hmic-response1b - stockwell

8/8/2019 hmic-response1b - Stockwell

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HMIC Review into MPS Implementation of Stockwell 1BRecommendations


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IPCC Recommendation 8:

Evidence: HMIC has reviewed Kratos SOPs and application in real time operations, as well as observing training exercises such as Tulipand Linchpin. The MPS has scheduled similar exercises to run four times within the next 12 months in addition to exercises such asWooden Pride which involve outside agencies. Learning derived from such operations is discernable within the new SOPs and staff awareness in relation to cross OCU operating protocols is significant with surveillance and firearms teams moving towards operating as ateam rather then in parallel. Staff also evince confidence when discussing training provision and its relevance to their roles andresponsibilities. Levels of interoperability are highest among SCD11 and CO19 but also evident between SCD11 and SO15 251 , SCD7 andCO19. Feedback from staff suggests that less confidence exists between CO19 and SO15, and between MPS operatives and other forceswho are less experienced and exposed to such operations, although increased exercising should in some measure address that.

MPS Action: All th e newly updated Kratos SOPs emphasise that communication is a vital part of interoperability and the MPS has worked todevelop a rehearsed understanding of the protocols governing the use of firearms in relation to surveillance operations, facilitating the deploymentof appropriate firearms support when necessary. The MPS has consequently exercised the new SOPs and introduced a training regime under the

auspices of Operation Enhance that exposes surveillance teams and firearms teams to real time operations increasing experience and familiarityacross the OCUs with beneficial results for staff skills and cross OCU operations.

Recommendation: To review existing policy and operational capability in relation to the deployment of surveillance teams on firearms operations and toensure that deployment fully complements and supports rapid armed intervention should such subsequently become necessary.

Comments: The MPS aim is to produce operatives capable of achieving complex operational objectives to the national standardsand provide them with the specialist skills commensurate to roles and responsibilities. The current arrangements constitutesatisfactory development, but the MPS would benefit from the co-location of all surveillance assets under one command, thusfacilitating co-ordination of operations, training and development and making full interoperability achievable.


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Evidence : MPS compliance with the Police Reform Act requirement as above is routine and this case in point was the exception to thatrule, due to the nature of the event outlined below. However the MPS has acknowledged that making the exception was an error and hasmade good progress in commencing renewed dialogue with the IPCC under the auspices of AC Yates.

MPS Action: The MPS has acknowledged and supports the role of the IPCC. The guidance provided by the Police (Complaints and Misconduct)Regulations 2004 stipulate under section 2(3) that where a complaint is required to be referred to the Commission under sub paragraph (1) (a) or (b) of paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act notification of the complaint shall be given to the commission not later then the end of the dayfollowing the day on which it first becomes clear to the appropriate authority that the complaint is one to that sub paragraph) applies and (b) in suchmanner as the commission requires. The MPS has made a concerted effort to establish a dialogue and a constructive working relationship under theauspices of AC John Yates.

Recommendation: That all mandatory referrals to the IPCC should occur, particularly in the case of death or serious injury, as soon as possible but in any

event not later than the end of the day following the incident, complaint or misconduct and that the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004should be amended accordingly.

Comments: The circumstances in this case were without precedent and confronted the MPS with numerous competing and seriousdecision-making responsibilities across a range of issues. These included the need to assess simultaneously the national securityconcerns at the time, the demands of progressing an unresolved terrorist investigation and the need to address all relevantlegislation requirements including the mandatory referral issue. It is acknowledged that the combined effect of these demands ledto the delay in the mandatory referral to the IPCC as per required procedure. However, it is emphasised that this occurred in the

most exceptional circumstances. The only comparable event since has been the shooting at Forest Gate (where there was earlyreferral to the IPCC). HMIC is of the view that the MPS is fully supportive of the legislative requirement and will facilitate futurereferral of appropriate cases expeditiously, irrespective of the nature of the surrounding circumstances.


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Has not been considered by HMIC as part of its review.


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hmic-response1b - stockwell

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