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Intermedia Framing and Intercultural

Communication: How Other Media

Affect American Antipathy toward Al

Jazeera EnglishKatie Brown & William Lafi Youmans

Version of record first published: 14 Jun 2012.

To cite this article: Katie Brown & William Lafi Youmans (2012): Intermedia Framing and

Intercultural Communication: How Other Media Affect American Antipathy toward Al Jazeera

English, Journal of Intercultural Communication Research, 41:2, 173-191

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17475759.2012.685084

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17475759.2012.685084




Journal of Intercultural Communication ResearchVol. 41, No. 2, July 2012, pp. 173–191

Intermedia Framing and InterculturalCommunication: How Other MediaAffect American Antipathy towardAl Jazeera English

Katie Brown & William Lafi Youmans

By covering underrepresented areas in the world, Al Jazeera English (AJE) can facilitate

intercultural understanding among Americans. However, AJE is not widely available on

television in the United States. Further, many Americans hold pre-formed suspicions of

the channel. Through an online experiment, we find that pre-reception audience bias

against AJE exists and correlates with prejudice against Arab Americans, limiting its

conciliatory potential. However, Americans can change their views toward AJE

depending on how it is covered by other media, or what we call ‘‘intermedia framing,’’

including both satiric soft news and hard news. An experiment finds that satiric newscoverage decreases anti-Arab American prejudice and, when combined with exposure to

AJE, elevates evaluations of the network.

Keywords: Al Jazeera English; Intercultural Communication; Framing; Minimal Effects;

Source Credibility; Arab Prejudice; Media; Race

In a segment covering the debut of Al Jazeera English (AJE) in 2006, Samantha Beeof The Daily Show with Jon Stewart visits the network’s Washington, DC broadcast

center. Bee pokes fun at AJE’s perceived association with Al Qaeda among

Americans, as well as its ‘‘boring’’ content. She asks how many people in the United

States are watching the channel, quickly answering her own question with a stinging

joke: ‘‘Al Ja-ZERO!’’ Coverage of AJE by other outlets like The Daily Show presented

important publicity for AJE, offering insight into a channel many Americans saw

simply as a belligerent in the war on terror. Bee was correct that the channel had very

Katie Brown is in the Department of Communication Studies at The University of Michigan. William Lafi

Youmans is in the School of Media and Public Affairs at The George Washington University. Correspondence to

Katie Brown, Department of Communication Studies, 105 South State Street, The University of Michigan,

Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1747-5759 (print)/ISSN 1747-5767 (online) ß 2012 World Communication Association

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17475759.2012.685084



few viewers, as it was not available on American televisions. It struggled to secure

carriage deals with cable companies. As of early 2012, AJE was not available in over

90% of American TV households. Many Americans refused to watch the channel.

Others took it one step further and pressured cable companies not to carry AJE,despite evidence the channel promoted intercultural understanding. Yet, emerging

research shows the channel’s content moderates extreme views. Powers and

El-Nawawy find a strong correlation between length of time watching AJE and

holding moderate views, which evinced the channel’s ‘‘conciliatory potential’’ (2009).

Content analyses demonstrate that AJE covers parts of the world under-reported by

other news channels, such as CNN and the BBC (Al-Najjar, 2009; Figenschou, 2010;

Painter, 2008). Taken together, these findings suggest that AJE can serve as a bridge

between cultures, one of the marketing points that comes up in the network’s press

releases and promotional materials. However, we posit that a pre-reception audience

bias limits the channel’s intercultural communication potential in the United States,

even after the channel gained wide attention for its coverage of the Arab uprisings.

This may not be permanent, though. We ask whether coverage of AJE by other

media—‘‘intermedia framing’’—changes how people evaluate AJE and thus increases

the potential for intercultural communication.

Established in 2006 as a sister channel to the Arabic news outlet Al Jazeera (AJ), AJE

faced protests and criticism by those who associated the parent network with Al Qaeda

and Osama bin Laden, a link reinforced by the George W. Bush administration and

many in the American media (DiMaggio, 2008; Marash, 2007; Miles, 2005). Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld frequently criticized the network for depicting casualtiesof American war efforts and giving voice to the country’s adversaries, writing in his

memoir that Al Jazeera ‘‘was a platform for terrorist propaganda’’ (Rumsfeld, 2011).

Linking Al Jazeera with Al Qaeda was inevitable given the resurgence of a paradigm

outlined by Huntington’s thesis, ‘‘Clash of Civilizations’’ (1996), in the years after the

terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 (Miladi, 2006; Seib, 2005). Writing

in the mid-1990s, Huntington took an essentialist, cultural view of global conflict,

hypothesizing that future international conflict would involve blocs of nations, or

civilizations, tied together by common, primordial cultural traditions. He

hypothesized a central friction between a Western bloc sharing democratic, free

market economics and a Judeo-Christian heritage, and an Islamic bloc defined by authoritarian politics and the religion of Islam. This was controversial but generated

a tremendous amount of scholarship and popular attention. Some deemed it

prophetic after the September 11, 2001 attacks (Abrahamian, 2003). It was also highly

congruent with Osama bin Laden’s view of the inevitable clash between the global,

Muslim community and the United States (Wedeen, 2003). ‘‘Clash of Civilizations’’

relies on a view of culture as monolithic, not just nationally, but regionally, ignoring

the rich diversity within, and great mixing and alliances between ‘‘civilizations’’

(Said, 2001). Still, it proved to be a powerful frame that resonated and continues to

resonate with many Americans, Arabs, and Muslims.Despite the raging misperceptions and mutual suspicions between peoples, AJE

could be a useful mediator serving the function of intercultural communication. As a

174 K. Brown & W. L. Youmans



network headquartered in the Middle East’s Qatar, AJE presents the possibility of

being a communicative bridge between the United States and Arab countries. El-

Nawawy and Powers (2008, 2010) find that AJE is a conciliatory media source. They

draw on the peace journalism literature, which posits news reporting oriented towardreconciliation that furthers understanding and thus non-violent solutions to conflict

(Galtung, 2002; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). El-Nawawy and Powers outline an 11-

point typology of media characteristics with the potential to enhance intercultural

communication (2008), including serving as a forum for the public, presenting

diverse views or ‘‘multiperspectivalism’’ (Pfister & Soliz, 2011, p. 249), speaking to

the audience as a global public, depicting underrepresented groups, avoiding

demonization, and providing contextualization. Similarly, Tehranian (2006)

considers media diversity key to the development of such peace journalism (2002),

especially media that do not over-represent the lives of those in advanced,

industrialized states and allow for cross-checking other news sources on issues of

conflict. Al Jazeera, he finds, is an example of this. To test this empirically, El-

Nawawy and Powers studied how watching AJE moderates viewer attitudes toward

other cultures (2008, 2010). Their reception study surveyed American Muslims in

Toledo, OH, one of the few places AJE was available on a cable system at the time of

the study. Respondents’ views on conflict correlated with duration of AJE viewing:

those watching for longer amounts of time tended to exhibit less hostility toward

other groups. Whether AJE moderated the views or attracted those with more

moderate views, and thus openness to exchange across identities, it suggests the

network can serve as an intercultural bridge.If AJE can serve as a venue for ‘‘mediatized recognition’’ (Cottle, 2006), by which

media represent ‘‘cultural ‘Others,’ on their own communicative terms,’’ thereby

‘‘negotiating cross-cultural tensions’’ (El-Nawawy & Powers, 2008, p. 21), it could

add to the growing corpus of work on intercultural communication that considers

mediation. Though historically focused on face-to-face (FtF) interactions,

‘‘researchers have begun to turn their attention to the promise of electronically

mediated contact’’ (Pfister & Soliz, 2011, p. 248), including television and movies as

parasocial interactions (Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2005). The promise of viewing

AJE online, like digital media in general, is limited by the problem of self-selecting

audiences. In a high-choice media environment, people have greater ability todevelop a media diet reflecting their pre-existing preferences, which can fuel

polarization rather than reconciliation (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, 2009; Prior, 2007;

Sunstein, 2002). This position puts aside traditional audience reception research

premised on media effects, and looks more closely at selective exposure dynamics.

Thus, there appears to be an inherent limit on AJE’s conciliatory potential. The

channel will only attract those already oriented toward intercultural exchange.

However, metacommunication suggests one important area of research. People learn

about media from other media, creating a potential middle ground between direct

effects and selective exposure.For AJE to serve as a conciliatory medium for Americans subscribing to a ‘‘clash of

civilizations’’ framework, they must have easy access and be willing to watch with an

Journal of Intercultural Communication Research 175



open mind. A golden opportunity to attract new audiences came to AJE in early 2011.

AJE’s coverage of the protests and eventual overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in

Egypt garnered unprecedented praise in the United States. As AJE became a primary

news source for Americans following Arab protest movements in Egypt, Tunisia,Libya, and other Arab countries during these months, demand for AJE grew. Online

viewing, the primary means for Americans to watch AJE, skyrocketed (Elder, 2011).

Importantly, the ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ frame that defined elite discourse around

AJE during the Bush administration gave way to a more receptive ‘‘Arab spring’’

frame (Youmans, 2011). Both frames emerged as a result of media coverage of AJE.

After the Egyptian revolution, news reports indicated that the White House kept

abreast of the protests in Egypt through AJE (Harnden, 2011; MacNicol, 2011).

American public thinkers (Bollinger, 2011), prominent media figures (Hagey & Tau,

2011; Kaplan, 2011; Kristof, 2011; Rich, 2011), and government officials (Bauder,

2011; Kayyem, 2011; Radia, 2011) praised the network’s in-depth reporting on events

in the Arab countries and began asking why the channel was not available on

television. Many journalists and observers wondered if this would be AJE’s

‘‘moment’’ in the United States (Bauder, 2011; Burman, 2011; Ferguson, 2011;

Harnden, 2011; Worth & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Robichaux, 2011).

Despite this praise, public voices challenged the growing receptivity of AJE,

charging that the network was anti-American and biased (Capehart, 2011a, 2011b;

Kincaid, 2011). They protested against AJE’s cable presence (Circelli, 2010). Although

new media campaigns by AJE and its fans generated tens of thousands of letters

calling for cable carriage (Wilkerson, 2011), AJE was still not carried widely onAmerican TVs even a year later, in early 2012. The growing attention for AJE may

have been limited to a small number of Americans who are highly involved and

attentive. If so, AJE’s role as a conciliatory medium is limited. However, given the

greater attention afforded AJE in the media, one possibility for eroding American

suspicion of AJE could lie in how other media depict the network.

The present paper asks, How does coverage by other media and/or actual exposure

to AJE change perceptions of the network? We term this media-on-media framing

‘‘intermedia framing.’’ Specifically, this study measures American prejudice against

AJE’s brand by having participants watch and evaluate the same AJE news clip with

different news logos in an online experiment conducted the month after the Egyptian

uprising. To understand how intermedia framing affects reception to the network, we

also consider the role of media frames in affecting these evaluations by first showing

some participants an ironically humorous Daily Show report versus a straight NBC

news package, both about AJE.

Literature Review

In this study, we draw from and seek to extend four main bodies of literature:news framing, metacoverage, source credibility, and Arab prejudice in America. Here,

we offer a brief overview of each and explain their applicability.




News Framing and Metacoverage

We propose the concept of intermedia framing based on the idea that people

increasingly learn about media from other media. The ‘‘framing’’ piece suggests that

how other media are represented impacts how the public evaluates those media when

viewing them directly. Though scholars differ in their definition (Weaver, 2007), the

general consensus is that framing refers to the organizing principles used by news

media to relay a news story to an audience and the potential effects of these

organizing principles on that audience (Druckman, 2001; Iyengar, 1991; Nelson,

Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1996; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007;

Weaver, 2007). Framing is thus a process, often conscious, that allows for the

construction and definition of an issue for public consideration (Nelson et al., 1997).

Iyengar (1991) shows how news frames can affect public opinion, as moderated by

audience characteristics.We propose intermedia framing as a specific mechanism that can contribute

to metacommunication research, which looks at ‘‘communication about

communication’’ (Esser, 2009; Simons, 1994). Building on previous content

research and conceptualization (Esser & D’Angelo, 2003), Esser (2009) advances

the concept of ‘‘metacoverage’’ to capture how news media report on

themselves, other news media, governments, and other political actors’ strategic

communications. He applies the concept to war coverage, a topic rife with

metacoverage, as his analysis of media coverage during the recent Iraq war

demonstrates. Further, he shows how various categories of framing are at play:

(1) ‘‘conduit frames’’ depict media’s role in communication efforts; (2) ‘‘strategy

frames’’ reveal contestation between media and political actors; (3) ‘‘account-

ability frames’’ hold news media up to the critical standards of democratic

theory; (4) ‘‘personalization frames’’ are about particular reporters or media

figures (pp. 715–717). These frame types do not consider how media coverage

can frame one particular media outlet despite the well-observed tendency among

American political officials and U.S. news media to discuss Al Jazeera’s reporting

as a factor in hostilities during the Iraq war (Samuel-Azran, 2010; Youmans,

2012). Esser negated this potential, claiming that ‘‘media organizations do not

usually criticize each other––unless they are motivated by ideological animosity or business rivalry’’ (Esser, 2009, p. 713). Motivations aside, American news

media actively covered the network and its Arabic and English services as part of

the ‘‘war on terror’’ and Iraq news stories. Thus, intermedia framing allows for

the occasion where news media report on a particular media outlet in such a

way that can impact how the public assesses it.

Metacoverage research on Al Jazeera further complements the present research.

King and Zayani (2008) consider how AJE is covered in print media, focusing on the

network’s branding. They find that AJE is rarely mentioned with terrorism or anti-

West violence in global print media coverage, unlike the AJ. Relatedly, Samuel-Azranalso shows how western news media package, edit, and disclaim AJ content it

transmits in order to lessen its critical edge (2010). This paper contributes to this




work by considering how media coverage of AJE impacts the audience’s receptivity to

the channel.

Intermedia framing also serves as a concept parallel to intermedia agenda-setting

(Boyle, 2001; Breen, 1997), a similar meta application of one of the key concepts of media effects theory. Intermedia agenda-setting looks at how news media story

selection is influenced by other news media’s agendas, or what they cover. Pack

journalism, as Timothy Crouse observed in The Boys on the Bus (1973), is an example

of intermedia agenda-setting. Intermedia agenda-setting, however, focuses on media

effects on other media, not on actual viewers. We propose intermedia framing to fill

this void.

In an era of media globalization and high-choice media environments, publics can

more easily access media from around the world. Since metacoverage is now more

frequent, as Esser (2009) demonstrates, people have more occasions to learn about

other channels and sources through their regular news diet. Intermedia framing is

thus a useful concept not only for analyzing a more complex media environment, but

also for intercultural research centered on mass media. While the presence of foreign

media has long been a source of resentment and fear, domestic media can be vital to

facilitating its reception. The foreign media can then offer windows into other

cultures to those willing to watch, listen, or read. The ways in which domestic media

report on new sources of information can help shape the public’s openness to them,

and can in turn impact the prospects for mass-mediated intercultural communica-

tion. Intermedia framing is most clearly justified if we find that: (a) assessments of

AJE differ between those who are just exposed to its content, versus those who areexposed to its content after watching other news media reports about the channel—

in other words, vicarious exposure; or (b) that assessments of AJE vary with exposure

to different types of intermedia framing.

Source Credibility

The current study also relates to the literature on source credibility, which we see

as important for facilitating intercultural communication. We propose that

intermedia framing can influence level of trust of the media framed. Beginning

with Hovland and Weiss (1951; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) and through the1970s, the persuasive effects of source credibility were posited to moderate media

effects (Sternthal, Phillips, & Dholakia, 1978). In the 1970s, however, researchers

began working to identify the bases of communicator credibility. Findings emerged

that indicated highly contextual and conditional effects. Moderating variables

explored included political involvement (Dean, Austin, & Watts, 1971; Johnson &

Scileppi, 1969; Rhine & Severance, 1970) and pre-existing dispositions toward an

issue (Bock & Saine, 1975; Sternthal et al., 1978), among others. More recent media

credibility scholarship focuses on evaluations of bias—or how people evaluate

sources (Eveland & Shah, 2003). Of particular relevance is the body of research thatconsiders media bias assessments at the group-level, which includes work on the

hostile-media phenomenon’s focus on partisanship as determining perceptions of




antagonistic media bias (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Hostile media bias research

suggests partisans with strong beliefs are more likely to evaluate media content as

biased (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001). Given the wide perception of AJE

as anti-American, we test whether many will presume the network is biased andhostile. If so, is there an intermedia framing effect? That is, will perceptions of the

source change if people are exposed to different types of news about that source?

Specifically, we consider the impact of satiric soft news versus hard news coverage of

AJE on how people evaluate AJE’s credibility before and after exposure.

Researchers employ the term soft news to include such diverse formats as

‘‘network and cable newsmagazine shows, entertainment and tabloid magazine

shows, and daytime and late-night talk shows’’ (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006,

p. 342). Though often grouped with other late night comedy shows and soft news in

general, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart is a unique series with a prominent position

in today’s political and media landscapes alike. Young adults view the series as an

important source of political information (Baum, 2005; Hollander, 2005). Daily Show

viewers demonstrated superior campaign knowledge vis-a-vis their network news-

viewing counterparts (Young, 2004). Further, the content of the series’ campaign

information is comparable to hard news (Fox, Kaloen, & Sahin, 2007). Going beyond

research on campaign and politics content, we posit that in ironically satirizing other

media, The Daily Show frames these other media.

The Daily Show is particularly interesting as a framing device because it employs

‘‘meta-disparagement humor, ’’ or jokes that explicitly target a marginalized identity

while implicitly targeting those who would laugh at the joke at face value (Brown,2012; Brown & Betz, 2011). If disparagement humor refers to jokes ‘‘in which one

party is victimized, belittled, or suffers some misfortunes or act of aggression’’

(Hobden & Olson, 1994, p. 239), meta-disparagement humor adds a layer of irony

to create the multi-level targets of ironic satire, making it more difficult to predict.

Research shows that direct disparagement humor leveled at minorities increases

prejudice toward these groups (Ford & Ferguson, 2004; Greenwood & Isbell, 2002;

Hobden & Olson, 1994; Martin, 2007). But, given its ironic intention, The Daily

Show ’s meta-disparagement jokes, in particular its early segment on AJE, may in fact

have the opposite effect.

Prejudice against Arabs

Finally, this study seeks to add to the relatively small literature on prejudice against

Arabs in America. Compared to African American prejudice, racism against Arabs

is a less studied phenomenon. Arabs in America have encountered waves of

discrimination linked to international politics. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the

United States in particular catalyzed overt discrimination and violent attacks of Arab

Americans (Cainkar, 2008). Despite the fact that just 20% of Muslims are Arab—and

not all Arabs are Muslim—the two identities are often conflated (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Read, 2008). Stereotypes of both groups include being violent

(Alsultany, 2008; Cainkar, 2008; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008) and ‘‘backwards’’ in




‘‘social, political, moral, and religious’’ terms (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008, p. 81).

These stereotypes unify many Americans against an imagined, monolithic enemy

(Alsultany, 2008; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Joseph, D’Harlingue, & Wong, 2008).

Brown (2012) finds that discrimination against Arabs is believed to be more acceptablethan that against women, blacks, or gays. Here, we consider prejudice against Arabs as a

possible explanation for negative pre-assessments, or hostile media bias, against AJE. If

people project group prejudices onto media, then such media are unlikely to be able to

play a conciliatory role. However, we believe intermedia framing may be able to

overcome opposition to AJE based on latent ethnic prejudice.

Hypotheses

Based on the active public resistance to AJE and its commonly perceived association

with Al Qaeda, we hypothesize that antipathy for AJE is more pronounced than for

Western news outlet CNN International (CNNI). We showed participants the same

news clip with different logos and asked them to assess the channels based on what

they watched. We propose the following hypothesis to establish baseline attitudes

toward AJE vis-a-vis CNNI.

H1: Participants will rate AJE more negatively than CNNI.

If intermedia framing plays a key role in creating these disparate evaluations,

we expect it can change them as well, depending on how it is framed. Asking

if evaluations of AJE change with exposure to other media coverage of AJE assumesthat metacoverage matters for audiences. Specifically, this study examines the

differences between hard news and satiric soft news packages on AJE on how people

evaluate AJE in terms of bias, trustworthiness, intention to watch the network, and

support for cable carriage. Specifically, we predict that a serious piece of hard news

coverage that considers AJE with a ‘‘war on terror’’ frame will increase negative

evaluations of AJE, while satiric soft news coverage of AJE with an ironic ‘‘war on

terror’’ frame will boost evaluations of the network because it makes light of the view

that AJE is a threat.

H2a: Hard news coverage of AJE will increase negative evaluations of AJE.H2b: Satiric soft news coverage of AJE will decrease negative evaluations of AJE.

As outlined above, intermedia framing in this context is contingent upon the idea

that assessments of AJE differ between those who are just exposed to its content

versus those who are exposed to its content after watching other news media reports

about the channel. Given the positive boost expected for those that view a meta-

disparagement frame of AJE that undermines prejudice against the network, we

expect this positive assessment will be intensified by subsequent exposure to AJE.

In accordance with hostile media bias, this will not hold for those who see an

AJE piece preceded by hard news coverage of AJE or no story on AJE (control).

H3: Exposure to actual AJE coverage will boost assessments of AJE, but only after exposure to satiric soft news coverage of AJE.




We also expect no effect of either frame or their interaction on evaluations of

CNNI given that both the hard news and satiric soft news pieces pertain to AJE.

Significant effects vis-a-vis AJE and null results regarding CNNI would speak to the

power of intermedia framing.H4: None of the clip conditions will affect evaluations of CNNI.

This study also considers the way in which assessments of media are related to

prejudice toward an affiliated ethnic group. In this sense, responses to global media

may include projecting of sentiments toward the region and peoples from which the

media source originated—a dynamic consistent with hostile media bias. As such,

we predict that Arab American prejudice is a deeper construct linked to negative

evaluations of AJE—and not CNNI—regardless of exposure to stories on or content

from AJE.

H5: Arab American prejudice will correlate negatively with evaluations of AJE but not CNNI.

While we predict that a hard news frame of AJE will negatively impact evaluation

of AJE and a meta-disparagement frame will have the opposite effect, we are unsure

how these framing stories will influence evaluations of Arab Americans. Thus, we

propose the following research question.

RQ1: How will hard news and satiric soft news coverage of AJE affect Arab American prejudice?

Methods

Participants

The sample includes 249 Americans (52.6% female) recruited from Amazon’s

Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Berinsky, Huber, and Lens (in press) find evidence that

Mechanical Turk offers more diverse and representative samples than do university

subject pools typically used in experimental research. To ensure an American sample

and maximize participation quality, we mandated that all participants live in the

United States and have a minimum approval rating of 95%. Users participatedin exchange for $.25 or $.50. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 82, with a mean of

34.8 years. Among the participants, 83.9% identified as white, 4% as Latino/a, 10%

as Asian-American, 2.4% as American Indian or Alaskan Native, 3.2% as African-

American, and 0.8% as Arab American or other, respectively. The mean political

ideology was 3.51/7, or moderate.

Procedure

Between February 23 and March 22, 2011, participants completed the online

experiment. To start, we asked participants about their news viewing habits. Then,participants were randomized into one of three media framing conditions: NBC

Nightly News, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart , or control (no video). Both the




NBC Nightly News and Daily Show clips came from 2006 and report on the launch of

AJE. The NBC Nightly News clip includes footage of Osama bin Laden, commentary

from the Bush administration, and discussion of backlash, all linking the network to

Al Qaeda. The report then roots AJE’s inability to find cable distribution to its Arabviewpoint. The Daily Show clip likewise includes imagery of Al Qaeda leaders,

commentary from the Bush administration, and discussion of distribution woes as

linked to an Arab identity, but the framing is ironic and humorous, and shifts blame

to the American public while mocking American news.

Then, in this 3Â 3 design, we again randomized participants into one of three

conditions: AJE, CNNI, or control (no video). Participants in the video conditions

watched a straightforward AJE news clip about potential peace talks between the

Taliban and government in Kabul. AJE’s coverage of Afghanistan has been found to

be overall more positive about Afghanistan’s future—and less focused on violence—

than CNNI’s and the BBC’s (‘‘Measuring Peace in the Media,’’ 2010). In the AJE

condition, participants watched the original clip. In the CNNI clip, participants

watched the same clip cleaned of AJE markings and re-edited to appear like a

CNNI clip.

Participants were then asked to indicate how biased and trustworthy they would

rate AJE and CNNI, as well as their intention to watch AJE and CNN, on a 7-point

Likert scale. Participants were also asked, ‘‘If your local cable company was

considering carrying AJE (CNNI), would you have a preference or try to influence its

decision?,’’ with 5 options ranging from ‘‘I would directly pressure the company in

support of carrying AJE (CNNI)’’ to ‘‘I would directly pressure the company againstcarrying AJE (CNNI).’’ Participants answered the questions for the news condition

they were in and then for the other network, presented in a brief description as a

competing news station. The order of network question presentation to the control

group was counter-balanced such that half answered AJE questions first, while half

saw CNNI questions first; no differences were found between responses across the

counter-balanced control groups, indicating no ordering effects, with one exception

noted in the results. We also gauged Arab American prejudice using Bushman and

Bonacci’s (2004) Arab American Prejudice scale, adapted under Bushman’s guidance

(¼ 0.93 for Bushman and Bonacci’s original scale; ¼ 0.91 for our adapted

version). Finally, participants answered demographic questions (Table 1).

Results

To test Hypothesis 1—that AJE will be evaluated more negatively than CNNI—we

compared responses to the four evaluation questions across clip conditions. AJE was

evaluated as significantly more biased than CNNI (t ¼ 6.74, p50.001), with a mean

of 4.72 for AJE compared to a mean of 3.97 for CNNI on a 7-point scale ranging

from ‘‘extremely unbiased’’ to ‘‘extremely biased.’’ AJE was also rated as lesstrustworthy than CNNI, with a mean of 4.22 for AJE, placing it on the untrustworthy

side of the scale, compared to 3.22 for CNNI, placing it on the trustworthy side of the




scale. Participants were also significantly less inclined to watch AJE ( M ¼ 2.97)

compared to CNNI ( M ¼ 1.90, t ¼ 7.91, p50.001). Participants additionally

indicated significantly less support for AJE’s cable carriage compared to CNNI

(t ¼ 5.92, p50.001), with a mean of 3.02 for AJE, on the negative end of the

spectrum, compared to 2.63 for CNNI, closer to indifference. This offers strong

support for Hypothesis 1.

In order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b and Hypothesis 3, we estimate a general

linear model predicting each outcome variable separately, with clip 1 condition(control, soft news, or hard news), clip 2 condition (control, AJE, or CNNI), and

their interaction as predictors, and political ideology (PID) and frequency of news

viewing in general as covariates (Table 2).

The model is significant for AJE bias (F (10, 226)¼ 5.15, p50.001), with PID as the

only significant predictor ( p50.001). The interaction term is marginally significant

( p¼ 0.07). Post-hoc tests indicate significant differences within the AJE second clip

condition, such that those who first watched the Daily Show framing of AJE rated AJE

as less biased (adjusted M ¼ 4.95, holding PID and news viewing frequency constant

at their means) than those in the control condition (adjusted M ¼ 4.22, p¼ 0.10) andCNNI condition (adjusted M ¼ 3.94, p¼ 0.02). The bias results offer support for H2a

(hard news coverage will increase negative evaluations of AJE), H2b (satiric soft news

Table 2. Findings for H2a, H2b, and H3.

AJE CNNI

Bias Trust Watch Carriage Bias Trust Watch Carriage

C1 *C2 * ** **C1xC2 * * *PID *** *** *** *** *** * *** ***FN * **

Model in GeneralF¼ 5.15*** 5.74*** 2.98*** 5.56*** 3.55*** x.xx* 2.79*** 3.00***SUPPORT H’s YES NO YES/NO YES YES NO NO YES

*¼ p50.10; **¼ p50.05; ***¼ p50.01.

Table 1. Model for H2a, H2b, and H3.

Dependent variables Independent variables

U¼Unbiased C1¼ clip 1 condition (soft/hard news)T¼Trustworthiness C2¼ clip 2 (AJE/CNNI)L¼Likelihood of watching PID¼Political ideology C¼Cable Carriage FN¼ Frequency of news watchingDV¼C1þC2þC1xC2þPIDþFN




coverage of AJE will decrease negative evaluations of AJE), and H3 (exposure to

actual AJE coverage will boost assessments of AJE, but only after exposure to satiric

soft news coverage of AJE.). The model was also significant in predicting CNNI Bias

(F (10, 226)¼ 3.97, p50.001). PID is again a significant predictor ( p50.001), whilethis time clip 2 is also significant ( p¼ 0.03). An ANOVA (F (2, 246)¼ 3.55, p¼ 0.03)

with post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Tukey’s correction reveals those in the

CNNI viewing condition tend to rate CNNI significantly more favorably than those

in the control ( p¼ 0.05) or AJE condition ( p¼ 0.05). As the AJE Bias results

demonstrate, exposure to AJE did not give AJE the same boost.

The model is likewise significant in predicting trustworthiness ratings of AJE

(F (10, 226)¼ 5.74, p50.001). PID ( p50.001) and Clip 2 ( p¼ 0.05) are both

significant predictors of trustworthiness. An ANOVA (F (2, 246)¼ 2.89, p¼ 0.06)

shows a marginal effect whereby those in the AJE condition rated AJE as more

trustworthy than those in the control condition ( p¼ 0.06). The trustworthiness

results do not support H2a or H2b and counter H3, as exposure to AJE alone boosted

perceptions of the network. The model is likewise significant for ratings of CNNI

trustworthiness, but only PID is a significant predictor.

We also estimate the model to predict intention to watch AJE (F (10, 226)¼ 2.98,

p50.01) and CNNI (F (10, 226)¼ 2.79, p50.01). For AJE ratings, PID ( p50.001),

frequency of news viewings ( p¼ 0.06), and clip 1 condition ( p¼ 0.06) are significant

or marginally significant. An ANOVA (F (2, 245)¼ 3.42, p¼ 0.03) reveals, relative

to control, those in the Daily Show ( p¼ 0.09) and NBC Nightly News ( p¼ 0.05) first

clip conditions are less likely to indicate a desire to watch AJE in the future.With intention to watch, we find support for H2a, but no support for H2b or H3.

For intention to watch CNNI, PID ( p50.001), frequency of news viewing ( p¼ 0.03),

and clip 1 ( p¼ 0.09) are again significant or marginally significant predictors. There

are, however, no significant pairwise comparisons.

We also estimated the model to predict support for cable carriage of AJE

(F (10, 226)¼ 5.56, p50.001) and CNNI (F (10, 226)¼ 3.00, p¼ 0.001). For AJE

carriage, PID is significant ( p¼ 0.001) and the interaction term is marginally

significant (.06). Post-hoc tests reveal that the AJE second clip is driving this

difference, with those who first watch The Daily Show (adjusted M ¼ 3.45, with PIDand news viewing frequency held constant at their means) more likely to support

carriage than those in the NBC Nightly News ( M ¼ 2.70, p50.01) and control

( M ¼ 2.73, p¼ 0.010) conditions. The carriage results thus offer support for H2b and

H3. Taken together, these four models offer surprising results: it seems a one-two

punch of a satiric soft news framing of the network and actual exposure to AJE can

together overcome antipathy toward AJE. For CNNI, we see a significant effect

of PID ( p50.001) and the second clip ( p¼ 0.04), as well as a marginally significant

interaction term ( p¼ 0.09). Post-hoc tests are not relevant to the hypotheses.

It is also important to note that the control for second clip condition (no clip)

counter-balanced presentation order of questions about each network. There was

an unexpected significant difference such that CNNI carriage received greater




support when participants first answered questions about AJE, suggesting a

compensation effect.

Next, we consider the relationship between clip condition and Arab American

prejudice (H4). We find significant correlations between Arab American prejudiceand AJE evaluations, such that, as prejudice increases, reports of the following

decrease: unbiased ratings (r ¼À0.353, p50.001), trustworthiness (r ¼À0.472,

p50.001), likelihood to watch (r ¼À0.399, p¼ 0.001), and support for cable carriage

(r ¼À0.491, p50.001). Correlations between Arab American prejudice and CNNI

evaluations are non-significant. These results offer support for H4—Arab American

prejudice will be correlated with negative evaluations of AJE but not CNNI.

The same general linear model is significant (F (10, 226)¼ 2.83, p50.01) in

predicting Arab American prejudice, a composite Arab American prejudice score.

Both political ideology ( p50.001) and the soft versus hard news clip 1 ( p¼ 0.02)

were significant predictors. An ANOVA (F (2, 236)¼ 3.02, p¼ 0.05) and subsequent

pairwise comparisons with a Tukey’s correction reveal that those in The Daily Show

condition demonstrated significantly lower levels of anti-Arab sentiments than those

in the control condition ( p¼ 0.04). Thus, we find an answer to our research question.

In line with the H2a, H2b, and H3 results, exposure to satiric soft news coverage

decreases Arab American prejudice.

Discussion and Conclusion

AJE faces a public antipathy that persisted even in the wake of elite-level accolades for

the network’s Egypt coverage. Evidence suggests the typical viewer is unwavering

in her pre-conceived evaluations of AJE, with inclinations linked to deeper constructs

of Arab American prejudice and ideological leanings. This does not bode well for the

prospects of AJE being a channel of ‘‘mediatized recognition’’ of a cultural ‘‘Other’’

for many Americans. That is, it will be difficult for AJE to become an intercultural

window to the world for those prejudiced against the network. Actually watching

the channel, albeit measured by viewing only one report, does not greatly change

attitudes toward AJE. We find that, by and large, resistant audience perceptions of

AJE endure despite exposure to an actual report by the network, a report of a highenough quality to elevate ratings of CNN International when attributed to that

network.

The glimmer of hope lies in the potential for intermedia framing effects.

Intermedia framing as a concept found support in our study. First, we showed that

vicarious exposure to AJE—learning about it via other coverage—mattered

differently from, and interacted with, the effects of direct exposure to AJE. Second,

we showed how different types of frames about AJE had different effects. The meta-

disparagement framing of AJE by The Daily Show decreased perceptions of AJE bias

and increased support for AJE cable carriage among those also in the AJE condition.Thus, the ‘‘Al Ja-ZERO!’’ sized audience put forth in The Daily Show piece on AJE is

not inevitable if satiric framing of this very sort can undermine institutionalized




prejudice and set the stage for actual exposure. Taken together, our findings offer an

empirical basis for intermedia framing as a concept of audience effects linked to

metacoverage.

This work has consequences for the role of news media in helping individualsnavigate increasingly complex information environment. If The Daily Show and other

media coverage can offset protests and latent audience bias against foreign channels

to some degree, it suggests that journalists, program writers and hosts, and others

working in media are cultural ambassadors who can help or hinder the public’s

openness to foreign media. The prospects of foreign media serving an intercultural

communication function depend to some degree on how they are processed and

depicted by domestic media. This is not necessarily promising since, as Esser notes

(citing Meyer, 2002), ‘‘Media actors pursue their own interests (striving for public

attention, economic success, and professional reputation) and follow a distinct

media logic (in terms of selection criteria and presentational styles) that often clashes

with the political publicity logic (striving for message control, strategic commu-

nication, and public opinion formation)—in both Germany and the United States’’

(2009, p. 716).

Also pertinent to research on intercultural communication is the relationship

between The Daily Show ’s satiric skewering of the mainstream media’s portrayal of

AJE as a platform for terrorism. Just a few moments of comedic undermining

of institutionalized prejudice decreased prejudice on an interpersonal level. Given the

increased discrimination against Arab Americans in the wake of the war on terror,

this suggests satire can decrease prejudice. Perhaps by laughing at the absurdity of discrimination, we can become more aware of our own prejudices, thus helping

open intercultural acceptance. The exact mechanisms require further research.

The results also suggest that scholars looking at prejudice against Arab Americans

post-9/11 can explore countervailing media coverage that may have mitigated the

well-documented backlash.

The limitations in this study point to further research. To evaluate the ‘‘effect of

effects’’ (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, p. 716), or the normative and policy implications,

researchers must be sure to measure the effects properly. Assuming there are

high rates of selective exposure, ‘‘manipulational control’’ designs cannot closely

resemble reality. Accordingly, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) suggest that ‘‘experimentalresearchers use designs that combine manipulation with self-selection of exposure’’

(p. 724) to avoid generalizability problems. Rather, our design attempts to simulate

incidental or involuntary exposure, rather than self-selection. Forcing exposure

revealed latent biases against AJE, an important factor in understanding its

intercultural potential. Further research could test audience selection behaviors

to gauge active source avoidance among populations in general. Additionally, our

media sample is not fully representative. We include just one news story watched in a

particular historical context, right after ‘‘AJE’s Moment.’’ Future studies could

consider the effects of long-term exposure over time.Limitations notwithstanding, we feel that motivating and exploring the concept of

intermedia framing contributes to our understanding of new types of media ‘‘effects’’




in a high-choice age of communication proliferation. While many scholars have

taken to considering selective exposure in opposition to the effects tradition,

audience reception research could move into a third area of vicarious exposure,

which explores metacoverage, or media about media. Even those who have self-selected themselves as audiences will learn about other media. After all, choosing

which media one views of the many available is itself subject to framing and other

mediatized influences. Intermedia framing is a concept that can add to the

conceptual tools for scholarship in an age in which metacommunication is

ubiquitous. As a concept, intermedia framing can motivate further content analyses

and more audience reception studies looking at different forms of media. In practice,

intermedia framing can facilitate intercultural communication.

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