5.2: Elements of the Community-Based Flood Map in Barangay Mangin

CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY TYPES/ CLASSIFICATIONS

Hazard Flood-Prone Areas Low Risk, Medium Risk, High Risk

Vulnerability

Vulnerable People

Senior Citizen, Children, Pregnant Women,

Sick/ Needs Medical Attention, Person with

disability

Vehicles for Evacuation Motorcycles/ tricycles, Jeep/Truck, Boats

Farm Animals Cow, Carabao, Horse, Pigs, Goats

Type of Houses

Light materials, Semi-Concrete, Concrete

Livelihood

Distributor, Bakery/ Mini-Grocery,

Restaurant, Hardware/ Internet Café, Sari-sari

(variety) store, General merchandise

Capacity

Barangay Infrastructure

Facilities

Barangay Hall, Health Centres, School, Day

Care Centre, Barangay Chapel, Basketball

Court, Barangay Chapel, Basketball Court

Early Warning System

Evacuation routes, Safe Pick-up Points, Flood

Markers, Post Used to Raise House, Electric

Post Network

Evacuation Centre Small, Large, Waiting sheds, Host family

Other Community Facilities Deep wells, Jetmatics, electronic

transformers, Pumping stations

Source: Mangin’s Map Legend

The barangay operates with pre-set damage scenario, pre-set roles and pre-identified

evacuation scenarios, a setup that makes early warning and response more effective.

Creating clear sets of roles and responsibilities ensured the effective participation of the

Barangay Government of Mangin. Flood monitoring and response was fully delegated to

the barangay, although the city can aid the community should the situation go out of hand.

Flood early warning depends greatly on the role of barangay officials, elected or appointed.

Barangay kagawads monitor the flood markers and relay the information to the Barangay

Hall, which in turn informs the community members of the real-time situation. “The

barangay informs the communities (on flood alerts) through megaphone, hand-held radio

and an indigenous material called “kanungknong" (See Figure 5.3).


Figure 5.3: Barangay Chairman Cabison demonstrates how to use a Kanungkong

(Source: Author)

Members of the barangay council, together with appointed barangay officials and staff

handle evacuation and search and rescue. The “kagawads” (elected council members) are

spread out in different sitios/purok (an informal subdivision of a barangay) in Mangin so we

are able to monitor a large area of the barangay more effectively” (R2). Figure 5.4 gives an

overview of their roles of the barangay during the response stage:

Figure 5.4: Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee (BDRRMC)

(Source: Photo of Mangin’s Organizational Chart)


5.2.1.3 Barangay Mangin Residents

One of the primary strengths of the top-down flood early warning system of Barangay

Mangin is the strong participation of the city and barangay government officials and staff.

But its primary weakness is the limited role and weak participation of normal community

members. Community members do not have any formal or specific roles during the pre-

disaster stage and their role is limited to attending information dissemination forums. Their

decision-making powers are also limited to personal decisions, the biggest of which is

deciding to evacuate their respective families to safer grounds during floods. One of the

respondents summarizes the role of community members in Mangin:

“We monitor storms through the radio and through the barangay. Even before they

hit, we pack our blankets, pillows, food and toiletries. We volunteer to evacuate

while we can still walk through the floods to the barangay hall”. (R6)

A strategy to tap the “may-kaya” (financially-able) community members to volunteer as

“host families” provided the exception. “During floods, residents can evacuate to host

families or owners of strong two-storey houses who volunteered to become satellite

evacuation areas. One of the mechanisms that sparked the host family setup in Mangin is

the familialistic orientation of the barangay. But host families do not just accept their family

members but also friends and neighbors” (R2). R5, an owner of a two-storey concrete

house and designated host family in Barangay Mangin mentions that:

“We accept friends and relatives in our home while there is still space. The barangay

personnel often tie a rope from the barangay hall to our house so that people trying

to evacuate can cross safely and will not be swept by the current.”

5.2.2 The Case of Barangay Banaba (Bottom-Up Setting)

5.2.2.1 Buklod Tao (People’s organization in Barangay Banaba)

Similar to Barangay Mangin, Barangay Banaba’s Buklod Tao also used capacity building and

clearly defined roles, responsibilities and decision-making powers to maximize the

participation of all its members and other community members. The use of a flood warning

system ensured the transfer of knowledge on the type of response expected from

community members through the different colors representing each warning level. Buklod

Tao also undertook an effective risk analysis and created a risk map similar to Mangin’s. It

also made use of a similar warning system as Mangin with minor differences in the use of

the colors and the measurement levels (See Table 5.4).


Table 5.4: Early Warning System of Barangays Banaba and Mangin

Barangay Mangin Barangay Banaba

Water Level Interpretation Water Level Interpretation

White 0-1 foot Normal <17 m meters No danger

Yellow 1-2 feet Alert Phase 18 m Standby

Orange 2-4 feet Preparatory Phase

1

19 m Full Evacuation

Red 4-5 feet Full evacuation 20 m Forced Evacuation

Green >6 feet Forced evacuation SAFE

Source: Map Legends, Barangay Mangin and Banaba

One of the main differences between the two barangays however is that Buklod Tao does

not have an annual budget coming from government, and Buklod’s roles extends to

vulnerability reduction at the pre-disaster phase. For Buklod, maintaining the active

participation of its members in flood early warning and response depended on securing

funds to maintain its activities and organization, which it did through member contributions

(initially) and then through external funding after.

To fully utilize participation and increase flood early warning and response capacity, Buklod

Tao also designates roles and responsibilities to the entire families of their active members,

ensuring the efficient implementation of flood preparedness measures, and more

importantly, the continuity of the system that the people’s organization built.“ Table 5.5

shows the variety of roles of Buklod Tao Members and their families before a disaster,

during a disaster and also at the non-disaster scenario.

Table 5.5: Buklod Tao Member’s Roles and Responsibilities

Non-DRR Scenario Pre-Disaster During Disaster

Tatay

(Father)

Farm workers,

Buklod Tao Officers,

election voters

Trainer, observers of

flood markers (early

warning)

SAR team, EOC*

Nanay

(Mother)

Clothing sewers,

Buklod Tao Officers,

election voters

Trainer, observers of

flood markers (early

warning)

Community kitchen,

health and relief,

evacuation, EOC

Anak (Child/

Buklod ng

Kabataan)

Community

organization

Surveyors, mappers Evacuation, games with

children at evacuation

areas

*EOC- Emergency Operations Center Sources: R11, R17, R21

Buklod Tao also encourages participation by giving its resident sources of income while

improving the barangay’s flood preparedness system. One of the most unique roles of

Buklod Tao members is creating their own fiberglass lifeboats used for actual rescue inside


the community. “Buklod Tao’s rescue boats are built within Barangay Banaba using internal

materials and internal labor” (R11). These boats are now being sold and used in other

communities outside San Mateo as well. Figure 5.5 shows the construction mold that

Buklod Tao uses and Figure 5.6 shows the actual lifeboat that was created.

Figure 5.5: Lifeboat Mold Figure 5.6: A Buklod Tao Lifeboat

5.2.2 Barangay Banaba Residents

While Buklod Tao has a very strong role in increasing participation and the community’s

flood preparedness capacity, residents in Barangay Banaba also have weak roles in the

entire process similar to the case of Barangay Mangin. Residents’ decision-making powers

are limited to personal preparations and eventual evacuation to pre-identified areas (R20).

Like that of Mangin, the color-coded early warning system of Banaba also has prescribed

roles for family at each alert level.

Table 5.6: Role of Families vis-à-vis the Alert Level

ALERT LEVEL Role of Families

White Preparedness (ready basic necessities and medicine)

Yellow Prepare to evacuate/ Evacuate already flooded areas

Orange

Evacuate and help with the evacuation area

Red

Green Return to homes

Source: Buklod Tao Signages (Translated to English)

In the case of Barangay Banaba, it is evident that membership in Buklod Tao is a necessary

factor that can result in greater participation and greater role of community members in the

barangay’s flood early warning and response system.

5.2.3 The Barangay and the City Government

R11 and R21 indicated that “the barangay had no involvement in Buklod Tao’s initiatives”.

As much as the researcher would like to include the roles of the Barangay Government of

Banaba and Municipal Government of San Mateo, the researcher decided that it would be

more prudent not to do so to avoid endangering the on-going efforts to fix the relationship

between Buklod Tao and the local governments.


5.3. RESEARCH QUESTION 3

How can communities address the barriers that affect participation in flood preparedness

measures?

This research identified four main barriers to participation from each of the case study

areas. These are 1) local politics, 2) poverty or economic difficulty, 3) limited knowledge

and 4) limited opportunities for community members to participate. This sub-chapter

outlines how each study areas addressed or aims to address these barriers.

5.3.1 The Case of Barangay Mangin (Top-Down Approach)

As a top-down system, Barangay Mangin’s flood early warning and response system is

supposedly more prone to politics. But the city and the barangay governments maintain a

good relationship especially in disaster risk reduction. The initial strategy to train civil

servants as champions in DRR kept the city-level committed and its political support

constant.

However, several parties within the community oppose the current barangay administration

and refuse to cooperate in flood preparedness measures (R3). But the problem of politics in

Mangin is often limited to personal issues, which has no concrete solutions. During the

response stage however, R3 indicated that “politics ends when the floods arrive” and

everyone in the community cooperate fully, regardless of political alliance, in order to keep

everyone safe.

To help alleviate poverty while increasing community resilience, Project PROMISE

incorporated livelihood projects to help raise the living conditions of people in the barangay.

These projects however are under tight financial constraints and could only help a fraction

of the barangay’s 3,823 people (Mata, 2009). And while livelihood projects were

incorporated when the project PROMISE was implemented in Barangay Mangin, the

interviews and workshops held under this study revealed very little information on how

poverty and economic difficulty is addressed to improve people’s capacity against floods

and disasters. One of the weak spots of the top-down approach in this case is that the key

actors still have not fully realized the potential impacts of poverty reduction measures to

reduce people’s vulnerability and their ability to participate in flood preparedness

measures.

Knowledge transfer from the city to the community leaders then to the community

members was very efficient in the case of Barangay Mangin. The strategy to build

champions in the city government likewise avoided several potential barriers as the

presence of trained and supportive tenured civil servants in the city solved in advance the

problems of discontinuity and lack of political support. This strategy also kept the

participation of the city government in the flood early warning and response system of

Mangin intact. However, R4 noted that considering the worsening impacts of climate

change, “the worst case scenario for the barangays must now be adjusted and the

institutional capacity must fit this new scenario”.


The champion-building strategy works well for a government-led early warning and

response system such as that of Mangin. However, the same nature of the initiative makes

it difficult to address the barrier of limited opportunities for community members to

participate. Being part of the barangay government ensures a significant role in the system

either as observers, rescuers and others. But Mangin’s public funds can only afford or

accommodate a limited number of volunteers (social worker, village watchmen, etc) to work

with their barangay’s elected and appointed official. This means that residents of the

barangay have very little role to play in flood early warning and response and very few

opportunities to play a bigger role should they choose to do so. The only exception to this is

the establishment of host families which gives direct responsibilities to well-off community

members as host to evacuees close to their residence increasing the latter’s chances of

survival during floods.

5.3.2 The Case of Barangay Mangin (Bottom-Up Approach)

The Barangay Government of Banaba and the Municipal Government of San Mateo have no

involvement in Barangay Banaba’s flood early warning and response system. But past legal

cases between Buklod Tao and the city government created a rift between the two,

consequently affecting the people’s organization’s relationship with the barangay

government and limiting the impacts of its initiatives. The rift is being solved through “third-

party mediation” through the intervention of the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP)

who are closely linked with Buklod and are also implementing projects in the municipality of

San Mateo (R21). This led to the improvement in their relationships and Buklod’s

involvement in CDP’s project which aimed to increase the city’s capacity against disasters.

Buklod Tao addresses poverty as a barrier of participation by engaging its members and

non-members in a variety of livelihood initiatives including: urban gardening, sale of

products from recycled materials or construction of rescue boats. Buklod gains support

from community member’s on its flood preparedness initiatives through their other

development initiatives. R11 indicates that Buklod Tao, aside from flood/disaster risk

reduction and management initiatives, has five other core programs that help increase

people’s participation in the earlier and vice-versa. These other programs include:

1. Para-legal advocacy

2. Buklod ng Kabataan (Translation: Group of Youth)

3. Livelihood (Social Enterprise Capital Augmentation Program) including micro-lending

4. Psycho-social support system (Lingap Loob)

5. Environmental Protection and Enhancement

“These components show that Buklod Tao does not just focus in solving the immediate

flood risks faced by residents of Barangay Banaba. It also deals with reducing the

vulnerabilities faced by people through poverty alleviation programs in the form of recycling

plant (creating bags, etc) and associate livelihood programs (SECAP) intended to help the

10% of the barangay’s population who have no income or earn only P50 or less per

day”(ibid).


Similar to Mangin, Barangay Banaba also experiences a significant difference in the roles

and opportunity to participate between Buklod Tao members and non-members.

Membership in Buklod Tao, in this case, is one of the means to attain a greater level of

knowledge, training/capacity and participation in the flood early warning and response

system of the barangay. Unlike Mangin however, it is easier to join Buklod Tao than to be

part of the barangay or city government. At present, Buklod has roughly 700 members or

about four percent of Barangay Banaba’s 20,861 people. These members maintain and

observe the flood markers, relay information to the command center, perform rescue

operations and maintain the evacuation site.

The people’s organization intends to create more rescue teams in flood prone puroks of

Barangay Banaba to help more residents soliciting the help of more Banaba residents. But it

also has longer-term goal to directly address the vulnerabilities that cause or increase the

flood risks, especially poverty and the high-risk location of their houses which exposes them

to floods.

“Di pwedeng laging maging mahirap (It is not an option to always be poor) because

participation will be difficult due to poverty. How can they initiate action if they still

have to work for what they have to eat?” (R21)

The approach to deal directly with their vulnerabilities has reached some of Buklod Tao

members, who now are now considering longer-term solutions such as relocation away

from their own homes (located in danger zones) to get away from the repetitive

vulnerabilities. “Di na ako takot sa relocation pagkatapos kong maranasan ang Ondoy” (I am

no longer afraid of relocating after I experienced Ondoy) R12. “The land where our house is

might collapse during floods. We would love to relocate ourselves but they do not have the

funds and their jobs are here” (R20).


VI. DISCUSSION

This chapter summarizes and discusses the results outlined in Chapter V as well as their

possible application on policies and design of flood early warning and response systems.

6.1. Barriers and Motivations

According to the result from the two case study areas, the factors that shape people’s

intention to participate in community-based flood early warning response system are not

personal conditions/ decisions alone but also include factors dictated by institutional

intervention or restriction. At the personal level, the findings show that the motivations to

participate in the system revolve around “human life”- the fear to lose one’s own life or

one’s family, or the sense of responsibility towards the well-being of friends and neighbours.

Ignorance however limits ones knowledge and motivation to get things done while poverty

forces one to focus on current basic needs than future ones such as disaster.

Institutional factors and interventions can increase people’s intent to participate especially

through capacity building as people would be able to learn the problems in their

communities and the solutions they need to solve them. However, institutional concerns

such as local politics can also hinder participation as it can lead to alliances that necessitate

group members not to participate in the flood early warning and response system organized

by rival groups. Likewise, the focus on building the skills of leaders and members of the

implementing institution can limit the roles assigned to normal community members (non-

leaders) to mere attendance and compliance.

The applicability of flood early warning and response system can be dissected into pre-

disaster and disaster stages. Given this dichotomy in the time frame, Figure 6.1 can

summarize the results from sub-chapter 5.1.


*EW- Early warning

Figure 6.1: Factors that shape participation

The diagram illustrates that people that the onset of floods can nullify the barriers for

participation and people are more likely to participate during floods when their options are

either participation or death. Capacity building can help them acquire the knowledge and

skills during the pre-disaster stage, which they can use during the emergency stage. The

case of Barangay Mangin showed the value of creating champions and building the capacity

of civil servants at the city level who will pass on the knowledge to communities and

ensuring the continuity of the flood preparedness system by through their technical advice

to elected officials. However, barriers like poverty and local politics must be addressed

together with limited knowledge from community members in order for capacity building to

be effective.

The diagram also shows that leadership and communication are essential catalysts in both

stages. But these two factors are also pre-conditions to effective flood preparedness.

Effective leaders are absolutely essential in leading the establishment of a flood early

warning and response system and maintaining it for years while addressing problems such

as complacency and lack of funds. This study finds that the systems in both study areas

depended and still depends heavily on their respective leaders and these systems would

perish without them. Community unity and effective communication channel is also a

necessary precondition, one that is built for years through interaction among neighbours in

normal conditions and during emergencies.


6.2. On Encouraging and Utilizing Participation

The two case studies illustrate the difference in the roles of various actors in setting up and

implementing a flood early warning and response system, and how the participation of key

actors were encouraged and utilized in these steps. Table 6.1 summarizes the strategies

used to encourage the participation of key actors in both study areas, as discussed in the

previous chapter.

Table 6.1: Encouraging Participation in the Case Study Areas

Key Actors Barangay Mangin Barangay Banaba

1 City Government

(Elected, Appointed and

Career Officials and

Personnel)

- Invest in people/ create

champions through

capacity building

(No role in Barangay Banaba’s

Flood Early Warning and Response

System)

2 Barangay Government - Effective transfer of

knowledge from city to

barangay

- Comprehensive risk

analysis

- Well-defined roles and

responsibilities

(No role in Barangay Banaba’s

Flood Early Warning and Response

System)

3 Normal Residents Establishing the host family

(Generally limited roles)

Participation in Buklod’s livelihood

programs

(Generally limited roles)

4 Buklod Tao (People’s

Organization)

(n/a) - Clearly defined roles for the

community

- Clearly defined roles for the

families of Buklod Tao members

- Knowledge transfer and capacity

building

- Comprehensive risk analysis

- Membership in Buklod-Tao

Barangay Mangin adapted a hierarchal setup that began with external organizations that

partnered with the city government. A large portion of the roles in developing the early

warning and response system depended greatly on the initial skills acquired by the city

government, which they eventually shared with their barangay(s). The barangay

government of Mangin then stood out and became independent in terms of flood early

warning and response especially during floods, and the city government will only provide

support if absolutely necessary. At the barangay level however, the skills, resources, and

actual roles and decision-making powers are heavily concentrated to the barangay

government and its leaders, which sets limits on the role that can be played by normal

community member. The relationships and the roles of different actors are summarized

and illustrated in Figure 6.2.


Figure 6.2: Framework of Roles in Barangay Mangin

On the other hand, the case of Barangay Banaba shows an independent and self-managing

system from the development of the early warning and response system to its eventual

implementation. The greatest involvement in its system comes from within the community

itself where community support was built years before the flood early warning and

response system was established. The barangay and municipal governments however had

no involvement in the establishment and maintenance of Banaba’s system- the most glaring

weakness of the barangay’s flood preparedness initiative. Figure 6.3 shows how the formal

roles of the participants in this bottom-up initiative transcends to the family level which is

evidently more defined that the roles in the top-down scenario.


Figure 6.3: Framework of Roles in Barangay Banaba

Three conclusions can be derived from these models. First is that the roles and decision-

making powers vary significantly with each cross-section of a community regardless of the

time period. ‘Normal’ community members are less empowered in both top-down and

bottom-up settings where their roles are more or less limited to compliance. At the top-

down setting, the small percentage of barangay officials and staff perform the crucial roles

of early warning and response, while the rest of the community are limited to personal

preparations or evacuation. Buklod Tao on the other hand has 700 hundred members out

of the 20,000 residents of Barangay Mangin (NSCB, 2007). But while the roles of non-

members are also less significant than Buklod Tao members, the organization is able to

reach and educate more people in its barangay.

The second conclusion is that group membership is a determinant of one’s level of

participation. R21 agrees with this conclusion and mentions that:

“It is not possible to make everyone leaders. Some activities have to focus on the

capacities of the leaders first. It is also more convenient for external organizations to

train and focus on community leaders and focal people”

Lastly, this study sees an inconsistency in Wilcox’s (1994) ladder where “acting together”

ranks higher than “deciding together”. The findings point out that during floods, “acting

together” is more likely to occur especially when community members cooperate with

Buklod Tao or the barangay government of Mangin in evacuating to safer areas during

floods.

These three findings have implications in Wilcox’s work. In using Wilcox’s ladder of

participation, it is necessary to analyse the roles of each section of a community to


accurately capture how they participate and the timeframe in which they do so. Table 6.2

illustrates how these conclusions will apply to the case of Barangay Mangin while Table 6.3

shows their applicability to Barangay Banaba and the case of Buklod Tao. The marks in both

tables were derived from the actual findings of this study that were discussed in previous

chapters.

Table 6.2: Type of Participation for Barangay Mangin (Top-Down)

Type of Participation Pre-Disaster During Heavy Rains and

Floods City Barangay Residents City Barangay Residents

5 Supporting independent

community interests

(greatest)

X

X

X

4 Deciding together X

3 Acting together X

2 Consultation X

1 Information (least)

Table 6.3: Type of Participation for Buklod Tao (Bottom-Up)

Type of

Participation

Pre-Disaster During Heavy Rains and Floods City Barangay Buklod

Tao

Residents City Barangay Buklod

Tao

Residents

5 Supporting

independent

community

interests

X X

4 Deciding together

3 Acting together X

2 Consultation X

1 Information (least) X X X X

6.3. On addressing the barriers to participation

As stated in the Chapter V, this research identified four main barriers to participation in the

case study areas: 1) local politics, 2) poverty or economic difficulty, 3) limited knowledge

and 4) limited opportunities for community members to participate. The approaches that

were used by each of the two case study areas, as discussed in the previous chapter, are

summarized in Table 6.4 below


Table 6.4: Approaches to Address the Barriers to Participation

Barriers Approach Used by Barangay

Mangin (Top-Down)

Approach Used by

Barangay Banaba (Bottom-

Up)

1 Local Politics/ Alliances - Focus on transforming the neutral

civil servants into champions for

DRR

- (No concrete solutions can be

made except resolving personal

issues)

- Third party mediation

between Buklod-Tao and the

city and barangay

governments

2 Poverty/ Economic

difficulties

- Short-term livelihood projects - Implementing a diverse set of

programs aimed at reducing

Banaba residents’ many

vulnerabilities (not just

economic difficulties)

3 Limited Knowledge - Trainings/ information campaigns

by city to barangay

- Capacity-Building Measures

- Opportunity to become a

member of Buklod Tao 4 Limited Opportunities for

normal residents

- Introducing the host family

arrangement

The table above as well as the discussions in sub-chapter 5.3 shows that capacity building is

the main focus/ strength of the top-down approach, reflected in the strong knowledge and

support at the city-level and the effective transfer of knowledge and skills from the city’s

officials and personnel to the barangay. The main weakness on the other hand is its limited

approach to solving economic difficulties which greatly affects the level of people’s

preparedness by shifting their focus to more urgent basic necessities.

On the other hand, the main strength of the bottom-up approach is the diversity of its

approach especially since the flood early warning and response system is also complimented

by programs aimed at reducing people’s vulnerabilities against disasters (i.e. livelihood

projects). The people’s organizations’ members have far greater knowledge, skills, roles

and decision-making powers than normal community members; however the latter has the

option to join Buklod Tao as members. The primary weakness of the bottom-up approach

however that it is in prone to conflict with the local government, especially since the

people’s organization normally perform roles that duplicate that of the barangay or the city

government’s leading to friction and conflict.

6.4. Implications of the Findings on Policies and Program Design

The recognition that storms occur regularly in the Philippines should guide local, national

and international organizations to invest their resources in more preventive or anticipatory

solutions such as flood preparedness measures in order to save lives before an “expected

disaster” arrives. The findings of this study can help improve the design of participatory

flood early warning and response programs or the policies to create them by considering

the findings on people’s motivations and anticipating the barriers to participation. The

findings for example show the significant effect of poverty and economic difficulties on


people’s intent to participate and their actual resilience to disasters, and must therefore be

included in program design or policy intervention.

This study concludes that there are also several pre-conditions before an effective flood

preparedness system can be established (presence of leaders, community ties, effective

communication channel and proactive institutions). These can be developed together with

the early warning system to ensure the proper implementation and the sustainability of the

system.

Both study areas have a fully-functioning flood early warning and response systems.

However the level of community participation in Barangay Banaba is evidently higher than

that of Barangay Mangin. This may be attributed to the fact that Buklod Tao uses

complementary approaches (ex. Social Enterprise Capital Augmentation Program) that were

created out of the realization that their flood-prone community cannot keep relying on early

warning and response. The research finds that these vulnerability reduction programs

provide the necessary motivations for normal community members to 1) initially seek

membership and 2) eventually learn about and participate in flood early warning and

response. Flood preparedness measures would be more effective and would receive a

greater level of people’s participation if complemented with such programs.

This research also found that “community-based” flood early warning and response

systems, especially the top-down system are implemented by only a handful of community-

members (leaders). The intent of this statement is not to suggest giving role and power to

100% of the community members but to give them a choice to do more should they choose

to do so. Normal community members are limited to the role of compliance sometimes by

personal choice, but in the case of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches, because

of institutional restrictions. Addressing this problem will improve the decentralization of

DRR functions to communities that countries like the Philippines and improve the resilience

of its “first responders” against floods.

Lastly, one unintentional consequence of increased participation in flood early warning and

response is that the people who implement them learn that it is more important to focus

more on solving their own vulnerabilities rather than continue responding to yearly storms

and floods. In the Philippines, people in slums close to danger zones would rather face the

floods than face relocation. But this is no longer the case for Buklod Tao because now, the

residents themselves understand that they cannot keep risking their lives and the lives of

their loved ones by relying on an effective warning system. As typhoons are becoming

stronger and/or more unpredictable due to climate change, typhoons stronger than Ondoy

(Ketsana) may strike and finally overwhelm the resilient communities. Relocation would

permanently remove their vulnerability to floods and people exposed to the benefits of

flood early warning and response are willing to take this option if given the opportunity to

secure a safer land and house even outside Banaba.


VII. Conclusion

“There can be no zero casualty scenarios without people’s participation. If the

barangay and community members are not involved, any system created by a

higher-level body will be worthless.” R11

The “bibingka approach” (R22), one of the concepts identified during the interviews

adequately summarizes the importance of both top-down and bottom flood early warning

and response systems. A bibingka is a local rice cake cooked by heating the cake with

burning coal from above and below. And like how a bibingka is cooked, “communities

should also be prepared from top and below” (ibid) as community members and leaders are

mutually dependent upon each other before and during disasters. This study concludes

that the top-down flood early warning and response system is more inclusive in terms of

involving higher-level and external organizations. However, a bottom-up system such as

that of Buklod Tao is more inclusive to community-members even though it has limited links

with its city and barangay governments. It is however important to adopt the best features

and anticipate the pitfalls of both systems in order to create greater resilience in

communities.

In the methodology section, the use of the grounded theory proved to be appropriate for

this research, which was able to form unique/deeper insights on participation out of the

data from the study areas. The study was also able to generate in-depth concepts as initially

envisioned through the appropriate use of semi-structured key informant interviews which

gave the researcher enough flexibility when new concepts came out during the interviews.

The research found that the set of motivations and barriers that shape people intention to

participate in flood early warning and response measures in the study areas are not

personal conditions/ decisions alone but also include factors dictated by institutional

intervention or restriction. In a community with a flood preparedness system, institutional

factors and interventions can increase people’s intent to participate especially through

capacity building as people would be able to learn the problems in their communities and

the solutions they need to solve them. However, they can also hinder participation as local

politics can lead to alliances that necessitate group members not to participate in the flood

early warning and response system.

While the study found four barriers to people’s participation (local politics, poverty and

economic difficulty, limited knowledge on hazards and solutions), most of these factors only

apply in the pre-disaster stage as the onset of heavy rains and/or the presence of floods

which gives only people two options: participate or die.


In the context of the two case studies, decision-making powers are centralized to the

community-leaders and normal residents seldom make decisions that affect their

community. The study also concludes that the significance of an actor’s role depends

greatly on his/her membership to the group involved in the flood early warning and

response system. Normal residents (non-members) therefore have less significant roles

often limited to personal preparations and compliance to evacuation orders during times of

floods. In the case of the bottom-up approach, normal residents have a higher chance of

being able to join the people’s organization. The government organizations implementing

the top-down approach however are less able to because of inherent limits on financial

resources.

Lastly, the study concludes that in order to motivate people to participate in flood early

warning and response, community organizations must think beyond flood early warning and

response, as did Buklod Tao. Community participation in flood preparedness in Barangay

Banaba is evidently higher than Barangay Mangin because of the many vulnerability (and

poverty) reduction programs that were created to complement flood preparedness

measures and reduce the sources of risks that threaten the community. Such a strategy

motivated normal community members to 1) initially seek membership in the people’s

organization and 2) eventually learn about and participate in flood early warning and

response in Barangay Banaba.


APPENDIX A: List of Interviewees

POSITION ORGANIZATION / PLACE OF RESIDENCE

City Agriculture Officer/ Head of

Technical Working Group

City Government of Dagupan/ Project PROMISE

Project Officer Center for Disaster Preparedness

Project Manager Project PROMISE- Center for Disaster

Preparedness

Managing Director Center for Disaster Preparedness

Captain/ Chairman Barangay Government of Mangin

Barangay Worker Barangay Government of Mangin

Civil Defense Officer CDRRMC

Head Buklod Tao Initiative

Livelihood Point Person and Secretary Buklod Tao Initiative

Treasurer, Health and Relief Officer Buklod Tao Initiative

Trustee, DRR and Early Warning Officer Buklod Tao Initiative

Rescuer, Compost Production Buklod Tao Initiative

Homeowners Association President Barangay Banaba, San Mateo

Resident (7) Barangay Banaba, San Mateo

Resident (Host Family) Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City

Resident (7) Barangay Mangin, Dagupan City

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION AND VALIDATION WORKSHOPS

POSITION ORGANIZATION / PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Barangay Health Workers Barangay Government of Mangin

Barangay Captain, Council and Staff Barangay Government of Mangin

Residents Barangay Banaba

Buklod Tao Members Barangay Banaba


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