human wisdom of st. thomas_ a breviary of philosophy, the - thomas aquinas & josef pieper

8/12/2019 Human Wisdom of St. Thomas_ a Breviary of Philosophy, The - Thomas Aquinas & Josef Pieper

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he umn idm f t hm



The Human Wisdom of

St. omas

BVY HLHY

M H WK . HM Q

Arranged by

JOSEF PEPER

ld y

R MCLE P

GNATUS PRESS SAN FRANCSCO



First published in 8 by Sheed & Ward, Ltd.

London, England

Reprinted by permission.

NHL OBTAT

Mark Brocklehurst, OP., S.TL.

Abert M. Brincat, O.P., Phi. ac.

MPRM POTETAntoninus Maguire, O.P.

Vicar Prvincial, English Province

London, May

Cover art: aint omas Dictating to a crib (detail)Soes de St. Thomas d'Aquin. Ms. I6o fol I

Abbey of Vauclair France. 13th c.

Bibliothue Municipale, Laon, France

© Giraudon/ Art Resource, New York

Cover design by Roxanne Mei Lum

Reprinted by gnatius Press, San Francisco, S o-89870-895

Library of Congress control number 8

Printed in the United States of America @



To Dr. Franz Schranz

wih cion and iud



CONTENTS

REFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

I The order of the parts of the unverse toeach other exists in virtue of the order of

the whole universe to God 5

I I The creature is vanit in so far as it comesom nothingness, but not in so far as it isan image of God 9

III There can be good without evil; but therecannot be evil without good . . . . . . . . . 2

I Intellectual natures have a greater ani tothe whole than other beings . . . . . . . . 3

Our intellect in understanding is extendedto innit . . . . . . . . 34

VI Morali presupposes nature 44

VII Reason is man's nature ence whatever is

conrar o ason s conar o uannature

VIII The desire of the last end is not among those

49

tings over which we have master . . 52

IX The happiness of the active life lies in theaction of prudence b which man ruleshimself and others . . . . . . . . . . . . 55



X. Moral virtue does not exclude the passions . .

X Through virtue man is ordered to theutmost limit of his capacity . . . . . . . 3

X. Pleasure perfects operation just as beautyperfects youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

X. Grace and virtue imitate the order of naturewhich is instituted by the divine wisdom .

X The theologian considers human actionsin so far as through them man is orderedto beatitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

X Each being naturally loves God more than

itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

X. Things are more in God than God is inthings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

X This is the nal human knowledge of God

to know that we do not know God .

NDE OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . 03



PREFACE

These remarks are not intended to releve the reader ofthe necessit of using his mind to get at the meaning of

the texts brought together in this Breviar On the contrary, it seems desirable that the reader should encounterthese passages om the works of Thomas Aquinas all onhis own and, so to speak, left alone without the aid ofan introduction or commentary It is to be hoped that

such an encounter will of itself introduce the reader tothe form and design of the whole work of the nver-sal Doctor" of Christendom

The Editor does not wish this book to be read straightthrough om beginning to end at one sitting, but rather

that one or more of these texts , or even a whole section,should be absorbed thoughtfull again and again; in thsway the reader wi kindle his own thinkng, and bgradually makng the thought of St Thomas hs own, hewill gain some degree of familiarit with the philosophi-

ca ai with which ach an vr on of thesewords has been uttered

I therefore deliberatel reain om even the briefestinterpretation of m own of the basic thought of StThomas Aquinas contained in this snthesis

In spite of this, I must not omit to point out that hisbook, which is intended to be a Breviary of Philosoph,contains nothing which is Theolog in the strict sense

9



0 e Human Wisom of S. omas

of the term Nevertheless, it must be rememberedthat this philosoph has sprung om the soil of a greattheolog in which alone was it able to ourish so it

can scarcel remain hidden om anone who foowsthe thought attentivel that the reections here gatheredtogether lead to the gatewa of Theolog and Faith.The last word of our Breviar is that concerning theowl and the eagle; blessed beond human power is a

heart which like an eagle, ing upwards over theists of human ailt, gazes with deepl penetratingee into the light of unchangeable truth"

Order and Mster" this title needs a word of explanation It has become almost a commonplace that ordo

represents a basic categor of mediaeval thought, and especiall of the sysm of Thomas Aquinas

Ordo: represents the clear and inteigible building upof realit, as we as the doctrine which reects that real-it; it represents the satisfaction enjoed b our inds in

surveing and penetrating the pattern of life; it representswas of life which can be trodden and followed b ourthought And in fact nobod who has absorbed intohimself even a ttle of the Summa Thologica wi be ablecompletel to resist the cold, logical enchantment thatthe reason in its search for enghtenment encounters inan explanation of the universe constructed with sucharchitectural power

Nevertheless, anone who does not see this world, ap-parentl explained with the utmost clarit of reason, sur-rounded on its borders b pathless mster does noto jusice o Thomas Aquinas

In the opinion of Thomas, not o does mster puta liit to the penetrabilit of realit, but ordo itself is



Prae

interwoven and crossed b mster And it is not omster in the theological sense, likewise owing throughever part of the whole world, which opposes itself to

the grasp of our ordering thought and our attempts atrational master No, the boundar between order andmster passes through his world itsel the eort of hu-man thought, sas Thomas, has not been able to trackdown the essence of a single gnat

One aim of our Breviar is to demonstrate this doubleaspect of the work of St Thomas the order and themster

Anticipating a probable objection b critics, I mselfwish to sa quite ankl that the choice of the texts has

been determined entirel b the personal feelings of thechooser; so a personal remark ma also be allowed hereDuring this work I had in mind especiall m own circleof iends, and I included o such texts as I should lketo bring to their notice This I did in order that the real

character of St Thomas might be made visible to themin this wa Yet after a, the objciv point of view abalance the subjciv to a certain extent

This Thomist Breviar has, I suppose, scarcel beenharmed b the fact that the work of selection and trans-lation has been done during m ears of service in thear, and had to progress n a not ve acadec ato-

sphere In such changing conditions of life, what hasalread become familiar is encountered aesh, as if forthe rst time, and with previousl unknown potenti-ties of understanding In this wa not a few tractates,which I thought I knew ver we, at this second meet-ing have entirel surprised me It is now m hope thatthe character of Thomas Aquinas as revealed in this



2 The Human Wisom of S omas

Breviar, ma dawn on the reader also, whether alreadacquainted with it or not, with that morning power ofradiation which is usual at a rst meeting

J O S E F P I E P E R



THE LEAS INSIGH HA ONE CAN OBAIN

INO SUBLIME HINGS IS MORE DESIRABLE

HAN HE MOS CERAIN KNOWLEDGE OFLOWER HINGS (1, AD I)



THE ORDER OF HE PARS OF HE UNIRSE O

EACH OHER EISS IN VIRUE OF HE ORDER OFHE WHO LE UNIRSE O OD . (I)

(2)Everythng eternal is necessary

(3)Just as God himself is One, so he also produces unity; notonly because each being is one in itself, but also because

things in a certain sense are one perfect unity(4)

The more uty a thing has, the more perfect is its good-ness and power

s

The hgher a nature is, the more closely related to it iswhat emanates om it

(6)Everything imperfect strives after perfection

(7)

The source of ever perfect thng les necessarl none perfect being

(8)The beginng of everything is directed towards its per-fection This is clear in those thngs that are done by na-

ture, as well as in those things that are made by art Thusevery beginning of perfection is ordered to the completeperfection, which is realized in the last end

1 5



I6 The Human Wisom of S omas

(9)The higher the rank a thing holds in the universe, themore it ought to participate in that order in which the

goodness of the universe consists(10)

The more perfect a thing is in power and the greaterdegree of goodness it possesses, the more universal is itsstriving after goodness and the more it seeks out and

accomplshes good in that which is distant om it

( 1 1 )The sign of perfection in lower beings is that the areable to produce things lke themselves

(12)What comes om God is well ordered Now the order ofthings consists in this, that the are led to God each oneb the others

(I3)

The complete perfection of the universe demands thatthere should be created natures which return to God, notonl according to the likeness of their being, but alsothrough their actions This can onl be through the actsof the reason and the will, because God himself has no

other wa of acting towards himsel ence, for the nalperfection of the universe, it was necessar that thereshould be intellectual beings

(I4)though a thing that adheres l to God is better,

et a thing that can either adhere to God or not is alsogood Hence that world in which both these kinds ofbeings are found is better than one in which there isonl one kind



e Human Wisom of S Thomas 1 7

( 5)thugh a being subject t decay wuld be f higherdegree if it were incrruptibe yet a wrd cmpsed f

bth permanent and transitry beings is better than nein which there are y incrruptible beings

( 1 6)thugh spiritua substance is better than crpresubstance nevertheless a wrld in which there were

y spiritual beings wud n be better but rather lessperfect.

{ 7)lmvement is derived m smething unmved

( 8)

verything changeabe is reduced a rst unmvedbeing; hence each particuar knwedge is as derivedm sme cmpetey certain knwedge which is ntsubject t errr

( 9)The rder f divine prvidence demands that thereshud be cincidence and chance in things

(20)The perfectin f the whe f crprea nature dependsin a certain sense n the perfectin f man.

(21)T ow mmbr of er of bn i awfund in cnac wih he highest member f a lwercass . Thus the lwest type f anima fe scarcey exceedsthe f f plants for exampe yters whih have nmvement have y the sense f tuch and stick t heearth just ike pants . Hence the bessed Denis says TheDivine Wisdmj ins the at f te higher kind wih herst f the lwer kind." In the genus f crprea things



8 e Human Wisom of S omas

we can therefore take something supreme namely thehuman body which is united in harmonious equilib-rium It touches the lowest member of a higher class

namely the human soul which om its mode of under-standing can be perceived to hold the lowest position inthe class of inteectual beings Hence it comes to passthat the inteectual soul is said to be like the horizon orboundary line between corporeal and incorporeal sub-

stance since it is itself an incorporeal substance and yet isthe form of the body

(22)Inteect is the rst author and mover of the unverse Hence the last end of the universe must necessarily be

the good of the inteect This however is truth Hencetruth must be the last end of the whole universe



THE CRAURE IS VANIY IN SO FAR AS I COMES

FROM NOHINGNESS, BU NO IN SO FAR AS I

IS AN IMAGE OF G

(24)

Even though created beings pass away they wi neversink back into nothingness

(2 5)The creature is darkness in so far as it comes out ofnothing But in as much as it has its origin om God it

participates in his image and this leads to likeness to him(26)

God cannot be the cause of a tendency to notbeingRather the creature has this of itself in so far as it hasdeveloped out of nothing

(27)The further a being is distant om that which is Being ofitself, namely, God, the nearer it is to nothingness Butthe nearer a being stands to God, the further away it isom nothingness

28The movement proper to the nature of a creature is not atendency towards nothingness: this movement has a eddirection towards good and the tendency towards noth-ingness is only a defect in it

(29)Since ee wi comes om nothingness, it is its peculiarproperty not to be naturay conrmed in good

1 9



20 The Human Wisdom of S omas

(30)The property of being pliant to evil belongs to the will invirtue of its origin from nothingness and not because it

comes om God(3 )

The intellectua creature cannot naturally be relieved ofthe possibilities of sinning; since it has arisen out of noth-ingness it can be capable of defect

(3 2)It is clearly not a convincing argument to say that whatis derived from nothing tends of itself to nothingnessand thus the potency to notbeing resides in all createdthings For beings created by God can only be said to

tend towards nothing in the same way as they have alsotaken their origin om nothing This however happensonly through the power of the agent. Hence the potencyto notbeing does not dwell in creatures but God has thepower either to give them being or to aow the inow of

being into them to dry up(3 3)

ven that which is stable in things would sink back intonothingness since it arises from nothing were it not heldup b the hand of the governor of a thngs

(3 4)

The potency to notbeing of spiritua creatures dwesmore in God who can withdraw the inux of his powertan in the nature of those creatures themselves

(3sIf God were to reduce a being to nothingness he wouldnot do it by an action but because he would cease toact



THERE CAN BE GOOD WIHOU EVIL; BU HERE

CANNO BE EVIL WIHOU GOOD.

(3 7)

Every creature participates in goodness in te same de-

gree as it participates in being{3 8)

Everyting tat is and in watever way it is is good in sofar as it exists.

(3 9)

Being itself is like goodness. Good and Bin are convert-ible ideas.

(40)Good and ru and bin are one and te same ting inreality but in te mind tey are distinguised om eac

oter(41 )

Good and te inclination to good folow from te verynature of a being; ence so long as te nature remainste inclination to good cannot be removed not even

om te amne.(42)

No essence is in itself evi Evil as no essence.

(43)Evil consists entirely in notbeing.

(44)Noting can be caled evi in so far as it as being butoy in so far as it is deprived of part of its being.

2 1



e Human Wsdom o S Thomas

(5)vi actions are good and come om God in so far as it isa question of the being they possess.

{6)l that belongs to being and action in a sinful act comesom God as rst cause. But the deformty in it goes backto ee will as its cause just as the progress made by onewho lmps is reduced to the power of movement as its

rst cause while all the obquity in such a gait arisesom the crookedness of his lmbs.

()There is nothing unseey in the thought that God actswith adulterers in their natural action for the nature of

adulterers is not evil only their wl. What is worked bythe power of their seed springs not om their will butom their nature. Hence it is not untting that Godshould cooperate m that action and give it its nalperfection.

{8)In the demons one is aware of both their nature whichis om God and the deformity of their sin which isnot om God. Thus it is not absolutely true to say thato n mon w m ao n o a a

they are real beings. But it is absolutely true to say thatGod is in things if we mean things whose nature is notdeformed.

(9)Since the demons are intellectual substances they can inno way have a natural urge to any evil whatsoever. Hencethey cannot naturally be evil.

sovil itself is no a positive thing bu tat in which evil



e Human Wisdom o S omas 2

adheres is somehing posiive in so far as ev akes awayony a par of he good. In he same way blindness is noanyhing posiive bu he who happens o be blind is

somehing posiive.(5 )

Jus as perfecion is comprehended under he wordgood so he word ev means nohing bu he loss ofperfecion.

(52)vil arises hrough some paricular hing being lacngbu good arises oy from a whole and inegral cause.

( 53)

single and solary defec is sucien o make some-

thing bad. Bu for a hing o be absoluely good a singleparicular goodness is no sucien; for his he enirefulness of goodness is demanded.

( 54)

very being is perfec in so far as i has real exisence bu

imperfec in so far as i is oy poenial and hus de-prived of real exisence.

(5 5)

Good is wha hings desire as was rs said so well byhe Phosopher. . . . Bu all hings in heir own waydesire real acua being This is eviden om he facta a ings y eir very naure g agains corrup-ion. Hence real acua eing makes up e idea of egood.

{56)The good fullls no oy he idea of being perfec bualso ha of causing perfecion

(5 7)

hough everyhing is good in so far as i has being yet



4 e Human Wsdom o S omas

being is not itsef the essence of a created thing. Hence itdoes not foow that a creature is good in virtue of itsown essence.

(5 8)verything naturay desires unit just as it aso desiresgoodness.

(59)There is no desire which is not directed towards a good.

(6 )Nobody can strive after ev for its own sake.

(6 )Sin does not occur in the wi without some ignorance inthe inteect . For we wi nothing uness it is good either

rea or apparent.(62)

It is impossibe that any ev shoud be striven after pre-cisey as ev either by the natura appetite or the sensi-tive or the inteectua which is the wi.

(6)We do not strive towards ev by tending towards anythngbut by turning away om something. Just as a thing iscaed good by reason of its participation in goodness so ang ev y eo o g ay om good.

(64)v in things ies outside any purpose: it occurs withoutthe inention of the agent.

(65)ven if that which s aimed at in sin is something evi inreality and opposed to the rationa nature nevertheess its apprehended as a good and according to nature.

(66)v is never oved except uder the aspect of good that



The Human Wisdom o S Thomas 25

is to say, in so far as it is truy a good in some particuarrespect, but is conceived as absoutey good

67)

To wi evi is neither freedom nor a part of freedom6 8)

Pain at the oss of something good shows the goodness ofthe nature

69)

Hatred woud never overcome ove, except for the sakeof a stil greater ove

70)The rational, inteectua nature is reated to good andevi in a way that distinguishes it above a other beings

For every other creature is naturay ordered to some par-ticuar, partial good On the other hand, ony the inte-ectual nature apprehends the universa idea of good itsefthrough its inteectua knowedge, and is moved by thedesire of the wil to the good in its universaity Hence,

among rational creatures, evi is divided in a particuarway, namey, into faut and punishment

7 1)In the sphere of eewi every evi is either punishmentor faut Faut comes nearer than punishment to the ideaof ev

72Punishment is opposed to the good of the one who ispunished and deprived of some good Faut stands inopposition to the good of the order towards God, andthus it is directy opposed to the divine goodness

7)udgment must not be passed on things according to theopinion of the wicked but according to that of the good,



26 e Human Wisdom o S Thomas

just as in matters of taste judgment must not be according to the opinion of the sick but according to that ofthe healthy. Hence punishment is not to be regarded as

the greater evil because the wicked are more aaid of it ;but fault must rather be held as the greater evil becausethe good are more afraid of it .

(74)

To the order of the universe there also belongs the order

ofjustice which demands that punishment should be inicted on everyone who sins. In this respect God is theauthor of the evil which is punishment but not of theevil which is fault

(75) It is thus determined in the order of divine justice: thatone is subject in punishment to the power of him bywhose suggestion one has consented to sin.

{76)

vil must be avoided in every way; hence it is in no waypermitted to do evil so that om it some good may ariseBut good need not be done in every way; hence somegood must sometimes be omitted in order that great evilsma be avoided

(77)Just as good is naturally prior to evil which signies alack of good so the aections of the soul whose object isgood are naturally prior to those aections whose objectis evil and which therefore arise om the former. Hence

hatred and sadness have their cause in some love desire orpleasure.

{78)Good is the cause of evil in so far as it can have a cause at



The Human Wisdom of S omas 27

a. For it must be realised that evil cannot have a causeproper to itsel

79)

vil is not caused except by good. )

very evil i based on some good . . . . Moral evil is basedon the good rooted in human nature; evil which springsom the nature and is the privation of being is based

on matter which is good ke being which only existspotentiay.

8 1)verythng evil is rooted in some good and everythingfalse in some truth.

82)vil produces no eect except in virtue of some good.

8 )vil does not ght against good except in virtue of good.For in itself it is powerless and weak and is the source of

no activity.84)

However much evil is multiped it is never able com-pletely to swaow up good

)Stronger than the evil in wickedness s the good m

goodness.86)

Good can be reased in purer form than evil. For there issome good in which no evil is mxed but there is nothing so very ev that no good is mixed in it.

87)Though evil alwas lessens good et it is never able com-pletel to destroy it . Just as in this way some good always



28 The Human Wisdom o S Thomas

remas so here canno be anyhing compeey andwhoy evi.

(8 8)

There can be no supreme evi in he same way as here isa supreme good which is esseniay good.

(89)In he wod nohing is found which is whoy and com-peey evi.

(90)In every sinfu acion here remains somehing good.

(9)Nohing is so very evi ha i canno have some appear-ance of good; and by reason of such goodness i is abe o

move he desire.(92)

I is impossibe for he good of our naure o be desroyedcompeey by sin.

(93)

I is no impossibe ha an evi shoud be ordered o goodby some good; bu i is impossibe ha anyhing shoudbe ordered o evi by some good.

(94 )

ev wee compee excuded rom eai i woud

mean ha much good woud aso be aken away. Divineprovidence does no impy he compee remova of eviom reai bu raher he ordering o some good of heevi which arises.

(95)

Many good hings woud disappear if God did no aowsome evi o exs.

(96)If God had aken awa om he word everyhing ha



The Human Wsdom of S omas 29

man has made an occasion of sin the universe wouldremain imperfect

(97)

If evil were taken away from some parts of the universethen much of its perfection would disappear for itsbeauty arises om the orderly union of good and evilwhile evil springs om the waning away of good. Never-theless by the foresight of the governor of the universe

good foows om evil just as the song receives its sweet-ness from the interval of silence



NELLECUAL NAURES HAVE

A GREAER AINIY O HE WHOLE

HAN OHER BEINGS.

(99)n the universe only the intellectual nature is sought onits own account, all others on account of it

( )The highest step in the whole process of generation of

creatures is the human soul, towards which matter tendsas its ultimate form Man is therefore the end of allgeneration

( )t follows that spiritual things are called great according to

their fullness of being For ugustine says that, amongthose things which have no size, to be greater is the sameas to be better

102Intelectual natures have a greater anity to the whole

than other beings for every intellectual being is in a cer-tain manner all tngs, in so far as it is able to compre-hend all being by the power of its understanding Everyother nature possesses only an imperfect participation inbeing

!0 The desire of man s to know something whole andperfect

0



The Human Wsdom o S Thomas

(04)he soul is given to man in the place of the forms sothat in a certain sense man might be a things

( )he natura perfection of each singe being that is in thestate of potentiaity consists in the fact that it can be madeactual But the inteect is in the state of potentiality withregard to things that can be known Before it is made

actual it is imperfect but it is made perfect when it iscarried over into the act so that it arrives at the know-edge of things Hence some phiosophers directing theirattention to the natura perfection of man have said thatthe na happiness of man consists in thisthat in his

soul is reected the order of the whoe universe Mans beatitude consists in the knowledge of God butnot in the knowledge of created things Hence one is notmore blessed because of the knowledge of creatures butonly because of the knowedge of God evertheless

this very knowedge of created things beongs to thenatura perfection of the sou

( 06)It is said that the sou is in a certain sense thingsbecause it is created to know a things In this way it is

possible for the perfection of the whoe universe to have eene n ne ne en ene an philosophers the utimate perfection to which the soulcan attain is that in it is reected the whole order of theuniverse and its causes his aso they say is the last endof man which in our opinion wi be attained in thevision of God What is there that they wi not seewho wil see him who sees a things?" Gregory theGreat



2 The Human Wisdom S omas

( 07)Only the intellectual creature is able to comprehend thedirection by which it is directed to its own acts

(08)t is clear that man is not only a soul but a compound ofsoul and body But Plato was able to assert that man is asoul which makes use of the body, because he attributedsense perception to the soul as proper to it

( 09)n so far as the soul is the form of the body, it has not gotan exstence apart om the existence of the body it israther united to the body through this exstence

( 0)

Union with the body belongs to the essence of the soul( )

Since the soul is only a part of human nature, it does notpossess its natural perfection except in union with the body

( 2)

Hence our body is transitory because it is not itself per-fectly subject to the soul for were it completely subjectto the soul, immortality would overow to it om theimmortality of the soul

( 3t is clear that the better a body is prepared, the betterwill be the soul allotted to it Since among men thereare some who possess a betterdisposed body, to themalso will be allotted a soul endowed with a greater powerof understanding

( 4)c he ody wh whch e neecua sou is unedmust be prepared in the best way, it is necessary for thesensitive nature to possess the nest possible organ of the



e Human Wisdom of S Thomas

sense of touch Hence t s sad that among senstvebengs we have the most relable sense of touch, and alsothat t s on account of the delcacy of ths sense that one

man s more tted than another for the work of the ntel-lect rstotle

( 5)l the other senses are based on the sense of touch ong all bengs that have sense percepton, man has the

most delcate sense of touch nd among men, thosewho possess the more rened sense of touch have thebest ntellgence

( 6)Snce man possesses ntellect and sense percepton and

bodly strength, so, accordng to the plan of dvne prov-dence, these are harmonzed n hm, n the lkeness ofthat order whch s found n the unverse

( 7)The human soul possesses such an abundance of varous

powers because t dwells on the borders of sprtual andmateral beng n t therefore the powers of both kndsof beng meet together

( 8)atural thngs learn nothng and forget nothng We

do not forget nor do we learn natural thngs I I 9

n man there s not only memory but also retrospecton

(120) devl knows the nature of human thought better thanman does

( 2 n us there s not only the pleasure that we share wth thebeasts , but also the pleasure that we share wth the angels



v

UR INELLEC IN UNDERSANDING

IS EENDED O INFINIY. I22

( 12)Desire of the knowledge of truth is peculiar to human

nature( 1 24)

In its active nature the intellect is therefore naturallycapable of knowing everything that exists

( 1 25)

onder is the desire for knowledge( 126)

Our intellect in knowing anything is extended to inn-ity This ordering of the intellect to innity would bevain and senseless if there were no innite object of

knowledge( 1 27)

An eversoimperfect knowledge of most subme tngstme h eetn f te u ene atuthe human reason is unable perfectly to comprehend what

lies beyond its limits, nevertheless it acquires much perfec-tion for itself if it, at least in some way, perceives it by faith

( 1 28)The greatest kindness one can render to any man consistsin leading him om error to trut

( 1 29)The distinction between intelligent beings and those thathave no knowledge es in the fact that the latter have

4



e Human Wsdom of S omas 5

nohng bu her own for whle nellgen bengs havehe fors of oher hngs also, snce he mage of hehng known s n he knower Hence s clear ha he

naure of nonnellgen bengs s narrower and moreresrced, whe ha of nellgen bengs has greaerbreadh and power of coprehenson Hence he Ph-losopher says ha he soul s n a ceran anner hngs

0)

The os perfec ypes of bengs, such as nellecualbengs ake he os coplee reurn o her ownessences In knowng soehng ousde heselves, heysep ousde heselves n a ceran sense n so far as heyknow ha hey know, hey already begn o reurn o

heselves, for he ac of knowledge s dway beweenhe knower and he hng known Bu ha reurn s co-pleely acheved when hey know her own essencesHence every beng ha knows s own essence s sa d omake he mos perfec reurn o s essence

)To reurn o s own essence s nohng oher han havngndependen beng resng n sel

)The proper objec of he huan nellec when unedwh he body s naures acually exsng n corporealar

)Our naural knowledge can exend as far as can be ledby he hand hrough aeral hngs

( 1 4)Snce he senses are he rs source of our knowledge, folows ha al hngs upon whch we pass judgen arenecessary relaed o he senses n soe way



3 6 e Human Wsdom of S omas

(1 3 5)though the soul s more lke God than other creaturesare yet t cannot arrve at knowledge of ts own nature

so as to dstngush t om other natures except by wayof creatures whch can be known by the senses and omwhch our knowledge takes ts orgn

( 1 3 6)though by Revelaton we are elevated to the knowl-

edge of thngs that would othese reman unknown tous yet we are never rased so far as to know them n anyway other than through thngs that can be known by thesenses

( 1 3 7)

The senses are not deceved concernng ther properobject

( 3 8)Truth s n both the reason and the sensefacultes butnot n the same way It s n the reason as the result of the

act of knowledge and at the same tme as known by thereason It s known by the reason because the reasons reected on ts own act knowng not only ts act butalso ts relaton to realty In the sensefacultes how-ee ut s o te resut of er ac But s notn te sensefacutes as known by te senses Though thesensefacultes make true judgments on thngs yet theydo not know the truth by whch they make true judg-ments For though the senses know that they percevetngs yet tey do not know ter own nature an con-sequently te nature of ther act ts relaton to realty ants trut reman unknown by te senses

( 1 39)o sense organ s aware of tself or of ts operaton The



The Human Wisdom of S Thomas 7

eye neither sees itself, nor does it see that it sees But theintellect is aware of itself and of its act of knowing

( 1 40)

To judge ones own judgment this can be done only bythe reason, which reects on its own act and knows therelation between that upon which it judges and that bywhich it j udges Hence the root of all eedom les in thereason

( 1 4 1)The object of the natural appetite is in every case this

thing in so far as it is this thing. The object of the sensitiveappetite is always this thing in so far as it is agreeable andbrings pleasure for example, water not in so far as it is

water, but precisely as pleasing to the taste But theproper object of the will is the good itself, taken as suchIn the same way sense perception is distinguished omintellectual knowledge the apprehension of this colourdthing is proper to the senses, but the intellect knows the

very nature of colour itsel( 1 42)

The truth of the human intellect receives its directionand measurement om the essences of things For thetruth or falsity of an opinion depends on whether a thingis or is not

142AThe most perfect kind of order is found in things omthem is derived the order of our knowledge

( 1 4)The human inteect is measured by things so that mansthought is not true on its own account but is called truein virtue of its conform with things The ivineintellect, on the other hand, is the measure of things,



3 8 The Human Wsdom of S omas

since things are true to the extent in which they representthe divine intelect

( 1 44)

Created things are midway between Gods knowledgeand our knowledge, for we receive our knowledge omthings that are caused by Gods knowledge Hence just asthings that can be known are prior to our knowledge andare its measure, so is Gods knowledge the measure of

created things and prior to them( 1 45)

The word has naturay more conformity with the real-ity it expresses than with the person who speaks, eventhough it dwels in the speaker as in its subject

( 1 46)obody perceives himself to know except om the factthat he knows some object, because knowledge ofsome object is prior to knowledge of oneself as know-ing Hence the soul expressly attains to the perception

of itself only through that which it knows or per-ceives Our mind is unable to know itself in such away that it immediately apprehends itself, but it arrivesat knowledge of itself by the fact that it perceives othertins

( 1 47)It is necessary to say that the human soul knows atings in the eternal ideas as a our knowledge arisesom participation in them The intelectual ligt dwel-ing in us is noting else than a kind of participated im-age of te uncreated ght in wich the eternal ideas arecontained

( 1 48)Just as in that part of the soul adapted to active operation,



e Human Wsdom o S Thomas 9

the rst intuitive awareness of principles never errs, soinsight into the rst principles of knowledge never errsin that part of the soul which is disposed to speculative

reasong( 49)

A twofold relationship is found between the soul andreality One is when the real thing is itself in the soul inthe manner of the soul and not in its own mode the

other is when the soul is related to the real thing existingin its own mode of being hus a thing is the object ofthe soul in a double way One way is in so far as the thingis disposed or adapted to be in the soul, not according toits own mode of being, but in the manner of the soul

that is to say, in a spiritual way his is the idea of intelli-gibility in so far as it is knowable In the other way, a realthing is the object of the soul in as much as the soul isinclined to it and ordered to it according to the mode ofreal being existing in itsel his is the idea of desirability

in so far as it is desirable( )

owledge takes place in the degree in which the thingknown is in the knower, but love takes place in as muchas the lover is united with the real object of his loveHigher things exist in a nobler way in themselves than inow tng u, on o an, ow ing na nobler way in higher things than in themselves Henceknowledge of lower things is more valuable than love ofthem, but ov of ge tngs, and above a ov ofGod, s mor valuae tan knowedge

( 5 )Love of God s better than knowledge of him on theother hand, knowledge of corporeal things is better than



The Human Wisdom o S. omas

love of them Nevertheless, considered in itself, the intel-lect is nobler than the will

( 52)

Knowledge is perfected by the thing known becongone with the knower in its image Love, however, causesthe very thing itself that is loved to become one with thelover in a certain sense Hence love has more unitivepower than knowledge

( 5 3)Union belongs to love in so far as the loving desire isrelated in aection to the thing loved as to itself or some-thing belonging to itself

( 5)

ntellectual activity is made perfect in that intelligiblethings are in the intellect according to its own propermode of being Hence the inellect is not injured but ismade perfect by things The action of the will, on theother hand, consists in movement towards the thing it

self, so that in love the soul is fused together with thething loved Hence the soul receives some blesh whenit clings to things in an inordinate way

( )There is the following ditincin eween the intllecand the will Knowledge is caused by the fact that thething known is in a certain way in the knower The will,however, does not act in the same way, ut contrariwise ,according as the will is related to the actual thing desired,in so far as the one who wills seeks something in whichhe nds satisfaction For this reason good and evil, whichare concerned with the will, are in things ut truth anderror, which are concerned with the intellect, are in themind that knows



The Human Wisdom o S Thomas

56)Love s sad to transform the lover nto the loved becauseby love the lover s moved towards the thng loved But

knowledge creates keness n so far as an mage of thethng known arses n the knower

5 7)Truth and goodness nclude one another The truth ssomethng good othese t would not be worth desr-

ng and the good s true othese t would not bentegble

5 8)Snce goodness and truth are convertble n realty t fol-lows that the good s known by the mnd as true just as

truth s desred by the was good 59)

Truth s the good of the ntellect for ths reason everyntellect s called good because t knows truth

{ 6 )

The wwould never desre knowledge unless the ntel-lect rst of all comprehended knowledge tself as some-thng good

6 )The good consdered as true s related to the reasonbefore t s related to the was somethng worth desr-mg.

{ 62)The ntellect s n tself pror to the w because theobject of the wll s a good that s known yet the w spror n acton and n movement

{ 63)Every act of the wll arses om an act of the ntellectevertheless one partcular act of the wll s pror to a



2 The Human Wisdom of S omas

particular act of the inteect for the wi tends towardsthe nal act of the intelect which is beatitude

{ 1 6)

The wil is not a supreme rule but is a rule receiving itsdirection om elsewhere because it is directed by thereason and intelect not only in us but also in God n usintellect and will are reay distinct and hence the wiland the rectitude of the wil are also not the same but in

God intellect and wil are the same in reality and hencethe rectitude of his wil is also identical with his wilitself

{ 1 65)n a certain sense the wil always obeys itself namely

so that man in some way always wils that which hewishes to will n one sense however it does not alwaysobey itself namely when one wills imperfectly andineectively what he wished to wil perfectly and eec-tively

{ 1 66)The perfection of goodness is more widespread than thatof truth lbeings strive after the good but not alknow the truth

{6 It would seem that God cannot be loved directly in thislife for one cannot love what one does not know" asugustine says But we do not know God directly in thislife we see him through a glass darkly" Cor Hence we do not love him directlyTo this we must

reply lthough one cannot love what one does notknow yet the order of knowledge need not necessarilybe the same as that of love Love is the term or end ofknowledge hence it can begin at once where knowledge



he uman Wisdom o S homas 43

ceases namely in the thing itself that is known throughanother thing

68)

he intelect knows not ony for itself but also for al thepowers of the soul he wil wils not ony for itself butalso for al the powers of the soul

69)Man wils good by natural necessity

7)he proper object of love is the good he good isthe proper cause of love

7 )Everything that acts whatever it may be performs every

action om some kind of love 72)

Just as natural movement and rest spring om the form ofa thing so every aection of the soul has its origin inlove

73)Love is the rst movement of the wi and every facultyof desire

74)In us love receives its order om virtue

7 5)e rst act o te wi oes not est in virtue o tecommand of the reason but in virtue of a natural instinctor some higher cause



ORALIY PSUPPOSES NAURE

1 77)Natural love resides not only in the powers of the vegeta-tive soul but also in all the powers of the soul and in every

part of the body, and universally in all things ! 78)

The rst source to which every act of the will is reducedis that which is willed naturally by man

1 79)

Just as natural knowledge is always true, so is natural lovealways good, since it is nothing other than a natural urgeimplanted by the author of nature Hence, to say that anatural inclination is wrong is to oer an insult to thecreator of nature

( 8 )In the same way as the will is founded on nature, every-thing that is desired has its origin and foundation intn tat natra re

( 8 )

The right order of things is in harmony with the order ofnature, for natural things are ordered to their end without any error

!82)Reason imitates nature

8 3)The principles of reason are thoe that are confored tonature



The Human Wisdom o S Thomas 5

8)It is certain that what the reason is naturaly endowedwith is true in the highest degree so much so that it is

not even possibe to think it can be fase 8 5)

Since the wil is naturaly good, its natura act is alwaysgood As man wils his own happiness naturaly, the natu-ral act of the wil is understood to be life and beatitude If

we are referring to mora good, then the wil consideredin itself is neither good nor bad, but is in potency to goodand evil

86)

In the sphere of intelectua knowledge and voluntaryaction, what is natural comes rst, and from it al else isderived From the knowledge of naturaly known rstprinciples is derived the knowedge of that which folowsom them, and om the fact that one wils the end natu-

raly perceived is derived the choice of the means leadingto the end

87)Action conformabe to art and reason must be uniformwith that which is according to nature and instituted by

the divine reason(r 88

A natura desire cannot possibly be vain and senseess

89)Nature is presupposed by al the virtues, those bestowed

gratuitously by God as wel as those that are acquired 9)

To become ike nature by consenting to the reason is theproperty of those virtues dweling in the appetite



6 e Human Wsdom of S. omas

1 9 1)Just as the order of right reason takes its origin om man,so the order of nature is om God himself

1 92)Natural inclinations dwell in things by the action of God,who moves all things Hence it is impossible that thenatural tendency of any kind of being should be directedto something that is evil in itsel But the natural urge to

carnal intercourse resides in perfect animals It istherefore impossible that carnal intercourse should beevil in itsel

1 93)Even in the state of innocence there would have been

generation of ospring for the multiplication of the hu-man race ; otheise man's sin would have been necessaryin order that so great a good should arise from it

1 9)Perhaps you may say If the Word has assumed a living

body, why then did the Evangelist make no mention ofthe spiritual soul but only of the esh, when he says,The Word was made esh"? To this I answer the Evan-gelist did this rstly in order to manifest the reaty of theIncarnation aainst the anichees, ho sai the ord

did not take on rea esh since it is not tting that theword of the good God should take on esh, which theythemselves called a creature of the dev

1 95)Since that which is according to nature is ordered by the

divine reason, which ought to be iitated by human rea-son, hence sin and evi is whatever is done by humanjudgment contrary to the order which is comonlyfound in natural things



e Human Wisdom of St. omas 47

!9)

Everything that opposes a natural inclination is sinful be-

cause it is contrary to the law of nature.

97)Sin is opposed to the natural inclination.

98)

Since sin is contrary to nature ..to seek the satisfaction

of a natural desire is not sinl if nothing inordinate isadded to it.

99)

The virtues perfect us so that we follow our natural incl

nations in a tting manner

200)The natural inclnation is the beginng of virtue

20)

Athough the virtues in their perfect state do not have

their origin in nature, yet they cause an inclination to

that which is according to nature, that is to say, that which is according to the order of reason.

202)

The submission of the lower powers of the soul to reason

comes om nature, but they are not actually and con

tinually subject by their nature(0)

The natural inclnation to the good of virtue is indeed a

beginning of virtue, but it is not perfect virtue Themore perfect such an incnation, the more dangerouscan it be, if it is not uted to right reason .. just as

when a race horse is blind, the more impetuously itdashes foard, the more violently does it colde withsome object and the more grievousl is it injured.



8 e Human Wisdom o S omas

2)There can be a natural inclination to the acts of a singlevirtue but not to the acts of a the virtues, because the

natural readiness by which a man is inclined to one virtueat the same time causes an inclination to the contrary ofanother virtue He who happens to have a natural predis-position to fortitude, which is manifested in the prosecu-tion of a dicult end, is less disposed to meekness, which

consists in mastering the passions of the irascible powers ( )

Every sin is based on a natural desire Since man naturallydesires likeness to God, in so far as all naturally desiredgoodness is an image of the divine goodness, hence Au

gustine says, when speaking to God: The soul comitsadulteryin sinningwhen it turns aside om Theeand seks outside Thee those things that it can nd pureand clear only when it returns to Thee"



EASON IS MAN'S NAURE. ENCE WHAEVER IS

CONRARY O REASON IS CONRARY

O HUMAN NAURE.

27)What is ordered according to reason is according to human nature

{268)The good of man precisely as man consists in this: that

the reason should be perfect in the knowledge of truthand that the subordinate aections should be reulated inaccordance with the rue of reason For man's humannature belongs to him from the fact that he has the powerof reason

29)The rule of the human will is twofod One is imediateand homogeneous namely the human reason The otheris the supreme rule namely the eternal law which is , soto speak God's reason

2 1)The human will can be protected om sin only when thereason is preserved om ignorance and error

2 1 1)Moral virtue perfects the appetitive faculty of man by

directing t towards the good of the reason212)

Human nature in the strict sense consists m being

9



The Human Wisdom o St. omas 5

222)

Considered in itself the wil that departs om the reason

is always bad, no matter whether it is right or wrong.

22 )Athough a man is not superior to himself, yet the one,

by whose command he has nowledge, is superior to

him; thus man is bound by his own conscience.

224)

When the reason proposes something to us as God's command, then, even if it is in error, to despise the comand

of the reason is the same as despising God's comand.

225)

Conscience is said to be the law of our minds because it

is the verdict of the reason, deduced from the law ofnature

22)

Man himself does not create the law; but through his

nowledge, by which he perceives the law created by

someone else, he is bound to obey the la22)

To compare the oblgation of conscience with the obli-

gation due to the command of a superior is the same as

comparing the obligation of a divine command with the

obligation of a superior's command Since a divine com-mand inds even against te order o a superior and in ahigher way, the obligation of conscience is thus higher

than the obligation of a superiors command, and theconscience w bind even i it conicts with te com

mand o a superior



THE DESIRE OF HE LAS END

IS NO AMONG HOSE HINGS OVER WHICH

WE HAVE MASERY

(229)

Wherever there is inteectual knowledge, there is alsofree will

(23 0)He who acts against his wi has no freedom of action,but he can truly have ee w

(23 )The nature of ee wi is not the ability to choose evil;but the choice of evil is a consequence of free will, in sofar as the latter resides in a created nature that is capableof defect

(23 2)We are masters of our actions in as much as we are able tochoose this or that Choice, however, is not concernedwt te ed, ut oy wt te meas eadg to teend Hence desire of the last end is not among those

things over which we have mastery(23 3)

The wnecessarily desires its last end so that it is unablenot to desire it; but it does not necessarily desire any ofthe means leading to the end

(234)Anything towards whic we strive naturaly is ot subjectto free will

5 2



e Human Wisdom o S Thomas 5

(2 5)Every appettve ature must ecessarily desire peacesice it aways strives to arrive peacefuy ad without

hidrace at that towards which it s desire goes out (2 6)

Whoever strives towards good, by this very fact also de-sires beauty I t is the same desire that is directed to-wards goodess, beauty ad peace

(2 7)The ed is last i executio but rst i the itetio ofthe reaso

(2 8)Ma ec essarily desires everythig o accout of the last

ed(29)

Ma is ot caed simply good whe he is good i somepart oly, but whe he s good i his etirety; but thelatter comes about throug the goodess of the will

(240)A good ma is ot oe who has a good iteect but oewho has a good wl

(24 )A good wl makes a ma absolutely good

(242)e ma wo as a goo s calle sp a gooma

(24)Rightess of itetio aloe does ot make the wlcompletely good

244)Fro the fact that oe ws the ed, the reaso deter-mies o the meas leadig to the ed



5 e Human Wsdom of St. omas

(25)Whenever a colour is seen, light is perceived at the sametime but one can see light without perceiving colour In

the same way, whenever the means to an end are wiled,the end is willed at the same time but the converse doesnot hold good

The theory o f light which S t . Thomas inherited from Aristoe isnow known to be quite erroneous. What he means by the words, "onecn see ligh wiho perceiving color, is that thogh the "diaphanos-i.e., air, ether, or atmospheris not visible in itself as colorsare, yet it may be said to be seen in the same sense as we say we see

darkness.



THE HAPPINESS OF HE ACI LIFE LIES IN HE

ACION OF PRUDENCE BY WHICH MAN RULESHIMSELF AND OHERS

(247)

Three thigs are ecessary for the salvatio of ma: tokow what he ought to beeve, to kow what he oughtto desire, ad to kow what he ought to do

(248)The wi is directed to the ed, but choice to that which

eads to the ed(249)

A ma does ot take couse with himsef over the ed,but oy over the meas eadig to the ed

(2 0)

To order is the task of the wise ma(2 1)

The ame of wise ma simpy i itsef is reserved oyfor him whose cosideratio is directed to the ed of theuiverse, which is aso the source of a thigs

5Eve though kowedge of uiversals is rst i certaity,yet it does ot have rst pace i the sphere of operatio;that beogs rather to kowedge of particuars , s ice ac-tio s cocered wth particuar thigs

(5)It is ot the task of prudece to cocer itsef with themost subime thigs, which are cosidered by wisdom



56 e Human Wisdom of St. Thomas

Prudece rules the thigs that are ordered to wisdom,amely, the meas by which me ought to arrive at wisdom I this way prudece is the servat of wisdom

(2 54)Prudece cosiders the ways by which we arrive ateatitude: but wisdom cosiders the very object ofeatitude

(2 5 5)

Ma already possesses some share i true beatitude ac-cordig to the measure i which he studies wisdom

(256)y wisdom itself oe is led to the everlastig kigdomis :

(257)Moral virtue presupposes kowledge

(25 8)Sice practical kowledge belogs to prudece, it ismore atural to ma tha pure speculative kowledge.

(2 59)Huma virtue is perfectio i a huma way Ma is otable to comprehed the truth of thigs with certaity ia simple ituitio, especially those thigs that are relatedto actio ad cotget

(260)The happiess of the cotemplative life lies i othigelse but the perfect cosideratio of the highest truth;but the happiess of the active life lies i the act of prudece, through which ma rules himself ad others

(26 1)The more cotemplatio excels the active life, themore servce seems to be doe for God by oe who hasto put up with a loss of his beloved cotemplatio i



The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas 57

order to serve the salvatio of his eighbour for Godssake

(262)

A precious pearl is more valuable tha bread; but i thecase of huger bread would be preferred to it

(26)He who is dyig of huger must be fed rather thataught sice for oe i eed it is better to iherit

wealth tha to be a phiosopher" Aristotle althoughthe latter i itself is certaily of higher value

(264)To be c ed from the cotemplative to the active lfe isot a loss but a gai

(265)l the virtues of the appetitive part of ma which arec ed the moral virtues i so far as they are virtues arecaused by prudece

(266)

Whe thigs are lower tha the oe who kows themthe to kow them is superior to wilg what is directedtowards them because the thigs are i a higher way ithe itelect tha i themselvessice everythig that isi somethig else is i it i the maer of that thig i

which it is But whe thigs are higher tha the oe whokow te te te w ae ie ta te mis able to reach Thus it comes about that i the spere ofmoral actio which is lower tha ma himself a itel-lectual virtue gives their form to the moral virtuesasprudece to the other moral virtues I the sphere of thetheological virtues however which are directed towarsGod harity wic is a virtue of the wil gives its formto faith which is a itelectua virtue



5 8 e uman Wisdom of St. omas

(267)To prudece belogs the executio of precepts aboutthe acts of justice cotaied i the law

(268)The act of the sesitive desire is imperfect uless reasois perfected by prudece, o matter what dispositio togood may dwell i the appetitive faculty Without pru-dece, therefore, there caot be disciplie, or modera

tio, or ay moral virtue(269)

Prudece is wisdom i huma aairs, but ot wisdomabsolutely i itself Prudece is directed to huma good,but ma is ot the highest good i the sphere of existigbeigs

(270)lmoral virtue must be prudet

(27 1)

l sis are opposed to prudece, just as virtues areruled by prudece

(272)Prudece helps all the other virtues ad acts i them all

(27)

I geeral, ma ca receive cousel om aother regard-ig that which is to be doe; but, i the very act itself,the preservatio of his judgmet i udisturbed rectitudeagaist the iuece of the passios arises oly om theuerrig rule of prudece, without which there ca be

o virtue74

I matters of prudece obody is selfsuciet i thigs



e Human Wisdom of St omas 5 9

(275)Those who eed to be guided by the advice of aother,if they are i a state of grace, at least kow how to advise

themselves by the fact that they seek the advice of some-oe else ad are able to distiguish good ad bad cousel

(276)I huma activity a special d of prudece is foudwherever there is a special kid of domiatio ad

orderig(277)

A ma caot be sucietly prudet i the domai of asigle virtue uless he is prudet i thigs

(278)

Whe ma acts agaist ay virtue he acts agaist pru-dece, without which there caot be ay moral virtue

(279)Prudece is ustrated chiey by itemperace Hece the vices opposed to prudece arise mostly om

impurity



ORAL VIRUE DOES NO ECLUDE

HE PASSIONS.

(28 !)

The passios are i themselves either good or badsice i ma good ad evil are determied accordig tothe reaso. Hece the passios cosidered i themselvesca be good as well as evil accordig as they ca corre-spod with the reaso or be cotrary to it

(282)What is good is determied for every beig accordigto the coditio of its ature Hece good huma ac-tio is accompaied by passio ad the service of thebody.

(28 )Sice huma ature is made up of body ad soul of aitellectual ad a sesitive part huma good demadsthat ma should surreder himself i his totality to vir-tue; that is to say both i his itellectual ad sesitive

part ad with his body Hece for huma virtue it isecessary that the desire for just vegeace should resideot oly i the ratioal part of the soul but also i thesesitive part ad i the body ad that the body shouldbe moved to serve virtue.

{284Hece it is true that o ac fom passon lesses both praisead blame but o ac wh passon ca icrease both.

6



The Human Wisdom of St omas 6

(28 5)It is ot cotrary to the idea of virtue that the deliberatioof the reaso should be suspeded i the carryig out of

that which has already bee cosidered by the reaso(286)

He who is agry or afraid is ot praised or blamed butoy he who while i this state behaves either properlyor ot

(287)There are four basic passios of the soulSadess JoyHope ad Fear

(28 8)Like ature passio also drives itself violetly to oe

detered thig(289)

Of a the passios sadess causes the most iury to thesoul

(290)

Every virtue by which a passio s ordered also gvesorder to the body

(29 )Ager it is true i some way upsets the reaso eve ifit foows a ratioal judgmet but it helps the promptitude of actio

292Ager like other movemets of the sesitive appetiteis useful from the fact that whe agry a ma does morereadily what reaso commads Otherwise the sesitive

Though ang coming aft a ationa judgmnt usts th asonnvthss it is usfu bcaus it givs gat omtitud in cayingout th commands of th ason Coming bfo a judgmnt howvangr is bad as it maks a tu ju dgmnt amost imossib



62 The Human Wisdom of St. omas

appetite i ma would be i vai, whereas it remais truethat ature makes othig i vai

(293)

Sice hatred wills ev to aother precisely as ev, itis ot satised with ay degree of ev, sice what is de-sired for its ow sake is desired without ay limit, as thePhilosopher says Ager, however, ws evil oly u-der the aspect of just vegeace; hece whe the ev

iicted exceeds the easure of justice i the opiio ofthe oe who is agry, the he becomes merciful

(294)Despair, like hope, presupposes desire either hope ordespair is directed towards aythig that does ot move

our desire(295)

Fear is ever without hope i a happy result, which ca-ot exist i ay way i the damed, i whom there catherefore be o fear

(296) fear arises om the love of somethig

(297)Fear makes me more deliberative tha hope



THROUGH VIRUE MAN IS ORDERED O HE

UMOS LIMI OF HIS CAPACIY.

(299)Sin consists in the loss of order in the soul just as sickness

consists in disorder of the body(00)

Inordinate love of self is the cause of all sin

(0)l sin arises om some ignorance

( 02)Inordinate fear is included in every sin; the miser fears theloss of money the intemperate man the loss of pleasure

(0)Spiritual sins contain a greater malice than those of the

esh(04)

He who sins turns aside om that in which the idea ofthe last end is truly found; but as a matter of fact he doesnot cease to intend the last end which however he seeks

won n ohe hn(05)

The goo d for everything is what is tting to it accordingto its form; evil is that which does not correspond to theorder of its form

(06)Sin is nothing other than faling away om the goodwhich is tting to ones nature



64 e Human Wisdom of St Thomas

(307)Virtue is called the limit of potetiality because itcauses a icliatio to the highest act that a faculty ca

perform(308)

The ature of virtue demads that it should look up tothe last ed



LEASURE PERFECS OPERAION JUS AS

BEAUY PERFECS YOUH

( )l tigs desire peasure i te same way as tey desire

goodess; but tey strive towards peasure o accout ofgood ad ot e converso. It does ot tereby foow tatpeasure is te greatest good or tat it is good i itsef; butevery pleasure does sprig from some good ad somepleasure sprigs from tat wic is te igest good ad

good i itse( )

Te fact tat cdre ad aimas seek pleasure does otsow tat tey are altogeter wicked: i tem te aturaimpulse acts from God wo moves tem to act accord-

ig to tat impuse( 2)

Peasure is a kid of perfectio of operatio as te Pi-losoper as made cear; it perfects operatio just asbeauty perfects yout

3 I 3Te desire strives towards good i te same way as itstrives towards te ejoymet of good wic is pea-sure Tus as te desire is moved to actio trougstrivig towards good so aso troug strivig towards

peasure( )

Te more perfect actio causes more perect peasure

6 5



66 e Human Wisdom of St. omas

(3 5) so far as it is loved, everythig becomes a source ofpleasure

(3 6)l pleasure is uiform i that it meas the restig isome good, ad i this respect it ca be a rule ad mea-sure of actio He whose will comes to rest i a actualgood is himself good, whe he whose will comes to rest

i evil is himself ev(3 7)

Good is aspired to ad pleasure is desired for the samereaso: this reaso is othig other tha the satisfactioof the appetite i good

(3 8)The idea of joy is distiguished om that of pleasurePleasure arises om a real uio with some good thigJoy, however, does ot require this; the mere satisfactioof the will is suciet for the idea of joy

(3 9)Pleasure is ot good i the highest degree om the factthat it is pleasure, but because it is perfect rest i a sub-lime good

)Pleasure which sprigs om cotemplatio is opposedby o sadess; or is sadess joied to itexcept i aaccidetal way

(3 2)There is a double goodess commo to pleasure ad sad-

ess; true judgmet o good ad evil as well as the dueoe o he w whh aeps goo a rejects evThus it is clear that pai ad sadess there is somegood the lesseig o which ca make them less good



e Human Wisdom of St. omas 7

themselves But in every pleasure there is not something

evil through whose removal the pleasure itself an be

ome better. Hene it is in fat possible that some plea

sure an be the highest good of man ...but sadnessannot be the greatest human evil



RACE AN IRUE IMIAE HE

ORER OF NAURE WHICH IS INSIUE BY

HE IINE WISOM.

(3 23)

The act of the iteect is accomplished by the thigkow beig i the kower; thus the exceece of theitellectual act is determied accordig to the degree ofthe itellect The act of the wi, ad of every appetitivefaculty, is perfected i the icliatio of the oe who

desires to the actual thig desired, as to its ed; hecethe digity of the act of the appetite is determied iaccordace with the actual thig which is the object ofthis act A thig iferior to the soul is i the soul i aobler way tha i itself, for every thig is i aother i

the maer of that i which it is A thig higher thathe soul, however, is i a obler way i itself, tha i thesoul Hece, with regard to what is iferior to us,kowledge is obler ha love, for which reaso hePhilosopher places the itellectual virtues higher tha

the moral virtues But with regard to what is above us,especially God, love is higher tha kowledge Hececharity excels faith

(324)The disciplie ad moderatio of the miser, which re-

strai the desire for itemperace because it may costmoey, are ot true virtue There ca be o truevirtue without charity

6 8



The Human Wisdom of t Thomas 69

( 2 5)Although charity is ecessary for salvatio, it is ot ec-essary to kow that oe has charity rather it is geerally

more useful ot to kow 26)

As it is good to love a fried i so far as he is a ied, soit is bad to love a eemy i so far as he is a eemy butit is good to love a eemy is so far as he is a creature of

God To love a fried as a ied, ad a eemy as aeemy, would be a cotradictio but it is o cotradic-tio to love both fried ad eemy i so far as both arecreatures of God

( 27)

To love a eemy is higher tha to love oly a ied,sice it shows greater love of God But if we cosiderboth acts i themselves, it is better to love a iedtha a eemy, ad it is better to love God tha a friedThe diculty ivolved i lovig a eemy does ot

detere the ature of merit, except i as much as itmaifests the perfectio of ove which overcomes thisdiculty Hece, if love were so perfect that it wouldcompletely overcome the diculty, it would be still moremeritorious

{3 2 8) I te idea o merit ad virtue te good is more valualetha the eort Hece, ot all that is dicult is also meri-torious but it must be dicult i such a way that it is atte same time good i a igher way

( 29)The ature o virtue ies i good more tha i diculty

( 0)The divie law so orders me to each other that each oe



70 The Hman Wisom o St. Thomas

preserves his order This meas that me have peace witheach other for peace betwee me as Augustie says isothig other tha the harmoy of order

(3 3 )The idea of peace icludes the idea of cocord ad addssomethig rther Wherever there is peace there isalso cocord; but wherever cocord rules there is otalways peace if peace is uderstood at i its proper

sese Cocord implies oe commo itetioamog may people; but peace i additio to this commo purpose also implies a uity of desire i each idi-vidual Peace is opposed by a twofold dissesio; thedissesio of me with themselves ad the dissesio

betwee oe aother Oly the secod kid of disse-sio opposes cocord

(3 3 )To be at peace bets love; but to make peace is the workof orderig wisdom

(3 3 2)A father aturay loves his so more tha brothers loveeach other although the so does ot love his father asmuch as he is loved by him

(3 3 3)The love with which oe loves oeself icludes the loveof wife ad child more tha the love of father

(3 3 4)

The coo good is the oblest amog huma goods;

but the divie goodess surpasses huma good(3 3 )

Ma caot possibly be good uless he stads i the rightrelatio to the commo good



The Human Wisdom of S Thomas 7

( 6)The higher virtues are i a coser reatio to the comogood But justice ad fortitude are more closely related

tha temperace to the commo good( 7)

The good of the whoe is higher tha the particular goodof a idividual if both are uderstood as sprigig omthe same source But the good of a sige grace is higher

tha the atural good of the whoe uiverse( 8)

Just as the right use of power i ruig over may people isa good i the highest degree so is its misuse i the highestdegree evil Thus power ca be tured ito good or evil

( 9)Gods power is his goodess; hece he ca oly use hispower i a good way But this is ot so i the case of maHece it is ot suciet for beatitude that ma shouldbecome ke to God i power uess he becomes like to

him i goodess also(40)

Every law is ordered to the commo salvatio of ma-kid ad it is i virtue of tis quality that it possesses theature ad bidig force of aw I so far as it fails i thisit has o power of obigatio

4 og the virtues oy justice icludes the idea of duty;hece mora virtue is determiabe by law i the degreei which it is reated to justice

( 42)The task of the huma awgiver is to rue exteral actiosoly To God aoe wo is the divie awgiver beogsthe rug of the iterior movemets of the will



72 Th Human Wdm f St ma

343)Huma law sets up o precepts except about justice; if itprescribes the acts of other virtues, it does so oly i so

far as these assume the ature of justice344)

Justice without mercy caot be perfect virtue

345)Justice without mercy is cruelt; mercy without justice isthe mother of laxit

346)Mercy does ot cacel out justice; it is rather, i a ma-er of speakig, the pleitude of justice

347)The old ad the wise, who thik that evil ca also hap-pe to themselves, kewise the feeble ad the fearfulare more merciful Those, o the cotrary, who thikthemselves to be happy, ad so strog that o evil ca

happe to them, are ot so easily merciful Thus weak-ess is always a foudatio of mercy

348)mog the moral virtues the activit of right reasoappears more particularl i justice The wrog use of

the reaso is therefore most apparet i sis agaistjustice

349)The good of the reaso lies i truth as its proper objectad i justice as its proper eect

3 )The praise o fortitude i a certai sese depeds o jus

This alies only to man God's mercy always arises om his love.



e Human Wisdom of omas 7

tice Hece Ambose sas Fotitude without justice isthe matte fom which evi aises"

( 5 1)

To sue death is ot to be paised fo its ow sake butoly because of it s ode to some good

( 5)Those who do bave deeds fo the sake of wody goyae ot tuy bave

( 5 )It ca happe that a ma may fea death ess tha heought

( 54)Fotitude appeas to exce amog the vitues Vitue is

coceed with thigs dicut ad good But fotitudeis coceed with dicut; hece it is the geatest of thevitues To this we must ep the idea of vitue cosistsi good athe tha dicut The geatess of a vitue istheefoe to be measued accodig to the idea of good

athe tha that of dicut( 5 5)

The boldest peope ae those who ae ighty elated todivie thigs

( 5 6)The acts of fotitude i batte ae odeed to victoy adpeace; o it woud e oois to wage wa oy o tsow sake

( 5 7)Fotitude has two actsto attack ad to hod oes goud

( 5 8)The most specia act of fotitude moe peculia to it thaattackig is to sustai that is to say to stad immovablei the ace of dage



he Human Wsom of St. Thomas

(359)Edurace truly implies a suerig attitude of thebody, but it also implies a act of the soul that with a

its stregth perseveres i good; it follows om this thatthe soul does ot yield to bodily passio already attack-ig it

(3 60)Edurace is more dicult tha attackig, ad this for

three reasos Firstly, edurace seems to mea that oestads fast agaist a stroger assailat, while oe who at-tacks goes forward with superior stregth; but it is moredicult to ght agaist a stroger tha a weaker oppo-et Secodly, edurace perceives dager already pres

et, while for the oe who attacks it is still i the future;but it is more dicult to be umoved by the presettha by the future Thirdly, edurace implies duratioi time, while oe ca attack with a sudde impulse;but it is more dicult to remai umoved for a log

time tha to y at some dicult object with a suddemovemet

(36 1)A brave ma is also patiet

362Patiece is icluded i fortitude, for the essetial quatyof patiece is also possessed by the brave, amely, otbeig upset by threateig evil Fortitude, however, addssomethig further, amely, to attack the threateig evilwhe ecessary

(3 63)A ma is caed patiet ot because he shus evil butbecause he edures a preset evil i a hoourable fash-io; that is to say, he is ot made uduly sad by it



e Human Wisdom of St Thomas 7

(64)og the virtues temperace i particular lays claim toa special beauty ad ugliess is most apparet i sis of

itemperace( 6)

There is somethig shameful about all si but especi yabout the si of itemperace

( 66)Itemperace is most opposed to the purity ad beautyof ma

( 67)Rght reaso makes oe exercise abstiece n a ttng

way, amely with cheerless of mid ad for a ttngend, amely for the glory of God ad ot for the gloricatio of oeself

( 68)l worldly thigs ca be reduced to three: hoour

wealth ad happiess( 69)

Abstiece om thigs which brig pleasure is ttigfor those who have udertake the life of cotempla-tio ad the passig o of spiritual good to others i a

kd of spiritual geeratio but it is ot ttig to thosewose task it is to do bodil work ad serve psicalgeeratio

( 70)If a ma deliberately abstais from wie to such a extet

that he does serious harm to his ature he wil ot beee om blame

7 1 Recreatio is ecessary to lead a huma life



76 h Human Wsdom of S homas

(3 72)The result of impurity is a harmful duplicity of mid

(373)

The virtue of chastity prepares ma best for cotempla-tio

(3 74)He who gives way to ager is less worthy of blame thahe who yields to desire for the latter is less deprived of

reaso(3 75)

Sos imtate their fathers more i sis of ager tha isis of desire

(376)

Meekess above all makes me masters of themselves(377)

Pride extiguishes all the virtues ad destroys all thepowers of the soul sice its rule exteds to them all

{3 78)

The skilful doctor puts up with his patiet beig aictedby a lesser illess i order that he may recover from aserious disorder; i the same way the gravity of sis ofpride is show by the fact that God allows ma to fallo oer orer o a ro pre

(3 79May people take pride eve i their humility

{3 80)I a certai sese humility is mas readiess to approachpiritual a vie thigs

(3 8 1 Humlity makes ma capable of kowig God

(3 82)Humlity prepares the way for wisdom



The uman dom of S Thoma 77

( 8 )Two thigs ca be cosidered i ma; what is of God adwhat is of ma I view of this every ma must sub-

mit what is of ma i himsef to what is of God i hiseighbour But humility does ot demad that a mashoud submit what is of God i himsef to that whichseems to be of God i aother I the same wayhumility does ot demad that a ma shoud submit

what is of himsef to that wch is of ma i aother( 84)

Pusiaimity ca also sprig om pride

( 8 )To act deceitfuy is a sig of pusiaimity but a proud

ma is ope ad frak i a thigs( 86)

The ambitious are easiy made jeaous I ike maer thefaithearted are jealous, as they cosider everythig tobe importat, ad whatever good fals to someoe else

they believe to be a ufair advatage



THE HEOOGIAN CONSIDERS HUMAN ACIONS

IN SO FAR AS HROUGH HEM MAN IS ORDERED

O BEAIUDE

(3 8 8)

The last ed of huma life is beatitude(3 89)

A ma is caed a waarer because he is strivig towardsbeatitude but he is caed a "comprehensor whe he hasalready reached beatitude

(3 90)Strivig towards beatitude is the same as strivig towardsthe satisfactio of the will

(3 9 )Happiess is a good proper to huma beigs Aimals

ca oly be caed happy by a misuse of laguage(3 92)

Eve though moey is merely useful, yet it has a certairesemblace to happiess because it possesses he charac-ter of uiversality, sice all thigs obey moey Eccles

: . (393)

I perfect beatitude the whole ma is made perfect,which meas that perfectio overows from the higherto the lower part of his ature I the imperfect beatitude

For the mser one who makes money the last end of human life allthings may be said to obey money St Thomas is here referring to the sinof avarice



Human Wsdom of St omas 8

(409)The a happiess ad beatitude of ay iteectual be-ig is to kow God

(4 )Purity makes the eye t for cear visio; so also the visioof God is promised to the pure of heart

(4 )The creature is darkess compared with the exceece of

the divie ight Hece created kowedge which is derived om the power of created beig is caled eveningkowedge

(4 2)Created thigs i themseves do ot ead away om God

but towards him; for the ivisibe thigs of God areceary see beig uderstood by the thigs that aremade" Rom : 20) . But the fact that they ead us awayom God arises om the faut of those who use themfooishy Hece it is said: Creatures are made ito a

sare to the feet of the uwise" Wis 4: But eve ithe fact that creatures ead us away om God i this waythere is evidece that they have their beig om God forthey woud ot be abe to ead the uwise away fromGod except by eticig them by the good that they pos

sess om God{4

It is quite ceary a false opiio to say that with regard tothe truth of faith it is competey idieret what oethiks about created thigs provided oe has the rightopiio about God; a error about creatures reacts i afalse kowedge of God

(4 4)The ed ad utimate perfectio of the huma sou is to



82 e Human Wisom o St omas

trasced the whole order of created thigs throughkowledge ad love ad to advace to the rst causewhich is God

(4 5)The ed which the itellectual creature reaches by itsow activity is the complete actualisatio of the itellecti relatio to all itelligible thigs lyig withi its ca-pacity i this the itellect becomes most like to God

(4 )though the huma itellect ca kow oy a littleabout divie thigs yet i that kowledge it ds its de-sire love ad happiess more completely tha i themost perfect kowledge it ca have of lower thigs .

(4 6)l beigs aturally strive towards Godot explicitlybut implicitly.

(4 7)though the soul is led to God thrugh the itellect

more tha through the love of the will yet the move-met of love reaches him more perfectly tha the itel-lect does

(4 8)Ma approaches earer to Go through love tha

through his reaso because i love ma does ot acthimself but is i a maer of speag draw earer byGod himself

(4 9)othig lies dway betwee our iteect ad Go ei-

ther by way of eciet causalitysice our ds areirectly create a sactie y Goor y way ofsome oj ect causig eatitudesice the soul is eatieby ejoyig Go himself



e Human Wisdom of St Thomas 8

420)

Love, which is an act of the appetitive faculty, even in ths

life tends primarily to God and om him passes on to

other things; according to this, charity loves God directlybut other things through the mediation of God In

nowledge however the converse is true, since we nowGod through other things, either as cause through eects

or by way of eminence or negation

42 1 )It can well happen that one who is not in charity lovesone created thing more than God, another equay with

God and another less than God But it is impossible

for one to love a creature equally with God and at the

same time love nothing more than God, because the lastend of the human will must necessarily be one singlething

442)

Since everything is worth loving in so far as it is good,

God is innitely worth loving since his goodness is innite But no creature can love innitely, since no nite

power can be innitely in act Hence God alone can love

himself in the most perfect way, since his power of loving

is as great as his goodness

42 )

e reason wy e are cae wayarers s becase e arestriving towards God, who is our last end and beatitude

In this life we advance by cong nearer to God, not wit bodily steps but trough the aection of the heartThis approach, however is made by charity because by itthe mnd is unied with God

424)

Man is united with God through his will



8 Te Human Wism St Tmas

(2 5)The love of God has the power of uniting things: it reduces human aections from many to one Love of

self on the other hand divides up human aections anddiversies them

(426)Since every creature according to its nature naturallybelongs to God it follows that both angel and man natu

rally love God more than themselves and before themselves Everything in its own way naturally loves Godmore than itself

(427)Hope leads to love in so far as the hope of getting some

good om God leads to the love of God for his own sake(428)

things in so far as they have being are like to Godwho is being in the rst and highest manner

(429)

It is evident that all things naturally strive after beingaccording to which they become like to God who isbeing itself while all other things only participate in being Hence the last end towards which all things strive islikeness to God

(430) things in so far as they have being aim at likeness toGod who is being itself

(43 )Being is itself a likeness of the divine goodness Hence in

so far as a thing longs for being it desires likeness to Godand longs for God himself implicitly

(43 2)he last end is the rst principle of being in which all



86 e Human Wisdom of St omas

may thigs, the last thig remaiig to it is to seek theikeess to God, who is the cause of other thigs

(440)

Although there is some likeess to God i creatures, olyi the itellectual creature is ts likeess by way of image i other creatures it is by way of vestige or footprit

(440)Our likeess to God is prior to our likeess to our eigh-bour, which is based o the former

(44 1)Creatures do ot reect their exemplar i a perfect maer Hece they ca reect it i may ways, ad there are

may images But there is oly oe perfect way of represetatio, ad so there ca oly be oe So, who is theperfect image of the Father

(442)There is oly oe perfect ucreated image The rst

exemplar, the divie essece, caot be represeted per-fectly by a sigle creature but must be represeted bymay created thigs

(443)e result of the visio of God is the immutability of the

itellect ad the will The itellect is xed, becausewhe the rst cause i which else ca be kow isreached, the quest of the spirit comes to a ed Themutability of the will also ceases , because othig furtherremais to be desired whe the last ed, which cotais

i itself the pleitude of goodess is reached(444)

The earer a thig is to God, who is completely immov-able, the less chageable ad more edurig it is



e Human Wisdom of S. Thomas 89

(454)he higher a being is the simpler it is Hence the beingsthat possess the highest degree of nobility must also pos-

sess the highest degree of simplicity(45 5)

God is the rst exemplar of all thngs

(456)Even though things in so far as they exist reect thedivine essence yet they do not do so in one and thesame way but in dierent ways and in dierent degreeshus the divine essence is the proper exemplar and ideaof a particular creature in so far as it can be reected bythis determined creature in this determined way

(457)From the one rst truth there result many truths in thehuman mind just as the one human face produces manyimages in a broken mirror

(45 8)God and what is in God are not directed to any end butare the end

(459)God who acts rst of beings does not gain anything

for himself by his action but communicates and givesout someting to oters Hence thngs are no rdered toGod as end in order to add something to him but so thatthey may reach the end each in its own way throughhim who is himself the end

(460)God loves those who love him but not as if their lovewere the reason why he loves them; rater it is thecontrary



90 e Human Wsdom of St omas

(46 )The divine love causes the good that it loves in something; but it is not always so with human love

(462)Since God is outside the whole created order and everycreature is ordered to him, but the contrary is not true, so itis clear that there is a real relation of creatures to GodThere is, however, no real relation of God to creatures, but

oy a rational one, in so far as creatures are referred to him(463)

We can in truth open our hearts to God, but not withoutGod's help

(464)

The word perfection, if taken in its literal sense, cannotbe applied to God, for nothing is made perfect (per-Jectum) except what is created (fctum)

(46)We know and judge things in the light of the rst

truth, for the light of our intellect, which is either naturalor a gift of grace, is nothing other than an imprint of therst truth

(466)st as a docto is said to cas halt togh h on ats

exteiol, while natre alone is active from within, soman is said to teach truth though he only announces itexteriorly while God teaches interiol

(467)When man teaches he exercises oy an external activity

like a doctor when he heals; but jst as the interior natueis the principa cause o ealing, so also the interior lighto the mind is the principal case of knowledge Tese,however, bot come fro God



e Human Wsdom of S omas 9 1

(468)We acquire our interior knowledge by the fact thatthings impress their likeness on our sous But in God's

owledge the contrary is true; om his mind formsow out to creatures Hence just as knowedge in us isa sealing of our souls through things so on the otherhand forms are nothing other than a sealing of thingsthrough God's knowedge

(469)Human rational knowedge is in a certain sense caused bythings; hence it follows that intelligibe things are themeasure of human knowedge That reality is of this na-ture is a true judgment of the reason but the contrary is

not true God's mind is by its knowedge the cause ofthings Hence his knowedge must necessarily be themeasure of things just as the rules of art measure theworks of art each of which is perfect in the degree inwhich it obeys these rules

(470)ven if the human intellect did not exist things wouldstill be called true by reason of their order to the divineintellect If however both intellects were thought to beno more which is impossible the idea of truth could notexist in any way

47 The knowedge of God is compared to created things asart to works of art Hence just as art not oy knows butalso creates what is artistically correct whie it oyows but does not create what deviates om the rues ofart so God's knowedge both knows and creates goodthings whie it oy knows sin and evi which are devia-tions om his eternal aw but does not cause them



e Human Wisdom of S omas 93

(47 8)Nothng s due to anyone except n vrtue of somethngthat has been gven to hm gratutously by God

(479)hngs are sad to have been created n the begnnng oftme not as f the begnnng of tme were the measure ofcreaton but because heaven and earth have been createdtogether wth tme

(480)God has created a men for beattude

(48 Just a s the prmary purpose of human law s to causefrendshp between men so the purpose of the dvne

aw s to establsh frendshp between men and God(482)

he eternal law s compared to the order of the humanreason as art to a work of art

(48 3 )

God by hs power does touch created thngs n movngthem but he hmself s not touched for the naturalpower of no creature s able to penetrate to God

(484)Irratonal creatures nethe partcpate n human easonnor do they obey t yet they partcpate n the dvnereason by obeying it.

(48 5 )Wherever God s there he s totay hrough hs und-vded power he s n contact wth everythng

(486)Even natra love whc wells n a tngs arses omsome knowedge; ts knowege owever does not be-ong to thngs theseves bt to the founder of creaton



94 e Human Wisdom o St omas

(487)It is true that God, who is the rst ause, does not enterinto the essenes of reated things; yet reated being an

only be understood as having arisen from the divinebeing

(48 8)It is lear that inferior beings, though they are ative,do not give being to other things exept in so far as the

power of God ats in them

(489)God must be in things in the most intimate way The fat that he ats diretly in things is a sign of the

almigh power of God(490)

Everything that ats must be said to at through thepower of God It is God himself who is the ause of theativi of a things

(49 1 )Though reated things produe their own proper eets,yet it is not superuous that God should also produe thesame eets, beause the reature produes nothing exet to te oe o o No i it seo

that the eets that God an produe by himself shouldalso be produed by other auses This omes not omany insuieny in the divine power, but om the im-mensi of God's goodness, through whih he has wishedto ommuniate his likeness to thingsnot oy by giving them existene but also in making them the auses ofother things In this doube way the image o God isommon to reatures Hee also is maniested thebeauty of the order in reation



e Human Wisom of t Thomas 5

(42) creatures are nothing other than an objective expres-sion and representation of what is contained in the con-

cept of the divine Word.(43 )

owledge and will mean that the thing known is in thekower and the thing wied is in the wier. Thus, ac-cording to knowledge and wi, things are more in God

than God is in things.(44)

We know that everything done by God dwells in him asknown, so it follows that created things are in him asin the divine life . . . . so the natures of inanimate things

are alive in God's mind, in which they have divineexstence.

(45)Since God is the universal cause of being, it is thusnecessary that wherever being is found, God is also there

present.(46)

God is the cause of action in so far as he grants thepower of acting, which he preserves and brings into act,and in so far as it is through his power that every otherpower is active. When we realise that God is his owno an ha h n eve n, no a a o essence ut as holding i in eing, it foows that Godhimself must act directly in every agent; this, however,does not exclude the action of the wi an of natur.

(47)The natural necessiy indwein in things hich are d-termned to a sngl end is he action of God directingthem to their end, just as the necessiy by which an arrow



6 The Huma Wisdom t St. Thomas

is determined to y to a certain target is an action of thearcher and not of the arrow ut there is a dierence;what creatures receive om God is their nature, but what

man impresses on natural things, in addition to their nature, is the compusion of force Hence, just as the neces-sary compusion in the ight of the arrow shows the aimof the archer, so the natural necessity in creatures mani-fests the direction of divine providence

(48)God moves a things in their own manner Hence somethings participate in the divine movement in a necessaryway, but the rationa creature is moved freey

(4)

It is not contrary to the idea of nature that natural thingsshoud be moved by God as rst mover, since nature is akind of instrument used by God In the same way there isnothing contradictory in the idea of vountary actionarising om God, in so far as the wi is moved by God

(5)God's providence cares for things in their own man-ner Vountary action, and mastery over that action,are pecuiar to man and to spiritual creatures To thiscomusion is oosed ence od does not compe

man to act righty(50 )

God's action as rst cause is perfect, but natura action isaso needed as second cause God coud do what naturedoes without the hep of nature, but it is his wi to actthrough the medium of nature so that order may be pre-served in thngs

(502)od does not justi us without any action on our part



e Huma Wisdom of S omas 97

(503 )Divine providene does not destroy the nature of thingsbut preserves it

(504)The gifts of grae are joined to nature in suh a way thatthey do not destroy but perfet it Hene the light offaith, whih ows into us through grae, does not extin-guish the lght of natural knowledge whih is our natural

inheritane(505 )

Grae does not destroy nature but presupposes and per-fets it



XVII

THIS IS HE FINAL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF OD:

O KNOW HA WE DO NO KNOW G.

(507)

Although uncreated truth exceeds all created truth, yetthere is nothing to prevent created truth om being bet-ter known to us. Things that are less known in them-selves are known better by us

()

God is one in realit but multiple according to ourminds; we know him in as many ways as created thingsrepresent him.

(509)The necessit of calling God by many names is evident.

Since we cannot know God naturally except om hiseects, so it is necessary to designate his perfection bydierent names, just as dierent perfections are found increated thins. f however, we were abe to comprehendhis essence in itself and give him a name proper to his

essence, then we would express him in a single name.This is promised to those who will see God in his es-sence. n that day there shall be one Lord, and his nameshall be one" Zach .

(5 )

Created things are not sucient to represent the creator.Hence we cannot possibly arrive at perfect knowledgeof the creator om creatures; in addition, because of the



The Human Wisdom of St omas 99

weakness of our ntellect we cannot even know all that

created thngs manfest of God

5 I I )

God can n no way be sad to be lke creatures; but creatures can truly be called like to God in a certan sense.

5 12)

No human aectons n the strct sense can actuay be n

God also, wth the excepton of joy and love.

5 I 3 )Even though a creature may be very lke God, yet t

never arrives at the stage when somethng is due to t n

the way that thngs are due to God.

5 I 4)

From hs eects we know that God exists, that he is thecause of other thngs, and that he excels everything else

whch he leaves far below hm; that s the nal perfecton

of our knowedge n ths fe.

5 I 5)

The truths of fath, whch can ony be known completely by those who see the essence of God, can be

known by the human reason ony n sltudes, whchare not sucienty cear to gve comprehensve knowl

edge of that truth as f by a demonstration or as f un-

derstood n tsel Nevertheless, t s useful for theman mn o eecse ise n suc enquires, inadequate as they are, provided there s no presumptuous

claim to complete understandng and demonstraton.A

lttle knowledge of the most sublme things, eventhough t s poor and nsucent, s a source of thehighest joy.

(s I 6)

The human nd proceeds to the knowledge of God in



The Human Wisdom of St omas

three ways, although it does not arrive at knowledge ofwhat he is but only that he is Firstly: in so far as hiscreative action is known more perfectly Secondly: in so

far as he is the cause of higher eects, for since these bearhis likeness in a higher way, they show forth his excel-lence more distinctly Thirdly: in so far as he is knownmore and more as being far above those things we seein his eects

(5 1 7)The human inteect, which naturay acquires its knowl-edge om material things, is not able of itself to arrive atthe point of seeing the divine substance in itself, since thelatter is elevated incomparably above material things

and even above other beings(5 1 8)

Our intellect speaks of divine things, not according totheir own mode of existencefor it cannot know themsobut according to the mode of existence found in

created things(5 1 9)

To know God in a created likeness is not to know theessence of God

(0

Whatever IS comprehended by a nite being IS itselfnite

(5 1 )The investigation of divine things in such a way as if onewere able to comprehend them completely is presump-

tuous and is forbidden(522

It is impossible to predicate anything of God and of otherbeings in the same sense



e Human Wisdom of St omas 0

(523 )The reason cannot track down the wi of God exceptwith regard to what he must will with absolute neces-

sity; but his will in relation to creatures is not of such aknd

(524)God is not called incomprehensible because there issomethng in him that cannot be seen but because he is

not seen as perfectly as he can be seen(525 )

God is honoured by silence not because we may say orknow nothing about him but because we know that weare unable to comprehend him

(526)Neither Christian nor pagan knows the nature of God ashe is in himself

(5 27)In this lfe we cannot know perfectly what God is but we

can know what he is not and in this consists the perfec-tion of our knowledge as wayfarers in this world Likewise in this life we cannot love God perfectly so that weare permanently turned towards him in act but only im-perfectly so that our mnds are never turned towards

what is contrary to him(528)

The divine substance in its immensity exceeds everyform that can be grasped by our mnds Hence we cannotcomprehend it y knowing wat it is but only have aslight knowledge of it in knowing wat it is not

(5 29)We know God truly only when we believe that he IS

above all that men can thik about God



1 0 Huma Wisdom of S omas

(5 3 0)It is said that at the end of our knowledge God is -

mately known as unknown because then the nd

knows God most perfectly when it knows that his essenceis above that can be known in this fe of wayfaring

(5 3 )Even though the eye of the owl does not see the sunnevertheless the eye of the eagle gazes at it



INDEX OF REFERENCES

ABVIATONS

In this index, the references to the umma eologica are represented ony by numbers . For example, I I-I I , 2 3 , 2, means theII Part of the II part, question 23 article 2. The sae hodsgood for the comentary on the Books of e Senences o PeterLobard For example, 3 , d 33 2, 5 means the 3rd Book,dist. 3 3 , question 2 , article 5 he other works are abbreviatedas foows:

C.

Comp theol.

Ver.PotMalCarCorr ratDe speVirt commVirt card.Spir creatnQuol

ef. i. iNat verbUn. intCom in nIn Met.

nJohIn Matth .In in.

Summa con GenilesCompenium eologiae

Quesiones ispuaae e 1eriaeQuesiones ipuaae e poenia DeiQueiones ipuaae e maloQuesiones ispuaae e cariaeQuesiones ispuaae e corrfraernaQuesiones ispuaae e speQuesiones ispuaae e 1iru ibus in communiQuesiones ispuaae e viruibus carinalibus.Quesiones ispuaae e spiriualibus creau risQuesiones ispuaae e animaQuesiones quolibeale

e eecioe 1ae piriualisDe nau verbi inellecuDe uniae inellecus con AveroisasCommenary on Ari ole ' De animaCommenary on e Meapysics of Arisole

ommenary on e Gospel of Jonommenary on e Gospel Maewommeary o Boeiu on e iniy

03



104 Han Wisdo of St oas

n dv. nom Contary on Psdo-Dionysis on th

Divin NasPac ca D dobs pracptis caritatis

REFENES

r Pot 9 (40) - , 29 5 (2) C G 8 3 . (4 ) Ver 6 3 ad (3 ) Pot 3 6 ad . (42) CG 3 (4) CG 102 (43) Pot J 6 ad J (5) C G 4 (44) I, 5 3 ad 2(6) - , 6 4 (45) Ver 8 4 ad 5() CG 28. (46) Pot J 6 ad 20(8) - , 6. (4) CG 2 89.(9) CG J 90 (48) I, 8 ad 4

(0) e G 24 (49) I, 63 4 r r eG 2 6. (o) Ma

(2) [ , ( 5 Comp theol I, 4 . r 3) eG 2 46. (52) - , 9 ad J (4) Ver 24 ad 6. ( 53 ) , 20 2 r 5) Ver 5 3 ad J (54) CG 28 (6) eG J 3 6. ( eG ' · 3 .() I, 84 ad J (6) Ver 2 3 ad 2( r 8) Ver 6 2 (5) I, 6 3 ad 2(9) eG J 4 (58 ) - , 36 J 20 Comp theol I, 48 . (59) - , 8 (2) eG 2 68. (6o) - , 8 ad 2(22) eG ' · . (6) eG 4 92(23) Car ad (62) I, 9 9(24) I , 65 ad . (63) Pot J , 6 ad 4.(25) Ver 8 2 ad (64) CG 3 426 I 04 d 65 - , 6 4 ad

(2) CG 2 30 (66) -, 2 ad .(28) Pot 5 ad 6. (6) Ver 22 6 .(29) Ver 24 8 ad 4 (68) , 3 5 ad J (Jo) Ver 22 6 ad J (69) -, 29 3 ad 2(3 2 d 2J (0) Mal 4(32) CG 2 JO () I, 48 I, 48 6 .( 3 3 ) I , 03 ad 2 (2) , 79 ad 44 I, 04 ad . (3) Mal 5 ad 10

(35 I, 04 3 ad J (4) I, 49 2 6 I, 09 ad (75) I, 6 8 .(3) Ver 20 4 (6) Corr frat ad 4(3 8 CG J (7) Ma O ad (39 Ver 2 J (78) Ma J



Index of Rerenes 0 5

(79) C.G. 3 , 10. (127) C.G. , 5·(8o) C.G. J , 1 1 . ( 128) In div. nom. 4, 4·( 8 1 ) I , 1 7 , 4 a d 2 . (129) I 1 4 , 1 .(82) Ma. 2, 1 ad 10. ( 130) Ver. 1, 9·(83) C.G. J , 9 ( 1 3 Ver. 2 , 2 a d 2

(84) C.G. 3, 1 2 ; c I , 48, 4 ( 1 3 2) I, 84, 7·(8 s) C.G. 3 , 7 1 . ( 3 3 ) I , 1 2 , 1 2 (86) Ver. 16, 2 (ed contra). ( 134) Ver 12, 3 ad 2.(87) I , 49, J . ( 1 35) Ver. 18, 2 ad 7·( 8 8 ) Cop. theo. I , 1 1 7. ( 36) In Trin. 6, 3 .(89) I 10 3 , 7 ad 1 (137) I , 85, 6.(90) Ver. 24, 10 ad . ( 1 3 8) Ver. , 9 ·( 9 1 ) Ver. 2 2 6 ad 6

(139)C.G. 2, 66.

(92) Ma . 2 , 12 . (140) Ver. 24, 2.(93) Ver. 5, 4 ad 6. ( 1 4 1 ) Ver 25, 1 .(94) Cop. theo. I, 142. ( 1 42) De pe 1 ad 7·(95) I , 48 , 2 ad J . (142a) 1 1-11 , 26, ad 2.(96) I, 92, 1 ad J . ( 143) 111 9 3, 1 ad J .(97) C . G . 3 , 7 1 . (144) I , 1 4 , 8 ad J .(98) eG 3 , 2 . ( 145) Nat. verb.

(99) C.G. 3, 2 . ( 1 46) Ver. 10 8.(100) C.G. J, 22. (147) I, 84, 5·( 1 0 1 ) eG. ' · 43· (148) Ver. 16, 1 (e� contra).( 1 02) C.G. 3, 2 . (149) Ver. 22, 10( ! OJ) 1-1 1 , J2 , 2 . (150) I, 1 08 , 6 ad J .(104) Comm. n An. 3, 8 , fet J ( 1 5 1 ) I , 8 2 , J .( 1 05) Ver. 20, 3; Ver. 20, 3 ad 5· (152) 1-11 , 28, 1 ad J.(106) Ver. 2, 2. ( 5 3 ) 1-11 , 26, 2 ad 2.( 1 07) C . G. 3, J ( 154) 111 86, 1 ad 2.( 108) I , 75, 4· ( 55 ) C.G. 1 , 77; c. I , 16 , 1 ; Ver(109) I, 76, 7 ad J . 26, J .( 1 1 0) Un. int. ( 156) Ma. 6, ad J.( ) Spr. creal 2 a d 5 · ( 57) I , 79, ad 2.( 2) Ver. 1 3 , 3 ad 2 . ( 1 58) I , 59, 2 ad J .( J ) I , 85 , 7 · ( 159) C.G , 7! .

( 1 1 4) An. 8. (160) C.G. J, 26.( 5) I , 76, s ( 1 6 1 ) 1-11 1 9 , 3 ad 1 ( 1 1 6) C.G. J 8 1 . ( ar J ad 12 .( 1 1 7) I, 77, 2. ( 163) 111 , 4, 4 ad 2.( 8 ) Virt com 9. (164) Ver 23, 6.( I I 9) An J . ( 165) Ver. 24, 10 ad 15( 1 2o) Ma. 1 6 , 8 ad 7 (!66) Ver. 21 , J ( 1 2 1 ) 1-1 1 J , 4 ad J . (167) 1 1-11 , 27, 4, obj 1 ad 1 (122) C.G. I, 43 · ( 68 111 17, 5 ad 2( 1 23) M a . 9 , 1 . (169) Ver. 25 .( 1 24) e.G 1. 59 · (170) 111 27, .( 1 2 5) 11 1 , J 2 , 8 . ( 1 7 1 ) 111 , 28 6 .(126) C.G. I , 4 3 · (172) De e J.



06 Te Human Wisdom of St. Tomas

( 73 ) I 2 0, . (29) I-11 8 2 .

(74) I11 55, ad 4 (220) 1 1-11 20, .

( 75 ) I11 7, 5 ad 3 (22) 1 1-11 45 2

( 76) Crr. frat. , ad 5. (222) I11 9, 5

(77) I11 26, ad 3 . (223) Ver. 7 , 3 ad 3

( 78) Car . (224) I11 9, 5 ad 2.(79) I, 6o, ad 3 . (225) Ver. 7 , ad .

(!80) Ver. 22, . (226) Ver. 7 , 3 ad .

( 8 ) .G. 3 , 26. (227) Ver. 7, .

( 82) I 6o, . (228) I 82, ad 3.

( 8 3 ) 1 1 1 1 I 54, 2 . (229) I 5 3

( 84) .G. ' · 7 (230) Mal. 6, ad 22.

( 8 5 ) M. 2 3 ad 2 . ( 2 3 ) Ver. 24, 8 ad 2.

(!86) I11 7, ad 2. (232) I, 82, ad 3.

( 87) 1 1-11 o 4 (233) Ver. 2 2 , 6.

( !88) .G. 2, 79. (234) I 83 , 2 .

( 89) Ver. 6, 2 ad 5 (235) 1 111 29, 2.

(90) I-11 58 , ad 3 . (236) Ver. 22, ad 2.

( 9 ) 1 1-11 54, 2 , ad . (237) I11 8 , 7 ad 2 .

(92) C.G. 3 , 26 . (238) I11 , 6.

( 93 ) I 9 8, . (239) Virt. comm 7 ad 2.(94) In job. , 7 (240) I 4 ad 3 .

( 95 ) 1 1- 1 1 3 0, . (24) Virt. cmm. 9 ad 6.

(96) 1 1-11 3 3 , ; 1 1-11 4 2 , . (242) Mal. , 5

(97) I 63 , 9 (243) I-11 9, 8 ad 2.

( 98) Qul. 3, 22. (244) I11 90, ad 3:

(99) 1 111 8, 2. (245) I11 8, 3 ad 2.

(200) I-11 5 8 , 4 ad 3 . (246) Virt. cmm. 5 ad 8.

(2) I11 7 , 2 ad . (247) Praec. car. (princ).

(202) Virt. comm. 8, ad 7. (248) C.G. , 88.

(23) I-11 58 , 4 ad 3 . (249) I11 4, 2 .

(24) Virt. comm. 8 ad 0. (2) C.G. , .

(205) Mal. 8, 2. (25) C .G . ,

(26) Mal. 4, 2 ad 8. (252) I-11 77, 2 ad .(27) 1 1-11 , 45 3 (253 ) I - 1 1 6 6 , 5 ad .

(208) Virt. cmm 9. (254) I-11 66, 5 ad 2(29) I11 7 , 6. (255 ) C.G. , 2 .(2) C.G. 4, 70. (256) C.G. , 2.(2 ) I-11 59 4 (257) I11 56, 2 ad 2(22) 1 1-11 5 5, ad 2 (258) Ver. 8 , 7 ad 7( 2 3 ) 1 1 1 1 5 3 3 (259) 11-11 5 , ad 2 .(24) Virt. cmm. 2 ad 6; 1 1-11 (26) Virt . cmm. 5 ad 8

57 2 . (26) Perf. vi. spir. 23.

(25) Virt. comm. 8 (262) Qul. , 4 .(26) C .G . 7 1 . (263) 1 111 32 , 3 (27) I11 66, ; Virt cmm. 4 (264) 1 1-11 82, ad 3

ad 3 (265) Virt. cmm 6(28) 1 1-11 47 6. (266) Car. 3 ad 3 .



Index of Reencs 107

(26) - 56 2 ad J ( J J ) Mal 10 J(268) Ver 14 6 (J 4) - J2 8 ad J (269) - 4 2 ad 1 (J 5) - J 6 (20) Virt comm 12 ad 2J ( J 1 6) J4 4 ad 2(21) - 9 J ad J ; 5 5 2 (J 1) 2 6 ad 1 ; J4 2 ad J

ad J ( J B ) CG 90(22) - 4 5 ad 2 (J19) J4 J ad J (2J) Virt comm 6 ad 2 (o) J 5 5 (24) 49 J ad J ( J2 1 ) J9 4 ad 1 (25) 4 14 ad 2 (J22) J J (26) - 50 ( J2J) 2J 6 ad 1 (2) Virt card 2 ad 4· (J24) 2J

(28) J ad 2 (J25) Ver 10 10 ad

(29) - 5 J 5 ad 1 (J26) Car 8 ad ad 12 (280) 59 2 (sed contra) (J2) Car 8 ad 1(281) 59 (J28) 2 8 ad J (282) - 59 5 ad J (J29) 2J 12 ad 2 (28J) Mal 12 1 (JJO) CG J 28 (284) Ver 26 ad 1 (J J 1) - 29 ; 29 (285) 58 ad 2 ad J

(286) 125 1 ad 1 ( 33a) - 45 6 ad 1 (28) Ver 26 5 (JJ2) I 96 J ad 2(288) G 9 ( J J J ) Car 9 ad 18(289) 3 4 (JJ4) - 1 24 5 ad J (290) Virt comm 12 ad 9 ( J J 5 ) - 92 1 a d J (291) Mal 12 1 ad 4 (336) 1 4 1 8 (292) - 1 58 8 ad 2 (33) J 9 ad 2 (29J) - 46 6 ad 1 (338) 2 4 ad 2(294) 40 4 ad J (JJ9) 2 4 ad 1 (295) - 6 4 ad 2 (J40) 96 6(296) 4J 1 (sed contra) ( 34 1 ) - 99 5 ad (29) - 44 2 ad J (J42) - 100 9(298) Virt comm 1 1 ad 1 5 (J4J) 100 2(299) Mal 1 (J44) 65 4 (JOO) - 4 (J45) n Matth 5 1

(JO) G 4 0 (J46) 2 J ad 2(J02) 1 25 2 (J4) JO 2(JOJ 7J J (J04) - ad (J49) 24 (J05) !8 5 (J50) - 2 J 1 2 ad J (J06) 109 2 ad 2 (J 5 1 ) - 124 J (J0) Virt comm 9 ad 1 5 ; Virt (J52) - J ad J

card J ( 3 5 J ) - 26 (JOB) 1 2J 4 (354) - 2J 1 2 ad 2 (J09) CG 90 ( J 5 5 ) 5 J (JO) 2 6 ad J (356) G J J 4 ( J I I ) - J4 ad 2 (J5) - 1 2 8 ( J 2 CG 1 , 90 ( J - . 2 J 6



Index of Rerenes 09

(4 5 3) I 10 5- (493) 8 J ad J .(454) C G. 8 (494) I 1 8 4; I 8 4 ad 2(455) I 44 J (495) e.G. J 6 8(456) Qu! 4 1 (496) t J 7(457) Qu! 10 7 (497) [ OJ ad J (458) t 1 2 ad 1 . (498) Qu! 1 7 ad 2(459) e.G. J 1 8 (499) 6 1 ad J (460) Ver. 27 2 ad 1 (5oo) e.G J 1 4 8 (46 1 ) e.G. J 1 50 (501 ) t J 7 ad 16 (462) I J 7 (502) [ 2 ad 2 (463 ) Ver 24 5 ad 2 (503 ) 10 4·(464) Ver 2 3 ad J. (504) In Trin 2 3.

(465) I 88 3 ad 1 (505) Ver 14 O ad 9 I 8 ad 2 (466) Ver 1 ad 7. I 2 2 ad 1 (467) I ? 1 ad 1 (5o6) t. 7 5 ad 14(468) Ver 2 1 ad 6 (507) Ver 1 0 1 2 ad 6(469) C. G 6 1 (5o8) I 1 3 4 ad J (470) Ver 2 (509) CG 3 1 (47 ) Qu! 5 2 (5 1 0) Ver. 5 2 ad 1 1 (472) I 6 3 7 ad 2 (5 1 1 ) Ver 2 1 ad 1

(473) I J 7 ad J (5 1 2) CG 9 1 .(474) Cmp the. 2 4· (5 1 3) Ver. 2 1 1 (47 5) JO 4 · (5 4) e.G. J 49(476) 2 5 J ad J (5 5) C G . 8 (477) I 2 1 4· (5 6) In Trin 1 2 (478) [ 2 5 J ad J (5 7) e.G. 4 1 (479) I 46 3 ad 1 (5 8) I 39 2

(480) Ver. 23 2 (5 1 9) I 12 4 ad 1 (48 1 ) 99 2 (520) 4 3 ad 1 (482) 7 1 2 ad 4 (5 2 ) In Trin 2 1 ad 2(48 3) I 05 2 ad 1 (522) C G 3 2 ( 8 ) 9 3 5 d 2 ( 3) I 6

human wisdom of st. thomas_ a breviary of philosophy, the - thomas aquinas & josef pieper

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