hertling eot assessment v2.4
TRANSCRIPT
TF Iron Operation Iraqi Freedom
07-09
28 October 2007 – 9 December 2008The overall classification of this briefing is
UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYas of 28 Jan 09V2.3
MND-N Provincial Orientation
TURKEY
SYRIAIRAN
•7 Provinces, 4 w/ CF presence•3 International Borders
–180 mi border w/ Turkey–175 mi border w/ Syria–300 mi border w/ Iran
•Population: ~10,200,000 (6.3 in MND-N)•48 Districts (23 in MND-N)
NJNJ
CTCT
MDMD
VTVT
Ninewa (~2.6 mil)Ninewa (~2.6 mil)
Kirkuk (~1.1 mil)Kirkuk (~1.1 mil)
Diyala (~1.5 mil)Diyala (~1.5 mil)
Salah ad Din (~1.1 mil)Salah ad Din (~1.1 mil)
475 km
450 km
JRTC/NTCComparisonJRTC/NTC
Comparison
Sunni/Shia Insurgency in MND-N Categorization of Groups
Sunni Extremists• Driven by Salafist ideology • Anti-Everybody• Non-reconcilable• Indiscriminate targeting of local nationals
Sunni Nationalists• Open to participation in current GoI if conditions are “right”• Willing to reintegrate into GoI security apparatus• Some cells focused targeting of Coalition Forces
Sunni Rejectionists• Desires return of Sunni/Ba’ath government• Rejects current GoI, Coalition “occupation”• Non-reconcilable• Focused targeting of Coalition /Shi’a security forces
Shi’a Extremists• Anti-Coalition• Non-reconcilable• Pursuit of military means to drive out occupation forces, counter / eliminate Sunni influence
•4 River Systems–Tigris River Valley–Diyala River Valley–Uzaym River Valley–Zaab Rivers
•Lake Thar Thar (Man-made)
•2 Mountain Ranges–Hamrins–Sinjar Ridge
•Barren Deserts–Jazirah–Jalam
•10 Major Cities
•Weather–Temps (35oF – 115oF)–Dust (Shamal/Haboob)
MND-N Terrain & Weather
475 km
450 km
Sinjar Ridge
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRANKRG
TAL AFARMOSUL
IRBIL
KIRKUK
HAWIJAH
TUZBAYJI
TIKRIT
SAMARRA
BALAD
BAQUBAH
MUQDADIYAH
KANAQIN
QARA TAPA
JALULA
Hamrin Mountains
Bayji
Dahuk
Salah ad Din
Diyala
Irbil
Ninewa
Tal Afar
Sulaymaniah
Kirkuk
Khanaqin
Hawijah
Mandali
Rabiah
Sinjar
Makhmur
Mosul
Tuz Khurmatu
Kirkuk
Kifri
Hawijah80,000
Mosul1,750,000
Kirkuk850,000
Baqubah350,000
Muqdadiyah84,000
Samarra189,000
Tikrit147,000
Tal Afar130,000
Sulaymaniyah900,000
Irbil900,000
Bayji145,000
Balad122,000
MND-N Demographics
Ethnicities
Kurds
Sunni Arab
Mixed Kurd/Sunni Arab
Shia Arab
Mixed Shia/Sunni Arab
Turkoman/Yizidi/other
• 3 Major religious / ethnic groups
• Turkoman and Yizidi ethnic minorities
• Small minority of Christians
• KRG boundary v Kurdish region
• Most diverse population in Iraq
Iraq Demographics
Iraq Demographics
Kurdish Tribes Barzani Tribe constitutes the majority of KDP leadership. Talabani Tribe constitutes the majority of the PUK leadership
Shammar Confederation:• Shia/Sunni
Janabi Confederation:• Shia/Sunni • Nearly 1 million members total• 8 tribes
Dulaym Confederation:• Shia/Sunni
Al-Jaburi Confederation: • Confederation claims over two million Sunni and Shia confederates
The Obeidi Tribe: • Obeidi Tribe does not currently recognize a single supreme Sheikh
Tikriti tribes:• Sunni
•7 confederations, but over a hundreds sub-tribes
•Tribal identity vs–National identity–Religious identity–Ethnic identity
•Tribal law vs GoI authority
•Cross boundary tribes–Smuggling–FF&E Facilitation
•Tribal feuds –Resources–Honor
•Tribal control of economic centers
MND-N Tribal Overview
LEGEND
Kurdish Influence
Current Green Line (GoI Recognized/TAL)
Kurdish Claims
LEGEND
Kurdish Influence
Current Green Line (GoI Recognized/TAL)
Kurdish Claims
The Kurdish “Factor”Current Status:• Delayed UNAMI Assessment - “Strategic Ambiguity”• Khanaqin Standoff
Concerns:• Continued GoI/KRG tension• Peshmerga/IA coordination • Elections law passed – status of Kirkuk still not resolved• UNAMI DIBs proposal
Expected Flashpoints (IA-Pesh Confrontation):• Khanaqin District• Kirkuk District• Sinjar District• Tal Afar District
SINJAR
TAL AFAR
KIRKUK
KHANAQIN.
. .
.
Energy Infrastructure
MND-NE
Ninewa
KirkukSulaymaniyah
Dahuk
Salah ad Din
Diyala
IrbilRabiyah POE
Muntheria POE
Stabilization Plants#1 & #2
NorthernGas Company
Kirkuk Oil Fields
Naft Khana GOSP
IZ-TU Pipeline
Mullah AbdullahPower Plant
Bayji Power Plant
• Both hydroelectric and oil-fired plants produce the region’s power
• Lack of electricity is often the limiting factor in other infrastructure performance •Kirkuk Oil Fields and the Bayji Oil Refinery are the principle means of production in MND-N
• Each piece of the oil infrastructure is critical to the operation of the overall network
Oil & Gas Fields
Processing Treatment
Pumping Stations
Oil Pipelines
Dams
Power Plant Bayji Oil Refinery
Habur Gate POE
Powerlines
1
23
45
6
7
8
11
13
10
14
1516 15
Rail line through Mosul
Lines of Communication
12
Key Bridges in MND-N
Operational
Shillal Bridge
Mosul Dam Bridge
Samarra Dam Bridge
Sarha Bridge
Quwair Bridge
Repairs Underway
Aski-Mawsil Bridge (ongoing, ECD FEB 09)
Quayarah Bridge (ongoing, ECD MAR 09)
Ash Sharqat Bridge (ongoing, ECD MAR 09)
Zekhaiton Bridge (ongoing, ECD FEB 09)
Baqubah Bridge (contracted, ECD TBD)
Samarra Float Bridge (ongoing, ECD DEC 08)
Badush-Siboni Bridge (ongoing, ECD JAN 09)
Fathah Bridge (ongoing, ECDMAR 10)
Unrepaired
Darnajukh Bridge
Fathah Railroad Bridge
Buhriz Bridge
Sindiyah Bridge
1
2
3
7
8
11
12
13
4
5
6
9
10
14
15
16
15
Heavy Railroad Track status:ObstructionsOperationalNeeds to be testedNon-operational (blocked or needs repairs)No GoI plan to openRail is on or next to MND-N base
9
The Threat in MND-N
12-Week Attack Trends by MND/F (Sep – Nov 2007)
TF Iron’s 1st Month
TF Iron TOA
TF Iron TOA
Week Ending Week Ending16-Nov-07 23-Nov-07
MND-BAGHDAD 60 64 4MND-C 66 51 -15MND-CS 1 3 2MND-N 232 270 38MND-NE 0 0 0MNF-W 23 29 6MND-SE 11 16 5
Region # Change
MND-B MND-C MND-CS MND-N MND-NE MNF-W MND-SE
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Insurgency in Iraq
MNC-I C2 INTSUM31 OCT 2007
1st TF Iron KIA
CPT Timothy McGovern
MNC-I C2 INTSUM31 OCT 2007
1st TF Iron KIA
CPT Timothy McGovern
Diyala
KirkukKirkuk
TikritIRAN
SamarraSamarra
Hit
BaladBalad
BaqubahBaqubah
Kuwait City
KUWAITUmm Qasr
NajafNajaf / Kufah
SulaymaniyaSulaymaniya
An Nukhayb
NasiriyahNasiriyah
Safwan
Qurnah
BasrahBasrah
Al AmarahAl Amarah
SYRIA
Tall Afar
Habur Gate
Ar Rutbah
Al Asad
Al Walid
SAUDI ARABIA
IrbilIrbil
N. Babil
Rabyah
Hawijah
HadithahRawah
Husaybah
Al Qaim
TURKEY
DahukDahuk
MosulMosul
Bayji
BaghdadBaghdadFallujah
RamadiRamadi
Al HillahAl Hillah
IskandariyahKarbala
Hindiyah
Diwaniyah
Al KutAl Kut
Samawah
Muqdadiyah
Baghdad022
MND-NE 0 / 0MND-N 12 / 31MND-B 4 / 9MNF-W 0 / 0MND-C 1 / 13
MND-CS 0 / 1MND-SE 0 / 2TOTAL 17 / 56
EFFECTIVE ENEMY ATTACKS / TOTAL ENEMY ATTACKS
1
1
1
1
1
1
2 21 1
10
Diwaniyah
0
0
0
0
Attack on CF
Attack on ISF
Attack on Civilians
Attack on Infrastr.
Zaab
Triangle
Security• Surge in Baghdad and Anbar driving fight
to MND-N• AQI dominant threat; organized, lethal,
capable• Foreign Fighter and external support
networks a significant influence in MND-N• Enemy finance, media capable & effective• Vast ungoverned areas, limited CF/ISF
presence
Provincial Governance• PGov/GoI disconnect; strong perception
of Shi’a bias and neglect• Lack of PGov capacity in Ninewa, Diyala,
SaD; public confidence in PGov low• IP capacity and capability low; IA
capabilities improving• Kurd concerns over Article 140 deadline
(DEC 07)
Economic Stability• Lack of budget execution and release of
funds across all provinces• High unemployment, lack of capital
generation and opportunities• BOR corruption and poor oil distribution
linked to AQI extortion, funding activities
Reconciliation• Population begins turning away from AQI/violence• CLC (SoIZ) well established in Diyala; indication of tribal/local CLC
interest in Za’ab region, southern Salah ad Din• Indications of insurgent group (JARF-1920s, JM) fledgling interest in
cease-fire, political participation• No DDR or reconciliation measures in place
AQI Presence
AQI Support Zone
JAM Presence
JAM SG Sanctuary
AQI Presence
AQI Support Zone
JAM Presence
JAM SG Sanctuary
MND-N ThreatKey Conditions in Oct ‘07
Al Anbar
Awakening
Baghdad
Surge
SVESTPropane Tanks
IRL’s
8 ft
4ft
Deep Buried IED CraterBBIED (Talon view)BBIED (Talon view)EFP’s
RPG’s
Weapons Cache of Various Ordnance Material
Projectiles encased inconcrete to look like curb MAIED
RKG-3M
UBE
Threat CapabilitiesThreat Capabilities
ExternalInfluence
ExternalInfluence
Mosul Attacks
Attack Trends
TF Iron Operations
Effective 28 OCTOBER 07
XX1
Attached to:
IGFC IGFC
32
XX XX 4
XX
II 3 1/3
MND-B
II 3 2/2
II 4 2/4
II 3 2/4
557 USAF
TENANT UNIT
431 CAOPCON
MP728OPCON
EASOS25
DS
I I
25 STB
I I
5 5
TF Iron MND-N
(-)
DS184
EOD
IGFC
II 3 3/2
X
3 2
(-)
ooo4 2X (-)
ooo4-9
ooo2-1
BTB
202
2-12
BSB
115 MPAD
717th EOD
DS
B/401 CA
EASOS 5-25
10511001
(-)
18 EOD
DS
X
4
SPECTRE TACON
5-82(-)
1-9(-)
2-7
STBSTBSTB4
BSB27
1000
(-)
B/431OPCON
CA
DS
IFSB237
EASOS9-25DS
3
xx
I
TACON ALB
2
xx
Partnered6, 7, 13 SIB
x
SIB
x
SIB
x
SIB
2
IIIMTR
TACON
X
142
TABTABTAB
1-4/A/1-14 TAB
HHB/142
HQ/C/1-14 TAB
FSE25ID
TAB
TABTABTABTAB
1-6/C/1-14 TAB
1-3/H-26
TABTABTAB
X
2 9
(-)
Partnered
II 3 2/5
X
4 9
8, 12, 18, 20 BN
C/431OPCON
CA
X
3 1
725EOD
DS
TACON
BLUE
5-73
6-9
BTB3(-)
BSB215(-)
1060
1-12
(-)xx 5
Partnered
II
2/12
EASOS9-25DS
2-23 ooo
1-38 ooo
B/425
506 EOD
DS
3-6
1-87
BSB325
1040
CA
BTB3(-)
2-22
X
1 10
EASOS25-25DS
Partnered
SIB 1BDE 1,2,3,4,5, BN
(-)x
2 4
x 3 4
x 1
(-)
5
XX
IGFC
DOC
(-)
111
19 CH
1 CE
I I
5 5
ADCON
I I
1AD STB
X
ADCON FOR UCMJ
I I
CA 431
(-)x
2 SIB
NP NP
6 2 NP
X
9,10 BN
x 1 4
4 4
X
EASOS14-25DS
A/431OPCON CA
1-327
2-327
2-320
X
1 101
BSTB101
1050
(-)
7-9EOD
DS
332EOD
EASOS
NP NPAA
X
1-32
BSB426
1-71
ODIN
1
ATTACHED
1-1
X
1
ASB601
4-6
3-1
1-6
2-1
AH
GS
ASLT
5 x US BCTs21 x US BNs
TF Iron StanceOctober 2007
Ninewa
KirkukSalah ad Din
Irbil
Sulaymaniyah
Diyala
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
Dahuk
4
3
XXXX
33
XXXX
55
XXXX
22
XXXX
44
PRT
PRT
RRT
ePRTPRT
PRT
MND-North MissionTransitions
OLD IRONSIDESOLD IRONSIDES
Operation Iron Resolve (January 2008):TF Iron in partnership with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Northern Provincial Leaders, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), conducts counterinsurgency operations by supporting the security of the population and by assisting in the development of a legitimate GOI throughout MND-N in order to transition to a stable and self-reliant Iraq.
Operation Northern Law (October 2007):TF Lightning conducts counter-insurgency operations to enhance population security and governance throughout MND-N IOT: develop credible and capable ISF; defeat terrorists and insurgents and neutralize extremists; legitimize provincial and local governments; and contain political and sectarian violence.
December January February MarchNovemberOctober April May June July August September DecemberNovemberOctober
Ramadan HajjHajj
28 OctMND-N
TOA
03 Dec3/1 CD to 4/2 ID
TOA
2-23
6-9
2-82
11 Dec4/1 CD(-) to 3 ACR(-)
TOA
AO Lightning
2-71-9
5-82
TAO Mameluke
4-6A
L
(+)
OPCON to TF714OPCON to TF714
15 Mar142 FiB to 75 FiB
TOA
01 AprTAO Mameluke Active (MNF-W)
29 May111 EN to 18 EN
TOA
01 Jun4/2 ID to 2 SCR(-)
TOA
IIooo2 2
II25
IIooo4 2
2
From MND-BFrom
MND-B
26 Aug4-6 CAV to 6-17 CAV
TOA
1-24
1-5
3-21
5-1
251
2-8
15 Oct•1-67 AR
Arrive FOB McHenry•18 EN to
Kirkuk (KLE)
27 Oct•2 SCR to 1/25 ID
TOA •2/3 ACR to Mosul
05 Nov•TAO Tripoli Active (MNF-
W)•AO Ligtning and TAO
Mameluke Inactive
07 Nov1/10 MTN
Depart(No Backfill)
2-221-873-6
2-12
1-38
2-1
1-122-320
IIooo3 2
1-327
3-8
1-6A
L
(-)
1-71
4-9
IIooo1 2
1-1
A
H
2-1 GS
3-1 ASLT
X
1
142
111
1-32
22 Nov1/101 ABN to
3/25 ID TOA
2-35
2-27
3-4
3-7
3 25
28 Nov1 ID CAB to
10 MTN CAB TOA
3-3
A
H
2-10 ASLT
3-10 GS
6-6A
L
X
10
01 DecMND-NE
EOM
XX
1-8
1 3
3 3
3
6-17A
L
75
18
1-67
TAO Tripoli
09 DecMND-N
TOA
2-327
125
20xBN 18xBN 17xBN 16xBN 15xBN 14xBN
Iron Hammer Iron Harvest Iron PursuitVoter
RegistrationIron Reaper
01 AprAO Lightning
Active (TF 525)
MND-N Stance06 Dec2/3 ACR to Diyala
15 Dec3/2 SCR to Diyala
05 Jan1-8 IN to Mosul
15 Jan4-9 IN TOA with
2/25 IDBattlespace
Realignment with MND-B
01 Feb1-71 CAV(+) OPCON to
TF 714
2008200820072007
TAO Striker
15 JulTAO
Striker
15 Aug1/2 SCR to
MosulTAO
Striker Ends
2 3
(-)
OIF 07-09
MND-N Stance
728 MP448 CA
2/1 AD(-)
DDR508 518 565 1k 1.5k 2.5k 2.5k 3k
8k 15.5k
SoIZ8.5k 15k 16.5k 20k 24.5k 32k 31.5k 30.5k 30k 29.5k 27.5k
Att
ac
k T
ren
ds
Secure Environment
Capable
ISF
Economic Stability
Functioning Provincial
Government
3k 3k
27.5k 27.5k
HAMMER
REAPER
IRAQI VOICE PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III
IRON MAMMOTH
MoTS IIMoTSLION’S ROAR GToB
United & Prosperous
United &Strong I U&S II U&S III
U&J III
Rule of Law
U&J II
Energy Conf #5
Energy Conferences
United & Healthy Women’s Conference
HAJJ HAJJRAMADANASHURANOV 07 DEC 07OCT 07 NOV 07 DEC 07OCT 07 MAR 08 APR 08JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08JAN 08 FEB 08 JUL 08 AUG 08MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08MAY 08 JUN 08 NOV 08 DEC 08SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08SEP 08 OCT 08
MROC
OIF 07-09
MND-N STANCEMND-N
STANCE
Drought Relief
NiOC
HYDRA
HARVEST PHASE II PH II PH III
En
du
rin
g E
ffe
cts
IRON PARTNERSHIP
IRON MUSALAHA
CLC Contracts
MI-17Crash
TF IronBDA
Energy Conf #4#3#2#1
TAOTripoli
Qayarrah Bridge
Assessments
Zanjili Explosion
Enabling TF IronTF Iron Remembers
IA/IP Soccer
Khanaqin StandoffPGOV’s Son
Archbishop Kidnapped
GEN Petraeus Testimony
TAOMameluke AO Lightning
Rabiyah POE SVEST
ROUNDUP
ISF/CFOPs
3IA Air AssaultRegional Tng Ctr Kirkuk IP GraduationMPSA
IRON RHYTHM
Shi’a Pilgrimage (Samarra)
DoI Graduation
PURSUIT
Hood HarvestFratricide
PB Bushmaster VBIED
United & Just I
Salah ad Din Visit
COP Inman SVBIED
MND-NE
Kirkuk Demonstration/IED
OH-58DCrash
Water TankerAttack
Iron Observations
OIF 07-09Operational Assessment
Challenges to “Hold” and “Build”• Effects of surge in Baghdad/southern Iraq and
awakening movement in Al Anbar pushed AQI east and north into MND-N.
• MND-N remained an economy of force during surge in Baghdad.
• Many key population centers were “unsecure” in northern Iraq.
• AQI retained freedom of maneuver in northern provinces.
• CLC (Sons of Iraq) recruiting still immature in MND-N.• Weak government institutions – provincial and GoI.
What Changed+ 80% decline in attacks + 79% reduction in improvised explosives+ 43,000 increase in Iraqi Security forces+ Sons of Iraq growth 26,415+ DDR - CF cease fire ~3000Challenges transitioning to “Build”- Only 73% 07 budget received; only 19% 08 budget received- Slow economic expansion - Police primacy (hiring/training) 16,000 IPs still untrained- Sons of Iraq transfer to GoI progressing slowly- Border focus- Elections issues- Kurd influences
Operational AssessmentsOctober 2007 December 2008
Public Perceptions
Confidence in Prov Gov’t to provide security?
Public Confidence in IP in MND-N ?
Public Confidence in IA in MND-N?
Current Household financial status (have enough)?
Is the Govt making efforts to improve job opportunities?
Is the sewage disposal system working?
Is there trash collection in your neighborhood? Does your family get the electricity you need?
Likelihood to Vote?
% October 07
5.3%
Positive Response 49.1%
Positive Response 51.3%
51.2%
3%
14.9% Yes
10.5% Yes
15.4% Yes
39.3%
% December 08
64.3%
Positive Response 84.5%
Positive Response 81.7%
73.4%
25.7%
26.4% Yes
36.6% Yes
32.6% Yes
71.0%
Change (Oct-Dec)
59.0%
35.4%
30.4%
22.2%
22.7%
11.5%
26.1%
17.2%
31.7%
Changes in Public Perception
Source: MNC-I National Public Opinion Poll
• 80% reduction in total attacks– 79% reduction in IEDs; 76% reduction in Direct Fire attacks; 86% reduction in
IDF attacks– 89% reduction in CF KIA; 74% reduction in ISF KIA; 42% reduction in Civ KIA
• (S/MCFI) The enemy isolated and off balance – Driven from population centers / support zones– Finance and recruiting efforts disrupted
• (S/MCFI) Enemy no longer a threat to legitimacy and survival of GoI– High-level captures has left AQI fractured and decentralized– Targeting of Shi’a extremists has degraded their operational capability– While disrupted, Sunni rejectionists continue attempts to infiltrate GOI, ISF
and other Iraqi institutions
Security
MND-N Attacks: Oct 07 - Oct 08
16511488 1548 1555
1301
854
635
470
882806 864 909 857 812
739580
484 518607 562
382273
179326
753908
14121376
814879
0
500
1000
1500
2000
Oct NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Total Attacks IED Events
Operations Iron Harvest II, Lion’s
Roar, MoTS I
Operations Iron Harvest II, Lion’s
Roar, MoTS I Operation Iron Pursuit
Operation Iron Pursuit
Operation Iron HammerOperation
Iron Hammer
Operation Iron ReaperOperation Iron Reaper
Operation Iron Harvest I
Operation Iron Harvest I
Operation Iron MusalahaOperation Iron Musalaha
Mother of Two Springs II
Mother of Two Springs II
MND-N EOF Trends
Number of LNs Injured or Killed in MND-N EOFs
MND-N Total and Serious Injury, Death, or Damage (SIDD) EOFs
• 8 EOFs for OCT 08 is a decrease of 2 from SEP 08; the lowest month of incidents; and a 86% decrease since TOA.
• Two SIDD incidents resulted in two LNs wounded and one killed.
86%
14%
Shot to Kill First Step
Shot to Disable/Warn as First Step
One Non-Lethal
Two or More Non-Lethal Graduated Steps
Graduated Measures Employed in October
10
25
65
8
1913
8
20
32
2429
43
56
3112315877 5 5
20
10
20
30
4050
60
70
80
90
100
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
Total EOFIncidentswithWeaponsDischarged
Total EOFresulting inSIDD
NOV
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1
0
3
9
55
3
10
1123
1
6
10
2
6
03
1113 1
5
2
46
11
2
0
444
21 01
22
000
5
10
15
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
OverallWND/KLD
LN WND
LN KLD
PropertyDamage
NOV
EOF Incidents by Weapon Type (%)
• Nearly half of all EOF incidents in October involved the use of individual weapons.
• No crew-served weapons incidents in October resulted in a SIDD.
• Bastogne had a slight increase in EOF incidents. Brave Rifles had a significant decrease.
MND-N EOF Trends
Trends by BCT AO
1
16
35
7
18
9 10
11
47
38
7 5
01
0
210
21
1710
7
7
1416
13212
55
12 0
33
12
66
4
76
1 36
2 11
130
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
Salah ad Din
Kirkuk
Diyala
Ninewa
80
61
70
5549
626567
59
53
6360
75
2838
37
20
47
3137
2020
27 3238
29
12140
7
3
8
4
77
10
5 00
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
INDIVIDUAL
CREWSERVED
UNKNOWN
NOV
NOV
MND-N Detainee Trends
•Captured: 5,370 detainees•BCT Releases: 1,541 detainees•Transfer to ISF: 894 detainees•Sent to Theater Internment Facility: 2,920 detainees•Released from Theater Internment Facility: 5,711 detainees
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Captures 453 439 532 408 383 353 403 367 396 294 436 392 329 185
BCT Release 151 173 127 109 115 56 92 137 117 79 110 83 112 80
Transfer to ISF 95 53 125 136 63 69 66 51 43 31 50 45 41 26
Sent to TIF 312 178 214 215 216 183 206 248 177 210 238 222 224 77
Release from TIF 328 485 258 289 95 315 255 504 441 450 460 884 510 437
CCCI Referals 129 95 144 101 94 100 70 97 121 90 62 132 113 0
Oct Nov DecJan-08
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
ISF Service October ’07 December ‘08 Change
43,000 63,800 +20,500
56,000 76,000 +19,200
3,500 5,500 +2,000
5,600 5,500 -100
9,300 10,750 +1,450
NP
Iraqi Army (IA)
Iraqi PoliceService (IPS)
National Police (NP)
Dept of Border Enforcement (DBE)Strat.InfrastructureBNs (SIBs)
MND-N Iraqi Security ForcesOctober 2007 – December 2008
• Fielding's:• M16’s – 19,150 fielded • M1114s (UAH) – over 900 fielded • Badgers W/ILAV – 16 fielded• Symphony (IA CREW System) – 12 systems fielded• Radios’ – 55 SINCGARS/ 45 ASIPS fielded
• Capabilities: : • Minimized CF support /expenditures to the ISF by 85% saving roughly $385,000• Improved Class IX parts distribution (PLL established at unit level)• Enhanced Code-Out procedures; over 400 packets pending approval with MoD• Class III (B) self sustain without any CF support
ISF Logistics
Provincial Government Capacity
• Significant progress, but a long way to go:– Provincial governments and GoI improving ties and
cooperation
– Reconstruction efforts critical to stability
– Delivery of essential services remains inadequate• Sewage, trash collection, and electricity viewed as
unavailable
– Budgeting and cash flow challenges remain
– Improved perceptions of provincial governments:• OCT 07 – 5.3% favorable; Oct 08 – 61.3% favorable
JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08 MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08 SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08
U&S IU&S II
U&S III
U&P I Mosul Security Conf.
PM to Mosul U&P II
Rule of Law
Energy Conf.
U & S IVUnited & Healthy
Women’s Conf.
Energy Conf.
U&J II
U&J I
Economics Environment• Unemployment remains high – 68.7%• Lack of investment capitol• Drought
– MND-N coordinated for $8.5 M in drought relief efforts to purchase modern irrigation systems, seed, and “hoop houses”
• Some Successes– Coordinate for $28.7 Million in small business
grants and loans (MoIM/MoLSA)– Civil Service Corps – produced 50,000 jobs
• Banking system improving with new branches opening, some with ATM and Electronic Funds Transfer capabilities
• More people have positive perception of individual financial status– OCT 07 – 51.2% (had enough); DEC 08 – 61.1%
Enabling & SustainingTF Iron
TF Iron ISR SupportMISSION. Provide multi-discipline Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to TF IRON and partnered Iraqi Security Forces to enable support to ground operations and to enable the Government of Iraq, Provincial and Local Leaders to provide essential services, improved governance, and economic revitalization.
Collection Priorities1. Ground Operation2. CIED/CIDF/Cache3. Target Development4. Sectarian Activity5. Infiltration Routes
Full Motion Video (hours)•Ground Operations – 14,159.5•CIED/CIDF – 14,567.25•Target Development – 14,226.5•Total hours – 42,953
Still Imagery (images)•U2 – 21,068•Global Hawk – 20,495•TACRECCE – 1,069
HUMINT Reporting
SPOT Reports: 316DIIR: 10500SIR: 6711KB: 1190Sources evaluated: 80
SIGINT Reporting
TACREPS – 6,762KL – 7558 Tippers – 186
DOMEX Reporting
Documents – 2744Media – 2562 itemsCELLEX – 1022 items
SYNC MATRIX
AIR ASSETS
TIKRIT- SPEICHER
1-1 (AH-64D) 17
1-6 /6-17(OH-58D) 20
3-1/2-1 (UH-60L) 34
2-1 (CH-47D) 12
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 4
MOSUL - MAREZ
1-1 (AH-64D) 7
6-17 (OH-58D) 10
2-1 (UH-60L) 3
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 3
KIRKUK
1-6 (OH-58D) 20
6-17 (UH-60L) 5
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 3TAL AFAR - SYKES
6-17 (OH-58D) 10
6-17 (UH-60L) 6
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 2
Operations
Hours FlownType Hours
AH-64D 27,287OH-58D 64,922UH-60 42,146CH-47 7,849HH-60 2,158
SAFIRESUnit SAFIRES Effective
4-6 CAV 73 14 TF 1-6 11 1 TF 1-1 24 1
2-1 GSAB 14 2 TF 3-1 35 4
TF 6-17 9 1TF ODIN 4 0
TST 613Air Assaults 199
BFC 4,248Personnel moved 127,012Cargo Moved (TONS) 5,875Total Missions 27,153AMRs Supported 40,389MEDEVAC Missions 1,288Patients EVACd 2194
MND-N Aviation SupportOCT 07 – DEC 08
Total Hours by MNDDivision Hours
MND-N 144,362MND-B 61,314MND-C 91,127CORPS 53,584
MND-N MRAP Fielding
MND-N Units
MRAP Type Issued
O/H
1/10 (IBCT)
AH I Caiman
357 357
1-67 AR Caiman + 87 87
Div Trps/ 18 EN
BAE IICougar II
115 2 117
MND-N Total
Mixed 1288 1288
3 ACR (HBCT+)
IMG I
50BAE II 50
305
3721/101 (IBCT)
AH I Caiman
1/25(SBCT)
372
305
MRAP fielding began 5 Nov 07 for MND-N
MND-N Units
MRAP Type Issued
O/H
18 EN RG-33L 1 1
1-67 AR RG-33L 3 3
MND-N Total
Mixed 85 85
4 21
RG-33LMP+
12 14
25
12 18
3 ACR (HBCT+)
RG-33L MP+
30
261/101 (IBCT)
1/25(SBCT)
RG-33L MP+
HAGA – Heavy Armored Ground Ambulance(RG-33L & Maxx Pro + Amb)
Good Stewardship
DIRECTIVE
Reduce and clean upthe MND-Nfootprint
RECOMMENDED WAY AHEADAs troop reductions occur, requirements todetermine disposition of commercial off theshelf (COTS) and government purchasedItems (i.e. ICOMs, computers, UGSs)
How do we draw down equipment in theaterICW troop drawdowns?
•Drawdown troops or contractors first?-Drives equipment pushes out of theater-Drives CONUS-based RESET programs
•The “pipe” out of theater is only so big!
Programs to ease complexity to retrogradeequipment in theater, such as mobile one-stopTeams for CDRs/supply SGTs to turn-in equipment
ACCOMPLISHMENTSOver 220,000 excess CL II,III(P), IV, V, VI, VII, and IXreturned to the DoD systemDollar value returned = over $88 million
IMPLEMENTATION OFCommand emphasis on commandsupply discipline in combat Quarterly FRAGOs directing inventories/excess scrubs of CL VII(major end items)Implementation of Mobile Redistribution Teams (MRTs) forCL II, III(P), IV, VI, and IX items
OCT 07
DEC 08
Only the tip of the iceberg!
LOG Metrics
MND-N Fire Missions = 4372 - HE = over 17,200 rds - GMLRS = 66 - Excalibur = 7
Kinetic Strike Packages = 47 - Executed 30 (22 x CAS, 8 x GMLRS, 3 x both)
ASRs = 7200 were supported
24
581671
3096
4372
Fire Missions by Province
Excalibur
GMLRS
MND-N Fire SupportOCT 07 – DEC 08
Multiple Launch Rocket System
M109A6 Paladin 155mm Howitzer (SP)
MND-N Sorties ISO TICs: 676TICs w/ Drops: 145TIC’s w/ SOF: 68
BDACACHE: 14EKIA: 156EWIA: 9VBIED: 18HBIED: 74IED: 11
Munitions DroppedGBU-38: 284GBU-31: 68GBU-12: 74
Close Air Support Roll-upOCT 07 – DEC 08
MND-N Base CampsMND-N Engineers constructed 22 Coalition bases across northern Iraq since OCT 07.
MND-N Bases
135 Total
COB
COS
COL
Corps
IA w/MiTT
** IA & ISF bases not shown
HESCOs of FreedomHESCOs of Freedom
Engineer Mobility ReserveTF Iron Engineers established an Engineer Mobility Reserve (EMR) for MND-N. The EMR consists of 2 x AVLBs, 1 x MV-4, 2 x Panthers, 2 x MICLICs, 4 Wolverines, 4 x REBs, and 1 HET. The reserve is maintained by the Division Engineer Brigade (111th and 18th) and is used as the Division Reserve Mobility package. BCTs can request the reserve equipment and personnel ISO breaching and clearing operations where BCTs have limited internal capabilities. The reserve has been used for Operation Iron Harvest, Operation Iron Pursuit, and clearing operations along ASR Golden and the Siniyah Berms.
WOLVERINE Employment - Diyala
AVLB - Mosul
MICLIC employment - Diyala
Panther in use - Diyala
Culvert Denial & Crater Repair
• MND-N Construction Engineers since TOA:– repaired 2820 craters on MSRs, ASRs, and BCT and BN routes– Denied 365 culverts on MSRs, ASRs, and BCT and BN routes
Crater repair – 326thEN BN, 18th EN BDE
Culvert Denial Mission – 94th EN BN, 18th EN BDE
Route Clearance
Route Clearance Patrols across MND-N from Oct 07 – Dec 08:– Found and Cleared 1,300 IEDs
– Cleared over 1 million kilometers of ASRs, MSRs and BCT and BN routes
– EOCA qualified SAPPERs reduced over 1,000 UXOs and IEDs
Buffalo Interrogating suspected IED
Husky
AN/PSS 14
Sustain Soldier QOLsustaining, maintaining and optimizing a viable quality of life for MND-N Soldiers
• 41 Division QOL team site assessments
• Weekly QOL Assessments by BDE and BN Teams at 67 + Contingency Operating Locations across MND-N
7 Focus Areas• Living Conditions
• Shower and Latrine
• Food Service
• Commo (Spaware)
• MWR (Gym, AFN)
• Health (Medical Care, Field Sanitation)
• Other (REL SPT, Force Protection, Safety)
Casualties TrendsOCT 07 – NOV 08
• RTD for WIA: 68%• RTD for DNBI: 74%• 4,720 hours of rotary wing MEDEVAC flown in MND-N carrying 2011 patients
• RTD for WIA: 68%• RTD for DNBI: 74%• 4,720 hours of rotary wing MEDEVAC flown in MND-N carrying 2011 patients
Dec
MND-N Casualties
CASUALTY
MONTH KIA DOW DNBD VSI SI NSI TOTAL
OCT 07 1 2 0 0 1 12 16NOV 07 14 3 0 2 18 37 74DEC 07 7 2 0 4 13 93 119JAN 08 19 2 1 2 12 70 106FEB 08 5 1 1 2 8 64 81MAR 08 5 0 1 2 5 53 66APR 08 5 4 2 1 10 60 82MAY 08 0 3 0 1 2 63 69JUN 08 7 1 1 1 9 64 83JUL 08 0 3 1 1 6 80 91AUG 08 0 0 2 1 7 55 65SEP 08 0 1 1 2 2 49 55OCT 08 0 3 1 0 1 36 41NOV 08 2 1 5 3 7 24 42DEC 08 2 0 0 0 2 3 7
CATEGORY TOTAL 67 26 16 22 103 763 997TOTAL
DECEASED WIA
109 888
Distinguished Service Cross – 1Silver Star – 8
Distinguished Flying Cross – 5Soldier’s Medal – 3
Bronze Star for Valor – 54Bronze Star – 4,210Purple Heart – 702
Air Medal for Valor – 37Air Medal – 813
Army Commendation Medal for Valor – 13Army Commendation Medal – 1,131
Combat Infantry Badge (2nd Award) – 12Combat Infantry Badge – 2,035
Combat Medic Badge – 229Combat Action Badge – 3,628
TF Iron Observations
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (1 of 4)
•Role of the DIV HQ–In operations, MND-N, Task Force Iron served as an operational level HQ.–In line with FM 3.0/FM 3.07, DIVs promote economics, governance, and rule of law, but do so without having subject matter expertise in key areas.–There is a requirement for the integration of all non-DoD actors within the DIV HQ staff through an MOU with the particular agency.
•Organization of the DIV HQ–There is a distinction between the DIV & BCT “fight” in lethal versus non-lethal operations.–Must integrate PRT at DIV (as well as BCT) levels.–Division/Task Force requires augmentation of G8, EWO, SJA, Medical, CA, and Engineers, based on mission load beyond unit support.
Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (2 of 4)
•MND in a “steady-state” environment–Consider a rotational construct to maintain continuity, relationships, memory (section, individual)–Embed a staff team early (90-150 days) to gain better situational understanding
•Training–Redesign the BCTP training model.–Integrate PRT/SOF/CIA/OCFI (interagency) into DIV train-up…NOT replication, but duplicate.–Critical requirement to gain understanding of HN governance, economics, infrastructure, and rule of law systems beyond what is presented at the BCTP seminars. (“REACH FORWARD” with SVTC and current TF)–Incorporate “value chain analysis for dummies” for economic advancement.–IO/PA training to shape conditions in the environment (must change the way we prepare for this critical task).–EWO requirement as an Army-specific task (no longer AF/USN).–MRAP training for both home station and CTCs.
Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (3 of 4)
•ISF Development–Senior ISF leader development and enabler process development will be driving the ISF focus of the future (potential for mini Marshall Center?). –DIV/BCT staffs are not designed to “mentor” provincial Operations Commands (rank structure).–Attending Phoenix/COIN Academy in theater is too late. Need to understand ISF organization, personalities, and processes prior to deployment. (“REACH FORWARD”)
•Modular DIV/BCT Structure–LNOs and Rear Detachment not part of the MTOE; must establish beyond MSE.–UAS company at AVN BDE (CAB) unsupported. Recommend build within CAB due to safety and standardization issues.–Requirements for enhanced logistics, engineers, fires, and intel for surge at Division level.–Policy on females below the BCT level must change.–Dissimilar Intel capabilities at different types of BCTs defeats modular capability (different MICOs in HBCT, IBCT, CAV REGT, and STRYKER).
Division Observations fromthe 07-09 Fight (4 of 4)
•Training Core/Directed Mission Tasks –Must train with other non-DoD government agencies.–Directed tasks will focus on Baghdad scenario while core tasks are oriented on traditional Division C2 roles. Must do both.–Plug into MND-B Battle Rhythm early. Regularly schedule events/SVTCs with MND-B staff (real world vignette). –Gain directed METL from higher HQ (I and/or III Corps) beginning in AUG 09.–DIV Annual Training Guidance directed at Division staff and sent to BCTs joining us in the fight.
The FRSA program is excellent but could be improved:
Allocation should be based on number of soldiers in a unit, not task organization.
There should be two FRSAs at the BCT level.
The hiring process needs simplification.
1 AD FRG Observations
Modularization of the Army Structure has significantly hampered effective FRG and Rear Detachment operations and in particular the Chain of Command responsibilities and Chain of Concern effectiveness.
Currently there is no consistent standard from post to post.
Recommend DA must create a rear detachment / FRG certification process.
Recommend regional FRG leaders develop programs for coaching and mentoring BCT senior FRG leaders. The traditional structure of the chain of concern no longer exists.
USAREUR FRG / Rear Detachment Observations
Sustain current certifications and directives for rear detachments and family
readiness groups.
USAREUR has provided detailed instructions on the training and tasks of rear detachment and family readiness groups. This is not the sameacross the entire Army.
Due to legal and medical issues with stay behind Soldiers, the cadre of rear detachments must be enhanced or chapter and medical boards must be Expedited prior to deployment.
USAREUR / CONUS FRG Observations
There are some unique differences between a OCONUS and CONUS FRG:
Geographically disbursement of family support services – in CONUS almost all family support services can be found at one convenient location. In USAREUR this support may be dispersed over multiple locations and hours Apart.
Civilian Support Agencies - In USAREUR the support services offered by the Army are all that exist. In CONUS there are other available civilian support agencies by city, county and state.
Direct family support for critical issues – in USAREUR, child care provided by direct family members is not readily available in most cases because of thegreat distances, money involved for travel, and housing limitations.
Family Support Agencies supporting each other - In USAREUR, family support services can easily cover down on alternate locations, while in CONUS the installations are too far apart to provide assistance support for surge periods.
Summary