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Children’s  Rights  Clinic  Case  Law  Summaries  

2015-­‐  2016  

 

Reasonable Efforts: In the Interest of D.C. & B.C.: Affirmed (February 10, 2016) Parents appealed termination of parental rights. Father claimed the State did not make reasonable efforts in assisting him to work toward reunification with the children. He claims the Juvenile Court erred in denying his request for an additional 6 months to work toward reunification. Mother claims the termination of parental rights is not in the children’s best interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Iowa Code section 232.102(5)(b) requires the State to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family before removing the child from the home. After removal, the State must also make reasonable efforts to reunify the family as quickly as possible. Id. § 232.102(7). In determining whether reasonable efforts have been made, the court considers “[t]he type, duration, and intensity of services or support offered or provided to the child and the child's family.” Id. § 232.102(10)(a)(1). In order to continue placement for an additional six months, Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) requires the juvenile court to make a determination that the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension. The Court of Appeals found that the State has made reasonable efforts and granting the father an additional six months to work toward reunification would not be in the children’s best interests. The mother claims the termination of her parental rights is not in the children’s best interests. In determining the best interests of the children, we give primary consideration to “the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child[ren].” See Iowa Code § 232.116(2); P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37. In the Interest of J.C. Reversed & Remanded (February 10, 2016) Timothy, the father of J.C., appeals from the permanency order changing the permanency goal from reunification to another planned permanent living arrangement (“APPLA”). He contends the court erred in finding the State made reasonable efforts to reunify him with J.C. and in changing the permanency goal to APPLA. J.C., born in 2002, is one of several children adopted by Timothy and Sandra during their twenty-eight year marriage that ended in 2013. The Iowa Department of Human Services (“IDHS”) was involved with the family from 2010 to 2012 following allegations of abuse of the children by Timothy. A no-contact order was entered. The child-in-need-of-assistance (“CINA”) case was closed in 2012. By the time of the dissolution decree in October 2013, the oldest child had reached majority age, the middle two children had been permanently removed from the home in the CINA case, and J.C. was the only child left at home. The decree provided for joint

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legal custody, with Sandra having physical care and Timothy having “phased-in” visitation with J.C. “as determined to be in the child’s best interests by the therapist” Sandra Griffith. Following a contested review and permanency hearing in June, the court observed J.C. was participating in individual counseling with Sandra Griffith, who “continues to recommend there be no contact between [J.C.] and his father.” Despite the therapist’s recommendation, the court noted weekly supervised visits had been occurring since December 2014. The court continued: The visits appear to go well and they have fun together. However, [J.C.] does not want visits to occur in the father’s home and wants [the] visits to continue to be fully supervised. Ms. Griffith does not believe that [J.C.] is ready to move toward reunification with his father. The department concurs. [J.C.] displays anxiety about the possibility. Ms. Vail [the IDHS social worker] testified [] that it is not in [J.C.]’s best interests to return home to his father. [J.C.]’s mother is not an option due to her health. Therefore, the department is recommending another planned permanent living arrangement as the permanency outcome for [J.C.]. Ms. Vail believes such a goal would alleviate [J.C.]’s anxiety while continuing to allow him some supervised contact with his father and to continue to work on his issues in counseling and therapy. The court found the permanency goal should be changed from reunification to APPLA and that the change was in J.C.’s best interests. The court found compelling reasons not to proceed with termination of parental rights, “including [J.C.]’s ongoing relationship with his mother and budding relationship with his father in a fully supervised setting.” The court also found services had been offered to alleviate the situation leading to [J.C.]’s removal and that J.C. could not be returned to the parental home Timothy contends the court erred in (1) finding reasonable efforts had been made and (2) changing the permanency goal to APPLA. The main stumbling block appears to be IDHS’s and court’s delegation of decision-making authority on visitation to J.C.’s therapist, Sandra Griffith. The Court recognized the dissolution court ordered a period of phased-in visitation for Timothy that “shall end when Sandra Griffith determines that regular visitation can should commence.” The phased-in visitation was designed to give Timothy and J.C. time to develop a relationship because Timothy had been absent from J.C.’s life for approximately two years. The delegation of judicial authority to a third party, in the context of dissolutions of marriage, has been rejected by Iowa appellate courts and courts around the nation. See In re Marriage of Stephens, 810 N.W.2d 523, 530 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (listing 7 decisions from other jurisdictions). It is the court’s “responsibility to make an impartial and independent determination as to what is in the best interests of the child, and this decision cannot be controlled by the agreement or stipulation of the parties.” Id. at 531. Although a court can “seek and consider” a therapist’s recommendations, it is the court’s responsibility to make the decision. The district court found Sandra Griffith “continues to recommend there be no contact between [J.C.] and his father, Tim.” We are unable to make any finding concerning what the counselor recommends because the record does not contain any report from her and she did not testify at the permanency hearing. We also do not find the letter the court mentioned in the file. As shown from the testimony of Vail, she had not contacted Griffith for at least two months before the hearing. Although she acknowledged Griffith was not good about contacting the IDHS, she testified she thought Griffith would contact her if there was any change in recommendation. Vail did not take the initiative to contact Griffith for an update or to request a report for the court. Instead of increasing visitation or moving toward semi-supervised or unsupervised visitation,

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IDHS has cut family counseling, and likely intends to reduce visitation if the permanency goal is changed to APPLA. We conclude the State did not fulfill its mandate to make reasonable efforts to reunify J.C. with Timothy. In order to enter a permanency order pursuant to section 232.104(2)(d), such as is the case here where the court ordered APPLA, the court must find convincing evidence of all of the following: (a) termination is not in the child’s best interest, (b) services were offered to correct the circumstances leading to the child’s removal, and (c) the child cannot be returned home. Id. § 232.104(3). Because we have concluded IDHS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify J.C. with his father, we also conclude there is not convincing evidence services were offered to correct the circumstances leading to the child’s removal. Consequently, it is not proper to order any of the options set forth in section 232.104(2)(d), including APPLA. Accordingly, we reverse the permanency order and remand for further proceedings.

CINA Adjudication: In the Interest of C.V.-M Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part (Sept. 10, 2015) The Court affirmed CINA adjudications under (c)(2) and (n), but reversed on one ground. The court held that the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child had not received adequate food, shelter, and clothing while in the father’s care and therefore did not meet its burden under section 232.2(6)(g). The Court found that although the father did not have a stable job at the time, he stayed with his mother, girlfriends and friends, and utilized a shelter when needed. He had also participated in services in the past. The D.H.S. was unable to show when there were days or nights that father failed to provide adequate shelter and that the child had appropriate food and clothing.

In the Interest of K.K., I.K., and G.M. Reversed and Remanded (March 2016) Mother appeals from an adjudication and disposition order finding her children as Children in Need of Assistance (CINA). The Mother stipulated to the adjudication of her youngest child but contested the adjudication of her oldest three, after the youngest child’s urine and umbilical cord testing was positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The Mother also admitted to using methamphetamine twice while pregnant and the State presented evidence that the father provided care for the children while under the influence of methamphetamine. There is no evidence in this case to show an “active” methamphetamine addiction and that she continues to use while caring for her children. The Mother complied with all of DHS’s recommendations, working with a parent partner, and participating in Early Access with her youngest child. By the time of the dispositional hearing, the mother and father had liberal supervised visitation. The Mother was caring for the children for more than two-thirds of every day. There was also evidence presented that the three oldest children were doing well and were good students. The record actually showed that the Mother continues to provide for her children’s mental, emotional, health and educational needs. The court did not find “clear and convincing evidence that the three older children are imminently likely to suffer statutorily-defined harm as a result of her use of methamphetamine.” Therefore, the adjudication is reversed and the case is remanded for dismissal as to the three oldest children.

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Reasonable Efforts

In the Interest of P.R. Affirmed (October 14, 2015) Mother appealed a termination order, arguing, among other things, that reasonable efforts were not made. The Court explained:

We are not convinced the mother’s complaints about services were timely; they were not expressed to the court until the permanency hearing. See id. at 91 (“The Department has an obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification, but a parent has an equal obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to a permanency or termination hearing.”); see also In re C.B., 611 N.W.489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“This case emphasizes the critical need for services to be implemented by the DHS early in the intervention process and for the parents to actively and promptly respond to those services, as well as to voice any problems with services so changes or corrections in the case plan can be made.”). In any event, we agree with the juvenile court that under the circumstances presented, the mother’s extended absence from the child’s life, and the child’s needs and expressed wishes, the child’s best interest lies in the permanency order entered. We therefore affirm.

In the Interest of K.L.P Reversed and Remanded (Oct. 28, 2015) Father appeals termination arguing 1) that the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination and 2) that the juvenile court should have deferred permanency for six months to allow him to establish a bond with the child. The issue here is what rights, if any, does an incarcerated parent have in establishing and maintaining a relationship with a child where the parent is released from prison shortly after the child’s birth but in the midst of an adjudication or termination proceeding. The department’s denial of any visitation between father and child was unreasonable under the circumstances and constituted a failure to make reasonable efforts. In re T.A., No. 03-0452, 2003 WL 21459553, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2003) (holding denial of visitation to incarcerated parent where possible and without sufficient explanation “alone was a violation of the reasonable efforts mandate.”) As a result, the court found that the department failed to make reasonable efforts under the circumstances.

Father also contends that he should have been granted an additional six months. The Court of Appeals agreed. Father had been released from prison and would be able to correct any conditions that precluded him from reunification within the time period allowed. And since he could be released from the residential facility and have the opportunity to parent his child, he should be given the opportunity to do so.

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In the Interest of M.M., C.R., and B.B.; Affirmed (Dec. 9, 2015) Mother appeals the termination of her three children, seeking six months to achieve reunification as well as raising issues concerning reasonable efforts, the child’s best interest and a strong bond with the children. At the time of termination, mother did not request that the children be returned to her, instead she asked for a six month extension to work towards reunification. This analysis is broken up into four categories: Reasonable Efforts, Six-Month Extension, Best Interest of the Children, and Closeness of the Relationship.

Mother argues that two aspects were not accomplished by DHS: 1) housing assistance and 2) EMDR trauma therapy. DHS gave mother a list of places to call and mother testified that she had been approved for two different apartments. Also, mother’s therapist stated that she was not ready for the EMDR therapy because she continued to abuse substances and maintained a relationship with a man who had committed domestic abuse against her and that it was up to her “to make herself a viable candidate for EMDR.” As a result the court found that there was not a lack of reasonable efforts by DHS.

Code section 232.104(2)(b) allows a juvenile court to “[e]nter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue placement of the child for an additional six months at which time the court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which compromise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” To continue, the statue requires the court to make a determination the cause for removal will be remedied at the end of the extension. In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). The juvenile court ruled on this finding that “There does not appear to be a reasonable basis to believe that [the mother] will improve in the near future.” Therefore a six-month extension is not warranted.

The court of appeals also affirmed the decision of the Juvenile court finding that termination was in the best interest of the child and even though there is a close relationship, this is a permissive factor so the court may consider it but is not required to do so. A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113.

Permanency

In the Interest of A.G. and B.B. Reversed and Remanded (October 14, 2015) Mother of two children appeals from a juvenile courts second permanency order denying her request for additional time and altering the permanency goal, contending that the juvenile court should have given her at least three months to utilize services and that transferring custody and changing the permanency goal is not in the child’s best interest. The Court of Appeals agrees and reverses and remands for further proceedings The Court found that the children want to be together and be with their mother. The children’s GAL recommended additional time be given to the mother for reunification and the children are currently in the care of relatives. It is not in these children’s best interest to presume the mother will be unsuccessful because of a relationship that has caused no harm to the children and

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potentially resulted in one positive drug test over the span of eight months. (Mother had a paramour whom she realized was not helping her reach her goal of sobriety)

If on remand, things have changed for the mother where the GAL now recommends against additional time or reunification then the juvenile court should enter a permanency order as it sees fit. Otherwise, the court should amend the permanency goal back to reunification with the mother.

In the Interest of B.K. and J.K. Affirmed (Dec. 23, 2015) Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children arguing that the court erred when it failed to authorize a six-month extension of the proceedings pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) and that the court should have placed more emphasis on keeping his children placed together and placing them with a relative. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the juvenile court, concluding that termination of the father’s parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence and the placement of the children took into account the best interests of the children. Section 232.104(2)(b) allows a juvenile court to: “[e]nter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue placement of the child for an additional six months at which time the court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which compromise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”

Given the father’s ongoing incarceration and the speculative release date, the juvenile court could not make a determination that the need for the removal of the children would cease to exist at the end of the six-month extension and therefore a six-month extension is not warranted.

In the Interest of D.B. and G.B. Affirmed (Dec. 23, 2015) Mother, who admits intravenous opiate abuse, appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two young sons, seeks to extend placement for an additional six-months so she can attend to her addiction and claims termination was not in the children’s best interest. The Court of Appeals rejected this stating that additional time is not warranted because the record does not show the mother will be able to safely parent these children after six more months and the children’s best interests are best served by allowing them to move toward adoption by their maternal grandfather. The juvenile court relied, in part on Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) which requires proof that the children are three years of age or younger; have been adjudicated CINA; have been removed from the parent’s physical custody “at the present time.” The record indicates that the mother was unable to resume custody at the time of termination and did not request it, but instead simply requested a six-month extension under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) which allows a juvenile court to: “[e]nter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue placement of the child for an additional six months at which time the court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which compromise the basis for the determination

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that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”

In order to extend placement , the court must make a determination the cause for removal will be remedied at the end of the extension In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). The district court was unable to make such a finding and explained that returning the children to the mother at this time would subject the children to “great instability and uncertainty.”

Likewise, considering the best interest, the court found that the mother’s bond with her children does not outweigh the safety risk of returning them to her care or their need for stability and permanency and therefore affirm the court’s decision to proceed with termination.

Procedural/Evidentiary Issues In the Interest of D.R. Affirmed (October 28, 2015) Father appealed a termination, arguing in part that he was denied due process by the failure of the Court to appoint a GAL while he was incarcerated, and that taking Judicial Notice of the CINA files violated due process as well. Court ruled that the failure to appoint a GAL did not void a subsequent termination- especially where the presence of a GAL would not have been likely to change the Court’s orders in any way. The court also ruled the judicial notice issue was also not properly raised to the trial court. In the Interests of M.H., R.H., L.H., and C.H.; Affirmed (February 24, 2016) Parents appealed an order modifying disposition by placing children outside the home. Although the court affirmed the order, there was a good discussion about one of their issues: the parents and their attorneys were excluded from in-chambers questioning of the child. Iowa Code Section 232.38 authorizes a court to temporarily excuse a parent when it is in the best interests of the Child. But, the provision states that counsel for the parent should be allowed to remain in the hearing. Having a court reporter was not enough to solve the problem. The error was not fatal because the order was supported by other evidence (other than the Child’s statements).

TPR Grounds

In the Interest of J.P.; Affirmed (September 10, 2015) Mother appealed a termination order, and argued that because the child was placed with his father, the state could not prove one element of the termination ground: that he had been out of the custody of his parents for six months. Court explained that even though the child was with a parent, there was still technically a removal from the mother, and it distinguished In re A.T., 799 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) where the child had already been placed with the father by a dissolution decree, and thus was “already home” at the time of removal. In the Interest of D.S.; Affirmed (Sept. 23, 2015) Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of a substance abuse counselor which mother claims was “privileged and confidential” information.

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She also claims that the child could be returned to her care at the time or should have at a minimum been given a six month extension. Lastly the mother argues that due to the closeness of the relationship and the relative placement, that the juvenile court should have exercised its discretion not to terminate her parental rights. In Iowa, there is no common law physician-patient privilege, it is strictly statutory. Iowa Code section 232.96(5) provides an exception to this stating that “Neither privilege attaching to confidential communications between the health practitioner or mental health professional and patient nor the prohibition upon admissibility of communications between husband and wife shall be ground for excluding evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.” This also applies to terminations as well as CINA proceedings. See State ex rel. Leas in re O’neal, 303 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Iowa 1981). And as a result, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.

The court also found that there was clear and convincing evidence that D.S. could not be returned to the mothers care at the time of the termination hearing. Under section 232.116(1)(h), the court may terminate a parent’s paternal rights when at the time of the termination hearing, the child was three years of age or younger, had been adjudicated a CINA, had been removed from the parent’s care for at least six months, and could not be returned to the parent’s care. The mother failed to appear for the termination hearing, no one knew where she was residing and the mother also admitted to the substance abuse evaluator, less than twenty-four hours before the termination hearing, that she was using methamphetamine daily and had been for multiple years. She was also unemployed and had not followed through with any mental health or substance abuse treatment in spite of being diagnosed with antisocial disorder and amphetamine dependence. For these reasons there is clear and convincing evidence that D.S. could not be returned to the mother’s care at the time of the termination hearing.

Although the mother maintains that the juvenile court should have exercised its discretion not to terminate based on the close bond between D.S. and mother and because D.S. is in a relative placement, the court of appeals found otherwise stating that the permissive factors do not weigh against termination and afformed the ruling of the juvenile court.

In the Interest of J.T., I.T. and M.T. Reversed and Remanded (October 14, 2015) The mother appeals the termination of J.T., I.T., and M.T. contending that 1) the State failed to prove the grounds for termination; and 2) the juvenile court should have declined to terminate her rights because a) the children are in legal custody of a relative, b) the ten-year-old child expressed a desire to be returned to his parents’ care, and c) the children are closely bonded with their mother. On review the court of appeals concluded that termination was not warranted. Mother challenges § 232.116(1(f)(4), (h)(4) specifically that the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the present time.

Upon review, the court of appeals noted that the main concern when examining the termination was the mothers continued relationship with the father, with both the FSRP worker and DHS worker testifying that if the father had not been present then the mother should have been able to

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have the children returned to her at the time. Since the April permanency hearing, mother had ended the relationship with the father and although there is speculation that the mother had reunited with the father there is no clear and convincing evidence that the relationship had resumed. The Court noted that “past performance is not an absolute indicator of the future; it only may be indicative of what the future holds.” Mere speculation about a continued relationship was not enough to justify termination. The Court ruled the state did not meet its burden of proof on this case and therefore the judgment was reversed.

In the Interest of M.W. and Z.W. Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part; Juvenile Court Judgment Affirmed (March 4, 2016) (original appeal Oct. 14, 2015). The Juvenile Court terminated mother’s rights to two children. The court of appeals affirmed the termination of M.W. and reversed as Z.W. The Iowa Supreme Court, on review, affirmed the termination of M.W. under section 232.116(1)(h) and reversed the court of appeals decision concerning Z.W. stating that termination was proper under 232.116(1)(h).

The Court found that each requirement of 232.116(1)(h) had been met for both children and the grounds for termination were proven. Both children were aged three or younger and at the time of the termination hearing, the children had been out of the physical custody of the mother for twelve consecutive months. Likewise, there was not trial period at home with the mother. Furthermore, there is evidence that the children could not be returned safely to the mother’s custody at this time. The Court noted specifically that mother never accepted responsibility for her actions in the death of her younger child, L.W. She entered into a relationship with T.W. who has a history of child abuse and although she presented a clean apartment for CPS visits, she refused entry when visits were unscheduled. One mental health provider also stated that mother had a “continued lack of normal maternal interest in [her children’s] care and that strongly suggests attributes resistant to change.” As a result, the standards of 232.116(1)(h) are met and the mother’s rights should be terminated as to both children.

The most important part of the Supreme Court’s ruling was its holding that an appeal can be affirmed when any proper basis appears for the trial court ruling- even if it is not one on which the court based its holding. As a result, the Court overruled In re A.R. 865 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) to the extent it would require a rule 1.904(2) motion to consider alternate grounds for affirmance. There was also no need for the state to file a cross appeal to have the alternate ground considered- “It is well settled law that a prevailing party can raise an alternative ground for affirmance on appeal without filing a notice of cross appeal, as long as the prevailing party raised the alternative ground in the district court.”

TPR and Best Interests: In the Interest of N.H. Affirmed (Sep. 23, 2015)

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Although conceding that the grounds for termination were proved, father appeals asserting that the court should have granted his request to be personally or telephonically present at the hearing and that termination is not in the child’s best interest. In regards to the best interest standard, the court found that the father has demonstrated that he is a violent individual who cannot care for the child without subjecting her to harm. See In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (noting a parent’s behavior is indicative of his future actions.) And although he claims that termination would preclude contact with his relatives, permanency, in the form of termination of his rights, is nonetheless in N.H.’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)

Father contends that his due process rights were violated when his request to appear personally, or to be present telephonically throughout the hearing was denied. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court citing In re J.S. which held that “Where a parent receives notice of the petition and hearing, is represented by counsel, counsel is present at the termination hearing, and the parent has an opportunity to present testimony by deposition, we cannot say the parent has been deprived of fundamental fairness.” 470 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) Father was represented by council throughout the hearing and council was present throughout the hearing, cross-examined witnesses, and presented the father’s case to the juvenile court. Likewise the father was given the opportunity to testify by phone but declined the opportunity.

The Court affirmed this pursuant to Iowa statute and case law specifically In re J.S., 470 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) which held that a parent does not have a constitutional, due-process right to be physically present at the termination hearing when he is incarcerated. For these reasons the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

In the Interest of P.D and K.D. Reversed and Remanded (Sept. 23, 2015) The mother contends that termination of her parental rights was not in the best interest of the children. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded it for further proceedings with the permanency goal changed to reunification. The district court noted that the primary considerations on the best interest issue are “the child’s safety, the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” See in re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) In granting six additional months to reunify, the district court set forth clear expectations for the mother. Which were 1) to work with service providers in keeping “a clean and orderly home,” 2) work with the service provider on “managing and budgeting her finances,” 3) “address past-due medical bills,” and 4) attend co-parenting class with her husband. All of which the mother fulfilled.

The court also noted that there were some concerns with the behavior of the older child, they noted that the child showed the same behaviors before the six-month extension and this is not enough on its own to warrant termination

The Court of Appeals found that the mother met each of the department’s and court’s expectations well within the six-month extension period. The extension would be rendered meaningless if a parent’s compliance during the last half of the extension period were discounted

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based simply on the filing of a termination petition. See in re A.S., 2014 WL 4938010 at *4 (“we do not believe it was proper to discount [the mother’s] improvement from December 2013 through March 2014 simply because the CINA case was on a trajectory towards termination.”) For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court ruling and remanded it for further proceedings.

The dissent noted that the majority’s best interest analysis seemed to really focus on whether there was enough evidence to support the termination ground, which mother did not dispute. The dissent argued that the evidence support the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.

In the Interest of X.P., D.P, and Z.P. Affirmed (Dec. 23, 2015) Mother appeals the termination of her three children contending that termination is not in the best interest of her children. Because mother has not yet addressed her mental health issues and her use of an illegal substance and because the children are in need of permanency now, termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Although undisputed at trial that the mother loves her children and does a good job engaging with them and caring for them during supervised visitations, the mother was not able to care for and keep the children safe on a full-time basis as she did not have a residence to take them to if they were returned to her, and she had not yet addressed her use of marijuana. The court of appeals ruled believing that a stable, permanent home is in the best interests of each of the children, and termination is the way to achieve permanency. See in re A.m., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (citing In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa2006) (noting the “defining elements in a child’s be interest” are the child’s safety and the “need for a permanent home”)) Therefore, termination is in the children’s best interest.

In the Interest of M.H.: Affirmed (February, 10 2016) A father and mother separately appeal the district court’s order terminating their parental rights asserting they should be allowed an additional six months to work towards reunification and it is not in the child’s best interests to have their parental rights terminated. With virtually no progress made by either parent during the year since the child was removed from their care, the court agreed with the district court additional time would not prove beneficial and termination is in the child’s best interests. The court affirmed on both appeals. The parents do not dispute the existence of a statutory ground for termination. However, they claim termination of their parental rights is not in M.H.’s best interests. They point out that they have limited experience taking care of a young child and assert that additional time will improve their performance. They ask for more time for substance abuse treatment and to address their mental health problems. The father and mother claim that with appropriate time and training they can learn appropriate parenting skills and maintain sobriety. In considering the best interests of a child, we give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re

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P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). In order to continue a child’s placement in foster care for an additional six months under section 232.104(2)(b), “the statute requires the court to make a determination the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). In considering a child’s best interests we look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests. In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). We look at a parent’s past performance “because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future. How long a child is forced to be out of the home waiting for a responsible parent to emerge is determined by our Iowa legislature. See generally Iowa Code § 232.116. With those time frames in mind, we have recognized that at some point, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). “A parent does not have an unlimited amount of time to correct his or her deficiencies.” In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We conclude termination of the parental rights of the father and mother is in M.H.’s best interests. In the Interest of L.S.: Affirmed (February, 10 2016) A father, William, appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to his son, L.S., who is just shy of two years old. William asserts he would be ready to care for L.S. after his release from a residential halfway house where he was completing his prison sentence. He also contends termination was not in L.S.’s best interests. After reviewing the record anew, we conclude the evidence satisfied the elements of Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2013) and termination was in the child’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Accordingly, we affirm the termination order. William challenges the termination order in his petition on appeal. He contends “[t]here is not sufficient evidence in the record to establish the child could not be returned to the father’s care and custody within a reasonable period of time following the termination hearing.” He also claims “[t]ermination was not in the best interests of the child.” The DHS is required to “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.102(7); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). We do not view the reasonable-efforts requirement as “a strict substantive requirement of termination.” Rather the State must demonstrate reasonable efforts “as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. The State satisfied that burden of proof here. In the Interest of H.W. & T.W.: Affirmed (February 10, 2016) A father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to his two children: H.W., born in February 2008, and T.W., born in November 2005. The father argues termination is not in the children’s best interests because he shares a substantial bond with his children. The court of appeals affirmed. The father claims termination of his parental rights was not in the children’s best interests under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c)4 because he shares a substantial bond with his children.

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Under Iowa law, a court need not terminate parental rights if it finds any of the statutory exceptions under section 232.116(3) apply. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39. “‘The factors weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory,’ and the court may use its discretion, ‘based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.’” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113 (quoting In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)). We do not find that the bond between the father and his children weighs against termination of the father’s parental rights here. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41). “[A]t some point, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and needs of the parent.” In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). Thus, upon our de novo review, we conclude no permissible factors weighing against termination exist and termination of the father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. In the Interest of T.W. and T.L. Affirmed (February, 10 2016) A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children, born in 2011 and 2012. He contends (1) the record lacks clear and convincing evidence to support the ground for termination cited by the district court, (2) he should have been afforded additional time to work towards reunification, and (3) termination was not in the children’s best interests. The Department of Human Services became involved with the family in 2012, based on domestic violence in the home and the presence of a marijuana metabolite in the younger child at birth. In 2013, the department again intervened “due to concerns that the children were present during a domestic incident involving the parents.” The violence persisted and the children were removed from the parents’ care in 2014. A court may grant a parent additional time to work towards reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). The juvenile court declined to award this relief, citing “the dismal record that has been well-established over the past three years, the pending criminal charges, and the likelihood that one or both parents will be unavailable to parent the children.” The court’s decision finds support in the record. The father contends termination was not in the children’s best interests. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). He cites the “strong relationship” with his children and the “negative impact” termination would have on them. There is no question the father was close to his children. The department case manager acknowledged he was “very interactive with the kids” during visits and “very appropriate.” Indeed, before the drug raid, she anticipated the children would “go home probably within a few short months.” “[N]obody knows what is going to happen, if there is going to be any jail time or what is going to be the outcome of that case.” Given this uncertainty, termination was in the children’s best interests.

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In The Interest of C.C.: Affirmed (March 9, 2016) Father appeals a termination of his parental rights to his child. He contends that the termination is not in the best interest of the child. He argues that since he is presently incarcerated and cannot take custody of the child that he should be given more time to complete his treatment programs. The court reminds us that children do not come with “pause buttons.” Time is the most critical component of these cases and the rights and needs of the child must be more important than needs of the parents. The child should not have to wait to see if the father can beat his drug habit, after waiting an entire year already. Moreover, the child would have to wait until the end of 2016 to have a clear idea of where he would be, which the father agreed would not be best. Order was affirmed.

TPR and Discretionary Exceptions:

In The Interest of Z.S. Affirmed (March 23, 2016) A Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. He contends that a guardianship would be better than terminating his parental rights, because termination is not in the child’s best interest. The court may choose to not terminate if certain circumstances exist, but it is not obligated to do so. They must always determine what is in the best interest of the child. There is testimony from the child’s therapist showing that the child understands the reality of his situation and that his father may never make the changes required of him. He is comfortable at the relative placement. The court determined that the child’s long term physical, mental, and emotional needs are better off with a termination of the Father’s parental rights. The termination will allow permanency and stability that will come from an adoption. Termination is affirmed. In The Interest of L.W. and B.W.: Affirmed (March 9, 2016) Mother argues that the Court should not have terminated her parental rights due to the fact that the children were placed in relative placement with their maternal grandmother. “The court need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if the court finds . . . [a] relative has legal custody of the child pursuant to code section 232.116(3)(a). However the relative placement exception is not mandatory. If it the termination is in the best interest of the child and there is clear and convincing evidence establishing a ground for termination, the court may proceed with the termination. Moreover, the exception only applies when the relative has actual custody over the child. In this case, custody was to remain with the Iowa Department of Human Services. Therefore, the exception was inapplicable. In sum, the termination was affirmed. In the Interest of R.H. Affirmed (September 10, 2015) Father appealed a termination order, arguing that a guardianship with a relative should have been established instead. The Court explained that “[e]stablishing a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination of parental rights and adoption. See In re L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 67–68 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). We do not deprive a child of permanency when the State has proved a ground for termination “hoping someday a parent will learn to parent and be able to provide a stable home.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. Termination is the appropriate

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solution when a parent is unable to regain custody within the time frames of chapter 232. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 174

Appeals

In the Interest of A.B. and R.B.; Appeals Dismissed (September 10, 2015) The parents appealed the Juvenile Court’s permanency order directing the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals because the permanency order was interlocutory. The necessary “finality” of the order “does not come until the after the termination hearing.” In re W.D. III, 562 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 1997).

Right to a Jury Trial & ICWA: In the Interest of K.C. and J.P.: Affirmed on Condition and Remanded (February, 10 2016) This appeal presents the question whether article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution extends the right to a jury trial to a mother defending against a petition to terminate her parental rights. The mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her request to have jurors decide whether to sever the parent-child relationship. She also argues the State did not prove a statutory basis for termination and the court should have kept the family intact because her two children lived with relatives, her teenaged son opposed the termination, and she had a close bond with the children. Because the state constitutional provision listing “rights of persons accused” does not apply to child welfare cases, we reject the mother’s jury trial argument. We also find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support terminating the mother’s relationship with her two children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2013). Further, we conclude the factors in section 232.116(3) do not outweigh the benefits of achieving permanency for K.C. and J.P. Accordingly, we affirm the termination order. But we do so only on the condition that the proceedings complied with the federal and state Indian Child Welfare Acts (ICWAs). Because the record raises questions concerning the mother’s Indian heritage, but does not show ICWA compliance, we remand for further proceedings. In concluding the state constitution did not guarantee parents the right to a jury trial in termination proceedings, the juvenile court cited two delinquency cases decided by the Iowa Supreme Court. See In re Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Iowa 1977) (concluding “it is not constitutionally required to inject a jury into the juvenile court setting”); see also In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Iowa 2013) (observing neither statutory nor constitutional provisions guarantee juveniles the right a jury trial). The juvenile court ruled it must “hear and decide” the case without a jury.

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On appeal, the mother contends the juvenile court’s ruling was in error. She asserts the Johnson holding “should probably be revisited” but, in the meantime, asks us to limit its application to delinquency cases. She points to case law describing the right to parent as a “fundamental liberty interest” protected by the state constitution. See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999). From that premise, she claims the action to terminate her parental rights is a case involving the liberty of an individual, triggering her right to a jury trial under article I, section 10. In response, the State argues we should extend the reasoning of Johnson to termination-of-parental-rights hearings. The Johnson majority opined the drafters’ 1857 reference to liberty interests in article I, section 10 “should not blindly mandate an absurd result because our forefathers had not yet seen fit to establish a separate juvenile court system.” 257 N.W.2d at 50. The State asserts even stronger reasons exist for not allowing jury trials in child welfare cases than in delinquency proceedings. Finally, we raise sua sponte an issue concerning compliance with the state and federal ICWAs. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (federal ICWA); Iowa Code ch. 232B (state ICWA); see also Matter of N.A.H., 418 N.W.2d 310, 311 (S.D. 1988) (holding ICWA is “primarily a jurisdictional statute” and appellate courts “must examine jurisdictional questions whether presented by the parties or not”). The mother testified at the termination hearing that she “get[s] money from the Indian reservation” in the amount of $600 to $1000 per month. The juvenile court quoted this testimony in its termination order. But the order did not mention compliance with ICWA. See Iowa Code § 232B.5(4) (providing court “shall establish in the record that the party seeking . . . termination of parental rights over . . . an Indian child has sent notice by registered mail” to the tribe). “The ICWA has a dual purpose—to protect the best interests of a child and preserve the Indian culture.” D.S., 806 N.W.2d at 465 (noting ICWA 13 must be applied even where no evidence shows children were raised in Indian culture). Our courts strictly construe the provisions of ICWA. Id. The Court remanded for notices to be sent to the tribe, and if the tribe intervened, explained that the termination order would be reversed. In The Interest of J.P.-R: Reversed and Remanded (March 23, 2016) Mother argued that the termination of her parental rights did not meet code section 232.116(1)(h), which allows termination where a child is three years or younger, has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance, and has been out of the parent’s custody for at least 6 consecutive months, and the child is not able to be returned to the parent’s custody at that time. She also argues that the presence of a bond pursuant to Iowa Code Section 232.116(3)(c). Mother requests an extension. The court points out short-lived efforts and a lack of intent to change her lifestyle, to justify the termination. Therefore, the termination was affirmed. However, the termination was only conditionally affirmed due to a failure to determine if the child is an Indian child under section 232B.3(6) and 232B.4. Because of this failure, the case was remanded to Juvenile Court to comply with ICWA regulations. If the tribe fails to respond or determines the child not be eligible for tribal membership, the termination will stand. If the child is determined to be eligible for termination and a tribe intervenes, reversal of the termination order and further proceedings consistent with ICWA requirements. Ruling was affirmed.

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Least Restrictive: In the Interest of A.J., A.J., A.J., And A.J., Affirmed (February 2016) The mother of four children appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order continuing placement of the children out of her custody and with the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS). The juvenile court essentially found the mother was unable or unwilling to address drug issues in her home. On our de novo review, we affirm the court’s order. The mother now appeals, arguing: (1) the State failed to show at the dispositional hearing by clear and convincing evidence that the children’s custody must be transferred from the mother; (2) the court failed to make the least-restrictive disposition in not returning the children to the mother’s custody; (3) the court failed to make and file written findings as to its reason for the disposition; and (4) the court erred in directing the mother to complete the MMPI. DHS, the State, and the juvenile court have a duty to protect children. Because the mother demonstrated at the dispositional hearing she was unable or unwilling to address the illegal substances found in her home and her children’s access to them, as well as other drug issues, such as the hydrocodone found and her husband possibly selling heroin from the home, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the children could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody, and the court therefore selected the least-restrictive-dispositional option available to it. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional order continuing the children’s removal from the mother’s custody.

Delinquency:

In re J.K.; Affirmed (October 14, 2015) A juvenile filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's finding that he was competent. The juvenile argued that two points: 1) the court erred because that the only evaluator who assessed him recommended he be found not competent; and 2) that it violated due process to apply a presumption of competence to a child. The Court of Appeals ruled against the juvenile on both issues. The Court noted that the evaluator in the case was inexperienced, and noted that her report should be viewed with caution due to the child's lack of cooperation in the assessment. The Court echoed its previous ruling in In re A.B. and recognized that standard for competence is the same for children and adults, with the exception that a child's competence can be demonstrated not only by intellectual disabilities or mental health issues, but by immaturity as well. With regard to the presumption issue, the court noted that although the legislature could address juvenile competency more specifically, applying the presumption of competency did not violate due process. A recent decision in the California Supreme Court supported the Iowa Court of Appeals decision.

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In the Interest of C.M. Reversed (February 10, 2016) A juvenile accused of robbery in the second degree appeals from his delinquency adjudication. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he aided or abetted the commission of the delinquent act. We agree and therefore reverse. On January 9, 2015, teenagers DeAngela and Cassandra rode the city bus and disembarked near a drug store, which is apparently used as a warming area for students transferring to another bus. DeAngela went into the drug store to see if her mother was working that day. DeAngela was asked for money repeatedly by two other students she recognized from her school, Davion and Charielle. C.M. was in the vicinity. When DeAngela declined, Davion pulled her from the store by her back pack, took the pack from her, and removed her wallet, which he handed to Charielle. Charielle removed five dollars from DeAngela’s wallet and then threw the wallet on the ground. At the adjudication hearing, DeAngela testified Charielle and Davion had asked her for money on prior occasions, and that Charielle had taken money from her before. When asked if C.M. had asked her for money or had bother her before she said no. The juvenile court found C.M. aided and abetted Charielle and Davion in the robbery of DeAngela, concluding: Although [C.M.] may not have been the one to physically remove DeAngela from the store or physically remove her back pack and money, the record contains substantial evidence to show that [he] assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act. . . . Although a defendant’s mere presence is insufficient to support a conviction on a theory of aiding and abetting, the requisite participation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed. . . . DeAngela testified that [C.M.] helped remove her back pack and that she was certain all three subjects were involved. Additionally, [C.M.] testified that he heard Charielle and Davion requesting money from DeAngela. At no point did he intervene to stop the requests, nor did he at any point attempt to stop the attack on DeAngela. During the subsequent investigation he was not truthful as to his involvement when interviewed by Officer Beck. C.M. argues the fact that he did not do anything to stop or prevent the robbery is insufficient to convict him of the crime of aiding and/or abetting the commission of a robbery. This record does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt C.M. actively participated or in some manner encouraged the robbery. We acknowledge that a person’s requisite participation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and conduct after the offense is committed. See State v. Miles, 346 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Iowa 1984) (noting defendant “took up the struggle for the purse” after another woman fled leaving the purse behind in which three dresses were placed, and insisted she had ample money to pay for the dresses though her purse contained only three dollars). The trial court rejected C.M.’s testimony that he did not know that Charielle and Davion were going to attack DeAngela based on C.M.’s “lack of candor during the interview with Officer Beck.” But the evidence of active participation or encouragement is lacking nonetheless. Even evidence that C.M. walked into the store with Davion and Charielle is insufficient to show proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

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In the Interest of J.C. Decision of the Court of Appeals and Juvenile Court Judgment Affirmed (April 1, 2016) J.C. appeals his delinquency adjudication arguing that there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause when the juvenile court admitted out-of-court statements of a four-year-old child victim, A.W. Applying recent authority of the United States Supreme Court, (Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 192 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2015)) which states that: “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers. It is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the police.” This analysis in Clark was used to determine what the primary purpose of the statements were. If the primary purpose was to be considered testimonial then they would be more likely to involve the confrontation clause. Based on Clark, the Court stated that they did not believe admission of testimony and the report violated the right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Likewise, the child in this case is very young and the Supreme Court stated in Clark that “[s]tatements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 192 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2015). And therefore the age of the child alone may settle this inquiry.

Private Termination: In the Interest of B.B.E. Reversed and Remanded (February 10, 2016) This case arises out of the mother’s efforts to terminate her rights and the biological father’s rights in their son for the purpose of facilitating adoption of the child. At the termination hearing, the mother testified that it was in her son’s best interest “to stay with the adoptive parents where he’s got a future and a life ahead of him that neither of us [the biological parents] would be able to give him.” The district court concluded the grounds for termination of the father’s rights had not been proved. The mother’s request for and consent to the termination of her parental rights was contingent upon termination of the father’s parental rights. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the mother’s petition to terminate parental rights. The child’s guardian and custodian and guardian ad litem timely filed this appeal. The father has not filed any brief in this appeal. The child at issue, B.B.E., was born in January 2015. The child was released from the hospital to the custody of his prospective adoptive parents, who live in Maryland. In January 2015, the mother filed a petition to terminate her parental rights and the father’s parental rights for the purpose of facilitating the child’s adoption. The child’s guardian and custodian joined as a co-petitioner. The petitioners contended the father had abandoned the child pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.8(3) and (4). The district court concluded the petitioners failed to prove the father abandoned the child. Specifically, the district court concluded the mother diligently attempted to alienate the father from the child by disallowing the father’s presence at medical appointments and ceasing communication with the father. The district court concluded the mother “has unilaterally decided that the child would be placed for adoption.”

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On de novo review, in light of the statutory factors, we conclude the petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence the father abandoned the child within the meaning of the Code. During the period of the pregnancy, the father took no action to demonstrate his commitment to the child. The father attended a single medical appointment with the mother and then had no further communication with her. Although the father had gainful employment at Polaris Industries and medical insurance, he did not provide any financial assistance to the mother or child. Although the father was aware the mother wanted to put the child up for adoption, he did not obtain counsel or take any other action to protect his rights in the child. (“A few sporadic text messages over the period of a few months . . . do not rise to any sort of meaningful contact that may fend off a claim of abandonment, particularly given the father did not attempt any other type of communication—or offer financial or emotional support—to K.M.”); In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (affirming termination order where the father communicated with the mother via “sporadic text messages” over the course of several months and made no attempts to follow up); In re D.S.P., No. 09–1188, 2010 WL 445690, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2010) (holding the father abandoned his daughter when he “largely gave up” on communication after his first attempts were unsuccessful). The father’s effort to establish a relationship with or assume custody of the child is particularly lacking given several other significant facts. First, the father attended the first prenatal visit with the mother and should have known who and where the mother’s doctor was located. At trial, the father excused his follow up by stating he did not take any notes. Second, the father and the mother shared mutual friends and acquaintances, but the father made no serious effort to contact the mother after the July 1 text message exchange. Third, the father and the father’s girlfriend knew the mother worked at Menard’s, but the father did not try to contact the mother there. At trial, the father testified he “[c]ouldn’t see it viable.” Fourth, the father knew he worked the same shift with the mother’s mother at Polaris. Yet, he made no effort to inquire about the mother or the child. Finally, by the time of trial in this case, the mother also worked at Polaris with the father, but the father still had not made any effort to contact the mother and discuss the situation. Demonstrating a commitment to a child requires more than pecking away at one’s phone every once in a while and then giving up when no response is received. “An abandoned child is no less abandoned because the parent can rationalize a reason for the abandonment.” M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d at 7. The court determined termination of the parents’ rights in B.B.E. is in the best interest of the child. The child is thriving in the prospective adoptive parents’ care. The prospective parents have two other children—a daughter, age six, and a son, age three. The prospective siblings sing to and play with the child. The prospective mother does not work outside the home so she can spend more time with the children. She worked with a lactation consultant to nurse B.B.E. and enhance the parent-child bond. The prospective parents take the child to music class and to the pool for water play time. The prospective parents have agreed to send an update on the child’s status to the mother every six months until the child is six and every year after that and to send the father the same information. The prospective adoptive family, including the children, has bonded with the child. It is the family the child has known since leaving the hospital. In the Interest of L.M.: Affirmed (March 9, 2016)

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Father appealed the termination of his parental rights. The court concluded that the evidence shows that the Father neither visited the child nor maintained communication with the child at all. Only minimal, efforts were put into any type of communication with the child. Therefore, there no affirmative parenting took place. Since there was no affirmative parenting that occurred there was clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the child. The father also argues that it “should not be easier for a parent to terminate the parental rights of another parent than to obtain sole legal custody of the child. He contends that termination would not be in the child’s best interest. The court determined that since there had been limited contact with the child since July 2013. Therefore, the child has no real relationship with the Father. The Mother was also about to be married to someone else, who is interested in adopting the child. That would be what is in the best interest of the child. The termination order is affirmed.

In the Interest of J.E.: Affirmed (March 9, 2016) Father appealed a termination of his parental rights, claiming that he did not abandon his child. Over the time that the father was incarcerated the father write two or three letters to the child. He paid approximately $35 in child support since 2009. In In re D.M. the court stated that abandonment is “a giving up of parental rights and responsibilities accompanied by an intent to forego them.” The court understands that imprisonment hampers the ability to pay child support and visit a child. However, the Father here didn’t attempt “affirmative parenting” that was in fact practical in his circumstances. Even after his release, he continued to fail to pay any child support. The court acknowledges that there were difficulties for the father, however, the court points out that the difficulties were the result of his own “actions and lifestyle.” All new efforts from him were “too little too late.” Termination due to abandonment was affirmed.

Legislative Update: 1. Iowa updates related to the Federal Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act. Highlights (SF2258): APPLA limited to 16+; new reporting requirements for DHS when children leave placement and/or sex trafficking is a concern. Also introduces reasonable prudent parent standard for foster placements, which allows group and foster care placements the discretion to authorize activities for foster children that promote “normalcy” like school field trips or extracurricular activities.

https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ga=86&ba=sf2258.

2. Juvenile Record Confidentiality (SF 2288): Delinquency records for delinquent acts (other than forcible felonies) are presumptively confidential. Records can become public based on motion, or new delinquent acts.

https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ga=86&ba=sf2288.

3. GAL in Adoption Proceedings (HF2282): Requires Court to make a finding prior to an adoption hearing on whether a GAL should be appointed for the Child.

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https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ga=86&ba=hf2282.

 

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